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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a rationale for a disclosure approach to value analysis and describes the components of this approach, which involves student construction of value profiles of his own mythic thought, or mental framework, vis a vis a specified concept. The rationale is discussed in terms of the relationship between value study and mythic thought, delineating the components needed to complement the present state of the art relative to value study in social studies education analyzing mythic thought and narrative explanation, and outlining an approach to value education through the use of narratives to investigate value positions. The components of the disclosure approach include the explanatory power of the narrative and mythic thought of the author, the use of metaphor, the nature of value concepts, construction and use of value continua, development of a value profile, and augmentation of personal definitions. The example given of the process, which includes a classification scheme for value analysis utilizing clarification questions for use in small groups, is based on the concept of justice. (Author/KSM)

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A DISCLOSURE APPROACH TO VALUE ANALYSIS IN

SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION: RATIONALE AND COMPONENTS

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**A Disclosure Approach to Value Analysis:
Rationale and Components**

The first principle is this: people do not behave according to the facts as others see them; they behave in terms of what seems to them to be so. The psychologist expresses this technically as: Behavior is a function of perception. What affects human behavior, we are beginning to understand, is not so much the forces exerted on people from without as the meanings existing for the individual within. It is feelings, beliefs, convictions, attitudes . . . of the person who is behaving that constitutes the directing forces of behavior.

Arthur Combs

Introduction

This paper argues for the development of student insight into a most common phenomenon; that is, the understanding that different men "see" the world through different "eyes," and knowledge of this phenomenon is necessary if students are to engage in meaningful value study, leading ultimately to a clearer conception of their own personal values. Concomitant to the notion of different world views, is the realization that this personal world "view" is shaped by what might be called a conceptual framework, mental set or mythic thought. All individuals mentally carry a mythic framework that allows one to "make sense" out of the world. Our mythic framework also structures our value-belief system. This notion of mythic thought suggests some intriguing questions about the relationship between value study and said mythic thought. For example:

- How can we examine and understand our own value position?
- How do we undertake an investigation of value positions? (Can we study our own mythic framework or world view directly or must it be done indirectly?)
- What kinds of explanatory models seem most appropriate to the task of value study?

In consideration of these questions, this paper is organized in the following way. First of all, a brief delineation is made of the components needed to complement the present "state of the art" relative to the values in social studies education. These include an understanding of certain concept categories, the use of narrative explanation and the utilization of future-oriented stories for the investigation of an individual's mythic framework. Next, an analysis is made of mythic thought and narrative explanation. An argument is made for the appropriateness of the narrative mode of explanation to the development of an understanding of mythic thought. In other words, narratives can give the investigator insight into the mental framework of the author and through the nature of language, which is metaphoric in construction, into his own (the investigator's) mental framework. Finally, an approach to value

education will be outlined bringing into focus the use of narratives through which students can investigate value positions (mythic thought) of the author of the narrative and/or actor(s) within the narrative. Using the value concept of justice as an example of the kinds of values that can be examined, "value profiles" of authors and/or actors described in the narratives can be constructed. It is argued that through these narratives students will be metaphorically constructing value profiles of their own mythic thought or mental framework vis a vis the concept of justice. The concept of justice is used because of its place of importance in western thought and its recurrence in utopia and dysutopia literature.

Value Study

The emphasis upon "value study" in social studies education has steadily increased during the past decade. Evidence of this increasing popularity can be found in many sections of the social studies community. The 41st Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies is devoted entirely to value education. Many of the national project materials of the 1960's and 1970's which have been published deal specifically with values.* Even areas of study such as ecology (Disch, 1970) and science (see "A Guide to Science Curriculum Development," Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 1968) have entered and emphasized value education. On the broader educational front, such books as Values and the Future (Baier and Rescher, 1969) and Values and Teaching (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966) are manifestations of this growing interest in the study of values.

These efforts in the study of values are perhaps more appropriate today than at any previous time in history, for it can be argued that the rapid changes in society, science and technology are having a profound influence upon our value systems. This emphasis upon value study might also be a manifestation of a search for cultural clues upon which to build more stability in a turbulent world. These, and many other reasons have been enumerated relative to value study, but these reasons have made only a small dent in the problem of relating pedagogy and epistemology.

To generalize and delineate the attributes of value as used in "value education," the following points are suggested:

(1) A methodology (or skills) necessary to make good or reasonable moral decisions and to act on them; (2) a descriptor used to classify particular actions or beliefs; (3) a term of approval; and (4) an intrinsic awareness, purpose or meaning rather than extrinsic behaving. Beyond these attributes one should note the relationship between values and facts, which is a focal point in most decisions on the subject of value education. To argue on the one hand that facts and values are the same phenomenon is inconsistent with our western philosophical heritage. (Wilson, Williams and Sugarman, 1967, pp. 212-217) Value questions are problematic in a way in which at least some factual questions are not--that there are difficulties of principle about how to answer them. However, it does not follow that therefore values are "arbitrary" or

*Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., Fenton Social Studies Program; American Education Publications, Harvard Project by Oliver and Newmann; Allyn and Bacon, Sociological Resources for the Social Studies; elementary level materials like the Greater Cleveland Project published by Allyn and Bacon are typical of those newer materials which place emphasis on "value study."

"irrational" or "a matter of opinion" in the sense that one reason for a value is as good as another reason, or one value is as appropriate or as rational as another value. Values are conceptually (linguistically) different from facts, and it is this difference in the nature of value-fact conceptualizations that presents some definitional difficulties.

Although the concept of value as used in this paper carries the attributes of methodology, descriptor, term of approval and intrinsic awareness, it is critical to consider here the nature of concepts in distinguishing value from non-value statements and thus to start from the presupposition that one cannot treat these two concept categories in the same way.

What is value? An analysis of the concept of value in the social sciences calls attention to such definitions from economics as "market value," or "market price"--the quantity of resources a person must relinquish if he is to secure a particular commodity, and so secure the benefits its possession can yield. In welfare economics we see such phrases as "a person's values" or "society's values" and a large part of the study of welfare economics is a discussion of the resolution of value conflicts between society and individuals. (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953)

In political science the key concept with regard to values is allocation--the study of the allocation of resources, power and values. The value of something carries the meaning of evaluative property--the capacity to confer a benefit on someone; to make a favorable difference in a person's life.

In the social sciences generally, the concept of value suggests a grading or ranking, pricing and action (duty).

Given a knowledge of his tastes, of his overall life plan for the purpose of best catering to them, of the place he has reached in his journey, of the duties limiting his freedom to choose, of the priorities of claims on his resources, of the price of things (including alternative courses of action), and the value of things involved in the alternatives before him, and finally a knowledge of the resources at his disposal, he is then set to work out which of the alternatives open to him is the one on which he should enter. There are many formulae he can use. One that takes into account all the relevant considerations goes something like this: choose that course of action which will employ your resources so as to make the greatest possible difference to the excellence of your life; where this requirement takes notice of all the legitimate claims on one's resources including the avoidance of emergencies, the claims of other people, and the pinpointing of "best buys." (Baier, 1969, p. 52)

We do not know enough about the physiological or psychological structure of the choice processes of the human nervous system to say values are x and not y, but we can say that values shape and are shaped by our methodologies, our descriptors for categorizing the physical and social environment, our means of approving and disapproving actions and beliefs, and our awareness--our ability to give or see meaning in our lives.

Value Approaches in Social Studies Education: Some Inadequacies

In an analysis of several major social studies projects (Hartoonian, 1972, pp. 4-55) it was found that in dealing with values, certain critical areas or

concerns about the nature of concepts, the nature of language and the nature of man as a future gazer were not adequately dealt with.

Nature of Concepts. Although this problem is discussed in more detail later in this paper mention is here made of the overall dilemma--namely the failure to distinguish between disclosure and non-disclosure concepts.

Picture Concepts
(Point-at-ables)

Disclosure Concepts
(Non-point-at-ables)

Concepts might be classified into the three categories depicted above: disclosure concepts, picture concepts and a third set made up of a mix between the two larger sets. The significant point in value study is that value concepts are disclosure in nature and cannot be approached in the same way one approaches a picture concept or a concept that carries the attributes of both disclosure and picture. This distinction has not been made in the present approaches to value study, and, thus, this inadequacy must be dealt with.

The Nature of Language. Second, little attention has been given to the nature of (common) language which calls attention to metaphoric thought, narrative style and mythic constructs.

The true meaning of any philosophically significant word or phrase is disclosed by looking at the ways we not habitually use it in talking about any situation in which it is naturally employed. There is no possibility of distinguishing profitably between meaning and use, and when in our philosophizing any such difference is assumed, we inevitably fall into error. It is both presumptuous and a distortion of our role to suppose that we can discover the sole proper definition of this or that fundamental concept, which will be superior to the network of meanings revealed in the ways in which it is used. The scientist must sometimes propose new uses of words; his task is to correct false ideas about the world by true ones, and in doing this he may need more accurate definitions of current words. But this is not the philosopher's business. He does not add to our information; his role is to deal with the concepts that all of us acquire in the course of our common experience, and he frees them from confusion by reminding us of the meanings with which we are already familiar. His skill can be employed in devising methods by which the logical texture of these established uses will shine through the tangles into which thinkers have fallen. (Burtt, 1967, p. 48)

With reference to common language, one of the problems with present approaches to value study is the small amount of emphasis placed upon the use of ordinary human narrative. The dynamic character of language is such that attention to what is said can tell us a great deal--it may take account of a large area of human experiences; it may draw phenomena together into a more subtle and consistent fashion; and it may be more fertile in its capacity for continued growth.

As we relate this phenomenon of dynamic language to the problem of concept categorization, it is noted that language usage affects values. An example of usage carrying with it certain values is the statement, "His brain is as quick and as accurate as a computer." This statement carries with it the false analogy that a computer and the human brain are similar. As a matter of fact, a whole new science has developed around this presupposition--the science known as cybernetics.

The Nature of Man as Future Gazer. Finally, the concept of man as a future gazer tends to be overlooked by present approaches to value study. The point here is that man's behavior is, to a large measure, a function of his scan of future alternatives. This means that although man's behavior may be shaped by his past experiences, his view of tomorrow will also determine present actions and movements. Further, man projects into the future those values which are most dear.

Thus, as we look at the present approaches to value study developed in the 1960's and early 1970's, there appears the need to complement these works in the areas of concept categorizations, distinguishing between the disclosure and non-disclosure sets; the nature of narrative (common language) and the nature of man as a future gazer.

An Alternative Approach to Value Study

A significant part of the approach that is here developed must be considered in terms of the way in which language is used; for in much the same way that style, syntax, stress, juncture, etc. are not instrumental to language--they are language; symbolic usage is this approach. Thus, an important part of the development and use of this approach will emphasize narrative (common language) explanation, with its concomitant aspects of mythic structures. This approach should also be emancipatory in nature reflecting upon those dominant interests of man while at the same time sufficiently flexible in its ability to create new ways of approaching this enormous problem of value study.

A disclosure approach to value analysis attempts to deal with the symbolic activities of man. It is a disclosure and as such is a non-picture, but the notion of non-picture is an adequate conceptual tool to comprehend human values in all their variety and richness. A disclosure approach to value study also suggests a new philosophical synthesis among such concepts as subjective, descriptive, psychological and logical. Above all, this new synthesis calls attention to the heterogeneity of the human organism, individually and collectively. It posits the notion that value(s) cannot be adequately explained any more than the process of cultural function can, without a careful consideration of individual and collective man, including his total cultural and physical environment. Any other position will ultimately yield a study of values which is no study at all, but a sterile catalog of value forms or technique.

The Narrative in Social Science and History: Explanation Appropriate to Value Study

Any social inquiry must eventually come to grips with that mode of explanation called narrative. To some social observers (e.g., Gallie and Mandelbaum) the narrative is a necessary but not sufficient component of social commentary. To others (e.g., Danto and White), the narrative is both necessary and sufficient in the enterprise of social inquiry. Traditionally, the technique of

narrative has been categorized as applicable only to history, but there is no reason to limit the narrative in this manner, for as we shall see later on in this chapter, examples of the narrative can be found in the social sciences and the natural sciences as well as in history. Further, and of significant importance here, is the fact that the layman uses narrative as a way of life; as a response to questions, or as he tries to "explain" his state of being. "What did you do in school today, son?" "Charlie, why are you going to invest all your savings in an unstable stock market?" "Well, John, what do you think of our President now?" Questions like these are asked every day by citizens who in effect call upon narrative for explanation. In most cases the above questions will elicit a "story-like" response that places events in sequence and describes a change.

It is important at this point to suggest that in history and social science explanation there is the philosophical dichotomy that, on the one hand, wants to account for the use and potential of explanation in an empirical fashion, and yet, on the other hand, provide insights into the basic nature of man who more often than not operates with additional dimensions. In social inquiry scientism has been quite strong, particularly among such philosophers as Hempel who admits that typical historical explanations lack explicit reference to "covering-law" generalizations. (Hempel, 1966, p. 109) For the most part, this does not force Hempel or others (see Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science) to discount meaning as a factor in history, but it does force them to operate primarily with a functional definition of meaning. This result tends to be atomistic and narrow in nature.

Or, as Chomsky asserts, "Empiricist speculation has characteristically assumed that only the procedures and mechanism for the acquisition of knowledge constitute an innate property of the mind." (Chomsky, 1965, p. 51)

Narrative explanation represents a specific example of the ambivalence found in an area of study like history which explores the nature of man, and thus, is caught between the pull of a clearly scientific mindset which can describe outward behavior but can neither account for nor explain causality. It seems that empiricists' theories are refutable whenever they are "clear." Furthermore, empiricists' speculations are (have been) quite empty and uninformative. One reason for this situation is the fact that empiricism is basically a static measure, while the object of its measurement is usually dynamic. Thus, in many cases where quantitative change and qualitative modifications are interrelated, empiricism must stick with the former and in so doing it becomes a "perfect corpse"--pretty but devoid of life.

In the Process of Schooling, J. Stephens reports on a situation that seems to be common when quantitative measures are applied to dynamic human processes.

A Partial Summary of Studies in the Field of Education Involving
(for the most part) Experimental and Control Group Design*

Items Compared (Experimental Listed First)	Number of studies conducted and the results		
	Favors Experimental Group	No Significant Difference	Favors Control Group
1. Weekly quiz vs. semester exam; effect on student achievement		5	
2. Independent study vs. regular lock-step classroom; effect on student achievement		2	
3. Effect of larger accredited high school upon college success vs. small, non-accredited high school	6	24	3
4. Effect of progressive education upon college success vs. effect of traditional college-prep program		11	
5. Effect of TV programs upon student achievement vs. classes not having TV programs	83	255	55
6. Effectiveness of the discussion method vs. the lecture method	3	17	5
7. Student achievement in small classes vs. achievement in large classes	23	255	38
8. Student achievement in classes taught by highly qualified teachers vs. achievement in classes taught by unqualified teachers		8	1
9. Effectiveness of programmed instruction and other self-instructional strategies vs. regular classroom instruction	1	6	
10. Ungraded team-teaching strategy vs. regular lock-step teaching with single teacher; effect on student achievement		7	1
11. Ability grouping vs. heterogeneous grouping and student achievement		1	
12. Effect of high school costs vs. low school costs on student achievement		1	

*Source: J. M. Stephens, The Process of Schooling, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967, pp. 71-90.

Items Compared (Experimental Listed First)	Favors Experimental Group	No Significant Difference	Favors Control Group
13. Effect of various "new" methods including "new" math and science programs on student achievement		13	
14. Effect of language laboratory on student achievement**	1	1	1
15. Effect of "new" methods of teaching foreign languages on student achievement vs. traditional methods**		1	1
TOTALS	117	607	105

**U.S.O.E. reports.

The above is typical of a situation where researchers keep refining their procedures, largely but not exclusively statistical procedures, seemingly unaware of where the crucial problems rest. An elaborate research methodology has evolved around the investigation of inconsequential events or happenings.

There seems to be a need (in education) for a mode of inquiry that can effectively pair the processes of description with the processes of explanation. Narrative is, or at least can be, unifying in that it is something in which all intelligent people indulge. It is true, of course, that intelligent people can indulge in many forms of explanation depending upon the nature of the questions asked. But, narrative seems to have a high propensity for use simply because explanation is tied to personal considerations and the narrative model seems historically to be more in keeping with human nature and human beings who are required to make more subjective decisions based upon accounts or stories or beliefs relative to the situation under consideration. Another way to put it is to suggest a continuum with scientific, deductive explanation on one end and narrative, subjective explanation on the other. This does not mean, by the way, that the one end (deductive explanation) is any better in terms of explanatory power than the other (narrative explanation), it simply means that they are different and perform different functions in response to different questions. The argument here, however, is that in value study within social studies education a higher degree of emphasis should be placed upon the narrative end of the continuum simply because the questions raised tend to be more humanistic than scientific in nature.

The narrative is an accurate story about change. The narrative is also universal in that no man is without stories. Further, it is universal because no man is without mythic structure through which he "sees" the world and builds support for his stories. The idea of story development through the use of some

mental framework is basic to the larger concept of narrative explanation as it portrays man as mythologizer. Thus, to come to grips with narrative explanation it is imperative that we understand the relationship between man and mythic thought.* In other words, the narratives that men build are reflective of their mythic thought and it is this thought which holds promise for value study in that an understanding of man's mythic conceptions can lead to an understanding of his value positions.

Mythic Thought

The concept of mythic thought draws many of its attributes from classical sources. Within the set known as myth can be found certain universals which have major implications transcending any one particular view of the concept. There is, for example, a tendency to merge idea and object. The facticity of thing becomes an extension of idea and actuality. Object does not stand for the idea; the two are one and the same. To prick the voodoo doll with a pin is to do the same to the man. Osiris in the Egyptian pantheon is the Nile and the Nile is Osiris. In much the same way, when Vigotsky asked young students whether we could switch names so that a cow would be called ink, and ink cow, the children replied: "No, because ink is to write with and cows give milk." (Kuhn, 1963, p. 33)

Emile Durkheim, who is noted for studies of totemism, observes, "One comes to the remarkable conclusion that images of the totem-creature are more sacred than the totem-creature itself." (Langer, 1966, p. 134) And S. Langer notes, "A myth-making mentality does not keep symbol and meaning apart, the moon not only represents, but presents." (Langer, 1966, p. 144)

In various refinements of this merger concept, myth and language also join, casting language into a meta-linguistic function; e.g., Isis, the Egyptian goddess of motherhood and fertility, tricked Ra, the sun god, into revealing his name to her, thus allowing Isis to gain power over him as well as the other gods. The name of a god is part of his essence; hence, name magic is a very real aspect of man's efforts to control the world around him.

A second important notion of mythic thought is found in the purposiveness of causality. As an attempt to explain developments in the physical world, myth first drew heavily upon cause-effect relationships. These relationships in myth, however, are much more closely keyed to the contiguity of elements than to antecedent-consequent relations in a phenomena ordering sense. Cause-effect is not keyed to change as a resulting factor in the temporal succession of elements.

A third central notion is what Ernst Cassirer refers to as "the principal of res pro toto," a general tendency to thwart dissection of reality into partial factors; an opposition to reductionism. Leaving behind a personal possession in some cults is the same as leaving the entire body. Sacrifice of an animal as an extension of the group self appeases gods in others. (Cassirer, 1966, p. 50)

Mythic thought and myth are separate concepts with some common but many different attributes. Our concern, here, is with mythic thought as opposed to mythical thought.

A fourth fundamental idea is the move to hypostatization of properties, processes, emotions, etc.--a desire to materialize complex intangibles.

Seasons of the year are tied to god forms and their tangible behaviors. Even Pandora could release the plagues and sorrows of the universe as entities from a small wooden chest. Dynamic relations find significance only as qualities of specific entities chartered to gods, things or places.

Throughout the study of mythic thought there appears always implicit and often explicit the notion that the mythic mentality is significantly different from and inferior to scientific thought or empirical thought. It reflects an incomplete and inaccurate view of man and his relations to the various determining elements and forces of life. Irrational in nature and simplistic in design, myth represents the baser element of man's thought.

Such a view itself reflects some of those same supposed inadequacies attributable to mythic thought. For instance, it fails to see in the operations of man at any time a sustaining drive for system and order and that system and order's relating to fundamental exigencies of a given context within which man must function. A contemporary science educator observed that the evolution of scientific thought is marked by stages in which one set of lies replaces another set as the theoretical framework from which scientific study operates. In a persuasive argument, T. S. Kuhn, a science historian, lends support to this premise with an elaboration of the nature of scientific evolution,

. . . scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the explorations of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 92)

In the sense that scientific thought is often posited as the opposite of mythic, the above observation offers an interesting insight. The evolution of scientific thought as a series of tradition bound periods punctuated by occasionally serious breaks, rather than a simple piling-up of scientific knowledge is a revolutionary idea; an idea which calls into play major group commitments. The nature of scientific insights which obtain from any given group paradigm are shaped then by the lenses of social context and sense-data interpretation integral to that paradigm; hence, world view elaborations obtained are true or accurate largely within the context of the closed system of that paradigm itself.

There appears, however, an even more fundamental question to be considered. Ernst Cassirer hinted at it when he asked, "Does myth not signify a unity of intuition, an intuitive unity preceding and underlying all the explanations contributed by discursive thought." (Cassirer, 1966, p. 69)

S. Langer in a slightly different and perhaps more suggestive vein offered,

Ideas first adumbrated in fantastic form become real intellectual property only when discursive language rises to their expression. That is why myth is the indispensable forerunner of metaphysics; and metaphysics is the literal formulation of basic abstractions, on which our comprehension of sober facts is based. (Langer, 1966, p. 173)

In short, it is quite possible to view a conception of mythic thought as opposed to scientific thought as being anomalous. A more viable and functional conception is one which sees in mythic thought a modality of forms and structure which provides both a spiritual unity of essence and an imaginative sense of configuration from which all thought and consequent behavior arises.

It is strongly intertwined with the incredible human drive to symbolize; to derive reality in modes of symbolic configuration. Rooted in rite and ritual, symbolic forms nevertheless find in myth their finest base of explication and in mythic thought their most satisfying mode of extension.

Language, of course, has to be the most sophisticated expression of the notion of symbolic forms, for it is both a reflection of the inevitability of man's symbolic roots and a source of symbolic generation of new form conceptions. Here, however, the concern is primarily with its latter role. That is, in those broader aspects of mythic thought as they relate to man's efforts to find a unity and purpose in existence.

It is indeed within the rubric of these fundamental aspects of mythic thought where one can find a generative source from which springs all thought and behavior of man, scientific and otherwise. The anomaly of delineation of thought form roots, then appears conspicuously obvious.

Mythology is inevitable; it is an inherent necessity of language, if we recognize language as the outward form of thought; it is . . . the dark shadow which language casts on thought and which will never vanish as long as speech and thought do not fully coincide, and this can never happen. Mythology in the highest sense of the word is the power which language exerts on thought in every possible sphere of cultural activity. (Mueller, 1955, p. 21)

Symbolization is the essence of all intellection and as such knows no bounds which keeps it from pervading all thought patterns of man's cultural forms, scientific paradigms, social models and exemplars. Language itself is only one attribute of the mythic extensions of symbolic forms and serves to reinforce the broader and more subtle thrusts of that principle.

Before moving ahead to a delineation of a disclosure approach to value analysis, it might be useful to restate the significance of narrative explanation and mythic thought to this type of value study. First of all, it should be pointed out that mythic thought is the structure upon which one develops a narrative. And, a careful look at the narrative can make explicit certain mythic structures or value positions of the author. It is this manifestation of a value position that will provide the foundation upon which to build a value study approach that will, because of the metaphoric nature of language, ultimately allow the investigator to make manifest his own value position.

Components of a Disclosure Approach to Value Analysis

A disclosure approach to value analysis in social studies education calls attention to the following six important components: the explanatory power of the narrative and concomitant mythic thought of the author, the use of metaphor, the nature of value concepts, the construction and use of value continua, the development of a value profile, and the augmentation of personal definitions of justice. These components, in turn, suggest a useful process or procedure for the investigation and clarification of personal values. What is described

below, then, is a process for dealing with values that is consistent with the nature of value concepts, as well as the nature of man (his languages, myths and explanatory potential). This approach will take a student through certain processes (experiences) that will allow him to augment his concept of justice. To be sure, other value concepts will also be clarified, but the primary concern is the development of an individual, personal value profile (value position) that will help the student to better understand the general value concept of justice in juxtaposition to his own value profile. The processes involved in this approach include:

1. Recognition of a disclosure concept. It is imperative that teachers and students be able to recognize disclosure concepts from non-disclosure concepts. Such concepts as God, love, happiness, sportsmanship, citizenship and justice are examples of disclosure concepts that call attention to the procedures discussed below.
2. Use of metaphor. The recognition of a disclosure concept calls for the use of metaphoric analysis, since disclosure concepts will not allow for direct personal investigation. That is, if an individual is to come to a clearer understanding of his own position vis a vis a disclosure concept, he will need to approach the concept metaphorically. This does not mean that disclosure concepts have no attributes that are held in common; it simply suggests that a very effective way to think about disclosures is through the use of metaphor since many attributes are, indeed, not held in common.
3. Narrative explanation. Since metaphoric analysis is the appropriate mode through which the study of disclosure concepts can be facilitated, it is the narrative which can provide metaphorically rich situations for analysis; particularly narratives about the future.
4. Value continua. A series of value continua is suggested which, after being explained to students, will provide a schema for plotting the "value profile" of the person or group discussed in the narrative.
5. Constructing a value profile. Students will construct a value profile from the three value continua provided in the disclosure approach to value analysis.
6. Value profiles and the concept of justice. Finally, the student will consider the value profile which he constructed from the narrative using the three continua with general definitions of justice.

Disclosure Concepts

Disclosure concepts are not descriptive miniatures, neither are they picture enlargements. Disclosure points to mystery, to the need to live as best we can with uncertainties. Disclosure concepts make extensive use of narrative modes of explanation and rely upon metaphoric language for extensional potential. These concepts see no intrinsic positive value in reductionism--that desire to quantify all phenomena; suggesting that if "n" is quantifiable it is good; and if "n" is non-quantifiable it is bad. They also suggest no positive value in suggesting that social scientists are just a few years behind mathematicians and natural scientists and they will soon "catch up" if they (the social scientists) only learn to be better quantifiers. The point of difference

which disclosure concepts and semantical models* make relative to "picturing" (reductionist) models is that of asking a different question about the nature of man. That question, simply stated, asks whether or not the subjective nature of the human being is appropriate to the picture model of explanation-- e.g., the objectifiable, quantifiable model of reductionism. If we look at such behaviorlists as Pavlov, Thorndike, Watson and Skinner (all picture modelists) we witness a feverish attempt to reduce man to the parameters of stimulus and response.** To observe man as fitting into this picture belies many characteristics of being human and reduces explanation relative to human behavior to such levels of simplicity which ultimately renders them useless. Take, for example, the two concepts of "act" and "movement." As Ramsey suggests, by treating act and movement as synonymous (or, indeed, not bringing up the distinction in the first place) behaviorlists can overlook the distinction between participant and observer. (Ramsey, 1964, p. 25) "To act is to participate; but what the observer observes and all he observes is movement-- more or less complex, more or less expressible in roles. But to participate and to observe are rarely equivalent--to participate in a kiss, for example, is vastly different from merely observing one." (Ramsey, 1964, p. 25)

The point of this argument is, of course, that there is a need in any approach or model that deals with people to provide insight into ourselves. This claim suggests that there is no observable data that can ever be adequate in social explanation. Ramsey suggests that this claim is justified because:

. . . this insight into ourselves, this self-disclosure, is the source for each of us of that subjectivity which is logically demanded by the objectivity of all the behaviorlists' data. There can--and it is a logical "can"--be no objects without a subject which cannot itself be reducible to objects. The ideal of logical completion is never a third-person assertion; it is a first-person assertion. He does x necessarily carries with it a pair of invisible quotation marks, so that it is to be set in some frame as "I am saying. . ." and without this wider frame the third-person ascertain is logically incomplete. (Ramsey, 1964, p. 26)

In making the point another way, it can be argued that the concept of "organism" is out of place with human explanation. Peter Winch raises the question this way: "Would it be intelligent to try to explain how Romeo's love for Juliet enters into his behavior in the same terms as we might want to apply to the rat whose sexual excitement makes him run across an electrically charged grid to reach his mate? Does not Shakespeare do this much better?" Ramsey pushes this argument somewhat further when he states:

*	physical model	formal model	interpretive model	semantical model	disclosure model
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It is upon an expansion of the semantical model that this value analysis approach is based (see Kaplan, 1964, and Ramsey, 1964).

**Although Skinner might argue that his theories are more holistic, he is placed here because of his faith in "schedules of reinforcement" and his failure to deal with philosophical questions about the nature of man.

I might ask that no one puts his arm around his girl friend and speaks of their relation in terms of available response alternatives, or reinforcement parameters. It is true that psychologists on the seat opposite may do all this; but my important point is that he on the seat opposite is not the man with his arm around the girl. In other words, let us not blind our eyes to the logical discrepancy between the mathematical models which in the most democratic fashion unite us profitably with the rats, and the insight by which we know ourselves as distinctly ourselves, insights for which the sort of language used by Shakespeare may well be more reliable currency. Here is an insight into ourselves to which no models however illuminating will ever be completely adequate; an insight which all models demand, yet which none singly or jointly ever exhaust. Here's the meeting place par excellence of models and mystery: In what to each of us is the disclosure of himself. (Ramsey, 1964, p. 27)

Thus, Ramsey emphasizes the inadequacies of picture models when applied to personal explanation.

The importance of a model as applicable to "the person" is stated quite succinctly by Ramsey as he argues for "personal models."

. . . we readily acknowledge the need in social studies not only for models with a scientific status but for distinctively personal models--models of persons in relation. This will mean that whether in psychology or sociology there will be models which do justice to us as persons rather than as organisms or even "individuals." These will be the models whose links with observable facts are not predictive, after the fashion of scientific models. These models will work in terms of what in the first lecture I called empirical fit. For it is empirical fit, rather than deductive verifications, which characterizes models which are distinctively personal. Let me illustrate. From "a loves b" nothing can be rigorously deduced which permits of appeal to experiment and consequent verification or falsification. For instance, someone might allege that if "a loves b" there will be some occasion when a will be found planning for b's happiness; but a might some day plan for b's happiness simply in the hope of favours to come--and apparent experimental verification would be wholly deceptive. Alternatively, from "a loves b" someone might suppose that a would never be seen for example in any sort of way which might cause b even momentary unhappiness. But this would be a far too shallow view of human relationships; love indeed is "deepened," through tensions lived through and redeemed. In brief, "a loves b" will only be verified in terms of . . . "empirical fit" and the test will be how stable the assertion is as an overall characterization of a complex, multi-varied pattern of behaviour which it is impossible in a particular case to specify deductively beforehand. (Ramsey, 1964, pp. 37-38)

This disclosure approach to value analysis, then, which calls attention to narrative style, metaphoric language and personal relations, seems most appropriate for the task of analyzing human values. To be sure, this

approach is invisible or "non-point-at-able" in that it presents no model that can be pictured, but we should be mindful that the power of disclosure is in its ability to expand our consciousness to the uncovering of new mysteries-- even the mystery of our own value position.

A Disclosure Approach to Value Analysis

The present approach for value analysis incorporates the three interrelated aspects of explanation discussed above. First of all, the process emphasizes personal explanation. It is concerned ultimately with the individual reader's intrapersonal, intellectual and emotional growth (both subjective-objective, logical-psychological). Second, this approach is metaphoric in nature, calling upon simile and analogy for meaning. Finally, the procedure uses narrative as its data source.

The three continua which are used in this approach are reflective of the major concerns man faces as he makes decisions. In his attempt to make "value judgments" man is faced with conflicts, or what Gunnar Myrdal calls valuation clashes, and what is here referred to as value conflicts. (See Myrdal, 1962, p. 1027)

In an attempt to help students clarify their value position, this approach presents a framework by which a "value profile" can be developed reflective of the data (narrative) under consideration. For example, through a narrative of, let us say, George Washington, a value profile can be developed showing dominant value emphases in that part of Washington's life described in the narrative. Further, and more important, through the process of developing the value profile for George Washington, the student will come to a clearer understanding of his own "value profiles" or value position as portrayed against the backdrop of a moral principle like Justice.

A Disclosure Approach to Value Analysis: Operations and Procedures

Again, it should be noted that the present approach to value analysis calls attention to four kinds of considerations on the part of the teacher:

1. the nature of disclosure;
2. the utility of metaphoric thought;
3. the explanatory power of the narrative; and
4. the clarification potential of value criteria.

The procedures that the student will experience can be listed as follows:

1. An explanation of the value continua is given. The teacher may (or may not) want to use the five clarification questions that are listed below. If these questions are used, the class should be divided into groups of about five members each. The teacher can then discuss each continuum (each continuum is discussed in detail below) with the students. The five questions are then passed out to the students who are now working as a small group. Each group must come to a consensus true or false answer to each question. The discussion in the small groups should help students further define the end points in each continuum.

2. Second, the narrative (metaphor) is presented and the students are asked to pay particular attention to the person or group within the narrative who is under study.
3. Next, the student is asked to place the person or group from the narrative on the three criteria, constructing a "value profile" for the actor(s).
4. Finally, the student is asked to compare the "value profile" of the actor(s) with given definitions of justice.

This approach operates, then, in four phases. Phase one presents an explanation of the three criteria and suggests the use of a series of true-false questions which are related to each of the three categories of the classification scheme for value analysis. These questions are considered and answered through consensus within small student groups. This exercise is carried out before the model is applied to any narrative so students can clarify any definitional problems that might subsequently interfere with the functioning of the model. The questions will also serve as discussion starters.

Phase two encompasses the application of the three continua to a narrative.* The narrative reflects the mythic thought of the author and/or actor(s) described therein. In Phase three of the approach the student is asked to formulate a "value profile" for the author, actor or actors (and metaphorically for himself), and in Phase four the student will compare his constructed "value profile" with the general value concept of justice. Let us now consider the design of the present approach and analyze more closely its germane attributes.

A Classification Scheme for Value Analysis

I.	self orientation	other person (mutual respect and trust) orientation
	orientation toward obedience and punishment	orientation toward universal and logical principles or conscience

--Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself in a commitment to personal wants and avoidance of punishment or in self-accepted principles and a concomitant concern with the establishment of mutual respect and trust?

II.	situational (honesty in a particular situation)	general (honesty)
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--Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself in consistent adherence (at all times and in all places) to a particular explicit or implicit set of rules**, or is the behavior contextual or situational relative to modes of conduct?

*Future oriented narratives are suggested for use with this approach.
**Or set of principles

III.

goal (terminal values)**

modes of personal conduct (instrumental values)***

(major goals in a person's life which may or may not be end states of existence)

--Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself toward an established (explicitly or implicitly) goal; or is the behavior more consistent with personal conduct which may or may not help in the attainment of said goal?

A Classification Scheme for Value Analysis Utilizing Clarification Questions for Use in Small Groups

I.

self orientation

other person (mutual respect and trust) orientation

orientation toward obedience and punishment

orientation toward universal and logical principles or conscience

True-False

- 1. An individual can behave only in accordance with personal well being.
- 2. There is appreciably no difference between principles of personal conscience and principles of norm conformity when decisions are made.
- 3. It is more just to base behavior upon principles of mutual respect and trust than on principles of obedience.
- 4. It is easier to live with self-condemnation than it is to live with group condemnation.
- 5. It is more likely that an individual will be more creative, and therefore, more human, if he adheres more closely to universal principles or conscience than to social rules or role behavior.

II.

situational (honesty in a particular situation)

general (honesty)

** X is good in itself

*** X is good because it leads to Y

True-False

- ___ 1. Always adhering to a mode of conduct, for example, "always honest," is consistent with the highest values of human dignity and worth.
- ___ 2. It is impossible to establish rules of conduct for future situations.
- ___ 3. The behavior that is most consistent with human dignity and worth is behavior that is situational in nature--that is, following no pre-established modes of conduct.
- ___ 4. If an individual's behavior is situational relative to particular modes of conduct, it is reasonable to assume that he is following the dictates of his conscience and not the dictates of the group.
- ___ 5. Since man lives in a society that is constantly changing, it is important that he become flexible and situational in his ethical positions.

III.

goal	modes of personal conduct
(major goals in a person's life which may or may not be end states of existence)	

True-False

- ___ 1. If a goal such as equality, freedom or salvation is, in reality, unobtainable, it makes little sense to pattern behavior toward the achievement of such goals.
- ___ 2. Modes of personal conduct are always dependent upon goals.
- ___ 3. Goals are always dependent upon modes of personal conduct.
- ___ 4. Societal goals are always generalized personal goals.
- ___ 5. Modes of conduct are based upon principles of norm conformity are more consistent (and beneficial) to societal goals than those of conduct which are based upon principles of conscience.

The purpose of this series of true-false questions is, of course, to foster the kinds of discussion that will draw attention to the spectrum of intra and inter-personal values that abound within individuals and within groups of individuals. Second, to personally make manifest various value perceptions that are held relative to the three continua. It is argued that this experience of self-searching is prerequisite to the application of the model to a narrative. It is important to place significant emphasis upon discussion* for it provides the opportunity to foster clearer understandings of value positions.

*Here again, the point of discussion is self-awareness and students must operate in an atmosphere of trust. The student must be free to "expose" his conceptions to others.

As for the use of the value continua, let us now consider them individually and then as a functioning whole. First, however, the question of rationale for continuum usage needs to be discussed. We can consider the (use of) continuum as a method of analysis which calls attention to three important and related attributes. First, there is the quality of "dynamic logic." That is, the continuum offers a logic which can handle continuous change. By suggesting that human nature is too subtle for aristotelian logic, the claim can be made that there is a demand for a law of the included middle; e.g., a thing can be both p and not-p.

Long ago Hume pointed out the inevitable ambiguity in controversies over the degrees of a quality or circumstance; in the issues of the arts and humanities we cannot hope for utterly precise locations and measurements. Yet merely to recognize and define the problem is a considerable gain. Everything is indeed a matter of degree. For the practical purposes of thought it is not all one, as we say; it is always two. If we mark the poles, include the middle, use a sliding scale, we can at least hope to make controversy more profitable; ideas may approach and not merely collide like billiard balls. The assertion that the Heart sees farther than the Head gets us nowhere, until we specify what kind of thing it sees better, under what circumstances, for what purposes--always remembering that heart and head see in conjunction, and are not engaged in a seeing contest. And elementary as these principles may seem, few thinkers consistently apply them. The logic of most discourse is still based on the sheep-or-goat concept of truth. (Muller, 1962, p. 35)

Second, the continuum provides a setting for the use of metaphoric thought which helps us view the world from different vantage points. It also helps us pair different ideas, which can reflect fresh synthesis and new insights into the nature of value incongruencies that exist in our lives.

Emerson remarked that it is a good thing, now and then, to take a look at the landscape from between one's legs. Although this stunt might seem pointless when things are already topsy-turvy, it can be the more helpful then. One may say that what this chaotic world needs first of all is more dissociation; by breaking up factitious alliances and oppositions, one may get at the deep uniformities. Or what this nightmarish world needs is the strategy of the dream, which appears to multiply and magnify contradictions but actually ignores them. ("Dreams are particularly fond of reducing antitheses to uniformity," Freud wrote, "or representing them as one and the same thing.") Specifically, the situation calls for a technique of analysis that Kenneth Burke names "perspective by incongruity."

In its simplest form, this is merely a violation of the intellectual properties by mating words that have moved in different circles--as when Mencken described hygiene as "medicine made corrupt by morality." Such bundlings are the essence of paradox and epigram, and a familiar trick of humorists and satirists. They are also the essence of metaphor. And as a marking of unsuspected connections they lead, ultimately, to the heart of all thought and knowledge. The great revolutionary thinkers are those who most violently wrenched traditional associations; Karl Marx was a philosophical Oscar Wilde, more scandalous because

more sober. Hence Burke has deliberately, systematically cultivated "the methodology of the pun." Throughout Attitudes Toward History he uses the religious vocabulary of motives for describing aesthetic and practical activities, the aesthetic for religious and practical, the practical for religious and aesthetic. By such impious means he piously strives to integrate these vital interests. Perspective by incongruity enables the perception of essential congruity.

The lead here is the parable of the pike. Placed in a tank with some minnows but separated from them by a sheet of glass, the pike bangs its head for some time in an effort to get at them. At length it sensibly gives up the effort. Much less sensibly, it continues to ignore the minnows after the glass is removed; it fails to reevaluate the situation. In other words, it becomes a dogmatist. For just so are men's powers of analysis and adaptation stupefied by unconditional, is-nothing-but generalizations. Thinkers demand that we choose naturalism or idealism, communism or capitalism, revolution or reaction. In the name of realism they copy the pike. (Muller, 1962, pp. 30-31)

Finally, there is the attribute of humanism or holism, which suggests that value (human) analysis demands a command of the whole scale (as opposed to a single value) of motives and values before a given event, person or situation can be realistically evaluated.

At any rate, humanism is an effort to place all doctrine on an appropriate scale, to see it in relation and in degree instead of as isolate truth or vagrant error, to provide a perspective in which dualistic aspects may again be seen as aspects of a whole--the organic whole that is the included middle. The yes and no constantly asserted in daily behavior are naturally translated into right and wrong, good and bad; but we can make choices without becoming Manichaeans. (Muller, 1962, pp. 36-37)

Value Profiles

An important aspect of the disclosure approach is the delineation of a value profile of an individual or group under consideration, and ultimately, to illuminate the value profile of the investigator to himself. A value profile is a value position viewed by the investigator using the classification schemes of the three continua. Value profiles may be consistent as an actor moves from one situation to another, or they might be changeable or relationally inconsistent. The only claim here is that the investigator using the model should be able to locate the actor on the three continua and obtain a "view" of his values--in situation S.

The use of the continua (seen normally as quantifying tools) might seem out of place when dealing with a disclosure concept, but it is argued that there is in all disclosure concepts some degree of commonality that will allow for communication. Concept "commonalities" can be advanced through this disclosure approach and thus is the only claim made relative to "operational definitions," that is, the clarification of those attributes held in common or consistent with a definition based upon an intellectual or cultural heritage.

A further consideration of this approach has to do with its ultimate usefulness relative to helping students discuss and, hopefully, come to a better understanding of the nature of justice--that ultimate virtue or moral principle upon which our present value of equality, fairness, reason, rightfulness and righteousness are derivatives. The position taken here is that acquaintance with the concept of virtue* as a drawing out process calls attention to exposing value conflicts.

The first step in teaching virtue, then, is the Socratic step of creating dissatisfaction in the student about his present knowledge of the good. This we do experimentally by exposing the student to moral conflict situations for which his principles have no ready solution. Second, we expose him to disagreement and argument about these situations with his peers. (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 82)

A disclosure approach for value analysis should ultimately, then, help the student come to a more "operational definition" of the one moral principle which in this case is justice. The demand for a definition of justice, thus, seems to imply that there is some conception in which all applications of the word meet like lines converging to a common center, or, in more concrete terms, that there is some principle whereby human life might be so organized that there would exist a just society composed of just men. A society so composed and organized would be ideal, in the sense that it would offer a standard of perfection by which all existing societies might be measured and appraised according to the degrees in which they fall short of it. Any proposed reform, moreover, might be judged by its tendency to bring us nearer to, or further from this ideal. Justice, of course, is at the center of most philosophical questions dealt with by western writers. What is justice and how can it be realized? This is the main question, for example, to be answered in Plato's Republic. Through Socrates we view a number of attempts at definition; i.e., justice as honesty in word and deed; justice as helping friends and harming enemies; and justice as the interest of the stronger. We also see justice and injustice discussed relative to its profitableness and its ability to bring happiness as well as unhappiness. The difficulty of placing a disclosure concept like justice into an operational definition is cited by Plato when he states: "So now the whole conversation has left me completely in the dark; for so long as I do not know what justice is, I am hardly likely to know whether or not it is a virtue, or whether it makes a man happy or unhappy." (The Republic of Plato, 1945, p. 40) (See also Kohlberg, 1970, pp. 58-70; Atkinson, 1950, pp. 643-645)

*Socrates suggests that virtue cannot be taught--however, The Republic makes manifest the nature of virtue as a disclosure concept obtainable through analogy and questioning.

Let us now call attention to the individual facets of each continuum.

I.

self orientation	other person (mutual respect and trust) orientation
orientation toward obedience and punishment	orientation toward universal and logical principles or conscience

--Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself in a commitment to personal wants and avoidance of punishment or in self-accepted principles and a concomitant concern with the establishment of mutual respect and trust?

Continuum #I reflects the work of Lawrence Kohlberg who has analyzed moral conduct and has constructed the following three levels and six stages:

Level I--Premoral

Stage 1.--Obedience and punishment orientation. Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.

Stage 2.--Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally other's. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.

Level II--Conventional Role Conformity

Stage 3.--Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior and judgment of intentions.

Stage 4.--Authority and social-order-maintaining orientation. Orientation to "doing duty" and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.

Level III--Self-Accepted Moral Principles

Stage 5.--Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare.

Stage 6.--Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orientation to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust. (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 7)

In the Kohlberg schema, the individual makes decisions in terms of personal wants and avoidance of punishment. He then seeks approval by conforming to norms and authority for their own sake. If and when he matures, he develops self-accepted principles and is concerned with the establishment of mutual trust and respect.

Kohlberg also identifies 25 aspects of moral growth which occur throughout the six stages. Of particular interest to this study are those aspects which he refers to as "the basis of moral worth of human life."

Stage 1.--The value of a human life is confused with the value of physical objects and is based on the social status or physical attributes of its possessor. Tommy, age ten: (Why should the druggist give the drug to the dying woman when her husband couldn't pay for it?) "If someone important is in a plane and is allergic to heights and the stewardess won't give him medicine because she's only got enough for one and she's got a sick one, a friend, in back, they'd probably put the stewardess in a lady's jail because she didn't help the important one."

(Is it better to save the life of one important person or a lot of unimportant people?) "All the people that aren't important because one man just has one house, maybe a lot of furniture, but a whole bunch of people have an awful lot of furniture and some of these poor people might have a lot of money and it doesn't look it."

Stage 2.--The value of a human life is seen as instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons. Tommy, age thirteen: (Should the doctor "mercy kill" a fatally ill woman requesting death because of her pain?) "Maybe it would be good to put her out of her pain, she'd be better off that way. But the husband wouldn't want it; it's not like an animal. If a pet dies you can get along without it--it isn't something you really need. Well, you can get a new wife, but it's not really the same."

Stage 3.--The value of a human life is based on the empathy and affection of family members and others toward its possessor. Andy, age sixteen: (Should the doctor "mercy Kill" a fatally ill woman requesting death because of her pain?) "No, he shouldn't. The husband loves her and wants to see her. He wouldn't want her to die sooner, he loves her too much."

Stage 4.--Life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties. John, age sixteen: (Should the doctor "mercy kill" the woman?) "The doctor wouldn't have the right to take a life, no human has the right. He can't create life, he shouldn't destroy it."

Stage 5.--Life is valued both in terms of its relation to community welfare and in terms of life being a universal human right.

Stage 6.--Belief in the sacredness of human life as representing a universal human value of respect for the individual. Steve, age sixteen: (Should the husband steal the expensive drug to save his wife?) "By the law of society he was wrong but by the law of nature or of God the druggist was wrong and the husband was justified. Human life is above financial gain. Regardless of who was dying, if it was a total stranger, man has a duty to save him from dying." (Kohlberg, 1966, pp. 8-9)

Kohlberg's analysis of moral development suggests that the teaching of values is a matter of helping individuals grow into increasingly advanced stages of personal organization, enabling them to mediate their needs and those of others. Kohlberg sees a direct interrelationship between value education and personal development. "The attractiveness of defining the goal of moral education as the stimulation of development rather than as teaching fixed virtues is that it means aiding the child to take the next step in a direction toward which he is already tending, rather than imposing an alien pattern upon him." (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 19)

No claim is made here of moving the individual toward "higher levels of moral development." Although this might, indeed, happen, the purpose of this continuum of the model is to help the investigator determine the "value position" of the actor(s) under investigation, and ultimately his own (the investigator's) value position with respect to Continuum #I. The hope is that through the investigation of value positions the individual will come to appreciate the various positions from which any situation can be judged and, perhaps, ultimately develop ideals that embrace alternative positions and give a basis for action. Seeing alternative value positions in the narratives under study, the individual will be less inclined to see (and adopt) value positions as rigid, simplistic rule systems. He will, on the other hand, be better able to build concepts that accommodate different stances or provide negotiation among them. He will also be more willing to structure his own inquiry or to see himself as a transactor within the complexity of situations that is the milieu of life.

In dealing with the dichotomy of self- (obedience and punishment) orientation and other person (mutual trust and respect) orientation, it is important to discuss some of the mutual influences that exist between the individual and the group. One's first impression is to suggest that all behavior is based upon principles of personal conscience, as all decisions are personal. Or, as Allport suggested, there is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals.* This, however, belies the research of many persons such as Lewin that suggests a great deal of behavioral influence is exerted by "the group."

If recognition of the existence of an entity depends upon this entity's showing properties or constancies of its own, the judgment about what is real should be affected by changes in the possibility of demonstrating social propertiesThe taboo against believing in the existence of a social entity is probably most effectively broken by handling this entity experimentally. . . . (Lewin, 1947, pp. 5-41)

*See F. H. Allport, Social Psychology, New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1924.

One can always ask, when does personal orientation become group oriented? And, when does group oriented behavior become personal? Analysis begins, for our purposes, here when distinctions can be made between the concept of self- (obedience and punishment) orientation and the other (mutual respect and trust) orientation. First of all, we must state that an individual's ability to experience, to decide and to even control his own behavior is dependent in many subtle and involuntary ways on his relationships with other people. (Hare, 1962, pp. 191-265) This means, of course, that individual behavior is a function of group involvement--yet it is just that, and only that--a function of group involvement. In every instance the individual must call upon innate mental faculties in response to decisions that must be made. Two factors make individual involvement significant: (1) each individual has a unique personal history and (2) unique innate mental abilities. Thus, in any action (or thought) the fact of personal uniqueness is a factor, and although behaviors of individuals can, indeed, must, be viewed against the backdrop of group norms, the ability to obtain a better or clearer view of person's value profile depends on seeing him (the actor) as an individual in relationship to others. As he makes decisions (lives from day to day) we can develop a picture of his reliance on self versus his reliance on the group. This knowledge will give us a beginning relative to understanding the actor's value profile, and will also allow us to make better predictions relative to the actor's future behavior. Ultimately, when this continuum is used with the other two continua of this approach, we may have more clues relative to the actor's conception of the moral principle of justice. Beyond this, of course, the process of studying the actor in this way (as applied in a narrative situation) will ultimately help in clarifying the investigator's value position relative to his orientation toward mutual respect and trust on the one hand versus his orientation toward obedience and punishment on the other. It is suggested that this knowledge should help in illuminating his (the investigator's) concept of the moral principle of justice.

II.	situational (honesty in a particular situation)	general (honesty)
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--Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself in consistent adherence (at all times and in all places) to a particular explicit or implicit set of rules; or is the behavior contextual or situational relative to modes of conduct?

This second continuum is related to and expands the analysis which began with Continuum #I. In the first continuum the investigator defines the point that separates an individual's commitment to principles of personal conscience from that individual's allegiance to principles of norm conformity.

Continuum #II represents analysis from another vantage point by taking the notion of personal versus group value claims and viewing these value claims from a situational versus a general position (relativism--universalism*). The dichotomy suggested by Continuum #II might best be stated in two questions. What should

*For a more thorough discussion of the relativism--universalism dilemma, see Clarifying Public Controversy by Fred Newmann, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970, Chapter 4.

I (the actor) do now? What, in general, are the reasons for this action now? These questions should not be seen as mutually exclusive; for as was stated above, a moral principle is not only a rule of action but also a reason for action. There is also the consideration of a middle ground (as the continuum suggests) between allegiance to general rules or principles and some kind of individual, situational choice. It can be argued, of course, that even existential "choice" is based upon some moral system which the individual accepts.

The present continuum places emphasis upon the concept of reason as an important criteria for judging an actor's preference for general versus situational commitment. That is, in placing an actor or group of actors on Continuum #II, it is imperative that problems of justification not be ignored. To argue for a particular position means to argue toward consistency with generally held values.

. . . we believe men widely share values that seem to transcend historical and cultural differences. Although men of different cultures would dispute the morality of a sizable range of behavior, there is also a realm of behavior that is almost universally believed to be brutish and uncivilized, and another realm widely considered to be essentially human. But to suggest that some values may be legitimately applied beyond oneself (or one's immediate community) is not to say that all should be. The latter interpretation would obviously violate our commitment to pluralism and free choice. (Newmann, 1970, pp. 102-103)

It follows, however, that an actor can also opt for situational positions in his value choice. But, to be rational (as the term is used here) involves a willingness and the skill to weigh that value choice in the light of general societal (group) values. And, vice versa, an actor can opt for a general position in his value choice, but, again, is rational only when he is willing to examine that value choice in the light of a situational orientation.

Thus, analysis through Continuum #II can occur only when the narrative provides argument of the type that calls attention to the ethical basis of value controversy, e.g., the desire on the part of the actor(s) to persuade his audience that his position is consistent with the general values or principles of man (or at least consistent with the general values of the group he is trying to persuade).

. . . important reasons exist for not abandoning the search for consistent application of general principles. First, principles used to justify action may be impossible to eradicate from memory. Whether we like it or not, principles of justice seem to remain in our nervous systems. The question becomes "How should such principles be used?" We could also argue that many situations do not differ in the most relevant or salient aspect of moral choice--both the American Revolution and Negro rebellion concern basic human rights and how best to attain them. Making explicit such commonalities among issues helps to clarify the issue over which people disagree. Comparing situations and testing whether principles of the past can be applied consistently does not necessarily make one a slave to accepting past principles. On the contrary, comparing and distinguishing among situations stimulates rejecting some principles as irrelevant, qualifying others as not sufficiently complete to deal with the new situation, and accepting others as adequate in some instances, no matter how "old" the rules or principles might be . . . Finally our commitment to rationality, by definition, inevitably leads us to be concerned with

But the pleasure in eating will often consist also of attitudes and beliefs . . . This familiar activity illustrates several aspects of the conception of ends as complex entities. To be sure, a person eats in order to maintain his health, to be sociable, perhaps to win a contest. This eating may be an example of an instrumental activity in the sense that it is a means to an end external to the activity, separately identifiable from it. If the activity is purely instrumental, then every element in it must be determined by its aptness to that external end. But it may be and often is an end in itself as well, in that no further end can be adduced as determining that activity. The answer to the question "why did you do that" is then only something of the form "because I wanted to." Nor do we feel that any further information has been supplied, any further end identified if that answer takes the form "for pleasure." (Fried, 1970, pp. 11-12)

Clearly, we have occasions in life when decisions have to be made not only between or among conflicting goals, but also between goals and modes of conduct (or stating it differently between instrumental and terminal values). There may be times when certain modes of conduct (honesty, cleanliness) are dysfunctional to certain goals (becoming rich, joining a hippie commune) and to better understand the rationality or lack of rationality that is made manifest by an actor's decision is most germane to this continuum. The distinction and relationship between modes of conduct and ends or goals might best be explained in the following two examples. Consider the building of a bird house as an expressed end of having a bird house. The ordering of activities is irrelevant as long as the end (a built bird house) is achieved. Clearly, this is a goal that stands apart from an ordering of activities. To be sure, it might be more advantageous to saw the boards before one applies paint, but this is simply technique and not a matter of construction law. Next, consider a dance. The activities related to the dance and their ordering; e.g., rhythm, steps and mood are not instrumental to the dance; they are the dance. This end-state is one with (and logically consistent) the mode of conduct or an ordering of activities. Continuum #III should allow the investigator to determine between these two types of ends-conduct relationships and simultaneously develop insights into the nature of goals--rational ends.

Taken together, these three continua when applied to a narrative, can provide an analytical framework which can make manifest the actor's and the investigator's value profile, and to see that value profile in relation to the moral principle of justice. No claim is made relative to changing value positions of investigators toward any predetermined goal. All that can be said of this approach is that it should help clarify value positions of actors under consideration in relationship to the three continua and through this process a clearer and more realistic view of the investigator's values should emerge.

Three final points need to be made relative to this approach. First of all, it is assumed that the three continua will not be seen to apply equally in all narrative situations. For example, in any given narrative it might be the case that only one or perhaps two of the continua are applicable. However, in those situations where all three continua can be used, it is assumed that this will be done. Second, it is again reiterated that the main function of this model is to illuminate the "value position" of the actor under investigation, and ultimately, the value position of the investigator.

Finally, there is the question: "What value profile (position on the three continua) is most consistent with the concept of justice as defined above?" The following diagram is suggested as the optimum value profile vis a vis the concept of justice. It also suggests further research relative to empirical tests of the value position suggested below as well as other positions and their consistency with the definition of justice.

I.	self orientation	other person (mutual respect and trust) orientation X
II.	situational (honesty in a particular situation)	general (honesty) X
III.	goal (terminal values)	modes of personal conduct (instru- mental values) X

The reason for the above placement rests on arguments presented above. For example, the position on Continuum #I (other people oriented) calls attention to the principle of justice as an obligation (moral) to respect the right or claim of another person. The position on Continuum #II (general or universalism value position) calls attention to the principle of justice as an obligation to rationality involving the willingness and skill to weigh value choices in the light of general societal values. The location on Continuum #III (midway between terminal and instrumental values) calls attention to the principle of justice as both a reason for action (goal or terminal value) and a rule of action (mode of conduct or instrumental value). Justice implies a balance of the two notions of reason and rule.

Conclusion

This paper calls for a conscious development of a more holistic approach to value study. While it does not posit a systematic repression or rejection of Skinnerian objectivism or materialism, it does call attention to the need for a more careful balance between materialist and mentalist models in understanding human values.

One basic argument of the paper has been the contention that man is both a structured and structuring animal whose concepts are developed and augmented not only by outside stimuli, but more importantly, perhaps, by inward or mental mythic thought or paradigms that shape the outside world of things, movements and acts. A second argument has been the metaphoric nature of language and the explanatory power of the narrative for finding out about "self." In other words, through a narrative study of an actor we see not only said actor but also ourselves mirrored in the actor's words and behavior. Finally, the argument was presented that a fundamental difference exists between disclosure and non-disclosure concepts and one appropriate mode for the study of disclosure concepts is the use of value continua; developed out of a consideration for the meaning of "value." In focus, then, the point of value study vis a vis value continua, as here developed, calls attention to the need to come to some self-understanding of value (disclosure) concepts. Value

concepts, such as justice, happiness or love, often mean so many different things to different individuals that they tend to leave one in that state of mind which suggests that "the concept that means everything conveys no meaning at all." Thus, the need for concept clarification through value continua is posited as consistent with the nature of disclosure concepts and the need to clarify said concepts in order to communicate more effectively and to develop self-meaning.

Although this paper places emphasis upon the concept of justice, a disclosure approach to value analysis can also be applied to other value concepts such as happiness, success, kindness, etc. It might be interesting, for example, to have students* develop an "optimum value profile position" for happiness similar to the one developed above for the concept of justice. As with the value profile for justice, each student would have an opportunity to discuss, compare and contrast his value profile with value profiles of other students. Hopefully, through group processes, students will have an opportunity to come to a better understanding of the value concept under investigation.

In the final analysis, this paper poses not simply an approach or a project but also a problem. It does so because it is far from clear to what extent and by what methods we can probe the value-belief systems of individuals and groups. The standards of such investigations represent an issue that is still, to a significant measure, far from settled.

*It should be pointed out that this approach has been used extensively with inservice educators at the high school level with little observable difficulty relative to the constructing and describing of value profiles. But, it may be the case that the experience of "value profile construction" is only appropriate for students who find dealing with abstract concepts comfortable and at the same time exciting.

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