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AUTHOR Knudson, Jerry W.
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ABSTRACT

Each year a committee on freedom of the press, established in 1946 by the Inter American Press Association (IAPA), exposes those countries which it feels do not have freedom of the press. In 1952 Bolivia underwent a social and economic revolution. As a result, angry mobs forced the closure of the two newspapers with the largest circulation in Bolivia--"La Razon" and "Los Tiempos"--when the new regime refused to provide police protection. Although the revolutionary government gave Bolivia political stability and social reform, this record was marred by twelve years of blacklisting by the IAPA. The Bolivian experience is representative of the misuse of censure power by the IAPA to foster its own political ends. Bolivian authorities disputed claims of the IAPA on the grounds that the organization was composed of entrepreneurs and that a proper investigation had not been conducted. In the case of "Los Tiempos," the exiled publisher Canelas himself was a member of the committee. (EE)

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THE INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION

AS CHAMPION OF PRESS FREEDOM:

REALITY OR RHETORIC?

The Bolivian Experience, 1952-1973

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Jerry W. Knudson
Department of Journalism
Temple University
Philadelphia, Pa. 19122

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The Inter American Press Association (IAPA), an organization of western hemisphere newspaper publishers founded in 1926 and reorganized in 1950, first established a committee on freedom of the press in 1946. Since then, this group has designated each year those countries of the Americas where it deems freedom of the press does not exist. How accurate and impartial is this black-listing? In the most extensive study of the IAPA yet undertaken, Professor Mary A. Gardner concluded in 1967: "On the basis of the evidence available, there seems to be no doubt that the Inter American Press Association has proved to be an effective instrument in maintaining and perpetuating freedom of the press in the Western Hemisphere."¹ This paper will challenge that assertion on the basis of a five-year study of the Bolivian press since 1952, and the author does not feel that the Bolivian experience with the IAPA is atypical.²

Bolivia in 1952 was the scene of the second social and economic revolution in Latin American history. The Bolivian National Revolution, led by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), was a much more rapid process than that experienced by Mexico after 1910 and more democratic than that experienced by Cuba after 1959. Within twelve years, before the MNR was overthrown by the military in 1964, the revolutionary party was able to redistribute more than two-thirds of all Bolivia's agricultural lands to formerly landless peasants, grant universal suffrage in a country which had limited voting rights to literate, property-owning males, and nationalize the Big Three tin companies, each of which had been more powerful than the Bolivian government itself.³

In the first few years of this social upheaval, the traditional Bolivian press was undoubtedly harmed. La Razón, the La Paz daily owned by tin-mining magnate Carlos Víctor Aramayo and regarded as one of the best-edited newspapers in Latin America, was unable to resume publication after the 1952 revolution. The MNR did not close La Razón, as is frequently charged, but in effect the revolutionary regime did so by not providing police protection when the newspaper was menaced by angry mobs. Later, publisher Demetrio Canelas of Los Tiempos charged that his Cochabamba newspaper plant was destroyed by government-inspired mobs on November 9, 1953. These two newspapers had enjoyed the widest circulations in Bolivia.⁴ Yet Los Tiempos was not to reappear until 1967, La Razón never.

When the IAPA met in Mexico City on October 7-11, 1953, it declared that freedom of the press did not exist in Bolivia.⁵ Jules Dubois, chairman of the committee on freedom of the press, sent a letter to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, major architect of the MNR and president, asking guarantees for newsmen and opportunity for newspapers in Bolivia to import newsprint. José Fellman Velarde, sub-secretary of the Ministry of Press, Information and Culture, replied that exiled Bolivian newsmen had participated in conspiracies against the government. He also pointed out that the IAPA had never intervened against oligarchical regimes in Bolivia when newspapers were closed and newsmen "killed, imprisoned, tortured and exiled."⁶ Moreover, Fellman Velarde explained, the newsprint restrictions--as well as those on food and other goods--were necessary to protect Bolivia's rapidly dwindling balance of payments.⁷ (It is true that the MNR organ La Nación itself suffered from lack of newsprint and was

forced at times to go to tabloid size.) Nevertheless, the IAPA compared the plight of La Razón to that of La Prensa of Buenos Aires, confiscated in 1951 by Juan Domingo Perón, and called the cynicism of the MNR government "an act of aggression against the free and independent press."⁸

Thereupon began a vendetta between the IAPA and the Bolivian revolutionary government that was to last almost two decades. The MNR was to give Bolivia unprecedented political stability (Paz Estenssoro in 1956 was the first president to complete his four-year term since Bautista Saavedra in 1925) as well as beneficial social reforms, but this record was marred internationally by the fact that every year of its twelve years in power (1952-1964) the MNR saw Bolivia black-listed by the IAPA.⁹

Was this constant censure justified? The IAPA refused to concede that freedom of the press existed in Bolivia as long as La Razón could not publish and Los Tiempos was not indemnified. Bolivian authorities, on the other hand, disputed any right of the IAPA to sit in judgment, since it was composed of entrepreneurs and not workers of the press. Action by the IAPA committee on freedom of the press, the MNR maintained, was taken only upon hearsay from other newspaper owners and not after proper investigation on the scene. Moreover, in the case of Los Tiempos, exiled publisher Canelas himself was a member of the IAPA committee, therefore being both judge and party to the cause. Let us examine the facts surrounding the cessation of publication by both of these newspapers.

The Death of La Razón: Murder or Suicide?

What kind of newspaper was La Razón that the MNR government could no longer tolerate its existence after 1952? Founded in 1917 by the physician José María Escalier to boost his presidential aspirations, La Razón was soon acquired by the powerful Aramayo tin-mining family. Although Bolivia was the poorest country in the western hemisphere with the possible exception of Haiti, Carlos Víctor Aramayo enjoyed an annual net income of more than \$1,500,000.¹⁰ La Razón became a spokesman for the status quo in Bolivia. The newspaper's editorial positions on social matters were the most retrograde of the three capital dailies.

For example, when a strike at the Simón I. Patiño tin mine at Catavi exploded in violence on December 21, 1942, La Razón saw behind the desire of the Catavi miners to raise their wages from about 75 cents to \$1.50 a day "the avid tentacles of communism."¹¹ When the striking workers first made their demands-- during a wartime boom of exceptionally high profits--La Razón was aghast:

There is not...any reasons whatsoever properly social or economic that should induce the workers of the mines to strike. To understand this event, which is going to obstruct seriously the development of Bolivian production, one should look only at the fruition of a seed of dissociation and anarchy thrown among the working masses by political elements who, in trying to obtain their secret ends, do not hesitate to place in danger the internal peace of the nation and the life of its institutions.¹²

The government of General Enrique Peñaranda admitted that 700 Army troops and Carabineros (national police) fired into an unarmed advancing mob of men, women and children, killing 19 and injuring 30. Timoteo Pardo, the Catavi union leader, testified later that he had seen at least 400 bodies buried, some still alive.

Opposition deputy Ricardo Anaya charged in the congressional inquiry of August and September 1943 that 700 had been killed and 400 wounded.¹³ Whatever the actual number of dead and disabled, the Catavi incident became a cause célèbre which first brought the MNR into the national limelight and led to the overthrow of Peñaranda on the first anniversary of the Catavi violence.¹⁴

When public opinion, whipped up by the MNR newspaper La Calle, made a parliamentary interpellation mandatory, the reaction of La Razón was characteristic:

Demagoguery, upon opening parliamentary fire against two ministers of state [Government and Labor], flaunting a sad event as a banner of false proletarian vindication, an event of which they themselves [the MNR] and their clacques are alone responsible, is proceeding in its habitual manner. . . the vulgar jockeyings of those who see in it [the Catavi violence] a modus vivendi and a platform for lowly aims.¹⁵

Time and time again, La Razón denounced the interpellation, which brought about the resignation of Peñaranda's cabinet, as a pretext for the satisfaction of personal egos and as desecrating the Catavi dead by using them for selfish and disruptive political ends. The newspaper defended the Army for having used force to put down disorder and advocated amending the Constitution of 1938 to outlaw all strikes.¹⁶

If La Razón took a dim view of worker demands, it dealt even more harshly with the campesinos, the Indian masses who make up the great bulk of Bolivia's population. In 1943 the newspaper attacked a proposal for extending liberal education to the Indians: "It is thought that the Indian should be educated with a humanistic and not technical criterion, and from this absolute blindness that afflicts those charged with solving this problem can come serious damages to the country."¹⁷

Again, when a rare Indian congress was held in La Paz in August 1943, La Razón denounced the event:

...in this type of gathering demagogical elements always predominate, anxious to obtain political notoriety by any means. They bring together however many Indians perfectly ignorant of the meaning and scope of these reunions, and they induce them to plant complaints of all kinds and to formulate votes of protest against this or that, without logical foundation and without serious reasons.... [We have always repudiated] the political agitators who want to make of every Indian a doctor [of philosophy] who will claim and demand the redemption of his brothers.¹⁸

Thus, as with the tin miners, La Razón found absolutely no common ground with the Bolivian Indian--in the world's most Amerindian nation. On the contrary, the Indian was to be kept submerged forever in the worst of colonial traditions. It is not surprising that such men, peasants and miners, terrorized La Razón after the MNR revolution of 1952 and kept the newspaper from reopening.

Nevertheless, reactionary editorial positions do not constitute grounds for refusing to protect the right to publish. Did La Razón ever pose a more direct threat to the MNR? The newspaper was clearly an insurrectionary force which engineered the overthrow of Major Gualberto Villarroel, with whom the MNR shared power between 1943 and 1946. There is no doubt that the elite opposition press, incited by La Razón, was instrumental in toppling the Villarroel regime on July 21, 1946. The corpse of the unfortunate president was hanged from a lamppost in the Plaza Murillo, along with those of several of his aides and Roberto Hinojosa, MNR propagandist.¹⁹

The reactionary press gloated over the role it had played in destroying the reform administration of Villarroel. La Razón proclaimed, "The newspapermen who

from the tribune of 'La Razón' were the promoters of the uprising, were defending liberty of thought and pointing out the road of rebellion to the people."²⁰ Ultima Hora, published by tin tycoon Mauricio Hochschild, added, "Whoever believes that the movement of July 21 was unexpected and without roots in an occult labor are in error. That movement was prepared by the press."²¹ La Razón asserted later, "The government of Villarreal committed an error that eventually was to become fatal: it gave temporary Liberty to the press."²²

The MNR did not intend to make the same mistake when it gained power after three days of street fighting in La Paz and Oruro on April 9-11, 1952, which claimed more than 600 lives.²³ President Paz Estenssoro said on April 19 that the Bolivian government would not assist La Razón to reopen because it was "an enemy of the Bolivian people." The MNR president declared, "I am not going to shoot the people to defend Aramayo."²⁴

After 1952, the Bolivian revolutionary government steadfastly defended its position against the yearly strictures of the IAPA. La Nación, official governmental spokesman, described the IAPA as a "capitalist consortium" which did "not defend an idea [freedom of the press] but rather an economic position."²⁵ On another occasion, La Nación observed:

The IAPA does not know, or pretends not to know, that after April 9, 1952, the daily La Razón stopped appearing only through the will of its proprietor, surely fearing reactions of the people, who saw in that spokesman one of the most efficacious of the oligarchial oppression. But in no moment was the plant of La Razón threatened, let alone confiscated, by the Government, making it impossible 'to restitute' that which is found in the hands of its own owner.²⁶

In 1959 La Nacion noted with dismay that Bolivia was once again black-listed while

the IAPA declared that there was freedom of the press under the regime of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua.²⁷

Augusto Céspedes, Bolivia's foremost living writer and then editor of La Nación, delighted in taking swipes at Jules Debois, chairman of the IAPA committee on freedom of the press. Céspedes wrote in 1959, "When the Cuban Revolution, more or less at the beginning of this year, did not threaten to be more than one of the inoffensive exultations of the Caribbean, Jules Dubois found in Castro--who is now an enemy of 'liberty'--a savior, a great democrat and the expulsor of a tyrant."²⁸ Another victim of Céspedes' trenchant pen was Argentine publisher Alberto Gainza Paz of La Prensa, subsequent president of the IAPA and owner of large cattle ranches. Céspedes referred to the IAPA as "constituted by retired colonels [Dubois] and bovine oligarchies that mix news the same way they breed cattle."²⁹

The final insult came in 1960 when the IAPA, meeting in Buenos Aires, declared that freedom of the press existed in Argentina but not in Bolivia. La Nación pointed out, with heavy irony, that on the very day that the IAPA was assembling, the government of Arturo Frondizi closed down La Razón of Buenos Aires and imprisoned its editor. Moreover, El Pueblo of Cochabama added, 90 percent of the radios of Argentina were controlled by the government and four million peronistas neither had a single newspaper spokesman nor could they even vote.³⁰

The Times and Los Tiempos

The case of La Razón was never settled to Aramayo's or the IAPA's satisfaction. The circumstances surrounding the closing of Los Tiempos in Cochabamba were even more controversial. The morning daily was founded by Demetrio Canelas on September 16, 1943. It survived the 1952 revolution for nineteen months as Canelas fought the MNR reforms--especially land reform and universal suffrage--every inch of the way. On November 9, 1953, Los Tiempos closed down after a violent confrontation with the government. What happened?

Lee Hills, former president of the IAPA, gave this version in 1969:

"The late Demetrio Canelas, of Los Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, saw his newspaper destroyed by government-inspired mobs, and then he was thrown in prison and threatened with execution as a traitor for not bowing editorially to the government. IAPA protests saved him."³¹

But the MNR spokesman La Nación gave a diametrically opposed account of the incident in 1959, relying on a dispatch from its Cochabamba correspondent Julián Cayo. This newsman, sifting the evidence of six years after the event, reported that Los Tiempos had not been destroyed at all. Two Linotype machines were not damaged while a third and the press itself were damaged only slightly and were functional again after light repairs. In fact, Canelas' "destroyed" press was sold to Crítica of Cochabamba, to Crónica of the same city, and finally to Progreso of Santa Cruz where it continued in service.

Cayo reconstructed the events of November 9, 1953. That morning the people of Cochabamba learned by radio news reports that a counter-revolt led by the

extreme rightwing Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) had broken out in their city. The rebels used the Los Tiempos building as their citadel. After the noon hour, the newspaper plant was taken by MNR students against machine-gun fire from the building. The students were going to issue the first edition of El Proletario when a mob of campesinos invaded and occupied the building. On November 10 the student group, Avanzada Universitaria, again gained control of the newspaper plant for four hours, enough time to prove that the equipment had been damaged only lightly. Altogether, some 50 workers lost their lives putting down the attempted rebellion.

Ironically, the MNR correspondent continued, Canelas had used illiterate peons to run his editorials from his ~~near~~by estate of Pucara to Cochabamba. These Indians were "innocent porters of editorials which argued that it was necessary to perpetuate the regimen of commanding bossism." The correspondent charged that Canelas had conspired with the Rural Federation of Landowners to carry out the attempted counter-revolt of November 9, 1953. The reporter wrote that the publisher had no social conscience whatever. He had used pongos (serfs) both in his country house and in the plant of Los Tiempos itself, where they could be seen "running like souls in pain to fulfill the domestic commands of the patrón." The MNR writer concluded, "dressed in coarse flannel, wearing sandals, the campesinos watched terrified the functioning of the linotypes and the press which was publishing the newspaper that was inciting repression of the agrarian revolution in march."³²

It was as if this MNR correspondent and the IAPA lived in different worlds. In 1962, for example, Samuel Mendoza, last editor of Los Tiempos before it went under in 1953, told the IAPA meeting in Santiago de Chile that the newspaper had been assaulted by the MNR because Los Tiempos had denounced alleged Communist infiltration in the government. It was also revealed at the 1962 meeting that the IAPA had been studying the possibility of guaranteeing a loan for the acquisition of new equipment for Los Tiempos, but the project was abandoned.³³

Finally, at the 1969 meeting of the IAPA in Washington, D.C., it was announced that the civilian government of Luis Adolfo Siles in Bolivia had appointed a commission to ascertain the amount of damages suffered by Los Tiempos. Siles was soon overthrown, however, and it is not known if the Canelas family ever received payment.³⁴

Aftermath of the Revolution

After the Bolivian military establishment, reconstituted by United States aid and training missions, kicked out the MNR on November 4, 1964, the IAPA decided that freedom of the press had returned to Bolivia. This writer disagrees strongly, based upon his observations in Bolivia since 1968. The regime of Air Force General René Barrientos Ortuño, who shared power initially with Army Chief of Staff Alfredo Ovando Candia, was repressive and brutal. Barrientos persecuted organized labor, killing scores of tin miners during the massacre of San Juan in June 1967, and the press was not immune from his heavy-handed coercion. At the same time, the dashing general manipulated the press to bolster his image.

After the death of Barrientos in a helicopter crash in April 1969, it was charged that he had spent \$280,000--more than the budget for the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum--to buy the services in 1965 of a United States public relations firm, Hamilton Wright Organization, Inc.³⁵

The death of Barrientos unleashed even more virulent factionalism within the Bolivian armed forces. His civilian vice-president Siles lasted only a few months before being ousted by General Ovando on September 26, 1969. A rather colorless figure, Ovando sought to rekindle the revolutionary mystique by nationalizing on October 17, 1969, the Gulf Oil concessions handed out by Barrientos. Then Juan José Torres, a younger Army officer dissatisfied with the progress in recovering the revolution, split Army ranks on October 7, 1970, to overthrow Ovando as Bolivia's gobiernos de turno continued. General Torres in turn became a captive of the non-democratic left by forcing out the 100-member Peace Corps, allowing an unelected Popular Assembly to meet, and courting aid and assistance from the Communist bloc countries. In another coup d'etat resulting in more than 120 dead and 700 wounded, Torres was defeated on August 21, 1971, by rightwing Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez, backed by the formerly bitter opponents of decades, the MNR and FSB.³⁶

During these precarious years the IAPA steadfastly insisted that freedom of the press existed under these repressive rightwing military regimes, except for the ten-month interlude of leftist Torres when Bolivia again wound up on the black-list. In short, since 1952 the IAPA has censured Bolivia for throttling freedom of the press

under every progressive government but never under any repressive military government which protects property and investment but not human life and civil liberties.

The evidence is ominous. On March 14, 1970, for example, a bomb delivered in a package killed Alfredo Alexander and his wife in their home in La Paz. Alexander was publisher of Ultima Hora and the tabloid Hoy, both of which had criticized the military regime of Ovando.³⁷ In July 1970 police, allegedly unauthorized by the government, severely beat the staff of the leftwing daily, La Jornada, co-edited by Ted Córdova-Claure, later to be press secretary to Torres and to suffer seven bullet wounds in the overthrow of that regime.³⁸

Since August 21, 1971, Colonel Banzer has been even more repressive. A British scholar has estimated that some 100 newsmen were imprisoned or exiled immediately after the coup d'etat. The conservative Catholic newspaper Presencia reported that Banzer had asked three prominent La Paz journalists to edit El Diario, on its way to becoming a cooperative during the Torres regime, as his governmental spokesman--but all three refused flatly.³⁹

Since then, the situation in Bolivia has steadily worsened. The New York Times reported in January 1973 that there were 1,500 political prisoners in Bolivia--students, teachers, workers, labor leaders and journalists. Perhaps three times that number have been forced to flee abroad.⁴⁰ An American, Mary Elizabeth Harding, was not so fortunate. A former Maryknoll nun who had served in Bolivia since 1959, Miss Harding left the order several years ago, became involved in political activity and was arrested and imprisoned by the Banzer government for about a month before

being deported on January 12, 1973. Is the press controlled in Bolivia today?

Miss Harding replied:

Yes, many journalists have been deported, several of them arrested. There's the case of the AP correspondent, Harold Olmos, who... was accused of subversion by the Banzer government and was being looked for by agents of the secret police. They didn't find him because he went underground and it was generally accepted that the reason he was considered subversive was the amount of bad publicity Bolivia has been getting lately as the truth about the political oppression is being brought to light outside the country in the international press...⁴¹

Miss Harding also cited the fact that Bolivian newspapers today do not publish criticism of the government, even signed statements by labor groups, teachers' unions or church organizations. Recently a group of 90 religious officials took out an ad in Presencia analyzing violence in Bolivian history and criticizing the Banzer government. The Minister of the Interior, reported Miss Harding, "told these priests that it would be a good idea if they took up an extra collection on Sunday to pay their passage home..."⁴²

Yet, despite such evidence, the IAPA concluded at its meeting in Jamaica on April 3-5, 1973, that freedom of the press exists in Bolivia today. The committee on freedom of the press reasoned that exiled and imprisoned newsmen had been plotting to overthrow the government--an argument advanced by the MNR against its opponents in 1953 and later but rejected by the IAPA.⁴³ Every government--as every person--has the right of self-defense, which was how the MNR justified its censorship of the press in the early years after the 1952 revolution. But to the IAPA--in the case of Bolivia--that right seems limited only to conservative or reactionary governments

pledged to the protection of private property. In short, the IAPA seems to be using its arrogated power of censure--if the Bolivian experience is representative--to foster its own political ends. The IAPA judgments on freedom of the press in the hemisphere should not, therefore, be accepted without question.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mary A. Gardner, The Inter American Press Association: Its Fight for Freedom of the Press, 1926-1960 (Austin, 1967), 143. Adverse views against the IAPA in Appendix B, 165-176, are labeled as "Propaganda Disseminated against IAPA," while favorable views, Appendix C, 177-185, are described simply as "Letters and Editorials in Behalf of IAPA."
2. See the author's forthcoming The Press and the Bolivian National Revolution in the Journalism Monographs series. A book-length study, Propaganda and the Bolivian National Revolution, is also in preparation.
3. The best treatments of the Bolivian National Revolution to date are James M. Malloy, Bolivia, The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1970) and Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution, Bolivia Since 1952 (Pittsburgh, 1971). The earlier account by Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J., 1958) was overly enthusiastic.
4. It should be remembered that newspaper circulation in Bolivia is low by standards of industrialized societies. Circulation of daily papers in La Paz in 1963, then a city of 350,000 was only slightly more than 40,000 due to illiteracy and poverty. U.S. Army, Area Handbook for Bolivia (Washington, D.C., 1963), 375.
5. New York Times, Oct. 6, 1953.
6. The government of General Enrique Peñaranda, for example, closed the MNR newspaper La Calle on December 17, 1943. Conversely, the military-MNR government of Major Gualberto Villarroel confiscated both La Razón and Última Hora after they were charged with stirring up an abortive coup d'etat on June 13, 1946. There is no adequate history of the Bolivian press. Victor Santa Cruz, Contribucion a la historia del periodismo en Bolivia (Sucre, 1962) is sketchy, but an important book in the MNR propaganda campaign was Carlos Montenegro, Nacionalismo y coloniaje, su expresión histórica en la prensa de Bolivia (La Paz, 1943).
7. New York Times, Oct. 18, 1953. Ultimately, the United States was to aid the Bolivian National Revolution with more aid per capita than any other country in the world--a total of \$275.9 million through 1964. James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952, Financial Background and Context of Political Decisions (Los Angeles, 1969), 13. U.S. support to Bolivia dropped to its lowest point of \$5.9 million under Torres in 1971 and then zoomed to \$87.4 million under Banzer in 1972 to November. United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, "Bolivia: Human Rights Suppressed" (New York, 1973).

8. Newsweek, June 2, 1952.
9. Telephone interview with James B. Canel, general manager, IAPA, Miami, Fla., April 24, 1973. The IAPA found some "slight improvement" during these twelve years and noted by 1960 that government pressure on the press had "diminished."
10. Tristán Marof [Gustavo A. Navarro], La tragedia del altiplano (Buenos Aires, [1934]), 133-141.
11. La Razón, Aug. 13, 1943.
12. Ibid., Dec. 16, 1942.
13. Ibid., Aug. 19 and 28, 1943.
14. See Jerry W. Knudson, "The Impact of the Catavi Mine Massacre of 1942 on Bolivian Politics and Public Opinion," The Americas, A Quarterly Review of Inter-American Cultural History (January 1970), 254-276.
15. La Razón, Aug. 11, 1943.
16. Ibid., Aug. 12 and 19, 1943. For other editorial comment on the Catavi inquiry, see Aug. 13, 19, 21-23, 26, 28, 30 and Sept. 10-12, 1943.
17. Ibid., Jan. 30, 1943.
18. Ibid., Aug. 12, 1943.
19. In the attempted coup d'etat of June 13, 1946, La Razón printed broadsides urging La Paz mobs to seize Villarroel with the injunction, "Leave no one alive!" Carlos Montenegro, Calpables (La Paz, 1955), 36.
20. La Razón, Aug. 23, 1946.
21. Ultima Hora, Aug. 10, 1946.
22. La Razón, Jan. 1, 1947. See Also Guillermo Bedregal, La revolución boliviana, sus realidades y perspectivas dentro del ciclo de liberación de los pueblos latino-americanos (La Paz, 1962), 23-24.
23. Luis Peñaloza C., Historia del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, 1941-1952 (La Paz, 1963), 288. A writer in Commonweal (Dec. 25, 1970) erroneously stated that 3,000 lost their lives.
24. New York Times, April 20, 1952.
25. La Nación, Oct. 12, 1958.
26. Ibid., Oct. 16, 1958.

27. Ibid., June 3, 1959.
28. Ibid., Oct. 3, 1959.
29. Ibid., July 19, 1959.
30. Ibid., Oct. 31, 1960, For other criticism of the IAPA, see also May 23 and 31, and Nov. 16, 1958; Oct. 6, 7, 10 and 30, and Dec. 4 and 9, 1959; Feb. 25, and Aug. 23 and 28, 1960; and Oct. 23, 24 and 28, 1962.
31. Lee Hills, "The Story of the IAPA," Nieman Reports (March 1969), 6. Hills mentions that during his presidency of the IAPA in 1968, the policy was adopted of making on-the-scene investigations before pronouncing judgments on freedom of the press in Latin America.
32. La Nación, Oct. 16 and 20, 1959. For other comments on the case of Los Tiempos, see also March 24 and 25, 1955; Aug. 27-31, 1957; May 28, Oct. 11, and Dec. 25, 1958; Aug. 17 and 24, Sept. 1, and Oct. 9, 1959; Feb. 13, March 10, May 12 and 22, and Oct. 19, 1960; and Feb. 24 and Oct. 21, 1961.
33. /IAPA/, XVIII Annual Meeting, October, 1962 (Mexico City, 1963), 160-169.
34. /IAPA/, XXV Annual Meeting, October, 1969 (Mexico City, 1970) 161-162. Also, letter from James B. Canel, general manager, IAPA, June 27, 1972.
35. Raúl Peña Bravo, Hechos y dichos del general Barrientos (La Paz? 1971), 139. See also William H. Brill, Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR (Washington, D.C., 1967).
36. The author attended every session of the Popular Assembly, June 22 to July 2, 1971, and also witnessed the overthrow of the Torres regime on August 21 and the assault upon the University of San Andrés on August 23, 1971.
37. New York Times, March 15, 1970.
38. Ibid., July 19, 1970; Presencia, Aug. 24, 1971, and Hoy, Sept. 1, 1971.
39. Laurence Whitehead, "Bolivia Swings Right," Current History (February 1972), 87, n. 2, and Presencia, Sept. 1, 1971.
40. Jaime Calderon and James Petras, "Government by Colonel," New York Times, Jan. 22, 1973. The authors are members of the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners.
41. Speech by Mary Elizabeth Harding, Temple University, April 12, 1973. See also "Repression in Bolivia," America (April 7, 1973), 297-298, and "Repression and Resistance in Bolivia," The Christian Century (June 7, 1972), 667-669.

42. Harding speech, op. cit. Miss Harding suffered physical abuse and torture, although the American consul in La Paz wrote to her parents that he had found her "in good health and high spirits" during a personal visit. At the time, she had had nothing to eat or drink for four days. She had a blackened eye and could barely stand.

43. Canel interview, op. cit. Banzer proclaimed a state of siege in Bolivia on Nov. 22, 1972, and extended it for another 90 days on Feb. 21, 1973. Despite this curtailment of civil liberties, the Inter-American Press Association News (February-March 1973), 5, stated: "There have been no reports of direct press restrictions as a result of the action renewal of the state of siege on Feb. 21, 1973. The press, generally, supports the government of General Hugo Banzer."