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## ABSTRACT

This essay is the first of a series of occasional papers written by members of the Humanistic Education Project. The purpose is to examine the possibility that philosophy might in fact provide a foundation for educational practice; that philosophy would provide practical knowledge concerning what ought to be done so students and teachers could deal intelligently with social reality in an effort to bring about change without the use of force. After some initial definitions of politics and ethnics, the theme of this essay is developed in four parts. An analysis of ethical theory believed relevant to the current crisis in education is followed by an analysis of political theorizing thought to be relevant to the educational crisis. Consideration of the relationship, if any, between ethics and politics is described, as is the consideration of the implications of the theoretical discussion for educational practices. It is argued that practices allowing teachers to help students deal with society in an effort to bring about needed social change and action would include values clarification techniques, the methods of the social and physical sciences, and the dialectical method. (Author/KSM)

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Social Studies and Reality

A Commitment to Intelligent, Social Action

by  
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Directed by Dale L. Brubaker and  
James B. Macdonald

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## Foreward

The University of North Carolina - Greensboro Humanistic Education Project is now in its third year of existence. During this period of time, professors, teachers, students, and members of the larger community have worked together in developing the philosophical (theoretical) and technical dimensions of the project. Progress achieved thus far has been summarized in two major publications: Curriculum Patterns in Elementary Social Studies (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971) and Toward More Humanistic Instruction (Dubuque, Iowa: William Brown Co., 1972).

Pre-service and in-service teacher education programs have been conducted in order to achieve the major objective of the UNC-G Project: the integration of the cognitive (thinking), affective (feeling), and psychomotor (motor skill) dimensions of learning. In the process, materials have been created for use in classrooms K-12.

The following essay is the first of a series of occasional papers written by members of the project. Robert Ubbelohde, Assistant Professor of Education at Earlham College, was active in the project from its very inception and we therefore present his position paper with a great deal of pride.

Dale L. Brubaker  
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SOCIAL STUDIES AND REALITY  
A Commitment to Intelligent, Social Action

Robert Ubbelohde

The feeling that social change of any basic character can be brought about only by violent force is the product of lack of faith in intelligence as a method, and this loss of faith is in large measure the product of a schooling that, because of its comparatively unfree condition, has not enabled youth to face intelligently the realities of our social life, political and economic.

-- John Dewey (2:78-79)

### Introduction

If the recent reliance by students on 'confrontation' and 'revolutionary' tactics (i.e. on violent force) as a means for effecting social change is indicative of a lack of freedom necessary for both students and teachers within the schools to deal intelligently with political and economic reality, then it may be reasonable to assume that what is desperately needed in education generally and social studies programs specifically is the requisite freedom for teachers and students which will allow them to deal intelligently with social reality in an effort to bring about change. While recent occurrences on high school and college campuses combined with the rather pervasive feeling that there is a "crisis" in American classrooms<sup>1</sup> at all levels of education may justify the call for apposite instructional practices and curricula, the further assumption -- that philosophy can provide the foundation for or direction to such curricula and programs -- is neither justified by recent theorizing within philosophy nor readily apparent to those educators who would forego reliance on 'arm-chair' speculation for the supposed immediate pay-off of 'hard,' empirical data and research. It is the purpose of this essay, therefore, to examine the possibility that philosophy might in fact provide a foundation for educational practice.

### Some Initial Definitions

Two areas within philosophy have 'traditionally' been viewed as providing direction for practice -- that is, have been thought to provide practical knowledge concerning what ought to be done -- namely, ethics and political philosophy. Initial definitions must be provided for these areas of convenience prior to an examination of them.

Politics, although often approached from the point of its relationship to economics (i.e. in terms of the regulation and distribution of economic

<sup>1</sup>One view of the current "crisis" in education is presented by Charles Bilberman in Crisis in the Classroom. References made in this book provide other sources of information.

goods and services), is essentially concerned with an analysis of 'power' including such topics as the 'best' or 'just' distribution, utilization, and nature of power in regard to the 'social-regulation' of individuals. Early in his Second Treatise of Government, Locke defines "political power" as the,

...right of making laws with penalties of death and consequently, all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury: and all this only for the public good. (11:4)

While Locke makes certain assumptions about the nature of man and further assumes that it is conflicts regarding property and the preservation of property which serve as the focus for discussions of political power, Locke's definition of power is included here because of Locke's supposed influence on some of the founders of the United States of America and because it emphasizes the two basic concerns of much political philosophy. First, politics is concerned with the 'social-regulation' of individuals in view of certain presuppositions about man's nature or rights and/or an idea of what constitutes 'justice'. Second, the ultimate value or goal of a 'commonwealth' or 'state' is the preservation of itself. With the preservation of a given form of political organization or regime as its goal, politics concerns itself with the regulation of conflicts between or among individuals which threaten the 'public good', that is, which appear to be aimed at the destruction or impairment of the existing 'commonwealth'.

Ethics, in contrast to politics, has a personal rather than a social goal or orientation. As defined by Phenix,

The realm of ethics, then, is right action. The central concept in this domain is obligation or what ought to be done. The "ought" here is not individual but a universal principle of right.

Moral action presupposes freedom. Ethical meaning does not attach to coerced, purely habitual or mechanical, accidental, unconscious, or compulsive action. It is conduct that is deliberately executed as an expression of what one is committed to personally. Such action is self-determined rather than determined by outside factors. (16:220-221)

Thus, although based on a universal principle of right, ethical behavior involves self-regulation, personal commitment, and freedom as presuppositions. Ethics, as a field of study, is concerned with the way in which universal principles for the self-regulation of individuals can be justified, whether or not such universal principles can be justified, and the demands made by such principles of conduct.

Given these definitions of ethics and politics, the procedure to be followed in this essay is as follows: (1) analysis of ethical theory believed relevant to the current 'crisis' in education; (2) analysis of political theorizing thought to be relevant to the educational 'crisis'; (3) consideration of the relationship, if any, between ethics and politics as described; and (4) consideration of the implications of the theoretical discussion for educational practices.

## Ethics

Although the idea that education is to some extent a moral endeavor is given lip-service by many educators, the claim that ethics might provide guidance to or direction for education is antithetical to most of the recent work done by both philosophers and educators. Prior to this century, it was not unusual for philosophers to construct systems aimed at giving direction in regard to what ought to be done and for educators to base their curricula and instructional programs on such systems. The fact that this is no longer the case may be accounted for, at least in part, by a shift within the field of ethics. "Traditionally, according to Nowell-Smith,

moral philosophy has always been regarded as a practical science, a 'science' because it was a systematic inquiry the goal of which was knowledge, and 'practical' because the goal was practical knowledge, knowledge of what to do rather than knowledge of what is the case. (15:11)

Characterized slightly differently, what Nowell-Smith calls the traditional approach to moral philosophy has been termed the "metaphysical" approach by M. Warnock who claims that,

At the beginning of the twentieth century, ethics was predominantly metaphysical. The most important writers on moral philosophy explicitly linked their discussions of morals with views about the nature of the universe as a whole, and man's place in the universe. A system of ethics was what such philosophers aimed to set out, and this meant a total explanation of the way things are, which contained as part of itself an explanation of the demands and requirements of ethical behavior. (25:5)

The shift in emphasis or concern within ethics is often dated by the publication of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica in 1903 as noted by Warnock (15:11); and it has been argued by Nowell-Smith that,

When we turn, however, to the works of some of the best known twentieth-century moralists we find this conception of moral judgments [i.e. the 'traditional' conception -- ed.] deliberately abandoned. The direct object of ethics, we are told, is not Practice by Knowledge...

The contrast between Practice and Knowledge implies the assumption that there is no such thing as Practical Knowledge... The moral philosopher's task is now conceived not to be one of conducting a theoretical inquiry into practical wisdom, but to be one of investigating questions, judgments, doubts, and beliefs that are themselves theoretical. The moral philosopher not only makes theoretical statements about his subject-matter; his subject-matter consists of theoretical statements. (25:23-24)

While it is not the purpose of this essay to suggest what it is that the philosopher should or should not concern himself with, it is interesting to

note that Dewey once complained about a shift of concern within philosophy and suggested that,

The work that once gave its name to philosophy, Search for Wisdom, has progressively receded into the background. For wisdom differs from knowledge in being the application of what is known to intelligent conduct of the affairs of human life. The straits of philosophy are due to the fact that the more this available knowledge has increased, the more it has occupied itself with a task that is no longer humanly pertinent. (2:7)

According to Dewey, the task with which philosophy occupies itself is the 'possibility of knowledge'. While Dewey's claim about philosophy is not to be construed as a claim that philosophy ought to return to metaphysical system building in the traditional sense noted above, his characterization of the straits which philosophy is in does suggest that philosophers ought to concern themselves with the application of knowledge to the conduct of affairs.

The disregard for metaphysics by philosophers may account for the apparent disregard for both 'metaphysics' and philosophy itself by educators and this possibility has been discussed by Lucas who further claims that,

Then the educational philosopher is concerned with theory construction, metaphysics conceivably will be shown to yield statements supplementary to but supportive of statements of facts and value alike. Efforts to clarify what it means for a metaphysical proposition to be true in philosophical theory about education would be helpful since there seem to be so many natural connections between particular pedagogical issues and non-empirical considerations. The Procrustean refusal to admit even piece-meal metaphysical considerations into philosophizing about education, it would seem, can cut off important dimensions of certain concepts and problems. (12:141)

While Lucas' analysis may not justify the concern in this essay with 'metaphysical' claims and the ethical implications of such claims, his analysis would appear, at least, to suggest that 'metaphysical' positions deserve consideration prior to or as part of theory construction in education.

Despite the characterization of twentieth-century ethics noted above, one group of contemporary philosophers has engaged in the 'metaphysical'<sup>2</sup> or 'traditional' approach to ethics. Not only has this group of philosophers engaged in the consideration of 'metaphysical' ethics, but they have dealt specifically with concepts such as freedom -- freedom, as noted by Phenix, being a necessary presupposition for ethics. A problem is encountered immediately in any attempt to deal with this group of philosophers (that is,

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<sup>2</sup>The word, 'metaphysics', has been used in an ambiguous way up to this point. While no attempt will be made to delve into the numerous problems within philosophy in regard to the meaning of and/or possibility of 'metaphysics', the meaning afforded this term within one of Sartre's books will be explored below.

with existentialists) due to both the many mis-conceptions about their position and the variety of the positions within existentialism. (25:115)

Possibly the greatest difficulty involved in providing some meaning for the term, 'existentialism', arises because of the non-philosophical use of such existential concepts as freedom and alienation or anxiety by persons wishing to justify ways of living which deviate from the accepted norms of their society. A term such as 'alienation' provides a convenient shibboleth when used not only to describe what is in fact the case in regard to an individual's relationship with society, but to justify -- in the same breath -- that relationship. The concept of freedom is also easily perverted to both describe and justify an unwillingness to accept responsibility for one's actions. In the writings of such men as Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers, Camus, Kierkegaard and other 'existentialists'; however, terms such as 'freedom' and 'anxiety' have a technical or contextual meaning often inconsistent with common usage.

Problems also arise, however, when attempting to present an existential position, due to the fact that acknowledged 'existentialists' differ greatly in regard to both assumptions and methods. This diversity in positions among existentialists necessitates the taking of sides in selecting a position to explicate. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to argue for the validity of one position over others, a position will be stipulated which, it is believed, is consistent with that taken by Sartre in Existentialism and Humanism. However, even in selecting one existentialist and one work by this existentialist, problems arise. While the work selected was in fact written by Sartre, he later repudiated the position taken in this book according to Warnock who argues that,

The specifically ethical views in it are different from any that could be derived from Being and Nothingness... So, though it is necessary to look at this essay for the sake of historical completeness, and perhaps to see it as containing a possible doctrine for an Existentialist thinker to hold, yet it would be misleading to treat it as properly the theory of Sartre himself. (24:39)

Whether or not Warnock is correct in noting a difference between the position taken in Being and Nothingness and the essay selected for consideration or the later repudiation of this essay by Sartre, it should be noted that Sartre's position as explicated in this essay is taken to be no more and no less than one possible position which an existentialist might take.

With these problems out of the way, it should be noted that there is some common ground for existentialists according to Sartre who notes "two kinds of existentialists" who,

...have in common...the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence -- or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective. (19:26)

It is this belief which serves as the cornerstone for the views expressed in Sartre's own argument.

Freedom, as this term is explicated by Sartre in Existentialism and Humanism, is derived from the assertion that existence precedes essence.

What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world--and defines himself afterwards... Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is...Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself...Before... projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence; man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be. Not, however, what he may wish to be. (19:28)

Since there is no 'human nature' which pre-determines what man is, he is free to become whatever he 'purposes to be'. The atheistic flavor of this claim is not to be confused with a 'theological' or 'ontological' proof a priori of God's nonexistence. It may be helpful at this point to clarify Sartre's position to note that he makes a distinction between metaphysics and descriptive ontology. According to Sanborn,

Sartre, at the conclusion of Being and Nothingness, distinguishes between ontology and metaphysics and claims to be engaged in the former only. He argues that ontology describes the structures of being whereas metaphysics raises questions of origin and explanation... Whereas ontology is descriptive, metaphysics asks why things are as they are. (18:40-41)

Thus, Sartre is not concerned with the question of why Man is in the condition he is in or why there is or is not a God; he is only attempting to describe man's ontological state (i.e. the condition of being). As Sartre notes near the close of Existentialism and Humanism,

Existentialism is not atheistic in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. (19-56)

The argument being presented merely asserts that if God exists, that makes no difference to man who is still in a position of being unable to fathom any purpose God might have for him. Any purpose constructed by man through reason or intelligence lacks empirical or inter-subjective proof as an a priori proposition in the sense that it cannot be supported or derived from experience and thus even rationalistic philosophies which attempt to establish some a priori principle of morality (i.e. some 'nature' of Man) fail.<sup>3</sup> The non-existence of God, "at least as a basis for an explanation

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<sup>3</sup>A poem by Stephen Crane, "A Man Said to the Universe," seems to reflect Sartre's position in regard to man's condition as this might be viewed from the vantage point of some deity:

A man said to the universe:  
"Sir, I exist!"  
"However," replied the universe,  
"The fact has not created in me  
A sense of obligation."

of some pre-determined nature of Man, allows Sartre to assert that,

Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself... For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism -- man is free, man is freedom. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. (19:33-34)

The important thing to note is that man defined as freedom denies that an individual can blame society or other individuals for determining what he is. This is not to say that physical laws or biological laws do not apply to man since what is being discussed is man as an 'ethical', 'spiritual' or 'psychological' being as shall be discussed further below.

The two concepts -- freedom and choice -- having been asserted, a third notion, responsibility, can now be examined. According to Sartre,

-- continued on page 7

If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men... When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean every one of us must choose himself, but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be... I am thus responsible for myself and for all men; and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man. (19:29-30)

In asserting that an individual is responsible not only for himself but is also responsible for creating an image of man as he thinks man ought to be, Sartre is recognizing not only the influence an individual has on his contemporaries insofar as he is an example of what any man can become, but also the influence an individual exerts in an historical sense by helping to create an image of what Man can be. While Napoleon or Hitler may be discussed as examples of what man can become, lesser known men, in fact, every individual contributes something to the image of what man can be in fashioning his life in terms of what he believes man should be. This assertion that man helps to create an image of what man can be is particularly interesting for teachers who are attempting to educate individuals in terms of certain goals -- that is, in terms of an image of what should be.

Whatever its implications for education, the concept of responsibility helps to understand both anguish and self-deception as Sartre uses these terms.

The existentialist frankly states that man is in anguish. His meaning is as follows -- when a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind -- in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility. There are many, indeed, who show no such anxiety. But we affirm that they are merely disguising their anguish or are in flight from it. (19:30)

It is the flight from or disguising of this 'profound responsibility' or anxiety which is "self-deception." (19:50-51) The concepts of anguish or profound responsibility and the associated idea of self-deception might be utilized in characterizing the present situation of those who realize that such things as environmental pollution, racial and sexual discrimination, and war are helping to create an image of man (are, in fact, creating an image of man through the participation of individuals in them) while.

self-deception or flight from responsibility might account for those who refuse to face their responsibility in an attempt to deal with it. It is important to realize, however, that the 'drop-out' is helping to create an image of man just as much as is the 'polluter', and questions can be raised concerning the value or worth of either course of action.

An initial problem which arises in regard to Sartre's position is that it may be an egoistic or solipsistic philosophy. That is, the position taken may lead to the assertion that the individual is the only being which is important or which exists -- that is, only 'I' exist and have worth. Sartre attempts to answer this possible criticism by claiming that each man,

...recognizes that he cannot be anything (in the sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or jealous) unless others recognize him as such. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself. Under these conditions, the intimate discovery of myself is at the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom which confronts mine, and which cannot think or will without doing so either for or against me. (19:45)

While this brings the discussion back to the point noted above that what Sartre is discussing is spiritual man and not biological, physical or 'political' man as such, the important thing to note is that the fact that others are necessary for an individual's 'spiritual' existence does not in itself prevent a man from being wicked or jealous, or greedy -- in fact, others make such an existence possible. That is, while other people may be necessary for an individual's 'spiritual' existence, other people are not a sufficient basis for a person's being good rather than wicked.

The crucial problem for Sartre is that of developing his ontological description of man into an 'ethic'. According to Sartre, his position does allow for the formulation of judgments and provides an 'end' or 'aim' for action.

We can judge... One can judge, first -- and perhaps this is not a judgment of value, but it is a logical judgment -- that in certain cases choice is founded upon an error, and in others upon the truth. One can judge a man by saying that he deceives himself. Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without help, any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver... The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a dissimulation of man's complete liberty of commitment... If anyone says to me, "And what if I wish to deceive myself/" I answer, "There is no reason why you should not, but I declare that you are doing so, and that the attitude of strict consistency alone is that of good faith. Furthermore, I can pronounce a moral judgment. For I declare that freedom, in respect of concrete circumstances, can have no other

end and aim but itself; and once a man has seen that values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness he can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the foundation of all values. (19:50-51)

Thus it appears that Sartre has established a basis for making ethical judgments and a universal 'aim' or end as a guide for 'right' conduct based on his ontological description of man's condition; however, there are those writers who think this is not the case.

In a discussion of the ethical theory developed by Sartre in Existentialism and Humanism, Mary Warnock raises numerous questions and problems related both to the derivation of the ethical claims from the ontological description and the universality attributed to the concept of freedom. (24:39-44) "The essential point," according to Warnock,

is that, concrete or not, Kant's moral theory is firmly based on the law that, since the only ultimate good is the good free will, the free wills of others must never be overruled for some private and individual end. And he further held that if everyone had regard to this law, human ends would somehow fit with one another, and prove ultimately compatible with each other, in a 'kingdom of Ends'.

That there is much which is incoherent or unclear about Kant's theory will not be denied. But it does contain a serious attempt to deal with the problem, which as I have suggested already, seems to be at the heart of morality, namely, how one is to reconcile the free choices of one person with those of another equally free agent. Sartre, on the other hand, in the essay we are considering, merely says that in choosing freedom for myself I am choosing it for others, but does nothing to show how to avoid my freedom's clashing with that of others, or how to reconcile conflicting free choices. Moreover, as we have seen, he tries to show that there is a kind of logical necessity in choosing freedom for myself and that this further logically entails my choosing it for others, since whatever I choose for myself I also choose for others. Neither of these logical points is enough to serve as the foundation of an ethical theory. (24:42-43)

This criticism of Sartre might be more understandable if Warnock has said that Sartre fails to provide a foundation for ethical theory as ethical theory is defined by Warnock. That is to say, Warnock's criticism of Sartre seems to be predicated on an assumption about what an ethical theory ought to be and do and it involves, further, several misconceptions concerning Sartre's position and claims.

First, according to Sartre, an individual does not choose freedom for himself or anyone else. Freedom is established not on the basis of a choice but by an ontological description of man's condition. In fact, Sartre denies that the sort of rationalistic construction of freedom engaged

in by Kant and being suggested by Warnock is even possible. It is not a logical necessity or construction that forces an individual to choose freedom, rather it is a psychological necessity (in the sense of psycho-analytic or phenomenological recognition or awareness) which forces the individual to recognize (not choose) that he is in fact free. Whereas a person may admit to or deny the fact that he is free, the admittance or denial does not depend upon a logical argument (i.e. inductive or deductive argument) or rational analysis and construction.

There is a logical necessity involved only after an individual has recognized that he is in fact free since logical consistency would then entail that he could not both admit and deny his freedom -- Sartre suggests. However, this logical necessity which allows for a moral judgment is dependent upon the prior 'psychological' recognition of freedom by the individual involved. Sartre is not of course suggesting that there is a rationalistic, a priori principle to establish freedom as its own end in the manner in which Kant treated freedom. The further 'psychological' fact -- that in a state of forsakeness man can will only freedom -- suggested by Sartre is contradictory to the notion that an individual can choose not to choose -- or so it seems. However, if an individual admits that he is free to choose not to choose, he either is confused as to the meaning of the idea of freedom to choose or is contradicting himself. Once the freedom to choose not to choose is admitted, it would seem logically and 'psychologically' impossible for a person to deny that freedom to choose is the condition of man (although he might choose to be conditioned or to allow someone else to choose for him, in both cases, all choice being determined by his own initial freedom and choice).

Further, it is interesting to note that the denial by Sartre that there is a 'metaphysical' entity such as God or any other causal determination of a non-natural or natural sort, or any possibility of a rationalistic or naturalistic definition which determines or provides a basis for justifying values seems consistent with much of the ethical theorizing of recent 'Anglo-American' philosophers since G. E. Moore.

The further claim by Warnock, that a necessary feature of a system or "theory" of ethics is a calculus or some other means of reconciling clashes of freedom between or among individuals is both predicated on the assumptions that this needs be the case and seems to ignore the possible distinction between ethics and politics -- between 'spiritual' and socio-physical man. If politics is in fact concerned with the social-regulation of individuals, clashes of individuals' freedoms would appear to be a political not an ethical problem. Warnock's criticism depends upon the belief or assertion that there is a pre-determined set of values or a value for man and that a method of resolving 'social' conflicts is a necessary part of an ethical position or theory. If ethics is defined as it is in this essay, it would seem that freedom (as the universal condition of man as opposed to a universal principal or concept) is established as both the basis for and the aim of ethical activity. Further, freedom is established by a method which is open to support or denial on the basis of ontological (or phenomenological) 'fact'.

This is not to claim that ethics and politics are or should be unrelated. In fact, a political judgment might be made about an individual's choices

or an ethical judgment might be made about a society or a given political reconciliation of freedoms. This is a claim that clashes of personal freedoms are a socio-political problem which must be adjudicated by political means within a given government and not in some transcendent 'kingdom of ends'. A given political reconciliation of freedoms effected by a society may be judged either ethically good or bad by an individual or a group of individuals and lead to a withdrawal from society, to revolution, or to an attempt to change society on the part of those judging. Whatever course of action an individual takes, although it is motivated by an ethical concern with freedom, is a political problem insofar as it issues forth in action which may either support or tend toward the destruction and/or change in some way the existing political organization -- that is, the commonwealth.

### Politics

Having briefly discussed ethics, it is now possible to examine political theory believed relevant to educational planning and practices.

Implicit in Locke's definition of political power quoted above is the traditional approach to political theorizing which asserts certain rights which by nature pertain to Man (e.g. the right of an individual to own and use property in accord with his personal goals and aims) and an argument concerning the form of government which 'best' protects the individual's rights in regard to property -- for example, socialism, facism, tyranny, anarchy, or communism might be argued for. Also implicit in the definition is an assumed relationship between politics and economics (i.e. the distribution and availability of property, goods and services all of which are assumed to be relatively scarce).

Any approach to political theory based on the assertion of certain 'rights' supposedly determined by man's nature must be rejected in formulating a political theory consistent with a 'descriptive ontology' which entails the denial of some inherent or pre-determined nature of man. Given Sartre's description of man, man simply is free and freedom is its own end. On this approach, there is no perfect 'state' (i.e. form of government) which man should live in or under. Thus, man is faced in politics as in ethics with no a priori principle and therefore with no technique or calculus to determine or direct him in making political decisions -- that is, with no basis for reconciling clashes of freedom.

It should be noted, however, that the ethically best -- most effective although not necessarily the most efficient -- form of government is that which allows man to be free (i.e. serves freedom as its own end). Thus, a government can reconcile conflicting freedoms by accommodating such conflicts (providing a reconciliation which does not violate individual freedoms) is theoretically the best form of government. This may sound as though anarchy is being suggested as the 'best' form of government, but this conclusion does not follow from what has been said.

It must be remembered that Sartre has provided us only with a description of 'spiritual' man and does not attempt to describe man as a social or physical entity or being. The converse of man's spiritual freedom is his socio-physical dependency. While man is spiritually defined only insofar as he

chooses to act and become, he is politically or socially defined only insofar as there is physical reality (e.g. economic goods and services) and existing state (i.e. form of government) or society. It is interesting to note that mystics have long known that the only way to deal with themselves in a wholly 'spiritual' or ethical manner is to deny or transcend political and physical reality. Further, the influence of economic reality as a factor limiting individual freedom has also long been taken into account in political theorizing.

Having recognized economic reality as a factor limiting individual 'rights', for example, for Locke -- a political theorist writing in an essentially agrarian economy -- it seemed natural probably that an individual's ethical freedom (i.e. 'rights') be defined at least partially in terms of property. A man was in fact socially and physically free to some degree -- during this historical period -- only insofar as he owned property. In fact, freedom (i.e. 'rights' or 'liberty') for an individual tended to increase with the increased ownership of land. On the other hand, Marx who had as a reference point for his writing what was essentially an industrial society (i.e. laissez faire capitalism) recognized that it was the control of industrial machinery which to a large degree determined personal freedom rather than the ownership of land. Marxian doctrine is thus captured in the aphorism that he who controls the tools makes the rules. Again, history may well support the claim that during the period in which Marx was writing social freedom of the individual tended to increase as the ownership of industrial 'tools' increased. In both cases -- that of Marx and that of Locke -- there is always the possibility that personal freedom which typically attaches itself to the person who denies economic reality and socio-political reality after the manner of a Thoreau might be attained, but this is to say that such an individual denied or ignored the political and economic reality and asserted the ethical freedom which was his. Given this perspective of economic limitations on freedom, it is also possible to make some sense of revolutions which followed from political theories. For example, the revolutions which followed in the Lockean mold were revolutions primarily of those who either held property and were still denied political power or by those who possessed other economic goods and were denied access to political power. At least some Marxian revolutions, on the other hand, were supported by peasants -- 'owners' or 'users' of land -- and others possessing property or 'goods' but denied access to political power. While an 'exploited' worker within industry is not apt to overthrow his 'exploiter' since the 'exploiter' provides the worker with the means for obtaining biological and physical necessities (meager as the provision may be), the land owner or property owner who has biological and physical needs provided for either by his own labor or because of excess capital but lacks access to power is apt to view the control of industrial tools as a necessity if his freedom is to be increased.

At present, property, 'goods' and services along with the ownership of tools of production no longer seem to define (or be the means to) freedom for many individuals and groups -- with the possible exception of those minority groups which have been denied even minimal access to and benefits from industrialized society. Currently -- for those capable of obtaining goods and services, of purchasing property, of participating in the ownership of 'industrial tools' -- it is the development of technology and the attendant

'technology' which limits freedom.<sup>4</sup> It may be that the difference in perspective of what limits freedom of an individual between those in minority groups and those in the majority is their view of economic reality -- which is to say economic reality viewed by people in different economic states of development.

This shift in view of the economic reality facing man may be what accounts for the rise of the perspective of economic theory which Heilbroner attempts to deal with in his book, Between Capitalism and Socialism. (C)

Besides economic reality imposing limitations on man's freedom of choice, of course, there are other limitations of greater or less importance. For example, group dynamics may tend to limit choice and freedom although an understanding of group dynamics may counteract the limiting nature of the phenomenon. Likewise, certain physical and biological characteristics of a man or men may tend to place limits on socio-political decisions, although again, these limitations may in some cases be less real than originally imagined. Primarily, the limitations placed upon the reconciliation of individual freedoms are those social phenomena studied by the social scientists and to some extent by physical and biological phenomena as studied by natural scientists. Whereas the ethical condition of 'nature' of man is recounted in biographies, works of art and religious writings (i.e. by the humanities and arts), the methods of the social, biological and physical sciences may be utilized to study the limitations of and the practical alternatives within a given state and physical condition.

Looking back at Locke's definition of political power, it is now possible to replace the term 'property' with the term 'freedom' and thus paraphrase Locke's definition of political power as follows:

Political power is the making of laws with penalties of death and consequently all lesser penalties for the regulating and preserving of individual freedom, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all of this only for the public good.

Notice that the word 'right' is omitted from this definition since it would be redundant to use this term in the sense of 'power' or 'force' (i.e. political power is the force necessary to make laws) and a 'right' in the sense of some metaphysical, a priori principle has been rejected. While an individual's freedom may be manifested both in regard to the possession and use of property (i.e. economic reality), property is an economic not a political or ethical term. Of course, the inter-relation of economic and political theory and categories has been a tradition in Western thought and discussion of 'politics' has often been discussion of 'political-economy'.

<sup>4</sup>For a discussion of the effects of technology see: Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, (New York: Vintage Books, 1964); Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man. (Boston: Beacon Books, 1964); and Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, (New York: Bantam Books, 1966 ).

Much of the relatively recent debate about technology, on the other hand, has been a debate which might be termed 'political-ethics' as opposed to 'political-economics' although, again, it is well to remember that in practice economics, politics and ethics are all interrelated.

Within politics, then, an 'ontological description' of man's condition (i.e. socio-political condition) might utilize terms such as 'society' (i.e. 'social regulation' or 'state') to the concepts of 'freedom' and 'responsibility' in ethics. 'Society', like its counter-part in ethics -- 'freedom'-- is both the ontological condition of man and the aim of society. 'Society' is an end in itself within political theory. To justify a particular 'reconciliation of conflicting freedoms' within a given political organization (i.e. state), it must be shown that the reconciliation tends toward maintaining a given form of political organization (i.e. 'society') otherwise the reconciliation is 'bad' or 'false'. Reconciliation in the political sphere may limit or deny an individual's freedom -- that is, it may be ethically bad but politically good.

#### Ethics and Politics

The problem that Warnock raised in regard to Sartre's position has not been avoided. Although it is possible to determine what might best serve an individual's freedom and likewise how to reconcile individual freedoms to further a given society, no account has been offered as to how freedom (as personal) can be reconciled with the furtherance of society when a conflict exists between the two. It should be noted, however, that the problem has been reformulated from its statement by Warnock. In Warnock's discussion of Sartre's position, the problem was one of reconciling clashes of individual freedom. Given the position taken in this essay, such clashes between individuals can be reconciled if it is assumed that 'society' is an end in itself and therefore that 'society' will provide for the reconciliation of personal conflicts in an attempt to maintain itself. That is, given 'society' as a value and given personal freedom as a value, political theory and reality sacrifices individual freedom (when and if expedient) to maintain itself. On the other hand, an individual might 'sacrifice' a given 'society' to preserve freedom as a personal value (i.e. to serve freedom as its own end). The problem is not one of reconciling individual freedoms -- as Warnock argues against Sartre's position -- but rather is one of reconciling the freedom of the individual with the demands made by 'society' (i.e. 'society' attempting to maintain itself).

Rather than imagining a situation in which two individuals are in conflict, it is now necessary to imagine a situation in which an individual (or possibly a minority group of individuals) asserts that his or its freedom has been limited by society. Two possibilities immediately present themselves: (1) it is possible that the individual is mistaken about his freedom and/or the supposed limitation or negation of it; or (2) it may be that society did not choose or select the 'best' method or means for reconciling individual freedoms in the attempt to maintain itself. Were either of these alternatives the case (or, in fact, if both were the case at the same time) it might be possible to get either the individual or the group to reconsider its position. In theory, at least, these possibilities are easily dealt with since -- assuming man is capable of reasoning -- methods are available in the form of inductive and deductive reasoning to clarify and reconcile the individual's misunderstanding,

society's error, and/or the conflict between these. However, assume that either the society or the individual is unwilling to admit to having made a mistake or that no mistake has been made (for example, society has limited the individual's freedom but there is no other way in which society can preserve itself), then the paradox is a real impass and not a theoretical problem.

disagreement between values or value orientations -- that is, between society trying to preserve itself and the individual attempting to serve freedom as its own end -- comes into being as opposed to a conflict within a value framework (for example, a mistake made in distinguishing what limits or furthers an individual's freedom or society) in the 'real impass' just noted, and the question becomes: Is there a means (that is, a constructive means in terms of the individual and society) for dealing with and adjudicating this real sort of impass? The issue is whether or not there is some over-riding value which can be invoked to adjudicate the problem or if, lacking such an over-riding value, there is no hope other than that of persuasion, social conditioning, and/or revolution. Of course, numerous answers to the question of what constitutes an over-riding value have been given. For example, a metaphysical deity such as God or Nature has been postulated as the creative-directive ruler of the universe which has determined once and for all time the end or over-riding value of or for man. A dialectical-material answer suggests that the end for man is determined in an 'evolutionary' or historical manner and that individuals can somehow merely further or hinder a rapid achievement of the end but that in fact it is the historically determined and 'social' finale which establishes that the postulated end was correctly identified (i.e. determines what the end was in fact). It is also possible to postulate other sorts of 'kingdoms of ends', methods of intelligence, or intuitive bases for ends which function to justify or to withhold justification from various reconciliations of ends. Certainly arguments can be and have been suggested for each supposed 'true' end for man.

The traditional 'faith' of educators, it would seem, has to a great extent been placed in something similar to Dewey's "method of intelligence." There has been an emphasis on intelligence as a method or on forms of inquiry imposed by the structure of varying disciplines as the solution to social problems as is apparent in curricula emphasizing a method of inquiry or structure of the disciplines approach. Even those curricula which have claimed to focus on the child or on society have approached these 'phenomena' from the vantage point of structured disciplines and as such, as 'objects' which are merely actors in a play the script for which is the 'structure' or 'accumulated knowledge' disclosed by intelligent (i.e. 'social') methods.

As one example of this 'traditional' educational approach, it is possible to examine Dewey's position. Without presenting an extended analysis of Dewey's arguments for "intelligence as a method", it may be possible to suggest some presuppositions involved in his position and some of the limitations such a view involves.

In a small treatise entitled, Liberalism and Social Action, Dewey argues that,

In material production, the method of intelligence is now the established rule; to abandon it would be to revert to savagery. The task is to go on, and not backward, until the method of intelligence and

experimental control is the rule in social relations and social direction. Either we take this road or we admit that the problem of social organization in behalf of human liberty and the flowering of human capabilities is insoluble. (4:92-93)

For Dewey, the method of intelligence is the method of experimentation and "experimental control" when applied to social organization. Objections to Dewey's position as an ethical position have been raised by Garnett who argues that there are three main flaws in Dewey's claim:<sup>5</sup>

- (1) Every line of action involves some conflict and competition with other members of society; and intelligence finds its promise of most "unified orderly release" in choosing to conflict with those whose opposition is most easily overcome, particularly when it is supported in such exploitation of the weak by the example of the strongest or most numerous section of society. Against such results of the intelligent seeking of outlet for energy, society has erected some barriers in concepts of justice, but these are often distorted by the concerned intelligently operating energies of powerful groups; and even where this is not the case the intelligence of the individual, seeking its "unified orderly release in action", will only be influenced by concepts of justice in so far as his conscience may be worried by the thought of injustice, or society exerts pressures in its support. Yet conscience, interpreted as merely an effect of social conditioning, is something that intelligence should ignore except so far as it points to existing social conditions that may affect the course of activity. (5:51-52)
- (2) The second flaw in Dewey's position is that his analysis. . . turns the pursuit of the good into a pursuit of power. (5:52)
- (3) The third flaw in Dewey's argument is the inadequacy of his analysis of conscience. . . He adopts the explanation of conscience put forward by a great many naturalistic psychologists. It is simply a result of social conditioning. The mind of the child echoes the value judgments he hears expressed by those around him. (5:53)

To summarize these flaws noted by Garnett in terms of the analysis presented in this essay of ethics and political philosophy, Dewey ignores the ethical realm (i.e. the analysis of 'conscience' in terms of freedom and its attendant concepts of anxiety, self-deception and choice) and turns to politics for his 'ultimate' value (i.e. society is an end in and of itself). While the method of intelligence and experimental control are operable given a view of the optimal or 'best' form of society (e.g. assuming socialism, communism, anarchy, democracy or monarchy to be the 'best' form of government) and by ignoring the aspect of man discussed as his ethical 'freedom' in this essay, the method of intelligence is also suitable within ethics as a means of determining (i.e. of logically judging) actions consistent with freedom as an end in itself IF society (i.e. if conflicts of freedom) are ignored. The problem, as indicated by Garnett, is when the individual and the society (i.e. viewed in terms of political power) are examined together.

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<sup>5</sup>For an extended analysis and criticism of Dewey's position see also Garnett's, The Moral Nature of Man, (6:259-66 and 87-93).

While Dewey does invoke a naturalistic psychology which he might argue denies the 'ethical' freedom argued for in this essay insofar as it explains the individual as a socially conditioned animal, Dewey's position has been rejected in the argument for man's freedom based on the ontological description of man's condition. In short, Dewey's method of intelligence can only bring about social action and change if a best form of society is assumed a priori and it cannot deal with conflicts between society or groups within society and individuals without sacrificing the individual's freedom to the predetermined social goal (whether the sacrifice is offered physically or by means of behavior modification or 'therapy' aimed at saving or adjusting the individual to society). By invoking a naturalistic explanation of man, Dewey is -- given Sartre's analysis -- guilty of self-deception.

The reason that the method of intelligence and experimental control is inoperable given the ontological description provided by Sartre is that it provides -- in and of itself -- no means for critically examining and thereby generating socio-political alternatives and/or ethical alternatives. The motivating factor for the generation of alternatives, given the position outlined in this essay, is the conflict between individual freedom on the one hand and societal self-perpetuation on the other. Society tends to be oriented toward the status quo in attempting to maintain itself while the individual is oriented toward maintaining and/or increasing his freedom in the spiritual sense. A democrat tends to remain a democrat while a libertine tends to remain a libertine. Within monarchy, for example, it is possible for goals to be generated to further (i.e. maintain) monarchy through what appear to be changes and given an amount of freedom an individual can set goals to maintain and possibly to increase his understanding of freedom through what appear to be changes within a given social system such as, for example, monarchy. The problem which self-perpetuating societies taken in conjunction with individual freedom raises have been examined, for example, in regard to one type of society by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man. Without a motivating or dynamic element which helps man to conceptualize (i.e. give meaning to) and thereby deal with the conflicts between his socio-political position and his freedom and vice versa, the status quo tends to maintain itself ethically and politically. The dynamic element (in the present analysis, the conflict between society and the individual) is dependent upon a means of conceptualizing alternatives which go beyond a linear method (i.e. logical deduction and induction) of intelligence such as that conceptualized by Dewey in his method of intelligence. Such a means for conceptualizing alternatives is presented, it seems, in the 'dialectical method' as it is presented attached to various metaphysical assumptions in the works of Schiller, Hegel, Marx and Marcuse. The dialectical method is viewed in this essay apart from any metaphysical position and is not viewed as being in opposition to Dewey's method of intelligence, in fact, it is viewed as a necessary adjunct to Dewey's method of intelligence (not including necessarily the need for "experimental control"). Put another way, social change is predicated upon the ability of individual's (individually and collectively) to generate and deal with meanings (that is, to deal with theses and antitheses -- real alternatives which go beyond a given system whether it be socio-political, metaphysical, religious, mystical or 'epistemological'). Intelligent change is predicated on the ability to criticize (i.e. to point out alternatives at all levels of meaning) in counter-distinction to change guided by logical argument within a system of thought or action. As Lippard has suggested in regard to art criticism, "Criticism has little to do with consistency; for consistency has to do with logical systems, whereas criticism is or should be dialectical, and thrive on contradiction and change."  
(10:25)

Assuming, then, that the function of the schools is to deal intelligently and critically with social reality in an attempt to bring about meaningful change, it would seem that conditioning children to accept a socialistic political system is no different than conditioning them to a monarchical system. To go beyond a given form of government and political indoctrination, it would seem possible either to assume that man is socially (or economically) conditioned or determined and then to argue according to some naturalistic psychology that social harmony or 'progress' ought to be brought about by social conditioning because a certain form of society is the 'best' or 'inevitable' form or to assume that there is a method which will allow for the generation of alternatives which are practicable. The dialectical approach or method when combined with a motivating force derived from or based in the conflict between individual freedom and social conditioning or societal limitation of freedom may be viewed as the necessary adjunct to Dewey's method of intelligence insofar as it provides the alternative to purely conditioned approaches to change within a given socio-political reality or ideal by providing for the generation of 'real' alternatives for social change.

### Philosophy and Educational Practices

The implications of the foregoing analysis may best be seen if practical suggestions are inferred from it concerning a social studies program or curriculum committed to intelligent, social action.

It should be noted that inherent in this view is a conception of what constitutes education. In its most succinct form, the underlying assumption made in this paper is that: Philosophy is the theory of education. Readers familiar with Dewey's Democracy and Education may be reminded of both the claim he made therein and his assertion about the nature of education:

If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education. (3:328)

While this essay is not an attempt to explicate Dewey's position in regard to philosophy or education, the assertion by Dewey that to view philosophy as the theory of education it is necessary to view education as a process of forming dispositions, suggests another assumption made in this paper: Education is the process of forming fundamental dispositions.

Any definition or conception of education which involves the notion of dispositions is immediately faced with a plethora of philosophical and psychological problems and issues related to the meaning of the term, 'dispositions'.<sup>6</sup> While the problems associated with the use of the term are both many and complex, it may suffice for the purposes of this essay to stipulate a meaning for the term 'dispositions'. Thus, any definition which would equate 'dispositions' with 'unthinking', 'habitual' or 'conditioned' responses to stimuli are rejected in stipulating a meaning for the term which is consistent with Arnstine's claim that,

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<sup>6</sup>For example, see C. L. Stevenson's discussion of 'dispositions' in Ethics and Language. (23:46-59)

A change in a person which is not simply a new habit, but which affects his future action, might best be understood as the acquisition of a new disposition -- that is a new way of approaching, or looking at, or of dealing with some range of topics or problems. To have a disposition is to be disposed to act, but it is not simply to be prepared to run off a specific set of responses.

Because dispositions are not just habits, they are not simply automatic. Thus the possessor of a disposition exercises choice in action; his action is discriminating. To this extent, and in contrast to habits, dispositions imply intelligence. (22:27)

Defined in this manner and interpreted in the context of this essay, 'dispositions' involve the dialectical method as well as the 'method of intelligence' as used by Dewey. A disposition -- insofar as it implies or involves free choice -- entails the personal (i.e. ethical) commitment alluded to by Phenix in the definition of ethics provided above. Insofar as a disposition implies or involves action, it becomes a social manifestation of a commitment which either supports or conflicts with the existing socio-political structure. Intelligent methods are implied, as noted by Arnstine, but involved is also the ability to approach a problem in a unique way (i.e. in a way which is at least 'unique' for a given individual and possibly for a given society in which the given person operates). What we need is a dialectical mode of thinking.

Turning now to the relation between ethics and politics on the one hand and apposite instructional programs on the other, the purpose of education has been defined as the forming of dispositions which are inferred from free, intelligent choice on the part of the students and we have accepted traditional logic as a means of dealing with inductive and deductive arguments within a value framework (i.e. given personal or social goals) combined with dialectical methods to deal with constructive alternatives for change which necessitate the relating of the ethical and social realms.

The ethical perspective provides a convenient starting point for the discussion of educational practices since there already exists a model for working with valuing which is to some extent based on Dewey's method of intelligence and related work in the theory of valuation. (17:9) As opposed to other discussions of affective behavior, the work done by Raths, Harmin and Simon approaches values from the point of view of valuing (i.e. the valuing process). (17:10) Part of the strength of this model is the fact that it attempts to deal with the individual in relation to society. (17:4) Thus, it would seem likely that the Raths', et al work might serve as the basis for an instructional program consistent with the ethical and political position developed in this essay.

A further examination of Values and Teaching indicates that rather than focusing on values as 'entities' this model for value clarification emphasizes the valuing process and defines,

...values as based on three processes: choosing, prizing, and acting.

- CHOOSING: (1) freely  
(2) from among alternatives  
(3) after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative

- PRIZING: (4) cherishing, being happy with the choice  
(5) willing to affirm the choice publicly
- ACTING: (6) doing something with the choice  
(7) repeatedly, in some pattern of life

These processes collectively define valuing. Results of the valuing processes are called values. (17:30)

This definition of values in terms of the valuing process is to serve as the basis of the discussion of this approach. It should be noted initially; however, that while this definition is dynamic in the sense that action is to follow from choosing and prizing on the part of the individual, it is only ethically and socially dynamic in the limited way in which Dewey's method of intelligence is. That is to say, while the model deals with the dynamics of making ethical (i.e. personal) choices within a given social system of which the teacher is a part and representative of, it does not deal with the problems of relating 'freedom' as a goal or end to 'society' as an end. It is interesting to note that the method of intelligence as applied within the sphere of politics by Dewey and the dialectical method of relating the ethical and socio-political spheres are left in the hands of the teacher and/or the larger society. (17:33-36) That is, it is the teacher or the larger society which determines whether or not an area or 'conflict' or possible choice may be dealt with and which alternatives are 'safe'. Although the teacher may use dialectical means to reconcile his freedom with societal restraint (or if the teacher can't, assumably others can who make decisions about or for the schools), the model is essentially static in regard to politics -- that is, in regard to the methods and possibilities for social change. Thus, the value clarification model is essentially therapeutic in regard to children making personal choices since the teacher or some 'other' authority apparently only allows the child to operate only in regard to 'safe' issues and problems thereby denying the personal freedom of the student (i.e. the possibility of choosing "freely") to be dealt with except in instances in which society offers only minor or challengeable restraints. (17:33-36) At least two dangers seem to be associated with this attempt to convince the student that a given society allows him to assert his personal freedom: (1) students who come to realize that they have been allowed to deal only with 'safe' issues in regard to which society allows them to express their freedom may see no way in which to bring about constructive change in supposedly 'unsafe' instances and therefore turn either to violence or withdrawal; and (2) students who have not really dealt with conflicts between their personal freedom and societal limitations and who are not aware of this fact will lack the means necessary to generate constructive alternatives and to evaluate proposed alternatives thereby being left to follow blindly the plan of some other person (be he democrat or 'communitis') and while possibly being led to a violent rejection of a system will lack the means to bring about peaceful change in the system.

The value clarifying methods suggested by Raths and his colleagues do in fact suggest the need for free choice from among alternatives; however, the problem is that the utilization of dialectical methods for the generation of meaning are left to teachers or the 'larger society'. The aim of value clarification, then, can be none other than to 'condition' or 'adjust' the child either to a given society or to a given ideal of society as it might be -- that is, the aim is to habituate not to form 'dispositions'.

The concept of a dialectical approach to thinking may horrify those who equate the dialectic with its explication and utilization by Marxian polemicists. Although there is not space in this essay to consider the accuracy or adequacy of 'dialectical-materialism' either as it was used by Marx or by his followers, the dialectical method does have a broader meaning than given it by Marxian apologists.

Dialectical thinking is essentially a method for counteracting social conditioning by focusing on the meaning of 'particulars' be they systematic explanations or atomic particles. It involves the determination of meaning by consideration of both a thesis and an antithesis (i.e. a term and its negation) as opposed to 'traditional' logic in which consideration of a negation is not involved. From the consideration of meaning -- thesis and antithesis -- which involves criticism (i.e. focuses on contradiction and change) a synthesis is formulated which goes beyond a mere working out of inconsistencies between the thesis and its negation. A synthesis involves a better understanding of the original particular both because of a better historical-evolutionary understanding of socio-physical practice and consciousness and the formation or formulation of an image of a practicable reconciliation of thesis and antithesis -- in the present instance, a reconciliation of personal freedom and social limitations of that freedom. As applied to educational practices which involved both the ethical and the political realms under discussion, a dialectical consideration would involve the consideration of personal freedom (as an immediate fact of existence and as an 'historical' possibility for individuals) and the social limitations of such personal freedom. Social limitation of personal freedom would also involve an historical understanding or study as well as analysis of the immediate conditions in a given society. To consider personal freedom as an immediate fact, a psychological ('psycho-analytic' or phenomenological) awareness would have to be developed. Essentially, however, the dialectical mode of thinking is a means for generating an image capable of explaining present reality (personal and social) and capable of guiding and directing constructive (i.e. practicable) action toward changing society. The goal of the individual, of course, always being the increase of personal freedom in the 'spiritual' sense.

The image or vision here referred to is no less real than an architect's vision which is put into a blueprint, or than the painter's or sculptor's image for a work of art. The image of social change is limited as is the artist's image by socio-physical reality not to mention the individual's own personal awareness and understanding. However, there are methods available (i.e. the methods of the social and physical sciences) to determine if a given image is practical. Thus, a vision or image created to guide social change is subject, at least, to the test or tests of its practicality -- of its applicability to social and physical reality. Social and physical reality, however, is also subject to the test of a person's understanding of freedom. An image which meets social, physical and personal tests would appear to be practicable as program for social action.

While the Raths model may be useful as a model for value clarification once the goals to be used as criteria are stipulated by the 'isolated' individual, the social sciences and the methods thereof are adequate for determining the possibility of attaining to a stipulated social goal; however, an educational program which aims to develop a disposition toward constructive social action will also need the dialectical method of thinking in order to develop (allow students to develop) images or goals for social change. It is the dialectical method, further, which will help to insure personal freedom by helping to give meaning to the concept and at the same time counter-act social conditioning. The teacher thus has these

methods available for use: (1) value clarification techniques given the personal goal of freedom; (2) the findings and methods of the social and physical sciences insofar as they help to understand the existing society and its possibilities; and (3) the dialectical method for obtaining meanings and creating images of social change given personal freedom. **It must** be remembered that the object is for the students to also have available all three methods.

The content for such an educational program consists of the individual's (i.e. of a student's) understanding of freedom which can be furthered by reflection on one's own values and valuing processes, through philosophy, biographies, plays, fiction, works of art -- that is, through the humanities and art. The content also consists of an understanding of socio-physical reality as this is available through history, the social and physical sciences, and interactions with other people. The content also includes, however, the process (i.e. dialectical process) of expanding meanings of social determinism and personal freedom in formulating an image.

Rather than opening up the social studies to irresponsible, chaotic or violent social action projects, this model would place the 'responsibility' squarely on the shoulders of each student for determining the practicability, efficacy and value of a proposal for social change. This model shifts the role of the teacher from that of propagandizer for the status quo, guardian of culture, or political censor of student concerns and interests -- that is, it takes the teacher out of the role of political functionary whose tool is political power (and not knowledge) exercised without the consent of the students being governed -- to that of facilitator of learning whose weapon is the authority which attaches itself to disciplined thinking and the open-ended search for 'truth'. Given this model, a teacher's claim that a student's behavior is 'incorrect' or 'wrong' no longer can be confused with the assertion that a student's behavior is not sanctioned by the existing civil authority but means that a student has made a mistake in the utilization of methods or techniques or is not practicable. An image or proposal for social change, this means, is inconsistent with what is known to be possible given ethical, physical and/or social reality and that to establish the proposed change either the plan needs to be altered or some error must be shown to exist in the data concerning or methods of obtaining data about reality.

The goal of this plan is intelligent social action; however, it should be noted that inexperienced students are apt to make mistakes as are more experienced students (including teachers). While a mistake in forecasting the economic growth of a nation may have widespread and serious consequences and may thus be left to 'experts' until the proper understanding of phenomena involved is acquired (that is, are better left to 'experts' unless there is reason to believe experts are wrong or not 'experts'), there are aspects of the 'real' world both of more immediate concern for students and effecting a smaller sphere of people than predictions of economic growth of a nation. What is being suggested is that students already have an area of concern which is both socio-political and ethical within their classrooms and schools. It is only as they are given more freedom of movement outside the schools that their area of interest expands -- this includes, of course, movement in terms of travel and use of such things as news media. The classroom and school; however, are a continuing source of ethical and social conflict. The classroom is real even though there are those who believe that reality begins somewhere near the edge of the school playground. The classroom or school should not, however, be viewed as an end in itself or as a limitation on student

social action. Students will soon push beyond their school, neighborhood and city as they comprehend and come into contact with the larger society as it limits their freedom and the freedom of others. While the teacher has a responsibility to insure that the larger world is at least considered at some point, the starting point for this model remains the immediate political and social setting of the student -- that is, the classroom and the school. The continuing responsibility of the teacher given this model is; however, to help students deal with society 'intelligently' in an effort to bring about needed social change and action.

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