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ABSTRACT

The field of conflict resolution in the social studies curricula is considered in this paper. The author presents a repertoire of creative and peaceful conflict resolution approaches in a copyrighted appendix. Techniques are described and contrasts are drawn with current social studies curricula. Some of the effects of teaching part of the repertoire to some high school students is reported. The proposed creative, peaceful approaches to international conflict are organized into six categories based on what dimension of a conflict is mainly involved: the parties involved, the bases of conflict, the location, the timing, the nature of the involvement, and the causes. It is suggested that the value of including conflict resolution in social studies curricula is that creative, peaceful approaches can provide options that can reduce the necessity for a persisting stalemate, can reduce the need for tension to continuously escalate while negotiation continues, and can reduce the likelihood of exhausting all the promising nonviolent strategies for dealing with a particular crisis. (Author/SHM)

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SOME EFFECTS OF TEACHING ADOLESCENTS SOME
CREATIVE, PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACHES¹

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Nearly all of the available social studies curricula neglects the field of conflict resolution. Curriculum specialists are now showing considerable interest in filling the gap, but they are having trouble finding a variety of conflict resolution approaches. I have made a beginning on preparing a repertoire of creative and peaceful approaches. I would like to describe it, show how it contrasts with presently available social studies curricula, and report some of the effects of teaching part of the repertoire to some high school students.

In the early '60's, because of their concern about nuclear war, behavioral scientists began suggesting creative, peaceful diplomatic innovations for use when traditional diplomacy reaches an impasse. These innovations form a distinct class of conflict resolution methods which seem not to have been collected into one book nor considered as a separate class. I will sketch a definition of this creative, peaceful class of approaches and will present a repertoire of about four dozen such approaches, which is in the mimeographed handout. Hopefully this repertoire is sufficiently powerful and lengthy to convince people of the inexhaustible number of means for dealing with conflicts without using violence. As a result the search for these means can be prolonged during dangerous crises.

Examples from the repertoire include nonviolent demonstrations, Charles Osgood's Graduated Reciprocal Initiatives in Tension-reduction (with the acronym, GRIT),² , Muzafer Sherif's superordinate goals,³ and Roger Fisher's fractionation of conflict.⁴

1. Adapted from Some Effects of Teaching Adolescents Some Creative, Peaceful Approaches to International Conflict, Richard W. Fogg, 1972, Harvard School of Education, (Unpublished dissertation available on microfilm).
2. Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, Urbana, Ill., 1962.
3. Muzafer Sherif, In Common Predicament, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1966.
4. Roger Fisher, International Conflict for Beginners, N. Y., Harper, 1969.

Graduated Reciprocal Initiatives in Tension-reduction are announced de-escalation steps taken without consulting the opponent. The purpose of the initiative is to induce the opponent to follow suit with a step of his own, followed by one by the original party, etc. Each step is small enough so that one opponent cannot take advantage of the other. The GRIT approach is particularly applicable when opponents are unwilling to negotiate with each other. One of its purposes is to reduce tensions sufficiently so that opponents will negotiate with each other. Arms races would seem to be a particularly relevant issue for the GRIT approach.

Superordinate goals are purposes that cannot be achieved without cooperation among contenders and which offer goal-satisfaction for all sides. These goals supersede the lower-order goals with which the contenders began. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the Soviet goal of installing the missiles and the United States' goal of removing them were superseded by the superordinate goal of avoiding nuclear war, making possible the removal of the missiles in return for a no-invasion pledge. Cooperation on superordinate goals can reduce hostilities, making further cooperation possible.

Fractionation of conflict means the breaking up of disputes into elements that might be settled separately. The more easily resolved elements are dealt with first to build a momentum of trust. If trust is not forthcoming, a partial solution is at least salvaged. The Test Ban Treaty barring nuclear tests above ground but not below it stands as an example.

The general class of creative, peaceful approaches to conflict is considered here in an international context, but it applies to all levels. These approaches are alternatives beyond flight, fight, or simple compromise (where the only

question is where the loaf will be split). They are often built on contenders' common interests.

Creative, peaceful approaches to conflict can be distinguished from the ordinary, peaceful class of approaches; from ordinary, tough ones; and from creative, tough ones. The ordinary, peaceful class of approaches includes simple compromises. The ordinary, tough class of approaches includes the threat of a military frontal attack or of an economic boycott. The fourth class involves creative, tough methods, such as a fait accomplis.* The chart in the printed copy of this talk clarifies the four classes.

* Four Classes of Approaches to Conflicts

	<u>Ordinary Approaches</u>	<u>Creative Approaches</u>
<u>Peaceful Approaches</u>	e.g., a compromise that splits the difference	e.g., fractionation of conflict
<u>Tough Approaches</u>	e.g., a threat of military frontal attack or of economic boycott	e.g., a <u>fait accomplis</u> .

I have distinguished four inclusive classes of conflict-management approaches, each of which has dozens or perhaps hundreds of individual approaches. These, in turn, are very useful for generating specific strategies, of which there is an infinite number. An example of a strategy of ordinary, peaceful compromising would be Adlai Stevenson's suggestion during the Cuban missile crisis that the American missiles in Turkey be removed in return for the removal of the Soviet ones in Cuba. An example of an ordinary, tough threat in that crisis would be the military alert. The agreement not to invade Cuba if the missiles were removed would be an example of a peaceful, creative superordinate goal. The partial quarantine of Cuba would be an example of a tough and creative blockade approach.

Sometimes strategies within all four classes are used in a single crisis. Often a strategy from one class depends for its success upon the use of a strategy from another class. Nonviolent demonstrations, for example, are a creative, peaceful approach which frequently depend for their effectiveness on the fear that things will get out of hand and become violent.

Let us return to the creative, peaceful class of approaches and define its terms. The concept, creative, in the sense used here means productive, unusual, remote, flexible, and numerous. These qualities are taken mainly from Guilford's list of factors that make up creativity.⁵ For lack of time, I will not develop the meaning of these factors. Definitions can be found in the chart in the mimeographed version of this talk. (See Figure 1 on Page 5.)

5. Joy Paul Guilford, The Nature of Human Intelligence, N. Y., McGraw-Hill, 1967, Ch. 6.

Figure 1 -- Aspects of creativity in conflict resolution

Productive

One arranges goal-satisfaction for all contenders.

One avoids destruction, minimizes threats, seeks force reductions.

Unusual

One goes beyond fighting, doing nothing, arranging simple compromise or bargaining, where the question is only where the loaf will be split.

The creative solution is not often thought of at first.

Remote

May include a change of set.

Is beyond the bargaining positions the contenders began with.

Flexible

No component of the problem is initially taken as given.

One can cooperate and contend with another party concurrently.

Numerous

Many strategies are conceived.

The concept, peace, in the negative, passive sense is easy to define: the absence of war or other hostilities. In the active sense, peace means those interactions that promote harmonious relations and promote the development of personal potentialities. Such interactions might be trade relations marked by distributive justice, cultural relations marked by diffusion, and dispute settlement that is likely to avoid an outbreak of hostilities. Further, active peace involves relationships that are intended to reduce levels of armaments.

Finally it requires an attitude among adversaries whereby they seek to preserve each other's interests and identity.

When translated into curriculum the creative, peaceful class of conflict resolution approaches contrasts with other social studies curricula. Such a curriculum is mainly cognitive, while many others having to do with conflict are mainly affective, urging amity among peoples or urging peaceful resolution of conflict out of an appreciation for the dangers of and horrors of war. My proposal would have students consider a large variety of ways of dealing with a given conflict, whereas many social studies materials offer only a few ways - frequently falling under liberal, conservative, and middle-of-the road positions. Most of the new social studies projects teach general methods of inquiry, such as historical methodology or legal justification procedures. Implicit in the work of these projects is the assumption that the student will learn to recognize, conceive, and evaluate conflict resolution methods on his own. Most curricula fail to stress strategizing, except simulation games. These, however, rely mainly on the students' imaginations, with the result that sophisticated strategies too often fail to come to mind. And finally, a study of a spectrum of conflict resolution approaches stresses what could be done about crises; as opposed to traditional curriculum, which focusses on what was done; and the new social studies, which emphasizes opinions about what should be done; and radical curriculum, which concentrates on what the student will do about a conflict. Obviously the repertoire presented here could be used by curriculum makers of all these types.

Curriculum specialists of all persuasions are chastened as to the power of schooling to make major changes in students' cognitive capacities - a point which I'm sure does not need to be documented here, and which Piaget knew all along. A tendency, for example, for a student to think in stereotypes is likely

to be very stable. I would like to suggest that even though such students can rarely be taught to avoid categorical thinking, they can more readily be taught to expand the number of categories they will consider when dealing with a problem. Some research I have done lends support to this proposition.

The study centered around the teaching of a three week unit on the four creative, peaceful approaches to conflict mentioned above to three classes of high school seniors in a community typical of "middle America." The approaches were taught by programmed instruction and were then applied by the students in discussions of current and hypothetical crises. The instruments used to measure the effects of the teaching were a classroom test, a preference questionnaire, and interviews. I taught the classes, and the control group was made up of three other classes.

The hope was that the teaching would move the students beyond the tendency to respond to international crises by conceiving of and favoring only fighting, unspecified "talking things over," or doing nothing. I had observed this closed-minded "fight-gab-or do nothing" syndrome widely before and documented it in the responses of the students described here. The study rests on the faith that if many creative, peaceful ways of avoiding wars were widely taught, fewer wars would occur.

One of the main purposes of this study was to examine the effects the creative, peaceful approaches would have on the closed-minded students. The Rokeach dogmatism scale was used to define closed-mindedness. Such people tend to dis-trust an opponent but to trust their own government to an excessive extent in both cases. Considerable question existed in my mind as to whether those students would even respond to the approaches. These encompass new belief systems, which Rokeach showed closed people have trouble dealing with. My hope was that

they would respond to the approaches because these are themselves rigid in the sense of being limited, defined categories.

In spite of the theoretical doubts about whether the closed students would respond to the approaches and in spite of the comprehension difficulties some of these students had, many of them readily accepted the approaches and found occasion to use them in their own lives.* (Twenty-three students - half of the experimental group - were interviewed concerning transfer effects. 60% of these students - both open and closed ones - claimed to have used the approaches in their own lives, even though no assignment to do so had been made. The regular teacher doubted half of the usage claims, but even so, the transfer effect was strong. He did not doubt closed students more than open ones.) Indeed, to a striking extent, it was the closed students who said they did use the approaches. The uses were specified in each case.

*The 23-student subsample that was studied for transfer effects resembled the experimental group as a whole in several important respects:

	Subsample	Experimental group
IQ	107	106
Average test grade	<u>C+</u>	<u>C+</u>
Social Class (10-point scale)	3.7	3.4
Average Rokeach score	-.26	-.21

The cross tabulation is:

	Claimed to have used the approaches	Claimed not to have used the approaches
Open students (\bar{X} Rokeach score: $+.09$)*	4	8
Closed students (\bar{X} Rokeach score: $-.79$)	10	1
Totals	14	9
*Median for whole sample: $-.21$)		23

These results are statistically significant by the Chi square test (P .01). (But they are not fully reliable because the second column has one less student than is needed to make that test appropriate.)

These results probably can not be explained as being due to acquiescence differences because both the group that transferred the use of the approaches to their own lives and the group that did not had similar acquiescence scores on my test of that quality. Possibly the results can be explained partially by the fact that the transfer group had a higher mean IQ (110) than did the nontransfer group (103).

An example will show how students used the approaches. The custom in the community where I taught is to go on dates which are not planned in advance and which involve circulating through stores and gathering places for young people. There are more places to go than time will allow and there are places which only one partner wants to visit. The closed students are caught between the old belief that the boy chooses where to go and the modern belief that the girl should have a say - particularly on such dates where many of the things to do cost nothing. The result is a constant, tense attempt by members of both sexes to have their own way. The open students are somewhat open to

the new beliefs and are trusting enough to ask their partners what they would like to do some of the time. The tension-reducing initiatives revealed to some of the closed students a mechanism for reciprocal giving in to the other person's desires in small steps without being exploited. After the teaching, these students began a date with an offer to go where the partner wanted. They found that the partner reciprocated the offer later.

A quotation from a closed student provides another example: "One day my boss wanted me to do one thing and I wanted to do another so we settled on a third thing, the backlogged filing." This resolution is a superordinate goal. The same approach was used by a student to work out his view of what to do about the Vietnam war: he favored placing the problem under the control of an international commission. ¶ The students where I taught have the usual conflicts adolescents face, such as occasional disagreements with their dates, arguments with their parents about how late to stay out at night, and conflicts in their minds about what the country should do about the serious problems it faces. The open students have found a variety of ways to deal with such conflicts. Besides, when faced with a problem, they handle it intuitively, not with prescriptions.

The closed students, however, suffer more tension over their personal conflicts and they have more frustration about public problems because these students do not like what is happening in Vietnam and other areas, do not know what else could be done, and yet chauvinistically support government leadership on principle.

The approaches seem to have done for the closed-minded students what generalizations about conflict resolution had failed to do in the past. These students have been told many times that violence should be minimized, tension reduced, and common interests sought (i. e., the principles behind the approaches). The students had been told that the spirit is what counts in such

things, not so much the letter. I had tried to teach the spirit of the approaches in the pilot study without success in the case of the closed-minded students. But closed-minded students had not been able to work out the letter because of dependence on authority; because of conflicting principles, such as the idea that a contender can not be trusted; and other reasons. The approaches helped untie the bind for these students by spelling out sophisticated ways of resolving conflicts in an authoritative way, in specific ways, and in an overarching (superordinate) way that would allow the students to continue to distrust the out-groups with whom they or their country are contending while working for common interests opponents can be trusted to work for. As well, the stress in the approaches on common interests would make it possible to deal with people with strange belief systems without having to consider whether those systems have values which would suggest modifying one's own dogmatically held belief system.

The closed students may have been able to accept the approaches because familiar reasons for doing so could be found. The main reasons used were to reduce violence and to add new ways of compromising. The open students who accepted the approaches gave reasons involving violence reduction, but seemed already to know a variety of ways of compromising. One closed-minded and very bright girl expressed the two reasons in this way: "I believed before that force was the only way or else compromise. Now I see that there's more than one way to compromise, and other more satisfactory ways of dealing with problems."

The closed students, then, apparently had a limited, categorical view of compromise, which the approaches extended. This result fulfilled one of the main purposes of the teaching, which was to increase the categories of response to problems that closed students would consider.

The results of the teaching for the closed-minded students were modest; I saw no evidence of greater openness in general, greater trust, or greater

empathy as yet. But the approaches provided the important step of specifying alternatives for resolving conflicts in dilemmas and impasses where hostile assertion or simple compromising had not worked.

To sum up, many of the students learned to recognize and generate a large variety of peaceful strategies for dealing with conflicts and used these to replace more militant strategies they initially conceived for dealing with particular conflicts. This process occurred often in class discussion and in both the questionnaire and interviews. A particularly important finding of the study was that the creative, peaceful approaches to conflict serve important purposes for closed-minded students in expanding their thinking about peaceful conflict resolution beyond a limited view of compromise.

The overriding value of the creative, peaceful approaches is that they can provide a spectrum of options that can reduce the necessity for an endlessly persisting stalemate, reduce the need for tension to continuously escalate while negotiation drags on, or reduce the likelihood of exhausting all the promising nonviolent strategies for dealing with a particular crisis. Thus, when students consider a particular conflict, they are more likely to come up with options which preserve the interests of themselves and their opponents without violence.

It is my hope that the repertoire presented here will be of use to curriculum writers who would like to include the dimension of sophisticated conflict resolution in their work.

CREATIVE, PEACEFUL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Richard Fogg

Introduction

This repertoire gives some approaches for dealing with international conflicts when ordinary negotiation has failed and when threats seem dangerous to use as a mainspring for resolution. The list was gathered from among the international relations literature, though the items on it could be used in any sort of conflict. Elmore Jackson and Fred Charles Ikle¹ made earlier attempts at the same sort of list, and both found the task to be a fledgling, pioneering one, as it still is. Indeed, the repertoire could never be finished, as there are probably an infinite number of variants that could be devised. The point is to become adept at using a number of variants that could be devised. The point is to become adept at using a number of the approaches and to be alert to the underlying idea that varying anything in a conflict can produce a new approach for settling it.

As an inclusive convenience for organizing the repertoire, the approaches are divided into six categories based on what dimension of a conflict is mainly involved: the parties involved ("Who"), the bases of the conflict ("What"), the location ("Where"), the timing ("When"), the nature of the involvement ("How"), and the causes ("Why"). Many of the items involve more than one of these categories. The explanation of each item is brief because the repertoire is more of a checklist than a complete treatment. Most of the items on the list can themselves be broken up into several subcategories. Nonviolence, for example, has over 200 forms in Gene Sharp's dictionary.²

In contrast to the approaches given here, many peace plans are long-term affairs. However, the time difference is not so distinguishing as it may at first appear, for the longer term approaches are likely to come about in increments marked by the very sort of crises discussed here. Indeed, major system-change itself may not come about except in reaction to a major nuclear crisis. Thus crisis management of the sort presented here is closely connected to more fundamental approaches to peace.

* Taken from Some Effects of Teaching Adolescents Some Creative, Peaceful Approaches to International Conflict, Richard Fogg, Harvard School of Education, 1972 (Unpublished dissertation available on microfilm).

I. Vary Who is Involved

A. Unilaterally take an initiative, hoping to influence the adversary.

1. Graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT).³ One side de-escalates by a small amount. If the other side follows suit, further de-escalation can proceed. Each step should be sufficiently small so that the other side cannot take advantage of it. The technique is used when face saving problems or the like prevent contenders from negotiating an agreement. (Arms budget reduction are particularly amenable to GRIT.)

2. Acceptable fait accompli. An issue can be settled unilaterally in a way that accounts sufficiently well for everyone's interests that no one opposes the settlement. (When it became clear that the Berlin wall signalled the end of the Berlin crisis, settling the problem of the flow of refugees, which had troubled both sides, the wall was regarded as an acceptable fait accompli.)⁴

3. Tacit agreements. The parties to a dispute can separately settle it when it is politically impossible to deal with it by agreement. (After the peace talks in the Korean War began, the dispute between patrols of soldiers as to which side controlled what ground was settled temporarily in this way: Communist patrols took to the high ground, UN patrols stayed in the valleys in a few areas.)⁵

B. Call in a third party to help settle a dispute.

1. Arbitration. Each side in a dispute selects individuals such as judges to decide upon a solution. These individuals choose one or more people who are acceptable to both sides to join the panel, particularly in order to break tie votes. Before agreeing to establish an arbitration panel, the parties to a dispute agree to accept its decision as binding. (In 1895 a boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela threatened to lead to war between Britain and the United States over the question of British territorial encroachment in the Western Hemisphere. Arbitration settled the dispute.)⁶

2. Mediation or good offices. A mediator can serve as a communications link between contenders, improve their perceptions of each other, and suggest solutions to the problem in dispute. (In 1966, after a cease-fire was reached in the war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Premier Kosygin of the Soviet Union convinced the heads of those two states to meet to discuss Kashmir. As a result of the agreements reached troops were withdrawn, prisoners exchanged, and telephone and postal communications between the two countries were reestablished. Premier Kosygin bore considerable responsibility for these agreements.)⁷

3. Court decision. A dispute can be brought before the World Court for a decision if all parties agree to do so. (In 1962 The Court awarded a small border area to Cambodia and ordered Thailand to withdraw its police from the area and to return any relics which had been removed from an ancient and famous temple in the territory. The orders were carried out.)

C. Change the parties involved.

1. Ignoring of an uncooperative contender. ⁸ A group of negotiators can ignore a disruptive contender and proceed on their own, expecting the disrupter to settle down in order to avoid being left behind. (This approach was behind the United States' policy toward China from 1949 to 1971.)
2. Permitting concessions by virtue of the strength of a new negotiator's partisanship. It is possible to bring to power a person or political party holding a position against the opponent so firmly that domestic opinion will permit concessions. (President Nixon held such a firm anti-communist position that he could recognize Red China, whereas Democratic presidents would have lost too much domestic support by doing so.)
3. Changing to higher echelons. ⁹ The assumption can be made that disagreement comes from lower echelon officers in the adversary's government. Upper echelon officers can then come to agreement. (Khrushchev offered Eisenhower an "out" in the U2 crisis: Blame the flights on the CIA.)
4. Pimping of cooperative officials. ¹⁰ Rather than expecting an entire adversary group, or even an entire adversary national government to accept a settlement offer, it can be determined who can do what is wanted and an offer can be made to him (or them). (Soviet-American conservation of fur bearing seals in the North Pacific continued through the ups and downs of the cold war because fish-and-wildlife officials were the individuals asked to cooperate in that conservation crisis.) ¹¹

II. Vary What is Involved

A. Seek common interests to build upon.

1. Superordinate goals. ¹² These are inclusive purposes that cannot be achieved without cooperation among contenders and which offer goal-satisfaction for all sides. (During the Cuban missile crisis, the goal of avoiding nuclear war replaced the goals of removing the missiles from Cuba and of preventing an American invasion of Cuba. The solution - the American promise not to invade, providing the missiles were withdrawn - satisfied the earlier, apparently incompatible goals.)
2. Synergy. ¹³ Relationships can be exploited in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. (When third world countries set aside their disagreements and join together on an issue before the UN, their political power is greater than it is when they act separately. Other nations can afford to offend them individually much more than when an offense against one is an offense against a major section of the world. This synergy can be used to enhance the object of the third world nations' dispute, e. g., if they are disputing the amount of trade each will have with the United States, they might win a larger total amount of such trade if they were to act together.)
3. Fractionation of conflict. ¹⁴ The breaking up of disputes into elements that can be settled separately. One purpose of fractionation is to settle agreeable parts of a dispute first in order to build trust for settling more difficult parts later. An alternate purpose is to identify those elements upon which agreement can be reached in order to salvage as much as possible from a diplomatic conference that

otherwise might break down with no results. (The Test Ban Treaty secured an agreement to avoid atmospheric tests but not ones underground. Without the fractionation, no treaty might have been signed.)

4. Potential agreement discussions. ¹⁵ Discuss what could be agreed, as a preface to attempting to arrive at an actual decision. (Such discussion at the UN about the Cyprus dispute resulted in the passage of Security Council resolutions that led to the policing of the cease-fire there. No power used its veto during the Security Council meetings that followed these discussions about potential agreement.) ¹⁶

5. Common means for different ends. ¹⁷ When agreement can not be secured on the criteria for a good program, an acceptable program can still be found which will be a means for achieving different goals of the parties. (The Soviet and American governments could never agree on what constitutes a proper election, but they did agree at Geneva in 1954 on the provisions for an election in Vietnam. The American goals had to do with ending the fighting through familiar, "fair" electoral procedures. The Soviet goals had to do with exploiting foreign electoral procedures to win control of territory in a situation where they knew their side would be victorious.)

6. Functional analysis of disputes. ¹⁸ Deal with the fundamental problems underlying a dispute rather than concentrating exclusively on the immediate, symptomatic manifestations of it. Any dispute can be reduced to a conflict over material welfare, status, power, etc. Frequently, alternate, more acceptable ways can be found to serve these functions than the particular means the contenders were quarreling about in the first place. Sometimes these alternate ways are ones on which the disputants can cooperate. (Part of the Middle East crisis boils down to the lack of sufficient water and how to blame the other side for the lack. A functional analysis of this part of the dispute would lead to an attempt to develop desalination plants for the area so that sufficient water could be available and scapegoating would be unneeded.)

B. Bring in subjects unrelated to the object of the dispute.

1. Package deals. ¹⁹ Make a package deal involving a current dispute and an unrelated outstanding disagreement; one side gets the advantage in the current dispute, the other side gets the advantage in the outstanding disagreement. (That the United States agreed to joint submission to arbitration of damage claims with Mexico in 1923 probably made the latter more willing to accept arbitration of alleged damages arising out of revolutionary acts in Mexico. ²⁰

2. Prelude goals. Lesser, more easily attainable goals unrelated to the dispute can be pursued as a basis for closer relations that will make it possible to achieve the goal of settling the larger dispute later. (The problem of disarming the Canadian-American frontier after the War of 1812 was not solved until a large number of business and personal relationships had been established between the two countries regarding day-to-day matters.) ²¹

III. Vary Where Things are Involved

A. Integrate or assimilate.

1. Formation of a security community.²² Contenders come to enjoy sufficient value-agreement so as to drop their defenses against each other and to defend against outsiders jointly. The locus of dispute is changed from the near to the more distant. (Canadian-American integration stands as an example.)

2. The "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em" technique. This is a variant on 1. The difference is that here the contenders maintain an armed truce, whereas in 1 they have come to trust each other. (Soviet-American cooperation during World War II was an example.)

IV. Vary When Things are Involved

A. Postpone resolution of a dispute while trying to build trust.

1. Functionalism.²³ Common loyalties can be built through functional organizations. (The International Geophysical Year, joint space exploration, and the International Postal Union have resulted, it is hoped, in trust concerning more contentious matters.) Functional organizations rule on disputes that were formerly dealt with politically or militarily.

2. Agreement to disagree for the present. (During World War II, the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. tacitly agreed to set aside their ideological differences.)

B. Postpone the resolution of a dispute while trying to build disgust.

1. Disgust-building.²⁴ A dispute can be continued until one or both sides would rather liquidate it with all its trouble than gain a victory. (It was for this reason that France finally allowed the plebiscite which turned the Saar region over to the Germans.)²⁵

C. Untie a double bind.

1. Interdependent actions. Things can be done simultaneously that would otherwise not happen because each depends upon the other's having occurred. (If country a will loan resources to country b only if these are used for joint development with country c, the loan and the commitment contracts can both be signed at once.)

2. Separation of the unacceptable. Things which would be unacceptable to the parties if they occurred together can be done separately. (Governments that did not recognize each other signed the Test Ban Treaty at separate times and on separate drafts.)²⁶

V. Vary the Reasons Why Things Happen

A. Convert the opponent.

1. Acceptance of new values. Conversion can be based on an acceptance of new values, not simply on coercion. (When management

accepted the right of unions to exist in the United States, the resulting increases in wages raised profits, rather than lowering them, as feared, because of the increase in the resources of the consumers who were also union members. The same principle might work in relation to American corporations that presently pay low wages to labor in other countries.)

2. Acceptance of new goals. Ways can be found in which the intrinsic goals of one party can become extrinsic goals for another party. (Under the sphere of influence system, one power gives up claims of hegemony over nations near its rival. The rival, by developing and policing the nations in its sphere of influence, provides profitable trading partners for the first power.)

B. Rationalize your opponent's position.

1. Rationalization of a loss.²⁷ A loss can be rationalized with references to your fundamental principles, e. g., your material gain is granted by my sense of justice. (The Saar plebiscite was a loss of territory for France, but was proclaimed by her as being consistent with her ideals of freedom.)²⁸

VI. Vary How Things are Involved

A. Change the institutions.

1. Modification of existing institutions. (The Common Market in 1967 took over the national prerogatives of making rules on worker immigration.)

2. Establishment of new institutions. (Peacekeeping forces were added to the UN.)

3. Alteration of the general system. (The formation of the Common Market and the proposal to form world government are examples.)

B. Remove violence from the contest, but continue the contest.

1. Weak-power nonviolence. A lesser power militarily and economically brings a greater one to agreement without bitterness. (India secured its independence partly through nonviolent resistance. Afterwards England was not an enemy.)

2. Great-power nonviolence. A greater power uses non-violent techniques to prevail over a lesser power without bitterness in a situation where a traditional show of force would be inappropriate. (In the late 1940's Americans wrote to Italian relatives urging them to vote against Communist candidates in an election. This gesture was judged to have swung the election.)

C. Increase your credibility rather than the amount of your offer.

1. The escrow system. Assure the adversary that he will get what you are offering. (Had President Johnson put development money for the Mekong Delta into the Asian Development Bank instead of just promising it to North Vietnam, that country might have believed he meant to aid Indochina and cooperated in the venture.)³⁰

D. Vary procedural and substantive approaches.

1. Substitution of procedure for substance.³¹ Rather than working for a substantive result, seek the result of a fair and acceptable procedure. (The Geneva Convention of 1954 proposed elections, not a particular government for Vietnam.)

2. Avoidance of dangerous precedents.³² Rather than working for a procedural result which may set a precedent that is undesirable, distinguish the substance of the result from other, similar cases which may arise. (The American promise never to "liberate" Cuba was linked to the removal of the missiles in 1962, and this was distinguished from other intervention situations.)

3. The little boys' cake splitting method.³³ One side divides a scarce resource; the other has first choice. (The U. S. government's 1962 proposal for general and complete disarmament includes a provision directing nations to divide their territory into zones, some of which the international inspection agency could choose for inspection.)³⁴

4. Agreement on procedures. Agreeable procedures can be established as a preface to agreeing on substantive issues. For example, in damage-claim cases between two countries, it is often agreed that the matter will be settled by a domestic court in the defendant country, rather than by an international tribunal, by diplomatic negotiation, or by arbitration. (During World War II, Peru posted bond to obtain the release by the United States of a ship for which Peru claimed immunity. The bond was not returned. Peru took the case through American courts and recovered on its bond (Ex. Parte Republic of Peru 318 U.S. 578 (1943)).³⁵

5. Agreement to violate an agreement.³⁵ Contenders can establish an agreement they plan to violate in substance while holding to the form. This approach is particularly useful if governments hold in common the willingness to break an agreement, but the public in each country involved does not. (Probably one of the factors that made it possible to end the Korean War was the inclusion of an article in the Panmunjom Armistice recommending a conference for "the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." This language referred to the General Assembly resolutions calling for free elections to reunite the country. The article perpetuated the form of the resolution, and, indeed, the negotiators are still meeting at Panmunjom. However, they doubtless have no intention of abiding by the substance of the article and holding an election.)³⁶

E. Use an effective group dynamics system.

1. A neutral person chairs meetings of adversaries. He summarizes the sense of the meeting, accepts corrections or dissents, but never takes a vote. (Hammaraskjold chaired meetings of Americans and Soviets concerning atoms for peace this way. Dissents were never registered.)³⁷

2. Controlled communication.³⁸ Social scientists meet with adversaries, not, ostensibly, to settle the conflict but to find solutions to underlying problems behind it. Blaming is discouraged, misperception social psychology experiments are described, the conflict is treated abstractly, and similar historical conflicts are described. (A partial solution (unspecified) to the Cyprus conflict occurred after controlled communication was used with diplomats from the London embassies of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.)³⁹

3. International encounter group.⁴⁰ An encounter group among statesmen or political scientists from disputing nations can be formed, deliberately, or after the dispute has come up of its own accord, an agreeable solution can be sought. (Political scientists from Ethiopia and Somalia decided upon the proposal to make disputed territory into a temporary neutral zone until new regimes came to power in the competing countries who could more readily negotiate a permanent settlement.)⁴¹

F. Help the opponent save face.

1. Effective timing to save face. A time can be found for an opponent to take a desired action without losing face. (Hammaraskjold convinced the Chinese to release some American flyers as a gesture toward world peace - after American demands had died down, enabling the Chinese to avoid the loss of face involved in giving in to American demands.)⁴²

FOOTNOTES

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