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ABSTRACT

The newsletter provides useful information for the introduction of philosophy as an organized high school course. Through the newsletter, the Center disseminates information about its operation, and further, facilitates the exchange of information about other places engaged in basic research experimentation about curriculum, methods, and implications of high school philosophy. Four main articles are included in this issue. The lead article, The View of the Center, discusses the rising interest, special problems, and values of introducing a philosophy course. The second article briefly examines the introduction of philosophy into the Lyons Township High School. Other articles include a brief review of "The Report of a 1968-1971 Feasibility Study on High School Philosophy," and a paper describing an attempt to introduce the history of scientific ideas into two all black high schools in Chicago. The newsletter is published for members of the Association for High School Philosophy. A related document is ED 063 220. (SJM)

HIGH SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY Newsletter

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
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August 1972

Volume 1, Number 2

Center for High School Philosophy

1308 - 20th Street, Rock Island, Illinois 61201

VIEW FROM THE CENTER

Hugo W. Thompson

The Center for High School Philosophy has been a modest operation this year, with a volunteer staff and important assistance from the office of the Central States College Association. During the year, the Center issued a book-length *Report of a 1968-71 Feasibility Study on High School Philosophy* and a four-page summary report entitled *High School Philosophy*. It conducted a National Conference on High School Philosophy on March 25, 1972 at Mundelein College in Chicago. It published the first issue of *High School Philosophy Newsletter* in April, conducted extensive correspondence, and sought funds to carry on a more substantial and permanent Center.

Rising Interest. Interest in high school philosophy is rising throughout the country, partly because of the CSCA-Carnegie feasibility study and partly because it is an idea whose time has come. All of the Chicago area high schools involved in the study, e.g., are continuing philosophy courses except two, where local problems intervened temporarily.

General problems which counterbalance the rising interest in high school philosophy include the following: (1) an atmosphere of caution about innovation for both political and economic reasons, (2) an over-supply of trained personnel and a crisis mood regarding job opportunities, (3) a tendency for this caution and crisis to distract our attention from basic questions about the purpose and functions of philosophy as an element in the high school curriculum, and (4) some apprehension that traditional programs at both undergraduate and graduate levels will need re-examination as to their appropriateness in the preparation of high school philosophy teachers.

Schools review their curriculum continuously, sometimes on a routine rotation basis, sometimes in connection with visits by teams representing accrediting bodies, sometimes under financial or political pressures for accountability to

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VIEW FROM THE INSIDE

Donald R. Reber

[Presented March 25, 1972 by Dr. Reber, Superintendent of Schools in Lyons Township, Illinois, at the first national conference on philosophy in high school]

I notice that four present or former teachers from Lyons Township High School are attending today's conference. With regard to the staff of the original project let me say I would be proud to have any of them at our high school, not just because of their scholarship, but because every one of them is a superior teacher.

I shall not re-pitulate the case Mr. Bosley made for the place of philosophy. Undoubtedly many of the concerns of students are philosophical in nature.

Introducing Philosophy. We used the coming of philosophy into our school as an occasion for examining our institution to discover how it was dealing with the complex problems of our day. Although we have two hundred courses -- a surplus, no doubt -- we have a greater variety of students' interests than we can possibly accommodate. Nevertheless, we have administrative problems in adding courses.

While we do not depend on unanimous

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VIEW FROM THE CENTER

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the community. After the CSCA-Carnegie feasibility study, any fresh consideration of the curriculum should include consideration of philosophy.

Values of Philosophy. Administrative comments show in general ways, and student evaluations show more specifically, that philosophy has these values for very many students: It gives new insights into honest listening and sharing with fellow students, improvement in logical thinking and writing, new understanding about ideas basic to our culture, new appreciation for critical inquiry, and ability to understand and confront oneself better. The students did not seem to find philosophical readings as difficult as had been anticipated but they stressed the more than usual importance of openness in the teacher and his ability to lead fruitful discussion and to offer useful study aids. Administrators were especially impressed with the popularity of philosophy among students, that adaptations were necessary and possible in varying situations, that teachers were useful beyond the particular courses, and that help had been given to near drop-outs and under-achievers as well as to high achievers.

Philosophy is flexible because it is a way of pursuing problems rather than a subject-matter field in the sense of mathematics or French. It examines underlying assumptions, context and definitions of significant questions. It not only uses careful steps of analysis and logic but gives conscious study to the process, showing reasons for using different methodologies in pursuing different questions.

Introducing Philosophy. Philosophy is often associated administratively with English or social studies, but it could be related as well to science or art. It can be a course or a sequence of courses or an occasional section in courses with other subject matter. It can become the core of interdisciplinary studies or it can be a kind of commentator.

A competently trained and adaptable philosopher can be of great practical use in a high school faculty. He could teach some sections in philosophy, take part in an interdisciplinary course, and be an available resource for other teachers on the staff. The philosophy teacher can help develop and coach the use of short units to deal with philosophical questions that arise in the context of almost every course in school.

The difficulty of introducing philosophy is usually less than anticipated. Teachers trained in philosophy are often available in the present faculty, teaching in another field. Persons competent in both philosophy and something else are available if a search is made. A teaching schedule which includes philosophy is no more expensive than any other.

The problem is not expense, but administrative desire to introduce the values which philosophy can bring. Certification can be arranged, on an emergency basis if necessary, until the state develops its own pattern of requirements.

Teacher Preparation. Note that adequate preparation of new teachers is more than ordinarily important in a field where textbook crutches are not available. To choose and create his own classroom material, the teacher must have familiarity with the field and understanding of what is relevant. He must have skill in use of dialectic dialog. Most candidates, even if fairly well prepared, will need some special courses or workshop assistance.

At the moment, colleges and universities must be cautioned against over-eager expectations of placement in high school positions. Openings are not developing that rapidly. Moreover, it is not simply a matter of counseling students who had planned to teach philosophy in college to turn their attention to high school. In very many cases, modifications will need to be introduced in the whole program to fit this new situation. All this is pointed out in the CSCA-Carnegie report.

There are some things which a concerned

college philosopher can do. After consultation with the education department of his own institution, he can talk with curriculum advisers, principals, and teachers in nearby schools about the values and possibilities of introducing philosophy into a high school curriculum. A very helpful step would be for a college philosophy teacher to teach a section of philosophy for a year in an interested high school. He must remember that this will not be a slightly modified college course, for that would mean failure. It must be a new experience and discovery. But he will get first-hand acquaintance with the possibilities and problems of work in the high school context, and he will become better prepared to teach or supervise future teachers. Until one lives for a time with the differences between high school, community college, and university teaching situations, one does not realize how significant they are.

Help from the Center. The Center for High School Philosophy can be of help to both high schools and universities through its reports and this Newsletter, through use of members of its staff as consultants, through conferences and training institutes, and through direct correspondence. It can facilitate exchange of information between places engaged in experimentation. It is hoped that the Center may soon expand its capabilities in all these ways and in basic research about curriculum, methods, and implications of high school philosophy.

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VIEW FROM THE INSIDE

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approval of our staff, we depend on substantial approval. A new course ought to be integral to the curriculum rather than stand as an island. Moreover a school needs to be concerned with the judgment of accrediting agencies. Before we introduced philosophy we sounded out the North Central Association for their blessing and also found we had a hard selling job to do with the state department of education. It is likely, however, that in the near future certification rules will be loosened in Illinois.

But let me urge a caution. While philosophy is a discipline of the whole person, we also must acknowledge that every department lays claim to dealing in a disciplined manner with the whole person. Since this is the case, we found it useful to present our visiting philosopher in other classes. Indeed with its singular emphasis on values we take it that the time must come when philosophy is pushed down to grade levels lower than the eleventh and twelfth years.

Philosophy Year. Now let me tell you about our philosophy year at Lyons Township High School. We had decided in the third year of the feasibility study of philosophy in high school we would institute a philosophy year engaging the attention of all teachers, students, parents, and board members. We set up an institute day kicked off by our philosophy teacher. Each department wrote up its own philosophy. The North Central Association had a team of fifty examiners on our campus at the time and they also reviewed the statements with interest. Now we intend to go over the total program of our school in terms of this philosophy and expect to find guidance as to what things need to be weeded out. At the same time our students worked on a new constitution for the student body. At Lyons Township High School philosophy has become part of the life of the whole school.

In parting let me point out that 82% or more of our graduates go on to college. They come from a settled conservative background. Introducing philosophy can be dangerous. Indeed, when one of our philosophy teachers together with a number of his students demonstrated against the war, we heard about it. I should like to say, therefore, if we have been able to assimilate philosophy in our situation it certainly can be done elsewhere.

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Stimulated by Russell's pictorial history of western philosophy. Barry Gill of Vintage High School, Napa, California, has tried illustrating philosophical concepts this year by drawing conceptions of the universe. Have you tried similar techniques?

REVIEW

Harold H. Titus

Report of a 1968-71 Feasibility Study on High School Philosophy, Central States College Association, 1972

I have been strongly of the opinion that introductory courses should be geared for students in general rather than merely preparing some students for some next or more advanced course. All students need a philosophy course that deals with the pressing, vital issues of today. My total reaction to the report was definitely pro. The report should be of great help to teachers and schools attempting to introduce philosophy courses in high schools in the future.

I was pleased with the "objectives of the study," pages 10-12, including "the need for perspective on the nature of selfhood and on the universe" and the view that philosophy has a "vital role to play in the intellectual growth and personal liberation" of all students. The course in philosophy should aim to help students gain a sense of meaning and direction and a life-view and a world-view. This can be done more adequately in a philosophy course with able leadership. Where philosophers have forsaken this task, the attempt to meet the need has been attempted by some other course or department -- religion, history, social science, or a general humanities course.

Chapters three through eight were informative and indicate that the study was well thought out and that a competent staff was selected. Thanks are due the Carnegie Corporation of New York for making the study possible. The facts presented regarding the operation of the project, the unit patterns, teaching materials, and the teachers themselves were helpful in understanding the nature and extent of the experiment. The fact that I knew something of the community settings added to my interest.

The four recommendations, page 131, and also the recommendation for a Center for High School Philosophy that will be a

clearing house for information and an organ of promotion or encouragement, call for support. This Center, I think, should be separate from any university where the teachers so often tend to be interested mainly in a specialty and in winning majors and graduate students. Knowledge has become so departmentalized, and often so impersonal, that it is hard for students to understand themselves or see life as a whole. Colleges and universities are doing a fairly good job in training students for trades and professions, but a relatively poor job, I think, in educating young men and women. The real crisis of our age is a crisis of belief and commitment. These cannot be handed out, but a course in philosophy might encourage students to work out some commitments of their own....

The list of useful readings is a help and it is a good list. It would have been more helpful to users if it had included editions, publishers, dates, and the like. But I know you cannot include everything in a report. There are some recent books that I think would add to the list, such as Ian G. Barbour, *Science and Secularity*, Harper, 1970; Richard L. Means, *The Ethical Imperative*, The Crisis in American Values, Doubleday, 1969; or Mortimer J. Adler, *The Time of Our Lives*, *The Ethics of Common Sense*, Holt. . 1970 (chiefly Part IV).

I note that the list includes my *Ethics for Today*. Morris Keeton and I will have a revised fifth edition out early next year. There is also a paperback reader that goes with it, *The Range of Ethics*, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1966, that includes such selections as Warburg's "How Civilized Is Our Civilization?" There is also a paperback reader, *The Range of Philosophy*, 2nd edition, 1970, that has selections that parallel the chapters in the latest edition of *Living Issues in Philosophy*, 1970. Perhaps these last items should not be mentioned but since I have been working on them they seem important to me!

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PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORY OF
SCIENCE IN GHETTO HIGH SCHOOLS

Fay Sawyer

I haven't been to the mountain top or seen the sun itself, let alone the Form of the Good. I am persuaded, nonetheless, that linearity, no-return and no-re-cycling, for so-called intellectuals is naive and inappropriate. I would go further and contend that it is morally wrong and, parenthetically, that Plato has said this too. Thus I construe myself as just another footnote.

That this "philosophers speak only to philosophers" position is naive and cognitively inadequate follows from a thesis I accept as to the nature of philosophy: that philosophy is a second-order discipline with no subject matter of its own. In candid expositions I simply call it "parasitical," without intending any of the negative connotations customarily clinging to the concept of a human parasite. If this is so, it follows that insofar as philosophers cease to refresh themselves with exposure either to other fields or to a hard look at "outside" life, they are on starvation rations. For example, should one's interest be political philosophy, a recurrent study of, say law or economics, or party machinery would seem to be in order. My own interest is in the network of conceptual development: the subtle ways in which, for example, changes in the perception of "what is possible" alter the sense of "what is real."

The moral indefensibility of intellectual apartheid is in part a consequence of its irrationality. But it also is illuminated against the notion of equitable sharing; here what is to be shared is the joy and the enrichment of thinking, of speculating, of the world of more or less free-wheeling ideas.

But this paper is presented not as an exposition of cognitive ordering or yet as a defense of a moral point of view, but rather primarily as a description of any attempt to introduce something like History of Scientific Ideas into two all-black high schools in Chicago. So I

shall turn now to this simpler enterprise of narration and explanation.

II

At one school I met with children who came for no credit, indeed who sometimes came because their regular teachers had failed to show up at the appointed hour! We worked for eighty minutes a week, usually divided into two forty-minute periods, in the early morning before 8:30. We met at a round table in the school library and, excepting only the janitor and the matron, we were the earliest arrivals at the school.

Frequently, we became involved in speaking of something within the school, a shooting, an election, a prom, and at such times no academic menu was even brought out. At that school I made some use of three paperback: Garrett Hardin's *Population, Evolution, and Birth Control*, *The Communist Manifesto*, and finally *Dora*, by Freud. The whole of the latter two works were read, and the children were asked to bring me short papers as "tickets" to parties I gave for them throughout the year. Not all of Hardin's anthology was read, although the children did produce papers on Darwinism and Fundamentalism.

I made a gift to the children of the books, and I made no objection when they came late, skipped "club," or brought friends along. A few of the youngsters at this early morning club were not bright at all. The core of these three theories can be instilled regardless, and, as I hinted in the preliminary remarks, should be. I warrant that even the slowest of these children knows who Darwin, Marx and Freud were, some portions of their central tenets, and some sense of the evidence on which their theories were based and of the hostility their theories evoked.

In the second school at which I presented a similar fare I took over two classes regularly from March until the end of June. I taught sophomores who came in two sections and for whom coming was of course not entirely voluntary since their

regular teacher appeared long enough to take attendance; grades on my quizzes were recorded, and indeed will constitute the bulk of this semester's history grade for them. I taught from 12:30 until 2:15 on Tuesdays and Thursdays.

I used no texts at all during this course although I did freely distribute various paperbacks in psychology when we came to Freud. I constructed a sort of textbook of my own as I went along in the form of two or three weekly handouts of dittoed materials. Usually I would prepare what I wanted to say and then type up a guide to it which would count also as a summary for review. Sometimes I would use as introduction to a theorist a species of "quiz" to start the children thinking along the line I wished to pursue. For example, in preliminary references to the dawn of Greek science in Ionia, I distributed a "test" asking the children to figure out what different sorts of sensible efforts at control and self-protection persons would probably use if they (a) felt that rainfall was the province of a divinity or (b) if it were a purely naturalistic phenomenon (in Cornford's sense of the "discovery" of nature). Later on, before launching into Darwinism, I distributed a pre-quiz encouraging the children to list all of the consequences they could think of which might follow from accepting as axiomatic that man is different from and better than anything else in the world. I adduced a broad hint in asking them to think about the self-justificatory uses of "better than" and "different from" in socio-economic and racist contexts. Several children did see the connection with environmental and animal exploitation; some even could be led to see that accepting this "difference" thesis as axiomatic would tend to blind one to the likenesses of man and animal (as Paul Feyerabend has shown in "Problems of Empiricism" the evanescent possibility of seeing counterexamples). I also introduced very casually some formal logic and some Venn Diagrams each of which went over easily. First year logic, even at the level at which it is taught at most colleges, is clearly a matter of simplifying and clarifying one's own readily

accessible inferences.

By the way, I found that any time a student looked blank during logic work and said, "I don't understand," if I said rather vigorously, not to say angrily, "Yes, of course you do understand; you just don't realize what you know," and then repeated the problem, the problem got solved. Often tone-of-voice mattered. "If p then q and not-q," recited in a boring monotone would befuddle many. Said, however, in a tone of voice resembling one we would use, for example, in saying, "I'm rather worried about John because he said he would be here on time if he was feeling better and he isn't here yet. . .," then the result of "denying the consequent" is obvious.

III

Methodologically the procedure I adopted was to treat the history of science, or at least of these scientists, as a progressive exposure of the fantasy-basis for the conviction of many people on topics like the geocentric theory of special creation, etc. and to rough in the psycho-social motives which (may have) led to the intensity with which people invented and clung to these very illusions. I treated, by the way, as terms on a continuum, the expressions: illusions, prejudice, fantasy, preconception, unexamined assumptions, unanalyzed beliefs and unconscious "sets." I tried to construct a sentence or two which embodied each one of these illusions. I wished (a) that the children might feel the force and attractiveness of the illusion (indeed in some instances the difficulty was to get them off it!), (b) to point to various ways in which holding to a particular "worldview" inhibited clear vision, and finally (c) to present the claim and some of the supporting reasoning for the new theory which ran athwart each particular illusion. Before mentioning the phrases and details employed, I should like to describe some of my grounds for adopting this method.

A conviction or belief which has been insulated from any awareness of the struggles and difficulties attendant on

gaining it, that is, one which is presented without any intellectual and emotional history, is frail, vulnerable even to fallacious argument, and artificial, a portion of a built-in program rather than an acquired, learned belief. Without the sense of development, I am convinced that a kind of empirical responsiveness (cf. "reality testing") is also undercut, perhaps because theories are ingested in vacuo, swallowed whole. Accordingly, I tried very hard to get the children to feel the force of a position which I was in fact about to criticize, because the efficacy of evidence and/or reasoning against such a position then is moved to the center of attention. In the ideal case a student would experience himself or herself at least mini-evaluative functions of weighing the evidence.

The illusion-sentences and some exegesis follow:

- (1) "Events in the natural world are caused by the desires and wishes of divine, invisible creatures, but these divine creatures are really quite a lot like me."

It is nice and comforting, somehow, to feel that fundamental forces in the universe are human and volitional, rather than non-human and mechanistic. This illusion was used as a foil against which I set some early Greek scientists (Thales, Anaximander, Archimedes).

- (2) "The earth is the center of the universe, which is rather small. The earth never moves but instead everything else revolves around it."

The easy analogy to being the "center of attention" was employed. The explication of why it was "better" to be still than to move (without entering into any of Aristotle's arguments) was accomplished by mention of the typical image of courtiers and servants dashing about to do the work of the immobile monarch. The small size of the universe was reinforced by citing the anxiety felt by almost everyone of becoming an infinitesimal when gazing at the multitude of distant stars. This general position was countered by discussion of some of the odd consequences (in

falling bodies, motive force in "heavenly" bodies, ballistics, etc.) of Aristotelian mechanics, by brief comment on the proliferation of Ptolemaic epicycles, etc. and by rather detailed examination of the relation of the failure to detect parallax to Bruno's inference to a spatially infinite universe.

In association with the period discussing the "new" physics and astronomy, I commented several times on the downgrading of an interest in natural phenomena associated with the concentration on the City of God. Indeed I drew sketches of persons always looking upward and so missing the sight of balls rolling down inclined planes and some of the problems and miseries of earthly life. We commented also on the associated notion of differential and "better" directions, such as that heaven must be "up" and must be better. Considerable stress was laid on the repression of science by the church establishment, the repression of Bruno and Galileo in particular, and we tried to expose or imagine some of the motives reinforcing this repressive activity.

- (3) "God made man absolutely unlike any other creatures. He made all the creatures that ever will be in their perfect and finished form, and they are all to be the servants of men."

I divided the anti-Evolutionary position into two groups, the non-Rational and the Rational opposition. To the former set belonged those arguments which bluntly denied what I called "Darwin's Central Thesis--that all living things are literally kin," either by shocked, emotional outrage ("I am much better than a grasshopper!") or by taking refuge in authority those arguments directed to the presumed inadequacy of a particular mechanism (random mutation plus natural selection) to account for observed systemic data. We considered Paley's arguments in this latter connection.

- (4) "I am in full control of myself and understand exactly why I do the things I do."

This, of course, was the illusion shattered by Freud--in older circles it is

usually called the "illusion of rationality." In trying to make clear the concept of the power of feelings and memories that are out-of-awareness (Unconscious) I relied heavily on cases of hysteria (paralyzed limbs where there was no physiological explanation and where the patient was not faking) because these helped the children to feel the perplexity of our "control." I encouraged them to reflect on the mechanism of projection and defense. We treated the Freudian model or terms quite strictly parallel to problems facing a minor; I urged them to try to figure out how--assuming that there are unconscious feelings and that they can often have a slave-driver hold over us--a therapist can "bring them out," can excavate them. The students had been told about inner censors and so quite naturally were able to see that techniques of catching oneself off guard were going to be essential to discovery. Thus the therapeutic use of dreams, of body language, and of free-association was embedded in a context of unearthing. The topic of sexuality emerged often, of course, but both embarrassment and just "rapping" were minimal because I kept firmly to a sequential account, and myself raised the subject of infant and child sexuality as a partial response to a question I forced the class to consider, "Why should any feelings be unconscious? Why should these particular feelings be unconscious?" They seemed well able to grasp the likelihood that feelings which greatly frighten us or which make us feel immensely ashamed might easily be ones which we "try" to hide even from ourselves (to repress) and that often we are almost too successful. I tried to illustrate some of the damaging effects of such repression with repeated reference to the "blindness" and lack of good sense (reality) consequent upon confronting the world wearing the blinders of pre-judgment. The parallel between the man who is incapable of observing the good will of his co-workers because he is hung up on fear and hatred of his brothers and of the white who is unable to discern blacks even as individuals was repeatedly employed in order to try to illustrate the malignant efficacy of our internal dictator.

- (5) "Deciding exactly and absolutely how fast and in what direction an object is moving is a problem which can be solved conclusively, and its solution will not in any way differ from the way I decide such problems when I'm thinking about running or about driving cars."

The comforting fantasy here is that the universe is all pretty much like the earth. In introducing some of the materials associated with Special Relativity, I tried to develop just a few notions. These were (a) that unless you could somehow know that there was a truly motionless background, that is, absolute Newtonian space, any measurement of velocity would be only in relation to some other moving object, and therefore the meaning of "real" or "absolute" velocity would be empty; (b) there is a "democracy" of positions in the universe from which to do your measuring, and none is more privileged than another. The job to be done, therefore, is to see if one can figure out--given "my" measurements--how "you," off on another inertial system accelerated with respect to my own, will measure the velocity of a third object (the transformation equations). This seemingly abstract notion was introduced, as I hinted, via the concept of "democracy"; the concept of transformation formula was analogized to the sort of knowledge we rely on when we try to figure out the ways differently raised people, from different cultures, will interpret the "same" phenomenon (and while we refrain from declaring that "our" interpretation is privileged or special!). Lastly I mentioned, but briefly, some of the history of the limiting value of "c."

Summing this short account of the approach I used: I had told the children initially that one part of the history of science on which I would focus was the way our feelings about ourselves (the "concept of man") have been intermeshed with and altered by scientific work. My own suggestion was that the dignity and worth of human beings is not dependent on this or that externalized prop such as special creation, or being the center of attention

of a circling universe. The highly understandable tendency to project one's wish to be important onto the external world (as Hume might have seen) was associated with some of the theories which were overturned, and the reluctance of anyone to change his mind, to abandon an official bit of doctrine, was proposed as behind much of the hostility to and repression of scientific findings. I pictured the change which has been mentioned in the above story of illusions this way:

The projected self-importance picture has man all alone and disconnected from any other creatures or things in the natural world; these others, stars as well as animals, are not very many (everything is somehow nearby) and their chief function is the service of man. The new scientific work resulted in man being moved, along with his planet, to a minor spatial position and at vast distances both in time and space from many entities but in ontological contact with them all.

IV

I want to consider now five sorts of objections which might be raised against such a program; some indeed have been raised.

- (a) At the school where I ran the "club" I did teach Marx and emphasized his use of the concept of alienation. The notion that communism must not be mentioned, except perhaps derogatorily, in the public school system not only runs counter to a (putative) ideal of free access to information, but also rules out of bounds any reference to various interesting experiments with communes in the history of this country. The thesis that it ill-behoves one to mention alienation to the presumably alienated (oil on fire?) can be compared to the suggestion that it is unwise to mention poverty to the poor. Communicated acknowledgement of one's state is a necessary condition of mutually respecting friendship and discussion, rather than being a sufficient condition of exacerbating problems.
- (b) An allied but more complex objection has been raised against the presentation of certain theories such as Darwin's which are in fact denied and denounced by the pastors of one's pupils. If there is any merit to the objection to teaching "standard" English as equivalent to "right" or "better" English on the ground that this places the pupil in a conflicted situation and denigrates figures of primary importance to him, then there is at least as much initial plausibility to the objection I mentioned here--that the religious dogmas of the parents and pastors are, by implication, presented as both foolish and misleading! Moreover, there is the added objection which suggests that this line of teaching damages or destroys the religious beliefs of children for whom such faiths are enormously supportive and to whom their loss may be traumatic. Here my reply must be about as general as the width of the objection. One can indeed conceive of persons (the aged or the desperately ill or the profoundly grieved or even the slightly feeble-minded) to whom no compassionate person would think of presenting arguments whose effect might be to remove a support or to lessen some solace. My first counter, though, to this objection is that these children are not weak or fragile or defenseless, and, moreover, if they are treated as though they are, and protected from information readily available to children of richer parents or of white parents, then they will be weakened. My second counter is somewhat less forceful, for one cannot but acknowledge that there is indeed some strength in the objection that to suggest to adolescents that their parents are mistaken or obdurate on significant matters is potentially destructive of the child's respect for his parents. I would nevertheless argue that lasting and secure respect is poorly bastioned when it is presumed to be dependent on

protection from dissident views.

- (c) Another sensible objection to the program as I conceived and managed it is that, after all, I am not a professional in any of these scientific fields and, accordingly, I am an inappropriate medium for their conveyance. It may well be argued that I might have conveyed misinformation in the guise of "science." Here my response is largely that ad hominem rigorous training in philosophy provides one at least with a measure of understanding of one's lacunae; "knowing that one does not know" is a preliminary examination one must pass in an Urphilosophical tradition. Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, there simply were no scientifically and historically trained persons presenting their materials.
- (d) There are two associated quasi-objections: one is that the history of science is not "relevant," and the other is that we must boost "humanism" and somehow eschew taking the scientific enterprise seriously. Objection along these lines being more declamatory than significant, it is perhaps not worth the effort to confront them. Nonetheless, I explicitly focussed the "history of science" on a variety of styles within which men and women have envisaged their own significance. And for "humanism" [In at least one of its possible meanings -- the steady attempt to integrate and incorporate the full range of the experiences involved in living-human -- "humanism" is indeed what I was teaching.] one of my hidden goals was to show forth some of the ways in which the history of science is a psychology and a sociology of science and so to run athwart an ominous current of detached and automata-like "field studies."
- (e) Lastly, there has been a rise and fall of objections that the materials were too hard, and that therefore they would confuse and/or discourage the students. My chief counter-argument here is the quality of

answers on many of the final examinations which I gave. But another and less tangible counter is that most of the material presented to most students in the city high schools is not only tedious but far too easy. This is perjorative and my use of the "too" is intuitive rather than empirical, so let me draw this section to its end by making two more comments. First, naturally the teacher must be flexible and be able to notice if and when materials are becoming too difficult or children are getting discouraged; secondly, initial exposures to "difficult" or "abstract" ideas are always troublesome, but frequently the materials, or portions of them, linger on in the fringes of children's minds and add fuel to later fires, or, more prosaically, help the children to comprehend the significance of things they learn later.

V

At the start of this paper I said that hard work in non-philosophical fields and wit' non-philosophers is important and useful for philosophers. The body of the paper, however, has set forth some of the techniques I used and objectives toward which I worked in an effort to be useful for these children. It is appropriate to conclude with some attempt to substantiate the self-help claim. And first of all I want to put this part in relief by stating what I do not mean. By help-for-the-philosopher I do not mean either the rosy glow of good deeds, however much in need of this philosophers may be! Nor do I have in mind the quantitative gain in knowledge about the conditions in all-black public high schools, although, of course, this is concomitant. Rather, I want here to try to draw together my comment at the beginning about the moral imperative of sharing and my other suggestion as to the linkages in conceptual systems.

Consider the following incident: I find the discussions and papers relevant to the new astronomical theories of Bruno, Copernicus, Galileo et al absorbing. I am keenly opposed to restricted pleasures

and, frankly, take a greater pleasure myself when I have managed to bring off a "Look, just see how lovely this is!" invitation effectively. Now the enterprise of showing the tensions within the debates among these early physicists obliged me to speak of spatial and temporal infinities, of extensions of parallels, of homogeneity and isomorphism and so on. These words are associated with concepts which are, as Whitehead used to say, high order abstractions. Within my particular intellectual sub-culture, high-order abstractions were vivid and were presumably meaningful. For these children these particular concepts were neither vivid nor meaningful, nor were one's regular stock-in-trade of examples, such as Socrates-seated or the interior-angles-of-a-triangle, etc. By working with body-analogues of parallelism such as pointing and walking, all of these other associated concepts became real, i.e., were fleshed-in. The concept that, for example, parallels never meet entails, when one is walking or pointing, that the medium through which these lines are projected have no effect on them and, by reference to "no matter how far they are extended," that there is no conceptual wall imposing a limit to extension. "But how about if it takes a very huge amount of time to keep on with this extending?" they ask. And so huge hunks of time, the immense Newtonian future, can be felt to be just like the present. "Later makes a big difference to me, I'll be older and I'll probably be tired." And so the contrast between lived- or body-time and the abstract time of the 18th century physicist is generated. In the process, then,

of trying to share an intellectual nugget I was obliged to seek out imagery new to me, that of body-space and body-time. And this result is a step in genetic epistemology. It is also one which, quite probably, I should not have come to understand had I not allied myself to the discipline of translating explanatory concepts.

There are many other illustrations of things I have learned relating to the philosophy of mind as a direct consequence of this translating task. It is perhaps worth noting that to "translate" is close in meaning with "to share." For example, I learned quite a lot about the concepts "formal" and "abstract" in trying to convey in sessions on logic how little difference it makes what you are speaking of, whether or not what you say makes any sense, so long as it is logical. Or again: Why should I be moral? when asked among philosophers speaking only to each other is a rather artificially considered question. If one speaks with a young person who really means this question, saying in effect, "What's in it for me?" then the impetus to hunt out fundamental principles in ethics is reinforced by the present need to persuade someone that morality is not just another plate of the masses.

This returns me to Plato with whom I started. Another and older way of putting a similar point is to say that philosophizing entails conversation, and that conversation is somehow spurious when, by speaking only with one's own kind and colleagues, one ends by speaking, in effect, only with oneself. + + + + +

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