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ABSTRACT

Designed to help bring students to greater understanding of concepts of the introduction to psychology and leadership course (see the final reports which summarize the course development project, EM 010 418, EM 010 419, and EM 010 484), this Structural Communications unit is coordinated with the instructional unit in the core course on problems in individual behavior (EM 010 421, EM 010 422, EM 010 423, EM 010 452, EM 010 453, and EM 010 502). The basic strategy of the unit is to have the student work through the central theme which dominates problems presented in a brief series of modules. Each successive module refers to a matrix of statements which the student examines for relevance to the problem being considered. The unit can be used either individually or in a group setting, and was designed so that the end product would be a student with a more complete grasp of the elements of the theme and their interaction. EM 010 420 through EM 010 447 and EM 010 451 through EM 010 512 are related documents. (SH)

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INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP



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ENRICHMENT II
PROBLEMS IN INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

EMOIO 466



Westinghouse Learning Corporation
Annapolis Division
2083 West Street
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INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

ENRICHMENT - . II

PROBLEMS IN INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

Enrichment Modules 4, 5, 6, 7

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Annapolis, Maryland

1971

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Orientation

This Structural Communication Unit, PROBLEMS IN INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR, is designed to be used only after Part Two, "Individual Behavior," of the course, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP, has been completed.

Each module is oriented towards discussion and is designed to be used for individual instruction. By working through these modules the student will gain confidence in his mastery of the concepts previously introduced to him. He will also be able to develop his own ideas and understand different points of view.

The feedback from the authors does not confirm the correct answer, though the authors do indicate the items they use in their interpretations. Each student is encouraged to develop his own interpretation of the case studies according to his knowledge and point of view.

Organization of the Unit

Each module is divided into the following sections:

INTENTION. This serves as an introduction. It briefly describes the theme which the authors intend to communicate. It also summarizes the rationale for the approach, method and viewpoint.

PRESENTATION. This presents the scope of the discussion, giving an outline of the main and subsidiary themes.

INVESTIGATION. This section explores the theme in greater depth, and introduces a set of PROBLEMS. By working through the problems, the student will have his attention focused on the more subtle points in the theme, enabling him to develop his understanding of it. Included in this section also are the DISCUSSION COMMENTS and INTERPRETATIONS which provide feedback to guide the student through the problem.

RESPONSE INDICATOR. This is a matrix of items, all of them relevant to the theme as a whole. The student uses these items to solve the problems in the Investigation, and they provide a basic vocabulary for the student to interact with the authors and to 'talk back' to the authors of the Unit. Different sets of these items can be used to give adequate expression of different viewpoints on, or interpretation of the problems.

Procedure

Instructions about specific activities are given to the student in the body of the text.

The student should commence work on the Unit by reading the Intention and Presentation sections. The student may refer back to the Presentation at any stage of the Investigation. He should next work on the Investigation with its problem situations according to the following procedure:

INVESTIGATING THE PROBLEM

The student should read the problem and make an individual response.

The student categorizes all items on the Response Indicator according to given criteria ranging from highly significant to irrelevant. The Discussion Section takes the form of an Interpretation or Analysis in which the authors group all the items into various categories and give their rationale. The student evaluates his response by comparing his interpretation with that of the authors.

The Discussion Section serves as a further stimulant to the student. It also acts as a bridge between the student and the authors of the material. It is the device for channeling more information to the students in order to clarify more complex aspects of the problems than the student may have been aware of in his individual response. It also exposes them to another point of view. The student should consider the bearing of this section on his response, and make a second selection if desired.

Each module can be adequately discussed with a number of possible combinations of items selected from the Response Indicator. The student can start with a small combination of items and build up a more complete picture by adding to it. Or he can make a broad attempt by including more general selections, review them, and reject some items. If he has no firm ideas on what to select, he can try anything at random, and then see if the Discussion helps him to make some sense of the problem. He should review his selection not just for what each item signifies, but to see what the items taken together signify. He should check that there is no internal

contradiction between them, and that as a whole they represent a set of coherent interdependencies.

THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURE

THE NOTATION FOR THE TESTS WORKS LIKE THIS:

When a test is written - I_2 (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) -
it means: "If you INCLUDED TWO or more (I_2) of items
1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, then read the comment below."

I refers to Inclusion (of items #....)

O refers to Omission (of items #....)

The numerical subscript refers to the count of items involved:

I_2 inclusion of TWO or more

O_3 omission of THREE or more, and so on.

The numbers in parentheses are the reference numbers of items on the Response Indicator included or omitted.

Thus -

I_1 (2, 12, 20) and

O_3 (1, 3, 5, 6, 7)

means -

if you have INCLUDED one or more of response items 2, 12, 20 and OMITTED three or more of items 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 read the following comment.

- (1) Look at the first test to see if it bears on your response. If it does, then read the comment below the test. If it does not, continue looking until you find a test that does bear on your response.

Example:

I_2 (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10)

"What you say is quite valid, but we would like to make the following points. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor"

- (2) When you have read a comment, review your response and the decisions which led you to it comparing your reasoning with that of the authors. Then look for the next appropriate comment.
- (3) Continue this process until you come to the end of the DISCUSSION. You may not have changed your reasoning and may be in disagreement with the authors, but you should make sure that you understand the significance of the authors' remarks.

Note: Modules Four, Five, and Six
are taken from NavPers 15924 PRINCIPLES
AND PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP. Module
Seven is fictional, prepared by Structural
Communication Systems Ltd.

PROBLEMS IN INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

INTENTION

Human relations, especially those which exist between an individual and the groups to which he belongs or in which he works, are an important content of leadership. If the leader is to function efficiently in his role, he must understand how to modify human behavior to fulfill those objectives which are his responsibility. The modification of behavior involves TRAINING and MOTIVATION. Training is to be understood as preparation through practice under simulated conditions (exercise, etc.). Motivation is a process that concerns attitudes rather than performance (morale etc.). These two processes are interrelated.

Knowledge of and skill in applying principles of psychology can be very useful for the realization of the leader's goals. The good leader should train himself to observe the behavior of his men (and of himself) in a systematic fashion, making it clear to himself where observation stops and INTERPRETATION begins. Only then can he put his hypotheses to the test by making predictions and thus providing himself with information to assess the validity of the interpretation he has made.

In this Discussion Unit there are a number of reports made by officers from which you are asked to make a psychological description of what has taken place. The problems are designed to make you aware of the shifting ground between observation and interpretation, and of the similarities and differences between the various conceptual schemes to which you have been introduced.

PRESENTATION

Psychology is the science of human behavior. But no psychology can deal with all the variety of human behavior in one theory or model. You have studied psychology from a number of different perspectives--such as learning, conflict, motivation, personality and so on--each one of which takes a limited view. We know in practice that learning is inseparable from motivation, motivation from conflict, and personality from motivation. If psychological studies are to be useful in ordinary life, the various segments of psychology you have

learned must be brought together. You will have to learn where and how to apply a given concept and what you can expect by doing so.

There are significant disagreements between different theories in psychology. The main issue you should be aware of is: what constitutes behavior? The strict behaviorist such as Skinner aims to remain strictly within the limits of observable behavior. He will not allow any terms to be used which seem to refer to "inner states" of people. Words such as "drive," "non-verbal thinking" etc. are rejected. All that is left to talk about is antecedent and consequent behaviors, and the prediction of probable behaviors from knowledge of antecedent conditions.

Other theorists have a different approach. Maslow, for example, has developed a model in which human behavior is interpreted in terms of a hierarchy of needs. The needs are suppositions, supported largely by subjective analysis. Nevertheless, they make a great deal of sense and can be used by a trained man as a guide in dealing with people.

In one thing all theories and all viewpoints agree: the study of psychology is based on SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION. If we are going to study human behavior we must be able to describe behavior. You may think that this is no problem.

Systematic observation is a hard discipline. The psychologist needs a framework within which to operate. The framework will be related to his theories and models, and so it will be biased. However, he can avoid the errors of casual observation--the imposition of assumptions and prejudices on what is observed, without realization of what is happening.

We have to become disciplined in our use of psychological words and concepts--not assume, for example, that we can observe the drives in a man just by looking at him. What people say about themselves can be very revealing--but only to an experienced or very alert observer.

There are two operations in psychology: OBSERVATION and INTERPRETATION. The two must be kept independent of each other. Observation provides us with what we know; and we must be sure to know what we know and what we don't know! Interpretation leads us to make predictions about future behaviors or make an explanation about a sequence of behaviors in the past. It is based on a model or theory and cannot be derived from facts alone.

INVESTIGATION

When human beings are in interaction with each other, time rarely allows even natural observation; and the would-be observer is himself a part of the situation.

In the CASE STUDIES you are going to investigate, you are going to be in the position of looking over the shoulder of an officer making a report on some problem. There are four such situations. Your task is to find out what was ACTUALLY OBSERVED in each case and make an INTERPRETATION by means of the RESPONSE INDICATOR.

The RESPONSE INDICATOR consists of an array of statements worded in the language of the various psychologies you have been studying. Use of any one of them means, therefore, that a certain theoretical bias is introduced, forcing you to think in a certain way. Use of statements from more than one psychological theory gives you many points of view; but you must realize that in certain instances, they may contradict each other.

Your task is to study each one of these case studies and put it into terms of the statements in the RESPONSE INDICATOR. You ask yourself: "What can I infer?" and you keep in mind that the reporting officer is a part of the situation being described.

We present the cases very briefly in order that you will not have grounds for the illusion that you have an omniscient view of what is going on. These cases are not narrative novelettes but sketch reports. Sometimes you may have to think very deeply about the situation described before you can begin to represent it in terms of the items of the RESPONSE INDICATOR.

PROBLEMS IN INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

Module Four: Case of the Missing Ensign

THE PLACE: ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.

THE REPORT:

"I was a patrol plane commander of a P2V aircraft attached to a squadron post at Jacksonville, Florida. Returning from a cross-country training flight, we experienced trouble with the No. 2 engine, and decided that an engine change would be necessary at St. Louis. This could be effected within twenty-four hours. I informed my commanding officer that I would remain overnight, and estimated departure at 0800 on the second morning. I authorized liberty scheduling muster for 0800 on the first morning and 0645 on the morning following i.e., the morning of scheduled departure. I granted special liberty to the second navigator, a young ensign who requested permission to visit and stay with close relatives who lived in the area. He was to return in time for the muster on the second morning. The engine change was completed, the plane test flown and everything was ready for scheduled departure. At 0645 everyone mustered except the second navigator. At 0715 I received a telephone call from the ensign informing me that he was still with his relatives, ninety miles from the field, and that the private transport he had hoped to use for return was not available. His only way of returning was by public bus and he estimated he would arrive at the field at about 1400. What action should I have taken at the time? What instructions should I have given the ensign? What additional action, if any, should I have taken upon return to my squadron?"

THE PROBLEM

In this case, there is a special challenge: only the fact that the ensign fails to turn up and makes a phone call to say he will be late is reported. Most of the information is contextual, and the officer making the report has no direct contact with the man except in giving him permission to visit his relatives.

Your psychological description, therefore, will tend to be speculative. Probably, the best way to work at this case is by elimination of hypotheses for which no convincing arguments can be found.

Consider the events described carefully. The officer making the above report is obviously faced with having to understand the BEHAVIOR of the ensign in order to decide on a suitable course of action. Put yourself in his place, and, using the RESPONSE INDICATOR construct your psychological description.

You, as the student, will undertake this exercise using a very small amount of information as the basis for interpretations. It is a very useful one as we rarely have all the information we desire.

REFER TO THE RESPONSE INDICATOR AND MAKE YOUR SELECTION. AFTER MAKING YOUR SELECTION TURN TO PAGE 15 AND EVALUATE YOUR SELECTIONS WITH THE AUTHORS.

DISCUSSION

[I - 1] I_3 (1, 5, 16) or O_2 (1, 5, 16)

The first things that are fairly clear about this case are the ensign's motives for visiting his relatives. In terms of one psychological description, the ensign is motivated by a primary drive (an affection-contact drive; these are *close* relatives, according to the story). A second psychological language describes his behavior as a result of his belongingness needs. In the third, his actions are intrinsically rewarding (he visits his relatives leisurely for his own enjoyment, rather than out of necessity). Note that while all three descriptions describe the same behavior, his motivation is described differently: in one he is motivated by a drive; in the second by a need; in the third, taken from learning theory, no drive or need is even discussed. In strictly behavioral terms it would be said that knowledge of antecedent conditions was insufficient to predict the ensign's behavior adequately.

[I - 2] I_1 (4, 11, 13, 14, 17)

There is no basis for such descriptions in the case presented.

[I - 3] I_3 (2, 3, 15) or O_2 (2, 3, 15) and I (8)

The last reported behavior of the ensign, the phone call, can be fairly easily described. In one terminology, a secondary, or learned drive is operating (perhaps fear, loyalty, and/or conditioning in naval behavior (i.e. punctiliousness). According to a second school of thought, he is motivated by a need for safety (in this case, job security). In the third, his action is extrinsically rewarding (he *has* to call up, however he "feels" about staying at his relatives). Although the lateness of his call may be an evidence of fear, as was stated above, this is not clear enough to be a certainty. Note that while in one terminology, the call is motivated by a secondary drive and his visit the result of a primary drive, in another (Maslow's) the call is motivated by a lower order, and therefore more strongly motivating, need than the visit is.

[I - 4] I₁ (8, 23, 24, 25)

Given very little information, we have to think hard about the possible psychological structure of the events described. We have to decide at what point our inferences go outside the boundaries of usefulness. The items nominated in this test seem to us to be so loosely connected with the observed behavior that we would be in the world of imaginative fiction if we followed them up.

[I - 5] I₁ (19, 22) or I both (1 and 2)
or I both (3 and 5) or I both (15 and 16)

At first sight it might appear that the ensign's motivations in being late are fairly clear. The situation: "being drawn" back to the plane and the Navy, and "being drawn" to his relatives at the same time - seems, behaviorally speaking, to be a clear-cut approach-approach conflict, and it may be hypothesized that the presence of his relatives was sufficient reinforcement for his subsequent behavior.

Such a description, strictly in terms of goals and goal strength, would cover either of two motivational descriptions of such a conflict: describing equally well a conflict between primary ("drawn to relatives") and secondary ("drawn to Navy") drives, or one between intrinsically and extrinsically reinforced responses. In either case, since this hypothesized conflict resulted in his lateness, it would seem that the primarily motivated, or intrinsically reinforced behavior was stronger. In another psychological language (drawn from personality theory this time) it would be said that there was a conflict between self-image and "social image," or more simply the demands placed upon him by the Navy clashed with the demands placed on him by his view of himself as a person. In a fourth phraseology, it could be hypothesized that security conflicted with his need for belonging, and the conflict was temporarily resolved by his short absence.

Notice that in this last (Maslow's) description, it would have appeared to be more probable that the ensign would turn up on time, security being a lower order, more strongly motivating need than belonging; this suggests that either the ensign was not in a conflict situation (his security was assured over such a "minor" incident, or his lateness was accidental), or that his lower order needs were temporarily bypassed to satisfy higher order ones. Reread the last comment, and think about the lateness of the phone call itself as if it were an indication of such a conflict situation as has been discussed here.

[I - 6] I (18)

In contrast to a hypothesis of conflict, it could be hypothesized that the ensign's lateness was simply due to his having learned to respond similarly in earlier situations: negative transfer - his earlier learning prevented him from learning to carry out this assignment. In simple language, he overslept, or forgot to find out, or did a sloppy job of finding out.

[I - 7] I₁ (6, 7, 9, 12)

There is no evidence in the story of aggression, exaggerated anxiety, inadequate reality-testing (unless you mean that the ensign has "misjudged" his senior) or repression. Reread the problem.

[I - 8] 0₁ . (10, 20, 21)

To speak objectively about the ensign's lateness, nothing can be said with certainty about motivations. It can, however, be stated that his striving to return on time, however "strong" or "weak" it was, failed to give rise to appropriate instrumental behavior (as the ensign himself reported). This statement, from a theory of conflict, indicates only that he did not return. The behavior prior to his lateness was inadequate to predict his lateness: the officer's knowledge of the antecedent conditions was inadequate. At the same time, in slightly different words, referring to the incident itself rather than what went before, the ensign's "overt" behavior was not enough to explain what had happened or suggest a course of action. It is possible, however, that if the officer in question had carefully observed the ensign earlier, he would have known the right course of action to take (i.e. whether the ensign's behavior in this case was typical and likely to recur or not). Such information, about the ensign's motivation, about his behavior patterns, could only have been gathered through natural observation: scientific observation would have been nearly impossible in the complex conditions of Navy life, casual observation would have been too haphazard to be of value, and introspective observation could at best yield either a "he forgot, or overslept" or "he was caught in a conflict."

Natural (i.e. keen) observation of the ensign prior to the incident would have revealed the *how* of the ensign's actions, that is, the tones of voice, facial expressions, gestures, postures and the like, and from this the officer could have *inferred* (not observed) the motivations guiding the ensign's acts, and could have inferred the sorts of behavior the ensign was likely to engage in. Of course, the officer can never be sure that the conclusions he draws will be accurate - for he cannot be with his men all the time, nor can he ever see more than their overt behavior. It is only by testing conclusions drawn from observation that anyone can learn how to improve his capacity for *natural observation*. Most people do this unconsciously (casual observation!) but to effectively influence the behavior of others as a leader must do, a continual effort has to be made to observe others closely and carefully. In this case, had the officer done this beforehand, he might have noticed something in the ensign's behavior which would have enabled him to see what had happened when the ensign was late. Clearly, though, his was a casual observation not a "natural" one.

CONCLUSION

Psychology is not just a theoretical study of needs, drives, conflicts and personality. For a naval officer it should be a guide for effective action. As this case shows, there are situations when no amount of theorizing will help. If the officer in question had been able, or willing to take the time to "get to know" his subordinates, he would have known what to do. Situations which arise suddenly can be prepared for in advance only if the officer "gets to know" (*naturally observes*) his men. The results of such preparation are always useful, though *necessary* only in special cases. Such *applied psychology* is one of the distinguishing marks of a good leader.

PROBLEMS IN INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

Module Five: Case of the Angry Seaman

The Place: A Subordinate Command in a Naval District.

The Report:

"I was personnel officer at a command where there were about 300 enlisted personnel. The service records of these personnel were maintained and administered by a support activity eight miles away. My chief responsibility therefore was to be liaison officer between the command and the personnel officer of the support activity.

One day one of my men arrived in the office quite upset; thoroughly angry, he stated that he had gone to the support activity to re-enlist and had been told that they were much too busy to re-enlist him (he had not come to see me before going to the support activity). Fuming about the whole thing, he kept talking about writing to his congressman.

At this time the Navy had a big re-enlistment drive on, particularly for men with this man's rate. What steps should I have taken to see that he re-enlisted, and to change his attitude? How should I have dealt with the personnel officer at the support activity who was senior to me?"

THE PROBLEM

The Case of the Angry Seaman is typical of the many situations that arise in which an officer is confronted by a man angry or disturbed by the treatment he has received. The personnel officer is aware that all is not as it should be in communications between his command and support activity, but his immediate problem is to put the man straight.

You are asked to make a psychological description of the situation. The behavior of the man is reported by the personnel officer, who says nothing about his own behavior. You have to see through his words to the structure of the seaman's behavior. In doing so, you may find it necessary to refer to the personnel officer himself as an element intrinsic to the behavior of the man.

REFER TO THE RESPONSE INDICATOR AND MAKE YOUR SELECTION. AFTER MAKING YOUR SELECTION TURN TO PAGE 22 AND EVALUATE YOUR SELECTIONS WITH THE AUTHORS.

DISCUSSION

[II - 1] O₂ (6, 10, 19, 21)

These concepts can all be argued for as descriptions of the behavior which confronts the officer, though their frames of reference are quite different.

The man is useful and dependable, but his self-image has received a blow from the treatment he received at the support activity. The idea here is that human beings are dominated by interior dialogue to the point that the sentences which "they keep telling themselves *are or become* their thoughts and emotions." It would be useful if you made some practical observations on yourself to verify this notion, which may appear quite exaggerated when first you meet it. Every now and then look at what is going on inside your head-- catch it as if with a camera-- and notice how much verbal activity there is that is full of a portrayal of yourself. You may be surprised!

Severe domination by 'self-talk' can make a person very vulnerable to attitudes of others which he does not expect.

In terms of the striving model, the failure to find an appropriate instrumental behavior is pretty obvious-- he was not able to enlist. Perhaps the fault was in himself; then how did he act at the support activity? Did he walk in arrogantly, having been filled with the idea that the Navy desperately needed people, and put people's backs up?

We could say that his reality-testing has broken down; his is an exaggerated reaction to the situation. There is certainly something that sounds like "a system that tends to act abruptly, on the basis of pre-logical thinking and poorly differentiated or distorted perceptions" (*archaeopsyché* function).

The officer being confronted can try to find out what actually happened. The man had not come to see him before he went to the support activity. Maybe the fault lies in his perceptions and something small has blown up to ridiculous proportions. What is irreducible is the need to bring the man back on to an even keel.

[II - 2] I (15) or 0 (16)

A lot will depend on the resolution of the situation. As soon as the officer reacts, opens his mouth, or simply begins to listen, he begins to influence the behavior of his man.

The man is full of righteous anger. If the officer sides with him and promises he will complain to the personnel officer at the support activity, the man will feel justified. His response will then be *extrinsically reinforced*. Whether he calms down or not depends on the *kind of need* that is dominating him.

If the officer tries to calm him down directly and questions him about the actual events, *intrinsic reinforcement* will go on: the anger directed at the support activity may spread to the Navy itself (*stimulus generalization*).

[II - 3] I₁ (7, 8, 12)

We are looking at somebody whose ego has been punctured. He is neither anxiety-ridden nor running away! He is letting fly at what he takes to be the best audience.

[II - 4] I₁ (13, 14)

Certainly, there is something of conflict here, but for the man who wanted to enlist it cannot be characterized by either of these terms. On the other hand, looking at the *personnel officer* himself, we do see behavior which fits the avoidance-avoidance category: he wants to remove the anger of the man in his presence and also avoid tackling his superior at the support activity; he is "between the devil and the deep blue sea."

[II - 5] O₂ (4, 9)

The relevance of these terms should be pretty obvious. The man is exhibiting an emotional response to the conflict in his experience in the form of hostility towards the source of his frustration. By *stimulus generalization*, this hostility is spreading to take in the whole Navy as its object.

With the fracturing of his self-image, the man becomes activated in his need for esteem. He talks of writing to his congressman in order to regain a feeling of position and power.

[II - 6] I (18) or 0 (18)

We disregarded item 18 before in the chain of comments, but it does have a significance for the problem facing the personnel officer. When he tries to do something about the attitude of the man before him, he will find in operation negative transfer from the experiences at the support activity. The man is convinced - he has *learned* - that he is not wanted by the Navy.

[II - 7] 0₁ (2, 3, 5)

What sent the man to re-enlist? He has *learned* his attachment to naval life. Perhaps the security of the job - evident in the latest re-enlistment drive - has a strong attraction for him and he really enjoys the companionship. All of that secure and amiable world is threatened.

[II - 8] I₁ (1, 11, 17, 25)

If you can see how any of these items apply, you see more than the author! That is a real possibility!

[II - 9] I (21)

Even though we introduced this item right at the beginning in a positive light, we have to recognize three things:

- 1) The officer can always get more information (call the support activity to check on the man's story).
- 2) In a real situation you cannot have all the information you might like.
- 3) Something can be understood and brought into action on the information at hand.

[II - 10] I (24) or 0 (19) or 0 (23)

You may have thought that here was an instance of ego gratification distorting perception. But where is the gratification in the display before the personnel officer? We must do some sorting out. The general point is that attitudes do affect perception. An interest in a topic will lead us to listen and take in a lecture devoted to it and lack of interest will lead us to the converse. We should also be aware of the extent to which our perceptions are conditioned by *mental sets* which prevent an open perception capable of providing access to new ways of thinking.

In the case being studied, the stimulus of the events at the support activity probably led to ego protection. The man's self-image is bruised. He has to build himself up again. His response to the stimulus was anger (but was he angry at the support activity?) and anger is a protective device. However, when in front of the personnel officer, has protection gone over into gratification?

Anger, especially self-righteous anger, can - to move to another terminology - be described in this situation in terms of fulfilling an esteem need.

We are on shifting ground in trying to make descriptions in terms of the man's subjective experience of himself. But if we restrict ourselves to a purely behavioral approach we can say very little indeed.

Operationally, it is fairly certain that the personnel officer should keep himself detached both from the anger of the man and also from any escape reactions in himself. His task is to provide an appropriate feedback to enable adjustive behavior to take place in the man. This will not be accomplished by mouthing platitudes. The officer has to give a convincing demonstration of the effectiveness of a rational approach.

CONCLUSION

If the personnel officer has been trained in psychological interpretation he has an opportunity to separate himself from the man's condition and guard against conflict-avoidance behavior on his own part. Basically, he is in an avoidance-avoidance situation (item 14): his own words bring this out. Such a condition can lead to withdrawal behavior, probably of a covert kind (item 12): the officer's affective state would be disturbed and judgment impaired. The situation can be handled only by a striving that belongs at least to esteem need (in Maslow's scheme). Here is an instance of the psychological basis of naval discipline and training. The key is prompt action turning the esteem drive of the man into *solving the problem* - the ego is neutralized in problem-solving. But the officer himself must put his energies in that direction first. In that way he satisfies the esteem need of the man who can either revert to security drives or activate on a higher level still - (self-actualization).

As far as the man himself is concerned, we can say the following:

- items 9, 10: these give a bare description of the causes of his anger;
- items 4, 5: a motivational description suggests the kind of feedback the man needs;
- item 19: a personality description goes in parallel with item 4 from Maslow's scheme;
- item 23: he is not getting the right feedback from the personnel officer.

If your final analysis (your second group attempt) has fallen short of the description above, reprocess your answer.

If, in your second group attempt, your analysis still falls short of the above description, i.e. you do not feel you have an adequate psychological interpretation, do the following: go back to the beginning of the Discussion Section (text p. 15) and each one, individually, reread the comments relevant to the second group response, using the normal diagnostic procedure. Make a note of the reference numbers of the comments you read in the space provided on the Instructions and Response form.

PROBLEMS IN INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

Module Six: Case of the Liquidated Project

The Place: South Pacific Island:

The Report:

"I was ordered to the South Pacific to become project officer over a group of civilians and Navy enlisted men, relieving an officer being returned to the United States.

"I must admit that the assignment upset me for several reasons. The fact that I was supposedly at last on shore duty after four years at sea did not help much, as I flew across the Pacific.

"Arriving at my destination, I was met by the officer I was relieving. He immediately told me that things were in a terrible mess, but that he would try to get everything straightened out before he left. This was very comforting at the time, but later that day he informed me that he was leaving the next morning. There was nothing I could do to prevent his leaving, and that night he explained some of his problems. The project has three Navy electronics technicians and a contract with a small electronics manufacturer to supply nine civilian technicians, to make up for a shortage in naval personnel. The project, equipment was located on four islands and a ship. The equipment on the ship constituted the master station, and had to operate perfectly at all times. However, it was sufficient if any three of the four island-based set-ups worked. The civilians were all former enlisted men, and it was explained to me that their contract stated that no orders could be given them directly. All orders had to be sent back to their parent company 8,000 miles away. These men could be returned to the States, but no other action could be taken.

"The first day I took over, a practice run was scheduled. The three Navy men were with me on board the ship with one of the civilians. The civilian was drunk and a great deal of bother. The Navy men seemed to be handling their end fine; however I could only get in contact with one of the four island locations. I cancelled the practice, and arranged for a helicopter to take me to all the islands concerned.

"At two islands I found the civilians drunk. At the third, the civilian met the helicopter, not only drunk, but stark naked. On the flight back to the ship I planned to solve things by putting one of the Navy men on each of the three islands, with myself and several of the civilians at the master station. However, when I arrived at the ship, this plan was erased by two new developments. First, the civilians left on board ship has created a terrible scene in the wardroom, and the commanding officer of the ship had ordered that the civilians could not come back on board the ship unless I personally vouched for the fact that they would remain sober. Secondly, a dispatch had arrived ordering me to return one of my enlisted men to the States for emergency leave.

"With many important missions coming up, and no one connected with the project in a position to help me before the project would be over because of my remote location, I was in a tight spot for getting the job done. What should I have done?"

THE PROBLEM

To simplify matters, you are asked to ignore the behavior of the captain in your analysis. The situation stems from the conjunction of the behavior of the civilians with the behavior of the new project officer. Things have been going from bad to worse under the supervision of the previous project officer. The new officer is shocked and amazed by what he hears and sees and is thrown back on his own resourcefulness.

How could the project officer have understood the behavior of the civilians? And how would such an understanding relate to his own condition? The officer must interpret the civilians' behavior according to his own goals and drives.

REFER TO THE RESPONSE INDICATOR AND MAKE YOUR SELECTION. AFTER MAKING YOUR SELECTION TURN TO PAGE 30 AND EVALUATE YOUR SELECTIONS WITH THE AUTHORS.

DISCUSSION

- [III - 1] I₂ (1, 8, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20)
or O₄ (2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13, 21)

Try to focus on the main characters involved: the civilians and the project officer. We want to look objectively at the behavior of each of these. The civilians are going to pieces; the project officer is faced with an almost intractable problem.

At present, your response is in need of serious revision. Think over the various items in the Response Indicator and see what you find that is descriptive of the civilians' behavior, then of the project officer who is making his report.

- [III - 2] O₁ (5, 13)

The civilians are thousands of miles from home, working on a boring job. They do not belong to the Navy group. They are not subject to command and therefore have not been called upon to make that sacrifice of freedom which enables a man to belong to the naval team based on the ship. For some time, they have been "going down," abusing their freedom, making things more and more difficult for the officers. They are becoming aggressive and wild in their behavior, resorting to drink to remove the aversive stimulus working to reject their being there.

Finally, consider the situation of the project officer. In the first place, he had not wanted such a post, though he is striving to make the best of it. Then he faces the problem of having to approach the civilians, in the knowledge that he has no power over them, to try to get some sense into them.

Look again at the Response Indicator in the light of these remarks and try to find items which point to important features of the characters.

[III - 3] I (4)

You may be right in choosing this item - it depends *to whom* you wish it to apply. Remember that the main characteristic of the esteem needs in Maslow's scheme is the desire for independence and freedom. Ascribing this desire to the civilians would appear rather exaggerated. 'Esteem' is a more pressing need for the project officer, who is faced with a real challenge by the 'mess' that has come about.

How hard he tries to solve the problem he is faced with will, in this interpretation, depend on the strength of these esteem needs.

[III - 4] 0₂ (6, 16, 18)

Let us take a look at the civilians. The ludicrous display of the naked man highlights the regression that has taken place from adult reality-testing. What has emerged is *archaeopsychic* behavior at the child level but with adult memories. Of course, the civilian was drunk, but most men even when drunk have enough contact with normal standards of behavior to avoid such extremes. A self-reinforcing cycle has been set up due to the lack of command and the ineptness of the preceding officer. Each step downwards has been made with a reinforcement from the "success" of the previous stage.

What was the original stimulus for these men? Would it help if the project officer could understand this? At the moment he has shown only casual observation in his report.

[III - 5] 1₂ (2, 10, 13)

These items can be interpreted with regard to the *Project Officer*. The project officer is under quite a strain. His sense of duty - a secondary or learned drive, to use a technical term - is putting him into a state of conflict. His wish was to go, after four years at sea on to shore duty. The frustration of his wishes may develop into a fruitful esteem need: he takes his office very seriously and might find it difficult to stomach failure.

[III - 6] O_2 (5, 10, 12)

If we adopt the hypothesis that the dominant need operating in the civilians is that of belongingness, and take into account that by their very position they are *outside* the naval group, then we can deduce the lack of appropriate instrumental behavior to mediate the striving and gain the result. Perhaps this is an example of the *degeneracy* of a relatively low potency (high order) need - that for esteem. An obvious way out is alcohol. It is very significant that the civilians were found drunk *by themselves*. Here we have *psychological withdrawal* of the kinds designated by the terms *suppression* and *fantasy*. What kind of hole are they hoping to fill up in themselves?

[III - 7] I (3)

In this situation, safety needs are significant by their relative *inoperancy* in the civilians. Part of the project officer's tactics could be to threaten the men with action from their headquarters.

[III - 8] O_1 (23, 25)

Adjustive behavior is intrinsic to social performance. The concept here is that a person's response to a stimulus gives rise to a change in the environment which provides feedback to modify his future behavior. Where the feedback is inadequate, adjustment fails to occur. The child who is not corrected will behave in socially unacceptable ways. Normal parents provide the requisite feedback for the child to adjust to social patterns.

Clearly, the previous project officer has failed to provide requisite feedback to the civilians. He probably gave up trying when he knew that he was about to be relieved. He might even have engineered his escape.

Social pressures originate from differential reinforcement. They are a particular instance of feedback leading to adjustive behavior. Differential reinforcement can operate only within the in-group of a society.

The civilians are outsiders. Their perceptions lack the patterns operative among the Navy personnel.

[III - 9] I (24)

This is a permissible description, but not very helpful in grasping the social context of the psychological difficulties of the civilians. The label 'ego gratification' all too easily degenerates into a pejorative term and loses its objectivity.

[III - 10] I₁ (7)

We think you are off course here. There is nothing particularly compulsive in the behavior described. If the men were becoming alcoholics, there might be a case.

[III - 11] I₂ (17, 21)

These items hardly go well together! All the project officer knows of the civilians is how they behave in this one situation.

CONCLUSION

In this case, we can see the use of Maslow's scheme, but also the problems of its interpretation. More than one level of potency will be operative at the same time. We know that a higher order (lower potency) need, when it is strongly active, will tend to suppress low order (high potency) needs. It is well known how men can drive themselves for esteem without regard to physical comfort. A bandit will sit for hours in the midday sun waiting for a victim! What is interesting in this case is the hint of higher order needs 'going negative.' It does appear that when these needs are not activated, a compensatory drive is set up which takes the form of the needs compensated but lacks their *level of discrimination*. The satisfaction of needs should be related to the proper instrumental components by which they can be satisfied. What is instrumental to safety needs is not suitable for self-actualization needs, and vice-versa. Where there is the drive without appropriate instrumentation, there are always signs of distorted perception and breakdown in reality-testing.

This case is interesting in the challenge it sets to the officer. He cannot turn to the book for help. He has to be original. There is a possibility for self-actualization here. Instrumental to this, psychological analysis could enable one to see what the mental sets are.

EXERCISE

Is there any real evidence that you have changed your thinking in working through this problem? Write down what you think would be evidence of a change of thinking for someone (not necessarily yourself) working through this problem.

PROBLEMS IN INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

Module Seven: Case of the Antarctic Accident

The Place: A temporary weather reporting station somewhere on the Antarctic continent, from which some minor scientific experiments in glaciology were also being made.

The Report:

"I was ordered to relieve the command of the weather station after the long dark winter. The group remained the same except for a maintenance man who was relieved by Seaman M.

"The immediate task was to service the instrument stations which were remote from the base huts. Having put forward the priorities, I was contradicted by Ensign B who was a meteorologist and had spent the winter out here. He suggested that the priorities should be different, and gave reasons which frankly I could not understand. Somewhat conscious of the fact that the men had spent all winter at the station and knew both its working and the surrounding terrain very well, I capitulated and agreed to Ensign B taking Seaman M to attend to another instrument station. I had noticed that Seaman M appeared withdrawn, tending to complain under his breath, looking rather anxious every time he was requested to do work outside the base huts. It occurred to me a longer expedition with an experienced man might give him more interest and confidence.

"When night fell on the first day of the first maintenance expedition, they had all returned, except Ensign B and Seaman M. The weather was not too good and I concluded a night search party would be both ineffectual and dangerous. Needless to say I was worried and had misgivings about having agreed to the expedition. I had since learned from the Chief Petty Officer in charge of instruments that Ensign B was running a glaciological experiment at the instrument station he was visiting and tended to put his science before everything else.

"At crack of dawn next day a search party went out and found the two men alive though frost-bitten. Apparently they had survived through Ensign B's heroic efforts in rescuing M from a crevasse into which he had fallen and wrenched his leg. The officer had then dug a snow cave and talked the whole night through to M who was continually on the verge of hysterics, seeming to have great fear of dying in the snow. Ensign B reported that M had been very withdrawn and at the instrument station was continually nervous and asking when they were going to leave. On the return journey he had become very agitated crossing a snow bridge and had tripped over his own feet and fallen in; fortunately the two men were roped and Ensign B held him.

With no relief party due for two months and minimum medical facilities available I had to consider what to do. M was a valuable technician but obviously in bad shape. Ensign B had put his science before the Naval objectives, which was serious, but had behaved nothing less than heroically in saving M's life."

THE PROBLEM

Accidents can be avoided in most circumstances by careful attention to right planning, safety and supervision. However, psychological factors can have an unpredictable effect in many situations, especially where there are unavoidable hazards. This is not so simple as the common idea of a person being "accident prone." There may be an unusual combination of circumstances. The case described is an example.

Part 1

Concentrate on the information available on Seaman M and see how far you can recognize the combination of factors which may have led to his accident.

Part 2

Now concentrate on the information available on Ensign B and see how far you can recognize the combination of factors which describes his make-up.

Before you proceed to the Discussion Section make your selection of response items for both Part 1 and Part 2.

REFER TO THE RESPONSE INDICATOR AND MAKE YOUR SELECTION. AFTER MAKING YOUR SELECTION TURN TO PAGE 38 (PART I), PAGE 41 (PART II) AND EVALUATE YOUR SELECTIONS WITH THE AUTHORS.

DISCUSSION (Part 1)

[IV - 1] I₃ (2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 19, 22)

Your response suggests that you have not brought into focus the specific kind of behavior exhibited by M. It should be clear that he has little control over his own actions in what are, for him, the anxiety-provoking conditions of open snow and ice. Anything in this which is learned (in the training sense) is irrelevant. The conflict lies deeper than a simple conflict of priorities of drive or need.

[IV - 2] O (1) or I (1)

Seaman M's weak primary drive for survival was supplemented by Ensign B's heroic action on his behalf - by "talking him into surviving." A strong hysterical condition in such difficult conditions can often override the extremely powerful primary drives for survival. For example, an urge to fall asleep in the snow, a sleep from which there may be no awakening. Ensign B was experienced enough in the practical psychology of Arctic or mountain conditions to appreciate this.

[IV - 3] I₁ (2 or 3)

The whole point here is that these were totally unreliable in M. Whatever his training in survival procedure, it was overridden by his hysterical anxiety. One could attribute his slowness on the snow bridge to the need for safety, but the antecedent and consequent events would not seem compatible with this.

[IV - 4] O₂ (1, 2 and 3)

The important point to have noticed is that the fairly straightforward rules that lower-order needs must be satisfied first, for example in Maslow's hierarchical scheme, do not necessarily apply in the case of extreme emergency. M's urge for survival was not strong enough to overcome his anxiety.

[IV - 5] O_3 (6, 7, 8, 12, 23) or I_4 (6, 7, 8, 12, 23)

Essentially, we can describe M in terms of a pretty strong anxiety psychoneurosis. The neurotic's responses are controlled by negative reinforcers which tend to sustain the anxiety state. The environment of ice and snow was sufficient to call forth states in early life which perhaps took place in such an environment and yet are forgotten from the conscious memory. The memory is repressed and the person avoids any situation which might recall it. This inhibits the realistic perception of the situation (it is possible for the man to walk down a narrow line painted on a road but he falls off a 3 ft. wide snow bridge due to emotional reaction) and this in turn inhibits the feedback of information which enables adjustive or adaptive behavior.

[IV - 6] I_1 (14, 18)

These are likely to be relevant only if you assume that M did not like his mechanical maintenance work. It is possible to be good at something without liking it, but it is not very likely. We are not given information as to whether M had learned to react this way in previous experience. The evidence looks much more like a neurotic transfer.

[IV - 7] O_1 (20, 21)

The officer can hardly be blamed for not anticipating the outcome of the expedition. A keen observation of overt behavior can give us clues for recognizing a possible neurotic, but often this behavior in isolation is little different from a normal person's bad mood or "feeling up" state. It is the neurotic's covert responses (how he sees his predicament) which, together with the overt behavior begin to be a much better guide. In this case we have no account that the officer had talked on a person-to-person level with M.

CONCLUSION

One simple account of M's behavior in this incident is unlikely to be the only possible one. The features which we have considered important for this discussion are as follows.

M is seen retrospectively to be a mild psychoneurotic (inclusion of items 6, 7 and 8) who appears to have some powerful and irrational fear and anxiety in open spaces, especially in snow. This anxiety may be associated with some previous now forgotten episode in his life (inclusion of items 12 and 23). In this condition, his primary drives for survival were weakened (omission of item 1). This situation which contributed in part to the accident could not have been obvious before the event on the basis of the information available (inclusion of items 20 and 21).

DISCUSSION (PART 2)

[IV - 8] I₂ (7, 8, 12, 14, 20, 23)

Your response suggests that you have not clarified the distinction between the behavior of Seaman M and that of Ensign B. There is a clear distinction between motivation which contradicts the dictates of a mission and reaction which stems from neurosis. Both are deeper and longer-acting aspects of human make-up, but they lead to markedly different behavior. Try rereading the case study with particular attention to the behavior of Ensign B.

[IV - 9] I₁ (1 or 3) and 0 (2)

The behavior of Ensign B is indeed strongly driven by the primary drive for survival and safety but this alone could not have got them out of the difficulty. Clearly, Ensign B showed prompt and skillful leadership qualities in rescuing Seaman M and ensuring their survival overnight. To accomplish this he needed to be very skilled in a variety of techniques for safety and survival in the Arctic. These are learned and provide a powerful secondary drive equal in strength to the basic survival urge. It is worthwhile noting that the survival urge alone is often misleading, even dangerous, in certain situations. It has to be radically modified by learned behavior.

[IV - 10] 0₁ (4, 17)

Since Ensign B is a trained meteorologist and capable of conducting scientific research we might conclude that he is something of an "intellectual" tending to put science before Navy, not out of disobedience or lack of loyalty, but through heredity and upbringing. Assuming he is from an academic background his drives for esteem (in Maslow's hierarchy) will tend to be directed towards scientific accomplishment. However, this personality trait is apparently contradicted by his heroic effort to get not only himself but Seaman M back alive. But you cannot necessarily infer from this action a high probability behavior in terms of his intellectual strivings.

[IV - 11] I₁ (9, 13, 16, 19)

Any of these could be argued as applicable to Ensign B's behavior. His contradictions of the C.O. could be backed by sufficient aggression to sway the C.O.'s judgement on priorities- the aggression being B's response to the conflict of objectives. However, it is likely that either contradicting the C.O. or going along with his view would have a positive and a negative side, thus constituting a double approach-avoidance conflict. Another feature to note about the "scientific type" is the tendency for the activity itself to be reinforcing - this means that there is a strong tendency for the work to be done "for its own sake." Perhaps Ensign B was in some way dominated by his "self-image" as a meteorologist and glaciologist and his "social image" as a Naval officer. The long rather inactive winter may lead to extension of his image-building.

[IV - 12] O₂ (21, 23)

Don't overlook the fact that the officer reporting in this case may be inexperienced and may be making a misjudgment of Ensign B. He may have a lack of respect for the scientific officer and not realize that the man's deepest self-activating need may be bound up with the whole success of the station, scientific and naval, and that his view of priorities may have been best. The C.O. has little information on which to generalize a summing-up of Ensign B. He probably would not have predicted his outstanding capacity for sustaining sensitive human relations when confronted by the neurotic, injured and dispirited Seaman M in a situation where he himself must have been suffering greatly from exhaustion and the cold.

CONCLUSION

There are several ways in which the behavior of Ensign B might be interpreted. The one chosen for this discussion was based on the following points.

Ensign B emerges as a man with contradictory features (inclusion of item 17). On the one hand he is motivated by a need for scientific esteem (inclusion of item 4) which leads him to pursue his aim aggressively (inclusion of item 9). On the other hand, faced with an emergency, he subjugates this drive to the help of a man in difficulties. Possibly, his need for self-actualization is greater than his need for safety (inclusion of item 11). The way in which he achieved the feat of keeping M alive indicates the paradox that his primary and secondary drives were working at equivalent strength (inclusion of items 1 and 2).

