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ABSTRACT

This student published, quarterly journal is a forum for student thought on contemporary issues in rhetoric and communication. This issue focuses on the "Political Rhetoric of Our Times." The articles in this issue focus on the following topics: application of fantasy themes to individual role identification in the small group setting; an analysis of the use of the "Cold-War Phantasy" themes that Johnson and Goldwater identified with in their 1964 presidential campaigns; examination of President Nixon's rhetoric of withdrawal; and investigation of the rhetorical strategies of radical movement groups such as the "Political Revolutionary," "Cultural Revolutionary," "Superstar," "Urban Guerilla," and "Political Anarchist." (LG)

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The central purpose of Moments in Contemporary Rhetoric and Communication is to present the thinking of undergraduate and graduate students on contemporary issues in Rhetoric and Communication. Specifically, the editors believe that academic journals must focus upon the contemporary situations that confront all of us in defining and reacting to our symbolic world. In addition, the editors believe that students need a forum to present their thoughts and that students are capable of critical, reasoned analyses of the world around them before they obtain any specific degree from an institution of higher education. Moreover, the editors believe that rhetorical criticism and communication studies can be an integral part of the decision-making process and interests of the larger non-academic community. While retaining a commitment to the insightful tools of analysis and standards of the academic world, there is a need to begin to change Otis Walter's descriptive claim that, "The world at large takes no note of the work of the professional rhetorical critic."

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POLICY
editorial

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Fantasy Themes and Roles in the Small Group

Dan L. Miller

Harvey Cox in his personalized treatment of fantasy concludes that individuals and institutions have "conspired to assign fantasy a back seat"¹ as a legitimate concern for scholars. However, there is a growing awareness of fantasy as a special type of reality that warrents investigation. R.D. Laing voices his justification for the study of "phantasy" thus:

"When contrasted with external and bodily realities, the phantasy, like other mental activities, is a firmment, since it cannot be touched or handled or seen: yet it is real in the experience of the subject. It is a true mental function and it has real effects, not only in the inner world of the mind but also in the external world of the subject's bodily development and behavior and hence of other people's minds and bodies."²

When the theory of fantasy themes is applied to small groups, Phillips provides the basic rationale: "All behavior, however, must be regarded as rational in the eyes of the behavior at the time of behaving."³ This paper is a report of a longer study concerned with the behavior of individuals in small groups with special interest being paid to the relationship of fantasy themes to individual roles.

What types of relationships exist between fantasy themes and individual roles within the group? After my experience as a participant observer, I concluded that fantasy themes are instrumental in facilitating identification. First, I feel that fantasy themes enable group members to identify their own personalities. And as Strauss suggests, this process may not be a

simple one for:

"Everyone presents himself to the other and to himself and sees himself in the mirrors of their judgments. The masks he then and thereafter presents to the world and its citizens are fashioned upon his anticipations of their judgments. The others present themselves too: they were their own brands of mask and they get anraised in turn."⁴

Turning to "need" theory as a starting point, I concluded with Laing that all men have needs which must be resolved, and that identification of self is one such need. Further, it is impossible to identify self without others: self-identity is actualized only through a relationship with others.⁵ Further, this relationship must involve the pleasure principle or the need will continue.⁶ And finally, the conclusion that fantasy provides the outlet for the need satisfaction. More formally stated, Murray concludes:

"There is a good deal of evidence to support the view that under certain conditions fantasy may partially relieve the tension of a need: That is, it may be the equivalent of overt action."⁷

In addition to providing an avenue for identification of "self," Cox opines that often through fantasy, an individual is able to shed his self perception and become his "ideal" self.⁸ Evidence from the group studied would tend to indicate that individuals do indeed attempt to become their ideal self through the use of fantasy themes. In essence, individuals were observed going through fantasy what they felt restricted from doing in real life.

What happens when the need for self identification is denied by other members of the group through a fantasy theme? Laing postulates that "intense frustration arises from failure to find that other required to establish a satisfactory identity."⁹ When this situation arose in the group studied, the individual seeking, yet denied, self identification was placated through a new and supportive fantasy which had the effect of reducing the individual's frustration even though the group insisted on giving the member an identity that he appeared not to want.

One final comment on how fantasy themes function for self identification. Tamotsu Shibutani states that with self consciousness comes the basis for corrective measures to be taken.¹⁰ In a conflict situation within the group concerning the leadership role, the group was able to chain out a fantasy theme that raised the consciousness of the leader. With the perception that his identity as a leader was in danger, the group leader did alter his behavior through corrective measures acceptable to the group.

To summarize the first level of identification through fantasy themes, I concluded with Paul Tournier when he states that, "all men feel the need to justify their conduct by the beliefs they profess, and to convert others to them in order to per-

suaude themselves of their value."¹¹ From participation in the group, I conclude that fantasy themes facilitate the identification of self--not in isolation but through others. This identity may at times be an ideal: how we would like to have others view us or how we would like to behave. When the need for self identification is not realized, frustration results and out of this may stem a growing self awareness which may provide the basis for adaptive behavior.

The second major way in which fantasy themes appear to facilitate identification is through the individual's perception of others. There can be little doubt that fantasy themes function here according to Pfeiffer and Jones: "Fantasy and non-verbal techniques used in human relations training are often used to promote heightened awareness of self and others."¹² In attempting to define others, one level at which a fantasy appears viable is at the level of role-taking. Shibutani claims that "it is through role-taking that each is able to anticipate the probable responses of others, impute motives to them, and make necessary adjustments."¹³ (Note also that there is a tension between role playing and further identification of self: "It is the enactment of another's role that gives meaning to one's own role."¹⁴) Thus, it would seem that fantasy themes are a means whereby individuals can communicate to others certain values. Or as Goffman says, the communication of expectations, "That others will value and treat him in an appropriate way."¹⁵ Through role-taking, others increase their self awareness and are in that sense identified by the group. Strauss reinforces this position on identification of others by talking about values in conjunction with the adjective useful--"useful for whom, under what conditions, for which of his purposes?"¹⁶ Fantasy themes appear to provide a method for identifying values and their relationship to the "selves" of others.

The third major way in which fantasy themes facilitate the process of identification apparently is through the identification of self through others. Having already noted the tension that exists here, Bonner concludes that it is during this process that group norms become important for they give the individual a "standardized interpretation of his own experiences."¹⁷ If as Slotkin suggests "fantasy is the covert (imaginary) performance of an inhibited action which is acceptable to the individual's conception of his various selves,"¹⁸ then the group acceptance or rejection of this action will help the individual to establish his identity.

To summarize, it appears that fantasy themes demonstrate a significant relationship to individual roles within the group. I have looked at the process of identification and concluded that fantasy themes facilitate the identification process in at least three ways: identification of self, identification of self by other, and identification of others.

But there is yet another relationship between fantasy

themes and individual roles within the group. In addition to helping establish identity along personality lines, I conclude that fantasy themes assist the group in assigning functional task and social roles to individual members.

In the group studied, for example, the task leader of the group became the "General" in the group fantasy. Even the metaphor into which the leader was cast may be significant. According to Bonner, the authoritarian leader "stresses the value of discipline, deference to authority, and the outward symbols of status and power, such as the military officer's uniform and the policeman's badge."¹⁹ (*Italics mine.*) The name eventually given the leader, "General Redneck Brass," may have hidden importance according to Strauss.²⁰

In addition to fantasy themes being important in assigning functional roles, it appears that the method in which fantasy themes are employed may further the process of identification. Adopting the artistic and non-artistic perspective advanced by Booth,²¹ I discovered that the task leader did not initiate most of the themes. Rather, the leader participated in them usually after the social leader or one of the other members began them. Jacoby also concluded that leaders are not as creative as person-oriented individuals in small groups.²²

Looking for an inverse relationship with the social leader, it became obvious that this individual was given the fantasy name of "facilitator," and was the one person who initiated the largest number of fantasy themes. Bales supports these findings when he suggests that the social leader is a more creative user of fantasy themes.²³

Hence, to summarize, I looked at the possible relationships of fantasy themes to individual roles within the small group. The first relationship was tied to the process of identification. Second, fantasy themes appear to be instrumental in assigning functional task and social roles to specific members within the group. I suggested that these roles may be stereotyped or as Murray puts it, "archetypal fantasies" may emerge.²⁴ Finally, I suggested that the task leader as inartistic and the social leader as artistic in their handling of fantasy themes. In short, despite the negative connotations associated with the term fantasy, it would appear that this perspective can provide a valuable approach for the study of the small group.

Footnotes:

1. Harvey Cox, The Feast of Fools (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 60.
2. R.D.Laing, Self and Others (NY: Pantheon Books, 1969), 9.
3. Gerald M. Phillips, Communication and the Small Group (NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), 28.
4. Anselm L. Strauss, Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 9.
5. Laing, 66.

6. Henry A. Murray, ed., Exploration in Personality (NY: Oxford University Press, 1938), 64.
7. Ibid.
8. Cox, 62.
9. Laing, 70.
10. Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), 169.
11. Paul Tournier, The Strong and the Weak (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), 33.
12. J. William Pfeiffer and John E. Jones, A Handbook of Structured Experiences for Human Relations Training, I (Iowa City: University Associates Press, 1969), 77.
13. Shibutani, 167.
14. Hubert Bonner, Group Dynamics (NY: Ronald Press, 1959), 36.
15. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959), 13.
16. Strauss, 24.
17. Bonner, 50.
18. J.S. Slotkin, Personality Development (NY: Harper and Brothers, 1952), 358-9.
19. Bonner, 179.
20. Strauss, 16.
21. Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 8.
22. Jacob Jacoby, "Creative Ability of Task-Oriented Versus Person-oriented Leaders," Journal of Creative Behavior, (1968), 253.
23. Robert F. Bales, "Task Roles and Social Roles in Problem Solving Groups," Readings in Social Psychology, (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1958), 441-2.
24. Murray, 285.

Academist, Academist
 Where have you been?
 I've been to Trivia
 To look in on the scene
 -Virginia Kidd

The Graduate Student's
 MOTHER GOOSE
 Academist, Academist
 What did you there?
 I crushed out a little mind
 Under a chair

Pamela Benter
 In her own meaning center
 Sat spooning in roles and forms
 A tactile communicator
 Sat down to persuade her
 And screwed up her understood norms

Johnson, Goldwater and the Cold War Phantasy

John F. Cragan

In a recent paper presented at the University of Minnesota, Ernest Bormann argued that Robert Bales' analysis of "group phantasy events" may be of significant value to rhetoricians.¹ Bormann cites the contrasting phantasies of the abolitionists and the proslavers in the 1800's as examples of what he means by rhetorical phantasy. The northern abolitionists dramatized their view of southern whites in a vision of a vicious slaveholder sadistically beating the black man and lustily raping the black woman. Uncle Tom's Cabin is probably the best statement of this phantasy. The southern white conversely depicted slavery in the aura of beautiful white mansions filled with delicate southern belles, gallant men, and happy slaves. Gone With the Wind is one of the more popular statements of this phantasy. Bormann suggests that instead of examining a speaker's arguments in terms of their logical construction or in terms of their audience appeal, it may be more insightful to look at a speaker's allusions to phantasies and examine those statements in relation to the audience's phantasies. Finally, Bormann asserts that human motives may follow the rhetoric instead of rhetoric appealing to basic human motives. In short, the significance of Bormann's argument is that the source of the speaker's persuasion may be his ability to identify with or create a phantasy that the audience is or is willing to participate in.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the United States foreign policy phantasy theme that Johnson and Goldwater identified with in the 1964 presidential campaign. The major foreign policy phantasy of the 1950's is described for the

purpose of explaining the argumentative interaction between Johnson and Goldwater, and the strategic use of the "cold war" phantasy in the 1964 campaign is analyzed.

Gold War Phantasy. Much can be learned about the cold war phantasy of the 1950's by merely reflecting upon some of the key terms that are used in describing this period, such as cold war, bi-polar, bi-partisan, monolithic, McCarthyism, conspiracy, indoctrinate, block, brinkmanship, Iron Curtain, international communist conspiracy, and containment. The Berlin Blockade, the Greek Civil War, the report of life styles in eastern Europe, and the Korean war were the catalytic agents that produced the American cold war phantasy. D.W. Smythe and H.H. Wilson provide the best description of this phantasy. They state:

"To sustain popular support for cold war policies it has been necessary to construct a dream world of popular myths. Seven of these myths are: (1) We are good; they are bad....(2) Communism is an international monolithic conspiracy. (3) Our foreign relations problems are caused by Communists and therefore counterrevolution anywhere in the world is good and will be supported by the United States. (4) The only appropriate response to foreign problems is military; we must be tough for force is the only thing Communists respect....(5) Foreign policy is too complex for citizens to understand, and therefore decisions are to be made by the President and his military advisers; we must trust our leaders.... (6) Technology, knowhow, and winning are the all-important values and our high moral ends justify our means. (7) We are the defenders of the 'free world' and we will take any risks to preserve our system. So, President Johnson proclaims that, 'History and our own achievements have thrust upon us the principle responsibility for protection of freedom on earth...No other people in no other time has had so great an opportunity to work and risk all for the freedom of all mankind.'"2

Although Smythe and Wilson give a vivid description of the cold war phantasy, it is important to note that there were two distinct variations of this phantasy. The words "victory" and "containment" might help to distinguish the two strains. The group that believed in the victory approach felt that the cold war would become a hot war and that total victory ought to be won. For example, the GOP platform of 1952 talked about "rolling back Communism and freeing the eastern Europeans."

The people that were wrapped up in the vision of a life and death struggle with Communism exhibited behavior patterns that were consistent with their phantasy. They built bomb shelters in their backyards. The towns bought air raid sirens. Factories and office buildings had air raid sirens.

We were at war, maybe a cold war, but nonetheless a war. Thus, similar to World War II, foreign agents were identified and stopped. In the 1950's Joseph McCarthy and the House on Un-American Activities Committee soon produced a long list of enemy agents. The Senate rather quickly signed forty-two international treaties which entailed our defense of any country that might come under Communist attack. Many got tense waiting for the big war with Communism.

The containment variation of the cold war phantasy postulated that we must contain Communism. Those who participated in the rhetoric argued that if we could stop Communist encroachment on the free world, then Communism would crumble from within, i.e., George F. Kennan's Containment Policy.³

The Truman-Acheson Containment Policy was set forth in the late 1940's, but was overshadowed during the 1950's by the victory phantasy and did not reappear at the national level until John F. Kennedy's campaign and election. The behavior resulting from this thinking was readily observable. We must stop "brush fire wars." Our soldiers will be airlifted to the "hot spots" and they will extinguish the fire before it can spread and endanger the free world. This phantasy was sometimes described in terms of a gradual, flexible, response. This meant we have to respond in kind, so we had to have a mobile army that was capable of fighting anywhere in the world. We developed new and "conventional" weapons to make the soldier more mobile. This phantasy also demanded the building of such planes as the C-5 and F-111. Versatile, speed, light, quick—these were the important words in the military, but flexible response did not mean just the American Army. It meant the armies of weak countries so they could defend themselves. It was very attractive for Americans to envision millions of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans defending the United States' vital interests.

This phantasy did not just deal with military responses. If the Communist chose to woo a free country with economic aid, then we would woo that country back with economic aid. Countries like Cambodia, Egypt and Pakistan now have an interesting blend of United States and Russian public works programs. Another form of response was in "spirit." This was Kennedy's "New Frontier" and the "Peace Corps." We were able to combat the revolutionary spirit of Communism with other kinds of international spirit.

Admittedly, the victory and containment strains of the cold war phantasy were distinct enough to make for a lively debate between Goldwater and Johnson. However, the political controversy over the United States foreign policy that caused the capitulation of President Johnson in 1968 makes it difficult to believe that in 1964 Johnson and Goldwater were debating variations of the same foreign policy phantasy. Strategic Use of the Cold War Phantasy. Barry Goldwater intended to give the American people a choice in 1964. He felt there was a "silent majority" of "true" conservatives in

America and that they would respond to the call of conservatism. With respect to foreign policy, Goldwater interpreted Republican Conservatism to mean an act of participation in the victory strain of the cold war phantasy. Goldwater's acceptance speech at the GOP convention is the clearest statement of Goldwater's identification with the 1950 cold war phantasy. Goldwater began his speech by saying, "The Good Lord raised this mighty Republic...not to stagnate in the swamplands of collectivism, not to cringe before the bully of Communism."⁴ Goldwater defined what his brand of Republicanism was when he argued:

"The Republican cause demands that we brand Communism as the principle disturber of peace in the world today. Indeed, we should brand it as the only significant disturber of the peace. And we must make clear that until goal of conquest are absolutely renounced, and its relations with all nations tempered, Communism and the governments it now controls are enemies of every man on earth who is or wants to be free."⁵

We find that Goldwater made an even stronger appeal to the cold war phantasy in 1964 than the GOP did in 1952 and 1956. Goldwater had clearly rejected containment of Communism and he argued for total victory. He cited Berlin, the Bay of Pigs, Laos and Vietnam as shameful failures and the reasons for these became abundantly clear in his unforgettable conclusion: "Extremeism in the defense of liberty is no vice... moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue."⁶

The cold war phantasy had been the real world for Barry Goldwater for some time. His convention speech was not an atypical presentation for in his book, The Conscience of a Conservative, he wrote: "The Communist aim is to conquer the world...Unless you contemplate treason, your objective like his, will be victory. Not peace but victory."⁷

If Goldwater was to successfully attack the Kennedy-Johnson handling of foreign affairs, it seemed clear to him that he had to reject the containment version of the cold war phantasy. Considering his personal history and remembering that his support came from a group of Americans who are actively participating in the victory version of the cold war phantasy, it is difficult to think that Goldwater could have done anything else. Goldwater adopted the one option he had. He resurrected the old "get tough" or victory version of the phantasy to the national level. He may have believed that since the majority of Americans were engulfed in a phantasy that portrayed the international scene as a struggle between good and evil that the public may have grown tired of being conspired against and that they were sufficiently frustrated by American setbacks that could be reconverted into 1950 McCarthyism.

Goldwater may well have believed that he was right but in terms of rhetorical strategies, he had many problems. One of the most difficult ones: How could he get tough with Communism in a more dramatic way than the present Administration

without producing an atomic bomb backlash?

Although Johnson was in a stronger position, he still had three problems in defending his Administration. First, he had to avoid the "devil" term of the cold war phantasy. He could not be colored "pink." Second, Johnson had to create a negative image of Goldwater. He had to create a phantasy with Goldwater as the central, dramatic, devil figure. Third, Johnson had to make himself the desirable central character in the containment phantasy.

Johnson was no amateur when it came to sounding like a true patriot that was appalled by Communism. He had survived the McCarthy purge of the 1950's and he was not about to let Goldwater tag him as a "pinko." Johnson provided an interpretation of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration that responded to Goldwater's charges. In his famous John-Hopkins Address, he stated:

"I talked to a friend of mine the other day. The last country that we lost to Communism was Cuba in 1959. Now, for a period of almost 6 years, we have resisted on many fronts, with, I think, considerable success. So we do not all need to have a martyr complex and be apologizing for the woes of Uncle Sam and all of his failures."⁸

Although Johnson's argument that no new country had gone Communist would be acceptable to the people who participated in the containment part of the phantasy, he was not content. He went after the victory people. When speaking to veteran's groups he usually made statements like: "We have peace. We must keep it. But let none misunderstand us or misrepresent us. The American people are in this peace to win it for freedom, for justice, and for the dignity of man."⁹

In speaking in the abstract about the horrors of Communism, it is difficult to distinguish a Johnson statement from a Goldwater statement. A good example is an argument Johnson gave at Syracuse University: "Aggression--deliberate, willful, and systematic aggression--has unmasked its face to the entire world. The world remembers--the world must never forget--that aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed."¹⁰

Johnson and Goldwater were bound to sound the same when they were talking about Communism since they were both appealing to the same general phantasy. The difference between them came when they talked about what we ought to do about Communism. And that is precisely the difference between the victory and the containment strains of the cold war phantasy.

Johnson's strategy of creating a devil image of Goldwater was easy to plant. Goldwater was prone to making flippant remarks about rather critical foreign policy issues, such as his suggestion to defoliate Vietnam with tactical nuclear weapons or his position that a detachment of Marines ought to have been sent in to turn the water on at Guantanamo. This was a frightening image when it was coupled with the total world view of the victory advocates.

The ability of the Johnson forces to capitalize on Goldwater's weakness was brought out by Theodore White in his book, The Making of the President 1964. White observed: "Never in any campaign had I seen a candidate so heckled, so provoked by opposition demonstration within his own demonstration, so cruelly...tagged."¹¹ The effectiveness of these tags is pointed out by the fact that many Americans still remember them. Such tags as, "In your heart you know he might," "In your guts you know he's nuts," "Welcome Doctor Strangewater," "Goldwater for Hallowe'en," "Goldwater in 1954."

One can never conclude a discussion of the devil image that Goldwater acquired in the 1964 campaign without talking about two television commercials that were each only shown once. The first one was shown September 7 during NBC's Monday Night at the Movies. The one minute attack on Goldwater never mentioned his name but showed a little girl picking the petals of a daisy and as a closeup of the girl's face appeared, her face faded to an atomic explosion. The second television spot was shown two weeks later. This time a pretty little girl was eating an ice cream cone and a motherly voice in the background explained the effects of radioactive fallout and pointed out that Goldwater had voted against the testban treaty.¹²

The college students were extremely effective at creating placards that kept the image before the American people that Goldwater was a reckless right-wing nut that would push the button the minute he became president.

The Doyle Dane Bernbach Inc. advertising agency had done its part with the television commercial on Goldwater. However, it was not enough to create the negative Goldwater image. The American people had to be able to picture the dramatic figure of Johnson in their minds eye if they were to accept the containment version of the cold war phantasy.

Theodore White probably made the most insightful remarks on the creation of the Johnson image. "One had been tempted even before the campaign began, to make a catalogue of all the Lyndon Johnsons there were, for in the etymological sense of persona as mask, Johnson's personae were almost unlimited."¹³ White argued that depending on the issue, Johnson portrayed a different character. White lists and explains several characters such as "Preacher Johnson," "Old Doc Johnson," "Sheriff Johnson," and "Lonely Acres Johnson." In describing a fantasy about American foreign policy, the central dramatic character is naturally the President. White feels that the character that Johnson portrayed on this subject should be called, "Mr. President - the solemn, grave man on television, talking of nuclear bombs, world peace, the public good, who spoke with ponderous gravity, licking his lips with pointed tongue between polished strophes written by speech writers, occasionally overstressing his 'the's' and 'and's'."¹⁴ The tag "Mr. President" does not really convey the full image of Johnson on foreign policy. The noun, president, needs

some adjectives around it like responsible, restrained, calm, or cool. Nixon's campaign image on Vietnam was very similar to this.

The first part of this image is "bi-partisanism." The cold war phantasy had long included the idea that "politics ends where the sea begins." Johnson stressed this point again and again. In August at his ranch, Johnson told the press:

"I have seen no evidence that our action in Vietnam should be made a partisan matter. I am exceedingly pleased with the unanimity which the Congress and the people--and, if you will pardon me, the press--supported this movement."¹⁵

The most successful aspect of the Johnson strategy was the subtle way he built his character of "responsible Mr. President" by contrasting himself to the negative image of Goldwater. Johnson had two basic arguments that he frequently used to create his image. The first one came from the "itchy finger" idea that had been attached to Goldwater. In Detroit Johnson argued:

"We, of course, must be strong, but we must not be reckless. We, of course, must be firm, but we must not be foolish. One miscalculated, impulsive, reckless move of a single finger could incinerate our civilization and wipe out the lives of 300 million men before you could say 'scat.'"¹⁶

Although the first argument allowed the people to envision what would happen in the future, the second argument let the audience speculate on what would have happened if Goldwater was president during the Gulf of Tonkin crisis. This oft repeated argument is indeed very ironic considering the criticism Johnson received in 1967 and 1968. In Des Moines, Iowa, Johnson stated:

"Recently near Vietnam, in the Gulf of Tonkin, when they fired on our flag, we retaliated in kind. We not only sank the boats that fired upon it, but we immediately moved to destroy the nests that housed those boats. But we didn't drop a bunch of bombs on civilian women and children in an act of desperation or in a thoughtless moment. We used our power with judgment and with restraint..."¹⁷

The final aspect of Johnson's characterization of himself came through the direct comparison of the victory and containment versions of the cold war phantasy. The concept of "brinkmanship" had long been associated with the victory approach and the "help people defend themselves" had been identified with the containment version. Johnson used Vietnam as the example to contrast these two approaches. Ironically, this was Johnson's strongest argument in 1964 and the basic cause of his destruction in 1968. Almost at every political rally during the campaign Johnson would proclaim:

"In Asia we face an ambitious and aggressive China, but we have the will and we have the strength to help our

Asia friends resist that ambition. Sometimes our folks get a little impatient. Sometimes they rattle their rockets some, and they bluff about their bombs. But we are not about to send American Boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."¹⁸

There is no question that Johnson's strategic use of the cold war phantasy was successful. He won a decisive political victory. But Johnson paid dearly for his success. The Dr. Strangelove mask that was created for Barry Goldwater was soon to be placed on Johnson. As the country came clean with Gene, Johnson found himself as the central devil figure of a new foreign policy phantasy. The Eugene McCarthyism of the 1960's presented a phantasy that Johnson did not comprehend. Johnson retreated toward the victory strain of the cold war phantasy and finally capitulated under the weight of the new phantasy.

Footnotes:

1. Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and the Rhetoric of Motives," (unpublished paper, University of Minnesota, May 1970).
2. D.W.Smythe and H.H.Wilson, "Cold-War Mindedness and the Mass Media," Struggle Against History, ed. N.D. Houghton, (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1968), pp. 65-6.
3. Richard J. Barnett, Intervention and Revolution (NY: The World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 90.
4. Theodore White, The Making of the President 1964 (NY: The New American Library, 1965), p. 260.
5. Ibid., p. 261.
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11. White, p. 391.
12. White, p. 384.
13. White, p. 426.
14. White, p. 426.
15. Lyndon B. Johnson, "The President's News Conference at the LBJ Ranch," August 8, 1964, Public Papers..., p. 940.
16. Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks at an Airport Rally in Detroit," October 30, 1964, Ibid., p. 1533.
17. Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks at the State Capital in Des Moines," October 7, 1964, Ibid., p. 1230.
18. Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron University," October 21, 1964, Ibid., p. 1390-1.

Nixon's Rhetoric of Withdrawal

Michael Gilliland

Few would deny that at the heart of Richard Nixon's rhetorical problem is the fatal clot of credibility that, for the most part, finds its nucleus in the VietNam War, or more specifically, its termination.

His campaign boasted that he would "end the war and bring Americans home." He needn't have even bothered though, for the nature of 1968 demanded such a promise from the winner. The American people in the year of the dove simply would not have elected a man who refused the war's end as priority #1. It is, consequently, relatively safe to conclude that the measurement of the President's achievement will be greatly dependent upon the accomplishment of this end.

These premises justify exploring the rhetoric of withdrawal. I shall be concerned with the period from Nixon's inauguration to the end of 1970. Selection of this period is not arbitrary; rather, the temporal boundaries are formed by two events: a promise and the 1970 election.

In the spring of his first term, Nixon promised that all ground combat troops would be withdrawn from Southeast Asia by 1970's end. The remark was made in a speech presented on June 20th as a response to Clark Clifford's challenging timetable, but hinted at by the administration as early as March to the extent that James Reston cited this plan of withdrawal as an explicit Republican goal.

Within the womb of this self imposed temporal limitation, the rhetoric of withdrawal was conceived. Gestation, however, was to be extended indefinitely beyond the end of

1970 through a last-minute stipulated definition of "combat troops."

Whereas the lay image that springs forth from this term is generally "any man wearing a uniform in a combat zone," the Administrative image was somewhat different. A "combat troop" according to Melvin Laird, is "any soldier participating in an offensive sweep,"¹ which, as we were to learn later, does not constitute offensive actions in the name of defense.

Further flexibility in the timetable was contrived from the unique interpretation of the phrase in Nixon's campaign promise "bringing Americans home." Here the Administration apparently does not mean to imply "all" Americans, but just some Americans, as Nixon clarified in a September, 1970 speech. "I promised to bring Americans home and I've brought some home."

With these two verbal ploys, the Administration is exonerated from their two-year restrictions. Since these tactics for extension were conceived at the eleventh hour, however, it is still safe to assume that the Nixon Administration toiled, for the most part, with the original timetable. The 1970 elections, on the other hand, would reveal the success or failure of the "end of the war" rhetoric and still remains valid as an outer limit for this exploration.

It is one thing to write a party plank; it is quite another to construct a modus operandi for an acting administration. Perhaps in this sense, Mr. Nixon was wise not to reveal his "secret" strategy for the evacuation of Viet Nam until the appointments had been made and the wind direction charted. Mr. Nixon had always been a good listener.

It is clear that within the scope of withdrawal procedures the options were many and offered a sufficiently wide latitude for executive discretion. These four were offered by the New York Times:

- 1) Cut back American forces from the present 550,000 to 100,000 or 150,000 men in about two years to get in position for a long haul, low-cost operation.
- 2) Dual-track negotiations, the United States and North Viet Nam attempting to negotiate mutual troop withdrawals in order to pressure Saigon and the Vietcong into a political settlement in the South.
- 3) (Ike-Korea ploy) letting word leak to Hanoi that the Nixon Administration was opening serious discussion on such possible military moves as a resumption of the bombing, blockage of principal ports, and even an invasion of North Viet Nam.
- 4) Negotiate a total package settlement embracing both troop withdrawals and a final political settlement.
 - a. Vietcong agree to renounce the goal of forcibly overthrowing the Saigon Regime.
 - b. During negotiations, the United States could either continue current forces or ease its bur-

den by sending units home as their places were taken by South Vietnamese.

In the course of events from 1969 through 1970, Nixon was to exercise all of these options in a combined effort to prolong the public support for the Administration policy by demonstrating that the war was becoming a lighter burden for Americans. He intended to exhaust every alternative to "redeem the investment of more than 500,000 American troops regardless of the merits of the initial involvement."²

The first option seemingly becomes the President's goal by default as is revealed by the late 1970 redefinition rampage and a barrage of promises to maintain bases and troops enough to protect them "for as long as they're needed." The other three alternatives are all means Nixon has exploited to achieve this end. The first is found in early 1969 in the numerous demands for commensurate withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops. The second option is manifested in every announcement of troop withdrawal when the Administration threatens massive retaliation if the North fails to comply, and in the stepped-up bombing and occasional rumors of limited nuclear warfare. Finally, the fourth goal, the package settlement, is found in the policies of Vietnamization and continual renunciation of Vietcong demands to overthrow Thieu.

The Administration has run the whole gamut in an attempt to reduce the troop level. It is not difficult, in retrospect, to determine the general direction of Nixonian withdrawal strategy, nor is it hard to draw conclusions concerning the reordering of Administrative strategy from the beginning of 1969 to the end of 1970. One need only analyze the first and last speeches and press releases. It is the progression of events that is most interesting, providing more than a mere notion of policy logistics and a sterile charting of strategies. With a chronological resumé it is possible to chart responses to events in a manner which gives us a revealing portraiture of the Nixon Administration.

Let us once again begin at the beginning with the expressed intent of scrutinizing the living nature of withdrawal rhetoric as it responds to the progression of political events.

Early in 1969, doves were to receive a strong hint that our President, despite campaign promises, was simply not "one" with them. That is, he was a dove with hawk's feathers, or a long-term dove, or a proud one, or at least one who did not enjoy the prospect of "peace at all costs." April, 1969, found the President explaining that peace must come as a result of the United States negotiating from a "position of strength."

Embodied within this phrase is a mastery of consensus leadership. While the hearts of the not-so-anti-war Americans (a majority) rejoiced at the sound of "negotiate" and "peace," the sort-of-pro-war Americans (another majority) were exuberant, recalling World War II and the signing of

treaties from a position of strength.

Undoubtedly, neither the left-wing doves nor the right-wing hawks were placated, but that grand majority residing in and around the middle of the road were.

There was one hitch that alienated a few more to the left than to the right, however. That was Nixon's refusal initially to discuss unilateral withdrawal. Herein lies another masterful strategy.

One would immediately jump to the conclusion, given the fact that Nixon renounced withdrawal discussion, that the whole of peace-minded America would wing to the Capital to protest. This, because of either an intentional or unintentional Republican ploy was avoided. All the time Nixon, in press talks and television addresses was refusing to speak of withdrawal, "leaks" were appearing everywhere from "cracks" in the Administration to the effect that as many as 100,000 troops would be withdrawn within a couple of months. In fact, the sievish administration managed to jam the front pages constantly with "hints" of withdrawal. Thus, while Mr. Nixon was assuring the North Vietnamese and the American hawks that there would be no withdrawal but a fight for a position of strength, the peaceniks were fed gossip of massive troop extrication.

All the time "knowledgeable diplomatic sources" fed peace-corn to the doves, the Administration was coming up with something new.

"Vietnamization," as it was to be called, was seemingly a brain-child of Melvin Laird (one of the leakiest) who told us in March of 1969 that withdrawal was contingent upon "turning over more responsibility for the fighting to the South Vietnamese." It became readily clear to the American people that Nixon would simply not allow South Vietnam to fall to armed insurgence.

The early 1969 period was essentially a time of looking for a solution. In every speech, the President assured us that American honor, South Vietnamese democracy, and the "investment of 500,000 troops" would all be redeemed in any settlement. The administration sought a very thorny solution which encompassed not only troop withdrawal and an end to the war, but an implied victory. As Mr. Nixon said on April 6, 1969, "It may be difficult to make peace with Saigon, but it will be impossible to make peace without Saigon."

Three factors were to pervade the two year period as determinants of our level of withdrawal. Announced in the late spring of 1969, they were to recur in nearly every withdrawal speech in some form or another: 1) training of the South Vietnamese and the ability to handle their own defense; 2) whether or not the offensive action of the enemy was receding; and 3) progress of the Paris Peace talks.

All three offered the President a certain amount of flexibility. If the country swayed dovishly, it would be

quite a simple matter to decide the South Vietnamese were becoming more efficient and able to swing more of the burden. In like manner, the level of enemy offensive action is a subjective judgment that can be manipulated with relative ease to give the appearance of Presidential strength and stick-to-itiveness even if the American public pushed him into withdrawal.

These elaborate backdoors could be likened to various drugs a heroin addict keeps around in anticipation of withdrawal. "Cold Turkey," as it is called, can be significantly mitigated if the proper measures are taken when symptoms of withdrawal pressures first manifest themselves.

With the first withdrawal of American troops in the late spring, there was conceived a whole new rhetoric which would be called the "now it's their turn" lingo.

On June 11, 1969, we find the first and, it might be added, prime example of this phenomenon. "The North Vietnamese must begin withdrawing forces as we have withdrawn ours. If they fail to act in one direction or another, they must bear the responsibility for blocking the road to peace and not walking through the door we have opened."

Although the initial withdrawal was only 25,000 troops, the President saw just cause to shift the burden of peace to the North Vietnamese. Regardless of the fact that it was nothing more than a token withdrawal, it was nevertheless a significant enough de-escalation to pass a bit of the buck for continued conflict.

Even with the first withdrawal of American troops, a very well defined pattern of rhetoric began to evolve. With a little causistic stretching, the one of speeches associated with withdrawals proceeds from pollution, to guilt to purification to redemption, a pattern Kenneth Burke suggests is the emotional order of all human events.

Withdrawal itself is the pollution.

The threat of retaliation at the close of every withdrawal speech if the North fails to comply is evidence of guilt.

The announcement of South Vietnamese success in shouldering the burden and a reduced American casualty rate is purification, and rumors of more withdrawals and finally the act itself is indicative of redemption and, once again, pollution. This cycle can be followed with little deviance through each cut-back in American troop ceilings.

Thus, it follows that little more than a month after the first withdrawal announcement, Nixon threatened retaliation for North Vietnamese non-compliance followed by a rash of praise for South Vietnamese fighting ability and finally, widespread rumors of total withdrawal of American troops by the end of 1970.

As pollution, guilt, purification, and redemption illustrate the microcosmic pattern of each withdrawal of troops, the larger view finds a trend away from the Paris Peace talks as a criterion for withdrawal. It was apparent that

North Vietnam was going to grant no concessions just as it was apparent that the United States, whose eggs had previously lain in the hawk basket, were surprisingly hatching doves. With this inflexibility abroad and mounting pressure at home, Nixon was forced to maintain the appearance of "sticking to his guns."

The troop withdrawal in the fall of 1969 further substantiated the Burkean rhetorical pattern. The only departure from this was a little more guile as was evidenced by the speech made in December. "The enemy still insists on a unilateral withdrawal of American troops and on a political settlement which would mean the imposition of a Communist government on the people of South Viet Nam against their will, and defeat and humiliation for the United States. This we cannot and will not accept."

However severe the pangs of guilt, the announcement of purification follows soon after. President Nixon had flown to Viet Nam with a man named Thompson whose book he had read concerning troop withdrawals. "Mr. Thompson was very impressed by the acceptance of the burden of fighting being assumed by the Vietnamese." One day later came the announcement of the withdrawal of 50,000 more troops by April 15 of 1970.

The new year presented new problems for the Nixon Administration. Whereas Nixon was managing to pull along a consensus of American support by periodic withdrawals interspersed with the vow to negotiate from a position of strength, Mr. Thieu was not impressed. The New York Times on January 1, 1970 states, "Mr. Thieu has no intention of taking over the fighting with South Vietnamese troops by the end of 1970. That he is prepared to exact a high price for approving American withdrawals; and that if American withdrawals are longer and quicker than he desires, he is willing to smash the false front of agreement on Vietnamization that has been exerted here and in Saigon."

Mr. Nixon's response was a resubstantiation of his three determinants (Paris peace talks, enemy activity, and progress in Vietnamization) assuring the American people (Mr. Thieu) that there was no danger of the South Vietnamese falling to the North.

The fine line upon which the Administration is treading becomes readily apparent with these statements. Not only must Nixon withdraw troops at a steady pace and maintain the image of seeking a just peace, but he must now exhume the three criteria for winding down the war which, according to pessimism in the peace talks and stepped up enemy action, is inconsistent with de-escalation.

It is time to employ another tactic previously mentioned. Mr. Laird is given the task of hinting to the press that complete American troop withdrawal by 1970 does not mean complete American troop withdrawal by 1970. Rather, it means the winding down of the war to about 250,000 men; these

essentially don't count because they're merely providing for the offensive defense of U.S. bases.

With the revival of the three criteria and the redefinition of "ground combat forces," we hear nothing more from Mr. Thieu and the Nixon Administration is free to project optimism to the still growing American dove faction. In fact, Melvin Laird hinted to the press as soon as three days following the placation of Thieu that "withdrawal would continue despite the Paris Negotiations and the persistence of substantial enemy threat on the battle field." Here is found the first implication of the demise of Nixon's second criterion for winding down the war. Despite enemy activity, withdrawal continues.

Not to appear to be departing too rapidly from his original determinants, a bit of sidestepping was necessary and indeed came in February 1970. "The continuing rate of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam causes concern here. There rate last week is said to have matched the high rate of this time a year ago." However, "they don't expect the North Vietnamese to mount so severe a challenge as to make the continued gradual reduction of ground combat troops impossible."

Whereas before, an excuse to halt withdrawal would have been gleaned from any enemy step-up, now the Administration deems it necessary to minimize enemy insurgence to be consistent with what declared "a universal trend of withdrawal." The high casualty rate is equally indicative of a high infiltration rate and is also necessary to minimize. "If the North Vietnamese find it impossible to rebuild the Vietcong infrastructure, they may find it necessary to risk heavy casualties by mounting some major assaults."

It should not be forgotten in the midst of this apparent self justifying withdrawal rhetoric that Nixon was loathe to abandon negotiating from a position of strength. Thus late February and early March found stepped up bombing and U.S. offensives. As if the microsmic guilt of each withdrawal has its counter part in the larger view, the pollution of abandoning his three criteria for ending the war found Nixon stepping up activity.

Apparently purified, late March found the Administration once again in a peaceful frame of mind and the next troop withdrawals were rumored. Direct action was delayed until April 21 when Nixon announced the withdrawal of 150,000 American troops over the following year. What followed was the most wide reaching guilt reaction of all, commensurate with the large number of troops to be withdrawn. Ten days after the announcement, we recognized the extent to which Mr. Nixon was losing sleep as a result of a departure from negotiating from strength. "I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last ten days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who would be there after

withdrawal of another 150,000."

Thus followed the invasion of Cambodia. It's interesting to note that three days before the announcement of withdrawal of 150,000 troops the Administration stated that they had no intention of widening the war to the rest of Indochina. If we take them at their word, the connection between the troop cutback and the Cambodian incursion with Mr. Nixon's guilt as a causal link is further substantiated.

Most assuredly, this offensive action alienated more doves than he would have hoped. Yet, Nixon was not unprepared for the unfavorable reaction. Coupled with a barrage of praise for the South Vietnamese who handled "60%" of the invasion (again the success of Vietnamization) came this announcement. "The Allied drive into Cambodia was the most successful operation of the long and difficult war." He concluded by announcing the withdrawal of 1/3 of the 150,000 troops by October.

By this time, Congress was wary and weary of Administration guilt reactions and voted 58-37 not to trust the President in the conduct of the Indochina war. Nixon again, was prepared to defend his own credibility: "By June of 1969 we could announce the withdrawal of 250,000 troops." "They came home." "In September, 1969, we announced the pullout of an additional 35,000 troops." "They came home." "In December, we announced 50,000 would leave Vietnam." "They came home by Spring." This is clearly an attempt on the President's part to emphasize the test of his credibility not on the end of the war itself but the troop withdrawals which, according to rising Vietnam expenditure, seemed not to be linked with the wars end.

As the end of summer, 1970, approached, many Americans recalled the words of the new President who promised the withdrawal of all American troops by 1970. Here we find reliance upon the previously mentioned stipulated definition. "Remaining American infantry units and artillery units will be responsible only for protecting American support units in Vietnam." Essentially, this promises nothing. The U.S. support units have always protected infantry and artillery. Following closely after was the message that distinguished between offensive and defensive sweeps. In any event, it still remains in the President's power to invade in the name of de-escalation.

A few days later, Laird announced that upon completion of the withdrawal of the 150,000 men in the spring of '71, all ground combat actions could be turned over to the Vietnamese.

The full impact of Nixon's strategy for peace unfolds.

It becomes apparent that the first of the four options mentioned earlier is to be the goal of the Administration, i.e., pulling out to 200,000 and remaining for an extended period of time. If this is not the case, then why, if all ground combat actions are turned over to the South Vietnamese,

do we need any American Troops at all? The answer becomes more clear when the nature of "Vietnamization" is scrutinized.

At the outset, when the term was coined, images of Viet Nam fighting its own battle with at most limited military technical assistance were conjured up by the administration. It becomes readily apparent that U.S. firepower required U.S. trained personnel. The nature of Vietnamization undergoes a rhetorical shift of sorts. It means, simply, (given the rising Vietnam budget) that the war becomes more advanced militarily in that air support and Navy support is stepped up with a limited number of Vietnamese troops fighting on the ground. It seems that it is not replacement of American troops that allows ground combat action turned over to the Vietnamese, but the reduction for the need for troops of any kind. Laird's promise of artillery and troops defending military bases further substantiates this indefinite stay and the changing nature of the war. The American burden is no longer men, but money.

What becomes obvious at the close of 1970 is that Mr. Nixon has not indeed lost sight of the original investment of 500,000 troops; nor has he abandoned the hope of saving the American face and negotiating from a position of strength. That he carelessly abandoned his criteria for determining the rate of troop withdrawal seems not to be a reaction to dovish pressure, but a shift of priority from men to materiel.

Recalling that the late summer strategy was to convince the American people that his word was good by his faithful withdrawal of troops rather than an actual scaling down of U.S. involvement, the test of credibility in the 1970 election becomes the extent to which Americans identify withdrawal with de-escalation.

What 1971 and 1972 will bring, I am not bound within this analysis to forecast. Yet, with the returns of the off-year elections, surely not forgotten, Nixon's Rhetoric of Withdrawal, to be successful, must surely re-identify itself with declining U.S. involvement.

Footnotes:

1. Melvin Laird, press conference, August 8, 1970.
2. Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation," April 4, 1969.
3. New York Times, April 9, 1970.

words caress
like touches
unspoken words
most of all

-Virginia Kidd

Rhetorical Strategies of the Radical Revolutionary

James W. Chesebro

A great deal of the protest and dissent of the early 1960's did emerge from proponents of the "New Left."¹ However, Le-land M. Griffin could accurately argue in 1964 that, "At the present writing, the 'New Left' movement cannot be said to have 'flowered into public notice.'"² As a result, Griffin's description of the "rhetorical structure" of the New Left focused upon the intellectual origins of the New Left and not upon agents of the New Left in action confrontations with the "establishment."

By 1968, however, the public was overtly and profoundly aware of the activities of the New Left. Moreover, 1968 was a turning point for members of the "movement." The 1968 Democratic Convention provided the environment for the first major rhetorical statement of the New Left. The Yippies had planned a "Festival of Life" to dramatize the Democrat's "Convention of Death."³ Strategically, it was hoped that the Yippies would be associated with youth, love, good, and hope. In contrast, the Democrats were to be associated with age, hate, evil, and despair. In part, the Yippie strategy was realized. The generation gap became a functional force, the "establishment" was aligned with violence and police brutality, and the political system appeared rigid and inflexible. However, the Yippie strategy was not a completely successful one. The New Left was viewed as an organic whole (a Communist conspiracy) employing a "violence of words and deeds."⁴ Moreover, the intellectual origins of the New Left were quickly forgotten as the words revolution, facism, pig,

radical, and Woodstock became the easiest and most popular way of identifying the different dimensions and concerns of the New Left.

While 1968 provided the foundation for the first national image of the New Left, 1968 also had a less commonly recognized but equally profound effect upon members of the New Left. The Democratic Convention provided the stimulus for a "higher level of consciousness and political awareness" to many members of the New Left--worldviews began to change for many members of the New Left on several fronts. First, the Convention and the Convention site--Chicago--provided a vivid example, to members of the movement, of a "pig" nation in operation. The system was perceived as controlled by "leaders" who were unresponsive to the "people," leaders who sought only to control and mold the people. The system seemed destructive, cruel and inhuman. The Yippies attempted dramatize the leaders by electing their own candidate. Quite literally, the candidate was a pig--his name "Pigasus." Jerry Rubin: "The Democrats nominate their presidential candidate and he eats the people. We nominate our candidate and we eat him. We devour our candidate before he devours us."⁵

Second, members of the New Left began to perceive the political system as a repressive, violent system. Carmichael had predicted that a "new level of violence was ahead" before the Convention. He suggested that the "Democrats would smash hippies heads if only to undercut the popularity of George Wallace."⁶ Later, Tom Hayden was to note that "We sensed only that we were entering into a new and dangerous situation in which traditional methods of organizing protest were outlawed or obsolete."⁷ While many radicals had always felt uneasy operating as protesters and as part of the system, the Convention became a pivotal point and many members of the movement shifted from protest to an overt resistance of a system that was now identified as "repressive and violent." Resistance became a self-defined purpose.

Third, with a new self-conception, members of the movement began to believe that the new self-conception required new forms of reaction toward the system. Marches and sit-ins could be easily destroyed in a repressive political system. Moreover, the system seemed unresponsive to protest. The old strategies did not seem to work. New strategies had to be developed. However, the goals, tactics, strategies, symbols, and perceptions of reality were markedly different and diverse. Groupings began to occur within the movement. Those groupings are mostly clearly identified by the strategies selected by the groups. This analysis will focus upon those diverse strategies.

While this analysis focuses upon the diversity in the strategies used by movement people, it ought initially be noted that there is a common bond among movement people. That common bond is both an ideological bond and a rhetorical

bond. Ideologically, most movement people see themselves pitted against capitalism, materialism, and representative democracy. These three philosophical commitments identify the nature and objectives of the "establishment." Movement people see themselves committed to three alternative philosophical commitments: socialism, humanism, and participatory democracy. This commitments are translated in an operational life-style based upon sharing, respect for all people, and a decision-making system in which all people voice their own concerns based upon their unique identity definitions.⁸ This ideological bond allows movement people to maintain a rich diversity of types and kinds within their ranks—the most despised within the establishment find a place within the movement. While many movement people may reject a concern for ideology, nonetheless an ideological bond seems evident and functional to the significance of the movement.

Movement people also have a strong rhetorical bond. The enemy is the "pig." Pigs become any advocate or leader who is not "in the control of the community."⁹ The solution is to give "all power to the people." Consensus of agreement is indicated by the phrase "right on." All three rhetorical phrases (pig, power to the people, and right on) were coined by the Black Panther Party who has periodically made moves toward a national union among movement people such as the effort made at the 1970 Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention.¹⁰ However, an even larger rhetorical union has developed. With the recognition that the political system fails to respond to protest, is a repressive and violent system, the term New Left seemed highly misleading. The term suggested a commitment to the system paralleling the actions of the "Old Left." A new label was needed to fit the new self-conception. The term revolutionary was selected. To members of the movement, the term revolution is a god-term and implies a commitment to constant change, development, and creativity. Thus, desirable actions are favorably labelled as "revolutionary" whereas repressive or oppressive actions are demeaned with the label "counterrevolutionary." A study of movement people today, then, becomes a study of revolutionaries who would resist the system militantly and seek to create a more humane system.

For the militant, or the person who actively resists the system, the central question becomes how shall revolution be achieved? The response to that question is extremely diverse and the concomitant revolutionary acts equally diverse in practice. However, revolutionaries have begun to vary more overtly along group lines. Employing the words and deeds of revolution as strategies of resistance, most revolutionaries seem to fall within one of five major categories. These categories are functional categories—the actions carried out by revolutionaries provided the basis for the categories. But the categories also identify the central and major sets of strategies used by revolutionaries.

From a rhetorical stance, then, revolutionaries can be defined and described by their choice of one or more of the strategic categories: Political Revolutionary, Cultural Revolutionary, Superstar, Urban Guerrilla, or Political Anarchist. We shall consider the nature of each of these categories with a special focus upon the strategic purpose of the revolutionaries most often falling within each category.

Political revolutionaries act out their resistance against specific institutions. Popular issues give rise to their actions, and those actions are carried out by mobilizing people as symbols of powerful resistance to the institution involved. Coalitions with other kinds of revolutionaries allow them to create symbols of strength and apparently very popular disagreement to the institutions. The National Mobilization Committee is one of the most popular of the political revolutionary groups. In an attempt to deny the validity of the size and activities of the military-industrial complex in Vietnam and to eliminate the empiricalistic foreign policy of the United States, this group mobilized revolutionaries across the nation for marches. More recently, the activities following the Vietnam Veterans march in Washington D.C. are typical of the political revolutionary who would engage in a power struggle with the system. A central assumption of the political revolutionary seems to be that whoever is the strongest determines policy. Some revolutionaries have referred to direct political confrontations such as these as "straight," "too political," or being "on a death trip."¹¹ Chicago's 1968 Convention has become the classical example of the potential for pain if there is a miscalculation in the political revolutionaries' strategy. French revolutionaries have aptly captured the point: "Une révolution qui demande que l'on se sacrifie pour elle est une révolution à la pappa." ("A revolution that expects you to sacrifice yourself for it is one of daddy's revolutions.")

While Vietnam marches and related activities to this War are the most popularly known activities of the political revolutionary, other political revolutionary coalitions are also evident. The Black Panther Party sought to unify all revolutionaries when they hosted two Revolutionary People's Constitutional Conventions which brought together street people, women, gays, third world revolutionaries, and blue collar workers. During this efforts, the Party was recognized as the "vanguard of revolution in America." As one third world gay revolutionary put it, "If the Black Panther Party isn't the vanguard, there is none."¹² Likewise, the Women's Liberation newspaper, Ain't I A Woman?, devoted two of its eight pages to the Convention.¹³ The strategic effort of the political revolutionary, then, is to create a real or symbolic power base that can confront, control, and force the establishment to make changes.

While political revolutionaries deal with specific in-

stitutions and issues, the cultural revolutionary deals with life-style activities of the society. The cultural revolutionary confronts the establishment in terms of its norms and value-orientations as reflected in day-to-day interactions. Liberation movements for street people, drug users, and communal families could easily fit into this category. However, Women's Liberation is the most popular group currently emerging. Attempting to deny the traditional norms regarding male and female sexuality, the group often can take a very pointed and alarming position. Valerie Solanis, writing for the Society for Cutting Up Men (SCUM), argues:

"...the male...is obsessed with screwing; he'll swim up a river of snot, wad through nostril-deep vomit for a mile, if he thinks there'll be a friendly pussy awaiting him. He'll screw a woman he despises, any snaggle-toothed hag, and further, pay for the opportunity. Why?...He hates his passivity, so he projects it onto women, defines the male as active, then sets out to prove that he is ('prove he's a Man'). His main means of attempting to prove it is screwing (Big Man with a Big Dick tearing off a Big Piece). Since he's attempting to prove an error, he must 'prove' it again and again."¹⁴

In more acceptable language, Kate Millett has argued that sexual relationships are not initiated to promote growth, development, understanding, and creativity but rather are political relationships or a "power-structured relationship" in which "one group of persons control another."¹⁵ Other cultural revolutionaries joining this central thrust are Gay Liberation and Men's Liberation. Denying the day-to-day value orientations, these groups proclaim—probably correctly—that "Cock Power Won't Last" and that people must be respected, not one's sex, sexuality or sexual preference.

While cultural revolutionaries confront establishment norms and value-orientations, superstars become individual, personalized forerunners of the new life-style. The essential function of superstars—seriously adopting the metaphor of the theater—is to dramatize the political and cultural struggle between the establishment and the revolutionaries. It has been seriously noted that drama does exist in political and cultural struggles,¹⁶ and superstars maximize this dramatic dimension. As stars, publicity and media coverage are crucial to their existence. There is a self-assertion of a single personality and role, rather than a group symbol of brotherhood or communal love. Jerry Rubin—a clearly recognized superstar—casts the 1968 Democratic Convention as a dramatic conflict ("The Festival of Life vs. the Convention of Death"¹⁷) with an overt analogy to the confrontation as "a morality play, religious theater."¹⁸ Likewise, Abbie Hoffman becomes a superstar by way of his sense of drama. In Revolution for the Hell of It, Hoffman describes his at-

tempt to elevate the Pentagon 300 feet off the ground, chant Aramaic exorcism rites and as a result have the pentagon "turn orange, and vibrate until all evil emissions had fled."¹⁹ In this particular case, 1200 people were to encircle the Pentagon but soldiers stopped the group before the "act could be accomplished." The movement people then carefully placed flowers in the gun barrels of the soldiers. The event received national coverage. Hoffman notes: "Media is free. Use it. Don't pay for it. Don't buy ads. Make news."²⁰ The dramatic scene, stage and audience are central to the superstars.

A union of superstars is often formed to act out a dramatic conflict. The trail of the Chicago 7 became such an act. A documentary of this courtroom drama is provided in The Tales of Hoffman. As the movement develops, there may be reason to believe that this category may become "blank" with fewer and fewer revolutionaries finding the superstar strategy acceptable. The term itself appears to be gaining negative overtones especially when offered as an alternative to the concepts of brotherhood and community. Symbolically, the release of Jesus Christ Superstar (a rock album) may suggest that the revolutionary man has come close to God and that such a move destroys the value of being man.

While superstars dramatize the political and cultural struggles, urban guerrillas resist the system by destroying the sources and symbols of the power of the system. In this case, the rhetorical strategy is generally a very physical, non-verbal act which may often take the form of arson, bombing, kidnapping, murder, and skyjacking. These activities are intended to create a revolution or change and any guerrilla arrest is thus perceived as a "political prisoner," not a criminal. Obviously, those within the establishment view such acts as the most disgusting. For example, when the Front de Libération du Québec kidnapped and murdered Quebec's Labor Minister Pierre Laporte, the "nation" was "stunned" and 97% of the public supported "Prime Minister's tough stance."²¹

The urban guerilla also operates under a rhetorical handicap. Because of the extremely high criminal punishment imposed for such actions, the agents seldom provide public verbal statements which might explain and justify the acts. To eliminate some of this handicap, analyses are often carried in underground newspapers which attempt to indicate to the guerrilla which acts of sabotage are most likely to be viewed by the greater majority of people as a "political act."²² Moreover, manuals are written and distributed in the hope that non-guerilla might understand both why and how to carry out guerilla warfare. The Minimanual is the most famous of these manuals. The Minimanual notes, for example, that:

"The accusation of assault or terrorism no longer has the pejorative meaning it used to have. It has acquired new clothing, a new coloration. It does not factionalize, it does not discredit; on the contrary it represents a focal point of attraction. Today to be

an assailant or a terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable man because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its monstrosities."

Few are able to secure the manual and even fewer would be able to identify with such reasoning. Overall, then, it is difficult to imagine a way in which the urban guerilla might overcome his rhetorical handicap.

In the United States, two groups are generally considered to be urban guerillas--the Weathermen and the Black Panther Party. With the decision to become a more recognized group and to release statements with their actions, the Weather People (the new name) have had more opportunity to explain their objectives. Harold Jacobs' Weatherman provides an excellent basis for examining the rhetoric of the Weather People. With the release of Communiqué #9--"Changing Weather"--there may be reason to believe that the Weather People will not longer be carrying out guerilla warfare.²³

The other group popularly considered to be guerillas is the Black Panther Party. Shot-outs in Oakland, New York City, and New Orleans with police are largely responsible for the popular belief that Panthers are guerillas. However, the Panthers do not appear to be committed to such actions.²⁴ Panthers clearly do not believe, however, in being attacked without a response. Huey P. Newton has noted, "I'm in favor of non-violence. But a man should not be brutalized. A man should defend himself against brutality...We stand against violence. We're for peace."²⁵ Moreover, the recent release of 13 Panthers in New York City--all found innocent--after being in jail for 16 months and after a \$2 million trial has suggested to some people that the Panthers may not be guerillas.²⁶ Clearly, however, the strategies of the Panthers are still an issue. One must assess whether the Panthers are involved in guerilla warfare, if they are only defending themselves and also if they should be justified in carrying out guerilla warfare.

A final functional category of the revolutionary response to a repressive system occurs by way of political anarchism. Political anarchism is not to be equated to the journalistic concept of anarchy as chaotic rioting and uncritical denials of all authority. For political anarchists, anarchy is an ideological world-view espousing a political and social system ordered by decentralized, individualistic community cooperation. Small scale industrial units and other cybernetic techniques would be used to make the small community a viable concept in a modern complex society. Above all, however, anarchism is not coercive, but seeks to see a people free of governmental, parental, bureaucratic and financial controls. Without such controls, harmony is predicted because individuals, then, join and contribute as they wish. Thus, political anarchism is not equated to government by riot.

Functionally, anarchism has taken several forms in con-

frontations with the establishment. Paul Goodman has argued that much of the student resistance, although unaware of the political ideology, rests upon anarchism.²⁷ The actions of SDS at Columbia would seem to fall within this category. Moreover, the Manhattan chapter of the SDS—calling themselves Up Against the Wall Motherfucker—have symbolized their efforts with the traditional black flag of anarchism and the all dark clothing of the anarchist. Motherfuckers are also indirectly mentioned in Nachman's "Obituary for SDS"²⁸ for their fight against a strong centralized body in SDS. In addition, individual anarchists have received a great deal of attention. Charles Manson—although viewed as a "mad man and freak"—has made a profound impact upon the underground press for over a year. Manson's stance is passionate: "I've cried so long for freedom until becoming one with self is like to unwinding a top. I see only only through the madness of mad men who try to kill soul and trap freedom in the name of peace, misusing the words love and god....I am no more than you let me be."²⁹ Hoffman likewise identifies Shirhan Sirhan as an anarchist very similar to Manson.³⁰

The political anarchist seems to offer an initial critique of many of the other revolutionary stances and strategic choices. First, anarchism directly denies cadre-formation as a political method. To the anarchist, forming small hard-core theorists who then disseminate and attempt to "radicalize" all others is a form of "conspiracy." The denial of cadre-formation also implies that "radicalization" ought not emerge from manipulation, but from self-recognition and practice through living and seeing the examples of others. Second, anarchism denies the validity of power blocks for any other reason than to have an individual accounted for within a community. Power, in this sense, is justified only to secure self-determination. Finally, anarchism seems to offer a concise definition of what revolution means—essentially a loosing of the structure of authority that controls people so that free functioning can occur and can be defended. This fifth and final functional category of revolutionaries, then, is a small but potent force within the revolutionary movement.

While we have focused upon differences in strategic approaches among revolutionaries, we need to reassert that there is an overall ideological and rhetorical bound among revolutionaries. Moreover, the five strategic responses identified here are clearly unique but do complement each other from a revolutionary standard. The political revolutionary identifies the sources of repression and casts that repression as a set of issues that many of the establishment can relate to. The cultural revolutionary acts out a lifestyle that provides a model for other revolutionaries and can often be perceived as a predictive model for the establishment. The superstars dramatize the confrontations between the establishment and the revolutionary movement once

the issues and models are identified. The urban guerilla provides the strong substantive and rhetorical evidence that the convictions of the revolutionary are to be taken seriously. The political anarchist provides the theoretical foundation for constant reassessment within the movement and the basis for modification of positions within the movement as well as providing an apparently viable community model. When these relationships within the movement are recognized, many would argue that the elements essential for a successful revolution are present. Charles Reich, in The Greening of America, argues:

"There is a revolution coming. It will not be like revolutions of the past. It will originate with the individual and with culture, and it will change the political structure only as its final act. It will not require violence to succeed, and it cannot be successfully resisted by violence. It is now spreading with amazing rapidity, and already our laws, institutions and social structure are changing in consequence. It promises a higher reason, a more human community, and a new and enduring individual. Its ultimate creation will be a new and enduring wholeness and beauty—a renewed relationship of man to himself, to other men, to society, to nature, and to the land."³¹

Footnotes:

1. Jack Newfield, A Prophetic Minority (NY: The New American Library, 1966), pp. 35-32. Several other books on the "new" radicals have reached the same conclusion.
2. Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the 'New Left' Movement: Part I," QJS, L (April 1964), 128.
3. Jerry Rubin, Do IT! (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 161.
4. Rubin, 161 and Rights in Conflict (NY: Bantam Books, 1968), 41-53.
5. Rubin, 176.
4. Rights in Conflict, The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Parks and Streets of Chicago During the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968, A Report Submitted by Daniel Walker (NY: Bantam Books, 1968), xi.
5. Rubin, 176.
6. Tom Hayden, Trial (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 12.
7. Hayden, 13-14.
8. Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture, (NY: Anchor Books, 1969) provides an introduction to the ideology of the revolutionary.
9. Huey P. Newton, "David Frost Show," NBC Television Network, May 20, 1971, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

10. Ibid. Also see Andrea Jones, "Affidavit," The Black Panther, October 31, 1970, 7 for a discussion of the Convention.
11. Hayden, 142.
12. Jim Chesebro, "The First National Gay Lib Convention: One View from Minneapolis," (Minneapolis: FREE/Gay Liberation of Minnesota), 9.
13. October 9, 1970, 4-5.
14. National Underground, August, 1968, 6.
15. Kate Millet, Sexual Politics, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), 23.
16. Richard W. Merelman, "The Dramaturgy of Politics," The Sociological Quarterly, 10 (Spring 1969), 222.
17. Rubin, 161.
18. Ibid.
19. Hoffman, Revolution for the Hell of It (NY: Dial Press, 1968), 42-43.
20. Ibid., 44 and 3.
21. Time, November 2, 1970, 21.
22. See: Anonymous, "The Political Effectiveness of Sabotage," Hundred Flowers, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 18, 1970, 2.
23. Number Nine from the Weather People, "New Morning-- Changing Weather," Hundred Flowers, January 1, 1971, 4-5.
24. "October 1966 Black Panther Party Platform and Program, What we Want What We Believe," The Black Panther, November 14, 1970, 19. The Platform generally appears in every issue of the newspaper.
25. Huey P. Newton, op. cit.
26. Time, May 24, 1971, 22.
27. Paul Goodman, "The Black Flag of Anarchism," The New York Times Magazine, July 14, 1968, 13.
28. Nation, 209 (November 24, 1969), 558-561.
29. Charles Manson, "An Open Letter to Tim Leary from Charles Manson, 'Revelation Brings Blood, Love Knows No Sin,'" Los Angeles Free Press, October 9, 1970, 3.
30. Hoffman, Woodstock Nation, (NY: Vintage Book, 1969).
31. Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (NY: Random House, 1970), 4.

Poetry

in this issue has been provided by Virginia Kidd (M.A., Sacramento State College, 1970), a Ph.D. candidate and Teaching Assistant in the Department of Speech-Communication at the University of Minnesota.

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forthcoming...

Students have indicated interest in:

- * The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation
- * The Radlib in the Political System
- * Youth, Police and Violence: A Communication Study
- * The Rhetoric of Gay Liberation
- * Draft Resistance as a Communication Problem
- * The Rhetoric of Black Power As a Black Rhetorician Sees It
- * Communication and the Aged

These articles have been identified as potential articles by U of M students but no final commitment has been made to any single topic at this point, and all U of M students are encouraged to submit articles. The Editorial Policy will be a helpful guide in the preparation of articles and is the basis for selecting articles published.