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ABSTRACT

Construction of an idealized decision-making model discloses four major curriculum and instruction perspectives within the rubric of the new social studies. The matrix is based upon the decision contexts of content and process and is designed to help differentiate between varying intellectual positions, techniques, and strategies. Patterns of instruction which emerge are labeled: I) scientific, discipline-centered; II) humanistic, discipline-centered; III) scientific, problem-centered; and IV) humanistic, problem-centered. Each paradigm offers a basic curriculum and instruction option to teachers, and each competes with the others for professional recognition and acceptance. Explanatory notes include bibliographic citations and related references. (Author/SHM)

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EMERGING PARADIGMS: A PROBLEM OF CHOICE FOR  
SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATORS

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Over the past fifteen years the social studies profession has experienced a veritable explosion of new materials and techniques, offering to those who can afford it the prospect of new even unique opportunities for the improvement of social studies instruction. However, this growth of options has also produced an important but relatively unexamined problem of choice. There is a pervasive lack of awareness among social studies "choosers" not only about surface distinctions among individual curriculum packages but more significantly about basic differences among several schools of thought which are commonly undifferentiated and indiscriminately thrown together under the amorphous label of the new social studies.

Conceptual flabbiness is especially vexing when the profession is struggling to locate its purpose and to establish its identity,<sup>1</sup> a search that is often complicated by evangelistic and misleading arguments to promote the new social studies over the old social studies. Left unclarified, the confusion threatens widespread disillusionment among social studies practitioners. On the faith that rationality is to be preferred over naivete, we shall identify and examine the nature of the options offered under the banner of the new social studies in order that we might become more conscious about our choosing and our professional identities. Broad overviews, in contrast with special pleading and Madison Avenue advocacy, are needed lest social studies educators fall victim to what Huston Smith has called the "dreadful freedom," the freedom to choose but lacking the necessary context, motivation, and criteria for making the choices.<sup>2</sup> We shall attempt a fresh approach by

constructing an idealized decision-making model which will reveal not one but four (and theoretically six) substantially different curriculum and instruction perspectives falling within the rubric of the new social studies.

For the purposes of this analysis, the four C & I perspectives shall be called paradigms in the belief that the differences will become increasingly sharper and important as we gain additional experience with the new social studies over the coming decade and consequently they will come to warrant something more than the label of "perspective."<sup>3</sup> However, the emergent nature of the paradigms is emphasized to convey the tentative character of what is being undertaken and to invite the reader to further inquiry.<sup>4</sup>

A curriculum paradigm may be defined as a configuration of norms about knowing, knowledge, and teaching which provides a structure and an energy to a curriculum conception enabling its practitioners to give their commitment to it. It enables practitioners to know what they are doing, why they are doing it, how to do it, and to judge what is important and what isn't so important in the social studies. A "fit" with a paradigm gives a teacher a sense of direction, loyalty, and purpose.. It defines a community which can lend intellectual support to its members in the department, in the school, in the literature, and in professional meetings.

New paradigms emerge when enough opinion-makers and practitioners in the current paradigm begin to experience discomfort and disagreement with the way it functions for them. For example, they may want to conduct a certain kind of research or develop and teach a particular type of program but find that the norms of the paradigm do not legitimate their activity. Pressure builds up and eventually splinters the community of values that defined the older paradigm and ignites a search for newer paradigms. These are usually periods of excitement, abrasiveness, and confusion. The social

studies analogy is apt. The past decade has seen a sustained effort by many social studies educators to disengage themselves from the older social studies paradigm. But overlooked in the deterioration of the older paradigm has been the fact that not all of those who opposed the old social studies did so for the same reasons. It is becoming clearer that the nascent contenders for a new, stabilizing paradigm for the social studies exhibit as many differences among themselves as they collectively differ from the old social studies.<sup>5</sup>


### The Decision-Making Model

Decision makers in the social studies must make choices in two contexts if they are to claim identification with the new social studies.<sup>6</sup> These two decision contexts are CONTENT and PROCESS. Content choices in the new social studies typically have been two: discipline or practical-problem centered. A third type is possible -- the learner-centered conception of content.<sup>7</sup> Although there are indications it is gaining adherents,<sup>8</sup> the new social studies has not included substantial attention to this third alternative. Process choices in the new social studies tend toward either a scientific or a humanistic mode. Organizing the content and process decision-making contexts into two continua, each reflecting a condition of more or less rather than all or none, and then combining them into a two-by-two matrix reveals the possibility of four different (again theoretically six) paradigms emerging within the new social studies (Diagram 1). These paradigms are labeled the: (I) scientific, discipline-centered; (II) humanistic, discipline-centered; (III) scientific, practical-problem centered; and (IV) humanistic, practical-problem centered.<sup>9</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*  
Place Diagram 1 About Here  
\* \* \* \* \*

Diagram 1

New Social Studies Curriculum Paradigms\*



\* It is possible (perhaps desirable) for a K-12 curriculum to contain elements of each paradigm. However, the smaller the unit, the less likely this is to be so. For instance, a particular course or an even smaller unit such as a lesson will more likely reflect just one paradigm. Also, it is possible for any given social studies educator to find himself in more than one paradigm (or none of them). The scheme is designed to help sort out logically-different intellectual positions. It is not designed to type particular individuals, although it should prove useful in helping teachers to clarify their own positions.

Each of these emerging paradigms offers a basic curriculum and instruction option to teachers, and in the name of the new social studies each competes with the others for professional recognition and acceptance. Though all the paradigms have much in common, like being opposed to the assign, read, memorize, recite syndrome of traditional social studies education, the purpose here is to pinpoint differences among them and to argue that these differences logically make a difference. For a social studies teacher to operate within the values and expectations of one paradigm he may need attitudes and skills which are not helpful or are even at variance with what is required to function successfully within one of the other paradigms. And the meaning of paradigm suggests that moving back and forth among the paradigms would not be done lightly for we are talking about belief systems as well as techniques and strategies. This is not to say that a particular teacher with allegiance to one paradigm cannot or should not teach according to the premises and expectations of another paradigm. In order to do this, however, he may be better advised to role play than to try to assimilate all the values into his belief system. The truly professional teacher is one who is conscious of the choices and, although his personal values may be more consonant with one paradigm than the others, he has cognitive control over the decision-making process and can defend his choice at any given time on the basis of his objectives and his competencies.

### The Paradigms

#### Paradigm I: Scientific, Discipline-Centered

This paradigm holds that content for the social studies ought to be defined and selected according to conceptions of the social science research disciplines. Processes of social science, as a subset of science, seek

reliable knowledge in the form of increasingly more powerful conceptualization and more warrantable generalization. Science is based upon observational or inferential data and is designed to describe, explain, predict, and control; if we do certain things, we are reasonably assured that other things will follow. Consequences of action may be suggested, but particular courses of action are not prescribed by scientific research disciplines. Scientific inquiry emphasizes externality, neutrality, separateness, and order. Its ideal world has recurrent entities, each clearly demarcated from every other and combining into more complex structures in regular ways. In scientific inquiry, facts and causes assume greater significance than values and reasons, marking it from inquiry modes more humanistically inclined. In the classical model, the social science research disciplines seek to tell us about the "real" world, and to do this as dispassionately as possible.<sup>9</sup>

Consider the following representative statements taken from one of the major social studies curriculum projects:

The basic premise of Sociological Resources for Secondary Schools (SRSS) [Sociological Resources for the Social Studies] is that the education of today's high school students can be improved by familiarizing them with the sociological perspective. ... The sociological perspective ... is characterized by the effort to construct broad generalizations about social patterns by gathering empirical data through careful and self-conscious techniques that are as unaffected by value judgments as possible.<sup>10</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

If our goal is reliable knowledge -- knowledge that holds up against rigorous testing -- what means should we use to obtain it? What methods are appropriate? The sociologists' general scheme of inquiry is the scientific method. Using this method, we translate general explanations into specific statements. These statements ... assert that with a change in one social factor, there will be an

accompanying change in another. Then we use this statement as a target, testing it under controlled conditions. To do this, the sociologist needs special tools for gathering, ordering, and analyzing the data; guidelines for observation, questionnaires and interview schedules, methods of sampling ... indexes and ways of measuring things .... These are ways in which the sociologist looks at the social world as he seeks increasingly reliable knowledge of what is.<sup>11</sup>

The scientific, discipline-centered paradigm offers to social studies instruction a pre-determined and generally-agreed-upon set of values, expectations, and standards drawn from the various social sciences. Naive and untutored in these beliefs and standards, social studies students are to be inducted into the paradigm and persuaded of its value for application in their own lives. The challenge for the social studies teacher is to find ways of organizing instruction so that students will learn the content, rules, and norms governing the paradigm and to be guided by the paradigm in their personal behavior. For example, an expected behavioral outcome might be that Paradigm I learners qua citizens will be more apt to listen to an argument based upon fact than one comprised mainly of personal opinion; in general the students will seek reliable knowledge as a guide to their behavior. In sum the paradigm assumes that both its content and process lie "outside" the student and the role of the teacher is to impose the paradigm on the students.

In order to illustrate how the scientific, discipline-centered paradigm can create frustration for naive teachers, the paradigm can be measured against other impulses in the new social studies, specifically the development of an open-classroom climate a value that crosscuts the whole of the social studies reform movement. Open-classroom climates are those where

controversial political and social issues are frequently discussed, the teacher is objective but not reluctant to express his opinion when deemed appropriate, students feel comfortable in expressing their own opinions and do not perceive themselves as passive receivers of knowledge from unquestioned sources such as textbooks and teachers.<sup>12</sup> The ideal then of Paradigm I instruction is for students to learn the concepts, theories, and values of the social science disciplines while simultaneously able to contribute their own agendas, opinions, and evidence. It is doubtful, however, that elementary and high school students can learn the expected amount of social science in an open-classroom climate given the constraints of time and resources of a typical school. More realistically a choice will have to be made between an open-classroom climate with comparatively lower student achievement in social science or a closed, highly teacher-centered classroom with comparatively higher student achievement in social science. What will a teacher decide?

At the metaphysical and epistemological levels the choice is framed by differing conceptions of the relationship between freedom and discipline. The most forthright proponents of the scientific, discipline-centered paradigm, though valuing both freedom and discipline, would logically argue ala B.F. Skinner that freedom follows from an ability to predict and control human behavior and we can only accomplish this by a willingness to have our conceptual processes and values molded by the social science disciplines. In this view, the social science perspective is so vital that its "force-feeding" to students is permissible, a stance hardly consistent with the value of an open classroom climate. Humanists tend to argue on the other hand that freedom and discipline are intertwined and if dealt with simultaneously will result in a greater human good, even though the process may

take longer. A teacher who holds scientific values to have priority will more than likely be comfortable in choosing to emphasize student achievement in social science over an open classroom climate. A teacher who is more humanistically inclined will feel better about choosing an open-classroom climate above social science achievement, thus violating the norms of the scientific, discipline-centered paradigm.

At the more practical level, research indicates that many teachers tend to use subject matter to establish and maintain their personal authority in the classroom. This gives us further pause to consider a possible "unexpected" impact of Paradigm I in a typical social studies class. A recent research summary suggested:

The official myth has it that a teacher's principal goal is raising the level of achievement or the quality of thinking of his pupils. However, studies of the perceived problems or concerns of beginning teachers force one to acknowledge a collective secret shared by teachers and all but the youngest pupils alike, that the paramount concerns of the beginning teacher -- and possibly many an experienced teacher too -- focus more on the teacher's own sense of adequacy and his ability to maintain interest and control in the classroom, than on the needs and accomplishments of his pupils. The most straight-forward interpretation ... is that teachers use subject matter to sustain themselves in the role of the principal source of knowledge in the classroom; to evoke interest in what they, as teacher, have determined that their pupils will do, to justify decisions and evaluations, and generally to maintain control in the classroom.

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The insecure teacher who needs to establish his personal authority in the classroom may perceptively seize upon the powerful scholarly authority of Paradigm I as a very convenient way to do this, particularly since at the same time he can expect to gain the esteem of his colleagues and superiors

by presuming to teach the new social studies. Without too much difficulty this potential corruption of the intent of Paradigm I could transform the study of the social sciences into a deja vu version of the "memorize - busy work - stay out of my hair" syndrome. If students perceive it as being a subtle extension of the old school game of behavior management, it is highly unlikely that they would readily accept social science as a guide to their behavior. Through inattention to these potential "unexpected" consequences, choosers of the scientific, discipline-centered paradigm conceivably could become party to moving social studies instruction toward a more closed, teacher-centered, and authoritarian stance than was the case even with the old social studies.

These problems of theory and practice of the scientific, discipline-centered paradigm are complicated by a fundamental issue that goes far beyond social studies education. This is the growing doubt in Western culture about the claims of scientific authority itself.<sup>14</sup> This is a cultural debate that has probably only just commenced. Meanwhile social studies teachers must make choices. Teachers who prefer Paradigm I should make special effort to avoid playing into the hands of conservative traditions within the social studies, a fate that some might regard as worse than the death of Paradigm I. Teachers need to resist the impulse to cover ground and treat the social sciences in a superficial way. If social science is worth being taught in elementary and secondary schools it is worth being taught well which means, among other things, taking time and being serious about the matter. Students should have the chance to experience that basing one's judgments on the values, processes, and knowledge of social science may be a satisfying thing to do and they should have a chance to consider social science as a viable belief system in our culture.

Paradigm II: Humanistic, Discipline-Centered

Paradigm II also seeks content for the social studies primarily in discipline-centered, organized bodies of knowledge. In contrast with Paradigm I, however, humanistic content is more wholistic and interdisciplinary and fosters a different, more qualitative process inclination. The paradigm will argue:

The mystique of empirical social research ... leads its acolytes to accept as significant only the questions to which the quantitative magic can provide answers. As a humanist, I am bound to reply that almost all important questions are important precisely because they are not susceptible to quantitative answers. The humanist ... does not deny the value of the quantitative method. What he denies is that it can handle everything which the humanist must take into account; what he condemns is the assumption that things which quantitative methods can't handle don't matter.<sup>15</sup>

A major difference between Paradigms I and II lies in the role of values in their respective inquiry processes. The scientific, discipline-centered paradigm commonly aspires to objectivity by identifying, isolating, and extracting value components from one's inquiry. By contrast, the humanist controls and objectifies his inquiry by identifying the values at issue, including his own, then incorporating them into the problem identification, understanding, and resolution. The impulse of the scientific mode is to equip learners with the appropriate tools for digging holes; the main thrust of the humanistic mode is to provide students with the personal sensitivities and broad-gauged ability to find the most appropriate location for digging the holes.

Creativity, divergent thinking, autonomy, and intuitive insight are key process values of this paradigm. In this vein, it has been suggested by

two social studies educators that too much attention to a rigorous scientific "model,"

... denies the children the kind of questioning, theorizing, re-organizing of data that cultivates autonomy and divergent thinking. The narrow and restricting limits of the approach raise such questions as ... how much convergence, at what price? ... could a more open, seemingly more random search for information eventuate in the children pondering their data, classifying, inferring, finally designing a model of their own ... ?<sup>16</sup>

Another writer argues:

It should be remembered that the purpose of the social studies enterprise is not only to develop the ability of students to identify dependable generalizations, but to be able to outline steps to be taken, roads to be traveled, utilizing both the cognitive (analytic) and intuitive (creative) processes and skills.<sup>17</sup>

This humanist paradigm embraces processes of knowing not generally acceptable to hard-line proponents of the scientific paradigm. Manifestations of this preference include the more subjective inquiry styles of "participant observer," "imaginative reconstruction of the past," and "personal knowledge." With their emphasis on the unique and the idiosyncratic aspects of man's condition, historians are likely to be more comfortable than social scientists in the humanistic paradigm.

Translated into social studies education, these humanistic process modes mean greater legitimization for intuitive, divergent, and personal approaches to gaining disciplined knowledge and achieving self-actualization. Consider the following representative statements. The second one is taken from the rationale of perhaps the only major social studies project which to any substantial degree has based its material and pedagogy on Paradigm II:

Many of us believe that there are "ways of knowing" not customarily pursued in the academic tradition; non-rational thought such as fantasy, "day-dreaming" that stimulates imagination; deep emotional experiences, (love, hate, humor) that communicate meaning on a non-intellectual level; non-verbal skills (craftmanship, athletic, music) that develop a sense of competence; music or religious experience that helps to clarify ultimate meanings; even nonsensical plays may have educational value. But the model of the scholar pursuing truth in his study or his laboratory obscures these dimensions of education.<sup>18</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

In short, it is the questions that give meaning to ... data, and these come from us, out of our own world, and reflect the things we want to know. Thus, while the bones are out of the dead past, their meaning or what we call history is very much a part of the live present ....

So it is, in fact, with the way we confront and learn from nearly every kind of experience, past or present, in or out of school, whether the data we deal with is pct or sex, politics, or history. The meaning that adheres to the experience or situation comes from us, from the curiosity or questions we bring to the experience, from our own past experience as it sensitizes us and enables us to hear or see or feel certain things in the situation .... Learning is an act that each individual does for himself, even when he is learning from and with others. This does not mean that each man's learning is as good as another, for not only do our experiences differ but our skills as well. It does mean that each man's learning is his own, ultimately a personal matter.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast to the predetermined nature of the knowledge-seeking process of Paradigm I, the establishment of the rules for reliable knowledge in Paradigm II are logically part of the classroom inquiry itself. The teacher and the learner become co-inquirers in a real sense for there are no predetermined answers. An open-classroom climate becomes more

necessary, and ceases to be simply a desirable condition in the humanistic, discipline-centered classroom as was the case with Paradigm I.

A teacher in the average school who develops a social studies program based on this paradigm may encounter bewilderment and resistance from many who prefer the security of highly-visible and common-place authority. He may find his greatest opposition from his colleagues who support the scientific, discipline-centered paradigm, for it is very threatening to question the grounds of all authority, including science. Given the embryo development of the humanistic paradigm in the social studies, about the only authority for the teacher to fall back upon is his own credibility; and this is small comfort indeed in the face of what is bound to be considerable criticism.

Paradigm II is presently a fragmented, unsettled strand within the social studies. It seems largely characterized by a skeptical attitude toward a rapid intrusion of Paradigm I into social studies rather than by a clearly-articulated program or theory centered around humanistic values. With the recent cultural shift toward humanistic activities this could change very quickly, but at the present writing it is probably the most "emergent" of the four paradigms.<sup>20</sup>

#### Paradigm III: Scientific, Problem-Centered

We now turn to a discussion of the emerging practical, problem-centered paradigms. Paradigms III and IV differ from Paradigms I and II in that the curriculum content of III and IV is derived from practical problems of man and society rather than organized, research disciplines. The distinctive characteristic of a practical problem inheres in a normative effort to determine what ought to be done in a personal or social problem situation containing multiple and possibly conflicting value positions. This normative

cast contrasts with the more descriptive orientation of the discipline-centered paradigms which focus on questions of "what is."

Paradigm III is primarily rooted in a generic, Deweyian formulation of science and the scientific method as applied to the clarification and resolution of practical problems. This conception is commonly referred to as the "reflective method" in the social studies literature.<sup>21</sup> It is an effort to counter the "amalgam of suppression, indoctrination, distortion, manipulation, prescription, and persuasion," which, in the judgment of the exponents of Paradigm II have all too frequently characterized teaching in the old social studies.<sup>22</sup>

The major and distinctive assumption of Paradigm III is that many, indeed most, value-laden practical problems can best be resolved by everyone getting the facts straight; once rational men in disagreement understand the facts, they are more apt to arrive at a consensus and agree upon a reasonable course of action.<sup>23</sup> Like Paradigm I, the scientific, problem-centered paradigm in dealing with a problematic situation tends to emphasize facts and causes over the motives, reasons, and subjective feelings which are given greater emphasis by those with a humanistic process inclination. For this reason social science is considered to be more desirable subject matter preparation than is history for those teachers who intend to operate primarily within the framework of Paradigm III. "Hard" data and consistent argument are generally preferred over other intellectual moves such as rationalization, appeal to authority, intuition, or common sense.<sup>24</sup>

A major portion of the classroom content for Paradigm II comes from the students themselves, their knowledge, values, beliefs, and habits acquired in previous experience. It follows that in a very significant sense, a teacher's knowledge of his students, their backgrounds, interests, sensitivities,

and abilities becomes equally as important to successful teaching as a knowledge of social science, because the "reflective" problem-centered teacher starts where his students are.<sup>25</sup>

It is consistent with this conception of social studies content that one of the pedagogical tasks is the creation of an open, non-threatening classroom climate so that students can feel free to make contributions which in turn can be used as data for reflective classroom analysis. Such a role calls for considerable skill, tact, and integrity. The teacher must constantly balance the urge for in-depth probing against a student's right to privacy; the authority of such a teacher may depend as much on his credibility and character in the eyes of his students as his technical skill and knowledge of social science. This is in sharp contrast with the Paradigm I teacher whose primary authority lies in his knowledge of social science which lies outside the student. As in Paradigm II, this teacher's ability to function successfully depends largely upon the confidence that others have in him as a person. It will take an extraordinarily skilled and tactful person to convince a group, whose values he intends to challenge, that it is in their interests to tolerate him.

The Paradigm III teacher will probably encounter some role frustration. He will violate the expectations of his Paradigm I social science colleagues who believe that his proper role is, straight out, to teach the social science disciplines. His Paradigm II humanistic colleagues will probably see him as too mechanistic and pre-occupied with social problems at the expense of self-actualization and personal fulfillment. And his interest in value-laden, practical problems (as contrasted with discipline-centered problems) will place him precariously close to the raw nerve centers of community political controversy. At this point in its development, the

paradigm offers little solace to those teachers who follow its injunctions to study social issues "closed" to rational thought in the broader society, e.g., American Imperialism or human sexuality, and as a consequence find themselves up to their necks in community controversy.

Paradigm IV: Humanistic, Problem-Centered

Paradigm IV represents the unique effort to bring a humanistic process orientation to bear on the appraisal and resolution of practical problems which are evidenced at the public policy level. The particular nature of the inquiry process is rooted in conceptions of democratic decision-making, including rational thought and the furtherance of human dignity. Though these processes may well include the scientific method, rarely, if ever, is science in any form considered the only appropriate method; and never does the ultimate authority for decision-making reside in science. This is in sharp contrast to the straightforward scientific approach to practical problems reflected in Paradigm III.

A typical position in regard to the ultimate authority of public decision making is:

In dealing with problems of public conflict and controversy, the American nation has both inherited and developed a tradition that government and law should be the outgrowth of public debate. Important to this tradition is the value placed on the dignity and worth of each individual and, as a corollary, the value placed on the use of reason and persuasion in resolving disputes among people who define differently human dignity and the conditions that promote it. From our point of view, a major goal of the society is to develop public awareness that these basic values should be respected and applied as standards for making public policy.

\* \* \* \* \*

We ... assume that basic social values depend upon a government committed to certain procedural principles .... In our present framework ... we have generally accepted the assumption that the violation of any of the principles is cause for concern. <sup>26</sup>

This grounding in the democratic ethic includes such procedural concepts as "legitimate persuasion," "due process," "checks and balances," and "federalism." At its heart, the meaning of authority is caught up in the liberal, democratic conception of an open society, a society that promotes the development of capable inquirers who can insure their continued growth by prizing and supporting those societal practices which in turn create and preserve open channels of communication and critical analysis.

The humanistic, practical-problems advocate holds that value conflicts are never "solved." Democratic, pluralistic societies are in a state of constant tension, hence individuals in those societies are locked into a condition of "permanent inconsistency." It follows that inquiry rules and processes are defined by particular situations at particular times. Because of the unique characteristics of each practical problem, the appropriate methodology depends on the nature of the problem, a methodology that is most consistent with the democratic ethic in the context of the problem. Choosing the appropriate methodology is a very important part of the inquiry process in this paradigm.

Most public policy disputes require skills of "working out" as well as "finding out." This "working out" engages the inquirer in political dimensions of inquiry which involve complex discussion techniques and the "anatomy of legitimate communication and persuasion." In dealing with practical problems, the humanist prefers to stay "loose," always looking for the right mix of the possible and the desirable within the framework of the democratic

ethic.

Unique among the four emerging paradigms, the thrust of Paradigm IV is toward social action. It is even compelling for one who shares the values of Paradigm IV to move from an intellectual discussion of social issues to direct and personal involvement. Humanistic endeavors find their fullest meaning in the character of people and character is manifested in actions of individuals in "real" situations. While some proponents of Paradigm IV may believe that the social action ideal is presently unrealistic, none will logically deny its ultimate importance in social studies education.<sup>27</sup>

The social studies teacher who attempts to lay claim to Paradigm IV is probably the most vulnerable of all the new social studies teachers for he has chosen to resist the prevailing will in two crucial areas of choice -- content and process. He must first justify his opinion that controversial public policy issues are the legitimate concern of social studies education. Second, he must justify a humanistic inquiry approach that does not have overwhelming institutional, societal, or professional support; he must defend against charges that the paradigm process underplays the importance of science and overplays social action. We are describing a role that requires the talents of a truly exceptional teacher. Thus, a major weakness of the paradigm, at least given its present stage of development, is that we cannot expect to recruit, educate, and retain large numbers of such teachers for social studies classes.

#### Summary and conclusions

By examining theoretical differences regarding content and process choices available in the new social studies we were able to identify and differentiate four major curriculum paradigms. These were labeled: I)

scientific, discipline-centered; II) humanistic, discipline-centered; III) scientific, problem-centered, and IV) humanistic, problem-centered. Each paradigm contains distinctive characteristics requiring different curricular assumptions and teaching behavior. The differences among the paradigms were found to be non-trivial.

Each paradigm tends to place somewhat different but in each case potentially severe role pressure on social studies teachers. These role pressures have not been given the attention they deserve in the curriculum development, the professional literature, and the training of teachers, thus obscuring the more basic problems of choice in the new social studies.<sup>28</sup>

The undifferentiated nature of the new social studies and the unanticipated role pressures surely help account for the oft-lamented slow growth of the new social studies. Many teachers have probably found out in the classroom what theorists have failed or refused to examine on the drawing boards. No amount of special pleading for teachers to use the new social studies is likely to be maximally effective until such issues are treated more candidly and analytically. By taking up where the new social studies has left off, we should be able to shape a more credible and productive kind of social studies for the latter quarter of this century.

There is little doubt that the emerging social studies paradigms are prompting a reconsideration of the nature and purpose of social studies education. Careful attention to what is yet problematic in the new social studies will probably raise even broader and more basic questions about the intent and organization of education itself in a democratic society. It is this connection with the larger society that helps make the social studies an exciting and challenging area. Continued experience with the new social studies and further inquiry may reveal that this broader connection even

provides the raison d'etre for the social studies. Such a recognition would challenge its practitioners to adopt a larger vision of their role and to assume greater responsibility for leadership in educational policy making.

Notes

1. J. L. Barth and S. S. Shermis, "Defining the Social Studies: An Exploration of Three Traditions," Social Education, 34: 743-751, November 1970; D. L. Brubaker, Alternative Directions for the Social Studies, International Textbook Co., Scranton, 1967; S. H. Engle, "Exploring the Meaning of the Social Studies," Social Education, 35:280-288+, March 1971 and "Objectives of the Social Studies," in New Challenges in the Social Studies: Implications of Research for Teaching, pp. 1-19, edited by B. G. Massialas and F. R. Smith, Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., Belmont, Ca., 1965; and H. W. Hertzberg, "The Now Culture: Some Implications for Teacher Training," Social Education, 34: 271-279, March 1970.
2. The Purposes of Higher Education, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1955, pp. 62-65.
3. The use of the paradigm concept, as applied to curricular phenomena, is drawn from Bridgham's analysis of claims made for science education curricula. See R. Bridgham, "Conceptions of Science and Learning Science," School Review, 78: 35-40, November 1969. Also see T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition, Enlarged, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1970.
4. Space limitations preclude a fuller elaboration of the paradigms. An earlier, but more extensive discussion can be found in J. L. Tucker, An Exploratory Classification and Analysis of Selected Problem Areas Within the "New" Social Studies, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Indiana University, 1968.
5. See Kuhn for a discussion of the process of shifting from one paradigm to another.
6. These are necessary but probably not sufficient conditions.
7. R. W. Tyler, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction, The University of Chicago, Chicago, 1950, pp. 3-21.

8. Mini-courses, alternative schools, do-your-own-thing, and self-realization activities are examples.
  
9. The literature on the distinctions between scientific and humanistic processes fill many book shelves. I have drawn on the writings of Reginald D. Archambault, Peter Berger, David Bidney, Theodore Brameld, Abraham Edel, Charles Frankel, Patrick Gardiner, Earl Johnson, W.T. Jones, Abraham Kaplan, Elizabeth Maccia, C. Wright Mills, Herbert J. Muller, R. Bruce Raup, Richard Rudner, Michael Scriven, J. W. Smith, Paul W. Tayler, Stephen E. Toulmin, and Peter Winch.
  
10. Sociological Resources for Secondary Schools (Sociological Resources for Social Studies), Designers' Manual, A project of the American Sociological Association, The Association, n.p., 1966, p. 3.
  
11. Sociological Resources for the Secondary Schools (Sociological Resources for Social Studies), Hypothesis Testing in the Social Sciences: Teachers Guide, American Sociological Association, n.p., 1967, p. 17. Similar "discipline-centered" Statements can be found in: M. Lovenstein, "Economics: Discipline, Structure, Sequence, and Pedagogy," in Development of Economics Curricular Materials for Secondary Schools, pp. 15-78, M. Lovenstein, et. al., U.S.O.E. Cooperative Research Project No. HS-082, The Ohio State University, Columbus, 1966; R. McNee, "An Approach to Understanding the Current Structure of Geography," in Concepts and Structure in the New Social Science Curricula, pp. 47-63, edited by I. Morrissett, Social Science Education Consortium, West Lafayette, Indiana (SSEC is now located in Boulder, Colorado and the book has been published by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston); H. D. Mehlinger, The Study of American Political Behavior, An Occasional Paper, High School Curriculum Center in Government, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, p. 19; W. D. Pattison, "Geography in High School," in Revolution in Teaching: New Theory, Technology and Curricula, pp. 303-310, edited by A. A. de Grazia and D. A. Soh, Bantam Books, New York, 1962; N. Sutherland, "Structure in the History Curriculum," Social Education, 26: 140, March 1962; and G. M. Sykes, "Sociology," in The Social Studies and the Social Sciences, pp. 156-170, G. B. Turner, et. al., Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1962.

12. L. H. Ehman, "An Analysis of the Relationships of Selected Educational Variables with the Political Sociolization of High School Students," American Educational Research Journal, 6, November 1969, p. 573.
13. J. C. Grannis, "The Social Studies Teacher and Research on Teacher Education," Social Education, 34: 293-294, March 1970.
14. T. Roszack, The Making of A Counter Culture, Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968.
15. A. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Limits of Social Science," in American History and the Social Sciences, p. 534, edited by E. N. Saveth, The Free Press of Glencoe, N. Y., 1964.
16. T. Parsons and F. R. Shaftel, "Thinking and Inquiry: Some Critical Issues," in Effective Thinking in the Social Studies, p. 163, edited by J. Fair and F. R. Shaftel, Thirty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, Washington, D. C., 1967.
17. B. Massialas, "Revising the Social Studies: An Inquiry-Centered Approach," Social Education, 27: 187, April 1963.
18. F. M. Newmann, "Questioning the Place of Social Science Disciplines in Education," Social Education, 31: 596, November 1967.
19. R. H. Brown, "Of History and Meaning: A Prologue," What Happened on Lexington Green? An Inquiry into the Nature and Methods of History, by P. S. Bennett, The Amherst Project, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1970, p. iii. The Amherst History Project seems to be closer, at least in spirit, to Paradigm II than any of the other major curriculum projects. The humanistic approach to history, a tradition of long-standing in the discipline, may take on renewed vitality in any future development of Paradigm II.
20. Although not frequently mentioned in social studies literature per se, another body of literature is developing that promises to give increasing legitimacy to Paradigm II. This literature includes Willis Harmon's "alter-

native futures for education," the late Abraham Maslow's "humanistic psychology," Theodore Roszack's "counter culture," Charles Reich's "Consciousness III," Margaret Mead's "pre-figurative society," and Alvin Toffler's man who has "the future in his bones."

21. M. P. Hunt and L. E. Metcalf, Teaching High School Social Studies, 2nd Edition, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1968.
22. L. E. Metcalf, "Some Guidelines for Changing Social Studies Education," Social Education, 27: 198, April 1963.
23. M. Scriven, Value Claims in the Social Sciences, Social Science Education Consortium, Boulder, Colorado, 1966, 39 pp.
24. M. P. Hunt and C. E. Metcalf, Teaching High School Social Studies, 1st Edition, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1955, pp. 52-63.
25. Hunt and Metcalf, 2nd Edition, op. cit., pp. 168-69.
26. D. W. Oliver and J. P. Shaver, Teaching Public Issues in the High School, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1966, pp. 81-82.
27. A strong statement of the social action position is found in R. B. Raup, et. al., The Improvement of Practical Intelligence: The Central Task of Education, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1950. More recently, the Harvard Group has translated the action mode into social studies education, see F. R. Newmann and D. W. Oliver, Clarifying Public Controversy: An Approach to Teaching Social Studies, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1970, pp. 313-345. Other action statements are found in S. B. Simon and M. Harmin, "To Study Controversial Issues is not Enough," The Social Studies, 55: 163-166, October 1964; S. S. Brodbelt, "Population Crisis: Education's Challenge and Moral Commitment," The Social Studies, 58: 71-76, February 1967; S. H. Engle, "Factors in the Teaching of our Persistent Modern Problems," Social Education 11: 167-169, April 1947; E. T. Ingles, "The Community: A Social Studies Laboratory," in Educating Citizens for Democracy: Curriculum and Instruction in Secondary Social Studies, pp. 398-424 by R. E. Gross and L. D. Zeleny, Oxford

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28. Exceptions to this are found in F.R. Smith and J.A. Mackey, "Creating an Appropriate Social Setting for Inquiry," Kappan, 50: 462-466, April 1969 and "Academic Freedom and the Social Studies Teacher: A Policy Statement of the National Council for the Social Studies," Social Education, 34: 489-491, April 1970.