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ABSTRACT

The special papers provide a definition, delineate the scope, present a conceptual framework, and identify the method of inquiry and some techniques used for explaining the body of knowledge for each of six disciplines. The background papers to Project Social Studies are: 1) "Sociology" by Caroline Rose; 2) "The Study of Geography" by Fredrick R. Steinhauser; 3) "The Study of Anthropology" by Shirley Russell Holt; 4) "Political Science" by Frank Sorauf; 5) "The Many Meanings of History" by Robert F. Berkhofer; and, 6) "Some Thoughts on the Teaching of Economics" by Leonid Hurwicz. A number of pages may be illegible. (Author/SJM)

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SOCIOLOGY

Caroline Rose

EPISTEMOLOGY

Behind every scientific discipline is a theory, usually implicit, about the nature and structure of science. This theory sets limits for and directs the development of the science. Failure to spell out the underlying theory can have a stultifying effect on the development of the science. A scientist, unaware of his assumptions, may not know that there are other possible epistemologies and will not be tempted to try them and thus enlarge and change his science. If he unknowingly moves from one epistemology to another, he will be unable to develop systematic theory.

Behind the sociology presented here is a theory of science--an epistemology--sometimes called operationalism, sometimes instrumentalism, and sometimes pragmatism. If one does not understand this theory, one can neither teach nor learn this version of sociology.

Instrumentalism regards science as an instrument or tool for understanding the real or natural world, which is assumed to exist, and which consists of a great mass of facts related to each other in some way. A fact is defined as anything that anybody can perceive in any way, including the material of dreams, private thoughts, abstract ideals, and values. A fact or a series of related facts has no meaning until some human being gives it a meaning. A meaning is roughly the same thing as a dictionary definition. It arises in communication when some one tries to explain "what he means" to himself or somebody else. A meaning may range in length and complexity from a synonym to a big fat book. It follows that a fact may have a very large number of different meanings depending on how it is explained. It also follows that in the strict sense, induction is not possible in this system since facts always acquire their meaning by the application of a concept.

Theory and the concepts and hypotheses that make it up are the instruments by which science gives meaning to facts. (Science can also be considered as the store house of the accumulated meanings that a science has developed). Each science has a specific and limited point of view with which it examines the real world--its theory. This point of view and the part of the real world in which any science is interested depends on the history of the science and may change over time. There may be a part of the real world a particular science is equipped to understand but in which its practitioners are not interested; or they may find investigation too expensive; or the society may discourage or forbid investigation of certain subjects; or the dominant theories of the science at the moment may be specialized in a direction incompatible with some kinds of investigations. On the other hand, some areas of the natural world may be investigated by several sciences. Sociologists find themselves in both conditions; they do not investigate much that they could; and they investigate areas in which other scientists are also interested.

Scientists test their understanding of the world by their ability to predict events. It is assumed that there is causation but not of the type, if a, then b; rather if a, b, c, d,.....n, then x, i.e. multiple causation. Inability to predict 100% is laid to the scientist's inability to locate all the terms of the a,b,c,d...n series and arrange them in their proper quantities and relationships.

When a criminologist says he can predict success or failure on parole with 75% accuracy, he is saying that his work is 25% inaccurate--not that the behavior of the 25% incorrectly predicted is not caused in the same way as the behavior of the 75%.

Fortunately, the mathematics of probability have been very useful to social scientists, but care must be taken to understand what is meant. The statement that there is a 70% probability of an event occurring, means only that it is probable that the event did not occur by chance alone in 70% of the cases. It is then assumed that some of the causal factors have been correctly located because chance alone is not operating. This will be discussed further in the section on methodology.

SOME ASSUMPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociologists accept a number of axioms, postulates, or assumptions, which come to be so much a part of their thinking that they do not usually specify them.

Sociologists make a sharp division between biological and psychological behavior on the one hand and social behavior on the other. Social behavior is what the socialized individual does. An individual becomes socialized by interacting (communicating) with other socialized individuals. He learns from them how he is expected to behave and he responds to their expectations. The human baby is an animal; in his family he becomes socialized by degrees. Neglected children or isolated children, such as those left for long periods in hospital wards, do not become socialized; they stay animals. Socialization goes on all one's life and nobody is completely socialized. It follows that a discussion as to whether certain behavior is individually or group determined is completely outside the sociologist's frame of reference. He thinks in Cooley's terms: All social behavior is at one and the same time both group and individually determined through the processes of communication and interaction. The individual and the group are like two sides of the same coin.

The reason for thinking of the relation of the individual to the group in this way is summed up in the phrase: "Society exists in the minds of the individuals who make it up." This idea is startling because it runs counter to common sense, but it is not hard to demonstrate. Where does a class go when school lets out? The class, the relationships that occur when the group is together, is in the minds of all the class members; the class will only exist again when the class members meet again.

The complete but deserted cities of science fiction point up the fact that the material adjuncts of a society are not the society. Society has ceased to exist in these cities because there are no people to give meaning to the material objects.

A common experience is to return to the scene of one's childhood. One remembers, one reconstructs mentally, the society one participated in. The houses, playgrounds, the trees and streets, may be the same, but the society of one's youth exists only in the combined minds of the former members of the society. No one individual has all of any society of which he is or was a member in his mind. It takes all the minds of all the members to produce a complete society.

METHODOLOGY

Science tries to generalize about what causes some category of events within its field in such a way that the predictive ability of the generalization can be tested. The generalization is part of an overall theory. Depending upon the generalization are one or more hypotheses stated in such a way as to predict. For example: Generalizations: (which are part of symbolic interaction theory) An integrated group is one in which the members interact and communicate with each other. A minority group is an integrated group whose members feel that they are disadvantaged in some way. A minority group with high morale is one in which, among other things, the members act in concert to try to remove their disadvantages. In a democratic society one way in which a minority group does so act is by voting in certain ways. If the right of a member of the minority group to hold high office in a democracy is challenged, the members of the minority group will support the candidate more strongly than they otherwise would. Hypothesis: In the 1960 election, Catholics, a minority group, will support Kennedy, the Democratic candidate more than they have supported Democratic presidential candidates in the other presidential elections since 1948. If they do so, it will indicate (1) that the Catholics have high morale and (2) that voting behavior is one way in which a group demonstrates high morale.

If a comparison of the Catholic vote for the Democratic Presidential candidate in 1960 with the same vote in 1956, 1952 and 1948 indicates a greater Catholic vote for Kennedy, the hypothesis is regarded as proved and both the generalizations and theory strengthened. If they did not do so, the hypothesis is disproved and the generalizations and theory weakened. Other studies about activities of minorities with high or low morale can similarly weaken or strengthen the basic theory. A generalization arrived at by this method is called a theoretical generalization.

This procedure is seldom followed. Instead (after the election) researchers count the number of Catholics who voted for Kennedy and compare this with the number who voted for the Democratic presidential candidates in previous elections. They report "The percentage of Catholics, supporting Kennedy in Minneapolis in the 1960 election was greater than the percentage of Catholics supporting previous Democratic presidential candidates." This is an empirical generalization. The final statements of theoretical and empirical generalizations may deal with the same facts and even sound the same as they do in this example. But because an empirical generalization was not based on an explicit statement of theory and because it was not set up to predict the relevant event, it cannot be used to strengthen the basic theory. This is not to say that empirical generalizations are not useful. They are. They are a form of classification and description with which every science must begin.

The instruments or tools a sociologist uses to test hypotheses must be carefully chosen. They must have validity--i.e. measure what they are planned to measure; and reliability--i.e. have the ability to give the same result each time they are used.

Validity is so hard to establish that most sociologists adopt the operationalist position because it solves or by-passes the question of validity. Instead of debating what sociability is, the operationalist says "For the purposes of this study, I shall define sociability as the number of times the individuals being studied have visited the home of somebody other than close relatives during the three weeks we have been studying them." Each operation is specified in

detail: who the individuals are; the length of time one must stay to be counted as a visitor; the purpose of the visit; what constitutes a "close relative"; and so on.

Some will argue that visiting is only a partial and inadequate definition of sociability. Because, however, a complete definition of sociability is in the end a value judgment and so complex, we cannot measure it, most sociologists are content to solve the problem of validity this way. Operational definitions do have the advantage of being clear and replicable. Those who do not like one definition of sociability, will think up another and eventually, all the dimensions of sociability will get studied. The establishment of validity, then, depends upon the researcher's skill in finding suitable and practical operations.

There is no such short-cut to establishing reliability. A test or scale can be standardized so that it is reliable as long as it is given to the same kinds of people on which it was standardized. These may not be the people we want to study, nor do we always know if and how the group deviates from the original group; comparison is impossible. To make it worse, very few tests are ever standardized.

It is questionable whether projective tests like TAT or Rorschach are ever reliable in a statistical sense although they may be useful. Some scaled questionnaires, used to measure authoritarian and permissive personality traits, seem to be reliable, although recent evidence on these is conflicting. Social distance tests seem to be highly reliable at least within the United States. Seldom are experiments in sociology replicated, so that what is and what is not reliable is still highly controversial.

Any technique which enables us to understand social reality enough to predict events is to some extent valuable. A large number of ingenious techniques have been developed, and one would expect many more to be developed in the future. Unfortunately, one of the best known research techniques, the questionnaire, is also the technique which requires the most specialized training before one can use it effectively; a questionnaire is almost impossible to use for replicating.

Questionnaires can be used to count with--as the Census does--or to explore attitudes, values, past and future behavior. Expected answers may be arranged in "yes," "no," or "don't know" fashion and may also be graded to show intensity: "strongly agree," "mildly agree," "agree," "mildly disagree," "strongly disagree." The respondent may be asked to choose from a list of possible answers or respond with a figure, or the question may be open-ended, allowing the respondent to contribute his own answer. Projective questionnaires probe for unconscious material and may consist of pictures, stories or simpler verbal material. All these forms may be combined in a single questionnaire.

One would think that counting is a simple operation. The Census Bureau, however, found that babies under one-year old were always under-enumerated--not because people had any reason to hide the birth, but simply because they forgot about it. Census takers are now instructed to ask specifically about children under one in the families. A public school once sent out a questionnaire to the parents of the children in the school, asking among other things, "Do you have a television set?" The questionnaires had the name of the informants on them (not a very good practice), so that it was possible to check some of the answers. Two kinds of people gave the wrong answers: intellectuals, who regarded TV as "degrading," but had succumbed; poor people, who did not want anyone to know they did not have a TV. Today, we probably would not get this kind of misinformation because TV is more omnipresent and more taken for granted by both groups. One

cannot, however, foresee all the things that will lead to concealment or boasting even when dealing with supposedly non-controversial questions. One needs an independent check.

It is much more difficult to measure attitudes than to count. Attitudes are defined as tendencies to act. Sociologists are not interested in attitudes themselves, but in the kind of social behavior that attitudes predict. People often say they will or will not do something or do or do not believe something, but this is no clue to what they will do when the time comes to act. Therefore, the researcher prefers to measure some action.

For example, he might ask people if they are going to vote for a particular candidate in the next election (rather than asking for the attitude toward the candidate). Sometimes one can actually check on how the informant voted, but usually all one can do is find out if he voted. In one case, a post-election check showed that among those who indicated they would vote for a particular candidate many did not vote at all. They may not have been registered to vote; they may not have been willing to take the time and energy to get registered; they may have been sick or out of town or have changed their minds. They may never have voted in the past, but be unwilling to admit this to an interviewer. The frequency with which expressed attitudes do not lead to expected behavior makes researchers very skeptical about the measurement of attitudes. If one asks questions in "sensitive" areas, about marriage, sex, income, the discrepancy between expressed attitudes and actual behavior can be even greater. Careful theoretical background for the questionnaire; general knowledge about the behavior and attitudes being studied; and independent checks can control this to some extent.

Construction of a questionnaire must be painstakingly taught. It is probably obvious that a request for a "yes" or "no" answer may force the respondent into an unrealistic answer; it is less obvious until one begins to work with filled out questionnaires that five categories force people's answer in the same way as three do. Unless one has a sample of enormous size, one ends with three categories-- "yes," "no," "don't know," which is always the most interesting one.

It is assumed that people who hold intense attitudes on a subject are more likely to act in the direction of their attitudes than are more neutral people. The measurement of intensity of response requires complicated techniques (Guttman, Thurstone or Lipset scaling techniques).

Sometimes one writes a projective test by accident--that is, taps unconscious material--and then cannot analyze the answers within the theoretical framework one is using. Open-ended questions must be categorized and coded, a process that requires both background knowledge and experience.

Language must be simple and unambiguous to avoid loading questions--i.e. stating the question in such a way that the answer is forced in a certain direction. The only way to test language is to pre-test the questionnaire on a good sample of the population to be used in the larger, later study.

Another major source of possible error lies in choosing a sample. The necessary size of a sample must be mathematically determined. This is not difficult, but it must be learned. While one can easily explain what random and stratified samples are, it is both difficult and expensive to draw proper samples or to reach them afterwards, much less to find a suitable control group for comparative purposes. Almost without exception, sociological research uses too small and non-representative samples.

Interviewer bias has been much studied. Although most researchers train their interviewers to some extent, it is not always easy to get non-professional interviewers to understand that they must do exactly as told. Unconscious and deep-seated bias can affect the results of any test or questionnaire.

For example, it is known that Negro children will do much better on the second half of a test standardized to give the same results as the first half, if the person giving the second part of the test is a Negro and the one giving the first part is white. But it is hard to predict who has what bias or whether it will affect the results of a particular questionnaire.

A substitute for the questionnaire technique is the use of the Census and similar government publications. Every junior and senior high school should have at least the basic Census volumes. Other Bureau of the Census publications, particularly publications of the Department of Vital Statistics, and from the Women's Bureau, Children's Bureau, the Department of Labor, Agriculture and Interior, to mention those most used by sociologists, are invaluable. In effect, one has the kind of material one gets from a fact-collecting questionnaire, except that the sample is perfect and the work done and corrected by experts.

An example of how Census material can be used both to do independent studies and to establish an artificial control group follows: The serious studies done so far on single women have studied only the women in one locality, one profession, or one occupation. It is obvious that none of the studies can be generalized to all single women. If, however, all of the data on single women in the last five Censuses were collected and analyzed, one would have a good idea of the age distribution of single women, their education, housing, income, race, geographical and occupational distribution and also how the group has changed over the past fifty years. The smaller studies could then be compared with the Census Study to find out how representative of all single women the women in their samples were.

When W. Loyd Warner studied Yankee City, he caused some amusement among sociologists because he collected independently the data available in the Census. Few people realize how much different material is available already collated by the Census or that the Census Bureau will make new runs of their material on the request of a responsible organization at far less cost than it takes to collect the material independently. For a Census study the only mathematics necessary are how to calculate a mean, median and mode and to know when to use and not use them on social data.

Still the most important method of sociology is direct observation and classification. Cooley's concept of the development of the self came about through his systematic observation of his own 2-year old child. One subject only--but, of course, only one Cooley, too. This is an example of the case study method in which all possible details about an individual, a single institution or social movement are collected and interpreted. This is a very useful technique when one is interested in the development of the person or social structure over time: a famous sociological study, the Jack Roller by Clifford Shaw, consists of a detailed history of the development of a criminal career. By classifying case studies into groups showing similar characteristics or by comparing them, one can sometimes isolate causal factors. An example of the first technique can be found in Clark Vincent's The Unmarried Mother and of the second in Clifford Shaw's Brothers in Crime.

A special kind of observation and one of sociology's most seminal methods has been that of introspection; a sub-category of this is sympathetic introspection or empathy. This method involves examining one's own behavior, attitudes and values and generalizing about them. Empathy is doing the same thing on another person. The experience, knowledge and wisdom of the researcher have much to do with the results. Arnold Rose did a study called The Negro's Morale (1949); while he used what empirical data he could find, the theory and the basic data come mainly from his own experiences with Negroes (empathy). The book has high predictive value. It predicts what is going on among Negroes today (1963), not in the form that we all use in regard to South Africa: "Some day there's going to be a blood bath there," but in a detailed, specific manner.

The use of dreams and other subconscious material falls into the category of introspection. The systematic study of autobiographies, diaries, letters, fiction and poetry, can be examined by sympathetic introspection.¹ The Polish Peasant (1919) a two-volume tome, and one of the most important of social psychological works, is based entirely on letters. There must be an explicit theory with a set of hypotheses to explore before one can call the analysis of such material research.

One technique of analysis of introspective material is called content analysis. In its dullest form it consists in counting how many times a certain word occurs. Counting ideas, situations, social types or characters is equally useful and more interesting. A good example of this is Dorothy Yost Deegan's The Stereotype of the Single Woman in American Novels (1951). Content analysis is indispensable training for categorizing the contents of open-end questionnaires. It is particularly useful in analyzing the products of the mass media.

A special kind of observation is called participant observation, in which the researcher either is, or pretends to be, a member of the group he is studying. Participant observation is the only tool we have for finding out about some social phenomena: one-time events like battles, riots, natural catastrophes, panics, or behavior in closed groups like adolescent gangs.

Another useful kind of research is historical. Institutions and social movements exist in time; to understand them, we have to understand their pasts. This kind of research differs from history in that the sociologist starts with theory and hypotheses. In addition, trend studies enable one to compare social structures, social situations, and different societies over time. By noticing the presence or absence of certain factors either over time or in different societies, one can do a kind of experiment. The quality of the sociological research one gets using this historical method usually depends on the quality of research historians do since most sociologists simply accept the material presented by historians.¹

In one case, however, historians neglected to do research on a certain period and what little they did do was biased; this is the history of the Negro in the South. By examining what was omitted and what was distorted and in what direction, sociologists have been able to learn a great deal about Southern culture.

Sociologists have always tried to do true experiments. The small group theorists and group dynamicists take successive small groups into a laboratory situation, subject each group to the same experience and record what happens.

¹Sociologists are poorly trained in the use of primary historical sources and if they do examine letters, diaries, or other primary documents, they must either get adequate training or collaborate with an historian.

How representative these groups are of non-laboratory groups is not known and there has been a tendency to over-generalize the laboratory findings. One sociologist tried to study what goes on during jury deliberation, but it was decided that the presence of recording equipment or observers might interfere with the objectivity of the jury. He then set up mock jury trials, using the material from actual trials and choosing the jury as it might actually be chosen.

Chapin proposed three ways of doing experiments with groups:

1. The Cross-sectional Experimental Design: Two groups are matched for factors relevant to the result or chosen at random from the population to be studied. Then one of the groups receives some program or treatment which the other does not. Differences between the two groups after the treatment are attributed to the program or treatment.
2. The Projected Experimental Design: Groups, matched for factors relevant to the results or chosen at random from the population to be studied, are pretested with respect to the behavior to be studied. One of the groups then receives some program or treatment which the other does not. Differences between the two groups after the treatment are attributed to the program or treatment. This differs from method 1 in that the groups are pretested and it is regarded as the most desirable method.
3. ex Post Facto Design: In this type of experiment some present effect is traced backward on two groups, matched in all relevant ways except in the factor to be studied or chosen at random from the population to be studied, to an assumed causal complex of factors or forces at a prior date using for this purpose such records as are available. This way is the least preferable, but is often the only way to do longitudinal studies and is resorted to usually when some systematic early data is suddenly made available.²

A rare, but exceedingly fruitful type of research might be called logico-deductive. One example might be the discovery of covert elements in a culture. An underlying assumption is that everyone, except some mentally disturbed patients, thinks logically, i.e. does not contradict himself. If an individual reaches conclusions that seem contradictory to openly stated premises, it can be deduced that he is operating from some unstated, covert premises. When a large number of people in a society do this, it can be deduced that the covert premises are contained in the culture and are thus shared by everybody.

For example, northerners are often baffled when a discussion with a southerner about bus desegregation ends with the southerner's question: "Would you want your daughter to marry a Negro?" (Note, it is never "your son".) The northerners know that Negroes have used buses and all other public facilities in the North for generations and that the Negro-white marriage rate has stayed at a very low level. Furthermore, the southerners know it too. Sociologists have postulated that the southern culture is a belief that the Negro male is so sexually attractive to a white woman that unless he is separated from her by all the devices of a segregated society, she will marry him in preference to white men.

²Details can be found in F. Stuary Chapin, Experimental Designs in Sociological Research, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947. There is a good summary in Martindale and Monaghan, Elements of Sociology, Harper, 1951, pp. 58 ff. and Appendix.

Such a theory must find independent support in order to be accepted, and this one has a great deal. One learns after some experience with this technique to become sensitive to illogical conclusions or behavior and to seek out the real premises. This is also the method used in psychoanalysis.

Another logico-deductive technique is to make a theoretical model. In An American Dilemma, Myrdal sets up a model of the upward or downward spiral of events concerning Negro-white relations in the United States. Each major event that occurs, such as the increasing level of education among both Negroes and whites, is assumed to affect all other factors being considered in such a way that other important trends move up or down a spiral. Increased education is regarded as being up and by its action increases the standard of living, political participation, and so on. Each other unit on the spiral in turn pushes other factors up; for example, increased standard of living increases educational levels, which was the original unit we considered. Events can move cumulatively up the spiral, cumulatively down, or both ways. One can intervene with laws or other public policies. This particular model has enabled people in the field of race relations to make remarkably accurate predictions.

A third type of logico-deductive method is the creation of an ideal type. Ideal types are complex models of social behavior or structure. They are not dreamed up but are constructed on the basis of empirical evidence, often the empirical generalizations mentioned above. Max Weber, who invented ideal types "conceived them as hypothetically concrete individuals (personalities, social situations, changes, revolutions, institutions, classes, and so on), constructed. . . by the researcher for the purpose of instituting precise comparisons. . . ."3 Examples of ideal types are: the acting crowd; the Bohemian social type; the charismatic leader, the folk society.

The use of statistics opened up a whole new area for research for sociologists; it enabled them to deal empirically with large masses of data, as they had never done before. Two excellent examples of the large scale use of statistics can be found in The American Soldier and the Kinsey Report. Sociologists must, however, use statistical techniques developed for other fields with a great deal of caution.

First, one cannot deal with the raw data of social life--actual social behavior. The statistician must try to find a valid and reliable index of the behavior he wants to study, encountering all the difficulties already mentioned. This means that statistical manipulation of data is always at least one step removed from what we are trying to study, as an attitude is only a potential index of behavior. Every statistical manipulation we make--computing a mean, or a Personian r , or a test of significance, removes us another step from social reality.

To give some examples: a correlation of .67 between I.Q. scores on the one hand (indices of part of intelligence, not intelligence itself) and the scores on a test indicating sociability (another index) does not mean that the more

3Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960, pp. 381-383, passim.

intelligent are more sociable, no matter how many cases one has or how high the mathematical significance is. It means that there is a correlation between the two indices which may arise because items on the indices are the same or related-- that on a line of regression, the variance from the line is small. It can never mean any more than this. Statistical manipulation is not the same thing as watching the social behavior of intelligent children and drawing systematic conclusions from the observation. On the one hand, the observer is dealing with raw data, social acts; on the other hand, with figures that may or may not clearly indicate the social act. In other words, the manipulation of indices is not the same thing as observation or experimentation. The precision involved is mathematical and can lead one to a false sense of security.

To give a further example: a test of significance of a correlation will tell us that one index is not doing all the varying from the line of regression and that great variations of one index are not being counteracted by great variations of another; but unless we actually draw the line of regression, we cannot be sure that something else mechanical is not happening. Mathematical formulae handle only those conditions we build into them.

Anyone who has worked with statistical material for some time can see by looking at the data whether or not the test will be mathematically significant if the sample is large. If the sample is so small that significance is not visible to the naked eye, the sample is probably too small to be worth bothering with. Formulae which presumably indicate significance on small samples are highly unreliable.

There are other objections, not to using tests of significance, but to depending upon them. In the first place the level of significance is always a matter of judgment. There is absolutely no reason to choose a 1% level as over against a 5% level of significance except habit or custom. When one says "this is unlikely to have occurred by chance," one is not talking about the social acts being studied, but about let us say, the mathematical probability of indices being distributed in a certain way in a four-fold table. Social acts never occur by chance.

Heavy dependence on the statistical method has meant for sociology the concentration of research in areas where reasonable indices could be developed at the expense of more theoretically or socially important problems. The author is not suggesting that we throw out the statistical method, but that we de-emphasize it and that we keep in mind what we as researchers are trying to do--find out the causes of social behavior, tested by our ability to predict.

In a class learning correlation it is proper to point out that correlation does not necessarily imply causation. But it is a waste of time for a mature researcher to run correlations without good independent reasons for thinking there is some causal relation between the items. He should be looking for causation. A study should be designed so the correlation is substantiating evidence. A researcher who gets low correlations all the time probably knows nothing about the subject. The same thing applies to scaling a questionnaire. A good researcher finds that most of his questions scale; if they do not, there is no mathematical way of making them scale; one is dependent upon the ability and knowledge of the investigator. In other words, one cannot depend entirely upon any statistical technique.

The almost exclusive use of simple percentages in sociological research has a number of advantages:

1. It cuts down on the need for indices. The statement that "67% of the women in the Lawndale housing project visited with their neighbors at least once during the week of October 1," deals with overt social acts.
2. Significance in the mathematical sense is irrelevant. Whether the percentage is 67%, 32% or 3% the information is important even if it is not statistically significant.
3. Percentages are intelligible and facilitate communication.
4. Use of percentages does away with a misleading concept of chance. Whatever the percentage we are dealing with, none of the acts occurs by chance. People either do or do not visit their neighbors for some reason. There is a reason behind each act and that is what a sociologist is looking for.
5. It is easy to isolate each fact. For example: of the 67% of the women, who visited, almost one half had more than a high school education; of this group none was raised in a rural area. Even though the number of city-born high school visitors is so small that we doubt the significance of the break-down, at least we are sure of what we are dealing with. We have not moved away from the concrete facts of social life. To be sure that urban residence and high school education are related to visiting habits, we would have to do more research. The best way would be to interview a good-sized group of better-educated, urban women on their visiting habits, which is exactly what we would have to do if we ran a test which showed no mathematical significance. Just as in other techniques, if relationships are all in one direction, we can feel more confident of a causal relationship: if the rate of visiting increases consistently with increased education for example.

VALUES

A teacher of social science should be very clear about the relation of science to values. (This is one of my own values that I am expressing). Sociology is a science and like all sciences cannot indicate what the individual's values should be. Because sociology does study values and how the individual acquires values, students of sociology often become confused.

The individual acquires values from the groups to which he belongs; part of a sociologists' values come from other sociologists and from scientists in general; part from the country and religious group he belongs to; part from the teaching profession. None comes from the subject matter of sociology.

As has been explained, a science is interested only in understanding the real world; "truth" for a scientist is what he can predict. His "truth" is variable, not absolute, and as his techniques for understanding reality increase, his "truth" will change.

Moral values on the other hand are absolute and may never change or change only slowly. A teacher must understand this distinction because one of the values a teacher has is to teach the important and enduring values of the society she or he is a part of and he brings these values to the study of sociology and does not derive them from it. To give some examples:

The desirability of teaching or studying sociology or any other science is a value. There is no way of proving this to be good or bad. One can only try to persuade by using such arguments as: "A knowledge of sociology will enable us to reduce juvenile delinquency, or drop-outs, or divorce." If one is unconcerned with reducing delinquency, the argument fails.

Anthropology and social psychology can prove that the Negro is not intellectually inferior to the white; if that fact changes an individual's attitude toward segregation, well and good. If the individual still wants to segregate, science has no way of persuading him that his values are wrong. We can even point out that prejudice costs the individual and society a great deal or that it conflicts with important social values (democracy and religion), but we are unable to do more than this. Some people prefer to pay the cost of prejudice and ignore value conflicts.

It is very important for the teacher to know his own values, and to know from what groups he derives them (whether from a small, non-representative group or from a wide, all-embracing group). He also should be aware of the values of his students and from what groups they derive their values. He must expect conflicts of values. Which values he plans to inculcate should be consciously chosen. He may use science to demonstrate that certain results will follow certain actions and that these results may be in conflict with the values he wishes to inculcate of the values his students hold, but further than this he cannot go. To pretend to be without values or as it is sometimes mis-called, to be objective, is to be dishonest and confusing.

THE FIELDS OF SOCIOLOGY

The divisions between the fields of sociology are historical, rather than logical. For example, the institution of the family is studied in the field called social structure. The family, however, like all institutions, is constantly changing; one cannot study the family without taking cognizance of how it is changing and looking for the causes of change. There is also a field

called social change which pulls together all the theories that explain how and why society changes, and this field studies family change among others. To make things even more confusing there is a field called social problems in which family situations which a society regards as undesirable are studied.

The illogical divisions are the results of events in the past history of sociology. For example, one of the major interests in early American sociology was the solving of social problems. It eventually became clear that one could not find remedies for mal-functioning institutions unless one understood all about the institution; one could not understand the causes of divorce without knowing something about how families functioned where divorce did not occur. Eventually the field of social structure--the study of institutions--developed, but the family was still studied also in the older field of social problems.

Similarly another early interest in American sociology was in the development of the self and in the relation of the individual to society. As the theory developed, it became evident that it must explain not only how the individual grew up in a family (social psychology) but also how that family was related to other institutions and to its own past history (social structure). Nevertheless, the traditional division of social structure and social psychology still exists although now one theory applies to both fields.

The subjects listed under all the fields of sociology will give the reader a good idea of the range of subjects a sociologist studies but not what theories and concepts he uses to study them. The fields of sociology here presented correspond to the titles of the courses usually offered in a large department of sociology.

I Social Structure

This field addresses itself to the question: "What is the nature of the social bond that holds groups together"? Everyone who has ever observed a society has noticed that people are not atomistically arranged in the society, but cluster in groups. Some of these groups are large and long-enduring; some, small and ephemeral, and there is everything in between. Some change rapidly; others do not. Membership in some groups seems more or less desirable to members of the society and gives the members greater or less prestige or a greater or less share of worldly goods. There are different kinds of relationships among these groups.

The study of the arrangement of these groups and of the relationships among them is one of the major fields of sociology. Sometimes, it is called Social Organization; sometimes it is called Social Structure, the term used here. It might just as well be called Social Arrangements or Social Integration. Old fashioned sociology used the term Social Statics.

The sub-fields within the field of Social Structure are:

1. The study of institutions. One can study the common characteristics of all institutions or focus on specific institutions such as the family; the church; the school system; government and other political institutions; trade unions, business and industry, and other economic institutions; artistic institutions; the law and legal institutions; institutions of defense (Army, Navy, etc.), (Courses in the Family, the Sociology of Law, the Sociology of Medicine, etc., typically include more than the material that properly belongs in the field of Social structure.)

2. The study of small groups, more informally organized than institutions, such as sects; voluntary associations; cliques; friendship groups. Whether one considers a group a "small group," or an institution is often an arbitrary matter. It may depend on the stage of development in which the group is. A voluntary association, like a trade union, may become institutionalized.
3. The study of social stratification. This includes the study of class, of caste, of vertical mobility, of elite and pariah groups among other things.
4. The sociological study of societies within a specified geographical area: urban sociology; rural sociology; studies of neighborhoods and communities in their social aspects.
5. The study of social interaction and of social processes; that is, the typical modes of interaction among groups; among individuals; and between individuals and groups. The most studied social processes are: accommodation; acculturation; alienation; assimilation; communication; competition; conflict; imitation; integration; socialization. This list should not be interpreted to mean that these are the social processes.

II Social Change

Change is an aspect of all the fields we are enumerating. Change could be listed as one of the social processes. All of the social processes are studied in this field as well as in the field of social structure. Because there has always been considerable specialized study of social change, we list it as a separate field.

The major sources of social change are usually regarded as:

1. Technological and other inventions.
2. Culture contacts.
3. Social movements.

III Social Psychology

This field is concerned with the question "How does society get into the minds of its members and what happens after it does"? The sub-fields include:

1. The study of socialization--how the human animal, the baby, becomes the human being; social learning.
2. The study of communication and other social processes--the mechanisms of interpersonal relations; the development of habits, values, symbols, myths, meanings, i.e. culture.
3. Social control. How the individual learns what expectations groups have of him and how he reacts to these expectations.
4. The study of collective behavior--fads, fashions, booms, crazes, rumor, the crowd, audience (mass) and public.

IV The History of Sociology

This field is sometimes called Social Theory which is a misnomer. The field includes the systematic study of what the most important precursors and both early and modern sociologists have done. It is an essential field. Study in this area prevents sociologists from going off into areas already proved sterile. The knowledge and the use of past data give richness to research by connecting it with what has gone before. Historical studies can be good substitutes for precise replication which is extremely difficult.

Out of this field has developed a specialized field called the Sociology of Knowledge which tries to explain the social factors in the origin and development of ideas, ideologies, scientific theories and methods, historical interpretations and other forms of knowledge, verified or guessed at, scientific, literary or popular.

V Social Problems

There is no logical reason why social problems should be a separate field. Its theory comes from the fields of Social Structure, Social Change and Social Psychology. It is one of the largest fields in sociology and some of the most important theoretical developments in sociology have been made by people working in this area.

1. Courses entitled Social Problems are often given. A social problem is defined as a condition which a large number of people within a society regard as undesirable and about which they think something can be done. These courses usually cover a few problems regarded either as important or illustrative of types of social problems.

Certain sub-fields have developed to such a degree that one can specialize in them alone:

2. Criminology. This field is one of the oldest, best integrated theoretically and most successful in its ability to predict human behavior.

3. Minority Group Problems, sometimes called Inter-group Relationships, or less euphemistically, Race Relations.

VI Population and Ecology

These fields cannot be understood by sociological theory and have their own theories and concepts, but population and ecological experts are trained in departments of sociology. This is not entirely accidental as a sociologist cannot work without control of these fields.

1. Population or Demography includes study of the growth of populations--birth, fertility, morbidity, migration, and death rates. It also includes the study of the characteristics of populations--the composition by age; sex; marital status; economic, religious, educational status; place of residence.
2. Ecology is the study of the spatial distribution of man and his social structures as determined by competition for limited land resources. In sociology ecology has been used mainly in the study of the city and metropolitan area and as an index to the location of social phenomena.

THE CONCEPTS OF SOCIOLOGY

The analysis of concepts will be made in terms of the theory of symbolic interaction. There are today just three widely accepted points of view in sociology:

1. The collection-of-facts point of view. People accepting this point of view are not interested in any theory. Their research produces empirical, rather than theoretical, generalizations.
2. Neo-functionalism. This is a closed-system theory which is incompatible with any other sociological theory; one must accept all or none of it. It excludes much of what has traditionally been regarded as sociology.
3. Symbolic interaction. The details of this theory will be explained as we go along. Use of this theory has some major advantages:
 1. It can include most of the empirical evidence turned up by the social facts researchers.
 2. The concepts of traditional functionalism can be translated into the concepts of social interaction. In the section below in Institutions, page 23, the first three paragraphs are a translation of traditional functionalist language into the language of symbolic interaction without any change of meaning.
 3. The theories of many of the great sociologists--Simmel, Durkheim, Weber, Dewey, Thomas, Lewin, Cooley, Mead, Park and others--can be integrated by symbolic interaction.
 4. It integrates the fields of social structure and social psychology. The field of social structure deals with the nature of the social bond. The field of social psychology studies the relationship between the individual and society. Symbolic interaction theory regards communication or interaction both as the basic social bond and as the means by which the individual is socialized and society integrated.
 5. In this system there is no theoretical separation of the social and cultural processes. Society is defined as a group of interacting individuals; the shared and common meanings and values of these individuals are their culture.

The disadvantages of the theory are:

1. It cannot be integrated with neo-functionalism and to only a limited extent with Gestalt or Freudian theory.
2. All theories have faults and are limiting; social interactionism is no exception.

Symbolic interactionism makes some assumptions about the nature of the mind; the mind seems to behave as if it were a unit. The processes of the mind do not correspond in a one-to-one fashion with biological processes going on in the brain. This concept of the mind is basic also to field theory (Gestalt theory) and to Freudian and similar psychological theories.

Symbolic interactionism also assumes that the mind has generalizing capacity, although the way in which this works is not understood. As far as we can tell, much of our thinking is done in stereotypes--pictures in the mind (Gestalten). The Gestalt psychologists have accumulated a great deal of empirical, laboratory evidence of this generalizing ability and the psychoanalysts also have some highly convincing, although unsystematic evidence--the processes of hypnotism, for example.

SOCIOLOGY

Sociology may be defined as the scientific study of society.

SOCIETY

A society is a number of people communicating with each other. The essential idea here is communication. Sometimes the word interaction is used instead of communication, or we could say relating or adjusting to each other.

Interaction in society is usually symbolic interaction. Symbols are words and gestures that stand for something. When symbols have meanings and when their use can evoke the same response in the person using the symbol as it does in the person responding to the symbol, we call them significant symbols. Interaction through the use of significant symbols is symbolic interaction. Significant symbols differ from natural signs, sounds and gestures that do not evoke the same response in the individual making the sign as they do in the responder. Animals as well as men make natural signs.

A yawn, for example, is a natural sign. We yawn for physiological reason, lack of oxygen. The person next to us may yawn immediately because the first yawn was a physiological stimulus to him. There is no communication or interaction between the two individuals.

When, however, we deliberately yawn in order to convey to late-staying guests that it's time for them to go home, the yawn has meaning. The yawner is trying to communicate something to his guests; he chooses the yawn because it means to him and he assumes it means to his guests, that he, the yawner, is tired and has had enough of the evening. Usually the guests get the point and respond the way the yawner expects; they go home. In this case, the yawn is a significant, i.e. meaningful symbol, because it can evoke the same response in both the maker of the gesture and the person who responds to it.

The number of people interacting in a society (the size of the society) is irrelevant. One man communicating with himself is a society. We sometimes talk about sub-societies when we want to indicate the relationship of smaller parts of a society to the whole society. Sometimes we use the word group, sometimes integrated group, sometimes public. Hereafter, the words, society, sub-society, group, integrated group and public should be considered synonymous, except that they refer to larger or smaller groupings.

When there is no interaction or communication we are not dealing with a society, but with some other phenomena. On this basis we are able to distinguish non-integrated groups such as the crowd, audience or mass and a population or aggregate from society.

A society does not have to have a geographical base, although it might. Scientists scattered all over the world, who may never see each other, can form a society if they communicate with each other.

Sometimes we are interested in the geographical base of a society; then we use the word, community, to describe a society whose members share a common geographic base. We use the word, neighborhood, to describe a small community. Unfortunately, in sociological literature of the past the words community and neighborhood have been used in the way we are here using the word, society. The only solution is to understand what is meant by society and to determine from the content whether the writer meant community or society. Community and neighborhood also have distinct meanings in ecology.

CULTURE

When the members of a society interact or communicate they develop common and shared meanings and values. The common meanings and values are the society's culture.

Every family has had experiences shared only by family members. In one family a child refused to go to bed one night. The father spent two hours convincing that child that "he had to go up the stairs some time, so he might as well go at once." Eventually the child was convinced, and the phrase became a by-word. When something unpleasant had to be done, the family members would say, "well, you've got to go up the stairs some time." Outsiders would have no idea of what the phrase meant, but family members did. The phrase and the meanings attached to it were a part of the family culture, a common and shared meaning.

The process of acquiring a culture is acculturation. It can take place simultaneously with socialization (the process of becoming human) or an already socialized person with one culture can acquire a new one as immigrants do and as we all do to some extent when we enter a new group.

As said before, there is in symbolic interaction theory, no separation between the cultural and social. The meaning and the values of the social processes to the members of the society are the culture of that society and we can describe both social process and culture together. Indeed we cannot separate them as communication can only take place if there are shared meanings and values.

COMMUNICATION (interaction)

The process by which the members of a society relate to each other is called communication. (It is the "social bond" spoken of earlier as one of the major interests of sociology). Communication proceeds this way: One person, A, makes a gesture towards or speaks to another person, B. B, if he understands A, that is, if he and A share the same meanings, imagines what A wants--what A's expectations of B are. B then responds to what he thinks A's expectations are. A then imagines, on the basis of B's response, what B, in turn, expects of A and responds in terms of what he thinks B's expectations are. We say that A and B are significant others to each other. This process just described is called taking the role of the other or role-taking. The process of role-taking is

instantaneous usually. It depends on the often observed, but never explained, generalizing ability of the mind.

This process of mutual adjustment is not possible if the gestures and words (symbols) do not have about the same meaning to both communicants. However, each one's judgment of another's expectations and each response is made on the basis of the individual's total past experience. He defines the situation as he sees it and acts according to his definition. Some of the things that go into defining a situation are: one's past history; one's cultural values and meanings; one's self concept; the loss of detail that occurs in generalization; one's reference groups; one's concept of the generalized other. A and B will not always read one another right; to the extent that they do not, communication and adjustment are imperfect.

If we want to know how one learns to take the role of the other, we must study socialization.

SOCIALIZATION

By socialization we mean the process by which the biological individual, the baby, becomes human or social. The baby is an animal. At what approximate age the child starts to develop into a human is not precisely known. All the evidence we have shows that contact with other humans from the very earliest days of a child's life is necessary for adequate social development; but we do not know if something is going on other than the physical contact between mother and child and if something is, just exactly what it is. We can hypothesize that the mother's response to the child's physical needs are significant, i.e. meaningful, gestures to which the child responds.

At later ages we can see and trace the process of socialization. The parents express certain expectations toward the child: "don't," "no-no," "wave bye-bye." The words are accompanied by gestures, facial expressions, tones of voice. There is consistency among the words and gestures. One does not usually say "say bye-bye" in an angry tone or voice. The adult is communicating to the child, not a single, isolated item, but a complex of behavior which has meaning. The child responds to the total complex and in so doing learns the meaning intended. If the child makes a mistake: says "don't" to an adult, for example, the adults correct the child and reestablish the correct expectation and meaning. Probably they'd laugh, again with a certain tone--derisively; the response would not be the same as when the child fulfilled the adults' expectations correctly.

The child generally and normally tries to fulfill expectations correctly in order to arouse the accustomed approving behavior toward himself from the adults, but he makes mistakes or he may not want to fulfill expectations. Moreover, no two sets of circumstances are ever the same, even though the difference between one and the other may not be measurable. There is always some variation in the successive expectations the parents have, the way the child perceives them, and his response at different times. This accounts for variation.

When expectations are not clear, or when they demand conflicting kinds of behavior, the child does not become very well socialized. The implications for child-raising techniques are clear.

ROLE

The expectations adults direct toward children are not random; they are clustered meanings and evoke patterns or consistent behavior. We call these patterns of behavior, roles.

Each individual has to learn a large number of roles, and he learns them gradually and continues to learn them all his life. At first he learns the role of a "good child" and equally of a "bad child"; he plays both. He learns the roles of a "boy", or "girl"; new roles are added at school and in association with his peers. Children learn some adult roles in their play. They pretend to be mothers, fathers, nurses, cowboys, and so on. We have to distinguish this type of playing at roles, from the actual playing of roles relevant to one's life situation.

Roles can be classified in a number of ways. Some roles are ascribed, that is, one is born into them as into the role of male or female. Some roles are achieved: the role of school teacher or President of the United States. Roles may be very narrow: the role of "good listener," as over against the broad role of a "woman." Some roles are very specific--the role of a private in the Army; some are very loose: the role of a business man. Some roles are transitory: the roles we play in the meeting of a voluntary association; others last a lifetime such as the sex roles. Some roles are more important in the life time of an individual than others, becoming the central role around which all others are organized--as the role of a mother.

Sometimes roles conflict. This conflict may be deep and long-lasting as the conflict between the role a Negro is expected to play in the South as over against the role of citizen in the wider culture of the United States. Or they may be temporary as when a legislator faces honest conflict about how he should vote because his role of legislator clashes with his role as business man.

Institutions can be thought of as clusters of related roles, but we shall look into this later. Now we want to look at how the self develops as an integrator of roles.

SELF

As pointed out earlier, the child learns to respond to words or gestures (significant symbols) and to the expectations (roles or parts of roles) that they represent. As the child grows, he expresses his own expectations in significant symbols. At some point he is able to respond to the symbols he himself is making. If we think of the child as A (see definition of communication above), he can also be B. The child says, "Billy go now," and responds to these words by going. He both arouses an expectation in himself and responds to it. (A child learns his name before he learns what the word "I" means because people address him by his name.)

Cooley uses the phrase, the looking glass self; the child begins to see and evaluate himself as he thinks others see and evaluate him. He becomes an object to himself. At this point we say that a child has a self.

Part of the self acts out expected roles and integrates all the roles a person plays. We call this the ego or I, roughly equivalent to the Freudian ego. Internalized roles constitute the me. There is a me for each role. The self consists of an I and me's.

Every group has certain expectations for its members which they incorporate into their me's. One internalizes a set of expectations and an idea of how the group regards one for every group one belongs to. It is thus sometimes said that one has as many selves as groups one belongs to.

There is another way of looking at the me. At first the child is in face-to-face communication only with the members of the family and the immediate neighborhood (primary groups). As he gets older, expectations come to him from other, more impersonal, sources--the school and the church, for example, (secondary groups) and the mass media. In some way, the individual integrates all these expectations from both primary and secondary sources so that he is able to respond to them as a whole. The sum total of these expectations we call the generalized other. The generalized other is what society thinks; what one should do. One has a generalized other for each of the groups one belongs to. (Roughly this is equivalent to the Freudian super-ego.)

This concept of the other we have met before. The significant other is one with whom communication is taking place; we do this by taking the role of the other. When an individual organizes the expectations (roles) others have of him, we speak of the generalized other. The me is the internalized reflection of a generalized other. The generalized other is one factor important in how we define a situation.

The concepts discussed above constitute the basic theoretical concepts of symbolic interaction. All other concepts can be derived from or related to these basic or key concepts.

When we look at a society of some size we see that there are a number of smaller societies or groups within the larger society. Many of these have been classified and studied. We shall first discuss integrated groups--those in which the members are in communication with each other.

PRIMARY GROUPS

Groups in which one has intimate face-to-face relationships are called primary groups. The most important of these is the family; sometimes the neighborhood constitutes a primary group; sometimes friendship groups and work groups are primary groups.

Early socialization takes place in primary groups. In the family and close neighborhood the primary sentiments, the universal sentiments--love, hate, fear, envy, pleasure, and so on--develop during socialization. All societies have some primary groups; hence all societies have some common human traits, what the anthropologists call the psychic unity of man.

SECONDARY GROUPS

Contrasted to primary groups are secondary groups in which one has formal, segmentalized relationships. One knows relatively little about the other people in the group and one spends little of one's own life in any one secondary group. Secondary groups are typical of pluralistic societies and typically one belongs to many. Examples are PTA's and other voluntary associations; most urban neighborhoods; professional societies. What may be a secondary group to most of its members may be a primary group to a few people who devote most of their lives to it.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

One kind of secondary group is the voluntary association, a small group of people, who, finding they have a certain interest (or purpose) in common, agree to meet and act together in order to try to satisfy that interest or achieve that purpose. Voluntary associations are characterized by formal leadership, specialized activity, operating rules and so on. In size they vary from a few members meeting locally to international groups with millions of members. Typical voluntary associations are the PTA, Rotary, the NAACP, a bridge club. Voluntary associations are present in many societies, but their proliferation is marked in modern, pluralistic, secular societies, especially in democracies.

There are two kinds of voluntary associations: expressive ones such as hobby clubs or professional societies; and social-purpose ones such as the NAACP or a political party.

In the United States voluntary associations are very important; (1) they perform a great many functions that in other countries, even democratic countries, are performed by the government. Voluntary associations provide alternative and experimental ways of solving problems; lend themselves to decentralization and local control; usually they operate at lower cost and more efficiently than does government. (2) They provide meaningful activity for large numbers of individuals, who, otherwise, would have no participation in public activities except as an audience. Voluntary associations are an antidote to mass society.

Membership in voluntary organizations is far more frequent among the middle and upper classes and among the better educated than it is among the lower economic groups and less educated. The most usual voluntary associations to which the lower class belongs are the church and union.

REFERENCE GROUPS

Those groups whose values and activities are regarded very highly by the individuals so that he tries to conduct himself according to their values are called his reference groups. An individual need not be a member of a group he uses as a reference group; he may only aspire to enter it, but he regulates his behavior according to what he thinks the expectations of the group are. For example, the professionals of a science are the reference group for Ph.D. candidates in that science; the members of the upper classes, for an upwardly mobile individual. A reference group may be thought of as a significant generalized other.

GROUP CHARACTERISTICS

The cohesiveness of a group, its ability to hold together and accomplish its purpose, is called morale. There are many different factors that keep morale high or lower it; for example, a group faced with a strong enemy is likely to develop high morale; if there are sub-groups in conflict with one another, the morale of the larger group is likely to be low.

An individual's morale depends on the groups to which he belongs. In a group with high morale, his morale is probably high, but he may belong to other groups with low morale and will have low morale in these groups.

In a voluntary group if morale is low, the individuals can move out of the group and may do so and thus destroy the group. Membership in some groups, as a racial group, is involuntary; if the group has low morale, the individual will not only be afflicted with the same morale, but must stay in the group. One form of low group morale is called group self-hatred. This has been studied among American racial, ethnic and religious minorities. Group self-hatred is devastating to the individual. Since his roles, his self-attitudes, his identity are developed in the group, he feels himself worthless and inferior. Group self-hatred has been characteristic of the Negroes in the United States until recently and accounts in part for the poor performance of many Negroes in the larger society. The new, high morale of the group, evidenced by the recent drive for equality, will undoubtedly enable individual Negroes to achieve more.

Every group has an ideology, a generally accepted, verbal justification of the existence of the group and of the desirability of group goals. Democracy is the ideology of the United States as Communism is of the U.S.S.R. Ideology is used to maintain and increase group morale. Well-known parts of the ideology are called myths. These are believed in and repeated in one or another form throughout the group. The idea that "everybody can be President," is a myth and part of the democratic ideology.

THE PUBLIC

The public is usually regarded as a form of collective behavior rather than a type of integrated group. Although the public is not as well integrated as the groups we have been discussing, it is integrated--that is, its members share meanings and values.

The public is a huge, informal discussion group. Membership in a public is voluntary; there are many publics each with a different interest. Among the members of a public there is sufficient communication so that they all understand each other's point of view even though they may not all agree. The result of the discussion publics engage in is called public opinion or sometimes consensus. Publics are typical of democracies, of plural societies where there are many groups, of secular societies where practically everything is subject to discussion. Publics cannot exist in totalitarian or traditional societies to any great extent.

INSTITUTIONS

Institutions are large, formally organized groups in a society. They can be thought of as related clusters of meanings and values which determine expectations, hence roles, hence behavior. The roles of an institution are integrated; they complement one another, as the roles of husband and wife in a family, of teacher and student in the school, or of leader and rank and file members in a trade union. These mutually dependent and supporting roles or patterns of behaviors that the members of an institution perform are the structure of an institution.

Some institutions, like the Army and much of government, have bureaucratic structures; their membership is hierarchically arranged, their roles are formally defined; the purposes and the ways of achieving these purposes are laid down in writing. A bureaucracy operates slowly, tied up in "red tape;" short-cuts around the rules and an informal structure paralleling the formal structure are often developed.

While each institution contains within itself many values, it can itself be regarded as a means whereby individuals who perform the behaviors it prescribes can attain certain more inclusive or "higher" values. This instrumental character of the institution is often spoken of as its function.

Some individuals are always entering and some leaving an institution, but there are always enough actively in it to permit the group to continue, or the institution dies. The older members teach, both formally and informally, the younger members what their proper roles are and the history and traditions of the institution. This arrangement of older and younger members, so typical of institutions and so important to institutional consistency and continuity, is called the overlapping of generations. Often there is conflict between the generations of an institution.

Some institutions have roles that are especially important. These are called the offices of an institution, and the people who fill them are called the officers.

Ceremonies are rules of behavior that govern the members of an institution on special occasions, such as the ceremony of marriage or initiation ceremonies. Rituals are prescribed sets of words and acts, used practically without change and that are believed to have a symbolic power to produce certain results, such as the pledge of allegiance or the saying of the mass.

Institutions may have physical appurtenances--formal symbols, such as the insignia of the Army, buildings, ritual objects and so on.

Most of the major institutions of the society are related to each other but the relationship may be one of conflict as between industrial and labor institutions.

THE FAMILY

The material in this section will concern the modern, American family. A family consists of a group of people related by blood or marriage or adoption. It may vary from two people united in marriage to a large clan. Families everywhere sanction sexual behavior and provide for bearing and raising children. Some types of families have economic, political, defense and other functions also.

The American family is a nuclear family; a man and woman and usually one or more children. Viewed from the point of view of the parents this is the family of procreation; from the point of view of the children, it is the family of orientation. Sometimes, but not usually, grandparents, uncles, aunts, nieces or nephews may be included in the family. When this is done regularly it is called the consanguineal or extended family. Even today in France, the claims of the extended family sometimes interfere with the operation of the economic system since, regardless of efficiency, one must find jobs for nieces, nephews and in-laws.

The only sanctioned (socially approved) sex relations in the United States occur in the family, although not the only sex relations. Because the modern family has lost many of its economic, educational and religious functions, and because it is one of the few primary groups to which everyone belongs at some time in his life, the providing of affection and emotional support are very important functions of the American family.

The American family is becoming less paternal in structure and more equalitarian. Decisions and economic support are shared by both husband and wife. The rural, Southern, Negro family is often maternal in organization, consisting of

mother and children, both legitimate and illegitimate. Eventually, it will probably become like the white family, but when the southern family migrates north, its different family structure causes conflict with the welfare agencies.

In a three-generational family, living in the same place over a long period, ways of raising children remain the same, taught by one generation to the next. When a young mother has her first child in a town 1000 miles away from her mother, she depends on books, acquaintances, and professional help for advice on how to raise her children. The United States is characterized not only by horizontal mobility but also by vertical mobility which means that many young mothers feel the child-raising techniques of her youth are not suitable to the new station she occupies or hopes to occupy in life. She will then also seek new ways of raising children. She may not know, but only guess, at the techniques used by the group she aspires to enter. These are reasons why the expectations directed toward our children are not always consistent and account for some of the problems of emotional upsets and delinquency.

Many American families are broken; that is either the father or mother, or both, are absent. In the past this was most often due to death. Today it is due mainly to divorce and desertion. Among the many consequences of this for the family are: usually a lower standard of living; absence of an adult male or female to provide role models; breaking of the ties of mutual affection and dependence.

Among the many changes going on in the American family is the change in the role of women. Early marriage, limitation of family size, increased education of women, a longer and healthier life for most people, the mechanization of housework, and the movement of many functions outside the home have produced the following situation. The average woman marries at 19, has 3 or 4 children. The youngest enters school when the mother is about 33 or 34. He leaves home when she is 46. She faces 20 years of healthy, vigorous life with no social function. This is the reason why so many women are going back to work as the children grow up. In all probability women will in the future live their lives in two parts: home-maker and mother during their younger years and career or working woman later.

In the United States mates are commonly chosen by the people involved. Dating and courtship are the preludes to marriage and have the function of enabling the young people to meet and choose a suitable mate.

Sexual relations before marriage and with persons other than the spouse during marriage occur frequently, although they are not socially sanctioned. They produce problems of conflict of values (guilt), destruction of the self-image of the neglected spouse, illegitimate children.

ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

Certain economic institutions have particularly interested sociologists. One is the trade union. Sociologists have studied:

1. The great variety of social structures found in the American labor movement--social reform movements like the early trade unions (1830) which crusaded for universal male suffrage and free, compulsory education; revolutionary movements like the I.W.W.; voluntary associations with limited aims like the A.F. of L. of the 1920's; institutions like the AF of L-CIO today.

2. The trade union as an organization engaged in limited conflict.

3. The processes of collective bargaining, mediation, and arbitration as institutionalized forms of accommodation.

4. The meaning of the trade union to its members, particularly as an organization that reduces anomie in a mass society.

5. The kinds of leadership found in labor unions.

5. Sociologists have also been interested in the informal means of social control that arise in unions, business and industry.

7. Some research has been done on the meaning of work in American society.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Political institutions will be better analyzed by a political scientist.

INSTITUTIONS OF DEFENSE⁴

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

The American people are overwhelmingly Christian, but the divisions among Christians are many and deep. Probably the most divisive conflict today is between Catholics and Protestants, not over basic doctrine, but over secular matters: birth control, separation of church and state; censorship and gambling. There are also divisions between the main Protestant bodies on the one hand and the minor sects, again, mainly over secular interests--Sunday closing, fundamentalism, racial integration.

The next largest group are the Jews. Conflicts with Christians are also not theological but over such things as Sunday closing, aid to parochial schools, birth control, released time, etc., with the Jews usually lining up with the Protestants. There are some, but not many Mohammedans, Buddhists, and other minor religions.

The number of atheists and agnostics is unknown and one cannot even guess at them. Prevailing opinion supports the existence of a plural system of religion and is extremely tolerant of any religion. The same tolerance is not extended to those without religion.

⁴For a discussion of the traditions affecting defense institutions in the United States, see Arnold M. Rose, Sociology, The Study of Human Relations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 196-198.

All religion in the United States is not institutionalized. Some of the small sects are little more than arrangements for expressive crowd behavior.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Only the naive would think that our educational system is designed solely to impart formal learning. Besides the stated additional purposes of character formation and education for citizenship, the schools are expected to support the basic values of the society. Some of the controversy around what should be taught springs from the fact that our society changes rapidly; the school is always a little behind since institutions with bureaucratic structures change slowly. In addition, in our society, power is divided among competing groups each of whom wants the school system to support what it thinks is right. It is seldom expected and practically never occurs that the educational system plays any part in initiating change or in providing leadership for the society. Professional training makes this very clear usually and is one reason why teachers as a group win less recognition than other groups with the same objective qualities.

The school system, partly because of its conservative character (not in the political, but in the general sense of preserving traditions and values), has had some important effects on American society. First, it served as an acculturating agency for the successive waves of immigrants. The school system is largely responsible for whatever homogeneity of attitudes and values exists in the United States. In part, this was made possible by the school's (society's) insistence on the use of the same language, facilitating communication and hence common values and meanings.

The second important function of the educational system was and is to serve as an avenue of upward mobility. The children of immigrants and other lower class individuals learned, in addition to formal and vocational material, the dress, manners, speech, and walk of the middle classes. This accounts for the presence in our schools today of many non-academic courses--physical education; home economics, including table-setting and good grooming; letter-writing, and so on. This is in the greatest contrast with European schools where, by one device or another, children from different class backgrounds are kept separate so that the distinguishing marks of a higher class cannot be learned by observation, nor are they directly taught. As a result even today, people of high status bear the marks of lower class origin in Europe. It also explains one of the reasons why Negroes, particularly northern Negroes, so vehemently oppose segregated schools even though the schools be equal in quality of buildings, teachers and instruction.

STRATIFICATION

In addition to the clustered arrangements of the members of a society, one can see other divisions--larger groups that cut across the institutional groupings. The members of some of these groups in contrast with the members of other groups have more or less prestige (status) and more or less access to the material goods of the total society. When this occurs, and it does occur in all pluralistic, industrialized societies, we say the society is stratified. The groups into which it is divided are called classes or castes.

Castes are characterized by endogamy (marriage within the group) and the inability of the caste member to move from the caste in which he was born to another. These attributes would apply to the caste system in both India and the United States, but when the systems are examined more carefully, there are such differences that we violate the empirical data by using the same term to explain both phenomena.

Because there is a phenomenon in the United States different from the class system and because it does have important characteristics in common with the Indian caste system, we shall retain the word, but preface it with American: the American caste system. This system describes the relations between white and Negro Americans. It has the following characteristics: intermarriage between white and Negro is very difficult, often prohibited by law, and always visited with sanctions of some kind; each caste has a class structure of its own; each caste has meanings and values not shared by the other--a separate culture. The Negro caste has less access to all prestigious things; it is a subordinate caste.

Indian castes are also occupational groups, and there are mutual obligations among castes, neither of which is true of the American system. Another difference is that the caste structure is based on and bolstered by religion and widely accepted in India. In the United States the caste system has always existed in violation of the religious and legal values of the society, and the lower caste member has not accepted his position to the extent he has in India. At the present time the caste system is breaking up both in India and the United States. The European feudal system is another example of a caste society.

For a long time discussion of the concept of class revolved around the definition Marx gave it; he defined class in terms of its relationship to the ownership of the means of production. Accompanying class membership was class consciousness or awareness of one's own class position in relation to that of others. Marx saw class consciousness as the catalyst of social change which he defined as the shifting of ownership of the means of production from one class to another. There is little doubt that Marx's description of class and class relationships was accurate for 19th century Europe. Even today the European class structure bears considerable relationship to his description. The class system in the United States, however, is so different from that of Europe that again we need a distinguishing term and again we shall resort to the American class system.

All class systems are relatively open or closed, that is, it is more or less easy to move from one class to another (vertical mobility, either up or down). The American class system has always been and is now one of the most open ever known.

The indices of class membership (class concomitants) are: income, occupation, education, religion, urban-rural residence, and to a small extent, family connections. Related to each of these indices are values and habitual ways of behaving. There is some correlation among all the indices, but nothing consistent; there are wealthy people with little education; high education without wealth; upper class people from small towns or farms; these people can be Catholic, Jewish, even Negro.

It is clear that there is a lower class, characterized by low income, low education, unskilled jobs, unemployment or dependence on relief. It is also clear that there is an upper class, characterized by high income and education and business or professional occupations. Everybody else is strung out on a continuum between--the middle class. The problem is at what income or educational level should we draw the separating line between the lower and middle class and the middle and upper class. If we try to separate one class from another objectively by using class concomitants, we can only do so arbitrarily and on the basis of common sense or for our specific research needs.

Warner's famous six-fold classification of classes--lower lower; upper lower; lower middle; upper middle; lower upper and upper upper does not solve the problem of where to draw the line. Warner defines class as the rating of one's peers, superiors and subordinates. Usually this is regarded as a definition of a clique.

The Warner system does not enable one to compare class structures. We might be able to get such ratings in a small town, but not in New York City. There is no way of comparing small towns with big cities or noting regional differences.

Some sociologists have tried to use Marx's definition to delimit classes according to self-awareness of class members. White Americans, if asked whether they belong to the lower, upper, or middle class, report overwhelmingly that they are middle class, even when they have huge incomes or are living on relief. If one adds the category, "working class," a substantial number of people will put themselves into this category. It is obvious that class consciousness of a kind is working here. In our culture, the lower class and upper class are equally undesirable. We prefer to think of ourselves as a classless society and middle class is equated with not belonging to one of the "bad" classes. On the other hand, the choice of "working class" springs from two sources. Some people are Marxist in thought and regard the working class as "good." On the other hand, manual labor is regarded as "good" in the United States.

Here is another distinction between the United States and Europe. We have no leisure class and we view it with contempt. On the other hand, manual labor is viewed as degrading in Europe and the leisure classes are those who can devote themselves to art, literature and statemanship and bring the culture to full fruition. (Veblen's use of leisure class is more akin to our use of mass society presented later.)

There is much controversy about mobility--change of social position up, down, or horizontally. Horizontal mobility is migration from country to country from rural to urban or urban to rural areas, from one section of the country to another. Areas in which this concept has been most studied are: Who migrates? the most or least educated and energetic? The answers are confused. When does migration occur? when things are bad at home or when they are good at the place to which migration occurs? Generally, good economic conditions attract immigrants; political or religious persecution pushes people to migrate. How do migrants adjust? What effects do they have on the welcoming society? Three areas of horizontal mobility have been important in American history: the immigration of non-Americans, primarily Europeans, and their dispersal across the continent; the movement from rural to urban areas which affects both immigrants and native Americans; the movement of Negroes from South to North.

There is a large literature on upward vertical mobility and much controversy about whether there is less now than formerly both in Europe and the United States. Implicit in the discussion is the idea that upward mobility is good and lack of it, or downward mobility is bad. Downward mobility has been less studied, but when it occurs rapidly and to large numbers of people, as in Germany after World War I, it is important. An important modern cause of upward mobility is the killing off in enormous number of the middle class as has occurred in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and China, leaving room for relatively uneducated and unskilled people to move up. Support of the regime can be engendered this way if the upwardly mobile have been frustrated for a long time.

America has, more than any other modern country, been characterized by much mobility, both upwardly vertical and horizontal. The result has been a loosening of traditional values and an easy acceptance of change, heterogeneity and pluralism. This same pattern is beginning to occur now in the rest of the world.

Another phenomenon, that began in America and is spreading throughout the world, is the movement upwards of vast masses of people in all the class concomitants.

education, urban residence, income, occupation (from unskilled to technical), although the relative position of one class to another has not changed.

There has been some study of elite groups, groups which control power, either in the society as a whole or in individual institutions such as business or labor. The role of leaders and their classification is important here. One can classify leaders in many different ways, but an important one is Weber's:

Traditional leadership occurs in integrated societies which may have a democratic, a monarchical or an autocratic form of government, but it could not occur in totalitarian dictatorships. Traditional leaders depend on tradition for their legitimacy. In our society traditional leadership is found mainly in the church.

Bureaucratic leaders emerge as publics emerge. The leader carries out the law, but since the law is not sacred, it may be changed if desired. It is the usual form of leadership in industrialized democracies.

Charismatic leadership is all-powerful, bound neither by tradition nor law. The leader leads by the force of his personality. Charismatic leadership is found in mass societies.

Part of micro-sociology, the study of informal groupings, studies stratification: the concern here is for cliques, groups smaller than classes, whose members have intimate social relationships other than family or neighborhood ones because the group members think of themselves as tied together by common interests, values and characteristics. One form of the clique is the gang; it is exactly like the clique but occurs generally among children, adolescents and adult criminal groups.

There are a few pariah groups in the United States--groups cut off from the rest of society either because of withdrawal like the Amish; by severe rejection (like some small, racially mixed groups accepted by none of the major racial groups); or by geographical isolation (like the mountaineers and some Indian tribes). These are characterized by being separate societies entirely surrounded by the larger society but not participant at all or to a very small extent. Generally the larger racial and ethnic groups have formed sub-divisions of the society and contact between them and other large groups in the society has been constant.

NON-INTEGRATED GROUPS

In contrast to the groups in which people interact by taking the role of the other are crowds and audiences or masses. The crowd is a number of individuals in temporary physical proximity to each other, influencing each other by their physical nearness and stimulated by some outside source. Each person in a crowd responds individually to the outside stimulus and to the physical stimulation and natural signs of others in the crowd, but there is no mutual adjustment through communication. There are two types of crowds; the acting crowd or mob; it is organized for a purpose such as a lynching; and the expressive crowd, such as the religious revival meeting. A panic as may occur in a fire in a crowded building is a form of the expressive crowd. The kind of non-cultural, animal-like behavior typical of crowds is called crowd behavior.

The audience refers to a number of people, who act in similar ways because of a common source of stimulation but without much communication with each other. The

members of an audience need not be in physical contact with each other but can all be listening to the same stimulus over the radio or TV. The person, who provides the stimulus is called a propagandist.

Being a member of an audience for a considerable portion of one's time reduces the amount of time available for organized group activities, activities in primary groups and private activities. It also reduces the person's ability to act in a socialized manner just as if he had been in physical isolation from other people.

A society, a large proportion of whose members spend a considerable portion of their time as members of an audience, is called a mass society. The word mass is here synonymous with audience although it is not always used this way in sociological literature. One of the characteristics of members of a mass society is anomie, a word first used by Durkheim. It means literally without norms; the individual does not belong to or participate in integrated groups; he feels isolated from other people and does not share the values of any society. The word alienation is sometimes used to refer to anomie or the process of becoming anomic. The extreme example of an anomic individual is the homeless man living in the disorganized areas of the city, but in a mass society many individuals suffer from anomie to some extent. Anomic individuals, because they have no stable value system, are more influenced by rumor than are others.

SOCIAL PROCESSES

Interaction among groups and individuals is not random, but falls into recurrent patterns. These changing patterns occurring to a person or group, in which one step develops out of the previous one, are called social processes. Since interaction is going on all the time, society is always in the process of becoming. There are hundreds of social processes and those which have been well described are a selection which sociologists have considered to be important or interesting. Alphabetically, these are:

Accommodation: The effecting of changes in the behavior and/or attitudes of a person or group in order to reduce friction or conflict with an existing situation; or, the changes, themselves. For example: the acceptance of segregation by the Negroes in the South, in fact, if not psychologically, was accommodation to the superior force the whites could and would mobilize. The abandonment of segregation so quickly and so deeply on the part of many southern cities today is accommodation to a new situation in which the Negroes are threatening disruption of the social order.

Acculturation: The adoption by a person or group of the culture of another social group; also the learning of the culture which takes place simultaneously with socialization; or the process leading to this adoption or learning. (See Culture).

Adjustment: The fitting of one's behavior to the expected behavior of others as a result of taking the roles of others. (See Role).

Amalgamation: The combining of two or more racial stocks.

Assimilation: The adoption by a person or group of another social group to such a complete extent that the person or group no longer has any characteristics identifying him with his former culture and no longer has any particular loyalties to his former culture; or the process leading to this adoption. One can become acculturated without becoming assimilated. A concept used to describe the person who has internalized two or more cultures is marginal man.

These concepts of acculturation, marginal man and assimilation were developed during the study of immigration to the United States. In the literature they have overtones of "good" and "bad". If one accepts the theory of the melting pot, assimilation is good. If one accepts the theory of cultural pluralism, assimilation is bad. The theory of separate but equal, or segregation, is a form of cultural pluralism.

In the literature it is assumed that the marginal man is in a sad position, neither fish nor fowl; typical examples, often given, are the mulatto stuck between Negro and white cultures or the second generation immigrant rejecting the culture of his parents but not integrated into the wider culture of the United States.

In fact, biologically, Negroes vary from a very few with completely Negro ancestry, through all possible mixtures of white, Indian and Negro ancestry, to a few with practically all white ancestry, who identify themselves as Negroes. Practically no Negroes support segregation; they are driving consciously for complete integration into the white culture, so they cannot be accurately described by the marginal man concept.

Research does seem to bear out that second generation immigrants, whether they come from foreign countries, or from rural areas to the city, are marginal men.

The intellectual, who typically moves away from the class of his birth into a group detached from tradition has been described as a marginal man.

In our secular, pluralistic society, many, many people are marginal men in the sense that they share many, sometimes conflicting, cultures and move from one to another. We need to clarify this concept considerably.

Communication: the transfer of meanings, values, or feeling tones from one person or group to another. Sometimes restricted to deliberate transfer of meanings from one person or group to another.

Competition: impersonal rivalry for identical goals without the existence, or at least the effect, of social communication. The progress of one impedes the progress of another, but there is no personal antagonism toward, or possibly even identification of, the competitor. (Where the competitors are known to each other, we use the concept rivalry.) In our society competition is an important process. It has been studied in ecology where competition for space based on land values has been one of the determining factors in shaping our cities. The effect of competition in institutions has been studied particularly in education and business institutions. Control of competition by informal group methods in factories has also been studied. Some of the new psychoanalysts, Karen Horney and Erich Fromm, have studied the anxiety-producing effects of a competitive society.

Conflict, culture: the rivalry of two distinct cultures or subcultures in the minds of an individual or group for their acceptance and loyalty and the tension created by this mental conflict. A good example would be the conflict the white southerner feels between the local culture concerning Negroes and the wider American culture requiring equal treatment.

Conflict, mental: the rivalry of two opposing values or sets of values within the mind of an individual and the effects of this rivalry. Culture conflict would be one form of mental conflict, but there are other kinds such as the conflict of loyalties to wife and mother or to family and peer group.

Conflict, social: activities among human beings intended to hurt others physically or mentally or to deprive others of life, liberty or property, or activities intended to prevent one from being so hurt or deprived. Conflict, unlike competition, is personal and antagonistic. Conflict among groups is very often a conflict of ideologies as between democracy and Communism. In our society conflict has a negative connotation. Conflict must end somehow; in extermination of one group; in subordination of one group to another; or in accommodation. Sometimes conflict is the only way of changing the situation and may bring about an accommodation which leads to more stability and consensus in the society.

Conversion: a change of opinion or value, usually rapid and complete.

Demoralization: a sharp reduction in the morale of a group, at least to a neutral zero point if not to the negative level of group self-hatred.

Diffusion: the process of dissemination of the traits of one culture to those who hold a different culture.

Disorganization: the loss of common meanings and/or values on the part of an individual or subgroup; anomie.

Identification: the process or practice in which an individual considers himself to be the same as someone or something else. In group identification the individual considers his interests to be the same as those of a group to which he belongs; since this makes for loyalty to the group, the term can be considered as equivalent to morale. In much of the protest literature so dear to adolescents one finds this term used in the form, search for identity--with what groups do I want to be identified? what values should I accept?

Individualization: the process by which a person becomes differentiated from the social group and identified by a unique combination of social traits; typical of adolescence, although not confined to it.

Interaction: mutual relations between persons usually involving communication, unless they are of the sort found in the crowd.

Migration: physical movement from one community to another.

Participation: behavior consisting of joining and conforming to the expected behavior in formal and informal groups, especially voluntary associations.

Revolution: a radical and far-reaching series of changes in a society, usually occurring rapidly but not necessarily with violence. The New Deal can be considered a revolution and we speak of the Industrial Revolution.

SOCIAL CHANGE:

Social change is the development of new meanings and values or the substitution of new ones for old; thus it involves changes in the characteristic behavior patterns in a society. Some of the more widely accepted theories of social change are:

1. Change is due to inventions, constructed mainly out of known elements in the society. The inventions cause changes in the society. Social structures and customs adjust to the changes, often with a time lag--culture lag.

2. Change occurs as a result of social contact and cultural diffusion such as occurs in migration and upward vertical mobility. A pluralistic society stimulates this kind of change.

3. Change is the result of a social movement. A social movement occurs when people feel a similar need due to some inadequacy in the social structure that prevents them from receiving adequate satisfaction. They band together to try to bring about the change in the society. Social movements may end in revolution which makes sweeping changes in the whole structure. In democracies, social movements are likely to be effected through peaceful channels and be much less far reaching. In modern democracies social movements are usually carried on by voluntary associations although not necessarily so. The New Deal was put into effect by government action. When a social movement has accomplished its purpose, it may die or it may be institutionalized, either to implement the changes or with new purposes. An example of the latter is the transformation of the Women's Suffrage Movement into the League of Women Voters.

There is a third kind of social movement, the expressive movement, which is best represented by fashions and fads and does not have the organized character of reform and revolutionary movements.

One of the aims of many social movements, particularly reform movements in democracies, is to change the law. The process of informing and changing public opinion that always precedes the success of a social movement (one of the roles of the intellectuals in social change) tends to create acceptance of the new law. The failure of prohibition in the United States is frequently cited to prove the impossibility of legislating change "you can't change human nature by law." The failure of prohibition, however, is one of the few cases one can cite. It should not be forgotten that three months after the Supreme Court had handed down its decision on segregation, half of the states formerly segregated had desegregated--in some cases, entirely, in others, considerably. This is rapid social change by any standards. The 24 Amendments to the Constitution, including the establishment of the income tax, are other examples.

If we mean by intellectuals, all those able to influence the public by means of their institutional position, plus scientists and educators, we can see how important the individual can be in initiating change or in making it acceptable.

SOCIAL CONTROL

Social control covers both the formal and informal ways in which the members of a society are taught to conform to group values.

1. The most pervasive way in which social control is exerted is by tradition even in the fastest changing society. Sumner called these traditional ways of behaving the folkways; he divided these into usages, customary ways of behaving which had no great compelling force; and mores, usages which people had come to believe were essential to the welfare of the society.

Because the term mores has come into common (and usually incorrect) usage and is often used by political conservatives to bolster their point of view with "science", I should like to discuss the term at more length than it deserves. Sumner's data were from primitive societies and for all I know, he correctly described the situation in these societies, but not in modern, urban societies.

Sumner defined the mores (singular, mos) as behavior which was so deeply tabooed that it was unthinkable generally and normally. If the behavior was engaged in, society reacted against the perpetrator immediately and violently. We need the concept of mores because it does describe some behavior in our society; for example, incest, cannibalism, treason, sex crimes against children, Negro male-white female sex relationships in the South all provoke the kind of immediate, violent reaction Sumner described.

Sumner did not, however, provide us with a term to cover the behavior between the mores and customs and conventions. Arnold Rose has used the concept, pseudo-mores, which are values formerly in the mores but now considered to be in the mores by only a minority of the group. The activities are not usually discussed so that most people believe that almost everyone else regards these values as mores. An example would be widespread, but secret, sex practices. This still does not give us a term to distinguish behavior like murder from failure to wear a necktie.

One way around all this is to think of values that determine behavior as being on a continuum; at one end, no deviation is permitted and at the other, complete deviation. Values which permit complete deviation are meanings. Even this will not, however, give us a complete conceptual framework. All values do not have the same salience. Some take precedence over others when there is a conflict--are "higher" so to speak. We also need to arrange values in a vertical continuum.

The power of society to enforce conformity to its values is called a social sanction. Social sanctions are rewards like occupational advancement, high income, public office and public esteem; or punishments like the deprivation of good jobs, high income and public esteem. The means of enforcing sanctions are informal--gossip, ostracism and public opinion--or formal--the law and penal institutions.

CONCEPTS DESCRIBING LARGE SOCIETIES

In the discussion of both integrated and non-integrated groups, we have so far refrained from applying sociological concepts to large societies such as a nation or even larger complexes such as "western society."

There are different types of societies for which sociologists have developed models or ideal types. In the models, sociologists exaggerate those traits of the society which they think are typical and important for determining the behavior patterns of the society and neglect other, less important traits. No real society is accurately described by an ideal type, but this method does enable us to pick out those traits that empirical research shows to be important, and to compare and contrast different types of societies.

One common type of society is the small, homogeneous, agricultural sacred society. Another common type is the folk society; a third, the secular society and a fourth, the mass society. The members of each different type of society exhibit different kinds of behavior according to the roles each society demands. There may be other kinds of societies than these four, but these are the ones sociology has been most often interested in and for which there exist ideal types.

Some of the concepts to be discussed below we have met before in a slightly different context; some are here introduced for the first time.

SACRED SOCIETY

A sacred society is one in which behavior is determined by tradition and custom. The members of the society regard themselves as an in-group and exhibit hostility to all others, out-groups. They regard their own folkways as the only possible way of doing things--ethnocentrism. Behavior is controlled by the mores rather than by formal law. There is little division of labor. Relatively these societies are small; they are agricultural or hunting societies. They have no cities. The society may be one big primary group; there are no secondary groups. Leadership is traditional. Status is often hereditary; there may be a caste system or a class system with practically no vertical mobility. Change is very, very slow.

"Tönnies developed the concept, Gemeinschaft to describe the sacred society. (Usually this is translated community but this is a literal translation, at odds with modern terminology.)

Sacred societies, according to Durkheim, are characterized by mechanical solidarity by which he meant that everybody's behavior is integrated with everybody else's because everybody shares exactly the same values and meanings. These values and meanings are the only ones available to the members of the society. There are very few differentiated roles in the society, usually only age and sex roles.

Other concepts which mean roughly the same thing as sacred society are: Theological society (Comte); Militaristic society (Spencer); Status-dominated society (Maine); Ideational cultural system (Sorokin); Primitive culture (Toynbee). (Taken from Don Martindale and Elio Monachesi, Elements of Sociology, p. 186).

FOLK SOCIETY

This ideal type was developed by Robert Redfield. A folk society is a type of society intermediate between a sacred society and a secular society in all the traits discussed above. It has never been delimited too clearly. In general, as soon as alternative values and meanings enter a sacred society, it starts changing to a folk society. A sacred society that begins to trade with a number of other societies probably becomes a folk society because at least those members of the society, who do the trading, are exposed to new values, meanings and behaviors and become less ethnocentric. If the group manufactures or grows certain products for trade, some division of labor usually takes place and affects the system.

SECULAR SOCIETY

A secular society is characterized by alternative, rational choices of behavior. Secular societies are pluralistic; that is, many groups, each with its own culture, exist side by side, accepting and communicating with each other. This means, of course, that in addition to the separate cultures of each group, there is a common culture for all groups (consensus) which sanctions separate sub-cultures. It means that everybody is aware of alternative ways of behaving. This can be called cosmopolitanism in contradistinction to ethnocentrism. Behavior is governed by law and by informal social controls but relatively little behavior is in the mores. The society is industrialized; there are cities; there is great division of labor. There are many secondary groups. Leadership is bureaucratic. There is a well-developed class system, usually with high vertical mobility and there is often much horizontal mobility, too. There are many publics; some audience behavior and anomie exist. Change is frequent, rapid, and affects all parts of the society.

Tönnies' concept for this kind of society is Gesellschaft. Durkheim speaks of organic solidarity, the result of division of labor. Roles become specialized; they mutually complement one another and the integration of the society depends on the mutual dependence of roles.

Other concepts used to describe the secular society are: Positivistic society (Comte); Industrial society (Spencer); Contract-dominated society (Maine); Sensate cultural system (Sorokin); Civilization (Toynbee). (Martindale and Monachesi, op. cit., p. 186).

There is a world-wide trend for sacred societies to change toward the secular type of society. In many secular societies, some parts may still have a relatively sacred form of organization.

MASS SOCIETY

Mass society is a form of secular society characterized by a very high degree of audience behavior. The modern totalitarian societies, Nazi Germany and the USSR, are mass societies. Change is very rapid; mobility may be very great; leadership is charismatic. Anomie is widespread; there are few voluntary associations and they are all of an expressive kind. There are no publics.

CRIMINOLOGY

The sociologist's view of criminal behavior is so different from the lay view that it seems worthwhile to describe some of the basic concepts of the field even though space will permit only a sketchy presentation.

Criminals do not differ from non-criminals biologically, temperamentally, emotionally, psychologically, racially or intellectually. Criminal behavior is learned in exactly the same way as is non-criminal behavior. Criminals associate differentially; that is, they enter groups engaged in criminal behavior in exactly the same way as non-criminals enter the Boy Scouts or a profession. As a result they define situations differently than do non-criminals. Poverty, broken homes, blighted neighborhoods, alcoholism in the home, and so on, are not causes of crime, but indices of situations that favor entrance into criminal groups.

Anomic individuals, especially juveniles, are often recruited into criminal groups because they do not belong to any other groups.

A useful classification of criminals is taken from Paul Horton and Gerald R. Leslie, The Sociology of Social Problems, pp. 103-112:

Legalistic criminals: those who become criminals through ignorance of the law; as a result of unjust law enforcement (Negroes in the South); or when the alleged crime is merely the pretext of action against someone with unpopular social or political ideas.

Moralistic criminals: violators of laws forbidding certain vices that inflict injury mainly on one's self (adultery).

Psychopathic criminals: kleptomaniacs.

Institutional criminals: those who gamble in churches or perpetrate income tax frauds. Sometimes called white collar criminals.

Situational criminals: the criminal who, under press of circumstances, engages in behavior at variance with his usual behavior (the employed man who steals).

Habitual criminals: people without skills or good habits who yield regularly to temptation and who have a long history of convictions for minor offenses.

Professional criminals: criminals, who follow a career of crime in exactly the same way as anyone follows any other profession. Highly skilled, they are least likely to get caught.

POPULATION OR DEMOGRAPHY

GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION

People are very unevenly distributed over the face of the earth. Their relative concentration in an area is a result of the amount and use of natural resources; the state of industry; the balance of births and deaths and of migration to and from the area; the level of living; and the past history of all the preceding factors. More than half of the world's population is in eastern and southern Asia; another fourth is in Europe. There is a world-wide trend for population to move into and concentrate in urban areas.

Changes in the size of a population occur when the birth rate plus migration to an area are greater or smaller than the death rate plus out-migration. The rate of natural increase is the birth rate minus the death rate. This is a crude measure which does not take into account the age distribution of the population as the net reproduction rate, to be described later, does.

Birth Rates: The birth rate is affected by:

1. Fecundity: the capacity for having children. This is affected by the age of women; heredity; diet; disease; sterilization.
2. Fertility: the actual bearing of children. Fertility is always lower than fecundity. Restrictions on sex relations either before, during or outside marriage; an uneven balance of males and females; contraception; abortion, either deliberate or spontaneous, all reduce fertility.

The simplest measure of fertility is the crude birth rate--the number of births occurring in a year within a population, divided by the size of the population and multiplied by 1000. The crude birth rate is affected not only by fertility but also by the proportion of women in the population or of the proportion of persons of child bearing ages, and it neglects the death of children, who do not reach child bearing ages. Refined birth rates can be calculated to take account of simultaneous variations in these influences. Refined birth rates include:

1. The specific birth rate: number of births for a given age-sex category.
2. Gross reproduction rate: sum of age specific female birth rates by five-year age periods.
3. Fertility ratio: number of children under five in the population per 1000 women, ages 15-45.
4. Net reproduction rate: the number of girl babies born--during a specific time--to a cohort of 100 girl babies traced through from their birth to the end of their child-bearing period. A net reproduction rate of 100 indicates a stationary

population; a rate of 50 indicates a population that is reproducing itself only by half; and of 200, a population that is doubling.

Death Rates: The crude death rate is the number of deaths in a year divided by the size of the population, multiplied by 1000. One can also calculate specific death rates for sex or other categories. The span of life is the total number of years a person can live. There is no exact information on this, but a number of deaths of people over 100 years old have been recorded. The average length of life is the average age at death of all persons in a given population dying in a given year.

The average length of life is the concept we most often work with. The control of infant and child mortality and lately of mortality of people over 65 has greatly increased the average length of life. It is a measure of the modernization and industrialization of a society. Differentials in a population indicate different access to the standards of living.

In general differentials in birth, death and morbidity (illness) rates indicate social differences among groups. The most important differentials are between urban and rural residents; among races; between the better and less educated; among religious groups; among recent and early migrants.

Migration adds to or subtracts from a population. It can have an effect on the rates measuring population growth. For example, if the immigrants are young, they will increase the birth rate; if they are old, they will increase the death rate.


COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION

Traditionally, demographers have been concerned with the composition of population by age, sex, race, nativity, religion, education, marital status, occupation and income. The sex composition of the population is measured by the sex ratio--the number of males for every hundred females. An unbalanced sex ratio--(given monogamy) will reduce the birth rate.

An excellent way to see the composition of the population is by using a population pyramid--two bar graphs back to back. It is also an excellent way to predict the future composition of a population.

This is an imaginary, unrealistic one. Note how one can predict:

1. The 0-5 group is going to increase the birth rate 20 years from now.
2. The marriage rate in the two groups--15-20 & 20-25 is going to be low.
3. There will be a lot of aged in relation to working population, in 30 years, but this will reverse itself in 40 years.



ECOLOGY

The study of the influence of man's natural habitat on the interrelations among men is called ecology. The basic process studied by ecology is competition used in the broad biological sense. The area over which competition occurs is called the community. Competition is an impersonal process during which an individual or group modifies his environment to meet his needs and thereby affects the ability of other individuals or groups in the same environment to satisfy their needs. If a group occupies space, that same space cannot be used by others. Since space and everything else is limited, those with most power (defined by the culture) get the most desirable things. Any increase in resources--improvement in transportation making suburban areas available; skyscrapers, making air space usable; an increase in population increasing demand--changes the situation.

There are a number of useful concepts in this field. Those we list below refer mostly to the ecology of the city because these are the concepts most used by sociologists:

Natural areas: areas whose use gives them distinctive and identifying traits -- the Loop; the used-car district; a neighborhood.

Dominance: control by one use of an area over a competing use: The city dominates the metropolitan area in competition with large-scale farming.

Succession: change in land use; one group follows another; each immigrant group has succeeded to the residential areas inhabited by preceding groups.

Invasion: when a new group out-competes an old group for a given area: the invasion of a good residential area by rooming houses.

Spatial segregation: restriction of an area to a certain use by law or custom: zoning.

Concentric zones of a city: the areas of use into which a fast-growing city is divided under competitive circumstances. This is an ideal type and no city is exactly like it, but most American cities approximate it. The city tends to grow outward along certain radii or fast transportation routes.


Central business district;

Zone of transition:
factories, wholesale houses,
slum housing, hobohemia,
rooming houses, vacant lots;

Workingmen's homes;

Middle class residences;

Commuters' residences,
Upper class homes.



Satellite cities: smaller cities around a large city many of whose needs are served by the center, larger city.

Suburbs: specialized areas surrounding a city. They may be middle class, upper class or working class residences or industrial areas. They occur when rapid transportation arises. The main characteristic is specialization and they depend for everything else on the center urban area.

Metropolitan area: an area surrounding a large city, including the satellite cities, suburbs, recreation areas, and the farming areas that serve the area with perishable food like vegetables and milk. The metropolitan area is linked together by a network of transportation and communication facilities and is interdependent.

KEY CONCEPTS OF SOCIOLOGY

There are four criteria for identifying key concepts in sociology. First, the concepts should be widely accepted by sociologists today. Second, they should be inclusive of all those widely accepted by sociologists. Third, they should be necessary for an orderly statement of the structure of the discipline. And finally, they should be explanatory for wide areas of the fields of sociology.

The following concepts are crucial:

For Sociology as a Whole:	Self Integrated Group Social Process Culture
For Demography:	Population Growth Composition of Population
For Ecology:	Impersonal Competition Ecological Processes

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Background Paper - Number 5

THE STUDY OF GEOGRAPHY

Fredric R. Steinhauser

INTRODUCTION¹

The divisions of knowledge called the social sciences exist because they are universally recognized as being concerned with a single category of phenomena -- man and his social, economic and political behavior. Each discipline within the social sciences has assumed the responsibility for the study of its phenomena because there exists a common curiosity about that subject. Every school child knows that history provides information about events in the human past and that geography is the knowledge about areas -- places and regions of the world.

The literature of geography began in the myths and sagas of every tongue. Every event described, every series of events reconstructed, had to be located in some area of the world. This consciousness of the locality of human experience and the continuing human need to describe the areas of the earth, as well as to recall the events of the past, are the foundations upon which both geography and history rest. It was no mere happenstance that Herodotus was called both the Father of History and the Father of Geography, nor that geography in the ancient world was called the Mother of Sciences. The record of human events on the earth's surface is, after all, the source of all scientific knowledge.

The development of individual sciences out of the common pool of knowledge did not displace either history or geography as fields of study. The newer disciplines studied their separate phenomena both as to origin and duration of occurrence as well as to location and distribution on the earth's surface, but only in terms of the phenomena themselves. The study of area, as a complex of phenomena, was left to geography; no other discipline studies the facts of area from the viewpoint of area, rather than from the viewpoint of the phenomena found there. This is the key point in distinguishing geography from the other academic disciplines. The analysis of the "area complex" as a field of study belongs to the geographer.

GEOGRAPHY TODAY¹

Geography may be described simply as "earth description" if it is understood by this that the geographer is describing the earth's surface in its areal differentiation. Teachers and students, however, need a more thorough definition. Geographers describe the earth, as do botanists, zoologists, physicists and economists. The sciences differ, however, in what, how and why they describe what they do. Each has a basic datum or given part of reality which its discipline studies and describes -- plants, animals, physical elements, economic value. The geographer studies space, which should be more clearly understood as area on the earth's surface. His given datum is the recognized fact that the world is made up of areas -- complexes of phenomena on the earth's surface which, as integrations and configurations, are differentiated from each other.

It is obvious that phenomena are spatially distributed over the earth's surface in patterns. The study of these patterns with reference to one another is the study of geography. Comparison and synthesis of different geographic

patterns reveals areas where distinctive combinations of landscape features appear to fit together. The world may be divided and subdivided into many such areas at many different scales and for many purposes. It is the character and differentiation of these areas that is the central subject matter of geography.

CONFUSION BETWEEN TECHNIQUES AND DEFINITION OF THE FIELD¹

The geographer, in applying the geographic method to the study of area, uses techniques which have many times been identified as geography itself.

For instance, geographers have made many maps of simple distributions. Examples are maps of population density, rainfall, coal fields, flour mills or Moslems. But these maps have been made because they were needed for study in conjunction with other maps to define and characterize the regions of the world. Thus geography is not the study of distributions, even though the study of distributions is a necessary procedure in the study of geography. It is common to label the simple distribution of something as its geography. However, this is obviously as inappropriate as labelling a chronological table as history. All phenomena have spatial attributes as they have temporal attributes, but the description of these attributes is clearly a problem of measurement, of symbolic representation, a relationship of phenomena to an arbitrary standard, not to other phenomena.

Studies involving the traditional location theory or its modern variants have also been confused with geography. Again the areal relation between phenomena is translated into an arbitrary standard, in this case usually some function of distance. There have also been attempts to reduce geography to "social physics", using the gravity model involving two variables, mass and distance, to interpret or explain a great many patterns of settlement and land use. This is also inappropriate, because reality is more than just mass and distance. Many other factors must be considered.

Geography is also sometimes mistakenly defined as the study of environmental relations. All geographic patterns are assumed to be explained by the distribution and character of some physical features such as landforms or climate. This is another and more venerable attempt to relate man's experience on earth's surface causally and directly to one phenomenon. Neither is this logical nor does it necessarily lead to an understanding of area. Geographers are interested in the element-complex which gives character to area and facilitates the understanding of areal differentiation, not in a simple cause and effect relationship between one set of phenomena and another.

A variation on these geographical determinisms, growing out of criticism of the cruder environmentalisms in the early twentieth century, was to define geography as human ecology, or more subtly, geography as the study of man's habitat. Geography in these later cases is generally phrased as the adaptation of man to his environment, rather than in the old terms of man determined by his environment. Important as this change in phrasing is in the history of the science, it still places the environment in a singular causal relationship with man and hence is not fitting.

More recently, criticism of this kind has induced a further change in methodological vocabulary: geography becomes the study of the interrelation of man and his environment. This definition meaningfully supports the idea of the element-complex. No one element is singled out by itself; man and nature are in mutual, reciprocal relationship. Above all, man is recognized as an agent of environmental change. In essence, man becomes part of his own environment rather than separated from it.

Geographers must deal with man and environment as elements of area, but these elements in themselves are not the geography of the area. Understanding of areas involves the integration of all elements which give character to the area.

GEOGRAPHIC DATA¹

All geographical data are empirical. What we call facts about area are observations and happenings, usually assembled by enumeration and measurement with instruments; but however assembled, they are a symbolized record of human experience--a statistic. Every distribution of phenomena, which is the basic set of data in geography, is a statistic. Being statistical, it is susceptible to mapping, classification, aggregation and analysis. Simple descriptions of size, shape, distance and direction, as well as analytic statements of gradient, dispersion, agglomeration, regression and co-variance, must be handled statistically. In these matters geographers, searching after areal differentiation or spatial arrangement of phenomena and areal element-complexes, use standard scientific methods to obtain their ends.

Geographers seek more than these abstracted areal patterns, however; they seek also the meaning of area. Geographers wish to understand not only why area is a factual event in human consciousness, but what beliefs people had about area. The basis of human action is in what is believed to be true, as well as in what is true; therefore, one cannot maintain that most of past human behavior has followed from scientific knowledge. Thus, it is necessary that the geographer not only objectively measure the location and areal configuration of happenings on the earth's surface, but also know what man experienced and believed about his environment. It is this that underlies his acts, which in turn give character to areas. Man, seeing his environment through the cultural prism of his beliefs, acts as a historic being; and place, as an event in human consciousness, is a cultural concept.

Given the above analysis, it follows that all geography must be approached historically. If culture is the historical accumulation of social behavior, it is hardly possible to study geography from either an accultural, strictly objective, singular viewpoint; or from a static, cross-sectional perspective. Culture is handed down by tradition and transmitted in large part by diffusion. We must understand these processes and have knowledge of these patterns to give meaning to social behavior. Geographers have no formulation of stable human attitudes and behavior toward environment upon which to base the understanding of area. The character of areas is always changing. To treat the study of areas otherwise is to delude ourselves into thinking we can differentiate the surface of the earth without considering the experience of man.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK^{1,2}

Although much of the terminology of geography is not uniquely geographic, six major concepts summarize fairly well the intellectual insights to be gained through the study of geography. They are globalism, diversity, spatial location, interrelatedness, change and culture. The study of geography uniquely contributes some of these concepts and reinforces others for elementary and secondary students. Of course, other concepts could be noted; and other formats or terms could be used to discuss those included here. The author has attempted to select and arrange those items which have been emphasized in the references cited at the close of this paper.

I. Globalism

The global concept arises from study of the earth as a sphere and its relationship to the solar system. The earth's roughly spherical shape, its movement, and its relationship to the sun result in many occurrences of significance to man. The distance between the earth and the sun affects the amount of sun heat received on earth. The inclination of the earth's axis and the revolution of the earth around the sun result in the seasons, climatic zones, and the amount of sun heat available to places on the earth's surface. The rotation of the earth affects the direction of flow of both air and water.

Study of the globe also provides the basis for understanding the earth's grid of parallels and meridians. This leads to the understanding of scale through the systematic comparison of earth dimensions and globe dimensions. It leads also to the understanding of map distortion as it becomes evident that the grid is necessarily altered and scale changed differently in different places when the surface of the globe is represented on a flat surface. Study of scale also leads immediately to understanding of the need for generalization--the selective omission or inclusion of detail in response to variations in map scale.

Knowledge of earth-sun relations, the grid, scale, distortion, and generalization is basic to geography.

II. Diversity- Variability

Phenomena are distributed unequally over the earth's surface, resulting in great diversity or variability from one place to another. Three terms--pattern, areal differentiation and regionalization are important to understanding the concept of diversity.

A. Pattern

Unevenly distributed phenomena form distinctive patterns on the map. These patterns occur at every scale. They include, for example, the distinctive configuration of the Tropical Rain Forest or the Manufacturing Regions on maps of the world; the distinctive field, road, and drainage patterns of a Japanese village or rural northern Iowa. These patterns can be classified and studied systematically. Their locational combinations define the distinctive character of different areas. Map patterns are recognized by their size, shape and location, much as features of the anatomy are recognized on an X-ray. They form part of the basic vocabulary of geography.

B. Areal Differentiation³

Areal differentiation is a key concept of the geographer, and to many it is the core of the discipline. Generally, the concept of areal differentiation refers to the variable character of the earth's surface. No two places or regions are exactly alike.

Geography exists because of man's desire to understand the diversity of the earth's surface--its areal differentiation. The world is made up of places and regions which are differentiated from one another as a result of the coincidence of the phenomena interrelated there. The recognition of the division of the world into places of distinctive character is areal differentiation.

C. Regionalization

Although no two places are exactly alike, there are broad geographical areas in which the content of the landscape varies only slightly from one place to another. These relatively homogeneous areas are called regions. Regions are delimited on many different bases, depending upon the purpose of the study. Some regions are delimited on the basis of a single phenomenon such as dense population. Others may be delimited by multiple phenomena which have common features, such as climate, vegetation, and economy. Regions may also be delimited on the basis of homogeneity in the sense of the degree of intensity of connection, rather than uniformity of phenomena. Such a functional region might be the trade area of a city. Regional boundaries are relatively narrow zones across which some feature or combination of features changes greatly from place to place. Regionalization is a tool which permits description and understanding of the earth's infinite variety in a limited amount of time. The world is divided and subdivided into regions; regions, like patterns, can be defined at any level of generalization and scale. For example, the Great Plains are a region; but so are the Los Angeles Lowland, the Kentucky Blue Grass, the Lombardy Plain, the Black Forest, or the Jersey Meadows. Many regions are recognized and named by the people who live in them. Still others have names on which the geographical literature agrees even though the names were conferred by professional geographers. These regional names are colorful and basic geographic vocabulary. And the regions are defined not by words but by combinations of overlapping geographic patterns on series of maps.

III. Spatial or Areal Location

A. Position

In the first type, location is a position which sets a phenomenon at a specific point on the earth's surface, usually designated by an abstract grid and described in terms of latitude and longitude.

B. Site

A second type of location, site, relates a phenomenon to the detailed physical setting of the area it occupies. Hence to understand site, it is necessary to understand the physical phenomena found at any place or region. Phenomena which a geographer normally studies while describing and evaluating a site are:

1. Landforms (plains, hills, mountains, valleys, plateaus, islands, peninsulas)
2. Water (hydrological cycle, relationship to sea level, drainage, lakes, rivers, oceans)
3. Climate (temperature, moisture)
4. Soil and Soil Materials.
5. Natural Vegetation (forests, grasslands, dry lands)
6. Minerals

C. Situation

A third type of location, situation, describes a phenomenon in areal relationship with other phenomena with which it is associated. A place or region is not really located or defined until it is described in relation to all other associated places or regions. It is important to know the direction and distance from other places, and the functional relationships

to other places and regions. Location, then, is not just position, not just a pattern of size, shape, extension and direction, but the relative distribution of phenomena in the reality of the earth's surface.

IV. Interrelatedness

In spite of the diversity of the world's surface, geographers agree that there is an interrelationship of the world's places and of phenomena in any one area. This concept has often become the main consideration of geographic research. Many terms, such as interdependence, interconnection, spatial interaction, and areal association describe in different ways the interrelationships which exist within and among the world's places.

Geographic literature places interrelationships into two main divisions, areal association and spatial interaction. The first are those relationships which exist among phenomena within places and the second, those which exist among phenomena located at different places and regions. Some of the descriptions used in discussing relationships are very simple, while others use numerous statistical devices for measuring the degree of their intensity.

A. Areal Association⁵

Areal association refers to the identification of the human and physical features of the world that are tied together causally, resulting in places and regions of distinctive character. Preston James has called this concept the core around which the theory of geography is built.

Geographers, while looking for places of distinct character, may make inventories of phenomena but the purpose is to find significant combinations which are tied together in a way to give meaning to the various world places. Areal association can also be a means of finding significant interrelationships of phenomena. At a less sophisticated level, areal association may be stated in terms of observation of human and physical phenomena which seem to fit together to make places distinct from one another. On a more scientific level, the combination of phenomena in an area can be measured mathematically to analyze statistically the degree of interrelationship of two or more occupants of an area.

Every area on earth contains a combination of phenomena which share the space of places and regions. Some of these things are closely interrelated ("element-complexes"), while others merely happen to be there and may have no causal dependence upon the others. One example of the type of association geographers study is that found between the distribution of people and moisture.

B. Spatial Interaction³

Spatial interaction is the interrelationship between phenomena in different places and regions of the world. All the places of the earth's surface are tied together by forces of man and nature. The world's air masses, rivers, glaciers and ocean currents carry certain properties from place to place. Even the world's animals and birds move things over the earth's surface. These movements may be as small as a fungus carried by the air or as large as the load of sediment moved by the Mississippi system. Each case reflects an interaction of places.

Man has speeded and complicated spatial interaction through communication and transportation. The migration of the earth inhabitants, material

resources, and ideas has reached tremendous proportions, rapidly intensifying the process of diffusion. A communicable disease can be contacted by a man in Switzerland and in two weeks an epidemic can result in Chicago.

1. Circulation

The concept of circulation implies the movement of physical phenomena, people, goods and ideas throughout the world. While circulation is involved somewhat with physical things such as air and water, a geographer uses the concept of circulation more often with the ideas of trade, migration and diffusion. To this degree, circulation usually includes both transportation and communication. Some geographers describe circulation as flow.

a. Trade

Through the centuries trade has drawn the world and its regions closer together. Man has always desired things not found in his immediate locality. Trade is a process by which goods of the world are transported and exchanged among the world's regions. The greatest exchanges have been between areas of like environment, not between different environments as might be supposed. High speed transportation in the exchange of goods has made close neighbors of countries from all over the world, usually reducing the regional differences which exist.

b. Migration

An important idea in understanding interrelations of the world's places is migration. This concept involves mass movements of people from one area of the world to another for the purpose of permanent settlement. The movement may be either voluntary or involuntary. Probably the best known migration has been the shift of European population to settle North America, South American, Australia, and parts of Africa.

Migration is important because it involves the movement of culture and material objects (e.g. animals, crops) to other parts of the world and thus results in changing those areas.

c. Diffusion

The concept of diffusion, like migration and trade, helps a geographer understand how things got to be where they are. It is thought of as a process by which the world's phenomena are scattered or transmitted from one area or culture to another--for example, the transmission of English trade practices.

2. Interdependence⁵

Interdependence is a form of interrelationship and it is based upon circulation. However, the association or tie is stronger and more apparent. The idea of mutual dependence implies that the regions of the world would suffer without these relationships or if certain relationships were displaced by others less favorable. The interdependence of the world's regions implies a system of organization which distributes products from where they can best be produced to the places that have need for them. The world is a community of interdependent nations

drawing upon the world's resources and all sharing in the benefits. The concept of interdependence also implies that in the present-day world, nations are so interrelated that important happenings in one will affect all the others. War and its effects as well as products can be transported from one part of the world to another.

V. Change^{6,7}

One of the most significant aspects of the world's geography is its dynamic character. It is ever-changing. Both man and nature change the character of the earth. Man cuts forests, causes erosion of the land, destroys grasslands, changes the course of rivers, moves mountains and transports phenomena from one part of the world to another. Nature builds new mountains, cuts new river channels, fills in the seas, inundates the lands and develops new plants and animals. It transforms the landscape, adding and subtracting phenomena as part of the process.

Geography is a study of the present. However, to understand the present one must understand the past. It is often necessary to reconstruct the geography of former periods. Terms such as sequent occupance imply a series of landscapes, each representing periods in history with different physical and human phenomena present. The world's patterns have never been static. The changes which occur on maps record the changing character of the world.

Directly associated with the concept of change is the concept of process. Process refers to a systematic series of continuous actions or changes taking place in a definite manner. All phenomena that are studied are in some stage of growth or decay. Preston James has said that the face of the earth is complex because processes of different kinds work at different rates or tempos. Different processes and processes in varying stages of development create unique combinations of phenomena which give character to the world's places and regions. The phenomena which can be observed at present are the result of the sequence of change, and any place or region observed at any time is in some stage of process.

Processes of geographic importance are those which change map patterns and regions in an evolutionary or systematic way. Of particular importance are those patterns which change the map significantly within the time span of major human events--life times, historical eras, the existence of the race itself. For geography is mainly anthropocentric. These processes may be grouped under three headings--physical, biotic and social.

A. Physical Processes⁸

Physical processes operate both above and beneath the earth's surface. These result in shaping and the re-arranging of the earth's continents and their landforms, ocean basins and their coastlines. They also produce continuing, systematic change in the map patterns of climate and water resources.

E. Biotic Processes⁶

Biotic processes operate within the world of plant and animal life which occupies the boundary zone between earth and water, earth and atmosphere, and water and atmosphere. Two sets of processes are especially important in geography. One is the process of soil formation,⁶ whereby unconsolidated earth mantle is transformed into soil by a combination of inorganic and organic interaction. The other is the process of vegetational succession or change, through which the mantle of forests, range grasses, or desert

shrubs continually changes its geographic pattern in response to changes in climate, human settlement, or other forces.

C. Social Processes⁶

Amid the physical and biotic changes which are taking place, man motivates yet another set of processes which may be classed as socio-economic. In the geographical literature these include political, economic, or other commonly-used dimensions of human society. These, too, produce systematic and evolutionary change in the map patterns and regional content of geography. Examples are the changing maps of population and settlement, industrial regions, or political boundaries.

The systematic study of geography as it changes over time is thus one of the avenues to understanding the physical, biotic, and social processes. Geography contributes uniquely and directly to the understanding of these processes as the study of anatomic change contributes to the knowledge of pathology in medicine. Time series of maps or aerial photographs are analogous, at a different scale, to time series of X-ray photographs.

VI. Culture Regions⁹

One of the major concepts of modern day geography concerns man's adaptation to and control of his physical environment. Statements such as "man the ruler," and "man the chooser" indicate man's position as decider of his own destiny. The decisions he makes are usually the result of his culture.

Culture is a "way of life," simply stated. It is a learned manner of living by which conformity or behavior is acquired by the individuals involved.

Every human culture has developed in a particular area within the world setting. These areas are distinctive in the combinations of phenomena found there. Each cultural group has made changes both in its way of living and in the area it has occupied. The result of this combination of people and natural environment produced a regional distinctiveness that is significant to geographers in understanding the world. The world's people may be grouped within a number of relatively homogeneous regions for study. The homogeneity is reflected in some combinations of economy, custom, religion, diet, technology or the physical aspects of the habitat.

The geographic study of culture regions contributes not only to understanding of the relationships between people and natural resources but also to tolerance and humanity.

Conceptual Framework

- I. Globalism

- II. Diversity - Variability
 - A. Pattern
 - B. Areal Differentiation
 - C. Regionalization

- III. Spatial or Areal Location
 - A. Position
 - B. Site
 - 1. landforms
 - 2. water
 - 3. climate
 - 4. soil and soil materials
 - 5. natural vegetation
 - 6. minerals
 - C. Situation

- IV. Interrelatedness
 - A. Areal Association
 - B. Spatial Interaction
 - 1. circulation
 - a. trade
 - b. migration
 - c. diffusion
 - 2. interdependence

- V. Change
 - A. Physical Processes
 - B. Biotic Processes
 - C. Social Processes

- VI. Cultural Regions

Footnotes

1. The parts of this paper labelled, "Introduction", "Geography Today", "Confusion Between Method and Definition", and "Geographic Data", are based upon a talk and a subsequent paper prepared for the Project Social Studies Committee by Fred E. Lukermann, Associate Professor of Geography, University of Minnesota. Also included in this paper are some ideas presented to the Committee by J.O.M. Broek, Professor of Geography, University of Minnesota, and by Clyde F. Kohn, Professor of Geography, University of Iowa. The paper has been reviewed by John R. Borchert, Professor of Geography, University of Minnesota, who is a geography consultant for the Project.
2. Recent papers concerned with geographic concepts are: (a) Preston E. James, a chapter in: The Social Studies and the Social Sciences (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1962), (b) Henry J. Warman, a chapter in: Curriculum Guide for Geographic Education (Norman, Oklahoma: National Council for Geographic Education, 1963) Wilhelmina Hill, editor, and (c) the Association of American Geographers and the National Council for Geographic Education, Advisory Paper for Teachers Associated with the High School Geography Project (Los Angeles, 1962).
3. Richard Hartshorne, Perspective on the Nature of Geography (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1959), Chapter II.
4. Ruby M. Harris, Map and Globe Usage (New York: Rand McNally and Company, 1960).
5. Preston E. James, Chapter on Geography in: The Social Studies and the Social Sciences.
6. Preston E. James and Clarence F. Jones, American Geography - Inventory and Prospect (Syracuse University Press, 1954), Chapters 1, 16, 19, and 20.
7. Alfred H. Meyer and John H. Strietelmeier, Geography in World Society (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1963), Chapter I.
8. Finch, Trewartha, Robinson and Hammond, Physical Elements of Geography (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1957), Section B.
9. Preston E. James, editor, New Viewpoints in Geography, 29th Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, (Washington: The Council, 1959), Chapters IV and X.

ANTHROPOLOGY*

Shirley Russell Holt

The Scope of Anthropology


Anthropology is both a physical and social science and it is also history, in that every observation of the anthropologist is a datum of historical fact and of course every cultural situation through time is in some sense unique.

Anthropology as a field of study is derived from a nineteenth century background which assumed that man and his works are an aspect of natural history, and can and should be studied as such.¹ Anthropology is by its nature an integrating field of knowledge, bringing physical science, biological science, social science, and aspects of the humanities and history "into a unity through the person of man" as E. A. Hoebel has put it.²

Broadly, the field is divided into Physical Anthropology and Cultural Anthropology. Physical anthropologists concern themselves with questions involving the evolution of man's physical form and with questions involving comparison of development of such physical forms among varying groups of mankind (human anthropology and comparative human physiology). Cultural anthropologists concern themselves with questions involving the evolution and development of man's culture. They interest themselves in the processes by which culture develops through time and in social behavior and the organization of social groups. Cultural anthropologists divide their labors under the rubrics ethnography, (description and collection of data on the cultures of the world) and ethnology, (the classification, analysis and formulation of principles in terms of anthropological theory and hypotheses). Social Anthropology constitutes both of these types of labors when concerned with man's relationships to other men and with the organization of groups. It is virtually synonymous with sociology, the main difference between the two being the kinds of societies traditionally studied by each. Anthropologists usually concentrate on non-literate peoples and sociologists usually concentrate on our contemporary civilization, although by no means has either group confined their interests to one or the other exclusively.

Archaeology is a special area of anthropological activity which provides evidence from the past for the hypotheses of physical anthropology and culture history. Linguistics, usually taught as a part of anthropology in the U. S., is a study of one aspect of culture, language, using specialized techniques and

*This paper was originally prepared for staff use and included numerous, lengthy quotations to help clarify ideas. The blank places in the pages which follow indicate places where quotations have had to be omitted or shortened for the public domain edition.



theories. These theories may be historical or involve structural relationships within language, or explore the relationships of language to other aspects of culture.

Method in Anthropology

Anthropology uses the method of empiricism, as do other sciences. Physical anthropologists use the techniques common to other biological scientists in their work. Cultural anthropologists almost universally are expected to do field work in a living community and to publish ethnographic descriptions of their work. Ideally such "descriptions" are objective and reliable so that a future worker would corroborate them. A primary technique of the ethnographer has been and is participant observation (over a sufficient period of time so as to enable the anthropologist to "translate" one culture to another). Other techniques, such as interviews, projective tests, surveys, questionnaires and other paraphernalia of the social scientist are also used.^{3*} Often the anthropologist has been guilty of neglecting historical documents and data although ideally they should be and are used in his productions also. Ethnographic data are used for purely historic types of studies or in the search for recurrent, predictable relationships between facts, i. e., science. The comparative method, using either quantitative or non-quantitative procedures, has been the backbone of scientifically oriented cultural anthropology (and physical anthropology as well) from its modern beginnings in the 19th century.

Quantitative data is relatively rare in anthropological studies. In comparing data from one society with that of another usually the ethnologist can do little more than note a piece of behavior's presence or absence, or give a rough estimate of how widely it is practiced or how important it is to the society or to its members. Examples of such studies using cross-cultural survey techniques are G. P. Murdock's Social Structure (1949) and Whiting and Child's Child Training and Personality Development (1953) which use a sample of the world's ethnographically described societies to test their hypotheses. These techniques have been rather widely used but also rather widely subjected to criticism on statistical and logical grounds.⁴ The non-quantitative technique of covariation is commonly used and advocated in social anthropology.⁵

Historical types of questions have also been subjected to statistical procedures, notably in culture element distribution studies in aboriginal North America.⁶

*The field worker is provided with suggestions as to what to look for by such aids as Notes and Queries on Anthropology, Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 6th revised ed., London, 1951--or the Behavior Science Outlines of the Human Relations Area Files--as well as providing himself with some sort of theoretical orientation. No longer is he expected to simply mirror the "facts", without such theoretical constructions, as many were in the 20's and 30's. See "How an Anthropologist Works in the Field", pp. 32-124 in D. Karing, Ed., Personal Character and Cultural Milieu, 1956.

Linguistics, a specialization in cultural anthropology, has well developed techniques of its own,⁷ and so has archaeology.⁸ They have relatively little in common with the techniques of the ethnographer or ethnologist.

The professional anthropologist, no matter what his specialty, must at least become acquainted with all of these fields and their techniques, in the classroom, laboratory or in the field. These fields and techniques are very diverse, and no one can completely master all of them, yet they are held together by common assumptions and concepts, which we will examine in the next section. By and large, anthropologists have not been so concerned with the development of methodology as have scholars in other behavioral science fields, such as sociology. They have developed techniques for trying to gather the data necessary to answer the questions they have posed for themselves, but have not tried to devise methodological systems.

Basic Assumptions and Concepts in Anthropology

Margaret Mead has listed some of the basic assumptions of the anthropologist as follows: "the psychic unity of mankind, as one species,...

the recognition that all cultures...

must be accorded a basic equal dignity,"...

the insistence that no behavior, no item, no artifact, can be understood except in a complete ecological context...."⁹

Basic also is the belief that culture is the core concept of anthropology, even though Kroeber and Kluckhohn's survey of the concept revealed rather wide differences in its definition and in theoretical uses of it.¹⁰ As a minimum definition, most anthropologists would still accept E. B. Tylor's definition given in 1871. "Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."¹¹ Culture has a generic referent and also a specific one.

A Culture is always made manifest by a group of people, a community or a society. A good many anthropologists use the definition of community provided by the Wilsons, "an aggregate of people to some degree localized in time and space and manifesting a relatively intense common life."¹² Society, as commonly defined by anthropologists, may mean "the aggregate of people and the relations between them,"¹³ or it may be used synonymously with the definition of community, above.¹⁴ Some anthropologists define it as referring to "all the people of whom the community is aware."¹⁵ In this kind of definition the society is always specified from the point of view of a particular community, the society includes a number of communities, and it may be that one or more communities are more dominant in one cultural dimension or another or in many

of them.¹⁶ The concepts society and culture, however they may be defined, refer to the same phenomena and must always involve one another.

There are other basic assumptions regarding the nature of culture which most anthropologists would hold. They would assume that some aspects of culture are universal and are possessed by every known society, although there is not agreement as to what these are. Instead of listing such aspects as part of the "Universal Pattern", as Wissler and Murdock do,¹⁷ it is now fashionable to list "instrumental ends" of culture or "functional prerequisites."^{*}

"Instrumental ends" of culture are referred to the individuals' needs which they satisfy, distinctions being made between primary drives which stem from the human beings' physiology, derived needs, or learned needs through which physiological drives are satisfied (needs for food procurement, tools, etc.) and integrative needs for forms of social organization so that primary and derived needs may be satisfied. Honigmann lists three functions or "general processes of culture: adaptation, adjustment and stress" which are "broad enough to include all others."¹⁸

Functional prerequisites look at culture from the standpoint of community survival, and lists of them also vary somewhat. A representative list would be the following:

1. Maintenance of the biological functioning of the community's members.
2. Production and distribution of goods and services.
3. Reproduction of new members.
4. Socialization of new members into responsible adults.
5. Maintenance of internal and external order.
6. Maintenance of meaning and motivation.¹⁹

In a given culture, no one individual ever exhibits or knows all of its traits. A commonly used set of concepts to make this characteristic of culture specific is Linton's who has suggested the term universals to apply to norms that apply to every member of a society, alternatives to specify norms which allow a choice for specific situations, and specialties for norms which are used or restricted only to some subgroup of the society.

Anthropologists also differentiate between ideal and real culture; ideal norms are those which the people of a society consciously state as standard behavior, while real culture refers to cultural behaviors as they actually are. The ethnographic account of the cultural behavior of a society is called a culture construct by Linton; such a construct represents the real culture of a society as closely as possible. (Usually the construct is made up of a description of the most common (modal) behavior in a given situation, although in

*Kluckhohn reviews some of the approaches to this problem in his "Universal Categories of Culture" in Anthropology Today, A. L. Kroeber and others, eds., University of Chicago Press, 1953.

some instances a range of variation and/or other information on the frequency of possible behaviors is made.)

Culture is conceived of being made up of component parts. The smallest unit is called a trait or element. Anthropologists also speak of culture complexes, which are networks of closely related elements. Some anthropologists speak of complexes which are "woven together in relation to the basic interest of social living" and are called institutions.²⁰

Culture is made up of behaviors which may be either overt or covert. Overt behaviors are those which involve activities which can be directly perceived--seen, felt, smelled, tasted or heard. Covert behaviors cannot be directly perceived, but are those attitudes and beliefs which predispose an individual to act in a certain way. They can be studied only through overt behaviors, though all behavior is initially covert. (The concepts implicit and explicit are sometimes used more or less interchangeably with covert and overt. When used specifically implicit and explicit refer to behavior which is originally covert; meanings which are implicit refer to those which are unverbalizable while those that are explicit are.)

A given culture is conceived of as having a particular kind of configuration, as Benedict puts it "The whole . . . is not merely the sum of all its parts, but the result of a unique arrangement and interrelation of the parts that have brought about a new entity."²¹ Most anthropologists would hold that there is a tendency toward integration in culture, and as a result, change in one area of culture will result in changes in other areas. This is not to say that everything is related to everything else directly; the relationship may be very indirect.²²

Questions about the nature of the interrelationship of the parts of a culture have spurred several kinds of approaches to the study of the problem. Hoebel attacks it through the "imperative of selection" which is summed up by Benedict as follows: "The culture pattern of any civilization makes use of a certain segment of the great arc of potential human purposes and motivations. . . .

which is far too immense and too full of contradictions for any one culture to utilize even any considerable portion of it."²³ Such selection is made according to assumptions about the world and about the nature of existence, and Hoebel calls these assumptions existential postulates. There are also assumptions about whether things are good or bad, and these are

called normative postulates, or values. These basic assumptions or basic postulates are "necessarily consistent among themselves, although rarely wholly so. If a society is to survive, the gears of its culture must mesh, even though they may growl and grind."²⁴ In selecting customs a society chooses three "ways that fit its basic postulates as to the nature of things and what is desirable and what is not."²⁵

Basic postulates may be overtly stated by the people who hold them, or they may be covert. A similar formulation has been made by the Kluckhohns.²⁶ Concepts may be existential or normative in variable degrees, most falling somewhere between the two extremes. Values are ideas leaning toward the normative end of the continuum, although containing an existential implication also. A "value" refers to a socially standardized concept of what is desirable or undesirable and may be implicit or explicit and covert or overt. Values are limited by ideas about what is possible--that is, existential definitions of the nature of the world and man. Values influence selection of behavior from both available means and ends of action; they may be positive or negative.*

The traits of a culture make a contribution to the total cultural system, and that contribution is its function. This is the usual meaning of function in present parlance in anthropology,²⁷ although in the past Malinowski and others following his usage sometimes meant by function of a given culture element contribution to the needs of individuals in a society.²⁸

Anthropologists also assume that the existence of cultural behavior rests on man's abilities of symbolization, and that as such it is the characteristic that distinguishes the behavior of man from the behaviors of other animals.²⁹

It is assumed that cultural phenomena can be studied on a level of their own in Kroeber's term the "superorganic", and that there are discoverable inter-relationships (or laws) on this level which do not have to be reduced to a lower level of explanation, i. e., a physiological or psychological one.³⁰

Theories and Concepts in Anthropology

Each of the subfields of anthropology also has its basic assumptions and concepts which are not necessarily used by specialists in other subfields, but which are of course subscribed to by other anthropologists if a relevant question arises. The following section explores some of these.

*A somewhat different approach to the study of values is suggested by Ethel Albert in her article, "The Classification of Values: A Method and Illustration", American Anthropologist, 58: 221-248, 1956.

Physical Anthropology

The principle concern of physical anthropology is the understanding of the process of human evolution. Such understanding is based on evidence of two kinds, the record left by fossils and the comparative anatomy of living forms, and experimental evidence from genetic studies. The theoretical orientation stemming from both of these kinds of evidence have been integrated into a "synthetic theory" which "states that evolution is caused by changes in the frequency of genes in populations."³¹ This theory has evolved in the last twenty years and has relegated evolutionary concepts and theories which preceded it to obsolescence. In this theory the unit of study is the Mendelian population, survival is defined as reproductive success, and changes in gene frequencies are due to mutation, migration, drift and selection. These concepts are those used by geneticists.³² Order and trend in evolution stems from selection, and trends continue only so long as selection favors them; when selection changes a trend will change. The theory and concepts of the synthetic theory of evolution have swept away many of the concepts and notions regarding evolution which have been current in the past. Any orthogenetic notion which would move a species down a predetermined course, or imply innate trends which would make reversals in form impossible or assume necessary development from simple to complex have been completely discarded. Characteristics relevant to the understanding of evolution must be adaptive ones. As Washburn points out, the synthetic theory "sets evolutionary problems in a form in which culture is important."³³

The treatment of race in anthropological literature until relatively recently has often been characterized by pregenetic thought. The "racial method" which sorts out individuals according to a few criteria is a part of this obsolescent thinking. Washburn points out that

"genes of individuals segregate and recombine so that, over the generations, it is the frequencies of genes in a population which are characteristic . . .

populations which exchange genes, but there is no way to divide an interbreeding population into types which represent ancestral strains."³⁴

Laughlin³⁵ has recently taken cultural anthropologists to task for other sins of omission and commission in regard to concepts and problems in Physical Anthropology. These are probably relevant to present social studies teaching about race. He points out that use of morphological comparisons between apes, Negroes and Europeans in lip form, hirsuteness, etc., simply keeps alive the notion that there might conceivably be some human groups closer to the apes than others, which according to modern theories is absurd. Also, in their eagerness to deny racists' arguments, many writers of introductory texts have disavowed any connection between race and culture so thoroughly that studies using correlations between known genetically determined factors and cultural factors have often been neglected although potentially very useful in tracing migrations of people, for example.

Montagu has suggested abandoning the term race and adopting a term like "genogroup" to convey the meaning of a breeding population differing from other breeding populations of the species in the frequency of one or more genes.³⁶ Others, like Hulse³⁷ and Washburn³⁸ would not do so, but would stress that the races of the past have developed in adaptation to local conditions and in circumstances where the flow of genes between breeding populations was much more circumscribed than it is at present, and that these conditions have disappeared to a large degree. Hulse would argue that man-made cultural lines of division separating mankind and impeding gene-flow are as important as natural phenomena, such as oceans, deserts, swamps and contagious disease; gene frequencies are still changing in response to selective pressures, and differences in gene frequencies between human populations living in different parts of the world have been of the same order of magnitude in prehistoric as in historic times.³⁹

Certainly, understanding of the modern concept of race requires a knowledge of genetics and modern theories of evolution. As Dobzhansky says "modern evolutionism is incomprehensible except on the basis of familiarity with fundamentals of genetics."⁴⁰

Cultural Anthropology and Archaeology

Cultural Anthropology can be divided into these major divisions: 1) culture dynamics, the body of theory concerning processes by which culture changes over time or persists over time; 2) social structure, the body of theory concerning patterned interrelationships in social groups; 3) culture and personality, the body of theory concerning culture transmission and formation of personality norms, and 4) culture history and evolution. Archaeology has a body of special techniques with which it elucidates the history of human cultures and where possible, uses the theories of cultural dynamics to do so.

Culture Dynamics

Persistence

It is assumed that a culture is always changing, although parts of it may persist over long periods of time. The term persistence implies that an observer can recognize certain elements over long periods of time even though the culture changes constantly. One concept used to investigate problems of cultural persistence is *terriance*, which means the persistence of traits in geographically marginal cultures. Anthropologists use this concept to explain certain kinds of distributions of culture elements and infer their usage in past time when archaeological data is lacking. Persistence is primarily a result of reluctance to change or lack of exposure to conditions which further change.

Analysis of such factors, although of interest to anthropologists for a long time, have come into recent vogue due to the burgeoning of practical problems involving adoption of western techniques in "underdeveloped" countries.⁴

Culture Change

Change in culture may result from adding or discarding traits, or by changing the frequency of their use. Revolution is a sudden change affecting a considerable portion of a culture. Style refers to changes in a single culture trait which last for a short time; they are sometimes cyclical. The process whereby minor variations arise, accumulate, and spread in society is called cultural drift. The culture change process can be broken down into subprocesses: origination, (discovery and invention), diffusion and reinterpretation. Investigation of these processes has a long history in anthropology and continues at the present time. Origination is the process by which new traits are discovered or invented. The spread in area geographically of a new culture element is diffusion, while the transmission of an element through time is called tradition. The term innovation covers both processes of origination and diffusion.* Discovery and invention are related to specific cultural factors which limit or encourage them.⁴² Studies of these factors have been a preoccupation of the anthropologist and remain so. Convergence, or the principle of limited possibilities, is a concept used to explain the presence of parallel discoveries and inventions; these occur when form or use of the nature of the human organism, or a combination of these factors produce very similar originations in two or more cultures independently. Diffusion refers to the process by which culture traits spread over an area.** Usually it is used to designate this process as it occurs between communities, (external or secondary diffusion) although it can also designate this process within a community (internal or primary diffusion). Types of diffusion have been singled out such as stimulus diffusion, where only the idea of trait diffuses. Conditions favoring and limiting diffusion have been analyzed.⁴³

Once an innovation is made in a culture, other processes occur. Traits may be displaced; displacement is seldom complete--traits rarely disappear entirely.

*Of course these terms refer to any kind of cultural element, not just to gadgeting or new scientific discoveries.

**In analyzing the diffusion process from the point of view of the individuals involved the terms acceptance or learning are used.

Usually the frequency with which they occur is reduced or the uses they are put to are changed. Reinterpretation is the process by which a trait is modified to make it fit into new conditions; modification of the trait in form, use, or meaning occurs. Syncretism refers to the fusing of traits belonging to one culture with an analagous one in another. Reduction-- segregation refers to the process of reducing the number of traits in a culture which an individual bearer of it must handle; this may occur by specializations--like those burgeoning among the professions in our culture, or by simplification and reduction through segregation of more valuable elements from its inferior ones.

Changes in some aspects of culture result in changes in others: ramification of change may not spread evenly throughout a culture, however. Such complexes as urbanism or ideological systems lead to ramifications in a large area of behavior. Ramifications are still difficult to foresee as are reinterpretations. Different social groups within a culture may accept changes at differential rates. Honigmann suggests some testable propositions regarding uneven change.⁴⁴

Acculturation is a term referring to conditions of culture change occurring when there is continuous contact, either direct or mediated, between two or more cultures.⁴⁵ Analysis has been made of the variations that occur in acculturation situations, such as differential social dominance of valuation and respect and deliberately controlled contacts. The processes of origination and diffusion and processes following from them, reinterpretation, displacement, syncretism, ramification of changes throughout other aspects of the culture, etc. occur in acculturation situations as in other types of social change situations. Acculturation also breeds its own specialized kinds of social processes. One of these is nativism, (a type of revitalism*), which is an attempt by a community to perpetuate certain aspects of its culture. Common sequences of events can be analyzed from such movements.⁴⁶ Culture conflict is an outcome of many kinds of acculturation situations, and not just for socially dominated communities. Acculturation situations may be resolved by processes of: 1) social extermination, 2) stabilized pluralism where the people involved are able to regulate borrowing, 3) symbiosis, where each culture develops a specialization and interdependence ensues, and 4) assimilation, where cultural fusion takes place and a single way of life emerges.

Social Anthropology and Social Structure

Anthropologists have traditionally divided up cultures into aspects which reflect their own culture and their assumptions about the universality of these aspects. The following would be a typical division although anthropologists

*A. F. C. Wallace defines a revitalization movement as "a deliberate, organized conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture." The concept would include nationalistic movements, messianic and revivalistic religious movements, and political movements of various kinds--rebellions, revolutions, etc., where applicable.

realize they are casting cultural materials with molds which do not always fit.⁴⁷

Technology: material culture and subsistence techniques

Social Organization and social structure, which includes: the study of marriage and the family, kinship, economic organization, associations, hierarchical principles, political organization and social control.

Ideational Culture: religion, knowledge and world view.

All cultures can be divided up from the point of view of the individual's life cycle, also, and this is often done in anthropology.

Technology

Technology is a "means for coping with the environment and sustaining life."⁴⁸

Men everywhere require food, drink and shelter. No culture, including our own, has made a scientific analysis of all the nutritive elements in its environment and then utilized these according to biological needs. Every culture has food preferences and schedules for eating it based on man-made values having nothing to do with nutrition. Likewise, in sheltering themselves with houses and/or clothing there is no hard and fast relationship between biological needs and cultural provision for them. Provision for these needs are always made with materials carrying sociological connotations and serving other ends, be they social structural, ideational values, or whatever.

Subsistence techniques have been classified into categories of food gathering and food production, and these in turn are subdivided into hunting and gathering, fishing (and hunting and gathering), horticulture, plow agriculture, and pastoralism.* The relationship of subsistence techniques to other aspects of culture is dependent on the surplus they produce, the energy they yield, their reliability, and the degree of social organization involved, among other things.⁴⁹ Correlations can thus be identified between subsistence types and a number of cultural characteristics, and identification of these among living communities have been spurred and verified by the findings (both empirical and theoretical) of archaeologists.

Anthropologists have created typologies of cultures using subsistence techniques and their cultural correlates as a basis for typology. One of these is the culture area, which has been most successfully applied to North America.⁵⁰ A culture area is delimited by determining the number of elements shared by geographically adjoining social groups. The concept implies the assumption the groups have acquired shared traits by diffusion, and that there exists a culture center or climax from which diffusion has gone on for some time. Archaeologists have coined the concept co-tradition to attempt to extend the culture area concept diachronically. Julian Steward proposes a method of "cultural ecology",⁵¹ to create such a typology, using a concept of culture core,

****For some purposes they are further subdivided. For example, see C. D. Forde, Habitat, Economy and Society.**

"the constellation of features which are most closely related to subsistence activities and economic arrangements. The core includes such social, political, and religious patterns as are empirically determined to be closely connected with these arrangements."⁵²

The manufacture of tools and goods is a universal in human cultures. Honigsmann suggests four factors, surplus, energy, capital and organization, which help explain how manufacturing influences other areas of culture.⁵³ Basic tools for manufacturing are cutting tools, and basic operations are pressure, fire, use of liquids and air. The archaeologist and culture historian find tools and their methods of manufacture highly useful in tracing innovation and cultural development; these also have social organizational, demographic and cultural correlates.

Social Organization and Social Structure

Social organization or social relations are descriptions of relationships between individuals and social groups. Social structure is a term with many meanings⁵⁴ in anthropology. According to Nadel,

"we arrive at the structure of a society through abstracting from the concrete population and its behavior the pattern or network (or 'system') of relationships obtaining between actors in their capacity of 'playing roles relative to one another'.⁵⁵ Basic to a study of social organization or social structure are the concepts of status and role. Anthropologists follow Linton's definition of status, which is any social position recognizable with reference to other positions in a society.⁵⁶ A role is the behavior appropriate to a status in any given situation. Statuses may be ascribed (given an individual automatically) or achieved (given to an individual because of his performance). Prestige or rank indicates positions of relative social worth. Specialization of status and role is universal in human society in terms of age and sex. Occupational specialization is common but not universal.

Any two or more people interacting form a group. Enduring groups exist in all communities. Groups can continue to exist though their individual membership changes. They can show little or great amounts of formality and organization in terms of decision making. Groups may be characterized as primary or secondary in terms of interaction of their members. Primary group members' behavior is intimate and personal while secondary group interaction is distant and impersonal.

Groups based on kinship ties are universal in human society and study of them has been and remains an important objective of anthropological research. Kin groups fall into two main types: those which form a residential unit and those which may not be localized but are united by geneological descent.⁵⁷ The nuclear family, a married man and woman and their children, is a nearly universal residential group found either as a unit existing by itself or as a part

of a larger residential kin group. Universal functions of the nuclear family are the procreation and socialization of the young. Almost universally there are incest rules restricting mating within the nuclear family to the parents. These restrictions force nuclear family groups to form new alliances in each generation, widening the circle of primary interaction, and forestalling sexual jealousy within the group; they give rise to residence rules which under some conditions produce extended families. Polygamy refers to any kind of plural marriage. Marriage of a man to more than one wife at a time is polygyny; marriage of a woman to more than one husband at a time is polyandry. Polygamous marriages produce composite families--they affiliate two or more nuclear families through a common parent. Extended families are those in which children stay at home after marriage. There are several types of these; residence rules specifying that sons stay at home are most common and are called patrilocal, or virilocal; residence rules specifying that daughters stay home are matrilineal or uxori-local, those specifying that boys live with their mother's brother are avunculocal; those which can be established at homes of either spouse, bilocal and those which can be established independently, neolocal. The form of the extended family is closely related to aspects of subsistence, political organization and religion. Residence rules and extended family systems give rise to non-residential kin groups based on principles of consanguinity, or descent; patrilineal descent is correlated with the patrilocal extended family, matrilineal descent with the matrilineal or avunculocal extended family, and bilateral descent with either bilocal or neolocal residence. (Patrilineal descent is descent traced through males only, matrilineal through females only, bilateral through both parents.) The joint family in anthropology is used to designate composite families consisting of two or more brothers and their wives and offspring; the group endures only until the brothers' deaths.

Marriage rules involving mate selection, and duration have been and are pre-occupations of social anthropologists. Marriage is often preferred with certain kinds of relatives. These preferences most often involve what we call cousins; the particular type of cousin is correlated with kin group type found in the society. (Classification of these cousins are of course very different from the way "cousin" is thought of in English.) Distinctions are made between parallel cousins, children of brothers or sisters of like sex to the parent, or cross cousins, children of brothers or sisters of opposite sex to a parent. Preferred or prescribed marriage between cross cousins is a very common phenomenon; it creates a structural linkage between kin groups which can endure over succeeding generations,⁵⁸ ("generalized exchange") with important consequences for the society in which it occurs. Parallel cousin marriage is rare among human societies but practiced among many Moslem peoples.

Anthropologists recognize several kinds of kin groups based on descent. Unilinear descent rules underlie the lineage, a consanguinal kin group which traces descent in known steps from a known common ancestor, and which is exogamous, (that is, demands that members marry outside of the group). Very commonly the lineage is a corporate group (one which acts in relation to others as one person) with many functions, economic, political and religious

as well as socialization and marriage regulation. Clans are unilinear descent groups recognizing a common ancestor, real or fictional, but unable to trace descent. Usually they have a marriage regulation function, exogamy, and sometimes additional functions as well. (What is here defined as clan is sometimes called a sib by some American anthropologists, such as Murdock.) Phratries are linked clans which are usually exogamous, and when there are just two phratries in a community, or just two clans, each is called a moiety. Some communities are double descent systems which recognize unilinear descent groups for both parents. In some communities with such systems these are divided into moieties, and such divisions are called sections, which can exchange sisters. (Some communities have 8 and even 12 section systems; the famous Australian kinship complexities result from such systems.) Kindreds occur with bilateral descent and are kin groups operating from the point of view of an individual; modern American kin groups are of this type. Bilateral residence units which are endogamous have been called demes.

Non-kin groups are of great variety. Those occupying a specific territory are: bands, small groups of 25 to 100 people who may be nomadic or temporarily sedentary, and depend on hunting and gathering or sometimes pastoralism for subsistence: sedentary local groups, villages or hamlets, scattered homesteads grouped around a ritual or administrative center, towns and cities. Cities differ from smaller groupings in greater heterogeneity of culture and specialized status, etc. (See below under Culture History -- Urban Revolution.) Tribe is a word designating people bound together by common language and/or culture who have a sense of group membership; they may or may not have a centralized political system. (It may thus refer to very small or very large aggregates.) Nation usually refers to territorial entity which possesses formal procedures for gaining membership, and has some corporate functions in regard to units outside itself. Empire refers to a situation in which a tribe or nation absorbs another. Confederation refers to two such units acting as one unity voluntarily.

Non-territorially based groups include "associations" (or sodalities) which may be based on sex, age or common interests, and have a wide variety of social functions ranging from very slight and occasional to very important political and economic ones in the case of some secret organizations. Instrumental groups are groups organized to achieve some specific goal-like factories or schools.

Hierarchical principles form another dimension of human society serving to differentiate and bring men together. For the anthropologist a social class is a group within a society whose members hold a number of distinctive statuses in common who thus develop an awareness of themselves as a group with like traits in reference to other groups; it is not organized and ignores sex and age criteria.

*See for example, E. R. Leach, ed., Aspects of Caste in So. India, Ceylon and Northwest Pakistan, "What Should We Mean by Caste?", pp. 1-10, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology, Cambridge U. Press, 1962.

The term caste in anthropology usually refers to a social phenomenon of South Asia where it allocates status positions in the social structure. Caste membership is hereditary and caste groups endogamous (with the exception of comparatively few caste groups who practice hypergamy or hypogamy where men takes wives of lower category or women take husbands of lower category, respectively.) Castes are localized in terms of social interaction, are graded and ranked (not necessarily correlated with economic and political power) and are explicitly identified.

Economic Organization

According to Firth, anthropologists are concerned with economics because most social relations have an economic coefficient; many social relations are primarily concerned with economic values. ⁶⁰

The anthropologist uses the basic concept of economics--the allocation of scarce resources between human wants, to examine "the specific ways in which the principles are exemplified in a range of given social situations. ⁶⁰

Exchange of gifts is a universally important human activity; it symbolizes mutual interdependence among members of a community and redistributes goods. Each occasion of gift giving works an expectancy of a return gift; reciprocity underlies all social relationships. ⁶¹ Trade differs from gift exchange in that its main concern is with distribution of goods rather than social relations, although it is based on the same assumptions of reciprocity and functions of interdependence. Virtually all communities engage in some trade outside the community itself, although intercommunity trade is not universal. Specialization is based on differences in resources, technology and custom. Markets are institutions which require supernatural and political sanctions to ensure peace and safety and adherence to market norms among participants. It also implies a type of exchange between individuals which results in fluctuating prices that can serve as a basis for integration of the economy. Polanyi has suggested that "Outside of the institutional system of price making markets economic analysis loses most of its relevance as a method of inquiry into the working of a definite economy". ⁶² Polanyi has suggested that two other forms of economic integration may be found among the world's societies; he calls these "reciprocative" where groups have established reciprocity relations with others as among the Trobriand Islanders and their "kula" exchanges and "redistributive" where goods are collected by a central source and then allocation takes place by custom, law or central decision. ⁶³

In comparing the total productive processes of given economic systems, anthropologists have used the concepts of division of labor and specialization. The term division of labor refers to the splitting up of the total amount of effort needed to keep the economy of a given society operating at its customary efficiency; specialization refers to society's members performing particular aspects of work and producing particular goods as opposed to everyone doing the same tasks and/or producing the same goods. Division of labor is found in all societies based on sex and there may be additional division by age, family affiliation, hereditary position, etc. Non-industrial societies differ markedly from industrial ones with machine technologies in the degree to which they practice division of labor and specialization in production. Production may be for consumption or accumulation of capital, although it is often difficult to separate these two aspects in practice. Property, a universal feature of human culture, is looked upon as a "web of social relations with respect to the utilization of some object, (material or non-material) in which a person or group is tacitly or explicitly recognized to hold quasi-exclusive and limiting connections to that object,"⁶⁴ and may be upheld by all forms of social sanction, legal and non-legal. Certain types of property have been subjected to intensive comparison by anthropologists. The relationships involved in land-tenure, for example, have been extensively studied in attempts to determine factors entering into evaluation of land. To be considered as property there must be a sense of scarcity present, labor must be expended in connection with its use and it must yield some kind of return. Some hunting groups like the Eskimo have no concept of land as property; pastoral people tend not to bother to establish property rights in land; gardening tribes usually vest the right of usufruct in family lines which in turn allocate the use of land to individuals, or else a village head assigns it periodically in the name of some entity who is the symbolic owner for the society.

Recently there has been much interest in anthropology in trying to outline a general theory of economics which would encompass other systems besides our own. A notable attempt at doing so is that of LeClaire,** who would define economics and economizing to include the allocation of anything human beings may desire or need, thus, of course, expanding the province of economics outside the area in which economists have specialized in dealing with our own society.

Political Organization

Anthropologists have had few useful concepts from western political theory to work with in describing or comparing the political systems of the societies with which they have had to deal. Western political science has developed relatively few concepts that are applicable universally in human societies. Sir Henry Maine's work⁶⁵ which isolated kin-based societies from territorially based societies was applicable to data found by anthropologists and inspired

*The following is based upon Melville Herskovits' Economic Anthropology, Ch. 7, Knopf, N. Y., 1952; and Ch. 25, of Hoebel's Man in the Primitive World.

**See Edward E. LeClair, Jr., "Economic Theory and Economic Anthropology", American Anthropologist, Vol. 64, No. 6, Dec. 1962, pp. 1179-1203.

some work by them, although this dichotomy proved to have limited usefulness in that all societies are territorially based.⁶⁶ In the last twenty-five years anthropologists have become increasingly interested in "political" aspects of society and have made their own attempts to develop useful concepts in comparative politics, usually assuming that some form of political organization exists in all societies.

A representative conception of political organization by the social anthropologist is that of Radcliffe-Brown, who defines it as "that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with control and regulation of the use of physical force."⁶⁷ Easton, a political scientist who has reviewed recent anthropological literature dealing with politics advocates an analytical treatment of his subject.

He says: "I shall confine the idea of political system to those activities more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for a society and its major subdivisions."⁶⁸

There are probably as many difficulties with Easton's definition as with Radcliffe-Brown's, which Easton criticizes.⁶⁹

With Easton's far reaching conception of political action the task of describing the political acts of a society would entail a description of almost all aspects of the society. On the other hand, he speaks

of a political system which makes decisions for a whole "society" and its major subdivisions. There exist societies in which "decisions" are not made for the whole society, unless "society" refers to a different entity for each type of decision made, and would thus have to be a very shifting and amorphous conception. As social anthropologist M. G. Smith has pointed out in a critique of Easton's and Almond's conceptions of the political organization

"the reality to which the model refers is the modern nation-state.... Clearly bounded societies with centralized authority systems are perhaps a small minority of the politics with which we have to deal."⁷⁰ Hoebel views political organization as consisting of "the network of customs that regulate the relations between groups within the society and between one society and others."⁷¹

Anthropologists must deal with societies without centralized authority and

without institutions which are specifically political. Many concepts used in analysis of politics in social anthropology are not yet acceptable to many others. The following are used widely and have some acceptance in this area of intensive interest and rather vast literature in anthropology.

Three principles of organization form the basis for the structure of political organization in society. * These are 1) geographical or territorial, 2) genealogical or kinship and 3) associational, based on sodalities. Every political entity uses the territorial principle, and the kinship principle as an important one in almost all but modern industrial states. The use of sodalities is widespread but less common than the other two. The territorial political entities which are classified according to size and composition of the political unit are: the local community (the camp among nomads, or village among sedentary people), the band or district, comprising a number of camps or villages, the tribe or nation, a consolidation of local communities or bands into permanent political organization, confederacy, the union of two or more nations for purposes of war or peace when each keeps a large part of its own autonomy, and empire, consolidation of tribes or nations into larger political units. Local groups, camps or villages which follow a rule of community endogamy and are thus all relatives, are called demes. Where local groups are thought of as belonging to a particular kin group, although non-kin may reside there also, they are called localized lineages or clans.

The personnel of government include: the headman, who is a leader in the local group and whose influence is usually informal and functions are rarely explicit, except to speak on important occasions and act as the focal point of the group; the chieftain, who is always present in the tribal state and differs from the headman by the degree of authority and social distinction he possesses, though usually his functions are not primarily political but ceremonial; kings who achieve their positions through a hereditary principle, and like many chiefs may be able to control supernatural as well as secular powers; and the council, the universal instrument of government which exists in all societies. Secret societies, military age and other kinds of associations all provide powers of government in a great many societies, including our own. Government personnel are very commonly selected by utilizing some form of the kinship principle, except among modern industrial societies where nepotism is eschewed in government as being non-rational, and where, as Mair points out, society is not in fact atomized so that individuals compete on their own merits but is organized so that people ally themselves to further particular interests through a great variety of associations.

The functions of government have been analyzed by Schapera and others;⁷³ Schapera finds, in comparing a number of So. African tribes of varying culture and political structure, that the only functions common to all forms of government

*The following two paragraphs are adapted from E. A. Hoebel, Man in the Primitive World, Ch. 28.

in that area are maintaining tribal boundaries and resisting aggression, and organization and direction of cooperative enterprises, often involving the whole community. He takes issue with MacIver's position that policing and administering justice are such universal functions, as the Bergdama and Bushmen do not have them.

Anthropologists separate societies into those which have state systems and those which do not.* Mair provides a useful summary of the characteristics of those which do not.⁷⁴

State types, on the other hand, have identifiable persons of authority who can make decisions affecting everyone within an identifiable territory, and can compel adherence to these decisions; they have personnel that can be identified as specifically governmental. Mair divides the stateless systems found in East Africa into two types, which she calls "minimal" and "diffused". Minimal governments are those in which the political community who look to a common source for decisions may be very small, as in small hunting-gathering bands such as the Tindiga of E. Africa, or in which the number of recognized positions of leadership may be small, as among the Nuer, or the extent to which people holding such positions can actually exercise leadership or authority may be small, as among the Shilluk. Diffused government is government that can be said to consist of a large part of the adult male population, and this type is found in E. Africa among such peoples as the Masai and Kikuyu, among whom age-sets, persons who have been initiated during a single initiation period, pass through successive age-grades which have specific political duties; this

*The terms "state" and "stateless" are used following the suggestion of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in Political Systems, p. 5. Other anthropologists prefer to use the term state to refer to the political system of any society, with or without a well-developed government; see E. A. Hoebel, Man in the Primitive World, Ch. 28.

type of political system focuses on the conduct of war and in E. Africa embraced populations of up to 50,000. Regulation of internal affairs fell to councils of old men who had moved out of the warrior age-grade.

Analogous "minimal" and "diffused" types of governments are found widely throughout the societies of the rest of the world also. Among those which have minimal government with few positions of leadership or whose leaders have little authority, are those with segmentary political systems,* where the kinship principle forms the basis for corporate groups fulfilling many of the functions thought of as political in our own.

The dynamics of expansion in the scope of political organization and the correlates of such expansion with other factors have been given considerable attention in anthropology, particularly in the last decade. Murdock, for example, has used cross-cultural survey techniques to find factors favoring wider political organization, finding that sedentary populations are more commonly organized into larger aggregates than are nomadic ones.⁷⁵ Anthropologists have found that the conquest and class struggle theories of political dynamics are applicable to only a limited number of cases. Mair traces the development of the powers of chiefs outside their own lineages in E. African data to a relationship which she calls "clientage", where circumstances provided individual lineage chiefs with the wherewithal to support non-kin clients who thus became dependent on them and independent of their own kin groups, and thus build for the chief power outside his own group.⁷⁶

Steward has proposed the concept of levels of socio-cultural integration which utilizes the type and scope of political organization as an important basis for differentiation of such levels.** Service has used Steward's concept and makes a number of hypotheses to the dynamics of development of these levels; for example, he suggests that chiefdoms develop as centralized redistributive centers under the conditions favorable for the production of specialized goods.⁷⁷

*This term appears in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's Political Systems and the phenomena it refers to have been intensively treated by anthropologists. See, for example, Middleton and Tait's Tribes without Rulers; E. E. Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer.

**See below under Culture History and Evolution.

Social Control: Law and Other Sanctions

"Every society must have a means of holding its members close to the norms of behavior; to do this its norms must be clarified and sanctioned. If it does not do it with one set of means it will do it with another."⁷⁸ But "custom" or "tradition" is not enough to ensure non-disruptive compliance in any society. The process of socialization of the individual and the informal sanctions of primary groups are important aspects of social control; they are studied in anthropology using psycho-cultural concepts. (See below under Culture and Personality.)

Social control is also maintained through supernatural sanctions. The individual who deviates from a norm or his kinsmen may meet with ill luck or sickness and he himself or someone with more supernatural authority, such as a diviner or priest, order redress for the deviation under threat of further supernatural redistribution to him and to his group. Thus positions in the society which carry supernatural force have functions in maintaining this aspect of the social control system; the system is buttressed by the interests of the individuals in the kin group who pressure the deviant to conform and make redress for fear of supernatural punishment against themselves.... Sorcery and accusations of sorcery also act as sanctions.* Withdrawal of reciprocity acts as a sanction in social control systems; a deviant individual or group may find that a serious breach of a norm is followed by a refusal of necessary services.

Law is another such set of means, and Hoebel defines it as follows, "A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of so acting."⁷⁹ It is best described for any society through an analysis of trouble cases, actual disputes and conflicts which arise in a society. (The study of Political Organizations (above) is the study of formal aspects of social control.)

Law performs certain essential functions in all but the simplest societies. Law defines relationships among the society's members and maintains some integration between them and between groups by specifying permitted and forbidden acts. Second, it allocates authority to exercise physical coercion as a socially recognized privilege right. Third, it disposes of trouble cases, and fourth, it redefines relationships between individuals and groups as conditions change. Universal or nearly universal principles of content of law include the following: treating excessive control of the use of supernatural powers (sorcery) as a crime, using an appeal to the supernatural to solve problems of evidence through oaths or conditional curse, oracles or divination,

*See Beatrice Whiting's analysis of Paiute sorcery as an example of how this works and a hypothesis as to its occurrence in society in relation to more organized sanctions, with a cross-cultural test of her hypothesis, in Paiute Sorcery, Viking Fund Pub. in Anthropology, No. 15.

treating homicide within the society as a crime under specified conditions and also as a privilege-right under certain circumstances, supporting exclusiveness in marital rights and punishing adultery, although definition of adultery varies widely, supporting the kinship group as a medium of inheritance of property rights, and recognizing the existence of private property rights in some goods.

Fundamental legal concepts have been analyzed by W. N. Hohfeld. A fundamental premise of Hohfeld was that all legal relations are between persons, and that there was no such thing as a legal relations between a person and a thing; the issue always resides in the relations between the persons involved. Thus every legal relation is bilateral: there are four fundamental relationships in Hohfeld's system, and there are therefore eight basic concepts which may be used to analyze any trouble case relationship between persons.

Hoebel diagrams them thus:⁸⁰

I	Demand-right -----	Duty
II	Privilege-right -----	No-demand-right
III	Power -----	Liability
IV	Immunity -----	No-power

Demand-right means that A has a legal expectation that B shall behave in a certain way with respect to A. Duty means that B shall do or refrain from doing specific acts in respect to A. Privilege-right means that A is free to behave in certain ways in respect to B. No-demand-right means that B has no legal redress if A behaves in a certain manner to B. Power means that A may voluntarily create a new legal relation affecting B. Liability means that B is subject to a new legal relation created by a voluntary act of A. Immunity means that A is not subject to B's attempt voluntarily to create a new legal relation affecting A. No-power means that B cannot by his own act create a new legal relation affecting A. Doubtless this analytical system is too technical for inclusion in a projected social studies curriculum, although perhaps knowledge of its existence as an analytical tool might be appropriate.

Substantive law identifies norms that are to be sanctioned by legal action; procedural or adjective law designates who, how, and under what circumstances a breach of substantive law may be punished. Private law is law which leaves the privilege and responsibility for enforcing it to the individual and his kin. Public, or criminal law is law in which responsibility for enforcement rests with the society or its agents.

Concepts relevant to the trend and growth of the law are of certainty relevant to the social studies curriculum. "It is a seeming paradox, on first thought, that the more civilized a society becomes the greater is the need for law, and the greater the law becomes."⁸¹ Small simple societies such as Eskimo groups have little need of law as most relationships are within an intimate, face to face primary group; informal sanctions are effective and no anonymity is

possible, there are few special interests for lack of wealth and specialization, and supernatural sanctions are effective. Conflict arises in interpersonal relations and homicide and adultery are situations most commonly dealt with by legal sanction. In groups of greater size and complexity such as wealthy hunters, pastoralists and gardening peoples, there are more possible diverse interests and private law proliferates. Procedure which relies on enforcement by individuals and their kin groups, sometimes leads to feuding rather than settlement, although every society has set procedures for avoiding and stopping feud, and the possibility of feud acts as a deterrent. Overt expression of conflict is deterred by conflicting loyalties within the vengeance group resulting from marriage rules and residence ties; these give rise to pressure on aggrieved parties to settle disputes without vengeance, bringing about "the peace in the feud". As the scope of relationships and community of interest expands beyond the kin group and local group, men have expanded the scope of law through innovating new devices of government, and private law is replaced by public law. The family's legal powers are eroded away and there is a growth of individual obligation, as Maine noted long ago. Today, "international law" is not law at all, but simply substantive rules without imperative legal sanctions.

Ideology

The Supernatural: Religion and Magic

All people divide phenomena between what is considered natural and what is considered supernatural; what is seen as one or the other is relative to a given culture. Durkheim used the terms profane and sacred to contrast these attitudes. Religion and magic are based on a belief in the supernatural. The distinction between them is primarily in the attitude of the practitioner, who recognizes his inferiority to supernatural forces if he is religious, but believes he controls such forces if he is a magician. Magic and religion are universal aspects of human societies.

Supernatural forces, (or collective representations, in Durkheim's terms,) can take the form of animism, the belief in spirit beings, or mana, an impersonal supernatural force. The soul concept, the belief in spiritual immortality of the dead, is found in all societies. Fetiches are material objects believed to be imbued with supernatural power.

Access to supernatural power is not distributed equally in any society and specialists in controlling such power exist in all of them. Specialized personnel dealing with the supernatural include the following: Shaman is the term anthropologists use to designate religious specialists who, like Joan of Arc, hold their powers personally and directly. The terms "medicine man" and "witch

doctor" usually refer to this kind of practitioner. Shamans are the most universally found religious specialists in human societies; they are found in very simple, small societies as well as more complex ones. They are usually practitioners of magic also, as are priests. Priests acquire religious powers by succeeding to religious office and becoming part of a religious corporation which holds supernatural power. The office may be a part of the kinship unit, in which case the powers held usually stem from the ancestors, or a cult group serving special spirits for a congregation surpassing kin groups. Conceptions of good and bad magic occur in all societies; practitioners of good magic who work in socially approved ways are magicians, diviners, oracles, doctors and medicine men, while those who use their powers injuriously are sorcerers.

There are several interpretations of religion which have found currency in anthropology. Lienhardt reviews them and classifies them as psychological, philosophical and sociological.⁸² E. B. Tylor accounted for religious beliefs by men's reasoning processes, through which men concluded, for example, from experiencing dreams that men have a soul. which served as a model for a belief in spiritual beings in general; this is a kind of psychological interpretation based on an intellectualist psychology. Other accounts of the basis of religious phenomena emphasize the functions of religious practice and beliefs; Malinowski, for example, found it important in the emotional needs of individuals and the need for social integration, thus standing between a psychological interpretation of religion and philosophical or sociological explanations. The philosophical and sociological approach is associated with Durkheim and his associates, who took the position that religion is a social matter and the spiritual beings represented or symbolized society. Lienhardt maintains that every general theory of religion is a substitute for religion by inserting something the analyzer can believe in, psychological needs, or society, or whatever, as the basis for religion.

This kind of position and one which fastens upon the symbolization process is probably gaining currency in anthropology.* From this point of view religions are in part theories about what the circumscribing conditions of life really are, and means of adapting to them.

Mythology and Ritual**

Religion universally involves myth and ritual. Sacred beliefs about the

*See, for example, C. Levi-Straus, Totemism, 1963, and E. R. Leach, "Two Essays Concerning the Symbolic Representation of Time" in Rethinking Anthropology, 1961.

**The following is based upon William Lessa and Evon Vogt's Chap. 3 of their Reader in Comparative Religion, Row, Peterson & Co., 1958; and Clyde Kluckhohn's paper, "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory", which is included in that chapter, pp. 134-151.

nature of the universe and man's place in it, the nature of supernatural power and how man should relate himself to it, ideas about good and evil, and so forth, are embodied in sacred stories transmitted orally or by writing which are called myths; the beliefs in myths are vouched for by tradition rather than experience. Rituals are the prescribed way of carrying on religious acts and procedures. Many rituals can be classified as either rites of passage, which introduce the individual to new social statuses (see below under Life Cycle) or rites of intensification, communal activities expressing society's basic values and promoting social integration which intensify social interaction after a crisis or disturbance in equilibrium affecting the group and which thereby restore equilibrium. Other kinds of rituals are not necessarily linked to myth and some do not fit under these two classification. The specific adaptive and adjustive responses which myth and ritual perform are differently phrased according to the historical experience of the society and the configuration of other aspects of its culture. The two tend to be universally associated, (though their relative importance in specific cultures may vary a good deal) because they have a common psychological basis. Ritual is obsessive repetitive activity symbolizing the fundamental "needs" of society, while mythology is a rationalization of these needs whether expressed in ritual or not.

Folklore

Folklore refers to study of traditional aspects of culture particularly in the field of oral and written literature (tales and myths), songs, dances, games, ceremonies, etc. The work of a folklorist overlaps greatly with that of the ethnologist.

Art**

Art is a human cultural universal; it is the overt expression of emotional drives through patterns in line and color, sculpture, dance, music and literature. The particular selections of form, pattern and technique that distinguish the art of a given cultural tradition is style. Decorative art, embellishments of artifacts, may be either representative (portraying an object) or formal (without reference to meaning). The function of art is to release tension by enabling the artist to set down his emotions and ideas in an objective way. It is also a social expression and is tied to religion, magic and politics in that it reflects social relations. It is a form of communication and involves symbolization; writing grew out of progressive conventionalization of representative art forms which originally portrayed an object, although representative art does not necessarily precede symbolic art in artistic traditions.

The Life Cycle

A culture may be described by tracing the passage of an individual carrier of it through time from his birth to his death. All cultures recognize

*The following is based upon Ch. 15, "Art", in E. A. Hoebel's Man in the Primitive World.

biologically and socially significant points along the way of this passage by special attention; these are called life crises* and the four basic ones recognized in all cultures are birth, maturity, reproduction and death. Each crisis marks a change in the individual's status.

In most societies biological childbirth is not enough to complete transition of a baby into a member of the community and this must be accomplished at a ceremony after birth, when it is often named and presented to society. Puberty rites at maturity emphasize the transition from childhood to the responsibilities and wisdom of adulthood; other functions, such as educational ones, often attend them. Death is the transition from corporal existence to the spiritual existence after death; functions of funeral rites include the preparation of the living for death, the assurance of the separation of the soul from the body in a proper fashion, the readjustment of the community at loss of a member and the regularization of the disturbing emotions resulting from loss of many significant habitual relationships with the deceased, and often the redistributing of wealth throughout the community.

Culture and Personality

This field explores the relationships between culture and the individual; studies in it are sometimes referred to as psychocultural or psychodynamics.

Personality refers to the actions, thoughts and feelings characteristic of an individual.⁸³ In part, personality means culture reflected in individual behavior, so definitions of it vary with the definition of culture used by the researcher employing it. Theoretically an individual personality could be analyzed into unlearned and learned aspects, although there is very little human behavior that is not affected by learning so in practice it is difficult to do so. The anthropologist is primarily concerned with learned aspects of personality which are shared with others and shared aspects which are unlearned rather than in unique behavior patterns. The concept of personality includes both observable and unobservable behavior, such as thought and feeling.

Modal personality refers to those elements of personality that are relatively frequent in a statistical sense in a social group. (Linton's concept of basic personality has the same referent.) Personality has overt and covert aspects: covert elements are behaviors like memory, feeling and dreaming which can only be known through overt aspects. Motives are conditions within the individual which impel him toward goals or values desirable to him. Status personality refers to those aspects of personality associated with particular status points in a social structure of a society. Ideal personality refers to patterns of how individuals ought to act; real personality refers to how they actually act. (Manifest personality has the same referent as real personality.) Character

*The classic work on the life crises or "rites of passage" is Van Gennep's Les Rites de Passage which has recently been republished in English.

structure is the organized, nuclear and generalized area of the personality: "by which the individual interprets the world around him and in terms of whose dictates he is impelled to act." It refers to the "nuclear motivating core of the personality."⁸⁴

Character structures are self regulatory devices which provide the personality with a selector mechanism to choose responses in a given situation; they also interpret the external world and views of the self.

The terms "national character", and "national genius" or "spirit" refer to the character structure of nations. * Ethos refers to the emotional quality of social behavior patterns reflecting the motivational state of the actor. Emotion here means a pleasant or unpleasant feeling disturbing an individual. The important factor in determining emotion is the relationship perceived between an external situation and inner motives. Two approaches to ethos have been current in American anthropology. One describes the emotional qualities of a culture "without reference to covert needs, aspirations or values which emotional expression reflects" as Benedict has done in characterizing Pueblo Indian life as "Apollonian" and Plains Indian life as "Dionysian" in her Patterns of Culture; the other approach describes ethos while referring emotional attributes to motivational states of the actors, as Honigmann does in describing Kaska culture in Culture in Kaska Society or Bateson does in Naven for the two sexes among the Iatmul. The terms "world view", "Zeitgeist" and "style of life" all have essentially the same meaning as ethos. The term patterning designates the overall process by which individuals in groups develop modal behavioral tendencies; patterns refer to generalizations subsuming aspects of modal behavior and may be little generalized or highly generalized when they group together many subsidiary patterns as does Benedict's "Apollonian". The term theme refers to a pattern of relatively high generalization.

Honigmann and others view the personality as being a product of five inter-related determinants which are: 1) the constitutional factors with which an individual is born, 2) the groups of which the person is a member, 3) the role in which the individual operates, 4) the accidents which befall him and 5) the geographical milieu. ** The anthropologist usually focuses his attention on group membership and characterized modes of action, thought and feeling, leaving other relevant topics to other social sciences.

*Victor Barnvow's Culture and Personality contains an excellent chapter (2) on the history of this line of inquiry which stems from 19th century humanism rather than natural science.

**There are other classifications, some of which are more exhaustive, such as Kluckhohn and Mowrer's which adds a dimension of degree of universality among human beings, and thus gives a much expanded conceptual development. See C. Kluckhohn and O. H. Mowrer, "Culture and Personality", American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, 1944.

Most research in culture and personality looks on psychological traits as dependent in some way on sociocultural factors, although the opposite approach deriving the sociocultural from fundamental human "biopsychological" determinants, usually using psychoanalytic concepts, is also utilized. Honigmann lists the following problems as relevant to studies or relationships between modal personality and community membership:⁸⁵ With reference to modal personality, how do individuals differ in socially standardized modes of action, thought and feeling from one community to another? How are socially standardized modes of action, thought and feeling acquired? How are particular patterns of socially standardized action, thought and feeling related to each other and to facts of social structure and technology? With reference to ethos, what are the emotional aspects of the culture? How are emotional aspects of culture perpetuated from one generation to another? How are emotional aspects of a culture related to each other, to the covert personality features of the behaving individuals, or to other classes of facts? Learning is focused upon in attempting to answer such questions, and the anthropologist uses concepts from learning theory psychology to frame hypotheses relevant to them. The concept of socialization is an important one also; usually it designates the process by which influences, and processes, formalized or implicit,

human nature [is molded] into conformity with group patterns of...
thought, feeling, and behavior.⁸⁶ Herskovits uses the term to designate approved interaction patterns for customary social relationships, and uses enculturation to refer to individuals acquiring socially standardized overt and covert responses as a whole.⁸⁷ This use of the term enculturation is widely adopted. Anthropologists use concepts and theories largely developed in social psychology in analysis of groups and use concepts from learning theory and clinical psychology in analysis of dynamic aspects; concepts from clinical psychology are operationalized by use of its less culture bound tests and techniques. (For example, such concepts as anxiety and projection are important, tests like the Rorschach and T.A.T widely used.) Some assumptions derived from the analysis of groups and learning which are relevant to the anthropologist are the following: members of enduring groups tend to manifest some common personality characteristics; personality patterns are maintained through rewards and punishments provided by the group; interpersonal relations provide the mechanism through which is acquired a large part of the individual's system of action, thought and feeling; the influence of group membership occurs throughout life, but habits of emotional response learned in infancy and childhood are of primary importance which subsequent learning never overcomes.⁸⁸

Culture and personality, then, deals largely with aspects of cultural dynamics. Anthropologists using psychocultural concepts and techniques direct their attention to problems of socialization, mental health and illness and the definition of normality and abnormality, the etiology of mental diseases, acculturation

processes, * including attention to personality conflict concomitant with conflicts between cultures, values, relationships between psychological traits and disaster situations, relationships between literature and art and psychological traits, and others.

Of all of the sub-fields of anthropology there is none in which there is as much disagreement over basic concepts and formulations as there is in the sub-field of culture and personality. Some of the recent writers in the field have been critical of the entire conceptual basis of virtually all work done up until the middle 1950's. For example, Anthony Wallace** challenges two propositions that are central in all personality and culture theories except his. One is that shared motivations are a requisite of any society; the second is that shared cognitions are a requisite of any society. *** He also strenuously objects to much of the descriptive language that is commonly used. For example, he supports Radcliffe-Brown's statement to the effect that to speak of culture being internalized in a personality is logically equivalent to the proposition that a quadratic equation can commit murder.

The Wallace argument is still so much on the frontier that it is still dealt with largely only in graduate courses in anthropology. Thus it is difficult to assess at this time what its place in a social studies curriculum should be.

Certainly many of the problems dealt with by this field are relevant to the social studies curriculum, but the relative tentativeness of much that has been written in it must be stressed, as well as the plethora of concepts and techniques from other fields, psychology and social psychology, which must be mastered to attain significant understanding of many aspects of it.

Culture History and Cultural Evolution

Anthropologists trace the development of man as a physical being and as a carrier of culture. It is impossible to say precisely when man had developed sufficiently to make possible lasting social inventions, as our only remains from the very early period in his history are surely very incomplete. The discoverers of the Australopithecines claim human status for them from evidences of claimed tool assemblages.⁸⁹ Probably most anthropologists would grant that any evidence of cultural transmission, which probably implies also the use of language, + qualified a being for human status. The living great apes sometimes use sticks and other materials as tools with great inventiveness but lack language ability and ability to produce culture. Studies of primate behavior

*Notable here is Spindler's work on the Menomini which finds that 5 categories of people arranged on a continuum from assimilated to native-oriented each show distinct personality configuration, the three middle categories showing reaction to conflict between the values of the two cultures.

**Culture and Personality by Anthony F. C. Wallace, 1961, pp. 26-41.

***See, for example, Aberle et. al., "The Functional Prerequisites of Society", in Ethics, LX, No. 2, pp. 100-111.

+This question is treated briefly below under Language and Culture.

to attempt to establish the basis for human development of social behavior have burgeoned in recent years.⁹⁰

A classification of the ages of prehistory into the chronological sequence of the Paleolithic, Old Stone Age, the Neolithic, New Stone Age, the Bronze Age and Iron Age was accomplished in the 19th century on the evidence accumulated and inferred from relative positions in the ground of surviving cultural materials by archaeologists. These Ages, referring to specific kinds of artifact assemblages characterized by chipped stone in the Old Stone Age, ground stone in the New Stone Age, and the use of those metals in the Bronze and Iron Ages were later embellished to include a preceding Eolithic, or dawn stone age, and a Mesolithic, a transitional stage added between the Neolithic and Bronze Ages.* A great many diverse culture types, based on tool assemblages, were found in the Old World and fitted into this chronological scheme, and by the present archaeologists have been able to outline sequences of culture types almost everywhere in the world.

V. Gordon Childe⁹² has, as Spindler remarks, "probably done more than any other contemporary writer to clarify and communicate the major outlines of social, cultural and political sequences in the prehistorical (beyond written documents) development of the Old World."⁹³

The neolithic revolution refers to the invention of food-producing techniques and attendant settlement patterns and development of social and political relationships leading in turn to an "Urban Revolution" which refers to another set of features--development of urban centers containing people with specialized occupations, writing and numerical notation, new patterns of social and political relations, trade and communication which are characteristic; these creations of man spread from the Near East to other areas of the world and are still spreading. The Neolithic and Urban revolutions also occurred in the Pre-Columbian New World, where the same phenomena with very different content have been found; the existence of these civilizations (a term usually referring to cultures with the characteristics of the Urban Revolution) poses a set of important and fascinating questions concerning the nature of human nature. These developments in the Old and New World show a very long list of parallels which are both of a general type (like the existence of social classes and empires) and very specific (like the building of pyramids and the use of palanquins to carry rulers), although different plants and animals were domesticated and generally the content of the two developments are different. Are the parallels the result of diffusion of basic inventions which occurred only once in human history⁹⁴ or are they a result of common human responses to similar problems of existence?

*Each culture type I suppose represents a "concept" relevant to the history and evolution of culture; a list of them would require many volumes. Recent volumes on Prehistory, such as Jacquetta Hawkes compendium¹⁰⁰ could be used to enlarge the meanings of these concepts.

In the last twenty years there has been a new interest in cultural evolution, largely neglected for the previous thirty years but always kept alive from the formulations of the 19th century when it was an important concept before Darwin's delineation of biological evolution occurred. There are two approaches to cultural evolution in American anthropology, one which is called multilinear evolution by its exponent, Steward, 95 and the other which may be called general evolution. Multilinear evolution does not attempt to develop a comprehensive set of evolutionary principles to cover culture growth from the first appearance of culture to the present, but consists of a methodology which focuses on parallel developments in limited aspects of specified cultures and tries to determine whether sequences occur in the same order, and if so, whether the same causes produced them. * (The concept "culture core" and his method of "culture ecology" are used here, along with a concept of "levels of socio-cultural integration".)

American archaeological thought has conceptualized such sequences of culture growth using the terminology Lithic and Archaic, representing New World hunting and gathering cultures; Formative, denoting the period when food production and sedentism and accompanying arts develop; Florescent, or Classic, when the potentials of the Formative are elaborated and developed into distinctive regional styles; and Expansionist of Empire, when military and political dominance are established through a series of wars. 96

General evolution attempts to establish evolutionary trends for culture as a whole and holds that broad-scale trends are evidenced in emergence of cultural forms; culture evolves from simplicity to complexity. As Hoebel notes, "the process of social change and cultural modification in a particular society is best considered as culture change, not cultural evolution." 97

White and his school emphasize the progressive increase in the amount of energy available to man's control.

*Leading exponents are V. G. Childe, Leslie White and Robert Redfield.

Language and Culture

Linguistics

Man alone possesses language, and without it human culture would be impossible.⁹⁸ It is an art which must be passed on from one generation to the next and provides a mode of communication which makes possible cooperative enterprises in society and continuity of behavior and learning necessary to the creation and maintenance of culture. Apes have a capacity to learn to use tools and invent them, as men do, and can learn many things easily, but they have never developed a culture; nor can they be taught one because language, symbolic communication, is beyond them.⁹⁹ Language enables man to make his experiences continuous and to apply his previous experiences with problems to new problems beyond actual physical experience; it enables him to share experiences with his fellows, thus enabling each generation to take over accumulated knowledge of their predecessors. This cumulateness is made possible by language. Hoiyer assumes that language must be as old as man's cultural artifacts.¹⁰⁰

All societies possess language. Some of these languages are historically related to one another--they are derived from a common source or "proto-language" and they are said to belong to the same language family or stock. There are many such stocks extant today which have no resemblance to one another, indicating great antiquity for language because language changes over time slowly. The structural features of languages cannot be classed in terms of developmental level. All languages have a system of distinctive speech sounds, finite in number, which are put together to make words, phrases and sentences according to definite rules. All languages have vocabularies comprehensive enough to meet their needs, varying in size with complexity of the culture of the people using it and indefinitely expandable. All languages have systems of grammar, the meaningful arrangement of sounds or combinations of sounds to produce words, phrases and sentences. Words, phrases and sentences are arbitrary symbols which themselves have no part of the reality or experience symbolized. How language originated we do not and perhaps cannot know, but its symbolizing nature emphasizes its social aspect.

The structure of language is studied by observing speech acts. Individual speech acts are utterances which must be collected from speakers of the language and which vary in length and complexity consisting of single units or series of units. A sentence is an utterance of the parts of which are united grammatically into a construction which is not itself a part of some larger construction. Sentences may be divided into smaller units, phrases and words, which also vary in size and complexity. Words may contain one element or more than one, each conveying a meaning. These simple linguistic forms, some of which

may constitute a word and some of which must be combined with other such units to form words, are called morphemes; those which can be pronounced alone are called free morphemes and those which cannot are bound morphemes. Combinations of more than one morpheme are complex linguistic forms. Morphemes must follow definite rules of arrangement when they are combined into words. These rules are called the morphology of a language. The rules for meaningful arrangement of words to form phrases and sentences are called syntax and the syntax and morphology together is the language's grammar.

Morphemes are composed of distinctive sounds called phonemes; the number of phonemes found in any language is quite small--usually not more than 30, but varying from about 16 to more than 30. Phonemes are combined according to definite rules; all possible combinations of phonemes according to those rules are not actually used.

Languages undergo constant change; they can be classified according to families or stocks having a common ancestral language (the prototype language) and thus possessing too many similarities and systematic divergencies in pronunciation, grammar and vocabulary to be explained by chance or borrowing. The processes of linguistic change have also been analyzed by linguists.¹⁰¹ Although reasons for change have been suggested, they have not been empirically tested to the degree that would warrant any conclusions.

The American linguists Swadesh and Lees have developed a statistical method for calculating an approximate date for the divergence of related languages from a common mother tongue, based on a premise that fundamental vocabularies change at a given rate; this field of linguistic study is called glottochronology.

The relationships between language and culture are subject to many lines of research. While it is certain that every known language is adequate to the needs of its culture, it has been a matter of much discussion and some research as to how the structure of languages may mold or direct the conceptions of the nature of the world a people may have. The linguists Sapir and Whorf directed attention to this line of questioning which is receiving much attention by both linguists and psychologists interested in language.*

Certainly concepts relating to the universality of language and its fundamental relationship to the acquisition of culture are important ones which may well be used in a social studies curriculum. Concepts relating to historical processes in language, and to descriptive linguistics are more technical and probably the

*Whorf's writings have been compiled in J. Carroll, ed., Language Thought and Reality. Roger Brown's Words and Things is a readable review of research on this problem from a psychologist's point of view. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is reviewed primarily by linguists in Language and Culture, Harry Hoijer, ed., Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations, No. 3, Memoir 79 of the American Anthropological Association, December, 1954. Psychologist C. E. Osgood's concept of the "semantic differential" and his work on it is of course relevant to this line of endeavor.

time involved necessary to teach about them would not be available. The problems involved in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis are of great interest to psychology and linguistics at present and perhaps could be presented as such--as an unsolved hypothesis in the process of evolving systematic conceptualization for empirical research, as so many linguistic and other social science problems are.

Archaeology

The study of early cultures is called archaeology in the U. S. and prehistory in Europe. The archeologist studies surviving evidences of human manufacture called artifacts. The archaeologist gathers such data from a number of sites in a particular area and arranges them in chronological sequence, which enables him to say when given traits appeared and what effects they had on the rest of the cultural complex. Archaeology reconstructs the development of human culture from man's earliest appearance to the beginning of written history.

In surveying and digging and analyzing a site the archaeologist uses systematic and complex techniques which require extensive professional instruction and apprenticeship to master; digging a site destroys it, and thus should be done only under supervision of competent and trained archaeologists.

The concepts used and developed by archaeologists have been referred to elsewhere in this paper, but concepts relating to their methodology will be noted here. The establishment of classifications of cultures, that is "recognizing the presence of distinctive culture units which were in existence at a particular moment of time in a particular area" is an important part of archaeology.¹¹³ The archaeologist who has excavated, described and analyzed a site "must then present his interpretation of where the site belongs in the known cultural sequence of his own restricted area and in the more general story of cultural development in a geographic region."¹⁰² To do this the archaeologists must first order the artifacts he has acquired, and often this is done in one of two ways, "either starting at the top and dividing the pots into successive subgroups, each of which has more and more features in common," (pots or other commonly found artifacts) or "starting with the most sharply defined units and placing them in families of increasing comprehensiveness", as in the McKern Taxonomic System of the Midwestern U. S., which uses the following basic framework.*

Base The most comprehensive grouping: e. g., "Horticultural-Pottery Base" or "Nomadic Hunting Base"

Pattern A less comprehensive and more specific grouping: e. g., "Andean Cultural Pattern"

Phase More specific: The Peruvian phase of the Andean Cultural Pattern

*Taken from p. 12 of Ford's A Quantitative Method for Deriving Cultural Chronology, James A. Ford, Pan American Union Technical Manual, Washington, D. C.: 1962, which is in turn an adaptation of McKern's system as outlined in V. C. McKern, 1939. 115

Aspect "The Chavinoid Aspects of the Peruvian Phase of the Andean Cultural Pattern"

Focus A group of sites which are highly similar;
"The Ancon-Supe Focus of the Chavin Aspect"

Component A single occupation: e.g., "The Ancon Component"

Ford and others have been critical of these systems as tools for research and would hold that they are useful only when serving as a framework for presentation of culture history after the principle lines of development have been worked out. At any rate the archaeologist must work with a typology. "A type ... is manufactured by the archaeologist, who ... defines it as sharply as possible from related types...."

The proof of the validity, or rather the usefulness, of a type is in the using of it. "103

The archaeologist must determine the chronology of the area he deals with; a complete sequence of cultures from the first appearance of artifacts to modern times must be obtained. Chronology may be either relative or absolute; absolute chronology is possible where remains provide a year-by-year count, with accurate dates, while relative chronology must be obtained through stratigraphy, seriation and typology. Relative chronology is obtainable far more commonly in archaeology than is absolute chronology. Stratigraphy is the establishment of culture types based on excavation by arbitrary levels, as opposed to stratification levels based on the unique happenings recorded in the particular piece of earth the archaeologist chooses to dig. Seriation is based on the principle of stylistic change which takes place through time in a given class of artifacts; objects which were easily made and sufficiently variable in style (like pottery) are arranged in "a stylistic or logical sequence in relation to some known end point, which is either the beginning or end of the series."117

Certainly the culture types recognized by archaeologists will find a place in the social studies curriculum, and possibly the concepts relating to their methods of obtaining these will be relevant on the higher grade levels.

The Key Concepts of Anthropology

Certainly the central concept of anthropology is culture; it is used by all anthropologists and assumptions about the nature of culture are used and shared in all fields of anthropology. All anthropologists share an interest in the mechanisms of culture dynamics; those interested in specific cultures emphasize event sequences we have referred to above as culture change, while those interested in culture as a whole or in making broad comparisons between event sequences in different cultures are interested in evolution. (Physical

anthropologists are also interested in the biological mechanisms of transmission and evolution, although these always involve the cultural ones.) All share an interest in human groups and relationships within these groups.

The "most important concepts" in cultural anthropology could probably be grouped in some such way as the following, with each heading and the concepts under it considered to be useful in illuminating the concept of "culture," which is of course the overriding concept in anthropology.

These are often referred to as "dynamics" or processes and they are on what might be called a macro-societal level, Evolution using "culture" as a whole as a referent, and other processes using societies or communities as wholes as a referent.

Concepts referring to external or internal adaptation using a society as a referent.

Concepts referring to the structure of society.

These would refer to dynamics, adaptation and structure with the individual as a vehicle of cultural behavior as a referent.

I. Culture Change Concepts

Evolution
Innovation
Acculturation
etc.

II. Concepts relating to Societal Adaptation

Integration
Social Control
Function

Values
etc.

III. Concepts relating to Social Structure

Status and Role
Institutions
Primary and Secondary Groups
Political Organizations
etc.

IV. Concepts relating to the Individual

Personality
Socialization
Values
Integration
etc.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Robert Lowie's History of Ethnological Theory for a good resume of the derivations of Anthropology up to the late 1930's, 1937.
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5. See, for example, Fred Eggan's "Social Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Comparison", American Anthropologist, Vol. 56, 1954, pp. 743-763, and S. F. Nadel's Foundations of Social Anthropology, 1951.
6. Driver, Kroeber, etc. (Culture element distribution studies).
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19. J. Honigmann, World of Man, p. 172.
20. E. A. Hoebel, Man in the Primitive World, p. 167.
21. R. Benedict, Patterns of Culture, 1937, p. 47.
22. J. Honigmann, World of Man, p. 13.
23. R. Benedict, Patterns of Culture, p. 237.
24. E. A. Hoebel, Man in the Primitive World, p. 159. See also his Law of Primitive Man, 1954, Chapter 1.
25. Ibid.
26. See -- Kluckhohn, Clyde, and others "Values and Value Orientation in the Theory of Action" in Parsons and Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action, 1962; and F. Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Substitute Profiles of Cultural Orientations: Their Significance for the Analysis of Social Stratification," Social Forces, 1950, 28:376-393.
27. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science", American Anthropologist, Vol. 37, 1935, pp. 394-395.
28. B. Malinowski, "Culture", Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, 1931, pp. 621-646.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE

Frank Sorauf

Ever since the resumption of scholarly life after World War II the discipline of political science has been torn by a dispute over its definition, its scope, its scholarly and theoretical commitments, and over the very theory of knowledge on which it would proceed. In this dispute over the goals and procedures of political science its practitioners have divided--in an unfortunate oversimplification of the issues--into those who ally themselves with the traditional ways of political science and those who choose the "new" political science of more rigorous empirical methods and new theoretical concern. Even more unfortunate than the oversimplified lines of battle, perhaps, has been the almost generally accepted name given to the new, innovative movement: "behavioralism." Apart from its semantic failings, it implies a relationship to the Watsonian psychology which does not exist.

What had by the beginning of World War II become the conventional political science was in reality an uneasy amalgam of a number of approaches and traditions. In the continuing struggle of different approaches to influence the course and commitments of political science, there have been no real victors. Each new intellectual movement has won its adherents and been absorbed into the discipline, creating thereby a new and more complicated intellectual mixture. The result of this progress of accretion, necessarily, was a discipline that lacked a consistent and agreed-upon set of goals. Political scientists followed any number of roads to Rome, and any given political scientist could, if he saw fit, follow more than one. Within this tangled skein of influences that constituted political science on the eve of the second World War one can, however, discern four main traditions: legal formalism, political ethics, policy activism, and science.¹

The first of these traditions, legal formalism, reflected an alliance of law and political science that characterized and continues to characterize much of the political science of continental Europe. Early American political scientists, often the product of the German graduate schools, brought it back from the continent along with their new Ph. D's. American political science at the end of the 19th century was greatly influenced, as were the other academic and scholarly disciplines, by the intellectual life and training of the German scholars and universities. The legalism that resulted in American political science treated governments largely by studying and comparing their constitutions and basic legal structures. The early texts in political science, for example, considered Congress merely in terms of its constitutional powers and of the constitutional and legal statements that set its main organizational outlines. (Against the backdrop of this tradition, Woodrow Wilson's attempt in his 1885 Congressional Government to find the informal centers of Congressional power was, of course,

a radical and innovating departure from the conventional political science of his day.) This tradition remains very much with political science today, albeit in a modified form, in the courses and scholarship on legal theory and jurisprudence, constitutional law, administrative law, international law, and to a somewhat lesser extent in policy courses which deal with legal regulation of labor, business, and agriculture.

Secondly, political science in the United States has always been to some extent under the spell of the political philosophers. This philosophical tradition has sought, much as did Plato and Aristotle, the bases of the good life and the political arrangements which would produce it. They have at the same time sought to clarify concepts such as those of authority, liberty, justice, and equality. The study of the great political ideas of Western civilization has formed the core of study in many American political science departments and their graduate programs, much as it continues to do today in the political science courses of British universities. In fact, the philosophic tradition has been strong enough in American political science to preempt the word "theory", for in political science alone among the social sciences "theory" is used to describe ethical systems and political doctrines rather than the systematic, causal explanations it connotes in other disciplines. This tradition of political theory remains a powerful and popular one in American political science, and Professor Leo Strauss and his students today constitute a movement within American political science which would raise political philosophy to a pre-eminent, if not exclusive, position in American political science.

Since the turn of the century American political science has also accommodated a stream of activism or reformism. Perhaps because of an implicit acceptance of the doctrines of progress and the perfection of man or under the impact of Dewey's pragmatism and instrumentalism, political scientists have involved themselves in a series of public causes. They shared the enthusiasm of the Progressives for organized political intelligence and supported legislative reference bureaus and local government institutes. They worked for the direct primary, the advent of civil service reform and merit systems, the tools of direct democracy (initiative, referendum, and recall), the commission and city manager forms of local government, non-partisan elections, and special governmental authorities. Although their enthusiasm for many of these reforms has cooled, they still advise state and local governments--occasionally even the national government--and maintain reference bureaus. In recent years a goodly portion of their activist zeal has gone either into partisan political activity--the number of political scientists seeking public office is probably at an all-time high--or into activity touching the international crisis of the times: support and advice for world government programs, the United Nations, foreign policy study, defense policy, or advocacy of disarmament, for example. In the curricula of American political science departments this tradition of activism still informs courses in political field work, much of public administration, and courses in domestic or foreign policy issues and alternatives.

Fourthly, the political science we now call "traditional" has within it a firm and dominant tradition of empiricism. Beginning with the work of Wilson and A. Lawrence Lowell, American political science has attended to the "real" and "practical" truth of government and politics. A. B. Hart's pioneering course at Harvard, "Actual Government as Applied under American Conditions", catches something of the flavor of the movement. The study of political parties and interest groups began, too, under its auspices. In many ways this "practical realism" grew out of the profession's concern for activism and reform, for it promoted the kinds of knowledge thought to be necessary for "political engineering". The empiricism, it should be noted, was usually a descriptive, down-to-earth empiricism, interested more in discrete "realities" than in formulating general rules, propositions, or explanations. At its least appealing, it led much of the study of political science into a hyper-factualism irreverently referred to in the discipline as "fire hydrant counting", but at its best it promoted an honest and hard-headed concern for the real and actual and ultimately to informal institutions and systems of power. It remains today a tradition which continues to exert enormous influence, especially in the study of state and local government and much of American politics.

Furthermore, there ran through these four traditions several common approaches to political phenomena and their study. They all in varying degrees accepted an historical approach and system of organization. Even today courses in political theory generally are histories of the major Western political thinkers, courses in diplomacy and foreign policy resemble courses in diplomatic history, and the traditional American government course often begins with an extended discourse on the work of the Founding Fathers. Secondly, they all focused very largely on political and governmental institutions, on the organizations and structures of the political system rather than the behavior of individuals and groups within the context of the structures. They saw elections and political parties, but rarely inquired into the voting behavior or the party affiliations of the electorate; they examined the Congress, its committees, and its leadership positions often without examining the processes by which influence was brought to bear on Congress and decisions made there. Finally, there was throughout much of traditional political science a distrust of theory. Political science was largely a profession of "hard-headed", practical realists little given to the building of general theories or explanatory propositions. It had what seems today a naive faith in the plain, unadorned "facts"--facts which they believed spoke for themselves (and spoke adequately by themselves) and that needed no one to "give meaning" to them. It was, above all, a profession chary and wary of basic philosophical questions, that hesitated even to ask questions of its own goals, its own epistemology, its own procedures.

Throughout the period of the late nineteenth century to 1940 political science also housed a small, but significant movement that wanted to move the discipline to a more scientific, theoretical, and methodologically sophisticated empiricism. With its roots in the new social science of Comte and Spencer, it hoped to build a science of politics. Arthur Bentley in his Process of Government (1908) regretted the lack of theoretical framework and organizing concepts in political

science, its lack of scientific empiricism, and described his work as an attempt "to fashion a tool." This trend within political science reached its zenith in the "Chicago School" of Charles Merriam and his associates in the 1920's and 1930's. Merriam, a founder and first president of the Social Science Research Council, tried to align political science with the other social sciences and with the development of more careful methods and theory in political science. Merriam's New Aspects of Politics (1925) and Stuart Rice's Quantitative Methods in Politics (1928) typified the movement; it profited also from the insights and leadership of Chicago sociologists such as Ogburn, Beyle, and Park. In the 1930's the work of the Merriam movement was advanced by his students, Harold Lasswell, still a creative, innovative leader in political science, and Harold Gosnell, who brought to political science a new empiricism rooted in careful field observation. 2

As political science emerged from World War II, however, Merriam and the Chicago school--and their adherents elsewhere--were definitely a minority. What seemed to be the conventional, traditional political science was an amalgam of traditions that emphasized the concern with a descriptive empiricism, a reformist activism, and an emphasis on the legal, formal aspects of political institutions. All of it approached political data with an historical emphasis and organization as well as with a distaste for broad theoretical propositions. It was a profession more comfortable in practical affairs and policy-oriented activism than in the building of theories or the polishing of methodologies. Above all, American political science had not achieved any consensus or agreement on its materials, its scope, its goals, or its methods and procedures. Splintered and diverse, it rarely concerned itself with the basic questions of method and theory which the other social sciences had begun to consider. It was, in short, a discipline without an intellectual identity and one that seemed little concerned by the fact.

In the 15 or so years since the resumption of scholarly life after World War II a new movement within political science, the one called "behavioralism", has challenged the traditional political science. In a cumulative sense it has proposed for the discipline:

- 1) new data--It emphasizes the study of the social and psychological roots of political behavior, all the way from the basic processes of political socialization and organization to the organization of influence and the development of role structures among political decision-makers. In this sense, it has sought to supplement the traditional concern of the discipline with institutions and formal structure.
- 2) new methods--Behavioralism has brought to political analysis a new rigor and precision of method, a heightened empiricism that employs more careful observation, more precise measures, more sophisticated tools of analysis. Its superficial marks have been the appearance of tables, graphs and formulas in the journals and their increasingly involved statistical measures and analysis.

- 3) new concepts and vocabulary--The movement has emphasized a more precise technical language for political science, drawing largely on the concepts of the other behavioral sciences: power, influence, elites, status, function, to mention but a few. At its worst, this trend has produced the obscurantist jargon that has plagued the other social sciences. At its best it has given political science new tools of more precise description and new categories for its data.
- 4) new theoretical goals--Finally, the new political science has revised the old goal of a science of politics: the development of theoretical propositions which will explain in causes and relationships the political phenomena under study. It has reintroduced the theoretical proposition and hypothesis into even narrow range research in political science, and it continues to seek, in theoretical models and structures, an over-all theoretical edifice into which data and middle-range propositions might be integrated. Its understanding of "theory", of course, differs from the traditional, normative meaning of "theory" that prevailed so long in political science.

It should be understood, of course, that individual political scientists may and do disagree in emphasis and understanding of these four goals, even though they may accept the loose designation of "behavioralism." It is by no means the rigid and monolithic movement some have imagined it to be.³

Some further explanation and elaboration about the new political science is also in order. Contrary to many impressions, it was not the creation of the post-war generation of political scientists. It can in many ways be viewed as a logical and consistent extension of the empirical trend in American political science that began with the Comtean science of society--with, indeed, the disciplinary pioneers who named it "political science"--and extended through the Merriam-Chicago refinements. In fact, the growing strength of the movement is visible through the 1930's, and its relationship to the post-war "behavioralism" might have been far more obvious had not the war intervened and marked a new generation of scholars. Secondly, there has been some uncertainty and debate within the fraternity as to whether the new political science was a "revolution" in the method or in the subject matter of political science, or in both. Again, leaving individual formulations aside, it has been both, bringing to political science a new, more rigorous empiricism and also a new "field", the material on individual and small group political behavior which the profession tended earlier to ignore.

When one is this close in time to a clash in scholarly traditions, it is difficult to judge the progress of the battle. It may not be clear for another generation just how far the new "behavioralism" has penetrated into contemporary political science. Some assessments, however, seem justified. First of all, it appears that again there will be no victor and no vanquished. The new will not replace the older traditions, but it also seems clear that it will not exist as a separate, discrete movement in political science. Because of its emphasis on methods

and theory, it can to some extent merge with the older political science. Even though it began as a separate movement, treated in special courses in political science departments, it increasingly is working into the older, traditional field and course categories. For example, the older, legalistic, case-centered study of constitutional law is being joined by studies of judicial voting and decision behavior and by studies in the politics of litigating constitutional issues. The study of comparative government (long a study only of selected foreign governments) is moving toward a genuinely comparative study that aims at developing comparative categories and theories. There remain able and influential political scientists who resist the new political science, but it seems clear that it is now or will soon have become the dominant mode in American political science. It has permeated the journals and the leading graduate schools, and its styles dominate the programs of the discipline's conventions and scholarly meetings. Just as telling, perhaps, is the fact that it has also won the favor of the foundations and other supporters of scholarly research.

The value and desirability of the new "behavioralism", however, remain the chief scholarly issue within political science. Its adherents see in it an antidote for the legal formalism and institutionalism, the historicism, and the activism that placed such a low priority on the business of formulating verifiable theories of politics. Their position rests on the high priority they attach to the development of that systematic, explanatory, empirical theory; it rests, of necessity, also on a confidence that empirical methods can procure and measure the necessary social data for such theory-building. The opposition in varying degrees challenges that faith in the methods and products of empiricism in the social sciences, especially in its ability to prevent the values of the scholar from intruding into his work. They have also accused the "behavioralists" of having chosen trivial theorizing and an ivory-tower role when there remain great issues and great problems in the world which call for the active concerns of scholars and educated men. The main issues, therefore, touch both the usefulness of empirical, "scientific" methods in the social sciences and also the goal priorities political scientists set for their efforts and resources.

In any event, the debate among the various persuasions and gradations of political science has produced a belated and self-conscious introspection in American political science. Journals reverberate with debates over the future of political science, and every convention of political scientists turns in part to a professional examination of conscience. A number of noted scholars in the field have published books within the last 10 years on the general theme of "whither political science?"⁴ Leo Strauss, a distinguished scholar of political philosophy, has organized, largely around himself and his former students, something of a "counterrevolution" in the discipline. His disapproval, it should be noted, goes far further than the reservations of many political scientists, for it appears to reject all or almost all empirical knowledge in the social sciences. In any event, there can be no doubt that political science has at last faced up (with a vengeance) to the problem of defining itself and its procedures. And it may very well now be closer to achieving a consensus about itself than it has ever been.

Politics and the Political System

The new introspection in political science has led the profession not only to ask what its goals and procedures are; it has as well persistently tried to define and redefine what it was studying. That problem of definition is essentially one of separating those forms of institution, process, and behavior that are specifically "political" from those that are not. Beyond this definitional task the discipline also faces the question of whether those activities we decide are political do indeed constitute a coherent pattern of activity--a system--which can be treated, much as the economic system, as a unit for the purposes of describing the scope of political science and defining the task of its theoretical knowledge.

Throughout the history of American political science it has been most usual to define political science as the study of the "state." The state is most often defined as an entity consisting of the people of the society, their geographical territory, their feelings of national identity, and their institutions of government. It possesses, furthermore, the attribute of sovereignty in its dealings with other states.⁵ The concept, which has its roots in the legalism and the Hegelian idealism of the early German political science, still has its adherents, but the "new" political scientists have largely rejected it. They have pointed to its essentially formalistic and legalistic nature, arguing especially that it is too rooted in the nation-state of Western Europe and the heyday of nationalism to embrace the political arrangements of other cultures. And in a simplistic way, it does very closely approximate what in common usage the average adult has come to call a "country." The post-war political scientists have tried instead to approach the definitional task from another tack--deciding what the "political" act or function is and then defining those activities, processes, and institutions which relate to it.

A number of political scientists have proposed that the discipline concern itself with the relations of power and/or influence among and between individuals and groups.⁶ Quite apart from difficulties in defining "power" and "influence", such a definition fails to distinguish what appears (by conventional usage) to be the political and the non-political forms of power and influence. Each of the other social sciences also concerns forms and varieties of power and influence relationships. David Easton in his The Political System (1952) has defined political science as the study of "the authoritative allocation of values in society". The political system, then, is the authoritative allocator, the mechanism by which society finally and ultimately decides which interests, goals, and wants shall be enforced on and in society. The Eastonian formulation, much like the classic concept of the economic system, depicts an allocative system which chooses and enforces among "scarce" (or rather, controversial or conflicting) goals and wants in society.


The political system, in other words, is one of a number of systems of social control and allocation. It is the one we associate with final and ultimate authority. It is marked, as none of the other allocative or control systems

are, by universality, legitimacy, and a monopoly and finality of force. The political system is universal, or virtually universal, in that it includes more members and groups in society than do the other systems of control, such as family, religious, ethnic, or economic groups. It enjoys as well the acceptance of its functioning and authority we call "legitimacy". Finally, it stands above the other allocative and control systems, enjoying the authority to control either the operation or the outcome of their operations. In this sense it is the final and "highest" system, the one which controls through its ultimate monopoly of force other systems for the control of behavior and the allocation of scarce and conflicting values in society. ⁷

This political system may be thought of in the somewhat simple manner of the diagram below. It involves, as a democratic political system, the organization of aggregates of political power to choose the governmental decision-makers and to influence their decisions.

At the left of the diagram one sees the countless individuals of the political system, each one with attitudes, outlooks, interests, and goals which they bring to the political system. Political science is, of course, interested in the political "baggage" they bring to their activity in the political system as well as in the process of political socialization by which they acquire it. To their right are depicted the varying groups and organizations which, through a series of successive "agglomeratings" build the political individual and his miniscule political power into aggregates of political power. They may include the political party, the interest group, the powerful political leader, the faction, the clique, the small primary group, the community elite, the mass media, and a social status group, to mention the most important ones. They in turn transmit the aggregates of political influence (which may even be majorities) to the decision-making structures of government--the legislatures, the executives, the courts--through their election or through other forms of influence and communication. These decision-makers, in turn, make public policy on the basis of a number of influences: the influences and pressures from various power sources and aggregates in the political system, from their own experience, backgrounds, personalities and loyalties, from their understanding of the "rational" pros and cons of alternative courses of action, and from the influences exerted by their fellow decision-makers. These latter include the values of the institutions in which they operate (e. g., the canons of judicial ethics) and the influences of other decision-makers and other decision making arenas (e. g., presidential influence on Congress on behalf of his legislative program). The effective decisions--the laws, ordinances, treaties, administrative rules and orders, judicial decisions and opinions--must then be effectuated by additional governmental bodies and officials. To the extent that they have a margin of discretion, they, too, may be the focus of attempts to affect the allocation of values. Congress or the President may, for instance, refuse to enforce court decrees, and tax officials may be under some pressure to reinterpret deductible entertainment expenses under the income tax statutes.

SCHEME OF A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM



Throughout this diagram of the political system the movement of the influence and decisional process has, in graphic terms, been from left to right. That uni-directional aspect is, of course, grossly misleading. At each point in the scheme there is also reinforcement, influence, and "feedback" which moves from right to left. For instance, the political organizations such as the parties and interest groups shape the political outlooks, values, and goals of individuals in the system; that is, they, too, participate in the process of political socialization. And the decision-makers may also influence, lead, participate in, and even regulate the political organizations. Finally, the uni-directionality of the scheme is misleading in that the end products of the system (far right) return to shape the goals, interests, and strategies of the political individuals and organizations. It would be better, therefore, to imagine this process in circular, rather than in linear terms.

In general this scheme reflects a policy-making approach to the political system, but it is cast broadly enough to accommodate the other approaches to the political system (with the possible exception of the functional). One will have some difficulty, however, in using it as a framework for the traditional course and field divisions of political science (local government, American government and politics, comparative government, political theory, etc.). Those traditional lines reflect an institutional and policy-centered approach to politics, and in many ways they cut horizontally across this scheme. Nonetheless, some relationship remains. The substantive material of political behavior, for instance, clearly concerns the data at the left of the diagram; courses on political parties, community power systems, and interest groups touch the area one step further in from the left margin. Courses in legislatures, executives, and administrative agencies clearly deal largely with the decision-making structures. Courses in constitutional law, government and business, and foreign and defense policy are concerned with the resulting public policy.

In addition, two areas of political science deal with the whole of the system. One, the field of comparative government, indeed, compares and contrasts whole political systems as well as specific institutions and processes. To the extent that the students of comparative government do compare entire political systems, they are becoming the systematic theorists--theory here used in the conventional sense--of political science. In addition, the political theorists (theory as doctrine and philosophy, that is) have developed propositions and evaluations about the entire political system, its institutional and process outlines, the forms of government, the goals and purpose of the political system, and the political values it seeks and achieves.

No quantity of effort and intellectual exertion, no increments of precision and conceptual clarity, will, however, ever succeed in outlining the scope of the political in such a way as to separate the political phenomena clearly and cleanly from other social phenomena. The dividing lines separating the social sciences simply are not that neat. Social psychologists as well as political scientists may be interested in the acquisition of political perceptions. Sociologists study the varying forms of political groups and organizations, and much

of their study of social institutions and processes is couched broadly enough to include the political.⁸ Legal scholars, too, concern themselves with the same aspects of the judicial process as political scientists do. Specialists in labor-management relations and agriculture join political scientists in the study of public policy on labor and agricultural problems. And political scientists join other social scientists in developing the new, interdisciplinary bodies of knowledge, such as those in bureaucracy, organizational theory, and decision-making strategies and theories. What marks--or should mark--the work of the political scientist in these boundary areas is his concern for relating these bodies of knowledge to others in the political system and for integrating them into the general theories of that system.

Part II -- Materials for a Curriculum

I) The Methods

Political science in the United States shares with the other social sciences the general methods of empiricism. The discipline continues to debate the problems of the application of empiricism to social behavior and the possibility of achieving a science of politics, but it has always been an empirical study. Its traditional activist and institutional movements were based on a "practical", "down-to-earth", descriptive factualism that was and is basically empirical--empirical in that it was based on knowledge derived from observation and sensory experience. Much, even, of the study of the great and seminal political theories depends on empiricism (e. g., the concept of state of nature in Locke, the influence of Blackstone on the American constitutionalists) rather than on a philosophical analysis of ideas, values, and constructs per se.⁹

A general appreciation and understanding of empiricism in the social sciences involves three general corollary propositions:

1) As a general system of knowledge, empiricism accepts as knowledge about the real life world only that which can be observed. It accepts as facts only those events, relationships, and conditions which can be experienced by sensory perception and which can be verified in the same way. It rejects a priori knowledge, facts by definition and assertion; it insists on standards of proof and validity for what it accepts as true and factual. It accepts, furthermore, an inductive system of knowledge that we may loosely call the "scientific method", in which the scholar proceeds from the specific event or observation, through others, to more general propositions, rather than by deducing specific data from general, fixed propositions. It is, in the broad sense of the term; "experimental" in that it sets up hypothetical propositions which it tests by the gathering and application of relevant data, either rejecting or affirming the proposition on the basis of the evidence.

2) The method of empiricism insists, furthermore, on the conventional, if simplified, dichotomy between the worlds of fact and value, the worlds of the "is" and the "ought", the existential and the normative. It insists on that

separation because its methods of proof and validity test and affirm only the knowledge of the "is". The questions of the "ought", of value preferences and issues of right, morality, and good, cannot be determined by the methods of empiricism, and hence they must be treated separately even though they clearly are often intertwined with issues of fact and empirical reality. The methods of empiricism must be in two senses "value-free": in the sense of separating the questions of value from those of fact, and in the sense of the empiricist's care not to let his own value preferences intrude in his observation and analysis of the factual.

3) Thirdly, and finally, the specific problems of the application of the "scientific method" to the social sciences cannot be overlooked, nor ought they to be exaggerated on the basis of myth or visceral reactions. ("But you can't possibly learn about something as complex as human behavior," etc.) The main problems would certainly include the following:

- a) replication. For the purposes of making generalizations and verifying data and theories, replication of circumstances is called for in the scientific method. The complexity and intractability of social processes make it difficult to repeat the same constellation of conditions and behavior as may have existed in the past. The issue, then, becomes one of whether sets of events are "similar enough" in major characteristics.
- b) limits to experiment and control. Obviously the data of the social sciences cannot be controlled to the extent that those of the natural and biological sciences can. We cannot contrive political situations to specification. We cannot give IQ tests to U.S. Congressmen, and we cannot easily alter the reward payoffs for participation in political activity. We are forced to a much greater extent to take data "as it is".
- c) complexity of behavior. In dealing with human beings we are dealing with complex patterns of behavior, with organisms capable of manipulating symbols and storing information. They are, in other words, capable of forms of behavior that have no external, observable manifestations. Thus, their total behavior is much more difficult to know; their motives, perceptions, and attitudes, especially, pose tremendous challenges to the techniques of the social scientist.
- d) volitional nature of the data. The data of the social sciences is capable of responding to the scholarship being exerted upon it. The citizen in the sample survey may be influenced in his answers by the nature of the questioner or the questions, or the Congressional committee may alter its behavior to conform with the findings of a study, or, indeed, to refute it. Social science may be in the business of making, to use Karl Mannheim's phrases, self-fulfilling and self-denying prophecies.
- e) cultural limitations. Given the variety of cultural contexts in which social behavior may take place, it may be that the scholar in any one

may impose his own cultural apparatus on data from other cultures; his work, then, will be "culture-bound." While there is little danger of political scientists asking for precinct committeemen in the Polynesian societies, there is some danger that the American political scientist will impose a Western concept and expectation about political parties and their roles and functions on the new parties of the countries of Asia and Africa.

There must certainly be other issues within the general one of the limits of empiricism in the social sciences, but these are the ones most frequently and heatedly raised. An awareness of them need not result in the rejection of empiricism; it may, however, prevent the budding social scientist from the most egregious scholarly blunders.¹⁰

In the use and application of the methods of empiricism in political science (and the other social sciences) the student will face a number of specific issues which should, perhaps, be explored. These concern the procedural problems of organizing his inquiry, gathering his data, making his analysis, and drawing his conclusions.

1) Design. When freshmen come to college they seem to know only one way of organizing an inquiry, a modest piece of research: by the historical (i. e., chronological) ordering of data. Their analysis is at most one of "trend" or time sequence; in a few cases, it may as well deal with change over time and suggest reasons for or "factors" in the change. Empirical social science, however, favors a research design in which some general problem or set of hypotheses suggests some possible relationship among variables. Once the hypotheses has been decided on, the student must make sure that the concepts and definitions he has chosen will define the data he seeks with exactitude, with relevance for the hypotheses, and with meaning that communicates to other scholars. The design of the inquiry, in other words, must set down the organizing problem--what the study will prove or disprove--or the purposes of the inquiry. It must as well define the important independent and dependent variables and the scope of the inquiry (the "universe" of data to be considered).

2) Data. Two main issues bedevil the collection of data: its validity and its representativeness. The question of validity is one of the accuracy and veracity of witnesses to an event, of the truthfulness of an individual about his own voting behavior and party loyalties, of the validity of a document, of the completeness of a report of a legislative debate. It is perhaps the very first methodological issue--the one of "proof"--that the student encounters. The second issue, the one of representativeness or the adequacy of the sample of the universe, is less obvious, but by no means less crucial. We rarely have data on all cases of a single category or set; then, to what extent are they representative of the whole? To what extent can we generalize about the legislative processes in the American states from data based on the legislature of Minnesota, Wisconsin, New York, and Utah? Or what generalizations are we permitted about political thought in the middle ages when our evidence concerns

selected writings of Aquinas, John of Salisbury, Marsiglio of Padua, and Manegold of Lautenbach? The problem of the sample becomes a central concern in the sample survey of opinions and attitudes, but few other areas of political research accord it its due.

3) Analysis. If the inquiry is organized around some guiding proposition or hypothesis, the analysis will be cast in its terms. In general, analysis and explanation move in sequences from simple description all the way to complex causal explanation. It begins with the description of the institution, the process, the behavior. There follows then the piecing together of specifics into sequences or wholes--into processes or configurations ("gestalts"). At this point the political scientist's analysis may enable him to answer the "how" questions; he establishes processes, mechanisms, and chains of events and conditions. He may have established a trend or change over time, a purposive sequence of actions, an alteration in institutions or functions. But he is some distance from answering the fundamental questions of cause. At the next point in the refinement of analysis, we deal with conditions and correlations. Here we establish the concomitance of event and conditions; A and B must exist for there to be C, or A and B exist in a significant % of the cases in which C does. Yet, we have no assurance that A or B causes C, or even that C causes either/or both A and B; outside factors D, E, etc. may cause the relationship. Finally, of course, we move to the analytical level of cause: the establishment of the causal mechanism linking the correlated variables. Perhaps this sequence of analysis might best be illustrated:

- a) description--Data on the city manager systems of a number of cities of varying size.
- b) sequences--The operations of city manager systems; the description of the tension between managers and elected public officials.
- c) correlation--statement of the relationship between failure of the city manager system and the population of the city. (At this level one can even predict with considerable certainty that managers in large cities will fail, even though the causal explanation is missing.)
- d) causal--identification of causal roots of relationship; e. g. , the larger city, the more complex its political system, and the greater the need for political leadership which the city manager cannot provide.

In general, the methods of empiricism move toward the building of systematic theories of social behavior and institutions. For it is committed to the proposition that mature knowledge in any field is by its nature theoretical. These theoretical propositions may be of any degree of breadth; those explaining a fairly narrow and specific range of events, those of the middle range, and

those of the entire system. They may deal with decision-making in general, or with the functional prerequisites of the entire political system. But at whatever level they are framed, they all must meet the test of predictability (within certain limits of probability). That is to say--perhaps less forthrightly--they must be cast and verified as an "if..then.." statement. If certain conditions are met, then the specified result will occur. In terms of the last paragraph, these theories grow out of correlational and causal analysis.

So far as the specific techniques within the methodological range of empiricism are concerned, political science has only recently discovered the techniques and procedures which others of the social sciences have made common in the last generation. Basically, political scientists have gotten their data in conventional ways. They have relied on documentary materials (census data, legislative reports and journals, executive and diplomatic papers, judicial decisions, state papers and government documents, U.N. materials, opinions of international tribunals, reports of local authorities, etc.) and on field observations and interviewing for data and information (the study of political parties depends heavily on these sources of data, as do the studies of primitive and non-Western political systems). Even more sophisticated ways of refining and ordering this (content analysis, for instance) have not been widely employed. Small group, controlled experiments have not been common, either, but the use of sample survey techniques has increased in the last decade.

Similarly, the more sophisticated techniques of analysis and description are also just reaching political science. Guttman scaling has within the last ten years been applied widely to the roll call votes of American legislatures and the decisions of American judges. Political scientists--at least the generation now passing through the graduate schools--are also sharpening their skills in statistical analysis. (They also use graphs, charts, tables, and maps in addition to inelegant prose as methods of presenting and organizing material!)

Finally, on this question of the empirical method, there are the attitudes and intellectual values on which empiricism depends and which it, in turn, ought to foster. It depends on a healthy skepticism, a demand "to be shown" and an unwillingness to accept the simple assertion just because some one else accepts it or because it has been widely asserted in the past. It is also an attitude of intellectual rigor and hard-headedness, an orderliness, a logical toughness; it demands the antithesis of wooly-headed ignorance. And it demands a commitment of objectivity, to the isolation of one's own values and preferences from his activity as a scholar. It recognizes, however, that objectivity does not mean a fence-sitting unwillingness to come to conclusions. Above all, it rejects the soft-headed impression that authoritative fact or generalization is not possible about social phenomena--that it is "just a matter of your opinion against mine."

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that empiricism is not universally accepted within political science. The exceptions are two-fold. First of all,

since political science has within it a tradition of philosophical-political studies, it is natural that those specialists may use the methods of general philosophical analysis as well as the empirical ways of the approach of intellectual history. They are concerned with the clarification of values, with means-end sequences, with tests of value propositions, with semantic and logical clarity and consistency.¹¹ Therefore, political scientists are concerned with clarifying "ends to ends" chains. One may say "democracy is the best form of government", and he will have made an obvious value statement. But such a value preference can be broken down into the underlying values: "Democracy is the best form of government because it will best conduce to individual self-fulfillment and choice." In the same way, one can apply pragmatic tests to political values; that is, one can say that this value preference will have consequences, A, B, and C; one then must apply other value preferences in order to assess those three consequences. The nature and implication of "ought" and value statements, in other words, cannot be validated by empirical methods. In coping with them, perhaps the greatest problem and curricular challenge is simply to recognize them.

Then, the "counter-behavioral" movement of Professor Strauss and his disciples also rejects empiricism--not only for philosophical analysis but for all the rest of political science. He would apparently substitute a neo-Thomistic rationalism, the knowledge of the common sense of the educated, liberated man. For the Straussians, the methods of empiricism apparently either elucidate the trivial or the obvious; in addition, they carry within them the inevitable value preferences of their proponents. Despite the acrimony of the Straussian challenge, the movement has attracted few committed adherents in political science.¹²

II) The Theories

Unlike economics, the field of political science has not achieved a central, organizing theory around which material can be organized and given meaning. There have been a number of attempts at working out just such a theory, but for the moment at least they have neither solved the integrative problem nor have they won wide scholarly consensus or acceptance. They remain for the moment only "frames of reference," "ways of looking at" and organizing the political world. At this stage in the development of political science they illustrate political science's concern for theory, they promote inquiry and analysis, they point to the relationships the discipline has not established, and they offer the student a series of conceptual tools for his own work.

To illustrate the types and varieties of theoretical systems which political scientists have been proposing, we might summarize very briefly four of the major ones: the power and influence theories, those centering on decision-making, conflict resolution theories, and the systems analyses.

1) Power and influence. Although these theories differ in the definition they give to the power or influence relationship, they have in common a concern for that relationship which divides the rulers and the ruled, the elite and the masses.

They concern the bases of power, its strategies and management, its objects and goals, and the mechanisms through which it is employed. In general these theories have grappled with only limited success with the problem of the scope of their applicability; if they are to embrace all relationships of power and influence, they absorb all social relationships, and, thus, all of the social sciences. Perhaps the best known of these theories is that proposed by Harold Laswell (in *Power and Society*) in which he defines power as "participation in the making of decisions.... The concept of power is perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of political science: The political process is the shaping, distribution, and exercise of power...."¹³

2) Decision-making. It is, perhaps, stretching the point to consider the decision-making theories as true theories; in reality, they are foci or systems of organizing the political process. They have been less successful in developing causal explanations between and among the political variables; the problem, indeed, is that they are attempts to relate and join activities rather than explain them. The decision-making system of Richard Snyder, for instance, outlines all of the major influences, both behavioral and institutional, impinging on (and permitting the impingement of) the decision-maker as he goes about the process of making authoritative policy.¹⁴ It is, however, really an outline or schema for analysis, rather than an explanatory theory for explaining the events and relationships. In other words, influence or group theories can be mated to the decision-making approach with little difficulty.

3) Conflict resolution. These theoretical systems view the political system in the aggregate as a system for resolving social conflict or choosing between contending political interests. Much of their vocabulary, appropriately, refers to political struggles, conflict, compromise, and accommodation. The best known of these systems, "group theory", views this political conflict in terms of major political groups, each of which organizes the political conflict by inducting its members into political goals and outlooks, by organizing aggregates of individuals, and by framing and influencing the final policy decision by the wielders of public authority. Group theory, perhaps most eloquently propounded by David Truman, additionally views the political system as a system constantly tending toward, but never really reaching, equilibrium.¹⁵ Like the economic system, it, too, tends to view the political system in mechanistic terms, often in rather crude "pressure" terms in which the strongest "pull" wins the legislative tug of war.

4) Systems analysis. Perhaps just as frequently referred to as "functional" theory, the systems analyses posit a total system, a political "enterprise", an entity which by its very nature demands the performance of certain political functions in order to maintain its well-being. Those processes and activities which conduce to the success of the system or entity are referred to as "functional" or "eufunctional"; those which do not are "dys-functional". By positing the entity the scholar then looks for the functions which must be performed in order to maintain the system. From that point, it next becomes a matter of determining how and by whom the functions are performed. One

recent, probably eclectic, exposition of functionalism has suggested that, aside from the policy-making functions, the political system must have performed functions of political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation (promotion), interest aggregation (organization), and political communication.¹⁶ Functional theories have been especially popular with scholars of the non-Western political systems who find the culture-bound categories of Western institutions and processes inadequate for studying and comparing the non-Western political system.

Even though these theories have yet to yield an organizing analysis of political relationships, they have continuing value as organized systems of concepts and as ways of looking at the political. In fact, the approach of the following section on the materials of political science will adopt an eclectic approach. Taken at the general level of tool, concept, and mode of organization, there is no reason why the conflict resolution, power/influence, and decision-making systems cannot be brought together. Basically there may be fundamental incompatibilities--the group theories reflect a degree of social determinism which the power/influence theorists might ultimately want to reject--but the concepts and foci the three introduce into the study of politics have no incompatibility taken as concepts and foci rather than as total political theories. The approach of the systems theories, with their commitments to a closed, total, self-contained system, is harder to integrate with the others.

The theoretical achievements of political science to date, then, have been almost embarrassingly modest. What theory the discipline has developed has been that of the middle-range, and it can probably best be integrated into the study of government and politics with its appropriate subject matter, since it cannot provide the great, over-arching, integrative function of a general, systematic theory. The study of political parties has, for instance, developed a body of theory on the formation of party systems; the general thrust of that theory suggests that the number of competitive parties in the system reflects both the presence of social cohesion or conflict as well as the influence of the political institutions themselves. Chief among those important, if secondary, institutional influences is that of the electoral system. That middle-range theory explains something of the pattern of party competition and inter-party relationships, but it does not in any sense either function as a general theory, or really even "hitch onto" one.

Perhaps the state of theory in American political science can best be summed up by saying that the theoretical systems of Lasswell, Truman, et al., outline the major variables--or rather systems of major variables--with which one can view political events. They are at this point only systems--"models", if one will--of concepts and relationships. Because of a shortage of data and an inability to measure what we have--and also because of the failure of the systems to accommodate all variables--we have not been able to convert these models into precise statements of relationship with predictive validity. One can reduce the political system, as Lasswell has, to a series of

statements that explain the political in terms of power, a group of the powerful, the roots and causes of power, the strategies of the exercise of that power. But it is quite another matter to develop propositions which will explain and predict the occurrence and exercise of power. We have a framework for a post-hoc analysis of power; we do not have predictive statements about power in general.

III) Curricular Matters

Since it seems to me that simplicity and conciseness of presentation is of overriding importance in this statement of the basic materials for a curriculum in political science, I have chosen to make several limiting assumptions. First of all, the material that follows will deal largely with contemporary materials. Non-contemporary materials, for illustrative or developmental purposes, could at many points be easily introduced; it is not, however, my intention that the scheme could or should accommodate full developmental sequences. There is no intention here of treating institutions or processes of government historically.

Secondly, there will be an assumption in the discussion of the political system, the institutions of government, and the behavior of individuals that we are talking of these phenomena in a democratic political system, most especially the American. That decision seems to me to be dictated by a number of obvious considerations. At the same time, the approach is broad enough to accommodate other political systems, especially the non-Western.

Thirdly, I have consciously eliminated much of the traditional, abstract philosophical apparatus of an approach to the political simply because it seems to me to be difficult for beginning students to relate to. To illustrate, there is little in the following pages that would call for a systematic exposition of theories of the state, of sovereignty, of legitimacy and obligation, or of any other philosophical or juridical principles. That decision, I know, some political scientists might not concur in; it grows out of my personal approach to politics and out of my own pedagogical judgments. Since my observation would be that distinctions between mechanistic and organic theories of the state do not excite introductory students, and since I do not believe the distinction is essential for the beginner in the field, I really see no point in including it (and its conceptual peers) in this summary.

The progression of topics, concepts, and materials which follows for the rest of this paper will reflect the decision-making focus suggested in the earlier schematic presentation of the political process. In other words, it centers around the decision of public policy-makers about whom and on whom the political influences of the system are brought to bear. Within the context of institutions of government, these authoritative policy makers resolve the conflict in goals and means which individuals and political organizations bring to their attention through their political activity. To take a specific illustration, if a Congress is attempting to frame and pass a new labor-management

relations law or a new farm price support bill, what would a student have to know to understand how and why that particular issue came to that specific group of decision-makers, and why and how it was being decided when and where and in the way it was? The same questions, of course, could be asked of a President trying to hammer out a foreign policy or negotiate a treaty, or of a Supreme Court deciding an issue of racial segregation or of Sunday closing laws.

The materials of the summary will be divided into six categories: micro-politics, political organizations, the institutional context, policy-making, international systems, and ideological and evaluative categories.

A) Micro-politics:

The individual citizen or participant in the political process approaches the political process with a complex of political attitudes, outlooks, values, and goals. He may believe, for instance, that government itself constitutes a threat to personal liberty and that that government is best which governs least. He may believe that the demands of "good citizenship" demand a certain level of political activity, or he may believe that his political activity is futile and inefficacious. He may indeed know nothing of the political system or its opportunities; as a result he may be forced to take all political cues from a political leader or organization. He also acquires values and needs that become demands or interests for him--the drive for racial equality, a minimum wage or a reduction in personal tax liability, unilateral disarmament, the blockading of Cuba. Some of these interests he may achieve without political action, but for them and others he may wish to seek the authoritative support of the political system. The sum total of these norms, attitudes, and expectations in a society we call the political culture.

The process by which the individual acquires these political attitudes and goals we may call political socialization. The process of socialization furthermore, continues throughout the individual's life. New experiences may develop new attitudes and demands; experience in political activity itself may reshape the individual's cognition of the political process. Very probably the chief political socializers are the home and family, the school, and the primary groups with which the individual is associated. Depending on the nature of the political system, the government itself, the mass media, occupation and religious-ethnic associations, and parties (through youth movements) may augment the process. In any event, political scientists tend to attribute the process, as the term "socialization" indicates, to social causes. There may be some psychological roots to political attitude, however; just at a common sense level, the paranoid individual will clearly perceive government and politics (and its complex ambiguity) in conspiratorial and black-white terms.

One can view the matter of political socialization from another perspective; it is the way in which one generation educates and inducts its successors. It is the process by which conventional political wisdom is transmitted. It is

also the point at which the individual acquires the basic political skills. At least he acquires the raw materials of the knowledge of the system and self-knowledge of his own goals in it.

Political activity follows when the individual seeks his goals and interests in the political system. That activity may take any number of forms, again depending on the nature of the system: voting, activity in a political party or an interest group, discussing politics in small groups, organizing litigation to test constitutional issues, lobbying before a city council, making contributions to the election campaign of a local candidate, for instance. The incidence of that activity varies considerably from political system to political system; for example, a far larger percentage of adults hold memberships in political parties in West Germany than in the United States. Voting turnouts differ greatly (40 percent to over 90 percent) among the democracies. And within any one, the incidence varies greatly--from almost hyperthyroid political activity to total passivity and inactivity. Those differing levels of activity are related to a number of factors: age, educational level, time and financial resources, nature of socialization, political role perceptions, class and caste structures, formal legal limits on activity (e. g., disenfranchisement of the American Negro), and conflicts in expectation.

Finally, the entire process of political socialization and activity is dependent on the quality of information in the entire system; indeed, all of the system depends on that political communication. But at this level, the process of socialization and the individual's activity depend on the processes by which he learns about the political, about what opportunities it offers, about what it is, what practical and immediate choices and options it affords, and about alternative candidates for public responsibility. The political individual's political attitudes and beliefs and demands--aggregately we may call them public opinion, or better, perhaps, the opinions of various publics--are formed only in response to a picture of reality formed for him, since he knows little of it at first hand. The importance of the mass media and other agencies which create that image--in some systems it is governmental propaganda agencies--is crucial. So, too, it is crucial in the ways it transmits the opinions of some to others in the system.¹⁷

B) Political Organization

Between the political individuals and the decision-making organs and institutions of government stand a series of political organizations whose task it is to bring individuals into aggregates of influence, to transmit those aggregates to the effective decision-makers, and to organize political conflict against other interests and organizations. They are the results of a political division of labor in which some individuals and groups are more politically oriented and active than others; they may also, because of the power of organization, offset the preponderance of sheer numbers by the use of organizational skills and concentrations.

The most common of the formal political organizations in the political party. It is most obviously distinguished from the other political organizations by its completely political character and by its general dominance of the organizational process of contesting elections. Parties generally exist in competitive systems, the systems actually named after the number of major, competitive parties. The number of competitive parties in the system--one, two, or many--will depend on the basic nature of the cohesions and conflicts in the society (and which are reflected in the competitive patterns of its politics), on the governmental structure (e. g. , whether there is a single or plural executive) and the electoral system (e. g. , plural constituencies and proportional representation tend toward multi-party systems). The parties within a system will also differ by structure and by function. In structure they range from elite, cadre parties to mass-membership, club-style parties; in function they differentially perform the classic party functions of nominating candidates and contesting elections, stating and promoting programs and platforms, and organizing the activities of elected decision-makers such as legislators. The form and functions they take depend on the political culture of the system and on the functional demands of the political system itself (e. g. , parliamentary systems which depend on legislative majorities to support cabinets compel the parties to greater organizational efforts on legislators than does the American system).

Another formal political organization, the interest group (i. e. "pressure" group), differs from the party in that it has, unlike the party, a non-political existence. Groups such as the AMA, the American Legion, the AFL-CIO, the American Farm Bureau, and the Foreign Policy Association achieve many of their goals outside of the political system, resorting to political action only part of the time. While it may also compete with the parties in their classic three functions, the interest group concentrates on another function: the exertion of influence on the decision-maker at the time of policy-making. The classic form of such activity we call "lobbying." In general, then, the interest group attempts to bring aggregates of influence to bear on the decision-making processes by education, by direct influence on decision-makers, by attempts to frame the possible choices the decision-makers have (e. g. , by bringing test cases before appellate courts). Their effectiveness as political organizations may depend on the degree of internal cohesion they can maintain within the organization and on the resources they can mobilize (numbers, level of activity, access to decision makers, financing, etc.). It must be kept in mind, however, that the interests they represent include the intangible (racial equality, civil liberties, patriotism, internationalism, esthetic virtues) as well as the tangible (which are generally the economic).

These two varieties of formal organization are characterized by organizational stability and longevity. Others, perhaps deserving of less attention, are not: personal cliques, factions, community elites.

The formal political organizations can (and should) also be approached in terms of their membership clienteles. Who is it who belongs to the interest

group and why? Who are the active members who run the organization? And for the political parties? In the case of the parties the issue is more complex. Especially in the American parties, people affiliate with the parties in varying degrees of intensity--active workers, officers in the party, party members, regular voters for the party candidates, and general sympathizers and identifiers. To some extent, the interest group may approximate such a range of affiliation. It is, therefore, useful to know who affiliates in the various ways, why they do so (e.g., who are the Republican and the Democratic voters in the U.S.? Are they from different social groups?) And the question of the internal distribution of power within the organization--the presence of intra-organizational democracy and centralization of authority--is relevant to both.

At a less formal level, the function of political organization may be accomplished by the political leader. Especially in the Twentieth century the rise of the mass political leader has become one of the startling facts about both democratic and non-democratic political systems. His organizing influence, personal at the outset, may, as Max Weber has pointed out, be institutionalized and formalized eventually. Political leadership, a relationship rather than a series of universal traits and characteristics, will differ as the leadership situation does. The mobilization of political support in Great Britain and Ghana may require quite different skills. Since leadership involves the mobilization of individuals behind common goals, it clearly touches the concepts of power and influence. The latter refer to the establishment of superordinate-subordinate relationships and to the ability of men to influence the actions and behavior of others. Aggregates of the powerful and influential form political elites. Both leadership and the power-influence relationship deserve study in terms of their roots and sources. These would include personal communication and magnetism, intelligence and intellectual skills, status and deference, and economic power (there is, therefore, a relationship between economics, social, and political elites). The main distinguishing factor between the leadership and the power-influence relationships is the dependence of the former on the personal skills of the individual leader, while the power-influence relationship may depend on factors other than the personal skills of the powerful or influential.¹⁸

C) The Institutional Context

The institutions of government constitute the arenas or the structures in which the authoritative decisions of the political process are made. They limit access to the decision-makers (e.g., one can bring a policy issue before the U.S. courts only in the form of a case with adversary parties), they set the procedures of decision-making, and they set the powers of the decision-makers. Clearly, the legislator or legislative majority is bound and hedged about by institutional limitations such as these. Furthermore, these institutional factors may, informally, distribute power and authority among the decision-makers. The institution of the seniority system combined with the role of the committees in the U.S. Congress clearly works to grant greater power within the chambers and access from outside to conservative Southern

and farm groups. In this sense, the institutions of government set the boundaries and dimensions of the political playing field and fix the rules of the game played on it.

The common approach to the institutions of government is to the common three-fold functional trichotomy: legislatures, executives, and judiciaries. Such an approach, however, reflects the American separation of powers, in which the three functional branches are in theory separate, co-ordinate, and even antagonistic. In the more common parliamentary systems, even though the judiciary remains separate, the parliamentary majority chooses from its membership a cabinet which performs for parliament the executive functions and which maintains responsibility for the administrative agencies to parliament. Legislative and executive-administrative functions are not performed by separate--separate in organization, powers, and personnel--institutions. In some non-Western and primitive political systems of course, this functional division will not be maintained at all in the political institutions. Finally, in operation and assumptions the separation of powers and parliamentary systems differ greatly. The separation proceeds on the assumption that governmental power can best be limited by an internal system of restraints, by pitting one structure against another; the delay and deadlock that often results from its operation is really its main justification. The parliamentary systems rely less on the internal checks within the institutions and more on the external control of an informed opinion and electorate holding responsible the parliamentary-cabinet majority.

In these categories which concern primarily the legislature and executive it is easy to overlook the institutional importance of the administrative agencies. The administrative bureaucracy, largely the result of massive, positive government, assumes the staggering task of effectuating the growing mass of public policies. Its relationships to the politically responsible, elected executives and legislatures remains one of the most troublesome problems of 20th Century government. It no longer suffices to dismiss the problem by simply describing the executive as the head administrator. (One rather specially American solution to the problem has been the city manager, a non-political and non-partisan administrative head separate from the elected executive in the cities.) Increasingly, administration operates independently, often in recognition of its superior competence and expertise in the complicated matters of government. Increasingly, too, as in the case of the American independent regulatory commission (ICC, FTC, FPC, SEC, FCC, etc.), the administrative agency has also become a policy-making agency with its own political clientele and its own contested policy-making decisions.

The institutions of government may also be viewed in terms of another scheme: that of the geographical distribution of authority (as opposed to the functional distribution discussed above). Again there is a common dichotomy: the decentralized federal systems, with a division of powers between the central government and regional units, and the centralized unitary systems in which effective powers are centralized in one, over-all government. Again,

there are different rationales behind the two systems, and they have different practical consequences. Federalism pays greater homage to local difference and autonomy, and it also pays the greater price in inconsistency, diversity, and competition. The system that permits local educational customs to prevail also permits different rates of literacy; deference to local preferences in tax systems may also produce tax competition for migrant industry. One should add, however, that local government exists in unitary systems--in the British town councils, for example--just as it does in federal systems. But it exists there at the sufferance of the central authority and subject to review by it.

Finally, when one speaks of the institutional framework, he ought also to speak of the constitution, the instrument that sets down the institutional framework. Constitutions set out the functional and geographical divisions of powers, and they also set down in the name of the people what powers will be granted to government; that is, they set the scope of governmental action, what matters government will settle and what it will not. The constitution usually also, beyond reserving certain matters and functions to private action, states certain rights of individuals which cannot be altered by the majority acting through the institutions of government. In these matters, it is the basic charter of government, the definer and explicator of the institutional context. Some, in addition, attempt to regulate and control the political organizations; the American constitution, however, does not. In dealing with constitutions, one cannot ignore the methods the system has for interpreting, applying, and changing the constitution. That matter, in turn, depends on the nature of the constitution. Change and application differ greatly, for example, between the codified, written American constitution and the loosely stated, custom-rooted British constitution. Judicial interpretation and "change" are now unknown in Britain.

In no section of this summary is it more difficult to generalize across national and cultural boundaries than here. Institutions differ greatly; the processes and functions on which the other sections are built do not. At this point, therefore, one has to make difficult choices: which set of political institutions will he describe? In the teaching of American political science the choice inevitably lights upon the American political institutions, with useful contrasts and comparisons made to other institutions. In addition, at this point one is reduced to more purely descriptive terms; analysis in institutional description is difficult and often unrewarding. So, one can view the entire material of this section in terms of American political institutions--in terms, of Congress, local city councils, the Supreme Court, the President, state legislatures, local administrative agencies, and the American constitution. The American institutions can also be analyzed in terms of the separation of powers and federal systems; illustration would be superfluous.¹⁹

D) Policy-Making

The point in the political process at which public policy is made is the crucial point in the process at which all influences and political activity

converge for the settlement of competing political claims. In this sense it is the point in the process at which one views the macro-political world.

Policy-making begins with the policy makers or decision-makers. They, not even judges, are not ciphers or automatons in the decisional process. Their choice may be influenced by their own experience, their values, their social characteristics, their own political outlooks. It may, for instance, make a difference whether a substantial number of judges in a judicial system has had administrative experience in public office, just as it may matter whether or not legislators are recruited from the ranks of active, long-time party workers. The backgrounds and values and experience of decision-makers not only tells directly in their decisions, but tells indirectly in the different degrees of access they accord to influencers. The preponderance of lawyers in American public office unquestionably gives access to legal and bar groups; organized labor and civil rights groups, conversely, argue their disadvantage in having so few members in legislatures. Ultimately, this question of what kinds of people make public policy depends on who picks them. If it is an electorate, it may not be a representative one (e. g., the American South); that fact may explain the characteristics of the policy makers. Whether the choice is by election or not, the chief question concerns the control of the selection. If it is an election, is it a party, a particular group of voters, an influential leader? If it is by appointment or co-optation, the issue remains. Often the answer is more complicated than formal reality; appointments to the lower federal courts are, in fact, controlled not by the President, but to some extent by members of the Senate (under the traditions of senatorial courtesy). Only in systems such as heredity does the selection process evade personal influence.

The strategy of influencing public policy depends on a number of factors. The groups or individuals must first of all define the possible decision-making points they seek to influence. These will be all those groups and individuals involved in the making and administration of the policy in which they are interested. They may attempt to influence its drafting in an executive office, its consideration in the House rules committee, its debate on the floor of the houses of Congress, its application by an administrative agency, or even its interpretation in the courts. Which of these points they seek to influence will depend on their calculations of victory; railroad groups have concentrated recently on the Interstate Commerce Commission rather than the Congress, and Negro groups, shut out of the Senate by the filibuster, have focused on the courts. Differences in their access will also determine which of the decisions they try to influence; access will depend on the traditions and norms of the institutions and decision makers (e. g., access directly to justices of the Supreme Court is virtually impossible), on the personal values, experiences, and preferences of the policy maker, and on the strength and skill of the would-be influencer.

The various sources of influence may be suggested briefly. Powerful individuals, local elites, and cliques cannot be discounted. Interest groups

also influence the making of public policy, depending on the cohesion of their members, their numbers, the financial resources, the status, and the strategic skills of the group. A political party may also try to influence policy making in conformity with its platform or manifest; the American parties, however, find it harder than most major parties to organize and discipline their elected officials to support party programs. In addition, various institutions and their decision-makers exert influence on others, the organized attempt of the American President to lobby and coax his program through the Congress is a classic example. Indeed, administrative officials spend a considerable part of a year's time trying to insure favorable legislative treatment of their requests and programs. The policy maker will also feel the pressure of his fellow decision-makers and of the organizational goals of his institution. Justices of the Supreme Court are conscious always of the need to maintain the integrity, authority, and independence of the Court; a reasonable case can be made that this has been the single most influential factor on the decisions of the Court throughout its history. Finally, the need for a "rational" decision, one which will (apart from the influences of those concerned) meet the needs of the problem to which the policy alternatives are directed, bears heavily on the policy maker.

The policy-maker, however, is not an impartial referee in the decision-making process. He is bound to certain clienteles by his dependence on them for his continuance in office. The most obvious of these is the electorate which placed him in office (if he was elected) and which keeps him there. That relationship, however, is not so simple as the possibility of defeat at future elections; it is a continuing relationship in which the members of his constituency maintain relationships with a decision-maker who is from the constituency and shares its values and knows its needs. It is also confused by the other bidders (such as the party) for the decision-maker's loyalty, and by his own perception of whether his greatest responsibility in making public policy lies with the wishes of his constituency, with the party which elected him, with some defined community or public interest, or with his own personal criteria of what is good and right and wise. All of these relationships are summed up in the concepts and dilemmas of representation. His dependence may, if he is appointed, extend to the people responsible for his reappointment. And if he heads an administrative agency, he may be dependent on the groups with whom his agency deals--which he may even regulate--if they are strong enough to curtail his budget and authority in the legislature.

Taking the policy-making process as a whole, one may also note overall patterns of influence and effectiveness. The general strategic advantage, for instance, always lies with the status quo. It has status, acceptability, and access--as well as financial advantages. It has also the advantage of the defense in a complicated policy-making process; it has to stop action at only one point in the process, but the innovators have to secure approval at a number of decision-making points. Political institutions (such as the American separation of power) that diffuse decision-making, thus tend to make change difficult and protect the status quo. One may also see the overall relationship between social and economic power and power in the political process.

Finally, the policy made in this process may be of a number of varieties: statutes, ordinances, treaties, rules and orders, decisions, or informal agreements. As policy, or law, it must be effectuated and applied; and in that process the entire decision-making and influence process goes on again. The speed limit has no real impact until it is enforced, and it falls to someone to decide how, when, and with which degree of stringency to enforce it. Ultimately, these problems lead to the more basic questions of the role of law in society--to questions of its ability to change social behavior and social attitudes, of the degree of acceptance and compliance necessary to enforce it (i. e. , the necessary balance between enforcement and self-enforcement), and of the most effective means of enforcement (i. e. , courts or administrative enforcement?). Every one of these problems is amply illustrated by the relationship between public policy--such as the Supreme Court opinion, Presidential orders and intervention, civil rights statutes--and the basic social problem in the controversy of the last ten years over desegregation and racial equality. 20

E) International Relations

That branch of political science which we loosely refer to as international relations includes in general the relations of nations in the international system. That system is in itself not completely comparable to the usual self-contained political system. Relations within it are free, bargaining relationships involving the strategic maneuvering of "sovereign" nations that do not necessarily accept the legitimacy of any authoritative conflict-settling mechanism. Its participants are exactly that independent--whereas the participants in a political system are not. Nonetheless, the politics of relations among nations has been a traditional part of the study of political science. In recognition of the difference of the relationships, however, one might point out the wider application to international relations of pure bargaining and decision-making models--such as the classic game theory of Morgenstern and Von Neumann. The international system, in other words, meets its suppositions about rational decision-making and the maximization of utilities more adequately than does the usual political system.

Each nation in the international system begins its relations by setting its own goals and strategies--its foreign policy. The goals may be determined by a need for survival, or by militant nationalism which preaches a national aggrandizement, by some internal definition of altruistic goals, by the necessity of protecting investments or other economic relationships, by the presence of commitments or colonies in other parts of the world. Take the United States as an example. Scholars over the last 15 years have engaged in a debate over just what constituted this country's "national interest" as a goal for its foreign policies. A nation must also examine its assets and set realistic strategies based on them; those assets are the foundations of national power discussed below. The processes by which a nation sets its foreign policy are very much a part of its internal politics. Presidential elections and congressional investigations may influence its setting in the United States; so, too, will powerful interest groups, such as exporting industries and farmers,

powerful religious and ethnic groups (e. g. , American policy on the foundation of the state of Israel), foreign policy associations and association for the support of the UN, and patriotic, veteran, and military groups. Similarly, the setting of the policy may be done as much in Treasury departments, with their influence on international banking and currency exchange, or defense departments, as by state departments or foreign offices. Indeed, the formal distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy may be increasingly unclear. If foreign policy covers those actions of a nation which influence the behavior of other nations, American policy on civil rights and Negro equality may well touch the functions of foreign policy.

The relations of nations follow a number of courses and mechanisms. The traditional form has been diplomacy, the direct bargaining and negotiation of nations over matters of mutual interest. These diplomatic relationships, and the rights and positions of nations in the international community, may be regularized and codified into international law. That law may be recognized and binding custom, or treaties and conventions, or the decisions of international tribunals. As a system of law, international law lacks the enforcement machinery of positive national law; nonetheless, nations find it to their advantage to accept its conventions and may, indeed, find themselves under considerable pressure to do so from allies and other nations. But, again, these relationships of diplomacy and international law are less formal and regularized than those within a political system; enforcement may depend ultimately on the power and willingness of some nation to enforce them.

Slowly, the nations of the world have tried to stabilize and institutionalize their relations with a variety of forms of international organization. These organizations regularize, even bureaucratize, the relations of nations, and they also provide an occasion and forum for their meetings and negotiations. Many of them exist for the purposes of common defense; collective security organizations (NATO, SEATO, and the UN) are illustrative. In addition to being the collective security organization of widest scope, the United Nations also provides a forum for international negotiation, a preponderance of world force and opinion for action against aggressors, and, increasingly, machinery for containing international tensions and threats to international stability (such as the Congo's civil war). Affiliated with the UN also are the functional organizations long a potent form of international organization: the World Health Organization, the UNESCO, and the International Labor Organization, for instance. They are collective attacks on problems of international concern and important sources for the exchange of knowledge and information. One can also cite the International Court of Justice as another form of international organization. At this point, however, it is important to understand the ways in which they fall short of the standards of universality of scope, legitimacy, and monopoly of sanctions. In the conventional use of the term, they are not "world government".

These are the formal mechanisms and routes of international politics. But in addition, the international system may be looked at as a series of power

relationships. The sources of bases of national power in dealing with other nations are many; technology and productive capacity of the economy, the numbers and skills of its people, their morale and identification with national goals, natural resources and self-sufficiency, financial resources and manpower for defense, general standard of living, the motivations of ideology and other value systems, the nation's geographic position--again to mention only some factors. Those resources the nation converts into bases of international power. That power may be brought to bear on other nations through the channels and mechanisms mentioned above. The power and sanctions may take a number of forms: power in international economic relationships, military force, the psychological and propaganda relationships. Finally, nations may pool that power in international relationship behind common goals in varying systems of alliances and combinations. Some of these combinations of equals (relatively equal, at least) are blocs and alliances. Others are aggregates in which even the fiction of equality is difficult to maintain; here one might mention the essentially exploitative and unequal relationships of imperialism and colonialism.

Furthermore, it is increasingly common to view these power relationships in international affairs as a whole--that is, to speak of the complex of these relationships as the "international system." The pattern of those relationships may be bi-polar--that is, centered around two great blocs--or it may be multi-centered or fragmented. Or it may be bi-polar, but with an additional fluctuating neutral group of nations which have maintained some independence of both blocs. And, of course, the relationships of nations within the polar blocs may differ; the dominant world power in one may enjoy different, more dependent relations with its fellow members than does the nucleus of the other bloc. The conditions under which power and patterns of power shift and disintegrate in the system touch the basic issues of the system. Such systems have, indeed, also been viewed mechanistically; the old concept of the balance of power furnishes the best example. That image envisions some nation in the international system with sufficient power to maintain a balance, a non-preponderance, of power, and thus minimize the possibility of a preponderance of power within the system on which some nation might act without the restraint of opposing force. 21

F) Ideological and Evaluative Categories

In addition to those categories of data which constitute the substance of the political system and political relationships, political scientists have ever since the days of Plato and Aristotle developed categories for assessing the political system and for analyzing the goals and values it was to achieve. Plato's Republic undertakes a discussion of what sort of political arrangements can best promote justice for its citizens, and Aristotle developed the descriptive trichotomy of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy which we still depend on. These evaluative categories, of course, can be easily developed and illustrated in terms of contemporary conflicts of ideologies, such as that between democracy and Marxian (and Soviet) communism.

The most basic system of categories--that similar to Aristotle's--describes political systems in terms of the distribution of effective political power. For simplicity's sake, it can be said to include autocracy (government by one, whether it be monarchy, dictatorship, etc.), oligarchy (government by the few, whether the few be an aristocracy, a plutocracy, a theocracy, etc.), and democracy (government by the many). These categories beg the question of how one defines effective political power, and one may, indeed, doubt that in complex modern political systems a genuine autocracy is possible. In the case of democracy the problem is one of defining the degree and nature of the participation in the making of political decisions. Does a system in which elections provide no real alternative to a popular leader and in which that leader depends on a personal, charismatic popularity with the masses meet the criteria of democracy? (It should also be noted that categories of economic systems, addressed to the problem of the distribution of the power of economic decision-making, raise quite separable questions. Although economic and political systems may be related, capitalism and socialism are generically different from democracy and autocracy.)

About the very definition of democracy itself, scholars and philosophers disagree. There are those who view it as a decision-making mechanism in which great majorities of adults participate and which they can use for whatever ends they will. Against this instrumentalist view of democracy are arrayed those who argue it is more than a means or mechanism, that it is a way of life, a commitment to certain ends and values. At the operating level democracy also involves working relationships with its citizens; it must provide ways for the expression of consent, for the representation of interests and goals and opinion, and as any political system, its stability depends on its acceptance (its legitimacy) by its citizens. It may also be approached in terms of the assumptions it makes: the system must contain opportunities for the expression of difference, for an exchange of political information, for freedom to differ, to illustrate. Finally, democracy may be approached in terms of the non-political conditions necessary for its success. Some years ago political scientists were vastly more confident of their knowledge on this point than they are now since the rise of democratic systems in the non-Western world. Scholars would still probably suggest these necessary conditions: political awareness and information, social stability and mobility, a minimum standard of living (a minimal equality), and general political culture supporting the maintenance of the system and its authority.

The alternative to democracy in our time has, of course, been the authoritarianism of Soviet communism. It presents something of a categorical problem here, since in theory and ideology at least, it is the complete social theory, dealing with history (the dialectic), with theories of the economy, the society, and the polity (based on the all-pervasive economic determinism). As an authoritarian, oligarchic political system it has much in common with others of this century. It depends heavily on the mass ideology, charismatic leadership, the recruitment and leadership of a single political party, and the use of communications media and personalism to create and manipulate popular

acceptance and acquiescence. All of these systems have had problems of creating their own legitimacy, of maintaining the consent of their citizens, of providing outlets for popular opinion and aspirations--those problems are not the exclusive concern of democracies. Democracies merely go about coping with them differently than do authoritarian systems.

This conflict or contrast between democratic and non-democratic political systems may also be looked at as a conflict in basic underlying values. Certainly there is a difference in value assumption about the individual, his worth and his competence. Democracy by definition accords the individual a greater role in the direct determination of his destiny; lying behind that value, of course, are the religious traditions, the humanism, and the legal traditions of much of the Western world. Basically this reliance on and deference to the individual grows out of two main justifications: man's God-given rights and dignity, and the pragmatic, instrumental value of individual freedom. Related to the issue of the place of the individual are the concepts of equality, liberty, and justice. In their various approaches they probe the problems of the relationship of individual to individual and of individual to the community, the whole. The community demands order, stability, and the division of responsibilities and skills--goals which may be incompatible with the demands of individuals. That continuing attempt to solve the dilemmas of this conflict is, perhaps, the central problem in all of political philosophy and in all the attempts to create and modify political institutions.

Finally, we argue about the proper role of government, its proper scope of action and function. Within the past several generations popular usage has developed the term "totalitarianism" to describe those new political systems which have a total scope, which concern themselves even with private and personal relationships that were long considered no business of the political system. Within democratic systems, there is considerable latitude for variation in scope of competence within the general notion of limited government. It is the old problem in the democracies of public action versus private action. Its most recent manifestation is in the contemporary American political controversy between "conservatism" and "liberalism", a controversy which hinges largely on this question of role of government, especially in the management of the economy and the areas of social welfare legislation. At one level such a controversy as this raises the questions of basic value commitments; are the important values of individualism, equality, freedom, and justice best served by one balance between the public and the private or by another one? Are they indeed all served well by the same public-private mixture? On another level--the level of inquiry and empiricism--this is a problem in the very theory of the political system. What sorts of needs give rise to political institutions? We know as a matter of fact that men turn to government when other agencies of social control or arbitration no longer can perform that function, when the complexity and interdependence of a society makes it less likely that individuals can meet their own needs and wants by themselves or in informal groups.

Footnotes

1. For a general review of the development of American political science, see David Easton, The Political System (New York, 1953), Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States of America (UNESCO, 1956), and David B. Truman, "Current Trends in Political Science," Liberal Education, XLVII (May, 1961), 280-303.
2. The works of this tradition have all had a recent vogue. Bentley's work has been reissued, and it directly inspired David Truman's Governmental Process (New York, 1951). The works of Merriam have all become classics for the new political science, and Lasswell's Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (1935) has reappeared in current paperback form.
3. Two excellent works on the "new" political science by two of its most distinguished practitioners are: Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion In Politics (New York, 1962); and Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," American Political Science Review, LV (December, 1961), 763-772.
4. See, for example: David Easton, The Political System (New York, 1953); Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States of America (UNESCO, 1956); Charles Hyneman, The Study of Politics (Urbana, 1959); Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Palo Alto, 1960); and Harold Lasswell, The Future of Political Science (New York, 1963). A far less sympathetic account is Bernard Crick's, The American Science of Politics (Berkeley, 1959).
5. Frederick Watkins, The State as a Concept of Political Science (New York, 1934).
6. Harold Lasswell is the best known and most influential of these. See his Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York, 1958) and Power and Society (New Haven, 1950), written with Abraham Kaplan.
7. For an excellent and brief attempt to define politics and the political system for college students, see Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963).
8. An especially good illustration of this overlapping of disciplines with political science is the field of "political sociology" which has developed within sociology. For example, see Seymour M. Lipset's Political Man (New York, 1960).
9. The empiricism of American political science is reflected in the implicit logical positivism of its spokesmen. See Van Dyke's Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis, and Arnold Brecht, Political Theory (Princeton, 1959).

10. The literature on the philosophy of science in the social sciences is too vast to note here. An article, which explores these issues in a way relevant to political science is Avery Leiserson, "Problems of Methodology in Political Research," Political Science Quarterly, LXVIII (December, 1953), 558-584.
11. See, for example, Thomas L. Thorson, The Logic of Democracy (New York, 1962).
12. For the Straussian position, see: Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Illinois, 1961); and Herbert Storing (ed.), Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York, 1962).
13. Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, 1950), p. 75.
14. See Richard Snyder's brief and summary essay in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, 1958).
15. Two of the most noted recent representatives of "group theory" are David B. Truman in his The Governmental Process (New York, 1951) and Bertram Gross, whose The Legislative Struggle (New York, 1953) is representative. Both have been heavily influenced by Arthur Bentley.
16. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960).
17. The following works illustrate the literature in this aspect of political science: Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, 1959); Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe, 1958); Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York, 1922); Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York, 1960); V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1961); and Bernard Berelson, Voting (Chicago, 1954).
18. For works on political organizations, the following are illustrative: Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, 1954); Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, 1961); Henry Ehrmann, Interest Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh, 1958); and the wide literature on community power systems.
19. To get data and description on the institutional context of the political systems of the world, the reader might best consult the better college texts; see, for example, James Burns and Jack Peltason, Government by the People, 5th ed., (Englewood Cliffs, 1963); and various editions of Herman Finer's various texts and treatises on the major governments of the Western democracies.

20. Material on the policy-making process can best be illustrated by the many case studies which have studied specific decisions. In the American context they would include: Stephen Bailey, Congress Makes A Law (New York, 1950); Clement Vose, Caucasian Only (Berkeley, 1959); and Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York, 1960).
21. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1960); Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Relations (New York, 1957); and Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1957).
22. The literature in this evaluative aspect is staggering in quantity. George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York, 1961) offers the best-known history of political doctrines; see also Arnold Brecht, Political Theory (Princeton, 1959); and the works of recent political philosophers such as Ernest Barker.

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THE MANY MEANINGS OF HISTORY

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The lessons of history are clear to everyone but historians, and history has as many interpretations as practitioners. But while historians disagree about the nature and synthesis of history, they agree upon the procedures for determining basic historical facts. In order to understand both the fundamental agreements and disagreements among the followers of Clio, let us briefly follow the actual operations of an historian. The typical one selects a topic or a man in some period of the past. Then he attempts to read all the documents written by or about the subject contemporaneously and since. From his notes on these documents, he then usually prepares a narrative history or biography. At each phase of this process we have a different meaning of "history": (1) as actuality, (2) as record or remains, and (3) as written or produced.¹ By examining the process and each meaning in detail, we can better discover the premises, implicit and explicit, that govern the actions of the historian.

History-as-Actuality

Even the universal historians who take the entire past of mankind as their domain and presume to point out the ultimate meaning of man's life suppose that they base their interpretations, like their lesser brethren in the field, upon the actual events of the past. All historians try to discover (perhaps uncover) history-as-actuality or the total past of mankind as it was lived. That this is a large task can be seen in the definition of this meaning of history as given in Bulletin No. 54 of the Social Science Research Council:

history-as-actuality means all that has been felt, thought, imagined, said and done by human beings as such and in relation to one another and their environment since the beginning of mankind's operations on this planet.²

This meaning is conveyed well by the German word for history, *geschichte*, "that which has happened." At least the tremendous task implied in this meaning is limited from recovering all of the past, for historians only deal, in reality, with men and their interaction with each other and their physical environment. For this reason, history shares the larger concern of the social sciences.

History-as-Record

But the past is not recoverable as such, for the very essence of time is irreversibility. Thus the discovery of the past is actually the reconstruction of it. There are many traces of the past: archaeological artifacts; tales and traditions; books, newspapers, and letters of the time; or pictures and other works of art. Although the historian utilizes all of these sources, he prefers to deal with history as documentary record. He spends his time reading in libraries and archives rather than digging up pots in the hot sun or interviewing senile tale-bearers. Because of this preference for written records, the historian, perforce, restricts himself to a very small (and relatively recent) part of the human past. Thus the first bias of the historian is for studies of literate civilizations. He, like the evolutionists of the nineteenth century, equates history with civilization, and both begin with writing.

The great problem for the historian, no matter what material he chooses to use, is the scarcity of sources. Much that was produced has been destroyed, so he must, at best, put fragments together. (This problem is accentuated in the so-called ancient period and is less bothersome as modern times are approached with the printing press, census-takers, and mass media.) Not only has much material been lost, but much that the historian wants to know was never produced. He must use the documents of the past as they were produced by the people of the time, and so he can only learn what they thought important. As E. H. Carr reminds us.

No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought--what he thought he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought.

Because of the nature of many past societies, he thus must read between-the-lines in order to obtain information about such topics, for example, as the activities and thoughts of the ordinary person. (Even now in this age of the opinion poll, this is still necessary to some extent.) In other words, the historian has only a few participants' conceptions of events at the time to depend upon for his reconstruction of the past--an infinitesimally small fragment upon which to build so much.³

Historical Method

Since most of Clio's followers deal with documents, the historical method is essentially documentary analysis, for the historian wants to know what a particular document can tell him about the past. It is, to use the words of Louis Gottschalk, "the process of critically examining and analyzing the records and survivals of the past."⁴ The procedures for accomplishing this analysis were worked out in the nineteenth century, and the classic and still-standard books on method date from the end of that century.⁵ Perhaps the best American volume is Louis Gottschalk's Understanding History.⁶

First, the historian must ascertain the authenticity of the document; whether it is what it purports to be. He must be on guard against the possibilities of forged letters of famous people, fake travel accounts, and fictitious diaries. From anachronistic details, incorrect chronology, stylistic variations, and comparison with other sources, the historian judges the authenticity of a document.⁷

Then the historian must concern himself with the document's creditability- "not that it is actually what happened, but that it is as close to what actually happened as we can learn from a critical examination of the best available sources. This means verisimilar at a high level."⁸ In other words, can the witness' testimony be trusted?⁹ In evaluating the reliability of one documentary source over another, the historian prefers the document that would reveal most accurately the facts he wishes to know about a subject at a time. Gottschalk gives four general rules for choosing one documentary source over another for reliability:

- (1) As we have seen, incomplete observation and faulty memory are often responsible for inadequacy of testimony. Because a witness's reliability is, in general, inversely proportional to the time-lapse, between the observation of the event and the witness's recollection, the closer the time of making a document was to the event it records, the better it is likely to be for historical purposes.
- (2) Some documents were originally intended purely as records or aids to one's memory, some as reports to other persons, some as apologia, some as propaganda, and so on. Because documents differ in this way in purpose, the more serious the author's intentions to make a true record, the more dependable his document as a historical source.
- (3) Because the effort, on the one hand, to palliate the truth or, on the other, to decorate it with literacy, rhetorical, or dramatic flourishes tends to increase as the expected audience increases, in general the fewer the number for whose eyes the document was meant (i. e., the greater its confidential nature), the more "naked" its contents are likely to be.
- (4) Because the testimony of a schooled or experienced observer and reporter (e. g., a professional soldier regarding a battle, an experienced correspondent describing an interview, a veteran policeman reporting an accident, etc.) is generally superior to that of the untrained and casual observer and reporter, the greater the expertness of the author in the matter he is reporting, the more reliable his report.¹⁰

For these reasons historians prefer contemporary records to later ones, confidential reports to public ones, but public reports to none at all.¹¹

Historical method produces historical facts after careful analysis of the evidence. Gottschalk concludes,

A historical "fact" thus may be defined as a particular derived

directly or indirectly from historical documents and regarded as credible after careful testing in accordance with the canons of historical method.¹²

A historical fact is not actuality itself, but hopefully corresponds closely thereto.

Nature of Historical Fact

To most historians and students of history, "facts are facts," as a graduate student once told me. Historical facts are seen as concrete and obvious as physical objects, just as if they were stones tripped over in an open field while walking blindfolded. That "facts" are felt to consist of this nature results from the peculiar misunderstanding of Ranke that became known as "scientific history" in the United States.¹³ This crude positivism results from the empiricist orientation of the Anglo-American intellectual tradition and flies in the face of thinking in contemporary philosophy and social science.

The very method of deriving historical facts means that they could not be of this nature. Since past events are no longer available for direct inspection, facts about them must be deduced from evidence. The validity of these facts cannot be tested by the scientific model of seeing whether they correspond to an independently known reality. Historical facts thus are neither reality nor measured by reality itself, but propositions about the past based upon presumed evidence. Checking historical fact is by reference to documents whose meaning and authenticity are not evident in the document itself. The procedures for establishing fact as outlined above rest upon two conditions: (1) the evidence is tested in terms of other material known, and (2) the discovered fact fits into a coherent, usually traditional, framework. Credibility of evidence thus rests upon implicit assumptions about the witness's motives and how that evidence fits into an already large framework of so-called facts. Facts, then, are found only by those with implicit and/or explicit hypotheses. Every fact an historian uncovers rests upon a large theoretical construction. In this sense, facts are low-level generalizations or abstractions. This does not mean there is no difference between what is commonly called fact and what is called generalization, but rather that facts are propositions generally accepted by all historians because the evidence seems so overwhelming in terms of the assumptions of the historical method. Much of the confusion about the precise nature of historical fact arises from confounding concrete evidence with the facts derived from it.¹⁴

If historical facts are created by the judgment of historians, then the social sciences also have a bearing upon understanding the nature of the judgmental process. To the extent perceptual categories are culturally determined, they lie within the realm of social science. The social, economic, and religious views of an historian will determine what he accepts as normal in another person, hence what he accepts as reliable testimony and what he accepts as likely events. Can a person understand views and actions alien to his own in reading the documents? In other words, is the historian a victim of his own history?

Furthermore, the advancement of social science theory widens the domain of facts that can be gleaned from the evidence. For example, theory in psychology not only allows the better assessment of motives of a writer of a document, hence credibility, but also a better understanding of the motives of men in general so that biographical documents reveal more than previously. New theories in economics created new sources of data about the past in censuses, old statistics, and account books. Similarly with the new political science, sometimes called political behavioralism, old evidence supports new facts. For example, Washington's Farewell Address becomes a political party fact.

All this means that analysis of evidence, establishment of facts, and general interpretation are all interrelated. What seems more factual than a date? Yet this seemingly concrete item is frequently involved in interpretation. Traditionally the Roman Empire fell in 476 A. D. , but today Odoacer's revolution in that year is no longer considered a turning point in Roman history. Historians believe that the Byzantine Empire carried on the tradition and that the making of European civilization did not occur till much later.¹⁵

The Divisions of History

Since the field of history is so large, tradition has split it into divisions of time, place, and topic that seem natural to Clio's practitioners. Underlying these "natural" divisions are implicit assumptions. For this reason, historians are again victims of their history. The basic divisions of history, which are reflected in the course-offerings of any University department in the subject, reflect the conventions of historiography and therefore the intellectual trends of the past few centuries.

A. Periodization

Time is a seamless dimension and is unknowable except for the processes of change that occur within it. Change takes place in time, but time does not cause change. Time like space is but a dimension in which things move. When we speak of time, it is of these processes of change within time that we speak.¹⁶ The historian's concern with time is really with the change in the social processes in it. Time can only be perceived historically by reference to periods in which presumably certain social processes took place, and so the historian is forced to make his chief division in the discipline.

The main question then becomes whether a given chronological periodization is arbitrary and oversimplified or well-grounded in the nature of the evidence about the social process. A period should have decisive turning points and homogeneity of features that can be expressed in a few leading ideas, or to use modern terms, grounded upon basic cultural assumptions. Arguments over periodization are not so much about what events occurred but the meaning of those events for interpretative unity. A period should display some significant characteristics. The "Age of Reason" and the "Age of the Baroque"

are terms borrowed from literature and art, but in each case they are supposed to designate a cluster of characteristics peculiar to those centuries denoted by the terms. Periodization does not serve its function if it does not integrate seemingly diverse trends and events.

How significant in light of these criteria is the standard periodization of European and American History? Is the characterization of modern European History by centuries particularly meaningful? Can American History best be comprehended in terms of four to eight year presidential administrations? Is it more than mere accident that art and literary history provided much of the initial periodization of European history and political history for American history? Or, are these the most meaningful ways for grasping the deeper flow of the histories of those peoples?

Perhaps the confusion over periodization is best seen in the traditional, major divisions of history into ancient, medieval, and modern. The term medieval came from linguistic studies during the so-called Renaissance period between two supposedly better periods in the history of civilization and implies that continuity existed between ancient and modern civilizations. As a result of this connotation, the typical student conceives of the Middle Ages as a dark period of superstition, that is, Catholicism, and disorganization. Only with the Renaissance, Reformation, and the Enlightenment does the sun of learning dispel the fog of superstition to bring the better day of individualism, Protestantism, capitalism, urbanism and science. Since the foundations of American civilizations were laid in this modern period it escapes the gloom of feudalism and darkness.

More and more historians are pointing out the grave deficiency of this Protestant-Progress Theme. Culturally, they question whether any genetic connections existed between ancient and modern civilization. Then, too, with a more "anthropological" approach, the Middle Ages are seen as possessing a vitality and life of their own. Some ask whether that period was not the formation of a European civilization stemming chiefly from the barbarian tribes and which has had two main periods: its formation which culminated in the so-called High Middle Ages and then its transformation by the scientific outlook in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While the events are the same as before, the new perspective drastically alters the teaching of European history. The inutility of the classic three-fold periodization of history is even more obvious to historians studying China or India.¹⁷

B. National History

Another "natural" unit of history is the nation. A professor teaches and a student studies American history or French history or German history. That the historical profession thought the study of the formation of a nation and its subsequent history was basic is quite natural. First, many of the documents studied were produced by national governments. Another major source, newspapers, reflected a national view. Also, scientific history and

the historical method matured in the century devoted to political nationalism and the romanticism that glorified it.

As a result of this preoccupation with nationalism, the historian, as David Potter has pointed out, not only studies the phenomenon but his judgments on the past are shaped by it. He assumes that peoples instinctively form national groups. In the descriptions of nationalistic growth among such peoples, the historian soon lapses into the moral judgment that it was right for them to do so and wrong for others to oppose them. Thus, "rebels" become "patriots" and opposition elements inside the nation-to-be become "disruptive" and enemies outside are "oppressive". At the same time, historians believe that the loyalty of nationalism should be paramount to any other group loyalty, and so sectionalism is bad. Once "a people" becomes "national" they can commit actions illegal to other groups such as warring or establishing a new government. In accounting for the actions of such a people, the historian draws upon the nebulous concept of national character.

David Potter, in a recent article whose title, "The Historian's Idea of Nationalism and Vice Versa,"¹⁸ indicated his approach, concluded:

Here, then, are a number of propositions about the historian's treatment of nationalism: that the historian conceives abstractly of nationalism in sound theoretical terms, regarding it as a form of group loyalty psychologically similar to other forms of group loyalty, and having the subjective, relativistic, developmental qualities which other forms of group loyalty possess; that the close relationship between nationalism and the political state warps the historian's view and causes him to treat it functionally as a monolithic and unique form of loyalty; that his use of the concept as sanction to validate the demands of some groups for autonomy, while denying the similar demands of other groups, leads him into the fallacy of a false correlation between the ethical rightness of a group's policies and the objective separateness of the group's identity; that this valuative use of the concept also impels him to explain the origins of nationalism in terms of deep-seated, long-enduring natural affinities among a people, or, in other words, to rely too heavily upon cultural factors in his explanation, even where they are tenuous; that this cultural emphasis has, in turn, caused him too frequently to overlook factors of self-interest, which have been vital in many historic situations in the integration or in the disintegration of natural loyalties.¹⁹

C. Topical Divisions

Because historians originally considered the nation-state as the basic unit of study in the modern period and portrayed the doings of great men to interest their readers, nineteenth century history books concentrated on diplomacy, wars, and politics. The political sector was considered to be all

of a nation's history as may be seen in the words carved over the doors of the John Hopkins University Library, "History is past politics and politics present history." Since the turn of the century, historians have turned to other areas of human activity. Gradually courses in economic, social, intellectual, religious, and other special histories were offered in university department. 20

Historical Synthesis: Method of Presentation

The ultimate aim of the historian is to produce the third meaning of history, written history. Though synthesis is part of the historical method, the methodology books devote far less space to this important aspect of the historian's task. For example, while Gottschalk devotes 102 pages to documentary analysis, he covers synthesis in a little over half as many pages. Although Gottschalk denies the positivistic tradition that "facts speak for themselves," his apportionment of space would indicate that he follows the vast majority of historians in not worrying too much about the actual process of synthesizing history.

Furthermore, much of the space he uses for this aspect is a discussion of what most people would call style, for example, use of language, footnoting, and space apportionment for topics. This fits in with the humanist approach of historians, for they are proud that they do not use modern social science jargon and concepts but rather ordinary language and common sense categories. In fact, there is a great concern in the profession over the lack of literary quality in modern historical writing.²¹ Historians are proud that they alone of the so-called social scientists have a muse; that they are actually humanists; and that history is a branch of literature.

Thus the traditional approach to history is one of narration. An historian thinks of his synthesis as a presentation, and the best men in the field frequently utilize the tricks of the novelist and dramatist to entertain as well as to inform. For this reason historians until recently concerned themselves almost exclusively with such dramatic actions as battles, or unusual occurrences, or notable people to hold their readers' attention. Diplomacy, war, and affairs of state were the main subjects of their writing. Good historical narrative like a play or novel possesses dramatic unity, and this unity determines the choice of facts included in the book. Historians describe events in light of their outcome and lead the reader to the climax of the story. Histories and biographies have the classic beginning, middle, and end. As a result of this narrative model, historians, as a recent critic wrote,

give us not simply the facts about the past, but certain selected facts, arranged in chronological sequence which exhibits their supposed causal interrelations, and illuminated by a unifying aesthetic and moral vision.²²

While morality is less explicit today than yesteryear and the dramatic unity is less obvious in the newer forms of social and economic history, still the

heritage lingers on in today's writing. It is seen in the lack of an explicit causal framework and a striving for stylistic unity. Hence historians are more frequently guided by implicit assumptions and so-called "common sense" in synthesis than by a reasoned, systematic approach to human behavior.²³

Historical Synthesis: Nature of Historical Explanation

All historians agree that written-history is more than a mere listing of events in time, but how much more it should be or can be is a matter of great dispute among them as well as the modern philosophers of history. To some historians, "scientific history" would seem to be a complete listing of the facts of the past in chronological order. Aside from the impossibility of this feat, such an account would not be history but what historians scornfully call "antiquarianism." It would be a mere chronicle²⁴ in which the reader would have to perform the task of the historian in order to make sense of it. Rather historians produce a selection of facts so arranged as to illuminate and depict the past. It is, in other words, explanation as well as description. But what is the basis of selection and what is the aim? Are process and goal mutually connected?

The historian's preoccupation with time predisposes him to look for change in the social process so as to both understand and measure time. Thus an historian feels his subject deals with the unique, the concrete, the individual situation or state of affairs unlike the scientists who pursue the recurrent in the hopes of discovering generalized laws. The historian wants to talk about the particular qualities of the Enlightenment or the High Middle Ages or the Roman Empire, and how these times differed from other times. He is interested in Julius Caesar, Thomas Aquinas, or Napoleon Bonaparte, not everyman. So history becomes a narrative about great men and outstanding events. The historian does not seek generalizations that are "timeless" but ways in which "times" differed. In order to characterize a period he seeks to describe how it differed from another not how it was similar, although overall similarities may have outnumbered overall differences between the two periods. He explains change by pointing out the differences in the two periods and by portraying the flow of the social process in as much detail as possible. His stress on all the possible facts results from the necessity of characterizing periods and measuring change by the flow of the social process itself. He must "fill in" time to measure time.

But is there no difference between depicting a period and explaining it? This would seem to depend upon the goal. To modern thinkers whose model of explanation is that of scientific causality, explanation only occurs when the thing to be explained is subsumed under a general law from which it can then be deduced. This so-called "covering law" theory of explanation seems irrelevant to the average historian. First, the state of general law in the social sciences is too under-developed to be applicable to the complex concatenation of events described by historians. Others argue that explanation in the field of human relations cannot be or should not be reduced to scientific law.

Most important, though, is the fact that the goal of the historian differs from that of the scientist, natural or social, and so his method of explanation differs. In explaining the men and their activities in a given period, the historian presents his facts as an interrelated set of events beyond mere temporal sequence or coincidence. As an eminent modern philosopher of history observed:

The underlying assumption here is that different historical events can be regarded as going together to constitute a single process, a whole of which they are all parts and in which they belong together in a specially intimate way. And the first aim of the historian, when he is asked to explain some event or other, is to see it as part of such a process, to locate it in its context by mentioning other events with which it is bound up.²⁵

Historical facts are only fully explainable in terms of each other, and it is the whole configuration that constitutes the explanation. The historian believes that the overall configuration in its total manifestation of multitudinous particulars is unique in time and place. What the historian does, then, is to determine and delineate the unique configuration of events constituting a period or a smaller historical process. One could call historical explanation for this reason, descriptive integration.²⁶

Implicit and Explicit Generalization in Historical Synthesis

While the explanation by the historian is far different from that by the natural or social scientist, does this mean generalization and law have no place in his explanatory process at all? As many historians and others have pointed out, it is impossible for the historian to avoid using generalization whether it is in the form of abstract words, such as "revolution" for example, or whether it is the syntactical structure of the language which implies motives and causation by the very act of arranging words in sentences. Furthermore, the demands of the narrative synthesis form impose similar implicit generalization about cause.²⁷

Thus while historians think that they rarely deal with generalizations or causations, they are constantly doing so implicitly. Every narrative, no matter how brief, makes judgments about the reasons for the behavior of individuals, the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, and the nature of society. At the same time the relation of the individual or society to physical environment is assumed. Lastly, the nature and cause of social and cultural change is part of every narrative. Thus historians always answer implicitly and sometimes explicitly, questions such as the following: Why does a man act the way he does? Can a great man affect history? (the hero in history problem) Is economic pursuit the basic motivation of man? (economic interpretation) How does an environment affect a society? (frontier hypothesis). How does industrialism change man's ways? All these questions and many others which the historian answers so glibly are also the domain of the social sciences which try to discover the laws of human behavior.

It is in this area particularly that the historian must resort to generalization, and it is here that the social scientists can most help him. At times the historian can utilize their generalizations to help him explain social phenomena that constitute part of his unique configuration of events at a given time. At other times, social science information will give him an added awareness in his use of documents. From psychology, the biographer and historian can receive aid in probing and understanding a man's actions. From the other social sciences, the historian could become more aware of the nature of social institutions and complex organizations and the interrelationship of institutions in a society at a given time and over time.²⁸

Of all the concepts, that of culture is perhaps most helpful. With this fundamental concept the problem of constructing the historical participants' conceptions of their world and their actions would be more systematized. Furthermore, the hazy idea of national character might be exchanged for something more valid than used now by most historians. Periodization in terms of basic cultural assumptions that remain stable for a period of time makes more sense than many of the current divisions of chronology. The functional interrelationship of the various sections of culture calls the historian's attention to the impact of change upon the entire culture. Lastly, the use of the culture concept would prevent much of the naive philosophizing about mental causation, or the problem of understanding the past (as Collingwood misunderstands it), or the idea that men have always acted the same throughout time for the same reasons.²⁹

Basically then, the historian becomes a consumer of social science generalization but not a producer, for his basic task is different. He utilizes social science theory in the assembling and explanation of the components of the unique configuration of events, but no social science generalizations exist to explain the configuration as such. The social sciences promote an awareness of the nature of social relationships in time and allow a systematic approach to the discovery of them but they do not fully explain the entirety of those exact relationships at a given time. As Joynt and Rescher argue, "Explanation in history and the social sciences can be furthered by the use of general laws, but cannot be exhausted by the use of such laws."³⁰ The historian must continue to explain the configuration in terms of itself, for while generalizations about human behavior can supply the necessary conditions for historical explanation, they cannot produce the sufficient explanation of the configuration. Thus historical explanation must be composed of (1) specific data about individuals, cultures, and societies at a given time, (2) restricted generalizations about relationships in those societies at certain times drawn from the knowledge of (1), and (3) generalizations from the social sciences to explain all human behavior--all combined to produce the historical synthesis to depict the unique configuration.³¹ Such an analysis utilizes both the participants' conception of the actions and the results as seen by the historical observer. History is then seen as a dialectic between the actors' wishes and actions and the results, both anticipated and unanticipated, of them. Change comes about because of the interaction of aimed-for results and the unanticipated consequence.

of such action and the resultant feedback to the participants. Written history is a comparison of the participants' conceptions and resulting actions with the historian's construction of the implications of those conceptions and actions.

Many historians object to the use of social science concepts because they fear such theories remove free will from individual actions in history and impose a cultural or social determinism upon them. Free will according to them would seem to mean only chance or accident. While accidents have their place in history, history is not a mere series of accidents. Men possess free will if they are free to determine choices in light of their preferences. The choice is theirs, but the preferences may be explained in light of background factors, so-called social and cultural determinants.

In return for aid from the social scientists, historians can contribute to them. Not only can history provide more sophisticated techniques in documentary analysis for other disciplinarians, but it can also supply additional data to a field and thus eliminate the time-bound characteristics of so much research today in the social sciences. Of perhaps more use would be testing of theories advanced in the various social sciences by checking their validity in past societies. Lastly, it would appear that historians would be in as good position to explore social change (and even produce theories?), as any other social scientists, for after all they have had an ancient interest in long-term trends.³²

Comparative History

Although rarely practiced, there is an area of history that imitates science by searching for general laws. It seeks to do this through a comparison of historical sequences in search of uniformities. In other words, the uniformities of the sequence are ripped from the configurative contexts of the various periods.³³

This is frequently the so-called historical method of the social sciences, but historians have produced a few examples of the genre. Perhaps the best known is Crane Britton's The Anatomy of Revolution,³⁴ which attempts to establish the uniform process for that word as seen in the English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions.³⁵ Equally famous is the currently popular little book by Walt W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, which attempts to show the necessary stages of and concomitants of economic growth accompanying industrialization.³⁶ That mere classificatory terms are not necessarily good comparative history can be seen in the heavily criticized book on feudalism by Rushion Coulborn.³⁷ That comparative history based on true comparison is difficult is seen in comparative frontier studies. Most writers of such studies have an outmoded geographical determinist approach.³⁸ This means that historians practicing this art face the same difficulties as other social scientists in discovering true comparisons.

Comparative history should not be confused with a form of descriptive integration that appears somewhat similar. This form is best seen in what is called a history of Europe. In that case, an historian attempts to integrate the diverse histories of the various European countries on the basis that all share the same fundamental history. He produces a history of the continent by supposedly comparing the Renaissance, Enlightenment, a Romanticism in the various countries in order to produce an overall configuration for a period or over time.³⁹ To the extent that he actually compares the various manifestations in the various countries, he is practicing comparative history, but his ultimate purpose is, of course, far different, for he is not seeking general laws. In theory, though, all histories of Europe or the entire United States or Asia assume comparison, and this fact points up the necessity for the historian to make comparisons in order to discover the truly unique.

Although few historians practice this phase of their discipline, additional work would be useful not only for the production of cross-cultural generalizations but also for the traditional interests of the field. Surely the historian can only discover the truly unique by arduous comparison of every configuration with every other configuration. While this is the counsel of perfection, it is implicit in every claim of uniqueness. Furthermore, elimination of nationalistic and cultural prejudices in the writing of history will only come from greater comparative work.

Comparative history in its most spectacular form occurs on the level of comparative civilizations. A plea for such a study on the basis of modern social science techniques and concepts is Philip Bagby's Culture and History: Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations.⁴⁰ This type of work has great appeal to the layman, and the best known current work is Arnold Toynbee's multi-volume A Study of History,⁴¹ which professes to compare twenty-one civilizations in order to discover the path of the future as well as that of the past.⁴² Here comparative history lapses into the universal history that has been so plagued by the analogy of society to an organism passing through the stages of birth, maturation, and death.

Metahistory

Laymen are interested in the universal histories written by Toynbee and others in the hopes that they will discover the meaning or purpose of history. This was the topic explored for years under the term "philosophy of history." Under that subject men sought the purpose of mankind or the meaning of existence as expressed in history as a clue to ultimate goals. In this view, history is a conception of the entire course of human events as a continuous unitary play in which basic principles unfold in its course. Whether the basic principles are God's doing, or the inevitable progress of Comte, or the dialectic of Hegel or Marx, the basic principles are not history. The search for the meaning of history is entirely outside the realm of history. It is really a metaphysical interpretation of history.⁴³

That Clio, the muse of history, was to inspire men as well as to inform them, however, calls attention to the role of history as a moral myth in a society. The function of history in American schools is to teach the children their "heritage" which is to serve as a basis for their patriotism and a rationale for our institutions. The Daughters of the American Revolution, the American Legion, and the John Birch Society all feel their stake in history--teaching in the schools is as great as that of the American Historical Association. The big question is: Can history be "heritage" and still be accurate according to the canons of the historical profession?

Philosophy of History

Traditionally, the search for the meaning of history was the subject of the philosophy of history, but with the new emphasis on analysis in modern philosophy this subject is changed also. Now the subject, under the guidance of Walsh at Oxford and others, probes the areas of the nature of historical knowledge and explanation, objectivity in history, and the relationship of history-as-actuality and written history rather than the traditional realm of metaphysical speculation. As a result of this transformation of the subject, the philosophy of history becomes pertinent to the practicing historian.⁴⁴

Definition of History

History has many meanings and any attempt to define it must try to capture all of them. Modern definitions are like E. H. Carr's, "the serious process of enquiry into the past of man in society,"⁴⁵ or G. J. Renier's, "the story of the experiences of men living in civilized societies,"⁴⁶ and both men devote many pages to elaborating the idea without fully doing justice to the concept. Perhaps the most sophisticated short definition is David Potter's:

Historical writing, in all its various forms, deals with people, as individuals or as aggregates, acting in relation to other individuals or aggregates, responding, with more or less freedom of response, to forces in the primary or secondary environment and motivated to follow a course of thought or action, often in preference to alternative courses of thought or action--with the result that certain developments become manifest. These manifestations, taking place in a context of specific culture and institutions, modify and are modified by the context, and historical change occurs. Historical writing also frequently offers conclusions, if not on the virtue and wisdom, at least on the effectiveness and suitability of given courses of thought or action.⁴⁷

Implicit in this definition is the factor of time as past sequence(s). To some historians, the central problem of historical study is the analysis of change over time.⁴⁸ Certainly the main differentia of historical study is the concern with the past. History, then, is the study of the unique configurations of events in time and their change over time. Like anthropology, history high-

lights the characteristics of present day society by contrasting it with another, except this comparison is over time and not space. At the same time, history provides the developmental background of contemporary society. Until recently historians have dealt chiefly with the master class of the past, but this need not be so with a more systematic use of modern social science concepts. History then becomes both an aid to the social sciences and yet is an independent discipline capable of synthesizing and incorporating many of their theories in order to depict and explain the past. In the end, it is only history that is concerned with explaining all of the particularity of the human past.

FOOTNOTES

1. On the various meanings of the word "history", see Social Science Research Bulletin, No. 54, Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1946), 33; Gustaf J. Renier, History, Its Purpose and Method (New York: Beacon, 1950), 79-84; Jacques Barzun and Henry Graff, The Modern Researcher (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1957), 44-54.
2. p. 5n.
3. On the nature of sources, see Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method (New York: A. Knopf, 1950), 52-61, 86-117; E. H. Carr, What is History? (New York: A. Knopf, 1963), 16.
4. p. 48.
5. Ernst Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie (1st ed., 1889); Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos, Introduction aux Etudes Historiques (1st ed., 1897). Unfortunately Bernheim has never been translated into English and Langlois and Seignobos only in a bad translation.
6. Op. cit.; Also see Homer C. Hockett, The Critical Method in Historical Research and Writing. (New York: Macmillan, 1955); Jacques Barzun and Henry Graff, The Modern Researcher (New York, 1957). A recent English volume is Gustaf J. Renier, History: Its Purpose and Method.
7. Gottschalk, pp. 118-133.
8. Gottschalk, p. 139.
9. Gottschalk devotes Chapter VII to this question.
10. Gottschalk, pp. 90-91. His italics.
11. Gottschalk, pp. 91-117. Also see pp. 52-61 on primary and secondary sources. More than testimony is derived from documents according to Vernon K. Dibble, in an excellent article, "Four Types of Inference from Documents to Events," History and Theory, III (No. 2, 1963), 203-21.
12. Gottschalk, 140. Cf. H. Stuart Hughes on the cult of the document in his book, History as Art and as Science (New York, Canberra, and London: Harper and Row, 1964), esp. pp. 90-94.
13. An interesting article on this misunderstanding is George G. Iggers, "The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought," History and Theory, II (No. 1, 1962), 17-40.

14. W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction (New York: Harper, 1960), 17-19, Chap. 4; Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 70-80; Sidney Hook in S. S. R. C. Bulletin, No. 54, pp. 123-125; Morris R. Cohen, The Meaning of Human History (Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1947), pp. 33, 44, 77-78.
15. For a critique of 476, see Oscar Halecki The Limits and Divisions of European History (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1950), pp. 25-41.
16. A good reference for the laymen on the concept of time is Robert M. MacIver, The Challenge of the Passing Years: My Encounter with Time (New York, 1962).
17. The concept of periodization is rarely discussed except in connection with suggested divisions: Halecki, Limits and Divisions, pp. 7-64, 145-184. Dietrich Gerhard, "Periodization in European History", American Historical Review, LXI (July, 1956), 900-913; M. I. Finley, "Generalizations in Ancient History", in Louis B. Gottschalk, ed., Generalization in the Writing of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 23-26. Also see Cohen, Meaning of Human History, 65-76; Geogfrey Barraclough, History in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 31-63.
18. American Historical Review, LXVII (July, 1962), pp. 924-950.
19. Ibid., pp. 937-38. The general concept of nationalism is covered by Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1943); Boyd Shafer, Nationalism, Myth and Reality (New York, 1955). Historians seeking insight into the concept of national character should consult David Potter, People of Plenty; Economic Abundance and the American Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 3-72; Walter Metzger, "Generalizations about National Character: An Analytical Essay", in Gottschalk, ed., Generalizations in the Writing of History, pp. 77-102.
20. For an European view of these fields, see Renier, History, pp. 54-78.
21. Particularly adamant on this subject is Samuel Eliot Morison. See, for example, his "History as a Literary Art", in Oscar Handlin, et al., Harvard Guide to American History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 44-49.
22. Philip Bagby, Culture and History; Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 48.

23. Besides Bagby, Chap. 2, on the nature of history writing, see his mentor, Frederick J. Teggard, Theory and Processes of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), Chap. 2, 5; and W. B. Gallie, "The Historical Understanding", History and Theory, III (No. 2, 1963), 149-202. Even an historian who stresses the marriage of history and the social sciences urges that the presentation of the fusion be in narrative form. Hughes, op. cit., Chap. IV.
24. For the difference between chronicle and history, see Morton White, "The Logic of Historical Narration", in Sidney Hook, ed., Philosophy and History (New York: New York University Press, 1963), pp. 3-31.
25. Walsh, Philosophy of History, p. 23. Cf. p. 62.
26. The modern debate over historical explanation began with Carl G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History", Journal of Philosophy, XXXIX (Jan. 15, 1942), 35-48. The best books on the subject and representing the two sides are Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); William Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957). The discussion has been carried on in articles in the Journal of Philosophy and History and Theory. For a sampling of these, see Patrick Gardiner, ed., Theories of History (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), 344-475. In addition, consult the recent Hook, ed., op. cit. Perhaps the most illuminating article for the practicing historian is Carey B. Joynt and Nicholas Rescher, "The Problems of Uniqueness in History", History and Theory, II (No. 2, 1961), pp. 150-162.
27. On this, see Gottschalk, ed., Generalization in the Writing of History, especially David Potter, "Explicit Data and Implicit Assumptions in Historical Study," pp. 178-194.
28. That is, he could do both synchronic and diachronic analyses.
29. The classic volume for the historian on the culture concept is Caroline Ware, ed., The Cultural Approach to History (New York, 1940). On the use of the social sciences in general, see Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 64, The Social Sciences in Historical Study (New York, 1954). Robert R. Palmer thinks the social sciences are useless in the historian's task in an addendum to his article "Generalizations About Revolution: A Case Study," Gottschalk, ed., Generalization in the Writing of History, 75. For an approach similar to mine, Cf. H. Stuart Hughes "The Historian and the Social Scientist," American Historical Review, LXVI (Oct., 1960); and Folke Dovring, History as a Social Science: An Essay on the Nature and Purpose of Historical Studies (Hague: Nijhoff, 1960).

30. Carey B. Joynt and Nicholas Rescher, "On Explanation in History," Mind, LXVIII (July, 1959), pp. 383-388.
31. Cf. Ibid., pp. 383-388.
32. On the uses of history for the social sciences, see e. g., Pauline V. Young and Calvin Schmid. Scientific Social Surveys and Research (3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1956), pp. 138-53.
33. The strongest recent argument for this approach to history was advanced by Kenneth Bock The Acceptance of Histories; Toward a Perspective for Social Science, University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, III, No. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), but see his mentor, F. J. Teggart, Theory and Processes of History.
34. The latest edition is by Vintage Books (New York: A. Knopf, 1956).
35. See Brinton's discussion of theory in Chap. I. Cf. Palmer in Gottschalk, ed., Generalization in the Writing of History, 66-76; Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago, 1927).
36. It has the interesting subtitle, A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
37. Feudalism in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).
38. For a critical bibliography of comparative frontier literature, see Dietrich Gerhard, "The Frontier in Comparative View," Comparative Studies in Society and History, I (March, 1959), 205-09; Marvin Mikesell, "Comparative Studies in History," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, L (March, 1960) 62-74. An interesting example of the genre is James G. Leyburn, Frontier Folkways (New Haven: Yale U., 1935).
39. For example, George N. Clark. The Seventeenth Century (2nd ed., Oxford, 1947); Robert R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1700-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).
40. Berkeley, 1958, esp. Chap. 8. He was a student of Teggart and Kroeber at California. Also see Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations; An Introduction to Historical Analysis (New York: Macmillan, 1961).
41. (London, 1935-1961) 12 vols.

42. Critiques of Toynbee are many, but see especially for this paragraph, Bagby, 177-182; William Dray, "Toynbee's Search for Historical Laws," History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History, I (No. 1, 1960), pp. 32-54.
43. For examples of such meta-history, see the authors gathered by Gardiner, ed., Theories of History, 9-211. For a good critique of the meaning of history as opposed to meaning in history, see W. H. Walsh, "Meaning in History," in Ibid., 296-307; and the introduction to his Philosophy of History; Hans Meyerhoff, The Philosophy of History in Our Times (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 1-25.
44. The best discussion of this field is the introduction to Walsh, Philosophy of History.
45. Carr, op. cit., p. 59.
46. Renier, op. cit., pp. 33-39.
47. Potter in Gottschalk, ed., Generalization in the Writing of History, pp. 187.
48. Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 64, pp. 24, 86, 100.

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Some Thoughts on the Teaching of Economics

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Lacking the necessary background, I obviously would not attempt to present a full blown proposal for economic education in the schools. Instead, I will try to state some of the principles that, in my opinion, ought to be taken into consideration in the framing of any such proposals.

In outlining these principles I am aided by the existence of the report of the National Task Force on Economic Education (Sept., 1961, C. E. D., New York). This report contains a great deal of useful material which I shall consider as "read into the record," and this will make it possible to concentrate on the crucial issues concerning the basic point of view to be adopted. I shall also take advantage of the NTF report to present some of my thinking by contrasting it with what I believe to be the emphasis of the report. In the process, I may exaggerate the differences between NTF and myself, and perhaps also appear over critical of the report. Let me therefore say that I regard the report as an excellent piece of work and no criticism of its value is intended.

One of the major reasons for interest in economic education in schools is the desire to prepare the student for participation in social or individual decision making in the economic sphere, be it as a voter, businessman, labor leader, or head of household.

Where individual action is stressed, economic education is pushed toward household budgeting, preparation of tax forms, etc. Where social action is the focus of attention, effort is made to analyze the pros and cons of, say, alternative policies for full employment or against inflation; also, to impart certain attitudes toward, say, profits, private enterprise, government intervention, planning.

In what follows, I shall concentrate on the social, as distinct from the individual, aspect of economic education. (There are interconnections between the two that can be exploited when both are being taught.) I shall assume that the only legitimate way to impart attitudes on economic issues is through improved knowledge and understanding, both factual and analytical, with emphasis (as far as my discussion goes) on the latter. This line of attack seems in accord with the NTF report (e. g., pp. 14-20, 71-3).

It is natural to start with controversial problems involving social decision making, e. g., (NTF, pp. 16-7) what, if anything, should we do to control

inflation? By choosing this type of question as a point of departure we stimulate the interest, relate the classroom discussion to debates in congress or the newspapers, etc. However, a normative ("should") question consists of (at least) two parts: (a) value criteria (goals); (b) causal relations between actions chosen and consequences to be assessed in terms of the value criteria.

It is true that many economic controversies of the normative type err by not stating explicitly the value criteria used and NTF is right in urging (p. 15) that goals be stated explicitly in such contexts. However, while both (a) and (b) (i. e. , value criteria and causal analysis of economic phenomena) are indispensable for normative problems, type (b) questions (causal analysis of economic phenomena) are of independent interest, and can and should be (in my opinion) studied for their own sake. This will now be discussed in greater detail.

The Causal Analysis of Economic Phenomena

Here we do not ask "should we raise interest rates to fight inflation?"-- but rather, say--"what will happen to prices, wage rates, employment, balance of payments if we do (do not) raise interest rates?"

Note first that the question asked does not involve value assessments. There is no "should" or "ought" in it, nor any linguistic equivalent such as "the nation's welfare", "good", "efficient," etc. I. e. , the question is not normative.

Second, we look at the economy in a causal manner, rather than teleological, functional, or anthropomorphic. Unlike NTF (e. g. , p. 24) we do not say that the "economic system faces a problem" or that it "solves problems" (NTF, p. 25). We view the economy as a certain mechanism, with structure and governing laws to be discussed below, rather than a problem-solving or a goal-oriented organism. It may be that the language used by NTF is merely allegorical and reflects only a desire to facilitate exposition rather than a different philosophical viewpoint. However, such language may cause confusion and sometimes creates difficulties due to the language rather than the substance of the problem.

How does one go about the job of causal analysis of the economic phenomena? To answer this question, it may be helpful to use the analogy of performing a similar analysis of the workings of a radio receiver. The receiver corresponds to the whole economy, its control knobs to controlled economic variables (tax rates, central bank discount rates, level of public expenditures). The problem is: what will happen to tone, volume, etc. , produced by the radio depending on how we set the various knobs, and why? (Note: we do not ask "how should we set the knobs?" or "what will make this radio play better?"--these would be normative questions which we are now avoiding. Nor do we speak of the functions which the radio is meant to perform.)

At times, we might be satisfied with answers which simply say that if knob 1 is turned clockwise, the sound intensity will usually increase. But to speak of understanding and causation, we must consider the inside contents of the radio. Similarly, we might at times be satisfied with the statement that higher interest usually results in lower prices and employment, but to speak of understanding and causation, we would want to dig deeper.

To understand why turning the knob increases volume, we consider a model of the radio. The most familiar form of such a model is the wiring diagram, but there are alternative verbal and mathematical methods of accomplishing the same task. The model lists the components of the receiver (knobs, tubes, resistors, capacitors, loudspeakers, etc.) and the manner in which these components are connected (the configuration). Furthermore, we may consider as available to us a handbook describing the behavior (performance, response) pattern of the various components.

Given the information about the components, their behavior pattern, and their connections (configuration), we can (in principle) predict and explain the consequences of turning a given knob (or set of knobs) in a specified manner.

Now let us think of the economy. Its components are the basic economic units: households (consumers), businesses (producing units, trading units, banks), resource holders (farmers, workers, factory owners), etc.

The behavior of these units is one major aspect of the study of economics. We describe this behavior in terms of certain variables (e. g. , quantity produced, price paid). The response pattern tells us about the reactions of the unit to changes in external conditions--say how much more (or less) will be produced if the price goes up by 1 per cent. (Typically, these responses are (in simple analysis) assumed to be those derived from a fairly general and simple general principle such as profit maximization.)

To the wiring connections of the radio diagram corresponds the flow pattern (see NTF, pp. 18-9) which shows that, for example, the wage costs of business firms show up as incomes of the workers out of which, in turn, spending flows back toward businesses.

The references made to flow diagrams point to the fact that from certain points of view the natural physical analogue of the economy is one involving the movements of fluids. A simulation device (nicknamed Moniac) based on this idea was constructed perhaps a decade ago. (I mention it, because it suggests possibilities of physical simulation in the classroom as a substitute for mathematical or verbal analysis. Moniac shows visually, even to a student who is not adept at abstract reasoning, what happens if rates of interest are changed, etc. Unfortunately, Moniac is rather cumbersome, and also expensive /\$4600?/. However, possibilities of simulation devices are tremendous and should, I believe, be subject to a serious study.)

Given a model, whether conceptual or physical, the student can (on his own, or with the help of the teacher) explore the consequences of any policies that are of interest.

At this point, he should be exposed to sample problems which are not readily solved in the absence of such a model. As an example, consider the question of the impact of a wage increase on the level of employment, or prices. In the absence of a complete model, one can argue in one of two ways: (a) wages are a cost component; when costs go up, output goes down, hence so does employment; (b) wages are an income component; when income goes up, so does demand for goods, hence employment rises. Here are two fairly plausible lines of reasoning leading to opposite conclusions. We may prefer one or the other depending on our emotional attitudes toward labor, but this has no bearing on clarifying the logic. Within the framework of a model, the apparent contradictions are eliminated, and an answer emerges.

Thus the student learns to avoid facile fragments of economic reasoning because he sees that they may yield fallacious or contradictory answers. He also discovers that the social scientist has evolved a discipline which, at least in principle, is capable of bringing order out of chaos. We do not merely exhort him to reason rigorously, but we show him how he can do it. He also finds that he must know quite a bit about the structure of the economic system before he can determine the probable consequences of a given policy, just as an engineer has to know quite a bit about the laws of statics and the properties of materials before he can predict the durability of different types of bridges.

Related Studies

Alternative Assumptions and Empirical Aspects

The learning process must go one step further. In analyzing the consequences of a given policy, the student will discover that the answers may depend crucially on the assumed response patterns of the various components. For instance, in studying the consequences of a wage change it would turn out that the effect depends on the manner in which the firm's costs vary with the level of output. Similarly, in analyzing the impact of a tax cut, the effect would depend on the consumer's propensity to spend out of the increased disposable income and the entrepreneur's inclination to invest. (On a machine such as the Moniac, he could 'plug in' alternative assumed response patterns of, say, consumers, and see the changes in the effectiveness of the tax cut.)

This sensitivity of the answers to assumptions concerning the response patterns (as well as other structural features of the model) brings out two important points:

1. Differences in opinions concerning economic policies may be due to differences in assumptions as to the structure of the economy, rather than to (a) faulty reasoning or (b) differences in goals (values).

2. These differences in assumptions pose meaningful empirical questions which must be resolved by studying the actual behavior patterns of individuals and organizations, as well as various technological facts.

(These required empirical studies can be historical, statistical, experimental etc. Such empirical questions constitute one of the links between economics and other social sciences (history, psychology) as well as with engineering, accounting, etc.)

(In studying the response patterns of the individual--or a household--to changes in prices, income, and liquidity, one can establish a connection with the problems of individual finance, including budgeting, insurance, tax payments.

In studying the response patterns of the firm, one can establish a connection with business subjects, e. g., accounting.

There are throughout ample opportunities for utilizing the techniques of mathematics and statistics.)

Some Implications of the Causal Approach

The stress on the analysis of causal relationships would result in some departures from the points of view emphasized in NTF report. In particular, I would question the NTF emphasis (p. 14) on economizing and scarcity. Most, if not all, modern economists would agree that scarcity is not necessarily the central issue in an economy with large quantities of unemployed resources (human or otherwise). In such an economy, the central problem may be that of avoiding the waste inherent in unemployment and its consequences.

In a full employment economy it is indeed true that a decision to commit resources to use A (say armaments) leaves less available for use B (say consumption) and, by definition, one cannot engage more resources in all directions. But in an economy of under-employment it may well happen that committing additional resources to use A may expand demand and, via the multiplier effect, result in increased level of B.*

(Incidentally, we see here how alternative assumptions concerning the economy--whether, or to what extent, full employment may be said to prevail--results in diametrically opposite answers to the same question.)

Our stress is not merely on causal relationships, but more specifically on direct or "elementary" causal relationships. By this is meant the following: if component 1 acts on component 2 and in turn component 2 acts on component 3, we have two direct relationships (1 on 2, and 2 on 3); furthermore, we can infer an indirect relationship (1 on 3). When a model is constructed only direct

*Should have been pointed out on p. 37 of NTF.

relationships are postulated or built into it. But then, by logic, mathematics, or physical simulation, various indirect relationships can be derived. The latter operation is often somewhat treacherous, since the system has a variety of roundabout repercussions that must be taken into account.

In any case, the student should be made aware of the distinction between the direct and indirect relationships. (On p. 27 of NTF report this principle is seriously violated. The statement that "consumers' money demands largely determine what is produced" is in the indirect relationship category, i. e., constitutes an inference based on one particular model of the direct relationships governing the economy. It is obvious, for instance, that the degree of prevalence of monopoly would affect the validity of the assertion.)

Certain Value-Related Aspects

Let us turn now to problems that do involve values. Casual reading of the NTF report (e. g., p. 32) shows serious violation of the report's own injunction that values be stated explicitly. On p. 32, and probably in several other places, we are told what is needed (competition) for the economy to "work well." But the meaning of "well" in this context conceals the basic assumptions as to what version of the welfare concept is meant. Economics has evolved certain technical definitions of welfare ("efficiency," "Pareto-optimality") which are presumably relevant here and would justify the statement. However, other welfare concepts (e. g., involving egalitarian notions or some idea of social justice) might result in different conclusions.

The impression is also created (pp. 32-5) that competition is sufficient (as well as essential) for economic efficiency. In fact, there are situations where so-called third party costs or benefits (external diseconomies and external economies) make competitive equilibrium inefficient; also, there are situations (decreasing costs, increasing returns) where competitive equilibrium is impossible. It would seem proper to put these facts in proper perspective for the student, especially as they are often at the heart of the controversies of the day. NTF report gets close to such issues on p. 38. (Education is a prime example of third party benefits! NTF might have pointed this out, instead of stressing pricing difficulty aspects. Pollution is an example of third party costs that are ignored under the competitive system free of government intervention.)