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AUTHOR Langman, Lauren; Natalini, Adrian
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ABSTRACT

This report presents and evaluates a simple thesis: that privacy, a manifestation of human territoriality, is a fundamental bio-social need. Aggression can serve to insure privacy. Privacy, then, allows one the freedom to explore the environment. It permits intimacy with others, and it fosters access to one's own inner feelings and experiences, a precondition for creativity. Essentially, privacy, territoriality, crowding, aggression, intimacy and creativity are seen as biological predispositions whose manifestations are greatly modified by social circumstances. The remarks presented here consider definitions, examples and functions of these several terms and concepts, and attempt to relate these concepts, sociologically, to the self, to others, and to one's environment. (TA)

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PRIVATE - KEEP OUT:

PRELIMINARY NOTES ON BIOSOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF PRIVACY

Lauren Langman, Ph.D.

Department of Sociology

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

and

Adrian Natalini, B.A.

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INTRODUCTION

Sociology, as a scientific enterprise began with its own declaration of existence. Thus Comte proclaimed sociology to be the master science of man, independent of mathematics, physics, or biology. This tradition culminated in the "sociological realism" of Durkhiem which considered other approaches not only irrelevant, but inimical to the development of scientific sociology. Given the state of knowledge at that time, we must agree and consider ourselves fortunate to be rid of such theories as Spencer's, Social Darwinism, Mac Dougalls' reductionistic instinctivism, or the Nazi theories of Aryan superiority.

The past fifty years have witnessed unprecedented advances in all scientific fields. Unfortunately, some of this growth has been due to increasing specialization which leads us to greater and greater ignorance of theory and research in other fields. There are good reasons to maintain this extreme division of labor. When we deal with colleagues in other areas our knowledge is limited and we are insecure. Further, we risk the scorn and consternation of our own colleagues. Yet as Campbell (1968) has argued, to regard one's own discipline in esteem and other's in disrepute is ethnocentrism at its worst. Interdisciplinary cooperation is no longer heresy. The fact that this section is titled "bio-sociology" would indicate that we sociologists can and must consider biological factors in social behavior. Obviously then, those of us attending this session are open minded, flexible, and spearheading scientific advance; everyone else at this convention is close minded, dogmatic and archaic.

A conspiracy of Konrad Lorenz, Desmond Morris, Robert Ardrey and the Book-of-the-Month club has made ethological research popular. Most writing¹ of this genre suffers from the misnomer of non-fiction. Ethology, as a scientific study of social behavior (human and otherwise) promises to open many avenues of research and theory for sociology. There will be many objections, "biological reductionism," "misplaced analogies" etc., especially by those who haven't studied the ethological material. Yet scientific progress is based on research and judgement must await evidence. The influence of ethology on sociology has heretofore been negligible. Most introductory texts cite Harlow's work on chimps and Scott's work on dogs as important contributions to the socialization of love and aggression respectively. Space will not permit us to answer the objections raised by traditional sociological approaches.

We should like to present and evaluate a simple thesis; privacy; a manifestation of human territoriality, is a fundamental bio-social need. Aggression can serve to insure privacy. Privacy allows freedom to explore the environment, it permits intimacy with others, and finally, privacy fosters access to ones own inner feelings and experiences, a precondition for creativity.

Aggression, Territoriality and Privacy

The definition of aggression is a topic in itself. Major concerns focus on antecedant conditions (drive states, frustration, etc.) or consequent behaviors. Subsequent "manifestations" can range from fantasy to war. Judgements as "aggression"

usually tell more about the judge. There are two major views of aggression as an antecedant, an inherited drive or a learned response to frustration. After extensive review of psychoanalytic, ethological and behavioristic approaches, Kahn and Kirk (1968) define aggression in terms of drive:

"Aggressive drive is an inborn, biologically rooted, directionally oriented energizer of behavior that is elicited by frustration of other drives and needs necessary to the survival of the species and the individual organism. Aggressive drive functions to serve, support, and insure success of these other drives and needs by assertive means up to destructive force." (Kahn and Kirk, 1968: 569)

This definition realizes that while aggression is an inborn capacity, the eliciting cues and modes of expression are often learned. Sociologists might consider this definition lacking; when we attempt to define aggression in terms of social phenomenon, the results become nebulous. Thus while psychoanalytic writers from Freud (1920, 1932) Storr (1968) see war as rooted in innate aggression, Frank (1967) also an analyst has argued that while aggression may induce men to fight, this is not the same question as to why nations go to war. Similarly, to consider ghetto or campus protest simply as acts of aggression is sociologically naive. For our purposes, aggression will be considered in interpersonal rather than institutional terms.

Aggression is a basic factor of social organization in the animal kingdom, aggressive behavior has survival value. Aggression serves many functions that insure maximal adaptation of a species. Aggression serves to keep animals sufficiently separated to

optimize the balance/^d population with food supply. Aggression often insures that the healthiest males sire subsequent generations. It is especially important to note that aggressive behavior rarely causes harm or injury between conspecifics, only man with his "superior" technology maims and kills his own kind.² Because human aggression often results in death or destruction we generally ignore healthy aspects of aggression (See Storr, 1968, Maslow, 1968)

Territoriality is usually defined as the tendency for an individual or group to demark, control and defend a specific area. This definition can be too broad for sociological analysis; drawn to its illogical conclusion we have Ardrey's apology for capitalism and a "biological" justification for apartheid. We will simply define territoriality in terms of the tendency for a social actor to regulate its behavior in terms of spatial considerations such as possession and control. Distances and positions between actors stand as important means of communication; the amount and location of human territory is closely related to status in various hierarchies (Hall, 1966, Sommer, 1970). Territoriality includes considerations of the mutual interaction between actors and the physical environment. The environment has generally been taken for granted and/or ignored in social research. Some recent authors have used territoriality as an explanatory concept (Suttles, 1968, Lymon and Scott 1970, Langman, 1970).

Territoriality is fundamental to a wide range of behavior e.g. sexual behaviors from courting to raising young, population regulation, food supply, domination - subordination, etc. One of

most important functions of the territoriality is the regulation of aggression. The establishment and control of territory can be viewed as a means of boundary maintenance which serves to reduce or eliminate aggressive behavior between conspecifics. Thus when territorial markers are observed, aggression is unlikely to occur; when intrusions happen, in most cases an aggressive display on the part of the defender is sufficient to deter further encroachment.

In natural conditions, aggression in the service of territorial defense serves functions of balancing population with available land supply. Overcrowding is extremely rare in nature, when it does occur, as in the classical case of the Red Deer, there will be an increase in aggressive behavior and a subsequent population drop off. The mortality was primarily due to adrenal hypertrophy and myocardial infraction--not due to actual injury from combat. The overcrowded animals died from exhaustion due to constant combat readiness rather than battle per se.

The major research on overcrowded populations is that of Calhoun (1967, 1968, 1969). Calhoun found that under conditions of overcrowding, normal behavior breaks down and a behavioral sink emerges. In the behavioral sink we find hyperaggression, neglect of young, cannibalism, deviant sexual behavior, passive males, aggressive females, extreme withdrawal, etc. Ultimately, when the population reaches a certain limit, copulation and conception cease. Hierarchies emerge based on motility. The research on animal populations suggest that needs for space are basic and necessary for survival (see also Wynne Edwards, 1962).

The research on territoriality and aggression in other animals suggests that man too is a territorial animal. It also seems that an intrinsic need for privacy is one manifestation of his territorial behavior. There is a considerable amount of evidence supporting this conclusion. Cohen (1964) has argued that the universality of a incest taboo is the result of an innate need for privacy. Kaufman (1960) a psychoanalyst has reviewed ethological research and has considered "the need to flee" as basic as sex or aggression. Recent dream research has suggested that the function of sleep is to prevent sensory overload, the need for sleep seems related to the activity of the reticular activating system. When all else fails, the individual can always find privacy in his dreams.

A preliminary definition of privacy might begin with territorial control, privacy is a condition in which an individual (or group) maintains exclusive use of an area. Privacy thus allows for non-interaction, or those interactions desired by the group controlling the territory. Westin's (1967) definition of privacy is similar, he places more emphasis on the amount of information available outside the privatized situation. Following Westin (1967), Proshansky, Ittelson and Rivlin (1970) add a most important dimension, "freedom of choice."

---privacy serves to maximize freedom of choice, to permit the individual to feel free to behave in a particular manner or to increase his range of options by removing certain classes of social constraints (Proshansky, Ittelson and Rivlin, 1970:176).

While our definition involves territorial control, we should not

forget that humans possess various distancing mechanisms such that external influences can be minimized (Hall, 1966). Thus an individual can obtain privacy in "public" situations.

There are different types of privacy with different functions. We should also be careful to differentiate privacy from related states. Westin (1967) lists four types of privacy-solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve. For our purposes, privacy serves functions in terms of relation to environment, others, and finally the self. Privacy is not the same as loneliness, the state of desiring company.

Since privacy sees the locus of choice within the individual, enforced "privacy" is a contradiction in terms; thus privacy is not solitary confinement or other imposed isolation. It would be beyond our scope to consider all of manifestations of privacy and their functions, the privacy of a walk through the woods is not the same as closing a bathroom door. Further, the privacy of an "exclusive" club differs from the privacy of the lover's bed.

Westin (1967) feels there are four types of privacy each of which can have four functions. Solitude is the state of isolation from others, intimacy is privacy that affords special types of interactions free of external constraints or distractions. Anonymity is to be unnoticed in public, while reserve is the ability to limit self-disclosure. Privacy can provide personal autonomy, emotional release, self evaluation or limitations on communication. Westin's framework has some utility, as well as shortcomings (See Proshansky, Ittleson and Rivlin 1970: 177-79).

Theory and research into privacy is limited; any definition must be tentative. We will consider privacy as the condition whereby an individual or group maintains exclusive control of a given area such that within that area the behavioral or experiential options are maximized.

Proshansky, Ittleson and Rivlin (1970) consider privacy a learned drive and territoriality a (learned) mechanism for obtaining it. As indicated above, the authors of this paper maintain that territoriality and privacy are fundamental bio-social needs. We claim that when these needs are not

gratified, the results can be fatal. Although we are cautious about comparing overcrowding in rats and ghettos, we feel that such evidence as the universality of spacing mechanisms and autonomic imbalances in conditions of crowding support a theory of biological predisposition (Cf. Chapple, 1970). This position is not as radical as it seems; it is no more extreme than Milinowski's functionalism or Parson's consideration of the organismic level. Finally, even if we are wrong, the effects of interactional patterns on human physiology have been so sufficiently documented, that privacy would still warrant consideration as a topic in "biosociology." Given our biological perspective, we should therefore like to examine the role of privacy, territoriality and aggression in social life.

CROWDING VS. PRIVACY

It is no accident that we become concerned with privacy at this time in history when the "right to privacy" is being assaulted by the government, by credit companies, by insurance companies, etc. (Cf. Ernst and Schwartz, 1962). Further, as our demographer colleagues warn us, we face serious threats to survival from overpopulation, overurbanization, and overcrowding. We saw that in animal populations overcrowding is fatal, we are now beginning to realize that the implication for man is not mere analogy.

"Crowding, therefore, is a lethal phenomenon, the importance of which, for the human as well as for the animal, is beginning to be realized. It results from the inability of the individual to establish a territory--and stable interactional relations with those around him--through which his equilibrium requirements can be preserved. How severe must be the stresses when a family, even sharing their space with relatives, may be forced to live twelve in a room in the tenements of Harlem or the Bronx. The impact of constant interactional disturbance can only be escaped by fleeing to the streets or to some kind of a job. There is no privacy for the individual under such conditions; privacy means the opportunity not to interact when one's internal requirements for rhythmic outlet to interactional stress imposes the need for an interval of time to elapse while being alone. Privacy also means the need to interact only with certain people, perhaps just husband and wife, and not to be forced constantly to respond to the initiations and attempts to dominate by others." (Chappel, 1970:171)

In conditions of normal social life among man and animal, various spacing mechanisms insure respect for the territory of others. In the animal kingdom, the various aggressive displays, releasers, and fixed action patterns are the result of the evolutionary process; in man the collective capacity for symbolic learning,

culture, has enabled a myriad of patterns that insure privacy as well as social engagement (Cf. Hall, 1966). Every group has its own concept of spatial norms. When certain conditions occur, such that these "normal" patterns cannot obtain, certain adjustments occur. Thus for example, the aberrant behavior of overcrowded rats (Calhoun, 1962, 1966, 1969), lemmings, (Wynne-Edwards, 1962), tree shrews (Autrum and v. Holst, 1968), or deer (Christian, 1961) can be seen as responses which attempt to restore "normal" territorial behavior - even when these responses include population drop off. We interpret these studies as evidence supporting the theory of intrinsic need for privacy.

In the past few years some social scientists have noted the importance of territoriality and spacing mechanisms in human populations (Sommer, 1970, Lyman and Scott 1970, Langman 1970, Hall, 1966, Little 1965, Cohen 1964). Most authors concerned with these questions feel that territoriality is an inborn need; some as Goffman (1959) or Strauss (1961) take no position.³ The literature on men in "crowded" situations reports conditions similar to overcrowded animal populations, especially in the slums and ghettos (Lewis, 1961, 1965, Schorr 1966, Biderman 1963). Unfortunately, these authors were unfamiliar with the ethological research on territoriality (Howard, 1920, Hedeger, 1955). Recent studies have been cognizant of this research and the literature in this area is beginning to expand (an excellent collection of papers is to be found in Proshansky, Ittelson and Rivlin, 1970. This volume also contains papers on psychiatric considerations).

An important study in territoriality is that of Altman and Haythorn (1967). Pairs of sailors, strangers to each other, were confined to a small room for ten days, controls were not confined. In the course of the study, sailors in the confined situation showed increasing withdrawal from each other and an increased territorial behavior. Territoriality was defined in terms of the degree of consistent and mutually exclusive use of particular chairs, beds or sides of tables. In the course of time the subjects performed more solitary acts in their "own" part of the room, they created social and spatial "cocoon" for themselves. This study illustrates several points. One reaction to "crowding" can be withdrawal and the attempt to secure greater privacy through increased territorial control. The increase in territorial behavior, which was mutually respected, as well as the "cocooning," served to reduce interactions that might have led to aggressive behavior.

In the course of examining alternative life styles, the authors were concerned with interpersonal behavior in communes. We would like to cite some of our data. This particular commune was a four room apartment with seven inhabitants. There were no provisions for the ordering of private property, clothing and personal belongings were strewn everywhere. "...bedding covered most of the floor space. The various mattresses, blankets and such that became scattered over the apartment added to the general disorder." (Natalini, 1970, p. 13). The events that transpired clearly indicate an inherent need for privacy.

...there were too many people living in the apartment for the amount of space provided. Because there was only one bedroom there was no privacy afforded in the commune; after the first month, the problems of space and privacy became so depressing that the individuals sought almost every means possible to escape from the stresses of limited space and gross disorder... The members of the commune finally devised a partial solution to the spatial problem. Each individual, or as in the case of Mr. W. and Miss L., each couple constructed tent-like structures which they called "forts." These "forts" were made from materials at hand; mostly blankets, sheets and pillowcases; Mr. W. and Miss L. had the most complex and most stable structure. Their "fort", constructed of a mattress, blankets, and sheets on the floor of the structure lasted over a week. The others, which were less carefully built, lasted only a few hours before they had to be reconstructed. The "forts" had strict rules connected to them when first built. No one might enter another's fort without the builder's permission, unless the individual was currently sleeping with the builder. The fort builders also kept much of their personal property, including food in their structures, which the others were not permitted to use. The forts, however, were only a temporary solution to the problem of space. The problem reoccurred when guests came over, and was intensified by the use of drugs. (Natalini, p. 13-14.)

As one might guess, this commune was not stable. While many factors are responsible, economics, drugs, the frequent formation and termination of sexual liaisons, personality factors, etc. But, the underlying problem was apparent at dissolution of the commune. When they were evicted from the apartment described, they found another. "The transition from the former apartment... to the latter...was the cause for the breakup.... At this point personal conflicts exploded and the members decided that they wished to end the commune." (Natalini, p. 25).

We interpret our data as supporting the findings Altman and Haythorn. There was an increase in territorial behavior and greater withdrawal or "cocooning;" the members spent less and less time at home. Since participants in this commune lived together for six months, we could observe the gradual breakdown of territoriality and withdrawal as defences against aggression. Aggression in this case could be seen as serving to provide for increased territoriality and hence privacy.

In our ongoing research into communal living, we have certain consistent observations. A major problem for commune dwellers is the attainment of privacy. We believe that the major cause of disintegration is failure to provide for privacy, the result of this failure is aggressive behavior between members. One term that we hear over and over again is "hassle." We feel that for a commune to be viable, there must be provisions for privacy. Further, there must be a strong commitment to a shared goal, generally of a religious or work orientation. Rural communes, with greater spatial availability especially those with an agricultural or handicraft orientation, seem to fare better than the urban apartment commune. Those who expect a commune to be a utopia of sex and drugs will be disappointed.

Our data, very limited at this time, supports the belief in an intrinsic need for privacy, afforded by territorial control. Even if this assumption is wrong, most of our commune dwellers are of middle-class backgrounds and their socialization has strongly instilled concepts of privacy and personal property (see below). In our society, personal possession of toys, one's own room, or least bed and dresser, are intrinsic components of

one's self concept. We find it hard for individual to deal with the privacy-engagement dilemma on an egalitarian basis.

Another problem, frequently encountered in communes is the emergence of hierarchies. In the animal kingdom, hierarchies of domination-subordination, serve to reduce conflicts and aggression within the group, our findings support an opposite conclusion the emergence of leadership become a source of conflict. However, we might note in passing that many "successful" communes have a rigid hierarchy that serves to stabilize the group and inhibit aggression. Sadly, we must note that under conditions of crowding, hierarchies, emerge among cats (Leyhausen, 1965), mice (Calhoun 1966) and men. We also note that many of the viable alternative societies, e.g. Amish, Hutterites, etc., are run by councils of elders. Our tentative conclusions lead us to pessimism about the viability of the commune movement. We feel that the needs for privacy and/or the predispositions for hierarchical ordering as means of reducing aggression run counter to the espoused values of sharing and democracy. Communism has been no more successful at eliminating private property than it has eliminated hierarchies. Nor do we consider the Kibbutz as viable without the Arab threat and the industrial economic base of Israel.

PRIVACY AND INTIMACY

Westin (1967) considers intimacy a form of privacy in which individuals seek freedom of constraint from external influences in order to engage in certain kinds of relationships. While we feel that every culture provides for privacy, intimacy is

especially important in the modern world. It is the prerequisite for the "romantic love" based conjugal nuclear family. Aires (1961) has shown that the "modern" house with separate bedrooms for children - themselves a new category, is a recent phenomenon in the world.

In the case of heterosexual intimacy, privacy, as territorial control, is primarily concerned with establishing the conditions for mutual physical and emotional sharing and exploration. Joint territorial defence strengthens the bond between the couple. Failure to consider the ethological significance of intimacy has resulted in various criticisms of the middle class family who seek their own bedroom and bathroom. The modern family primarily serves psychological functions - most of the traditional functions having been taken over by other agencies. The partners are less likely to be anchored in extensive kinship, occupational, or peer groupings. The high divorce rate indicated to frailty of the relationship; territorial seclusion is one means of preventing a dilution of bond. It is thus no accident that one of the first things a couple does is to secure a house or apartment.

In the case of romantic love, intimacy as territorial control, is primarily concerned with self-disclosure, sharing, and the emotional growth that is only possible in conditions of freedom from the external distractions of parents, friends and children.

PRIVACY, TERRITORIALITY AND SOCIALIZATION

Privacy is important in the socialization process. Most of our research and theory has been influenced by Mead and Freud, accordingly, we know much more about the effects of parent-child interaction on subsequent personality development than non-interaction. While isolated and feral children represent the limiting case, privacy is necessary for "normal" development and the establishment of identity. Cohen (1964) has been one of the first to argue that privacy, as an inborn need, must be considered in the development of the personality. He has argued that the universal incest taboo arises to insure the privacy necessary for psychosocial development.

"Children, whose insularity is poorly developed, are more vulnerable to overwhelming emotional excitation. It is because of this that children often manifest a tendency to halt stimulation from other people suddenly and completely, and acquire proficiency in slipping out of the physical or emotional grasp of others. The satisfaction of children's basic biological needs is so important to their survival that society cannot leave them to fend for themselves; society must make provision for the satisfaction of these needs. In view of the importance of the need for privacy--for the development and maintenance of emotional separateness--consistent provision must be made for its gratification and training. I suggest that incest taboos are a social means of enabling people to maintain a necessary degree of privacy and emotional insularity within the family and other kinds of groups." (Cohen, 1964:170-171)

The symbolic interactionist tradition has stressed role playing as a necessary part of social development. Role playing, a form of play in general is often done in situations that allow freedom from external influences, privacy.

In the higher animal species, play is closely related to territoriality (Jewell and Loizos, 1966, Hutt, 1966, Loizos, 1967). The possession and control of a defended territory, free of intruders or predators, is precondition for play. Play, including exploratory behavior, has adaptive value, it enables the animal to learn about the environment and practice social interaction. For our purposes, animal research demonstrates not only the necessity of childhood play for subsequent adult functioning (and even adult behavior itself) but the close relation of play to territorial control.

Ethological investigations of childhood play have revealed that social as well as solitary play is part of and necessary to the socialization process, (Hutt, 1966, Blurton-Jones, 1967). In young children about 3 years old, interaction is minimal, most play tends to be of an exploratory or manipulative nature. Defended territory is absent (Blurton-Jones, 1967). Older children, about five, begin to aggregate and defended territory becomes evident. We now observe aggressive behavior.

"Among three to five year old children in nursery school, fights occur over property, and little else. One child pulls at another's toys and the owner pulls back, then one of them kicks, pushes, bites, or pulls the hair of the other." (Blurton-Jones, 1967:354)

The relation of play, privacy and territoriality which begins to emerge at about five, may be as significant as the Oedipus Complex in the development of the personality. Children begin to learn individual distances at the same time they develop a feeling for property (Ploog, 1964 cited by Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970).

Children of this age seem to universally show a tendency to construct tree houses or other types of structures depending on availability of raw materials. Even children from urban areas do this when they go to the country - though they may have never seen adults performing performing this behavior (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970). Such structures provide privacy from the adult world, not protection from the elements. The senior author of this paper will never forget building a subterranean house when he was about 10; upon discovery of said structure, his father allocated physical sanctions. Aforementioned author had a very sore ass.

Psychoanalytic authors have also shown the importance of play to personality development. Although their concern has not dealt directly with privacy or territory, many of their clinical observations are germane. Erickson has shown that identity formation requires a certain withdrawal from the world. Indeed, the "psychosocial moratorium" is a social as well as physical separation from the adult world. In our terms, privacy is as necessary for ego development, as object cathexes. Schizophrenia, which often has its onset in adolescence, may be seen as an impaired ego state in which the individual cannot use the culturally available means of obtaining privacy (Cohen, 1964). In many societies adolescence is marked by a "rite of passage" or other initiation rite. Common to most such rites or their functional equivalents is a period of exclusion or other practice which provides privacy. The "vision quest" of the Plains Indian is thus quite similar to contemporary ritual whereby 16 year olds gain use of, if not possession of a car, though Indian fathers

probably worried less about such things as liability insurance.

Erikson tells us that when the "problem of ego identity" is solved, the next psychosocial problem is that of intimacy. As we previously noted, privacy is a precondition for intimacy. Some social analysts have jokingly maintained that the basic factor causing the "sexual revolution" was the availability of the car - a mobile territory affording privacy. In any event, most cultures provide for some type of privatized intimacy of a playful nature as a prelude, if not prerequisite for "normal" adult behavior. Hutt (1966) has interpreted play in its solitary (exploratory) and social manifestations in systems terms following Bertalanffy. She sees play as necessary for effecting the transition from a one steady state toward a higher order state of equilibrium; in sociological terms, this means that play is necessary for the age-graded role transitions from childhood to adulthood.

CREATIVITY AND CROWDING

Man's symbolic capacities enable him to learn a variety of ways of gaining privacy. Technology, the major cause of overcrowding and territorial compression, has enabled modern man to flee his overcrowded cities in overcrowded planes or on overcrowded highways. He can then go to overcrowded vacation "retreats." One fifth of all new homes are "vacation" homes. Camping is becoming a national epidemic.

But man has another alternative, he can expand into cognitive space. Calhoun (1969) has suggested that cognitive

expansion has been historically related to territorial compression. At each time of world population doubling, Calhoun claims there has been an intellectual revolution, an expansion of conceptual thought. Before we laugh at his sociological naiveteé, let us further examine the relation of creativity and crowding.

In introductory sociology, regardless of our predilections, we teach the eager scholars that the city has always been the center of knowledge and birthplace of ideas as well as a place of high population density. Yet genius has often involved withdrawal. Withdrawal, is perhaps the second most common response to territorial compression. But we interpret both aggression and withdrawal as attempts to gain privacy. Many of the world's important religious and political leaders spent extended periods in isolation. Toynbee showed us the pattern of withdrawal and return. We need only think of Moses, Buddha and Christ. Hitler wrote Mein Kampf in jail. Did not our own president spend eight years in obscurity, withdrawal and privacy?

Calhoun (1969) made a very interesting discovery. In conditions of overcrowding, hierarchies developed along lines of territorial control. At the top of the hierarchy were those who had the prime territories and most "normal" behavior. They showed the greatest activity. At the bottom were the most withdrawn; they were scruffy and had the lowest levels of activity. Yet they were the most creative in mouse terms! They discovered a new method of tunneling - rolling dirt in balls rather than removing it by mouthfuls. This was fifty times more

efficient! Calhoun bases his argument on human cognitive expansion as a result of territorial compression on this finding. He notes that many others have made this same observation in human groups. Erikson has maintained that withdrawal is a precondition for creativity. The sociological tradition from Simmel to Stonequist has also found that marginality is conducive to creativity; in current terms, marginality would be seen in terms of exclusion from the dominant's territory and a greater ability to withdraw and/or find privacy.

Privacy, as control over a territory, allows exclusion of conspecifics and therefore is often a condition of minimal external stimulation. Research into the functioning of the reticular activating system, especially sensory deprivation studies show that with the reduction of extrinsic stimulation, the organism will create its own stimuli.

"Experiments such as these demonstrate results similar to that given above for solitary polar living and sailing alone. If one is alone long enough and at levels of physical and human stimulation low enough, the mind turns inward and projects outward its own contents and processes; the brain not only stays active despite the lowered levels of input and output, but accumulates surplus energy to extreme degrees. In terms of libido theory, the total amount of libido increases with time of deprivation; body-libido reaches new high levels. If body-libido is not discharged somatically, discharge starts through fantasy; but apparently this is neither an adequate mode nor can it achieve an adequate rate of discharge in the presence of the rapidly rising level. At some point a new threshold appears for more definite phenomena of regression: hallucinations, delusions, oceanic bliss, etc. At this stage, given any opportunities for action or stimulation by external reality, the healthy ego seizes them and re-establishes more secondary processes. (Lilly, 1956:9)

If the psychoanalytically oriented reader objects to "libido theory," ego analysts describe the process as "regression in the service of the ego." The freedom of privacy allows one greater contact with one's primary processes as well as one's reservoir of accumulated rational knowledge. In privacy, we can play with ideas. Therefore, it seems as if privacy is not only crucial for ego development, but for ego functioning in its highest form - creativity.

Privacy, as territorial control, is a state of freedom from threat of attack or intrusion. We have seen that aggression often serves to maintain or obtain the greater range of options afforded by the exclusion of others. Given this freedom from trespass, there is greater energy available for such ego processes as creativity. Those who accept the theory of innate aggression also maintain that it can be ritualized or redirected toward positive goals - including creativity (Lorenz, 1966, Storr 1968, Tiger 1970). Of course we must be cautious as some of these authors define aggression so broadly as to be meaningless. Nevertheless, contemporary psychoanalysts are more likely to see aggression as accessory to ego activities, rather than in itself. When aggression becomes destructive, we are usually seeing its pathological manifestations,⁴ often due to overcrowding.

As sociologists, rather than ethologists or psychoanalysts, we must examine the social circumstances under which aggression becomes channeled for creativity or destruction. Our expertise lies in the analysis of the processes by which individual motives are shaped by the society and subsequently translated

from individual processes to collective patterns.

While privacy may be a precondition for creativity, we do not consider creativity as limited to the geniuses of the world. To the extent that "identity" is subject to choice, men have the opportunity for creative self-expression. Every role has its expressive components. As previously mentioned, privacy is essential for ego development, especially in the creation of identity. One means of establishing one's uniqueness is the personalization of private territory. The Cro-Magnons drew pictures on their cavern walls, our students turn their walls into unpaid political or pornographic announcements, their parents hire decorators, and we cover our walls with books criticising those parents.

It is no accident that totalitarian societies and total institutions begin the destruction of personal uniqueness by abolishing personal privacy, prohibiting privatization of state or institutional territory, and denying the right of personal display e.g. unique styles of dress are replaced by "uniforms." The individual is denied privacy even for the biological functions of eating, sleeping or eliminating. The denial of freedom of choice by limiting privacy, robs a person of his most human virtue - uniqueness.

CONCLUSION

The title of this paper indicates that it represents a preliminary attempt to consider the nature of privacy, territoriality, crowding, aggression, etc. We believe these

behaviors are biological predispositions the manifestations of which are greatly modified by social circumstances. If these speculations prove to be erroneous, we will have nevertheless attained our ends; we have raised questions that sociology has generally not considered.

The arguments and selective interpretations of data in this paper are addressed to the openminded. Those who accept this line of reasoning will find no great revelations herein, they might be more familiar with the ethological research than the authors. Those who maintain the traditional view that man has no instincts and all behavior is learned will find this paper quite unconvincing. If the reader might be interested in the lines of future research suggested by this essay, he will find the field not only exciting, but quite underpopulated. The territorial markers at the borders of biosociology read "Welcome In."

FOOTNOTES

¹Most serious ethologists or social scientists concerned with ethology literature. See for example Callan, 1970.

²Under abnormal conditions interspecific killing will occur. Ants and lions will kill their own kind.

³Space will not permit consideration of the instinct-learning controversy, it is more important that we consider spatial factors in interpersonal functioning than we engage in fruitless debate. The authors personally opt for a nativistic position; very few critics of this position have read the serious ethological research or undertaken systematic observations of animals in natural conditions. These critics usually regard ethology as an atavistic movement which threatens "established" sociology. It is a shame that popularized ethology, especially such works as Ardrey's Territorial Imperative, has given the field a bad reputation. For those more interested in the nurture-nature debate, excellent discussions can be found in Eibl-Eiberfeldt, 1970, Tiger, 1970. (See Ch. 1), Sommer, 1970, Friedman, 1966, Means, 1967, Hall, 1966.

⁴Let us not forget that Freud's pessimistic conclusions were shaped in part by the social circumstances of WWI, and the subsequent rise of Fascism.

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