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ABSTRACT

This report presents 5 papers that comprised the program sponsored by the College of Education during the 175th anniversary celebration of the University of Tennessee (U.T.). The papers concern: (1) university life in a global village; (2) an organizational approach to understanding student behavior; (3) relationships between U.T. faculty and students; (4) faculty-administration relationships; and (5) the relationship between the university administration and the social problems of its environmental community. (HS)

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**UNIVERSITY LIFE IN A GLOBAL VILLAGE**  
**a commemorative program**  
**celebrating the 175th anniversary**  
**the university of tennessee**

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
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## **THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE**

September 10, 1969, marked the beginning of an auspicious year for The University of Tennessee. On this date the institution launched the observance of its 175th anniversary. For double measure, the 100th anniversary of the University's designation as Tennessee's Federal Land-Grant Institution was also celebrated. In the academic world, these two anniversaries have placed The University of Tennessee in a unique position. It is the 28th oldest institution of higher education among the 2,300 colleges and universities in America. Moreover, it is one of only 68 Federal Land-Grant Institutions of the nation, and one of only 30 holding both that responsibility and the position of the official State University.

But, more important, these anniversaries signified the intimate relationship of The University of Tennessee to the history of the Volunteer State. Created two years before Tennessee attained statehood, the University has contributed to the progress of the state from frontier days to the present era of space exploration. On the one hand, the institution has offered Tennessee youth educational opportunities for fruitful and satisfying careers; on the other, it has provided professional and vocational specialists as well as the research and public service programs required for a forward-moving state.

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## FOREWORD

The College of Education believed that it could best celebrate The University of Tennessee's 175th Anniversary if it selected a theme which was pertinent to students and faculty throughout the university community. Subsequent planning resulted in a program representing faculty and students from the College of Education and a well-known philosopher and educator, Professor Anthony Nemetz of the University of Georgia.

A special anniversary committee from the College of Education was chaired by Professor Edward Christenbury and included Professors Orin Graff, Nell Logan, Eugene Schoch and Helen Watson.

The College is grateful to all who participated in the afternoon and evening programs. A special debt is owed to the University Development Office which provided funds to support these programs.

J. D. McComas, Dean  
College of Education

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**ANTHONY NEMETZ, Ph.D.**

Dr. Anthony Nemetz who contributed the major article for this monograph is Professor of Philosophy and Religion at the University of Georgia.

Dr. Nemetz was graduated from St. Francis Seminary in Milwaukee, and received the Master of Arts and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago.

Since 1958 he has lectured at more than 40 colleges and universities throughout the country. He is a member of a number of national professional societies and is listed in the *Directory of American Scholars* and in *Who's Who in American Education*. He has been a Danforth Associate, a member of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation's Fellowship Selection Committee and the recipient of the Andrew Wright and Good Teaching Awards at Ohio State University.

# UNIVERSITY LIFE IN A GLOBAL VILLAGE

ANTHONY NEMETZ • PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION  
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to specify the responsibility of the university to the society at large. However, to talk about the content of the responsibility of the university to society requires an antecedent discussion of the idiomatic features of our society. And such analysis confronts us with an immediate difficulty, "For the times, they are a-changing." As a waggish friend put it: "The trouble with our time is that the future ain't what it used to be." How, then, shall we characterize our society?

I believe that Reinhold Niebuhr's distinction between the principles of establishment and the forces of cohesion is a fundamental beginning.<sup>1</sup> By the principles of establishment he means the codified legal system by which the society has been established and is maintained. Whereas the forces of cohesion are those elements and facets of society which are the basis of societal community. For example, a common history, a common ethnic background, a common religion or *in extremis*, a common enemy—any or all could serve as forces of cohesion. Apart from a common enemy, it is practically impossible to discern any such effective force of cohesion present today in our society. Of course I am not saying that there never were such forces present, for there were. But I am asserting that our social and national history of the past century testifies that such forces have eroded or atrophied. Yet despite that

fact, it cannot be held that we have no social bonds of community. What I maintain is that particular skeins of self interest, such as economic aspirations, have grown in isolation from other interests and have been formalized in the sense of becoming separate institutions such as labor unions or chambers of commerce.

The proliferation of institutions could not have occurred without a concurring growth in the scope of codified law. For example, the enabling legislation of the Wagner Act sanctioned the formation of trade unions.

What I think needs to be observed about the multiplication of institutions is that it was based on fractionalized loyalties which were power vested, and for that reason could be viewed as potentially destructive of democratic aspirations, especially the belief in basic legal equality. Conversely, institutional competitiveness could be viewed as a viable means of enhancing and enlarging the domain of the public interest.

The immediate point of these scanty historical allusions is to suggest that to talk about the responsibility of the university to the community at large is overlaid with ambiguity. For, in my view, there is no single identifiable community, but rather a complex of communities or an interrelated set of institutions, among which I include government at all levels.

To think of our society as basically characterized as an interrelated set of institutions rather than as the sum of individual citizens reveals three tensions endemic to a democratic society. For the moment, I will only list the tensions and later discuss their particular functions and primary locations. The overarching tension is between autonomy and dependence. Both autonomy and dependence here refer indifferently to the social status of individuals and institutions. The second tension is between tradition and innovation. This particular tension is simply a shorthand way of temporally characterizing the continuing life of a society. Tradition and innovation are the tenses of justification in an ongoing society. The third and last tension is between leadership and responsiveness. This tension refers to the assessment and assignment of the functions proper and appropriate to the institutions which comprise the society.

I realize that this litany of tensions may seem to be indecently obtuse. Perhaps I am just not clear about it. But basically I'm trying to say that the notion of responsibility is as ambiguous as that of community. Moreover, since one is always responsible to or for something, it is impossible to delimit the meaning of responsibility without a clear and prior perception of that to or for which one is responsible. For example, to call somebody a responsible parent or a responsible child doesn't really say all that much. A responsible parent should permit, but not be permissive. A responsible child wants to do his own thing, but also wants parental rules. A responsible parent is not moved by the argument that "all the kids are doing it," but is concerned that the child may shame the parents in the parental peer group. I feel certain that this example could be elaborated upon by additional tensions. But that would not serve the point. All I intended to show was the ambiguous nature of the concept of responsibility, and now to suggest a reason for that ambiguity.

The most cursory examination of the example reveals that "responsibility" is still connotatively a moral notion, but certainly moral in an historically evolved sense. For if western movies are held to be historical documentaries, there was little confusion and less debate about the responsibility of parent and child in days gone by. A clear head, a firmer hand and an unwavering belief in the imminence of divine retribution seemed adequate to define parental responsibility. But even then, the appealing simplicity to

such a notion was not socially effective. Had it been so, Horace Mann would not have written in 1837: "The mobs, the riots, the burnings, the lynchings, perpetrated by *men* [italics his] of the present day, are perpetrated, because of their vicious or defective education, when children."<sup>2</sup>

For Horace Mann "universal and complete education would do more than all things else to obliterate factitious distinctions in society." And "breaking the violence of faction" was the chief advantage of a well-constructed union as Madison noted in the X Federalist. Horace Mann read men and their history aright when he declared that: "Education, then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equalizer of the conditions of men . . . I mean that it gives each man the independence and means by which he can resist the selfishness of other men."<sup>3</sup>

Mann won the argument for public education, a victory which was supplemented and magnified by the incredibly farsighted provisions of the Morrill Act establishing land-grant institutions. The significance of these historical allusions is to parallel the analysis between the notions of responsibility and that of the society at large. In an example I located the notion of responsibility within the family, using its fundamental moral sense as a socially cohesive force. But again history indicates that paradoxically the very concept of responsibility has itself undergone a broadening transformation. The establishment of educational policies and institutions was the result of the growth of moral concern with the general welfare of the citizenry. But the evolution of the concept of responsibility did not end with the establishment of public educational institutions. For out of the universities have come the social sciences which in turn have become criteria for determining the nature of responsibility especially in the area of criminal law.

In a parenthesis, I would like to point out that these days legal discussions about responsibility is far removed from the earlier simple determination of "did he do it?" Crime and sickness are regarded by many practicing jurists as differing only in degree and not in kind, with the result that punishment should fit the criminal and not the crime. In this view, a criminal is a sick man in need of rehabilitation.

At this point, I think I owe it to you to put straightforwardly my basic assumption. By the society at large I understand a complex or aggregate

of institutions which represent and advocate the special interests of particular groups of citizens. And the university is as much a part of the society at large as any other institution with its own special interests. Now if we as a democratic society truly believe in legal equality, then no one institution has any prior claim or privileged position over any other institution. What I mean precisely is that there is no hierarchy of institutions such that any one institution is a captive, servant, or indentured to the aims and purposes of any other institution. For example, I simply do not believe that the educational institutions are in any legitimate sense subject to the purposes of the industrial or governmental institutions.

To put the matter as strongly as I have, involves the obvious corollary that even on moral grounds, no one institution has especial obligations to any other *single* institution. And in this sense, we are a secular society. Again to be precise, I am denying that in any institutional sense, we are now a Christian nation. Moreover, I can find no evidence to support the claim that the interrelations among the component institutions are or have been guided by the so-called Judaeo-Christian ethic.

By insisting on the pluralistic and secular nature of our society, I am only calling attention to the autonomous character of our institutions. But to speak only of autonomy not only emphasizes the inevitable competitiveness among the member institutions, but if autonomy is left unqualified and unregulated, even self-regulated, it is identical with anarchy. At this point I have an irresistible urge to solemnly declare that I am not an anarchist or that I am advocating anarchy. But I should also like to remind you that anarchy and total order, i.e. totalitarianism, are opposites and made of the same stuff. If we can trust Madison, the emergence of factions is the greatest threat to national unity. Factions may indifferently be a minority or the majority, but the mark of a faction is that it is "united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."<sup>4</sup>

Unless I totally misread the national scene, there is a definite emergence of factions. Today we speak of the polarization of society, rather than of factions. The meaning is the same, and so, I suspect, are the causes. Earlier I tried to describe

the genesis and proliferation of institutions designed to effectively pursue group interests, noting also a possible danger to the realization of the ideals of democracy, especially if the institutions failed to extend the domain of the public interest. To put this warning in the language of the Federalist Papers is to see a faction emerge. Such an occurrence can accurately be described as institutional decay resulting in a lack of confidence or trust.

When the institutional mistrust becomes widespread, there is the clear and present danger of a conflagration, i.e. the Chicago disturbances during the Democratic Convention. And the reaction to the danger is predictable. From the side of a faction will come the demand for order, but the order intended is that of the demanding faction, which is simply tyranny. It makes little difference whether it is the tyranny of a few without law or graced with the facade of law, or the tyranny of the majority who at least in recent months have been declared to be so silent that they needed a spokesman.

If the demand for order is implemented at the cost of minority rights or at the sacrifice of the permanent interests of the community, the dissolution of a free society is a fact accomplished. On the other hand, if those opposed to the law and order of faction, be they minority or majority, depose the order of a faction, a revolution is born with attendant anarchy.

Horace Mann argued that the safeguard of democracy was a "universal and complete education," and that the cause of social turmoil in any age was a "vicious or defective education." If Mann's analysis be taken as sound, we have finally arrived at a workable restatement of the problem. For the hopelessly ambiguous question about the responsibility of the university to society has been translated into the question: What constitutes a "universal and complete education," and what is the hallmark of a "vicious and defective education"?

The latter part of the question is easy to answer in the terms I have been using. Whenever the educational institution becomes subservient to the demands of any faction, the education is of necessity defective. And it makes no difference whether the faction is self declaratively anarchistic, for example, the Weatherman faction of S.D.S., or whether the demands come from a patriotic partisan, dedicated to protecting our

patrimony or to preserving our potage. John Kenneth Galbraith recently expressed the fear that this society is on the verge of a polarization between the educated and the uneducated—a polarization that could only produce a repressive oligarchy. That fear is fully grounded if education as an institution is or allows itself in any way to be allied with the immediately sectarian interests of any other institution. I suspect that Galbraith's fear is a kind of trend line extrapolation based on education's past alliances with branches of government and industry, or even with the roots of popular political sentiment.

It is my conviction that Galbraith's fear can be decently interred, but if and only if the university finds a way to function in such a way as to enlarge and enhance the permanent interests of the entire community. I obviously believe that not only is that necessary but that it happily is also possible to achieve this end.

As a prologue to my view of how the university can advance the public interest or the common good, allow me to recall the role of law in the genesis of institutions as well as the role of law in the protection of human rights and property interests. I am not here concerned with the scope and purpose of law as I am with the functioning of the entire legal system. President Levi of Chicago recently said: "the legal system for good or bad is the greatest educational force in society which inevitably creates a picture of the kind of community we would like to have. In this sense it either represents and speaks to our better selves or it carries a message of indifferent power or worse."<sup>5</sup>

It may be argued that Levi exaggerated the educational force of the legal system, but I doubt it, for our legal tradition is based on English common law. And within that tradition there is an overarching principle which states that the bench—the judiciary—is *custos morum*, i.e., the custodian of the morals of the people. Being a custodian of the morals of the people is not overly burdensome, if the people do have a common morality. Supposing, however, that the people do not have a common morality, as I have maintained we do not, then a new problem arises. To put the matter in slightly different terms, if a nation has a common morality or a tradition of civility or an operative public philosophy, the bench does not stand in need of precedent in making decisions on novel instances of

violations of the law, or on violations of law that occur under novel circumstances. All that is required under such cases for the court to be "reasonable" is to cite the moral tradition and note that the offense in question is contrary to that tradition. But if there is no common morality, obviously no such citation can be made. Granted that there is no common morality to which appeal can be made, the operation of the legal system will appear to operate on rather whimsical grounds. For example, to many observers the conduct of the court in the trial of the Chicago Eight left a message of more than indifferent power. Yet for other sizeable numbers of the citizens, the decisions of the Warren Court in matters of civil, or better, human rights, left precisely the same impression.

My point is twofold. On the one hand, as President Levi says: "A society requires a vision of its better self."<sup>6</sup> To which I add, this vision should function precisely as a force of cohesion—an ideal—a common morality. But on the other hand, if the operation of the legal system is incapable of representing such a vision, then we must look elsewhere for the social genesis of such a vision. Let me be as emphatic as I can about the necessity of this vision of our better selves. If the operation of the legal system does in fact convey the message of indifferent power to a considerable part of the national constituency, it is at least indirectly contributing to the growing polarization of the nation. Moreover, even if the judiciary acts on what it perceives as a vision of our better selves, it runs the risk of being seen as a judicial tyranny unless it projects a popular image of unquestioned integrity and credibility—for us now a forlorn hope in light of the Fortas, Haynesworth, and Carswell affairs. In short, I simply do not see how at this time we can look to the operation of the legal system for the requisite vision.

I am not faulting especially the judiciary for this social want, because the difficulty is compounded by the historic fact that the legislature is structured to be primarily responsive to the popular will, and every political administration looks and hopes for a popular mandate to sanction its programs. In a more gloomy moment, I would tend to agree with McLuhan that electoral democracy as we have known it is dead.

Yet before I certify the death certificate, I think one more possibility must be explored. And that is

to look to educational institutions, especially the university, as having the potential for being the greatest educational force in the society. I realize that it sounds inane if not fatuous to ask: "Can the institution of higher education be the greatest educational force in society?" Unfortunately the question is anything but trivial. For anyone who reads the *AAUP Bulletin*, the answer is obvious. Consider, for example, the March 1970 issue of the *Bulletin* concerning the University of Mississippi. Central to the issues concerning the current troubles of that institution was a policy of the Board of Trustees of the Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi in regard to outside employment practices. The policy statement contained five points of which I will quote only point three: "that it [outside employment] does not bring discredit to the institution and that it does not bring the employee into antagonism with his colleagues, community; or the State of Mississippi including the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning." According to the cited *AAUP Bulletin*, this particular ruling was invoked by the top university administration to redirect and relocate two law professors who by previous agreement with their Dean had agreed to work part-time for an O.E.O. sponsored project designed to make legal services available to the poor. This activity was found to be inexcusably antagonistic and punitive action was initiated.

This case dramatizes the issue under consideration. Can the University be the instrument of producing the vision of our better selves? And if so, is it desirable that it do so? Finally, if we answer affirmatively to the first two questions, we have an obvious third question, i.e., what ought to be the content of that vision?

The answer to the question of the possibility of producing the vision of our better selves is immediately connected to the perception of the entire university community regarding its relation to all other social agencies and forces.

Usually the university community has spokesmen, sometimes by statute and sometimes self-appointed, who tend to inform the remaining university community what the relation to the external communities ought to be. Alumni generally speak for private schools and for state schools. In the latter case, however, the alumni are ably assisted by the legislature, the Governor, trustees, and regents and by the general citizenry.

The formidable power of these spokesmen is

well known. We usually call it by its proper name, "the budget." Moreover, as we well know, money isn't everything. And on occasion we are given guidance through the use of such deathless aphorisms as: "Teach them to think for themselves, but be sure they do not think deviant thoughts." Or as one irate parent put it: "Teach them what they need to know, but don't mess up their minds." I suspect that such assistance is well intentioned, but I know that the help of the spokesman tends to confuse rather than clarify the proper relation of the University to society and in the process impedes the development of relevant education.

What needs to be clarified is the sense and extent of the autonomy of the university in contrast to the accepted areas of dependency on society. This, you recall, was the first tension I mentioned.

I take it for granted that most faculty rigorously reject the notion that they are employees, in the ordinary sense of that term, despite the fact that they may be salaried by agencies external to the University. To be sure, accepting a salary involves accepting stipulated obligations such as meeting classes at specific times and places. But one obligation cannot be contracted, namely accepting an externally determined view of what constitutes a relevant education. In that matter faculty must be unqualifiedly autonomous. The society at large rightly does not want the educational efforts of the faculty to be counter-productive or self-defeating. But surely, faculty efforts will inevitably be counter-productive unless they are totally autonomous in educational matters as conventionally defined.

Allow me to illustrate my contention by way of analogy. A goodly number if not most faculty reject the concept of *in loco parentis* on the ground that this notion is an indirect way of imposing on students the social and moral standards of the Protestant ethic—a standard which was effective, but is no longer viable, if trends in student conduct are allowed as evidence. In a similar view, I maintain that if the faculty accepts as applicable the notion of employee, then by extrapolation the university as a whole, would act *in loco societatis*. And the activity of the university would be constrained to being the oracle of faction, and as such directly contribute, even if unwillingly, to the destruction of the society which acted as employer. For the society to insist that

the university be "safe" is, I believe, a greater threat to the society itself than to deliberately remove every and all regulations governing university operations.

The response to the first question asked should now be apparent. If a university is in no way subjected to the chaffing binds of factious regulations, then it certainly is possible that the university can produce a vision of our better selves. Not only could the university produce such a vision, but I think it also is possible that the university might attempt to programmatically implement the vision and so become the launching pad for a changed social order. However, to say that the university could do these things in no way implies that it would be desirable in the sense of promoting the public interest. In academia the current idiom used to discuss the desirability to the university minimally to propose a societal vision centers on the term "institutional neutrality." And on the issue of institutional neutrality, faculties are deeply divided. What is at stake is the propriety of the university to be directly involved in issues of national policy, such as Viet Nam and in principles of social concerns, such as the limits of deviant behavior.

The argument in favor of institutional neutrality has a double appeal. It is said, and rightly so, that under the aegis of this principle, academic freedom has been established and maintained. It is also argued, and this time more stridently, that faculty are appointed to a university because of a disciplinary expertise and for no other function. As Professor Tonsor put it approvingly: "What then is the legitimate role of the university professor? In the first instance [he mentions four] his role is essentially conservative. He is the keeper and transmitter of a cultural tradition. Far from being a cultural revolutionary, society expects him to transmit the heritage of the past, unimpaired, to the next generation. Society does not ask him to be a politician, it does not ask him to have any political view at all; but it does expect him to know Latin or German, Chemistry or Zoology, History or Accounting."

The arguments in favor of abandoning the principle of institutional neutrality do not have the blessings of our history and, therefore, are innocent of American tradition. But the most enthusiastic proponents of abandoning the posture of neutrality, such as Noam Chomsky, are given to an incendiary rhetoric of moral indictment which makes

a revivalist's impassioned call to repent sound as dulcet and decorous as a well-tempered clavier. The more restrained form of the argument in favor of abandoning institutional neutrality points to the obligation of faculties to take positions, because as Professor Koster said: "There are occasions in academic life today when political and moral issues are inextricably tangled with issues of educational policy . . . ." And he cites as examples, R.O.T.C., military and other recruiting on campuses, and contract research in biological warfare.

Like you, I have given this matter considerable thought, and I, perhaps unlike you, have come to the conclusion that abandoning the principle of neutrality is in the public interest, but may well not be in the interest of the university, if the interest of the university is defined in traditional terms. My reasons turn on my second tension—the tension between tradition and innovation. And the context of that tension is one of establishing a hierarchy of values especially regarding tradition and innovation. I subscribe to the notion that innovation is born out of dissent with tradition, and conversely, that tradition properly conceived, is the pervasive tone in which innovation is nurtured. But I am equally persuaded that today tradition is neither properly conceived nor is it nurturing innovation.

My evidence for saying that tradition is improperly viewed can be found within the university community itself. We are all looking at the same past, and yet there is a polarization of attitudes which could hardly be described as differences due to research guided by scholarly detachment. "Join them or lick them, but for God's sake don't debate them," has become a standard operating procedure. The self aggrandizing extremes have pre-empted all vestigia of the middle, the life of reason, and paradoxically all in the name of sweet reasonableness. The middle is no longer the distance between the extremes, but is instead a non-dimensional point, a dislocated place in no way contiguous with alternative positions and postures. Maintaining neutrality in a polarized world is not only unfertile and sterile, but is self-aborting in every innovative attempt.

The second kind of evidence for abandoning neutrality deals with the growing erosion of confidence in our institutions, such as government, the church, business and indeed the university. The erosion of confidence is not the exclusive property

of the unshorn, the culturally deprived or the supporters of the "Impeach Justice Douglas" movement. On the contrary a growing lack of confidence in our institutions as the instrumentalities of the creation and maintenance of values is the common property of all segments of society, allowing, of course, each segment to exempt his own institution from the contagious malaise of disillusionment.

Perhaps both the polarization of attitudes and the erosion of confidence can in part be explained by what I regard as the most difficult problem of our day. Due to, or because of, the revolutions in electronic technology, e.g., instant communication (which incidentally makes the world a global village), social engineering and biological engineering, we can create and live in any kind of society we desire. But our institutions are not now structured to effectively enable us to make such a decision. Our institutions operate on trend lines, i.e., on the principle that the immediate future will resemble the immediate past. But the possibilities inherent in our technologies have compacted us in time, and the future need not resemble the past. And why should it, if we can shape it? Indeed, are we reasonable if we allow the future to resemble the past in the sense of a life style dedicated to recapitulating and extending the past. Not to employ the possibilities present in technology, to make the good life available at all or most of its people, is at least a sign of moral delinquency. For such reasons, then, I reject the principle of institutional neutrality as applied to the university, in favor of seeing the university as especially qualified to proffer to society at large a vision of its better self—a vision which would inherently offer suggestions for the construction of a universal education.

I look to the university for the obvious, albeit paradoxical reason, that traditionally it has been the home of innovation. For example, until recently almost all research and development for commercial purposes was done in universities. Now corporations of even medium size have their own research and development programs. Moreover, the propriety of the university in accepting research contracts is now seriously challenged. Historically the university has evidenced its responsiveness to social needs through leadership in technological and scientific development. Although such a service function may still be asked of the university, I maintain that it no longer is its primary respon-

sive function.

Instead, I hold that because of reasons given, only the university can do what Levi claimed was the optimum function of the legal system, namely give us a vision of our better selves. But I added that I thought this could occur only at some risk to traditional self interest. The risk will be evident by sketching in the roughest outline, the function and content of the proposed vision.

Assuming that Levi was right in holding that the operation of the legal system mirrors for better or worse the vested beliefs of a society. Assuming furthermore, that there is a growing disillusionment with the legal system, then the function of the vision must act as a kind of judicial review—a review not of cases but of principles. Moreover, as in judicial review, previous principles may be reversed and new ones discovered. However, to analogize the function of the university to the judiciary cannot be extended beyond this point. For the university does not have the sanction to implement its findings. It can only persuade, and cannot coerce. Again, paradoxically, since we do not have a pervasive force of cohesion which is socially operative today, coercion remains as the only sanction for law. And it is that reliance on coercion which is further polarizing our society. Consequently, the need for persuasion as an alternative to coercion becomes the imperative function of especial responsibility for the university. But I do not believe that the university can carry out this mission as it is now structured, which is the risk to which I alluded. The university needs to be internally restructured in order to speak to the society in a single voice. At the moment we have many voices, but combined they do not constitute even polyphony but instead, a raucous cacophony. As a means to realizing a singleness of voice and action, I suggest that the existent pyramidal model of authority be abolished, and policy making be done by aggregates of interests to include faculty and students, aggregates that resemble a constellation rather than a pyramid.

Secondly, to borrow a notion from Corita Kent, I think that a university should view its every operation as an experiment, rather than a task done or ordered to a rule. Thirdly, the university structure needs desperately to discover or create new and appropriate sets of rewards for its contributing members, if the notion of institutional loyalty is not to disappear altogether. If this were to be done, a dean or vice chancellor might be lost in

the reshuffle, but some things are lost without intolerable pain.

A restructured university could, I hope, direct its energies in public utterance and in its research and teaching to propose, articulate, justify, and review the implications of what I regard as the emerging social persuasions in the country. The architectonic criterion of productivity as the ultimate arbiter of value has been riotously challenged. The direction of innovation is, I think, clear. Our society in various levels of consciousness is moving away from an orientation of legally defined rights and duties, to an undefined but deeply felt commitment to residual or reserved rights as the basis of a free society. For example, the right to privacy (unmonitored by an eavesdropping olive at a cocktail party), the claimed right to a free and unpolluted air space, point the way to a need for a basic re-evaluation of the relation between society and its members. Many hold, and I believe, that no longer can a member of our society be defined only in terms of legally ascribed rights and duties. On the contrary, the judicial legal direction has been and will continue to focus on a member of society as someone who possesses an intrinsic worth and dignity which transcends the constraints, proscriptions and prescriptions of every social institution. Such a concept of a member of society entails the notion that the primary purpose of social legislation will be on achieving more equitable means of distribution of goods already held in common rather than on facilitating the means for the acquisition and retention of things within the private sector. On the same ground, I hold that the immediate future, unlike the past will look to justice for every segment of society rather than to pursuing the interests of the vested power groups to determine the appropriate inter-institutional relationships. And at the international level, I feel certain that barring cataclysm, the concept of duty will replace the notion of right as the primitive term regulating the relationship among the family of nations without regard to nuclear strength and threat.

Now even if I am correct about these tendencies, it should be clear that my proposal does not specify a curriculum that is a complete and universal education. The content of such a project must on my terms be left to unending sets of experiments in which every faculty member by participation gets to do "his own thing."

Regarding a new curriculum, all I have to say is that human ecology ought to be equally as important as natural ecology, and that as academicians we should strive for a kind of intellectual plasticity similar to that with which nature has endowed its lowliest organisms. Working toward the achievement of this end is, I believe, the unique responsibility of the university to the society at large, and I for one hope that this end is partially realized minimally before the next 175th anniversary of The University of Tennessee.

<sup>1</sup>Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Structure of Nations and Empires*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1959, especially Ch. IX.

<sup>2</sup>Horace Mann, *Lectures and Annual Reports on Education*, ed. Mrs. Mary Mann, Cambridge, 1867, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup>Horace Mann, "The Importance of Universal, Free, Public Education," reproduced in *The People Shall Judge*. The Staff, Social Sciences I, The College of The University of Chicago (eds.), The University of Chicago Press, 1949, p. 592.

<sup>4</sup>*Federalist X*.

<sup>5</sup>Edward H. Levi, "Unrest and the Universities," *The University of Chicago Magazine*, Vol. LXI, No. 4, p. 25.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 26

<sup>7</sup>Stephen J. Tonsor, "Faculty Responsibility for the Mess in Higher Education," *The Intercollegiate Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 85.

<sup>8</sup>Donald N. Koster, "On Institutional Neutrality," *AAUP Bulletin*, March 1970, p. 12.

# AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING STUDENT BEHAVIOR

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Behavioral scientists have for many years developed "models of business organizations" in their attempts to better understand worker behavior. In his book *Personality and Organization*, psychologist Chris Argyris developed a model that has made a significant contribution to man's understanding of human behavior within an industrial organization.<sup>1</sup> However, research conducted about organizational behavior has indicated that there are certain similarities among all organizations, be they public, private, formal, or informal, and thus, certain aspects of organizational behavior may be generalized.

It is the purpose of this paper to generalize the organizational theory developed by Chris Argyris about business organizations to education. Specifically, it will be maintained that similarities exist between industrial workers and college students, and between policies of business organizations and policies of universities. If it is accepted that similarities may be at least minimally applicable, it then follows that the "model" applied to business organizations may indeed apply to education.

Thus, the first task of this paper is to present a brief description of certain similarities between the worker and the student, and between the industrial organization and the university organization. The second task is to explain the model that Argyris developed and apply the model to the analogous situation. Finally, some limitations and

implications of the adaptability of the model need to be considered. It is in this manner that the following pages of this paper are organized.

## *Some Similarities: The Industrial Worker and the College Student*

In an attempt to characterize the assembly-line worker who was considered highly desirable to the industrial organization, Chris Argyris interviewed ten workers who were judged to be "well adapted and well adjusted." He found that they tended to have the following personal characteristics: they valued money as most important, they aspired to do the minimal quantity of work, they were unable to perform several different tasks at the same time, they felt satisfied with the foreman because they seldom saw him and he seldom contacted them, they were hardly ever late or absent from work and they tended to dislike changes and were very rigid in their attitudes.

Similarly, in a number of recent interactions I have had with students who were judged as "well adjusted and well adapted" by one or more college administrators and faculty members, I found them to value grades and graduation very highly, to have relatively little interest in learning beyond the activity of getting a grade, to have little interest in events outside of the campus, social, and political arena, to be relatively satisfied with their professors and school, to be not often tardy or

absent, and to dislike unstructured classes and situations. Thus, if Argyris' interviews with the "better" workers were representative, and if my observations about the "better" student could be

further documented, the two groups may be perceived as being quite similar (as summarized below).

EMPIRICALLY - PROVIDED CHARACTERISTICS

<p>OF "BETTER" WORKERS          values money the most          aspires to do minimal amount of work          specializes to do one thing at a time          satisfied with foreman          not often tardy or absent          dislikes changes</p>	<p>OF "BETTER" STUDENTS          values grades and graduation          does minimal work for grades          not interested in "real" world          satisfied with professors and school          not often tardy or absent          dislikes unstructured situations</p>
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*Some Similarities: The Business Organization and the University Organization*

Formal organizations are administered by means of certain principles that serve to structure the work environment, as well as behaviors of people within that environment. Fundamental to most organizations are the principles of specialization of labor, chain of command, unity of direction and span of control. A brief discussion of how the principles function within formal organizations may be useful in understanding the similarities between business organizations and university organizations.

The principle of work (or task) specialization is that "rational" organizations find it organizationally and administratively efficient to have the employees become highly specialized. For example, on an assembly line, we may find a worker spending his entire working day placing nuts on bolts and tightening them. In a university, we find a high degree of specialization as departments and professors are so specialized that interdisciplinary endeavors are considered noteworthy accomplishments of the university. It is not uncommon to find courses that are specialized to the degree where one may take a course in psychological sociology or sociological psychology and where the respective departments maintain that the courses do not deal with the same curricula.

The concept of chain of command emphasizes a determined hierarchy of authority where the people in the top rungs of the organization direct and control the behaviors of the people in succeeding lower levels. "The leader is therefore assigned formal power to hire, discharge, reward,

and penalize the individuals in order that their behavior be molded toward the organization's objectives."<sup>2</sup>

The impact of such a state of affairs is to make the individuals *dependent* upon, *passive* toward, and *subordinate* to the leader. As a result the individuals have *little control* over their working environment.<sup>3</sup> Not only does the administrative principle of chain command cause workers to have *little control* over their working environment, but the principle used in education organizations limits the amount of control students may have in influencing or evaluating the curriculum, instructional techniques and those personnel doing the instructing. Moreover, the principle of chain of command had successfully been rationalized (in the past) in education as *in loco parentis*, and in industry, as paternalism. In the university, the administrative hierarchy serves to facilitate the chain of command.

The concept of unity of direction suggests that as every person (or department and discipline) must be specialized, so must their activities. Therefore, the organizational efficiency is increased as leaders closely plan and direct the activities of those under their domain. The assembly line worker has a precisely defined job description which he is required to adhere to; the college student must follow university regulations in regard to core courses, course outlines, and often as to the length of the paper he is to write. Moreover, university regulations often govern where the student sleeps and when he must be in his room. Although it is important for the university to have specified courses for all students, it is also clearly recognized that for any given student, such a

program may be highly irrelevant.

Finally, the concept of span of control states that administrative efficiency is increased by limiting the number of people a leader may have subordinate to him. In industry and in education, it is assumed that a *specific number* of workers or students should be under the direction of one supervisor or teacher. Few adjustments are made for the complexity of the task or the abilities and individual differences of the subordinate individual. Few adjustments are made for the lack of (or specialization of) "leadership" or "teaching" abilities of the supervisor or the teacher. Very rarely are universities flexible enough to employ such adjusting concepts as: team teaching, leaderless groups, individualized instruction, the rotating

leader concept, and the emergent leader concept. Moreover, the principle of span of control places unquestioned emphasis on close supervision. The effects of close supervision are dire:

Close supervision leads the subordinate to become dependent upon, passive toward, and subordinate to the leader. Close supervision also tends to place the control in the superior.<sup>4</sup>

The following table summarizes what I believe to be similarities between the business organization and the university organization. It has been my intent in the preceding discussion to describe how the four principles of administration apply to educational organizations.

#### PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATION

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS	UNIVERSITY ORGANIZATIONS
Specialization of Labor Chain of Command Unity of Direction Span of Control	Departmental & Teaching Specialization Administrative Hierarchy University Regulations Classroom Size

#### *The Argyrisian Model of Organizational Behavior*

In the preceding discussion, an attempt was made to indicate the similarities between workers and students, and the policies of business and university organizations. We can now turn to the model Argyris developed in an attempt to explain human behavior within an organizational context. However, it is important to mention Argyris' assumptions about the needs of a healthy individual as he grows from infancy to adulthood. A brief review of his analysis of the healthy individual will be highly useful.

The healthy individual can be defined in terms of his personality. Argyris described a healthy individual as having an internally well-adjusted and externally well-adapted mature personality. As the healthy individual develops, he moves from infancy (and immaturity) toward adulthood (and maturity) and his abilities and interests change accordingly. An infant and an adult may be characterized in terms of their personality and behavior manifestations. Some changes in the maturing individual can be graphically presented in the form of a "development" continuum as follows:

#### HUMAN BEINGS IN CULTURE DEVELOP

FROM INFANCY	TO ADULTHOOD
In a state of passivity In utter dependence Incapable of varied behavior With shallow interests With short time perspective With lack of self-awareness	to increased activity to increased independence to behaving in many ways to broad and deep interests to long time perspective to acute awareness and control

This model illustrates that—barring an unhealthy individual—an individual is predisposed to move from the infant end of the continuum to the adult end and would have the abilities and interests suggested.

It would, therefore, be expected that a healthy mature individual would tend to behave in active, independent, and varied ways with deep interests, long time perspectives, and with acute awareness and control. However, it had earlier been stated that organizations are administered through principles of work specialization, chain of command, unity of direction, and span of control. It was further suggested that these principles require individuals to behave passively, dependently, submissively, and (I now add) in ways characterized by infantile behavior. Thus, the focal point of Argyris' model becomes evident: *There is a basic incongruency between the needs of the healthy individual and the organization.* This incongruency is detrimental to both parties in that there is a high opportunity cost as the organization serves to retard maturity, mental growth, work productivity, and learning.

In studies subsequent to Argyris' book, individuals having the personality and mentality characteristics of infants (i.e., morons) were taught to do the same jobs that were designed for "mature" adults. In one study, the mentally deficient group increased production by 400 percent! Thus, it can be seen that the traditional principles of administration (set up for administrative efficiency) may, in fact, be dysfunctional to the overriding goals of the organization. In recognition of this fact, Argyris suggested three remedies: job enlargement, reality-centered leadership, and employee-centered leadership. It is noteworthy that all three remedies were designed to decrease the individual-organization incongruency through the revision of organizational policies.

But does this model apply to the university organization? It would seem that if well-adapted and adjusted students are similar to well-adapted and adjusted assembly-line workers and if the principles of administration are similar in business and in education, a basic incongruency between the educational organization and the college student is likely. Of course, it is expected that because of the *differences* between industrial workers and college students, and because of the *different* nature of the educational organization, the incongruency model that Argyris formulated for business

will only minimally and ambiguously apply to the educational organization for the time being.

#### *Some Implications for Education*

If we were to assume that a basic incongruency existed between the needs of college students and the administrative needs of the university, we might postulate that to some degree the following events would occur:

1. Many students who are successful in completing the degree program would have many of the characteristics attributed to infants.
2. Many students who are unsuccessful in the degree program would have many of the characteristics attributed to mature adults.
3. The university would seek to select out or not readmit students who indicate traits of activity, independence, etc.
4. Students who are "well-adapted and well-adjusted" to university life would remain basically apathetic and uninterested.
5. The student population would reflect the attitudes and behavior similar to those students that I interviewed.
6. As the university becomes more administratively efficient (using the four principles discussed earlier), student mental growth would be reduced and the university would become more and more dysfunctional toward its own goals of helping students to grow and toward the needs of society.

<sup>1</sup>Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 65, 66.

# RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN U.T. FACULTY AND STUDENTS

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My assigned topic today is "Student-Faculty Relationships at The University of Tennessee." My first thought when given this subject was that I did not think I could make one intelligent statement about this matter but that surely after some research I would be able to talk at length and with a certain degree of knowledge about the topic. However, having spent some time investigating this topic, I find I am still in the position where I cannot make one definitive sentence about student-faculty relationships at The University of Tennessee.

The question came to mind, "How do you go about finding out exactly what are the relationships between the faculty and students at U.T.?" The most logical approach seemed to be threefold: (1) solicit student opinions; (2) solicit faculty opinions; and (3) collect data from research that could give insight into the problem.

The opinions expressed by the students yielded all kinds of results, depending upon the student's age, class, major, etc. For example, some said the student-faculty relationship was entirely good, some said it was entirely bad, some said it was good sometimes and bad at others. Some did not know what I was talking about!

The opinions expressed from the faculty yielded about the same variety of responses as did opinions expressed by the students. For example, some said they had excellent relationships with students, some said they had terrible associations with stu-

dents because students did not care, and some did not know what I was talking about!

Finally, the question, "What is really meant by student-faculty relationships?" confronted me. Do we mean the ability of teachers and students to drink beer together or to call each other by first names? Or do we mean the ability of teachers to give good advice and counsel to the students?

In essence, the elusiveness of the topic and my inability to define in specific terms the parameters of student-faculty relationships at The University of Tennessee have led me to relate a story that I feel best represents the general situation at U.T. The story is based on the feedback I received from both students and faculty.

This is a story. A story of Stanley Statistic and his adventures at Probability U. Stanley is a normal fellow, just one of the some 8 million or so individuals who will bombard some campus environment during the 1970's. Being typical, Stanley is better prepared, more mature, and more socially alert than his counterpart a few years back.

In the process of selecting the institution Stanley is ultimately going to attend, he and his parents are amazed at the similarity (on paper, at least) between the purposes of many institutions. It is, indeed, refreshing to Stanley to learn that nearly every institution in the land is dedicated to "educating the student to his fullest potential." Testimony to this comment can be

found in the promotional literature of a sampling of college catalogs. For instance, one institution stated the theme this way: "The goal of a true university is to mature its students, to make a man humble but conscious of his ability, his competence, his character, and his culture." Another stated the same idea this way: "to develop a person who will be an informed and responsible citizen; academically, socially, spiritually, economically, and politically." Still another institution voiced its objectives this way: "to mold young people with a type of behavior based on ethical principles consistent with democratic ideals." Stanley and his folks were so impressed—in fact, they were elated—with the decree that higher education in the country seems to be so concerned with the total development of each individual student, that the anticipation of enrollment in one of these great educational and humanitarian type institutions became intense.

The day finally comes and Stanley arrives at the gates of Probability U. Probability U is the regular run-of-the-mill institution. It is a large state school with an ever-expanding campus and an enrollment of nearly 20,000 students. It is made up of a diversity of people and buildings. Its athletic program is far more prestigious than its educational program. Also, Probability U has been plagued by the appropriate number and kinds of student protest and demonstrations over the years. It is a normal school.

Stanley, more than anything else, has been totally captivated by the decree that once he gets to college he will be able to stand on his own feet as a free-thinking, decision-making, on-his-own-at-last person. He will be able to come and go, play or study, give or take, sleep or work, accept or reject—all on his own individual free will. Emancipation from the home environment. He will now become a man in a community of scholars.

Stanley's first encounter is with his place of residence at Probability U. Since all freshmen are required to live on campus during their first year, Stanley, like some 50 percent of all college students, is just another residence hall inhabitant. Stanley's dorm at Probability U is typical. It joins two students with two other students, has two beds, two bureaus, two desks, and two straight chairs in an effort to assure that Stanley will reach his height of individuality. It is up to him now to think for himself, provided he keeps with-

in the regulations of his living quarters, which in effect tell him this is his home away from home and he is to live and enjoy himself as he sees fit. He cannot, however, put Scotch tape on the walls; use, possess, or store alcoholic beverages in his room; make any loud noise, especially during quiet hours. Further, he is told that the use of electrical equipment such as sun lamps, hot plates, coffee makers, heaters, air-conditioning units, window fans, irons, toasters, television, and cooking units of any kind is strictly forbidden. This, plus the use, possession, or storage of firearms, weapons, air guns, spear guns, firecrackers, or explosives of any type is not permitted. This is added to the fact that he is told to keep his room neat and clean and that he will be subjected to periodic room inspections. Along with this goes the rules about proper dress at all times, no gambling and no yelling, talking or swearing out of windows. He is not to be agitator, participant or spectator at any unorganized activity. He is expected to comply with these and all of the rest of the regulations for the art of respectable living. Stanley is encouraged, however, to make his own decisions.

Our young student is particularly eager to get his academic program under way; after all, going to class and studying is what college is all about. We see Stanley now in his new surroundings already conforming to what he finds established germane to dress, speech, and behavior. During the rigorous process of registration, Stanley Statistic is to have his first meeting with his academic advisor at Probability U. Stanley is quite enthusiastic about this conference because he has heard so much about the genuine concern all faculty members have for students. He has also looked forward to his session because he is anxious to exchange ideas, observations, and recommendations regarding his own education with his faculty advisor.

As the session opens, we see Stanley hurriedly directed to the proper table manned by his advisor. To his surprise the line is long and it is apparent that others need the service of this warm, charming, considerate, and helpful consultant. After a rapid introduction and even quicker description of what Stanley would like to major in, he is presented a four-year outline of his program with the instructions that there is to be no deviation from the sequence of courses prescribed, all prerequisites are to be followed and elective

courses chosen only after approval by his advisor. Stanley's advisor informs him he is there to help him at all times; but since the program is so clearly outlined on the paper Stanley was given, if he just follows it, he will have no trouble. Stanley's advisor further states he is a pretty busy man. He is on a number of state and national committees, working on numerous publications at home, including a new textbook, has various conferences and conventions to attend out of town, and does a lot of consultant work across the country. Stanley is, however, encouraged to come by anytime he needs help.

As a somewhat stunned Stanley leaves this three and one-half minute interview, he is a little surprised at the lack of his involvement in the academic advising process. He is grateful, however, for the program outline he has received.

Going to class in a college environment is a strange experience for Stanley. He has two large lecture courses, two TV courses—one right in his own dormitory lobby—and a new human relations course called Sensitivity Training. Stanley is reminded by his graduate teaching assistants that because they have had no previous teaching experience and due to their own course work and thesis writing, the class material will cover the textbook only. Stanley and his fellow members are, however, encouraged to attend classes for there should be a stimulating review of the textbook. The TV class in the dormitory is particularly novel to Stanley. For nearly a whole year now he has been attending his philosophy class in his residence hall. Actually this is not a residence hall, but it is what is known as a living-learning center. This is the same concept that some of the first colleges in the nation adopted, with masters and students living together for mutual enlightenment. Stanley's living situation is a little different though. The living and learning here is a community of students and machines. For example, in Stanley's dorm there are TV classes, all sorts of tape recorders, film projectors, record players, a library, a gymnasium, a cafeteria, and all sorts of other educational materials. Stanley is afraid if the trend keeps up all of his classes will eventually be in the dorm. He will eat all of his meals in the dorm, attend all social events in the building, attend symposiums, art discussions, religious services—in fact, Stanley has visions of attending graduation by means of remote electronic equipment. Thus, for four years Stanley may never get

to see, in person, one faculty member. Stanley does not altogether like the living and learning concept.

During his entire first year on campus, Stanley has been exposed to so many graduate assistants, giant lecture classes and electronic gadgets, he wonders where all the teachers have gone. Stanley saw his academic advisor twice—both times by accident and both times at the airport. Quite disillusioned, Stanley, living up to his name, thinks about quitting school. He could become one of the 27 percent of the first-year students who completely drop out of college. Or he could be one of the 50 percent of freshmen who either drop out or transfer to another school. Maybe, Stanley thinks, it would be different at another school.

He has heard about other institutions of higher education that are taking new and different approaches to bridging the gap between the faculty and the students. The cluster college approach, like Santa Clara, where faculty and students work together on solving common problems such as pollution, poverty, and crime, seems appealing. The work-study approach like Antioch is also of interest. Schools that have students on curriculum planning boards likewise seem more worthwhile. Junior colleges which emphasize teaching rather than research are also desirable.

Over the summer Stanley, being normal again, decides to get married. This is not so unusual since a tremendous number of young people are getting married these days. In fact, 26 percent of the total college student population are now married and the figure will continue to rise in the 1970's.

We will jump ahead a few years; and since Stanley is now married, we will assume his degree of maturity is raised, and with more direction and purpose he will finish Probability U. He followed his program as outlined on the sheet given to him by his advisor. His experiences in class were not altogether delightful. The opportunity to participate in shaping his own education was pretty much to be anticipated. Oh, occasionally he was asked by an instructor what types of things he would like to learn in a particular class; but for the most part, there was little communication between professors and students. And strangely enough, when Stanley was asked what learning experiences were relative to him as an individual, he was hard pressed to come up with any specific

answers. Stanley even had a few professors who seemed interested in him as an individual and who got to know him outside of class, but these were few and far between. At any rate, despite the fact that Stanley had three different advisors, changed programs twice, which were altered six times, witnessed four revisions of the college catalog, had summer course work taken elsewhere accepted for credit but not for graduation, was totally unable to ever get corrected a computer error on his transcript during his sophomore year, and was suspended a quarter because he became so maladjusted after his sensitivity training that he insulted everyone he came in contact with in an effort to express his true feelings. Stanley received a diploma (which had his name spelled wrong) and was a true alumnus of Probability U.

Stanley had jumped so many hurdles, completed so many silly assignments, sat in so many boring classes, had so little contact with the faculty, turned in so much busy work, he felt he had the proper training to enter graduate school at Probability U. He also felt that because he had no courses in educational methods, philosophy, or psychology, and further knew absolutely nothing about teaching at all, he could qualify for a teaching assistantship. Because Stanley became so proficient at not being able to teach and "playing the game" in graduate school, he went all the way.

It is now four years later and we see Stanley as a new department chairman at his old alma mater, Probability U. Stanley had hardly settled in his new job when he was presented a list of grievances by the students. The students claim that the department had organized its classes for the prevention of learning. A long list of what the students claim were academic atrocities contained the following:

1. Failure of professors to meet classes on time or in some cases not at all.
2. Failure of professors to state course objectives or present course outlines.
3. Failure to construct valid and reliable testing methods.
4. Failure to turn back tests and go over them for learning purposes.
5. Failure to allow meaningful dialogue in the classroom.
6. Failure to relate course contents to present day society.

7. Failure to adequately prepare for class period.
8. Failure to keep office hours.
9. Failure to show any concern for student problems.
10. Failure to post final grades at the end of the quarter.

Stanley answered the student grievances by telling them it was an imperfect world made up of imperfect beings. He said there were members of the teaching staff who were professionally responsible and indeed interested in students but there were not presently enough of them. And finally, faculty members often had more important things to worry about than students. Stanley was willing to work on the problem and thus appointed a student-faculty committee to work on a solution. Stanley said the ultimate solution would be in finding warm, human souls, who were genuinely interested in students, to teach in higher education; but, at the present, there was a short supply of this type.

Stanley Statistic was working hard on the problem of student-faculty relationships at Probability U when he died at the average age of 63 1/2.

# FACULTY-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONSHIPS

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The American university is now infamous for its clashes between students and the administration. The power struggle that continues to plague the higher learning has gained for it a dubious place in the spotlight of world opinion. Less recognized and only occasionally exhibited before the public, however, is a more subtle power struggle between the universities' faculty and its administration. Uncertain relations have prevailed for decades, providing a target for lip and pen in the chronicles of higher education. Although largely limited to such respectable arenas as the faculty senate, departmental meetings and the occasional coffee lounge, the heart of the battle for authority is political.

As in most political issues, faculty-administration relationships can be examined in terms of the democratic principle of participation in decision-making, where such decisions affect both parties to the issue. This paper explores the nature of the problem of participatory decision-making, primarily from the faculty side of the relationship.

## *Participation in Decision-Making*

A plea for "shared responsibility" is often heard when an organization seems to give with the strains of division among its ranks. Such phraseology must in fact refer to the right of the gov-

erned to participate in the making of decisions that affect them. The right, however, is rarely met with execution of responsibility when parties to the decision perceive other obligations to be of greater importance than exercising their rights. To fail to share responsibly in such decisions is to allow decisions to be made by others. In Maclver's words, "Any institution cannot be well governed unless each of its components clearly recognizes its obligations as well as its rights in the promotion of the common ends."<sup>1</sup> To leave decisions entirely to others is to invite dissatisfaction with the results.

Such is the case with university faculties. Paradoxically, faculty members are often the first to decry lack of involvement in decision making, but just as often refuse to volunteer their time and energies to activities designed to promote involvement in the operation of a university.

## *Faculty Roles*

According to a recent study by Dykes,<sup>2</sup> faculty members perceive their decision-making role as one limited primarily to academic affairs, while avoiding direct participation in such "non-educational" concerns as student affairs, financial matters, and public and alumni affairs. Faculty members perceive themselves as being uniquely qualified to make decisions concerning scholarly

pursuits, but would rather leave ancillary "house-keeping" chores to the administrators.

Faculty members would prefer a "legislative" role, acting as an arbiter of proposals and recommendations passed on by the executive branch of the university. This system of checks and balances could easily extend beyond purely academic matters, if such "mundane" concerns as capital improvements should be found by the faculty to directly influence its welfare. In short, the faculty would prefer a kind of "benevolent despotism" to a system that demands direct involvement in the operation of a university.

#### *Obstacles to Participation*

The increasing size and bureaucratization of the university must rank as a prime deterrent to most university faculty members in their quest for direct participation in decision-making. A loss of a sense of community and a growing sense of exclusion from the center of decision-making activities leaves the faculty in a position not unlike the universal professional-in-the-organization.<sup>3</sup> The special talents and competencies of the rank-and-file faculty are often perceived as subordinate to staff specialists appointed to handle the complex affairs of administration. Moreover, to participate among the layers and divisions of a large bureaucracy is to admit of time and energies to which few academicians can lay claim.

The problem of allocation of the scarce resource of time is related to a system of priorities which only a faculty member can possess. The professor often finds himself deciding between allegiance and service to his institution and meeting the demands placed upon him by his own discipline. Ironically, the questionable standing attached by faculty to participation in organizational affairs stems at least in part from the reward system nurtured by the university itself. The importance of research and professional activities to promotions and salaries place service to the organization only slightly below the relatively unrewarded job of teaching. Consequently, a shift in values occurs from the societal-oriented goals of the institution to scholarship-oriented disciplinary goals. Caplow and McGee put it thusly:

Today, a scholar's orientation to his institution is apt to disorient him to his discipline and to affect his professional prestige unfavorably. Conversely, an orientation to his discipline will disorient him to his institu-

tion, which he will regard as a temporary shelter where he can pursue his career as a member of his discipline.<sup>4</sup>

For reasons apparent to those whose values are more cosmopolitan than local, young faculty members are often "warned" to avoid service appointments if they are to get ahead in the academic world. Interestingly enough, however, it is these same junior faculty members who complain of "faculty oligarchies" and exclusion from within faculty groups. Faculties are often resistant to the purely democratic approach to decision-making within their own ranks but demand it when their interests are set against those of higher authority.

Increasing fractionalization among specialties and distance from the point of university level decisions leads to a greater reliance on departmental staff meetings as the locus of participation. Decisions reached at this level are usually of immediate import to the professional concerns of the individual faculty member. Moreover, the individual can see results in much shorter time than in the case of macro-level decisions and their implementation. The primacy accorded this level of decision-making bears out the observation that a professor will stir only when decisions are important to him as an individual. A sense of personal involvement is more apt to be reached here than at any other level in the university hierarchy.

#### *Faculty and Administration Power*

A distorted and simplistic perception of the distribution of power is often found among university faculties. Generally speaking, they see a clear-cut dichotomy existing between power held by the administration and faculty power. Any increase in administrative power is seen as diminishing faculty authority.

An either-or view of the distribution of power on campus and the inflated perception of administrative power ignores three important characteristics of university politics. First of all, each source of power depends on the other, and a general increase in administrative power should strengthen the total organization and therefore lead to a concomitant growth in faculty power. For the faculty to look upon the administration as a competitor for a limited amount of power results in lessened influence for both. This competitive urge is in part an outgrowth of the second feature of the political scene, the influence of internal and external constraints placed on the administration. As

Gardner has noted,

Leaders are hedged around by constraints—tradition, constitutional limitations, the realities of the external situation, the rights and privileges of followers, and... the inexorable demands of large-scale organization."<sup>5</sup>

Forces external to the university can manipulate a weak administration to the point of loss of freedom for its faculty. Internally, an administration too easily swayed by the whims and demands of diverse interests on campus can lose the respect and cooperativeness of its faculty.

A third characteristic of the academic community lies in the nature of power held by the faculty—power that is often unrecognized by the faculty itself. Faculty concepts of campus politics are more closely related to by-gone times when most decisions were made by authoritarian presidents and their boards. Perhaps it is this concept of campus authority that prompts faculty members to believe that their institutions are by nature sound in structure and self-sustaining, and whose daily management could properly be left to others.<sup>6</sup> As a consequence, the door to control is left open both for insensitive administrators and for student agitators.

A new level of social and political prestige for academicians and the simple mechanics of supply and demand have placed faculty members in a more strategic position as the center of power on the university campus. As legitimizers and opinion leaders their influence is unparalleled. Students have regarded the administration as the political center of their attack, and have used the general opinion of the faculty as the decisive judge of any action against that center. As Bundy has put it, "when it comes to a crunch, in a first-class university it is the faculty which decides." Not only has the faculty often been the underlying and validating force in student successes, but dominant faculty opinion has provided the foundation for successful administrations in uncertain times.<sup>7</sup>

### Conclusions

One of the dysfunctions of a bureaucratic organization is the difficulty of its members involving themselves directly in decisions that affect the total organization. Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect all members of an organization to shoulder the task of keeping fully informed about all affairs of the organization while at the same time main-

taining the very expertise that makes them a vital part of the organization.

Universities are no exception to the above phenomenon of bureaucracies. Yet, faculty attitudes are ambivalent toward participation in decision-making. Faculty members voice convincing arguments in favor of an influential role in decisions, but reveal a strong reticence to give the time such a role would require. Moreover, they are reluctant to accord others the tasks of operating the university.<sup>8</sup>

Faced with such complexities, the faculty member has at least three alternatives: He can insist on direct involvement, re-order his priorities and time, and allow for the required activities. Another alternative is to yield to the necessity for division of labor and a representative type of government, and concentrate solely on more "scholarly" pursuits. A third and more desirable alternative would be to strike a balance between pursuit of professional goals and service to the university. While giving primary attention to his research and teaching role, the faculty member would help with the necessary committees, while striving to get rid of the unnecessary ones. He would accept administrative assignments or respect others who do. Above all, he would not remain indifferent to faculty government, but would accept the principle of accountability to the faculty and administration through his support of a unified faculty voice and formally recognized power structure. Such an expression of collective wisdom can only strengthen the university community—which to the faculty is life itself.

<sup>1</sup>Robert M. MacIver, *Academic Freedom in Our Time*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, p. 73.

<sup>2</sup>Archie R. Dykes, *Faculty Participation in Academic Decision-Making*. Washington: American Council on Education, 1968. (The author is indebted to Dr. Dykes for original expression of findings and opinions expressed in this paper.)

<sup>3</sup>William Kornhauser, *Scientists in Industry: Conflict and Accommodation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

<sup>4</sup>Theodore Caplow and Reese J. McGee, *The Academic Marketplace*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958, p. 83.

<sup>5</sup>See Dykes, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

<sup>6</sup>McGeorge Bundy, "Faculty Power." *The Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1968, p. 43.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>8</sup>Dykes, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

# THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF ITS ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNITY

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The American university, like other societal institutions of our culture, is presently a part of the upheaval and unrest characteristic of our era. It is a participant in a struggle with the forces of the unknown, generated on the one hand by our technological know-how and on the other by our behavioral ignorance, complicated by the gap between our scientific and productive capabilities and our philosophic, sociological, and psychological abilities to cope with this world of our own creation. "Our environment" is becoming society's concern and "Save our environment" its catchphrase. Witness last week's "Earth Day" and its consequent activities.

The place, the role, the right of the university to participate in "all this" is as confused and blurred as the goals of the society itself. The university is often on the scene attempting a cure while its constituencies are arguing the ill and its protagonists are debating its qualifications for performing the surgery. One needs only to glance at some of the current literature to appreciate the divisions within the academic community.

John Gardner (4) attacks the universities for their poor response to the urban crisis while Goldberg and Linstromberg (5) point out that because the university is a rational, intellectual institution, it is constitutionally incapable of being either the appropriate agent for the expression of disenchantment or the source of its solution. Levine

(10) suggests steps that universities should take to solve social ills, stressing their abilities to do so because of their "freedom of action" while Goodall (6) cites the need for the return to the traditional role of the university, even while noting that some community activity can be combined to "add to academic life."

Barzun (1) scores the universities for becoming like the medieval guilds, "which undertook to do everything for the town," as Healy (8) says, from "feeding the sheep" to "amusing the goats." Riesman (12) warns that in their retreat to the guilds the faculty have divested themselves of what had, in the earlier days, been their concern, namely the nature and function of the university. In addition, he points out that as more and more demands are made on the colleges, the institutions are spread too thin and are becoming omniverous and debilitated at the same time.

Logan Wilson (15) sounds a wise word of warning when he says ". . . under the growing pressure on institutions to become all things to all kinds of students and other constituencies, many are on a collision course. The collision would occur when the demands of meritocracy and of egalitarianism become irreconcilable." If this is true, a retreat to the ivory tower might be in order. However, if Merriman Cunnigim (3) is right when he states that by nature the university

believes in values, especially the values of truth, universality, freedom, relevance, and belief in human worth, then it would seem that if its beliefs are affective and internalized, rather than mere cognitive lip services, then these values demand involvement in and commitment to the struggles of its society. Cunnigim sums it up when he says:

. . . the university by nature is a valuing institution. To be a university at all it cannot be neutral, and certainly it cannot be opposed to many of the civilizing values of men. Its very existence and essence demand its acceptance of certain values; and if acceptance, then proclamation and action on their behalf. The public social responsibility of the university, as well as the time-honored duties of teaching and research, rests precisely at this point and nowhere else.

If we can appreciate the European monastery of the sixth through the eleventh or twelfth centuries as being the preserver of much of our Western knowledge and many of our cultural threads and the medieval university as being the disseminator and further developer of the same, then we should be able to ascribe to the present-day American university the roles of a preserver and dispenser of that knowledge and also a bastion of the defense of its worth. Many of us do not fully realize that in some areas it must come down to such a defense, for we have through the centuries successfully been proving to a large minority of our population that the truths and values we hold sacred are to them useless, worthless, valueless tender. In a discussion of the City University of New York's proposed open admissions policy and its significance, Timothy Healy (8) notes that most major American universities are under fire from their students for their failure to take institutional positions on issues of current social or political importance. Noting that CUNY's decision on open admissions is an example of an institution's accepting public responsibility in a social area, he points out that the university cannot do the whole job and that it shouldn't try, but that it can do much of importance.

It can short circuit the terrible rhythm of disappointment and rage that locks half our inner-city youth out of productive careers, that robs them of a stake in this

city, and that can create a new race of barbarians more terrible in their visitations than the Goths and Vandals because not only do they not care, but the whole sophisticated apparatus of education has taught them not to care.

When authors such as Singletary (13) and others decry the danger of lowering standards and urge that universities must not become "microcosms of the larger society," but must maintain themselves as "special communities for free and peaceful pursuit and inquiry of knowledge," else there is essentially no need for their existence; when many academicians plead for a return to the true purposes and functions of a university; one wonders about their comprehension of the American college and university as it has developed.

The thread of the American university has never blended into the warp and woof of the continental university or even of the British university, its immediate precursor. The American university was conceived in the same pragmatic womb and grew to term with the same practical, God-fearing meretricious placental nourishment that vivified the American character as a whole.

The function of the first American universities was neither to produce learned scholars nor to provide half-way houses to train the sons of the idle rich in intellectual pursuits with which to occupy their non-hunting-and-army-servicing leisure time. Their purpose and function, rather, lay in the realms of the production of an educated clergy to provide leadership, guidance, and enlightenment to the sinful masses, to provide the sparse crop of professionals necessary to legitimize a rugged, new-world existence, and, later, to draft the laws and set the course for a democratic society.

Although these early American universities were conceived in practicality, they were established and guided by men whose own university foundations were rooted in Oxford, Cambridge, etc. Their own experiences decreed a sometimes rather impractical classical curriculum, and a tradition not at all in keeping with the needs and demands of frontier realities. Thus was born that duality which has persisted to this day between the form, the function, the reality of the American university and the traditions of its European ancestors; between its stated and its real purposes; its desired and its actual product.

The Harvard Report of 1945 (7) put it a slightly different way, discussing the dual obligation of American higher education to further the Jacksonian principle of elevating the people at large and to advocate the Jeffersonian principle of drawing upon all strata in training a natural aristocracy of leaders, thus necessitating a reconciliation between quantity and quality in higher education.

About a century and a half after the founding of the first private colleges, our first state universities were created, largely under the impetus of establishing institutions which would provide adequate educations to the growing numbers of comfortably well off, thus keeping them at home and away from the corrupting influences of European universities. It was also felt by many citizens that our native universities provided their students an education better suited to their roles in our society. Later on, when our institutions of higher learning then in existence did not seem to be providing the type of education wanted and needed by the majority rural, farming faction of the day, the Morrill Act encouraged creation of the types of colleges and universities needed and emphasis in the curriculum on agricultural, mechanical, and technical studies.

And, the trend, which was really set with the founding of Harvard in 1636, has continued to this day. We might count as one exception to this trend of practicality and native inventiveness, the aspects of the German university which became somewhat a part of our heritage in the late nineteenth century due to the efforts of such German-trained university presidents as Elliott, Angell, etc. One can wonder if even this influence would have been long-lived if industrial, business, and political interests had not been serviced by much of the research that resulted.

Considering the public-demand sensitivity of the American university, there is little astonishment that it responded as it did when, with the onset of World War II, it was called upon to provide training facilities for armed service officers and specialists, scientific and technological research facilities and personnel for munitions research, and behavioral research and specialists for the planning and execution of occupation governments in the immediate post-war period. Later there was the crisis of providing facilities and appropriate curricula for the hordes of returning servicemen, many attending college under the benefits of the

G.I. Bill. This crisis was not completely over before that engendered by the Korean War was upon them with a small-scale repeat of World War II's picture. At the same time help had been provided in solving many of Europe's and Asia's problems, in retooling industry for peacetime production, in contributing to science's and technology's mushrooming knowledge explosion. Finally and slowly, attention was being focused on the ever-increasing and prominent social ills of our own country.

Government at all levels, industry, and various pressure groups were now in the habit of asking university help, and the university, which had freely offered its services in the face of national emergency, fully expecting to return later to its relative seclusion from things of the world, found that it was constantly being called upon. Apparently, nothing in its immediate training had taught it how to say "no." So, as the number of requests and demands burgeoned, the number of acquiescences, whether because of compassion, or avarice, or just plain ineptness, kept pace, and the involvement of the university in its community, like Topsy, "just grow'd and grow'd and grow'd" until eventually the fierce, clawing, snarling, lumbering, cumbersome, unwieldy, omnivorous, cannibalistic monster of total university commitment to its community—as we know it today—was born.

Now, as with so many activities in education, we are looking backward and asking ourselves, "Should we really be doing this?" As usual, we are rather foolish and johnny-come-lately. It makes no sense to ask after the fact. The only real analyses of university participation and its effects on social problems are usually made after the milk is spilt or the pieces are being picked up. If any forethought is given, it is usually hasty and pressured forethought which is the aftermath of student or interest-group pressure saying, "Take a stand, or else. . . ."

The quantity and severity of today's social problems can scarcely be denied—integration in school, in housing, on the job, in the society at large; the city blight, especially the inner city and ghetto problems—economic, cultural, moral, aesthetic; the rural poor, with many of the same implications; unprecedented leisure time in the hands of a society in which it has previously been unknown and with a condemnatory Protestant ethic about such frivolity; growing numbers of

senior citizens, faced with longer life spans and earlier enforced retirement ages, hence, more years of retirement, and little training or planning in their use. Just on the horizon we have the glossy, new, and much-touted problem that probably surpasses and encompasses all the others—our environment; environmental ecology; earth conservation—whatever popular phrase suffices.

Perhaps arguments exist for some academic disinterest in many of these areas, but since the latter is something of a sledgehammer reality for us all, it would seem difficult for the academic community to excuse itself, particularly if—as many concerned authorities are now advocating—solution of the environmental problem will involve a change or realignment of our values. Even the most pedantic scholar will generally agree to “values” as being the business of the university in its most traditional sense.

Newman (11) once stated that “Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human mind that any kind of knowledge, if it really be such, is its own reward.” He was reflecting the British university of his youth, the university that did not practically seek to turn out the civil servant and military officer needed by the British crown, but which effectively did preclude the necessary end-product.

The American university in the spirit of its culture has more often looked at the end-product needed and then sought the effective process. Now is scarcely the time to retreat to the Oxford method of the mid-nineteenth century. Whitehead (14) prophesied, “. . . the race which does not value trained intelligence is doomed. . . . Today we maintain ourselves. Tomorrow science will have moved forward yet one more step, and there will be no appeal from the judgment which will be pronounced on the uneducated.” Kerr (9) today proclaims, “The intellect, and the university as its most happy home, can have great potential roles to play in the reconciliation of the war between the future and the past, and the solution—one way or the other—of the war between the ideological giants who now rend the world with their struggles.” Because of such realities, “the university is being called upon to produce knowledge as never before—for civic and regional purposes, for national purposes, and even for no purpose at all beyond the realization that most knowledge eventually comes to serve mankind. . . . The reality is reshaping the very nature and quality of the

university.”

I would question that it really is reshaping the nature and quality of the American university—of the British, of the German university, yes—but it is really bringing to the conscious fore the sub-rosa service role which the vast majority of American colleges and universities have always maintained and which many were created to provide.

However, there is a difference. The American university, like American education in general, indeed, like much of American society as a whole, is crisis-oriented. Between crises it blunders along in the same pattern resulting from the last crisis. When the next crisis appears on the scene, it responds quickly, and often accurately, rather like a broken field runner to the threat of a charging tackle. Usually, its footing is sure, and its new path, though brief, is adequate. Today the crises are coming thicker and faster, and the numbers involved are greater and more immediately affected by the course changes. The time has come for an end to crisis-response. The time is upon us for careful beforehand examination of the scene, consideration of alternatives, decision-making, implementation of planned action, observation of results, analyses of effects, and recycling of the above activities.

Such planning is the aegis of the university administration. Too long the administrations of many colleges and universities have been either Casper Milquetoast acceders to faculty and student demands or rigid maintainers of a status quo several decades—hence, in our fast-changing times often the equivalent of several centuries—out of date. College administrators must leave the status quo rut. They must do better than just merely “giving in.” They must consider the Latin root of their title—the literal interpretation of whose verb, *administrare*, is “to minister to.” This can mean to lick and bind up the past wounds, but more likely we minister to the needs and wants of others through anticipation and leadership. The university administrator must reassume his leadership role.

If the administration, as Bolman (2) suggests, is worn thin, to where it cannot look at the whole of the institution, much less the whole of social life, it must first take steps to remedy this condition. Leadership cannot be exerted until a clear total picture obtains. Until that time, the administrators are in the awkward position of following where various pressure groups lead them

or adapting a dictatorial stance to gloss their uncertainty or lack of knowledge.

Most colleges and universities have grown in size to a point where it is impossible for one administrator to be well-versed on the total scene. Hence, teamwork, cooperation, communication, and efficiency must intrude. Riesman (12) suggests institutional research as a means—a logical solution if effectively carried out and efficiently used. Business and industrial management theory can suggest other alternatives. Whatever the process used, university administrators must first put their own institutional houses in order.

That done, the next move must be to look at the global village which is the university's total community, and the smaller regional village which is its immediate community, and to decide what the relations between them will be. This done, the purpose and function of the university determined, and those two items reconciled if necessary, the administration should be in the position to exercise and encourage institutional decision making on the role of the institution in relation to its social environment.

Again, alternatives must be sought and analyzed, and decisions made. In the process the administration must learn to say "no" when necessary, when a "yes" would harm the institution or do less than right by the community. Alma Mater—as Barzun (1) has suggested—can say "yes" too often just like a parent and lose the respect of its constituents who expect an occasional "no."

The administration must look at the three main roles of the university—teaching, service, research—and make decisions on the compatibility of the three. If they are not compatible, then they need to be separated, at least on a time or distance basis. Perhaps our academicians are capable of wearing all three hats, but are they capable of doing so at the same time? I doubt it. Administrations certainly permit and often condone if not encourage it. Institutional research could provide an answer scientifically. University administrations need to know, and, based on such knowledge, to make decisions.

Such decisions need to be scientifically determined in many realms, but especially in the area of the university's relation to and role in its community and particularly—because the problems there loom so large and so immediate and are in need of the expertise that perhaps the university alone can provide—in the region of the

university's involvement in its community's social problems.

The symbol for the word crisis in Chinese consists of two characters—one meaning "danger," the other "opportunity." However, the exigencies of our present world have narrowed both corridors and made a wrong turn more irretrievable. It is the lot of our administrators to point the way. *Quo vadis?*

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