Empirical research shows that neither leadership training nor experience increases organizational performance. These disappointing results can be explained by the Contingency Model. This theory postulates that task motivated low esteem for the Least Preferred Coworker (LPC) leaders perform best in very favorable and unfavorable situations while relationship--motivated (high LPC) leaders perform best in situations of intermediate favorableness. It has been assumed that training in the job's technical aspects and in handling interpersonal relations will make a leader more effective. In contrast, the Contingency Model holds that we must see training as improving the favorableness of the leadership situation. Therefore, in very favorable and unfavorable situations, training and experience will improve the performance of low LPC leaders but decrease performance of high LPC leaders. In intermediate situations training should increase the performance of high LPC leaders but decrease that of low LPC leaders. This hypothesis is supported by data from previous studies as well as 2 recent studies which specifically tested this hypothesis. (Author)
ON THE DEATH AND TRANSFIGURATION
OF LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Fred E. Fiedler
University of Washington

Abstract

Empirical research shows that neither leadership training nor experience increases organizational performance. These disappointing results can be explained by the Contingency Model. This theory postulates that task-motivated (low LPC) leaders perform best in very favorable and unfavorable situations while relationship-motivated (high LPC) leaders perform best in situations of intermediate favorableness. It has been assumed that training in the job's technical aspects and in handling interpersonal relations will make a leader more effective. In contrast, the Contingency Model holds that we must see training as improving the favorableness of the leadership situation. Therefore, in very favorable and unfavorable situations, training and experience will improve the performance of low LPC leaders but decrease performance of high LPC leaders. In intermediate situations training should increase the performance of high LPC leaders but decrease that of low LPC leaders. This hypothesis is supported by data from previous studies as well as two recent studies which specifically tested this hypothesis.

1 This paper was an invited address of Division 8, 14 and 19 and received the 1971 Research Award of Division 13 (Consulting Psychology) of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., September 3, 1971. It is a revision and extension of Technical Reports 70-16 and 71-21 of the Organizational Research Group, University of Washington, Seattle.
ON THE DEATH AND TRANSFIGURATION
OF LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Fred E. Fiedler

University of Washington

Why has empirical research failed to show that leadership experience and leadership training improve organizational performance? Common sense certainly tells us that they should make leaders and managers more effective, and the billions of dollars which are spent each year on various management and supervisory training programs are a glowing testimonial to this widely held belief.

Management is generally seen as the ability to work through people in order to accomplish organizational goals. The various supervisory and executive development programs teach, therefore, how to develop better relations with employees, how to solve administrative problems, and how to perform the various technical functions of the managerial job.

Reviews of the leadership training literature are less sanguine. Odiorne (1964), House (1967), and Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick (1970), among others, reviewed the empirical research on orthodox supervisory training as well as on sensitivity and T-group approaches. These reviewers found some changes in behavior and attitudes but no evidence of organizational improvement, either as a result of T-group and sensitivity training or as a result of the usual executive development and supervisory training programs.
The fact that neither leadership experience nor leadership training appears to improve organizational or group performance is, not surprisingly, one of the more embarrassing and certainly one of the less celebrated findings in organizational psychology. But experience and training may simply not raise the overall effectiveness of leaders.

This is also apparent from our own research. One of the studies (Fiedler, 1966) compared the leadership performance of three-man groups led by 48 Belgian naval petty officers and 48 newly inducted recruits on four simulated military tasks in a large field experiment. The petty officers had gone through two years of military school and had an average of ten years of experience. Nevertheless, they did not perform better than did the recruit leaders. A validation experiment (Fiedler & Chemers, 1968) involved 8 highly regarded captains and majors and 7 basic trainees who led three-man groups on three laboratory tasks. The officers had attended four years of military college and had 5 to 17 years of leadership experience. Here again, there was no significant or substantial difference in the performance of groups led by officers and basic trainees, despite the officers' superior intelligence, extensive experience and military leadership training. In one task the groups led by recruits performed somewhat better; in two tasks groups led by officers performed somewhat better.

Similar results were obtained in two field studies. The amount of training of 171 post office managers was correlated with rated supervisory performance (Fiedler, Nealey, and Wood, 1968). These correlations were .04 with post office technical training, -.001 with technical training given on a regional basis, and -.13 with leadership training. And a study of
various types of training given to police patrol sergeants also showed no superiority of the highly trained over the less trained police supervisors.

The findings which related organizational performance to supervisory experience and the concomitant on-the-job training which this usually implies are similarly disappointing. While the literature contains little, if any, hard research, there seems to be a firmly held expectation that leadership experience increases leadership performance. This can be inferred from the many regulations which require time in grade before promotion to the next higher level as well as the many executive positions which require previous managerial experience.

We have already seen that the trained petty officers and military academy officers did not perform more effectively than did the untrained enlisted men. A further analysis was, however, performed relating the years of experience of the petty officers and the military academy officers to their performance on the various tasks. However, on not one single task, either in the Belgian Navy study or in the military academy study, did years of experience correlate significantly with leadership performance.

Correlations between years of experience and supervisory performance were also obtained for managers of research and development groups, shop foremen, meat and grocery department managers, and production department foremen, as well as post office managers at various levels. The median correlation for all 13 groups, encompassing 385 managers and leaders, was -.12 (Fiedler, 1970).

To summarize the findings, neither leadership training nor leadership experience appears to contribute to group or organizational effectiveness. It seems reasonable to ask, therefore, whether we may be on the wrong track.
There is usually a great deal of talk about the paucity of good criteria, the difficulties of getting adequate control groups, problems of measuring change, and the possibility that our training methods are not sufficiently powerful to effect measurable changes in performance. The problem may, however, lie not so much with our training programs as with our conception of how training affects the leadership process. A recent theory of leadership, the Contingency Model (Fiedler, 1964, 1967, 1971), which is here briefly reviewed, suggests a new approach to the problem of improving leadership performance.

The Contingency Model

The theory postulates that the effectiveness of group performance is contingent upon (a) the leader's style of interacting with his subordinates, and (b) the degree to which the situation gives the leader power and influence. We have worked with a personality measure called the "Esteem for the Least Preferred Coworker," or LPC. The measure is obtained by first asking the individual to think of all the people with whom he has ever worked, and then to describe the one person in his life with whom he has been able to work least well. This may be someone he knows at the time or it may be someone he has known in the past. It does not have to be a member of his present workgroup. This description is made on a short scale modeled after the Semantic Differential.

The person who describes his least preferred coworker in relatively favorable terms (high LPC) tends to seek need gratification primarily from having close interpersonal relations, or in a very favorable situation, when everything is going his way, he tends to seek a position of prominence.
The person who describes his coworker in very unfavorable terms (low LPC) tends to seek primary need gratification from task achievement. If all goes well, he does so in a friendly manner. The low LPC person thus uses the group to get the task done while the high LPC person uses the task to obtain a favorable position and good interpersonal relations.

The statement that some leaders perform better in one kind of a situation while some leaders perform better in different situations is begging a question. "What kinds of situations are best suited for which type of a leader?" In other words, we must ask how we can best classify groups if we wish to predict leadership performance.

Leadership is essentially a relationship involving power and influence. It is, therefore, reasonable that we classify situations in terms of how much power and influence they give the leader. While various methods have been developed, one simple categorization classifies leadership situations on the basis of three dimensions.

Leader-member relations. Leaders will have more power and influence if they have a good relationship with members, if they are liked, respected, trusted, than if they are not. A number of studies have shown that this is by far the most important single dimension.

Task structure. Tasks or assignments which are highly structured, spelled out, or programmed, give the leader more influence than tasks which are vague, nebulous and unstructured. It is easier to be a leader whose task it is to set up a sales display according to clearly spelled out steps than it is to be a chairman of a committee preparing a new sales campaign. This appears to be second in importance.
Position power. Leaders will have more power and influence if their position is vested with such prerogatives as being able to hire and fire, being able to discipline, to reprimand, etc. That is, a company commander has more position power than one of his enlisted men, a manager of a store or a department has more position power than the chairman of a committee.

Group situations are categorized as being high or low on each of these three subdimensions. This leads to an eight-celled classification shown on the horizontal axis of Figure 1. The eight cells or "octants" can then be scaled from most favorable (high leader-member relations, high task structure, and high position power) to least favorable (low leader-member relations, low task structure, and low position power).

It is easiest to be a leader in groups which fall into Cell 1 since you are liked, have position power, and have a structured task; it is somewhat more difficult in Cell 2, since you are liked, have a structured task, but little position power; and so on to groups in Cell 8, where the leader is not liked, has a vague, unstructured task, and little position power. The critical question is, what kind of leadership does each of these different groups situations call for?

The vertical axis of Figure 1 indicates the correlation coefficients between leader LPC and group performance. Positive correlations, falling above the midline, indicate that the relationship-motivated (high LPC) leader performed better than the task-motivated leader. Negative correlations (below the midline) indicate that the task-motivated (low LPC) leaders were more effective as leaders in the particular set of groups. As can be seen, from the curve connecting the median correlations in each of the cells,
Figure 1

Relation motivated considerate leader

Task motivated managing leader

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEADER-MEMBER-RELATIONS</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>POOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TASK STRUCTURE</td>
<td>STRUCTURED</td>
<td>UNSTRUCTURED</td>
<td>STRUCTURED</td>
<td>UNSTRUCTURED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADER POSITION POWER</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the task-motivated (low LPC) leader tends to perform best in very favorable and in unfavorable situations. The relationship-motivated (high LPC) leader tends to perform best in situations of intermediate favorableness. These findings have now been validated in a substantial number of studies (Fiedler, 1971). (See dashed line on Figure 1).

The important implication of these findings is, first, that both the relationship-motivated and the task-motivated leaders perform well under some situations but not others. Second, it is not sensible to speak of a good leader or a poor leader—rather we must think of a leader who performs well in one situation but not in another. The performance of a leader obviously depends as much on the leadership situation as it does on the individual in the leadership position. Hence, the organization can change leadership performance by redefining the leader's job, or by making certain changes in the way his position or his task is designed. It can also improve his performance by assisting the leader in changing his leadership situation. This, as we will here show, is one important consequence of training.

Training, Experience, and the Contingency Model

Historically, training has been viewed as a means of changing the individual. We train the leader to improve his interpersonal relations with his group members and we provide him with technical skills and knowledge to make him more expert on his job. The basic assumption guiding this training is, of course, that the person who is skilled in human relations as well as in the technical aspects of the job will be more effective than someone who is less skilled in these areas. Hence, the more training, the more effective the individual will become.
The Contingency Model suggests a quite different conceptualization of leadership experience and leadership training. When we improve a leader's ability to get along with his coworkers, are we not improving his leader-member relations and, thus, the favorableness of the leader's situation? And when we increase the leader's technical and managerial skills, are we not concurrently increasing the structure of the task, and hence, the situational favorableness.

As we have pointed out before, task-motivated leaders perform best in very favorable and in unfavorable situations. Relationship-motivated leaders perform best in intermediate situations. If we now improve the favorableness of the situation by training, it follows that roughly one-third to one-half of the leaders should actually perform worse as a result of this training. A situation which is favorable for the experienced and well trained leader would, of course, be correspondingly less favorable for leaders with inadequate training and experience; that is, it might be intermediate in favorableness. Hence, untrained, high LPC leaders would perform better than untrained low LPC leaders in situations of intermediate favorableness. If we now train these same leaders, we would make the situation very favorable. Hence, the trained high LPC leaders will become worse while the trained low LPC leaders will become better (see Figure 2). A series of studies now support this conclusion.

Insert Figure 2 about here

---

School Administrators. McNamara (1968) investigated the performance of principals in elementary and secondary schools. The organizational performance of elementary principals was rated by school superintendents and
Favorableness of the Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very favorable</th>
<th>Intermediately favorable</th>
<th>Not favorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor performance</td>
<td>Good performance</td>
<td>Poor performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationship-motivated leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task-motivated leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2

Arrows indicate the predicted effect of experience and training.
their staffs. The evaluation of secondary schools was based on objective educational attainment tests given to all students of secondary schools in the province of Alberta in the 11th grade.

McNamara correlated the years of the principal's experience with the performance criteria and found no significant relations. He then divided his group of principals into those who had been in their position for more than three years (a more favorable situation), and those who had been less than two years on the job (a less favorable situation.) The results are shown on Table 1. As can be seen, he obtained results which seemingly make no sense. The correlations between LPC and performance are positive for newly appointed elementary and established secondary school principals but negative for experienced elementary and new secondary school principals.

An interpretation of these data is suggested by the Contingency Model. The elementary schools in McNamara's sample were very small (5 to 7 teachers) and they are relatively simple organizations which can be easily controlled. Hence, the leadership situation is likely to be very favorable for the established principals but only of intermediate favorableness for the new principals. We would, therefore, expect better performance from the experienced task-motivated (low LPC) than the relationship-motivated (high LPC) principals, but the reverse from inexperienced principals.

The secondary schools are considerably more complex. The principal not only must deal with teenagers but he supervises 25 to 40 teachers who are assigned to various departments with their own department heads. Thus, the
**TABLE 1**

Differences between Elementary and Secondary Schools in Effectiveness of Leadership Styles Over Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Newly-Appointed Principals (2- yrs.)</th>
<th>Established Principals (3+ yrs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elementary</strong></td>
<td>LPC(3) $\rho$ EFF(3) $^1$ 35(51)</td>
<td>-25(77) [p &lt; .05, two-tail]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[p &lt; .01, two-tail]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong></td>
<td>LPC rho ATT $^2$ -48(19)</td>
<td>45(45) [p &lt; .01, two-tail]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[p &lt; .05, two-tail]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


$^1$EFF = Effectiveness ratings by superintendents

$^2$ATT = Student attainment test scores
secondary school appears to be an intermediately favorable situation even for the established principal, and an unfavorable situation for the newly appointed principal who is still trying to learn the ropes. We would expect that the relationship-motivated principals (high LPC) will perform better if they have been on the job for several years; however, the task-motivated (low LPC) principals should perform better if they are new on the job.

As the Contingency Model predicts, experience improved situational favorableness which made the relationship-motivated principals of elementary schools actually less effective than the newly appointed principals (see Figure 3a). In the secondary schools, which are intermediate in favorableness, newly appointed task-motivated principals were more effective than were those with experience. Here again, the leader who was "mismatched" on situational favorableness performed actually less well despite his greater experience (see Figure 3b).

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Insert Figure 3 about here
---------------------

Data from Previous Studies

According to the Contingency Model, as well as the McNamara findings, the effect of experience and training will depend on the leader's motivational pattern, that is, LPC, and the favorableness of the leadership situation. For this reason, groups or organizations studied in previous investigations, were classified by independent judges as constituting favorable, intermediate, or unfavorable situations, depending upon the structure of the task and the leader's position power. Groups with high task structure and high position power were classified as relatively favorable, those with either low task structure or low position power as intermediate, and those with both, low task
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
1.80
1.90
2.00
2.10
2.20

Established
Grand Mean
1.80

New

a. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS

40.00
37.50
35.00
32.50
30.00
27.50
25.00
22.50
20.00

Established
Grand Mean
30.00

New

b. SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS

Figure 3
structure or low position power as unfavorable. The classification on the basis of these two factors follows the methods previously described (Fiedler, 1967). The hypothesis was that training and experience would improve leader-member relations or task-structure and, therefore, make the leadership situation more favorable. The various studies are briefly described below.

**Very Favorable leadership Situations.** Groups in this category included general managers of 32 small cooperatives selling farm supplies (Godfrey, Fiedler, and Hall, 1959) where the criterion was the average net income and operating efficiency over a three-year period, adjusted for gross sales; assistant postmasters and superintendents of mail from 10 different post offices; and general foremen and foremen of mails from large as well as medium sized post offices, where the criterion of effectiveness consisted of pooled ratings by their superiors.

**Situations of Intermediate Favorableness.** This category subsumed 15 patrol sergeants of a county public safety department where the performance criterion was based on supervisory ratings; and presidents of boards of directors who were sociometrically most chosen by their fellow board members (criterion of performance was the same as that for general managers above).

**Unfavorable leadership situations.** The only group in this category consisted of members of boards of directors of farm supply companies who were sociometrically most chosen by their fellow board members, but not board presidents, i.e., the informal leaders of these boards. The criterion was again the average net income and operating efficiency over a three-year period.

Table 2 summarizes the data. The significance of the combined probabilities of these independent samples was computed by the method
described by Gordon, Loveland, and Cureton (1952). As can be seen, four of the six sets of samples give a combined probability which is significant. One correlation in the unfavorable leadership situation is significant by itself.

Insert Table 2 about here

New Studies

Two new studies by Csoka and Fiedler (1971) and Csoka (1971) specifically tested the Contingency Model hypothesis that training and experience will improve the favorableness of the leadership situation rather than overall leadership performance. Both studies were conducted in military settings in which noncommissioned officers headed small task crews.

The subjects of the first study were 55 section chiefs of a field artillery group. Each of these sergeants was in charge of a gun crew consisting of six to eight men. The sergeants ranged in age from 19 to 48 years, with 1 to 22 years of experience, and from 0 to 180 months of experience as section chiefs. Most of the training the men had received was technical in nature, ranging from 0 to 36 weeks, with an average of six weeks.

The power of the leadership position, as rated by company officers, was high. The task of the men, as well as that of the section chief, is spelled out in some detail, covering problems of varying complexity. In particular, the section chief is required to troubleshoot when necessary, and he must exercise considerable judgment in the supervision of his men. While the task can be considered highly structured by the usual standards (see Hunt, 1967), a man who is completely untrained and inexperienced will be
Table 2
Summary of Correlations Between Performance and Experience or Training for Relationship- and Task-motivated Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Favorable Leadership Situation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. General Managers, Farm Supply Co.</td>
<td>Exper. as Gm</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assistant Postmasters and Supervisors of Mail</td>
<td>Trng.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. General Foreman of Mails (A)</td>
<td>Exper.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Foreman of Mails (A)</td>
<td>Exper.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Foreman of Mails (B)</td>
<td>Exper.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Foreman of Mails (Ill.)</td>
<td>Exper.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate Favorable Leadership Situation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Police patrol sergeants</td>
<td>Trng.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Most influential board members who are board presidents</td>
<td>Exper.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unfavorable Leadership Situation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Informal leaders of boards who are not presidents</td>
<td>Exper.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Combined probability less than .05
2 Combined probability less than .01
3 Combined probability less than .005
4 p one tailed less than .05
incapable of supervising his crew in the technical aspects of handling and maintaining the gun, and the task is, therefore, unstructured as far as the untrained or inexperienced leader is concerned. The criterion of leadership performance consisted of the pooled and average ratings by the battery commander, the executive officer, and the chief of firing battery.

The hypotheses, tested in this study, were specific to cells 1 and 5 of the situational favorable classification, depending upon whether the highly trained section chief enjoyed good or relatively poor relations with his group. The other hypotheses dealt with cells 3 and 7 for the untrained leaders, on the assumption that a lack of training would be tantamount to facing an unstructured task. Even though the median correlation between leader LPC and performance in cell 7 of the original data of the Model is near zero, we felt that the situation for the untrained and not accepted leader would be very unfavorable, and that the correlation between LPC and performance would, therefore, be negative. The correlations between LPC and performance should then be negative in cells 1, 3, and probably 7, but positive in cell 5. These hypotheses, shown on Figure 4, were supported.

The second study by Csoka (1971) utilized 58 navy petty officers who supervised aviation maintenance shops from two operational squadrons. The methodology of the second study was practically identical to the field artillery study with the following exceptions:

The petty officers were in charge of from 8 to 12 maintenance men; their training ranged from 2 to 98 weeks. The tasks of the petty officers, while also highly structured, were technically much more complex than were
Figure 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEADER-MEMBER RELATIONS</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>POOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TASK STRUCTURE</td>
<td>STRUCTURED</td>
<td>UNSTRUCTURED</td>
<td>STRUCTURED</td>
<td>UNSTRUCTURED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADER POSITION POWER</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELATIONSHIP—MOTIVATED LEADERS PERFORM BETTER

TASK-MOTIVATED LEADERS PERFORM BETTER

Effect of Training
the tasks of the field artillery section chiefs, and the crew members were also, on the average, more intelligent and more highly trained.

The findings from the first study had suggested that the position power of relatively untrained section chiefs was low if they also did not enjoy the support of their group members. This supposition was subsequently confirmed. These untrained section chiefs with poor leader-member relations described their position power as substantially lower than did their better trained or better accepted colleagues. The groups with relatively untrained section chiefs as well as poor leader-member relations were, therefore, assigned to cell 8 of the Contingency Model. The results of both validation studies are presented in Table 3. As can be seen, the findings from these two studies are practically identical, and both support the hypotheses. Figure 5 shows that the mean performance of low LPC leaders with training in cell 5 was, in fact, lower than was the performance of low LPC leaders without training in cells 3 and 8.

Insert Table 3 and Figure 5 about here

Discussion

In some respects, the results, while certainly not "common sense," are not in conflict with our work experience. We often speak of the manager who is overtrained, or one who becomes bored, stale and disinterested because his job presents no more challenges. Our research points to the specific conditions under which this is likely to occur, and it identifies the individuals for whom training and experience will be beneficial and those for whom it will be disfunctional and detrimental in a given situation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Octant Sample</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Lewis, Wh. Field Artillery</td>
<td>-.47* (N=12)</td>
<td>-.78** (N=11)</td>
<td>.75** (N=14)</td>
<td>-.66** (N=17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Chiefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whidbey Naval Air Station</td>
<td>-.50* (N=14)</td>
<td>-.57* (N=14)</td>
<td>.67* (N=12)</td>
<td>-.75** (N=15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Maintenance Supervisors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Leader-Member Relations**
- Good
- Good
- Poor
- Poor

**Position Power**
- Strong
- Strong
- Strong
- Perceived Weak

**Training**
- High
- Low
- High
- Low

* p < .05
** p < .005
While our results have major implications for the understanding of leadership, they suggest changes in training policy and management of executive personnel. The data show quite conclusively that the same type of training, given indiscriminately to relationship- and to task-motivated leaders will be disfunctional for a substantial number of these individuals. Training which increases the performance of one group of leaders is likely to be detrimental to the performance of the other group. We clearly need to develop new training strategies so that we can enable both types of leaders to benefit from leadership training or rotation policies.

One simple solution would be to give training only to either high or low LPC individuals in a certain situation, that is, only to those leaders who will improve their performance as a result of training. Oddly enough, this procedure is likely to present some problems which might be difficult to resolve. Training has become more a symbol of success and recognition than an indication that the individual is in need of remedial help or additional knowledge. Hence, being selected for training implies promotability. Else, "why would the company spend all this money on a man?" Not sending a manager to school, or not giving him additional training, is often interpreted as a black mark against him as a symbol of his failure rather than as an indication that he is already performing well.

A more appropriate strategy, at least at this point in time, might be to provide training for all qualified individuals but then to assign the appropriate group of leaders to different, more challenging jobs, while retaining the other group of leaders on the same job. The procedure would be relatively simple. We identify the relationship- and task-motivated
leaders, and we classify the leadership situations in which these individuals presently operate as well as the situations to which they might be assigned in the future. We then move the otherwise overtrained individuals to somewhat different jobs which present more challenging, less favorable task-situations.

The most economical method for improving leadership performance among managers may well be rotation. This is a very common administrative procedure in large organizations, in part because a man is promoted and in part because it is felt that he might benefit from exposure to other components of the organization. It is also seen as part of the overall management development program in some companies. While decisions to rotate individuals have generally been made on intuitive rather than rational bases, the present theory permits the use of rotation as a deliberate method for improving organizational performance. This is illustrated by McNamara's study of school principals as well as the study of farm supply company managers. As will be recalled, the task-motivated secondary school principals with less experience performed significantly better than those with more years of experience. On the other hand, the relationship-motivated elementary school principals with new jobs performed better than did those with more years of experience and so did the relationship-motivated managers of consumer cooperatives. It is clear that both types of administrators would become more effective by being moved to a new job at the appropriate time. These moves need not entail geographic dislocation, since positions of a similar type may well be available in the same area. Moreover, it is also possible to modify a particular position. Culturally or racially mixed groups, more unstructured tasks, having to work with subordinates who are technically more qualified than the leader, all act to make the situation less favorable.
In summary, our data as well as the underlying theory suggests methods which lead to a more effective utilization of managerial and leadership training, as well as a more efficient approach to rotational policies in business and military organizations. Current training programs may well have failed to yield the desired results not because the training was insufficient or inappropriate but because we have looked for a direct relationship between human relations skills or technical training and performance. Leadership training, or leadership experience need to be viewed as means for improving the situational favorableness. Thus, these leadership experiences in part moderate the relationship between the leader's personality and organizational performance, a relationship which the Contingency Model has explicated.
References


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Footnotes

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Figure Legends

Figure 1. Curve indicating median correlations between leader LPC scores and group performance in various cells of the situational favorableness dimension.

Figure 2. Schematic representation indicating the effect of leadership training and experience.

Figure 3. Mean performance scores of established and new school principals with relationship-motivated and task-motivated leadership patterns.

Figure 4. Hypothesized effect of leadership training and experience in the validation studies of field artillery sections and naval aviation maintenance shops.

Figure 5. Average performance scores of trained and untrained leaders with relationship-motivated (high LPC) and task-motivated (low LPC) leadership patterns.