This paper is an overview of accountability in higher education. Chapter 2 considers 3 major contexts for the term accountability: managerial accountability; accountability versus evaluation; and accountability versus responsibility. Chapter 3 examines the increasing pressures to be more accountable to external forces; i.e., executive agencies, and the public. Chapter 4 covers the question of accountability with institutions themselves. Three major difficulties in assessing internal accountability are presented: (1) the weaknesses of academic authority result in increased pressures to codify the faculty-administrative relationship; (2) lack of clearly defined goals and objectives are frequently matched with proposals to hold institutions more accountable through certain management techniques and by increased emphasis on student learning; (3) organizational complexity of colleges and universities often results in proposals for decentralized decisionmaking structures that are not sufficiently aware of legitimate demands for accountability. Chapter 5 considers some possible trends in accountability for the 1970s. An extensive bibliography on the literature concludes the report. (Author)
Accountability in Higher Education

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Foreword

Accountability in higher education is a complex concept that involves a wide variety of both external and internal interest groups. This review lends clarity to the discussion by considering explicitly the major uses of the term. Increasing demands to be more accountable to external pressures are considered in depth, and major difficulties in assessing internal accountability are analyzed. Probable trends for the 70’s are summarized at the end of the paper.

This report was prepared by Dr. Kenneth P. Mortimer, a Research Associate at the Center for the Study of Higher Education and Assistant Professor of Education at the Pennsylvania State University. It is the first numbered report in a new series of ERIC/Higher Education Clearinghouse reports to be published by the American Association for Higher Education (AAHE). In addition to the report series, the Clearinghouse also prepares brief reviews on topical problems in higher education that are distributed by AAHE as Research Currents.

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Carl J. Lange, Director
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1 Introduction

Colleges and universities have been and will continue to be under severe pressures for increased accountability to a variety of agencies and interests, including the general public, legislatures, governors, governmental agencies, the courts, governing boards, faculty, students, and other internal constituents. It is not clear exactly what each wants from institutions of postsecondary education or what reforms should or can be made to enhance accountability. In many cases the desires and proposals of various constituencies result in mutually incompatible demands and some difficult choices will have to be made. In other cases, there appear to be viable options for increased accountability that may be consistent with institutional functions, purposes, goals, and objectives.

This paper is an overview of accountability in higher education. Chapter 2 considers three major contexts for the term accountability: managerial accountability; accountability versus evaluation; and accountability versus responsibility. Chapter 3 examines the increasing pressures to be more accountable to external forces; i.e., executive agencies of federal and state government, legislatures, the courts, statewide coordinating agencies, and the public. Chapter 4 covers the question of accountability within institutions themselves. Three major difficulties in assessing internal accountability are presented: (1) the weaknesses of academic authority result in increased pressures to codify the faculty-administrative relationship; (2) lack of clearly defined goals and objectives are frequently matched with proposals to hold institutions more accountable through certain management techniques and by increased emphasis on student learning; (3) organizational complexity of colleges and universities often results in
proposals for decentralized decisionmaking structures that are not sufficiently aware of legitimate demands for accountability. Chapter 5 considers some possible trends in accountability for the 1970s. An extensive bibliography on the literature concludes the report.
2 What is Accountability?

What is meant by accountability? How is the term used as it applies to problems in higher education? Pleas for increased accountability in the expenditure of funds, for the effectiveness of education and for holding faculty members and students accountable for their actions and behavior are commonplace. The multiplicity of uses of the term accountability has resulted in a situation in which it is difficult to ascertain what reforms are necessary to achieve it and what activities should be revised.

The confusion results from three different areas of concern which will be classified as managerial accountability; accountability versus evaluation; and accountability versus responsibility. These three classifications are not mutually exclusive, as will be shown, but summarize a good deal of the content of the literature dealing with accountability in higher education.

Managerial Accountability

Control is one of the functions of management in almost any organization.* The mechanics of organization control are rooted in the basic elements of classic organization theory (Koontz and O'Donnell, 1959).

The control function includes those activities which are designed to compel events to conform to plans. It is thus the measurement

*Organizational control is a far more complicated subject than indicated here. See Tannenbaum (1968) for a more complete discussion.
and correction of activities of subordinates to assure the accomplishment of plans... Compelling events to conform to plans really means locating the persons responsible for negative deviations from standards and making certain that the necessary steps are taken to ensure improved performance. Thus, the control of things is achieved through the control of people (pp. 38-39).

The optimum control situation for organizational accountability is one in which rewards and sanctions are distributed so that those whose performance deviates from the plan will be punished (Etzioni, 1964). Holding organizations and their actors accountable for performance is one of the prime purposes of managerial control.

According to Spiro (1969) there are two basic schools of thought as to the best means of enforcing the accountability of administrators in public administration: the legal view and the constitutional view.

[Legalsists tend] to advocate accountability which is clearly defined as to both its content and the means and routes by which it can be enforced. The logic of this position leads to advocacy of a very clear chain of command and enforcement of accountability through two channels only: first, the courts and disciplinary control of departments; and second, the authority exercised over public servants by ministers who are accountable to a representative assembly (p. 89).

This is a rather simplistic view of accountability and is chiefly relevant where there is a unitary line of accountability to a single recognized authority such as a dictator, a monarch, or a body politic which derives its authority through coercion, heredity or elected representatives. In this situation the administrator is clearly accountable, at least in theory, to one entity.

The constitutional view of accountability gives wider latitude to administrative discretion as an integral part of the organizational environment. Adherents of this view tend to argue that a rigid definition of managerial accountability is neither possible nor desirable. Administrators need to exercise discretion in performing their duties and should be held accountable in terms of several mutually complementary standards. These standards emanate from a variety of sources including the people as organized into pressure or interest groups, the legislature, the chief executive, a profession and the courts.
The constitutional view recognizes that duly elected representatives of the people are often in conflict over what is in the public interest and that administrators clearly exercise a good deal of discretion in interpreting the laws passed by a legislature, signed by a chief executive, and interpreted, when necessary, by the courts. The administrator also is held accountable for the exercise of this discretion by those intimately concerned with the issue involved. Individual citizens or organized interest groups attempt to get administrators to exercise discretion in favor of the interests they represent (Mortimer and McConnell, 1970). Finally, administrators who are members of professions, e.g., accountants, lawyers, or engineers, are held accountable for implementing the canons of that profession.

The debate over organizational accountability and control in higher education reflects this contrast between the legal and constitutional views of accountability. Some of the advocates of collective bargaining believe that legally binding contracts will result in imposing accountability to a rule of law (Sherman and Loeffer, 1971). "By the emergence of a rule of law in the university, we mean the evolution of a system of accountability and a concomitant pattern of standards that attempt to govern the behavior of the institution and its agents (p. 187)." The emphasis is in limiting the discretionary power of administrators and faculty performing administrative functions to deviate from the terms of a legal contract. Although the scope of the contract varies among institutions, such issues as salaries, qualifications for rank, tenure, and other academic personnel policies, grievances, selection of certain administrators, and selected decisionmaking procedures may be involved.

Quite another view of accountability is suggested by Kingman Brewster, Jr., President of Yale (1971). He suggests presidential accountability be achieved through a periodic and explicit renewal of his tenure. Rather than being held accountable for each specific decision, the president would be evaluated and held accountable for his overall performance for a specified period of time. This would allow him to exercise discretion and leadership in interpreting and implementing the various goals of the institution and the demands of its many constituents.

In practice, both the legal and constitutional view of accountability are present in institutions of higher education. Neither view should be regarded as the ultimate answer.
6/DIMENSIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Accountability versus Evaluation

There is, admittedly, a great deal of overlap between the concepts of accountability and evaluation as they are used in the literature. Harnett (1971) says there are some basic distinctions between evaluation and accountability.

Evaluation is concerned primarily with educational effectiveness, whereas accountability is concerned with effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness is the degree to which the organization succeeds in whatever it is trying to do; efficiency is an organization's capacity to achieve results with a given expenditure of resources. The accountability expert is involved in assessing both effectiveness and efficiency.

Second, evaluation tends to be a process which is internal to the organization with respect to the stimulus for the evaluative effort and who participates in it. The process of institutional self-study, for example, provides an opportunity for the organization to assess its own strengths and weaknesses and thereby to improve its operations and educational programs. Accountability, on the other hand, carries with it the notion of external judgment. Accountability has the connotation of vindictive rather than affirmative judgment about the institution's activities, i.e., "the public has to know how its money is being spent."

Another distinction which Harnett makes between evaluation and accountability is the skills and orientations of those who perform each process. Evaluators are often psychologists or educational researchers, whereas those who assess accountability tend to have backgrounds in business and finance. The latter group tend to stress efficiency-oriented criteria, such as output models; whereas educational researchers often stress inputs, like admissions criteria and teaching. Those who are arguing that the accountability of institutions is crucial tend to favor evaluating institutional outputs, e.g., student learning, degrees awarded. The emphases are diametrical, with one likely to evaluate teaching and the other likely to evaluate student learning, while in the process attempting to hold the institution accountable for what is learned rather than what is taught. The latter emphasis is illustrated by the following statements of what accountability should mean to community colleges (Roueche, Baker, and Brownell, 1971).

Accountability accentuates results—it aims squarely at what comes out of an educational system rather than what goes into it. It assumes that if no learning takes place, no teaching has taken place.
Accountability requires measurement:

...modern educational techniques enable us to achieve acceptable evidence of learning. The concept of accountability is based on specifically defined objectives, measurement techniques that determine exactly what the teacher intends to accomplish, and the instructional methods that guarantee most students will obtain the objectives. (p. 7).

Accountability assumes and shifts responsibility—it assumes responsibility for the success or failure of individual schools and pupils and shifts primary learning responsibility away from the student to the school.

Accountability permeates the college community:

Accountability implies that two-year colleges must be accountable externally to the community and that colleges must be accountable internally to the students who pass through their doors. This state is achieved when students from the community enter the college, find a program that is compatible with their goals, persist in college until the goal is reached and then become productive members of the community (p. 8).

**Accountability versus Responsibility**

There is a growing concern in higher education about the distinction between accountability and responsibility. For example, the American Association of University Professor's Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities (1966) speaks of operating responsibility and authority, delegating responsibility, the faculty's primary responsibility, of students who may desire to participate responsibly in the government of the institution and of the special obligations of the president. Arp (1969) proposes that a university accept "the unequivocal responsibility for not producing or communicating knowledge without at the same time exploring and communicating the limits of completeness of that knowledge and its probable consequences applied in current contexts (p. 336)."

Neff (1969) proposes a useful distinction between the terms accountability and responsibility. "I would propose that 'responsibility' be used to refer only to the voluntary assumption of an obligation, while 'accountability' be used to refer to the legal
Frequently matched with proposals to make accountable through certain management techniques and by increased emphasis on student learning; (3) organizational complexity of colleges and universities often results in proposals for decentralized decisionmaking structures that are not sufficiently aware of legitimate demands for accountability. Chapter 5 considers some possible trends in accountability for the 1970s. An extensive bibliography on the literature concludes the report. (Author)
liability assigned to the performance or nonperformance of certain acts or duties" (p. 14).

The distinction between a legal or formal liability and assuming a voluntary obligation is crucial. Most social systems can enforce standards of accountability, while responsibility is often not enforceable because it is closely allied with individual freedom. The organization must decide, either collectively or otherwise, for which behavior it will hold its citizens accountable—but the individual has the freedom, in a democracy, to decide which obligations he will assume. Responsibility “consists of two distinct relations: the act of responding to something and the assumption of an obligation (p. 16).”

While the essence of responsibility is individual judgment, the concept provides for collective judgment, or what Neff terms academic responsibility, which is a “common responsiveness within a university to institutional and professional norms and values, and the collective voluntary assumption of the obligation of furthering these norms and values (pp. 18-19).” Many colleges and universities are adopting codes of professional ethics or statements of rights and responsibilities so as to define the differences between individual and collective or academic responsibility. There appear to be certain manifestations of academic responsibility for which individual faculty members can be held accountable; for example, teaching loads, meeting their classes, holding office hours, and publication output. Presumably the institution is justified in asking an individual to leave if he does not meet some of these standards. The current furor over administrative supervision of academic programs illustrates the kinds of activities for which many believe faculty can legitimately be held accountable (Hitch, 1970).

Our experiences have shown that it is necessary to provide more specifically and in detail for the prevention and correction of abuses in the conduct of courses. I think it is essential to state some principles about responsibility and authority.

1. The format of the conduct of a course. Methods for determining and authorizing justifiable changes in format need to be made clearer and more specific...

(a) Classes and examinations are to be held at the times and places officially scheduled by the department chairman and the Registrar...
WHAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY

(b) Each instructor and teaching assistant is responsible for keeping his instructional appointments at the assigned times and places. . .

2. The subject matter of a course and the use of time in class. The instructor in a course is obligated to teach the course in reasonable conformity with the subject and course description. . .

The purpose of such guidelines is not to restrict the legitimate freedom of the faculty member to teach his courses according to his best judgment but to establish common understanding of reasonable limits on what is and what is not professionally ethical and to provide checks against illegitimate practices (pp. 8-9).

The preceding is an example of an attempt to specify behavior for which faculty members can be held accountable. Should such a statement be adopted it would constitute an example of academic responsibility and be used as a guide to control excessively deviant behavior.

The term accountability has at least three major applications to higher education. First, in the management of higher education there is the view that accountability be defined in legal terms. In practice administrators are accountable to a variety of nonlegal but equally demanding interests and constituents. Second, evaluation is part of accountability but the latter term is more encompassing. Third, while responsibility and accountability are often used interchangeably, Neff urges a distinction between voluntarily assuming an obligation and the legal liability attached to the performance of certain acts. Some of the more common external and internal pressures for increased accountability will now be discussed and will reveal some of the applications of these three concepts of accountability to higher education.
Societal Accountability

Colleges and universities are social institutions and are increasingly of a public character. As such, they are accountable to the general public interest. The increasing public nature of higher education is reflected in the fact that three of every four students enrolled in a college or university in 1970 were resident in public institutions, whereas in 1950 the proportion was approximately equal (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, October, 1971, p. 17). Private institutions also perform public functions and receive support from public sources through their tax exempt status, federal and state grants, and public scholarships for their students. Although demands for public accountability may be more acute for institutions of obvious public character, private institutions are not immune to these demands.

A related point about the public nature of higher education is the apparently growing attitude that postsecondary education, like that at the elementary and secondary levels, is a right, not a privilege. Historically, higher education has been available to a well-screened minority, whereas current rhetoric is that access to postsecondary education should be provided to all who can benefit from it. In short, it is becoming politically unfeasible to deny postsecondary education to anyone who desires it. The community college movement has the “open door” as one of its major tenets and some previously more selective institutions are adopting open admissions and/or equal-access policies for all high school graduates. Some private institutions have had to alter their programs and emphases to maintain their vitality in the face of the greater availability of public higher education (Baldridge, 1971).
Higher education is accountable in the broadest sense to the society of which it is a part. Colleges and universities, like other social institutions, perform useful social functions. Peterson (1970) states that the term functions of higher education refers to activities that are functionally related to other social institutions. The functions of higher education have evolved over time and include but are not limited to socialization of the young, transmission of a cultural heritage, provision of trained manpower for the corporate establishment, certification for entry into the professions, provision of a means for social mobility, and provision of a sanctuary for scholars and artists.

Accountability to the public for the proper performance of these functions is exercised in a variety of ways. In recent years some elements of society have come to believe that higher education has not been accessible to a significant portion of disadvantaged and minority youths. Increased public concern with the problems of the disadvantaged has resulted in more experimentation with open admissions, remedial education for those unprepared for college work, special programs and admissions quotas for minorities, and in some cases increased support for institutions with open-door policies.

In performing the function of certifying entrants into professions, institutions of higher education are held accountable by those agencies that accredit professional programs. There are over 40 such agencies and one institution may be subjected to the standards of as many as 20 of them. These agencies consist of practicing professionals and university professors who teach professionals. They may demand that institutions conform to particular organizational arrangements and standards of education, including student-faculty ratios, library resources, and the quality of the faculty.

Most of the controls society exercises over professional education, such as accreditation, licensure, and certification, are in very general terms. Society grants considerable autonomy to professions to control the training of entrants to the profession. Anderson and Ettell (1962) hypothesize that there are three critical factors which determine whether or not the public will invade the authority of a profession and seek to exercise control over it. These factors are the quality, quantity and cost of service. Should there be deficiencies in any of these, society will demand some corrective action and "not the least significant of the ways in which it will
work its will is through the education of those whom it expects to serve society professionally (p. 253).”

Examples of this working of the societal will include the shortage of general medical practitioners, which results in more emphasis on general or community medicine in some medical schools; the increase in undergraduate programs of social work to fill the need for social workers; and an increase in degree programs in municipal and community problems to deal with the urban problems.

There are a number of specific instances in which social and community forces have pressured institutions to be more responsive to community interests; i.e., institutions are being held accountable by the communities in which they reside for the decisions and policies which are relevant to various community interests. Columbia’s decision to build a gymnasium in Morningside Park symbolized, to many residents of the community, the shortcomings of that institution’s attitude toward blacks in that community (Cox· Commission, 1968). Other institutions have experienced stoppages in the construction of campus buildings because of the discriminatory policies against blacks in the construction unions. The 1969 “people’s park” incident at Berkeley was, at least partially, a result of the University’s desire to make use of its property in the face of determined efforts by student and nonstudent members of the Berkeley community to retain that property for their own use (Wolin and Schaar, 1970).

In these ways higher education is accountable to society for the performance of certain social functions and for responding to the changing expectations of various elements of society. Institutions of higher education will continue to be held accountable for serving and helping to relieve the pressure of the rising expectations of the society in which it functions. The pressures for accountability, however, usually are mediated through agents of the public, such as governors, legislatures, and the courts. The pressure of accountability may come from all agencies of government simultaneously. These interrelationships become clearer when discussed separately.

**Accountability and the Executive Branch of Government**

The executive branch of government includes chief executive officers (presidents and governors) and a myriad of executive
agencies, including budget bureaus, departments of finance, education departments, civil service commissions, planning offices, and other administrative bureaus, departments, and agencies. It is not always clear in a given case whether such agencies are performing executive, legislative, or judicial functions. In practice, one agency may set policy in areas under its jurisdiction, determine and administer the guidelines for implementing these policies, and hear appeals from those who are affected by these policies and procedures. The demands for accountability that these agencies exert are substantial and varied, ranging from direct attempts to control institutional and individual behavior to more subtle attempts to influence the direction of institutional policy.

Glenny (1971) details the nature of formal accountability to federal bureaucracies. Each federal grant and contract carries with it controlling rules and conditions. Moreover each allows other federal laws to be applied to the recipient institution. These laws, usually applicable to business and industry engaged in interstate commerce, and initially enacted for this purpose, are the anti-segregation and anti-discrimination provisions, including race and sex, and the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and related legislation on wages, hours, and working conditions. These legal contraints apply to the operation of the whole institution, however small the grant received, and also to the private companies which construct campus buildings and provide major services (p. 11).

The institutional recipient of federal funds is held accountable to these and other rules and conditions as it seeks to accomplish the task for which funds were granted. The Chronicle of Higher Education reported recently that Columbia University has been warned by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) that it will lose its eligibility for federal contracts unless it files an acceptable plan for providing equal employment opportunity (Semans, 1971). HEW's Office of Civil Rights investigated the employment practices of 180 institutions of which 70 had filed affirmative action plans, while the rest were still being studied. To analyze an institution's commitment to increased minority hiring, the Office of Civil Rights developed the following guidelines for information to be included in affirmative action plans filed by the institutions:

1. Information on job classifications
2. An analysis of minority-group representation in various job categories and a comparison of the salaries of minority and nonminority workers

3. An analysis of hiring practices in the past year

4. An analysis of the university's methods of recruitment or an indication that the university has reviewed its methods of screening applicants, evaluating their skills, and rating their qualifications

5. An analysis of upgrading, transfer, and promotions

In other instances federal agencies have forced southern institutions to admit black students, assumed jurisdiction (for collective bargaining purposes) over private institutions with gross revenues of over $1 million, and forced some institutions to adopt program planning and budgeting and other management techniques for the control of contract funds.

At the state level there appears to be an increasing trend—as state political leaders fail to see their goals of accountability and control achieved through coordinating and governing boards—to turn to the governing budget officer or the legislative analyst to enhance standards of accountability. Many states have had line-item budget control over state-owned institutions for years (McConnell, 1966). In referring to the state college system in California, Alden Dunham (1969) says:

An inordinate and crippling set of bureaucratic controls besets the state colleges—preauditing and postauditing of a 27,000 line item budget and silly out of state travel regulations, for example. Apparently, many of these petty controls originated with the state budget office or have now been transferred to the Chancellor's office where, according to many faculty and administrators, they still continue (p: 55).

There are other executive agencies of the state government which exert significant control over institutions of higher education. In many state-related institutions academic and nonacademic employees are members of state civil service systems. In some states, the state building commission or Department of Public Works may design, build, and accept for the state all academic and, in some cases, nonacademic buildings. Central purchasing agencies may also determine the type and kind of equipment that may be purchased for some state institutions. In approximately 26 states there are state planning offices. Although
the incident of state planning officers is recent, they do have some potential for increasing accountability from institutions of higher education. These agencies are closely tied to the governor's office and are formed to provide research and analyses, encourage improved planning, and improve the coordination of the total program of state government. Glenny (1971) predicts that higher education hardly will escape intrusion by this office as it becomes geared to the use of statewide comprehensive information systems and to complementing the operations of the state budget office.

Accountability to State Legislatures

One of the more visible ways in which institutions, especially public colleges, are held accountable to the legislature is through the appropriations process. The political process of appropriating funds in the state legislature results in a number of significant constraints on institutions of higher education. In California, the legislature has failed to appropriate funds for faculty salary raises for the past 2 years. The legislature also failed to appropriate the budget request for the University of California's Academic Senate. In Pennsylvania a group of black legislators threatened to block the Pennsylvania State University's appropriation if it did not upgrade the quality of its Educational Opportunity Program. The legislatures in New York and Ohio deleted funds for sabbatical leaves from institutional appropriations.

State legislatures tend to support increased procedural controls like program planning and budgeting and cost formulas as a means to enhance accountability. Increasingly, higher education has had to compete for resources with other programs being considered by the legislature. Eulau and Quinley (1970) report an increasing attitude on the part of legislators to regard higher education as only one area of state activity that requires attention (p. 97). It is believed these procedural controls will make higher education expenditures easier to compare with requests from other areas.

Higher education also is held accountable at the state level through the drafting and implementation of a master plan. Berdahl (1971) points out that as of late 1969, 27 states had formulated either a master plan or a comprehensive study and report equivalent to it. Plans were being developed in six states and five other states were intending to develop plans. Although the details of a
master plan vary from state to state; these plans can and often do set the mission of various segments of public higher education in the state. They can limit institutions to undergraduate education and reserve graduate education for a special class of institution, or they can designate the function of some institutions as specifically teacher education and limit others to offering only the first 2 years of instruction. In cases where master plans exist, institutions are accountable to the broad purposes outlined in the plan.

In some states regulations governing the state-owned institutions are a part of the public school code. This code establishes the procedures for some of the bureaucratic controls on state colleges and, in some cases, for the formal qualifications of the faculty at the various academic ranks. Legislative action would be necessary to change public school codes.

O'Neil (February 1971) supports the view that many state legislatures are showing increased interest in fixing faculty teaching loads. Miller (1971) describes the attempts by Michigan's legislature to decide how many hours professors must spend in the classroom, although the courts subsequently ruled that some of these constraints are violations of the constitutional autonomy of the University of Michigan, Michigan State and Wayne State Universities. The New York, Florida and Washington legislatures have passed similar legislation, while such legislation was narrowly defeated in Illinois and Arizona.

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (June 1971, p. 165) reports that 29 of the 50 states enacted legislation in 1969-70 regarding campus unrest, the control of firearms, antidisturbance regulations and other legislation or penalties for campus unrest, including criminal offenses and the curtailment of student financial aid.

In the summer of 1969 the New York legislature enacted the Henderson Law. The law requires that all colleges and universities, chartered by the Regents file student conduct regulations and disciplinary procedures. Failure to comply renders the institution ineligible for state aid, a 'significant sanction' for both public and private institutions in view of New York State's system of aid to private higher education.

As we have seen, legislatures can exert considerable formal and informal accountability pressures on higher education through the appropriations process, including uniform procedures for presenting budget requests, state master plans, public school codes,
Dimensions of Accountability in Higher Education

Faculty work load legislation, and legislation designed to control dissent and disruption on the campus. The courts and other law enforcement agencies also exert significant pressure for accountability.

Accountability to the Courts and Law Enforcement Agencies

McConnell (June 1971) summarizes the increasing accountability of institutions to external agencies like the courts and the police in the following manner:

Judicial decisions and the presence of the community police, highway patrol, and the National Guard symbolized the fact that colleges and universities have increasingly lost the privilege of self-regulation to the external authority of the police and the courts. It is apparent that colleges and universities have become increasingly accountable to the judicial systems of the community, the state, and the national government (pp. 452-453).

It is fairly clear that colleges and universities are losing their privileged positions as sanctuaries from the rulings of the courts (Brubacher, 1971). Over the years the courts have required institutions to observe fairness and due process in dismissing faculty and students, but usually have held that colleges and universities have the right to establish regulations necessary for the orderly conduct of academic affairs. The American Bar Association Commission on Campus Government and Student Dissent (1970) says there are persuasive reasons why the interests of the public and the university can best be served by entrusting the primary responsibility for the maintenance of order to the universities when they are willing and able to perform the function. At the same time, the commission recognizes that there are circumstances in which the intervention of civil authorities may be required. Intervention by such public authorities may take several forms, including the issuance of an injunction, selected arrests, the introduction of substantial numbers of police on the campus, and civil suits for damages.

Robert O'Neil (February 1971) has summarized some recent court decisions and their bearings on problems of institutional autonomy and accountability. In several cases following the disruptions of spring 1970 over the Cambodian Invasion, the
courts required universities to reverse decisions made via the normal academic processes. In New York the Court of Appeals ruled that students who wanted to take the state bar examination must complete all their courses by regular written tests. This ruling forced the New York University Law School to reopen so that students could take the examinations qualifying them for the state bar examination. At Queens College the court forced that institution to offer special instruction to plaintiffs in the courses that did not meet regularly during the Cambodian Invasion.

At Kent State, in the aftermath of the shootings, the campus was closed indefinitely by the Court of Common Pleas. It not only closed the institution but delegated to the Ohio National Guard control over access to the campus. In referring to the Kent State case and the case of the University of Miami, which had voluntarily closed for a short time after the Kent State shootings, O'Neil makes the following comment:

In neither case was the administration even consulted, much less the faculty. The problem is not so much that these decrees were wrong on the merits; one would have to know more about the facts and the circumstances to make that sort of judgment. The fault is that they constituted complete and summary displacement of campus decision making by external agencies (p. 34).

It is not possible to discuss in detail here all the relevant cases currently in the courts, especially with the flood of litigation since the Cambodian Invasion and the subsequent Kent State incident. There are, however, some general points that can be made. First, institutions themselves are beginning to use the courts to protect their autonomy against external agents. The University of California at Berkeley is suing the National Collegiate Athletic Association over its standards of eligibility. Parsons College and Marjorie Webster Junior College have sued unsuccessfully regional accrediting associations (Koerner, 1970a and b). Second, many administrators are unaware of the price they have begun to pay in institutional autonomy when they resort to judicial authority for control over internal campus conflicts (O'Neil, 1971a). Once such authority is surrendered, it will be difficult to reassert. Third, the already blurred distinction between public and private colleges may virtually dissolve. This is especially true in the area of student rights (Fischer, 1971). Fourth, as students and faculty meet with success in the courts, they are likely to use this avenue of appeal more often. Many student associations already have hired their
own attorneys. Fifth, as the courts get more accustomed to handling higher education cases they may be more inclined to enter previously unregulated areas. The question of procedures for dismissal of nontenured faculty is one such area. Sixth, the mere threat of legal action may modify institutional practices and policies. One such case occurred at the University of Wisconsin where department meetings were opened to the public. Seventh, a judicial ruling often has wide application to other cases in the state or, in the case of federal courts, the nation. Once precedent is set it tends to modify subsequent behavior.

Higher education is caught in a dilemma when attempting to thwart increased intervention by the courts. Internal safeguards have fared badly in times of crisis due to insufficient campus police forces, unavailability of disciplinary sanctions between the drastic penalty of suspension or expulsion and a mere slap on the wrist, imprecise or poorly publicized rules of conduct, and lack of commitment to preservation of order by important elements of the university community. Student courts and other institutional judicial bodies have been unable to compel accuser, witness, or accused to appear (O'Neil, 1971b).

The feeling persists among educators that an alternative both to the courts and to external intervention must be developed. The process of displacement of internal decisionmaking has already begun, however, and the time is approaching rapidly when an institution of higher education will find it difficult to apply standards of internal behavior different from those for which the courts will hold it accountable.

Pressures for increased accountability from the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government are increasing and are not well understood by institutions of higher education. Statewide governing and coordinating boards, which are discussed in the next section, constitute another major source of the demands from external agencies for more accountability.

Accountability and Statewide Coordination

Most states have either a statewide governing board or a coordinating agency of some sort. As of 1969, only two states, Delaware and Vermont, had no state agency for coordinating purposes. Two other states, Indiana and Nebraska, were
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coordinated through voluntary mechanisms. Nineteen states had a single governing board with regulatory powers, and twenty-seven states had some form of coordinating board with various combinations of advisory and regulatory powers. Berdahl (1971) divides the twenty-seven states with coordinating boards into three separate classifications. One classification is comprised of those boards with a majority of their representatives from institutions of higher education and which have essentially advisory powers. The second classification is those boards comprised of a majority, and in some cases entirely, of public members, and which have essentially advisory powers. The third classification includes those boards comprised of a majority or entirely of public members and that have regulatory powers in certain areas but still do not have governing responsibility for all the institutions under its jurisdiction (pp. 18-21).

This classification illustrates one of the central issues in the statewide coordination of higher education, that is, who should be represented on the board and whether it should have regulatory or advisory powers. According to Paltridge (1968):

The primary need that coordinating mechanisms must fill today is for an intelligent and fruitful dialogue between educational institutions and their external supportive world—the public who are both clientele and sponsor and that public's instrumentalities of government, the state legislatures and the state executive. . . . The function of the coordinating agency is to effect this meeting in an atmosphere of mutual understanding of needs and problems and with mutual tolerance for varying professional perspectives (1968, p. 2).

Fifteen of the twenty-seven coordinating boards had membership from both the public and the institutional elements of higher education in the states. The other twelve coordinating board members were entirely from the public sector. Eighteen of the nineteen consolidated governing boards had membership drawn entirely from the public sector while the other board had a public majority (Berdahl, 1971, p. 22).

Glenny and his colleagues (1971) point out that three states unexpectedly have reversed this long trend toward coordinating boards by creating single, statewide governing boards. Several other states are considering similar moves. In this same study it is noted that "student and faculty unrest and the increasing financial demands of colleges and universities led to the concomitant
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demand by the public, governors, and legislatures for greater and more certain accountability (p. 3). The search for simplistic solutions to complex problems is leading to the resurgence of the idea that a single, all-powerful governing board could be charged with full responsibility for all that happens in the colleges and universities—a law-and-order view of the world.

These scholars argue that the coordinating board has one great, paramount advantage over statewide governing boards for public systems. It can act as an umbrella under which a variety of other institutions, agencies, commissions, and councils can be placed for purposes of coordination. For example, private colleges, which are demanding and getting more attention from states, can be coordinated under the coordinating board structure and can be made an integral part of the state’s concern for the beneficent development of higher education. The rapidly accelerating enrollment and the newly important role of the proprietary vocational and technical schools within a state’s master plan also can be encompassed by a coordinating board. Federal planning and grants and categorical programs require that a state administrative commission be representative of all segments of postsecondary education and this requirement is satisfied through a coordinating board structure. Coordinating boards can also incorporate the state’s own scholarship and loan commission, building authority, merit system commission, and other agencies that deal primarily with postsecondary institutions. The coordinating structure, according to these scholars, can better meet the demands that new constituencies such as business and industrial concerns, citizens groups, and public service agencies are placing on the institutions within the state. And finally, a coordinating structure would be more flexible in dealing with the impact of new technologies on education and their potential for extending education into off-campus learning and cultural centers (pp. 5-7).

On the other hand, those who favor the governing board structure would argue that its regulatory powers put it in the position to exercise firmer standards of accountability and efficiency from the institutions within the state. Again quoting Glenny et al.: “The danger of creating a board with insufficient power is that the public interest will not be adequately protected; in creating a board with too much power, that the necessary autonomy and initiative of the institutions will be threatened (p. 8).”
Institutional autonomy then is another of the major concerns which professional educators have about statewide coordination. It is difficult to specify the proper scope of activities in which coordinating agencies should engage and what activities and functions should be retained by institutions within a coordinated system. This difficulty is compounded by the tendency to confuse distinctions between institutional autonomy and intellectual freedom. According to the Committee on Government and Higher Education, "protecting the authority of boards of lay trustees from interference by the state is every bit as vital to the freedom of the university as is the preservation of freedom for teaching and research (quoted in Berdahl, 1971, p. 8)."

Academic freedom may be an absolute but autonomy is a relative concept. According to Berdahl (1971), who quotes liberally from Sir Eric Ashby:

"... academic freedom as a concept is universal and absolute whereas autonomy is of necessity parochial and relative, with the specific powers of governments and universities varying not only from place to place but also from time to time. This qualification in no way detracts from the importance of autonomy as an essential aspect of university life; it merely emphasizes the urgency of keeping its definition relevant to changing conditions (p. 9)."

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (April, 1971) also supports the relative nature of institutional autonomy.

Under no circumstances can institutional independence be considered absolute. Not even its strongest advocate can seriously question the legitimacy of requiring some degree of public accountability from educational institutions receiving public support ...

The techniques used to achieve public accountability of educational institutions must be, balanced against the need of educational institutions for that degree of institutional independence which is essential for their continued vitality (p. 104).

The real issue with respect to institutional autonomy and accountability is not whether there will be intervention by the state but whether the inevitable demands for increased accountability will be confined to the proper topic and expressed through a mechanism sensitive to both public and institutional interests. A proper balance is difficult to define and it will change over time.
The Carnegie Commission (April 1971) believes state influence or control over institutions the state largely supports is appropriate in the following 11 basic areas:

1. Numbers of places available in state institutions and in specific programs where there are clear manpower needs
2. Number and location of new campuses
3. Minimum and maximum size of institutions by type
4. General admissions policy
5. General level of institutional budgets, including construction budgets
6. General level of salaries
7. Accounting principles
8. General functions of institutions
9. Major new endeavors
10. Effective use of resources
11. Continued effective operation of the institutions within the general law.

The Commission offers several suggestions for implementing these areas. The report emphasizes that institutions must be assured the basic elements of academic freedom. These include appointment and promotion of faculty members and of administrators; determination of courses of instruction and course content; selection of individual students; awarding of individual degrees; selection and conduct of individual research projects, and freedom to publish and otherwise disseminate research results; and freedom of inquiry, speech, assembly, and other constitutional freedoms.

It is clear that colleges and universities are held accountable to a variety of external interests and agencies: they are accountable to society for the functions they perform; they are accountable to the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government for efficiency in their operations, for controlling excessively deviant faculty and student behavior, and for essential fairness and due process in their internal decision-making processes. The pressures from these sources are likely to increase substantially in the 1970's. The specific direction the courts will take is yet unclear, but executive agencies, legislatures, and statewide agencies surely will be demanding more fiscal accountability and greater control over forms of dissent and disruption. The pressure from external forces will be accompanied by pressure for increased accountability from agents within institutions. Some of these pressures will be consistent with and others will be in opposition to external demands, as reported in Chapter 4.
4 Internal Accountability

It is difficult to know definitively who should be making internal policy decisions in colleges and universities; consequently, it is difficult to ascertain who is or should be accountable to whom for what. Legally, but within the parameters set by external forces, the board of trustees has ultimate authority to control institutional decisions. In practice, this authority is delegated to administrators, faculty, and students. The extent to which they are or can be held accountable for the use of delegated authority is the point at issue. There are those who feel that faculty are the institution and, as such, control ought to be vested in them rather than in a board representing nonacademic, lay interests.

While there are many reasons for the difficulty in assessing who controls what or who is accountable for what, three factors seem of primary importance: the peculiar nature of authority in colleges and universities; lack of clearly defined goals and objectives; organizational complexity, which includes increased demands for involvement in decisionmaking. The discussion of these three factors will illustrate various approaches to increasing or decreasing accountability that are apparent in the literature on academic decisionmaking.

The Nature of Authority

A review of the literature on authority in organizations reveals considerable disagreement about the proper use of terms such as power, authority, and influence (Dahl, 1965; Platt and Parsons, 1970; Presthus, 1962; Etzioni, 1964; and Blau and Scott, 1962).
There is, however, a degree of consensus about the bases on which authority, power, and influence rest—in other words, the ways in which an organization gains legitimacy in its authority relationships.

Peabody (1962) summarizes much of this literature by classifying authority into two types: formal and functional. The bases of formal authority are rooted in legitimacy, organizational position, and the sanctions inherent in office. An organization and the position or offices in it gain legitimacy (e.g., the acknowledged right-to-rule) through their legality, which presumably results from general social approval, and by a general deference to authority of position or office accorded to traditional practices. On the other hand, functional authority is based on such relatively informal sources as professional competence, experience, and human-relations skills. Formal authority may be supported by functional authority where, for example, a department chairman also is recognized as an expert in his field. It is often the case, especially in colleges and universities, that formal and functional authority conflict with each other; i.e., where the college dean, whose field is English, is not competent to control the essential activities of faculty members in other fields.

The distinction between the formal and functional roots of authority is useful, for it summarizes much of the concern about professional and administrative authority in all organizations (Etzioni, 1964):

Administration assumes a power hierarchy. Without a clear ordering of higher and lower in rank, in which the higher in rank have more power than the lower ones and hence can control and coordinate the latter’s activities, the basic principle of administration is violated; the organization ceases to be a coordinated tool. However, knowledge is largely an individual property; unlike other organization means, it cannot be transferred from one person to another by degree.... It is this highly individualized principle which is diametrically opposed to the very essence of the organizational principle of control and coordination by superiors—i.e., the principle of administrative authority. In other words, the ultimate justification for a professional act is that it is, to the best of the professional's knowledge, the right act.... The ultimate justification of an administrative act, however, is that it is in line with the organization’s rules and regulations, and that it has been approved—directly or by implication—by a superior rank (pp. 76-77).
In practice, both formal and functional authority are present in organizations as well as a fundamental tension between them, especially in organizations such as colleges and universities, hospitals, schools, and industrial research laboratories where a substantial number of professionals are employed (Clear, 1969; Bates and White, 1961; and Kornhauser, 1962).

In this respect, the institution is unable to control important aspects of professional or functional authority valued so highly by some of its most prominent members. Recognition of expertise and the prestige that goes with it, for example, is often conferred on a faculty member by agencies external to the institution. While administrative or formal authority assumes a power hierarchy, or at least that rank and capability are closely correlated, such correlation is often not the case in colleges and universities. Of course there are hierarchical relationships in academic organizations, but the dilemma between formal and functional authority is particularly acute in colleges and universities (Anderson, 1963).

The university . . . if it is to exist as an organization, must enforce organizational discipline at the same time that it must foster independence or freedom for its most important group of organizational members (the faculty). This is a dilemma neither confined to the university nor to contemporary times. It is one of the great philosophical issues of history. Yet it is perhaps nowhere more strikingly revealed than in university government (p. 16).

How then are faculty held accountable for their performance? Using the term in its broadest scope—being answerable for one’s conduct—McConnell (1969) has discussed four ways individual faculty are held accountable: (1) he is accountable to his own conscience and especially to his own standards of scholarship and intellectual integrity; (2) he is accountable to his scholarly peers—the quality of his scholarship and performance as a teacher will be judged by his peers and he will be held accountable for these when promotion, tenure, and salary decisions are made; (3) he is accountable in a variety of ways to his students—for the quality of his teaching, for permitting freedom of expression and the right of dissent in the classroom, and for the confidentiality of a student’s beliefs and opinions; (4) he is accountable to his institution for the ways and procedures it adopts to administer the academic program, for the discipline of other faculty members, and for maintaining a productive educational environment.
Using the distinction drawn by Neff (1969) between accountability and responsibility, accountability to one's conscience refers to the assumption of a voluntary obligation or responsibility, while accountability to scholarly peers, students, and the institution are, or could be, matters of academic responsibility. Individual faculty members can be held accountable for much of this.

Traditionally, the standards for assessing accountability and the rights and responsibilities of faculty and students have been rather informal. Among the traditional guidelines used are (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, June 1971):

... the largely unwritten but shared understandings among faculty members and administrators about the nature of academic life and desirable conduct within it. These understandings have mainly involved collegial consensus about professional ethics and full tolerance toward the individual faculty member in his own teaching and research endeavors (p. 59).

The increased frequency of dissent and disruption on the campus have put severe strain on such informal understandings. Faculty are increasingly divided among themselves as to the basic elements of academic life (Lipset and Ladd, 1971). Pressure from external agencies and the administration has led many institutions, including the Universities of California and Illinois, and the Oregon Board of Higher Education, to draft statements of rights and responsibilities as guidelines for the control of excessively deviant faculty and student behavior.

Some attention is now being directed toward the accountability of various mechanisms like committees, senates, and faculty unions through which faculty participate in the decision-making process. Myron Lieberman (1969) charges that faculty senates and committees lack accountability—they cannot be brought to account for the advice they render. In the absence of codified grievance procedures, an individual faculty member has limited, if any, opportunity to appeal an adverse finding from a faculty personnel committee. The proceedings and membership of such committees are often confidential and the individual is denied the right to confront the evidence against him. Similarly a faculty selection committee can nominate a president, dean, or other administrator with complete immunity from having to answer for the quality of its recommendation. Lieberman (1969) refers to these practices as institutionalized irresponsibility.
Some advocates of collective bargaining in higher education argue that the process of negotiating a legally binding agreement on wages and terms and conditions of employment will result in firmer lines of accountability (Sherman and Loeffler, 1971). Codified grievance procedures will provide an avenue of individual appeal and a mechanism of external review over the decisions of administrators and faculty committees. The appeal procedure, because it may ultimately result in external review through fact finding and binding arbitration, formalizes standards to which administrators and faculty committees can be held accountable. Presumably, these standards will decrease the incidence of arbitrary administrative and faculty behavior, lack of fairness in handling personnel cases, and assure due process and the protection of basic freedoms. Both the institution and its officers can be held accountable to the system of law on which the contract is based (e.g., National Labor Relations Act, state-enabling legislation, and other relevant legal precedents).

There are two aspects of accountability in the preceding developments. Codes of conduct and ethics attempt to specify the limits of and thereby control individual behavior. Faculty organizations, especially those involved in collective bargaining, seek to ensure that the institution is held accountable to external standards of due process and fair play. Essentially these two developments are a long overdue recognition of some of the inadequacies of systems of functional or professional authority. Some of these inadequacies are reflected in the lack of precise goals and objectives in colleges and universities.

**Lack of Precise Goals**

Several observers have remarked about the diffuse functions and goals of institutions of higher education (Bell, 1971; Trow, 1970; Corson, 1971). There is some semantic confusion about the difference between functions, purposes, goals, and objectives. Peterson (1970) refers to the functions of higher education as the activities institutions perform that are related to other social institutions, such as socialization of the young and transmission of a cultural heritage. Purposes refer to stated conceptions of the mission of systems, groups, or types of institutions. The purposes of public institutions are often specified in a master plan. Goals
refer to the particular, possibly unique pattern of specified ends, outputs, and priorities of a single institution. Objectives are the ends of various component units, programs, or services.

It has been noted that colleges and universities are not completely free of external pressures in establishing their functions, purposes, goals, and objectives. Determining goals and objectives that are consistent with functions and purposes is, however, one of the primary requisites for establishing internal accountability.

The literature on behavioral accountability is voluminous. Many proposals are being advanced that would specify goals and objectives in behavioral terms and result in greater accountability. Conferences have been devoted to the topic and the proceedings published (Educational Testing Service, March and June 1971). Entire issues or parts of leading educational journals have been devoted to accountability (Educational Technology, January 1971; Phi Delta Kappa, December 1970; Junior College Journal, March 1971; Theory Into Practice, October 1969) and an annotated bibliography appears in the May 1971 issue of Audio-visual Instruction. While the vast majority of these proposals are directed at public schools, much of it is relevant to higher education. The essential features of behavioral accountability can be summarized from this and other literature on the topic.

**Behavioral Accountability**

If Leon Lessinger is not the father of behavioral accountability, he certainly is its midwife. His notion of accountability has been widely adopted by those writing on the concept as it applies to education. According to Lessinger (1971a):

> Accountability is a policy declaration adopted by a legal body such as a board of education or a state legislature requiring regular outside reports of dollars spent to achieve results. The concept rests on three fundamental bases: student accomplishment, independent review of student accomplishment, and a public report, relating dollars spent to student accomplishment (p. 62).

In another reference he defines the concept in more specific terms, stating that it means much more than simple indices, such as number of dropouts or the results of reading tests (1971b).
We must go far beyond such general outlines of general results and find out what specific factors produce specific educational results. We must find what specific educational results can be achieved with different groups of children for different amounts of financial resources (p. 13).

Almost all proponents of behavioral accountability urge that the effectiveness of institutions be judged not by their outputs alone but by their outputs relative to their inputs. What has a student attained relative to his capability at the starting point? This view assumes that colleges and universities are capable of having considerable cognitive and affective impact on those who pass through their doors. The assumption about affective impact has been seriously challenged by research on the topic (Feldman and Newcomb, 1969).

The proponents of behavioral accountability also argue that institutions must be efficient while they are having this impact. Requirements of both effectiveness and efficiency result in a plethora of techniques and approaches to achieving accountability. Browder (1971) cites 12 factors as critical to the process of rendering account in behavioral terms:

1. *Community involvement* is necessary so that members of concerned community groups are involved in appropriate phases of program activity. This will facilitate program access to community resources, understanding of the program’s objectives, procedures and accomplishments, and the discharge of program responsibilities to community support groups.

2. *Technical assistance* is necessary for providing adequate resources in program planning, implementation, operation, and evaluation. To provide such technical assistance, the institution should draw upon community, business, labor, education, scientific, and governmental agencies for expertise and services necessary for effective operations.

3. *Needs assessments* will identify the target group and situational factors essential to planning a program of action.

4. The development of effective change strategies for systematic change will need to be incorporated in the strategy of program operation.
5. The management system approach through such mechanisms as program evaluation and review technique (PERT), program planning and budgeting, and management by objectives will need to be adapted to education program management at all levels.

6. Performance objectives must be specified in a comprehensive manner that indicates measures and means for assessing the degree to which predetermined standards have been met. In curriculum design and instruction this usually takes the form of behavioral objectives (Mager, 1962; and Kapfer, 1971).

7. Performance budgeting will allocate fiscal resources in accordance with program objectives rather than by objects or functions to be supported.

8. Performance contracting will be used in some cases. This takes the form of an arrangement for technical assistance from an agent on a specified compensation schedule linked to the accomplishment of performance objectives.

9. The institution will have to determine the nature and extent of staff development needed to implement the related activities.

10. Implementation of accountability requires comprehensive evaluation or systems of performance control based on the continuous assessment of a program's operational and management processes and resultant products.

11. Some measure of cost effectiveness is necessary to analyze unit results obtained in relation to unit resources consumed under alternative approaches.

12. Program auditing or a performance control system will provide external reviews through qualified outside technical assistance designed to verify the results and assess the appropriateness of program management and operation.

These 12 elements comprise a total institutional approach to behavioral accountability. A program of behavioral accountability will include many, if not all of these 12 factors in a systematic attempt to specify objectives in measurable terms, control educational outputs to coincide with these objectives, and provide external program evaluation of the extent to which these objectives were achieved.
The proponents of behavioral accountability are not modest in asserting a wide variety of benefits that will accrue if their proposals are adopted. First, they claim that the successful implementation of accountability will shift the principal focus of an institution from inputs to outputs, from teaching to learning. Institutions will be held accountable for what students learn while they are in residence rather than what they bring with them when they enter or what the faculty claims they are taught. This will lead to a second benefit—reinforcement of the demand that every student shall learn, as opposed to a belief that some are incapable of learning.

A third major effect of accountability will be the development of better systems of instructional technology. Education will be less tied to the traditional systems of instruction because technology will clearly indicate that some students learn certain subjects better through less conventional instructional methods. Students and teachers will learn that technologies can help them achieve the recognized goal of education—student learning.

Fourth, accountability will result in development capital being set aside for investment by administrators in promising activities suggested by teachers, students, and others who can promise to produce results. This development capital will serve as an incentive for innovative experimentation.

Fifth, the definition of accountability requires some outside review and will lead to a greater emphasis on the modes of proof and methods of assessment. Accountability will insist upon techniques and strategies that promote objectivity, feedback knowledge of results, and permit outside replication of demonstrated good practice. In short, the scientific method will be used in the approach to educational innovation and curriculum.

A sixth major effect of adopting behavioral accountability will be to enhance educational engineering. Educational engineering is a rapidly emerging field designed to produce personnel who are competent in the technologies necessary to implement accountability. These techniques include but are not limited to system analysis, management by objectives, program planning and budgeting, and instructional planning through behavioral objectives. A common example of education engineering in public schools is the performance contract. Under a performance contract the local educational agency contracts with an outside enterprise to achieve specific goals within a specific period of time (Forsberg, 1971). The terms and conditions of the contract are
usually such that the contractor receives a predetermined compensation if the students achieve a specified set of learning objectives. If the students do not meet the specification, the contractor receives less reimbursement and may even be penalized; if the students exceed specifications, the contractor receives an additional reimbursement.

It is doubtful that all these benefits will accrue to higher education even if behavioral accountability were adopted. Faculty are unlikely to be satisfied with measures of institutional effectiveness based solely on student learning. In a time of increased financial crisis, few institutions will have the risk capital needed to experiment with and evaluate different educational approaches. Many institutions are not large enough to achieve the economies of scale necessary to use instructional technologies efficiently (Smith, 1971).

It is not possible, however, in a study such as this, to cover in detail each of the 12 elements of behavioral accountability or whether it will result in the six major benefits its proponents claim. There are three major points that should be made about the limitations of and resistance to behavioral accountability. The first has to do with unmeasurable intangibles in higher education and the second is related to the application of many of the techniques of achieving behavioral accountability. The third point relates to a possible distinction between or at least a better understanding of the interdependence of effectiveness and efficiency.

The difficulties in measuring effectiveness or the impact of colleges on students are well summarized in Withey (1971), Feldman and Newcomb (1969), McConnell (1971), and Hartnett (1971). First, few institutions have determined what their goals are and therefore have few measurable criteria to judge effectiveness. To achieve more precise statements of goals and objectives will be a monumental undertaking. Second, it is fairly clear that the personal characteristics of some students make them more educable, ready or eager to learn, than others. Third, given students of varying backgrounds, skills, interests, and educability, no single measure of effectiveness is likely to be adequate. Developing multiple criterion measures may be possible over time but will certainly not be a simple task. Fourth, changes may occur in students that are not attributable to the college experience. These changes may be due to normal maturation, personal trauma, or social influences external to institutions of higher education.
Given these difficulties in measuring effectiveness, can colleges and universities still be more efficient in their operation? The answer appears to be a qualified yes (Severance, 1971).

As a former official of the Rand Corporation and former undersecretary of defense, President Charles Hitch of the University of California is eminently qualified to discuss the application of one technique, system analysis, to the university (Wood, 1971).

There are a lot of opportunities for the university to use system analysis. We do run quite a large number of activities that are really business enterprises: our hospital operations for example; our dormitory operations; the large fleet of cars, which we maintain and service; computer centers which are very large and expensive operations. In all these areas, we have found such basic business principles applicable. But apart from these kinds of enterprises, it is much more difficult to apply systems analysis to an educational enterprise than it is either to a business enterprise or the Department of Defense. There are just terribly important intangibles you cannot measure (p. 54).

In practice these nonmeasurable “intangibles” are one of the primary sources of resistance to greater use of systems of behavioral accountability (Spencer, 1971). Some educators believe that education should not be regarded as a commodity that one, by various means, purchases for his own benefit.

Higher education is not a commodity. The chief beneficiary of higher education is not the person who gains its credits and degrees... The beneficiary is society itself (Beneiet, 1971, p. 242).

Few would argue, however, that these analysis techniques are totally inapplicable to higher education. The argument tends to be over the proper applications. Systems analysis, needs assessment, and management information systems are not so advanced in their technology that they can be transferred without modification to higher education. In order to apply the techniques of systems analysis, data of appropriate quality must be available. This is often a time consuming and expensive effort, especially in colleges and universities. System analysis is subject also to such biases as asymmetry in sources of information, disproportionate attention by the analysts to preferred information sources and selectivity in organizational recruitment.
In discussing the relationship between program budgeters and behavioral objectives in faculty instruction, Lindman (1971) says that both have found it impossible to place dollar values upon the behavioral objectives formulated. “Moreover they were unable to determine the cost of achieving various behavioral objectives because the cost depended upon the methods used and the ease with which students learn (p. B-5).” There appear to be important distinctions as well as interrelationships between a management system designed to allocate resources and an instructional and planning system designed to utilize educational resources most effectively. Budget decisions are often geared to a fiscal period, whereas instructional planning and evaluation is a continuous effort. The budgetary process is primarily concerned with decisions like class size and salaries—decisions that affect cost, whereas instructional planning and evaluation is concerned primarily with finding more effective teaching procedures that often have little or no effect upon annual costs. For example, some community colleges have adopted the behavioral objectives philosophy in their instructional efforts, yet it is doubtful whether this has increased their annual operating costs. It may require that more faculty time be spent in redesigning course content.

Another major factor is that basic decisions about budgeting and instruction are made by different agents, with the administration having effective control over the former and the faculty dominating the latter. This is not to say that program budgeting and behavioral objectives in instruction are totally independent activities; however, there are limits on the interdependence of the two. External agents and the administration may force the adoption of program budgets, while it is difficult to see them forcing faculty to adopt behavioral objectives in instruction.

In Chapter 2 the distinction between evaluation and accountability was discussed where evaluation was primarily related to effectiveness and accountability related to both effectiveness and efficiency. The unanswered question is the proper balance between effectiveness and efficiency. Colleges and universities can and should devote more attention to both, but the relationship between the two will be determined by the value judgments of those in positions of decision-making responsibility. It may be more efficient but less effective to operate large lecture sections in English and the social sciences than in physics or the creative arts, or in undergraduate than in graduate studies. In cases similar to those cited by Hitch it may be possible to be more efficient...
without sacrificing effectiveness; in other cases, efficiency may have to be sacrificed to effectiveness.

Colleges and universities need to have a much fuller understanding of the success and limitation of behavioral accountability than now exists. Even in the public schools, where several experimental approaches are being tried, the evidence is not yet definitive (Estes and Waldrip, 1971; Locke, 1971).

Organizational Complexity

The organizational complexity of colleges and universities makes control of the enterprise hazardous. There are two complementary aspects to this complexity: the multiplicity of structures and the demands of various internal constituencies for a part in the decisionmaking process.

Increased enrollments together with specialization of knowledge has resulted in a proliferation of academic departments in higher education. Many universities now have 80 or more academic departments organized into 10 to 20 colleges and professional schools. Some community colleges, in an attempt to fill community needs in vocational-technical areas, have added departments of plumbing, welding, auto mechanics, electronics, drafting, and printing. Few institutions have been able to resist this pressure to expand the scope of their offerings. The effect of these developments has been to increase the sheer variety of "experts" on the campus and support the tendency for authority to diffuse toward quasi-autonomous clusters (Clark, 1963).

Partly as a response to the organizational inadequacies of academic departments and partly as a response to demands for more certain accountability in spending external funds, major universities have created a substantial number of research institutes and centers. Ikenberry's (1970) survey of 51 land-grant universities revealed 907 such institutes and centers. He noted that 80 percent of these institutions had from six to 30 organized research units, with one institution reporting 86 organized units. Of the 857 units for which a founding date was available, 505 (60 percent) came into existence after 1955.

Accompanying this growth in research and instructional units is the growth of other decisionmaking bodies such as faculty committees, senates, councils, student governments at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, administrative committees and
committees to coordinate the activities of the above at all levels. In a multicampus institution there are likely to be faculty committees at each of the following levels: departmental, college or school, campus, and institutional. The Berkeley campus of the University of California had over 100 administrative committees in 1968. Hobbs and Anderson (1969) found 326 committees above the departmental level at SUNY at Buffalo. Even in a small, single-campus institution there are committees at both the departmental and college level with the possibility of some at an intervening divisional level.

The organizational complexity of colleges and universities is further compounded by the apparent need to provide access to decisionmaking groups by students, faculty, administrators, professional nonacademic staff, and others who desire a voice for their concerns. The question of who should be the decisionmakers must be viewed from the perspective of what level is most appropriate to the decision to be made. Keeton lists four questions that can be used to accommodate a variety of constituents (1971):

1. On what matters does each constituency want a voice and what voice does it want on each matter?
2. On what matters do others of the campus community urge involvement and in what form?
3. What expectations and perceptions do campus groups have as to how they will function in their decision-making roles?
4. What time and resources will the individuals and the institution put into preparation for, and exercise of, the responsibilities?

An answer to the question of who is accountable to whom for what becomes tied to the proper duties and responsibilities of each internal component at each decisionmaking level of the institution. There is ample literature about the duties and responsibilities of boards of trustees, administrators, faculty, and students but in practice these activities will vary over time and from place to place. A few examples will illustrate this point. Those interested in more details should refer to McGrath (1970), McConnell and Mortimer (1971), Baldrige (1971), and Hodgkinson and Meeth (1971).

According to Rauh (1969), boards of trustees have six basic responsibilities: (1) they hold the basic legal document or charter of origin and therefore bear primary responsibility for holding and executing the authority conferred by the charter;
(2) trustees are responsible for evolving the purposes and goals of the institution and assuring that these are consonant with the charter and other legal constraints; (3) the trustees are responsible for planning the present and future development of the institution; (4) they select and determine the tenure of the chief executive; (5) they hold the institution’s assets in trust; (6) boards of trustees act as a court of last resort when other internal components are unable to resolve problems.

The major issue relevant to the board’s performance of these duties is the balance between setting broad policies and actually managing the institution’s affairs. In order to implement the policy of a decentralized multicampus institution, the University of California Board of Regents in 1966-67 delegated final decision-making authority over certain kinds of personnel decisions to the Chancellors of the nine campuses. Two controversial cases, that of Herbert Marcuse at San Diego and Angela Davis at Los Angeles, led to the Regents asserting that authority to the dismay of many administrators and most faculty within the University system. Although many governing boards maintain a review of personnel decisions, there is great consternation when they seek to deny promotion, appointment, or tenure. The basic problem illustrated in this and other incidents like it is how trustees can be familiar enough with details of a complex organization to execute Raulh’s six basic responsibilities without intruding upon the functions of management.

There have been proposals for the trustees to take back from the faculty its authority over the design and administration of the curriculum because the board has the final authority and accountability (Rum and Morrison, quoted in Corson, 1960, p. 45). John Searle (quoted in Scully, 1971) proposes the abolition of trustees because, “in general, they are incompetent to perform the tasks of educational governance; they are subject to considerations of a political or at any rate nonacademic kind, and often they either don’t share or even understand the objectives of the institution (p. 9).”

Others commentators propose the recomposition of boards of trustees to create a more equitable representation from constituencies within the institution, namely faculty and students (McConnell, 1971). Proposals for recomposition usually cite data that boards of trustees dominated by lay members represent only the wealthy, white, Anglo-Saxon holders of economic and political power (Hartnett, 1970).
There is general agreement that the president serves a dual function: he is the chief recipient of authority delegated by the board and he acts as *primus inter pares* of the faculty, and as such is the point of contact between the board and the faculty. As chief executive officer he is accountable to the board and external interests for the effective and efficient utilization of the institution's resources. As chief academic officer he is accountable for the quality of academic life and for the protection of individual and institutional freedom in the search for truth and the dissemination of knowledge. In practice, the president, either in consort with or in opposition to the board, must interpret what are legitimate pressures for accountability and what constitutes invasions of basic freedoms.

The president's administrative functions are similar to those of any chief executive of a complex organization: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, and controlling. Many of these functions are, of course, delegated to vice presidents, deans, division directors and department chairmen. Supposedly, a dean stands as a man-in-the-middle between the faculty of his college and the central administration. He is accountable for his performance to both parties and loses some of his effectiveness if he becomes too closely identified with either. There is some debate whether a department chairman is clearly a representative of the dean or his department (Peterson, December 1970).

Studies show there are no less than 10 and as many as 46 areas in which faculty and administrators expect him to play some role. Despite the extensive expectations, he often carries a substantial teaching load, is given no extra pay, and is not permanent. Furthermore, high level administrators differ from faculty in the role they expect from chairmen, thus creating a classic "man-in-the-middle" conflict. The chairman is expected to be omniscient, omnidexterous, omnipresent and humble (pp. 2-3).

There is limited consensus about whether the board, president, dean and department chairman, or which levels of decision making, system, campus, college or school, and department should make what decision. As Hodgkinson (1971) states, it is just as important to decide who is to answer the question who decides; i.e., who should make the decision about the duties and responsibilities of the various levels, campus, college or school and department, and constituents, administrators, faculty, students and
nonacademic staff. This dilemma is well illustrated in the growing
debate about decentralization.

*Decentralization: Accountability and Autonomy.*

Higher education is being flooded with proposals for deccen-
tralization. Its proponents regard it as a step toward dealing with
problems of size, lack of faculty and student involvement in
governance, and increased individual freedom (Foote, Mayer and

Decentralization recommends itself because it represents an
attack on size and scale. Decentralization offers a method for
transforming the structure of the university from an obstacle to a
positive instrument for the realization of the values and commit-
ments of its members...

Just as there is an urgent need for a renewal of efforts to
secure genuine campus autonomy, there is an equally pressing
need for a thorough consideration of the centralized educa
tional structure at the campus level (pp. 57-58).

Jerry Gaff (1970) and his colleagues provide a look at the
cluster college concept as one answer to decreasing the size and
scale of instructional units. Burton R. Clark (1968) argues that
greater involvement in governance is possible only if governance
is brought down to where the faculty and students are, i.e., if it is
decentralized to small units of the campus. If the subunits of an
institution have some autonomy and are free to develop certain
features of their character, then the involvement of the average
faculty member and student is likely to be much higher. If such
units are to be genuine "consent" units, then Trow (October
1970) argues they ought to have control over who is to be ad-
mitt ed similar to the control over admissions that graduate depart-
ments in major universities now have.

An attempt to be more precise about what is actually in-
volved in decentralization reveals three factors of importance: (1)
the proper locus of control, (2) who should be involved in deci-
sions, and (3) what means of control are appropriate.

The proper locus of control for a given set of decisions is one
of the elements of decentralization in all organizations, including
colleges and universities. According to Etzioni (1964), "Whenever
there are two or more organizational units, with one [or more] of
they superior to the others in decision making authority, which
decisions should be left to the lower one[s] and which should be
made by the higher unit[s] (p. 28)? Many of the proposals that
urge a more specific designation of lines of authority and responsi-
bility in colleges and universities are directed towards vertical
decentralization or the proper locus of control (Peterson, 1971).
The question of what decisionmaking authority, a department, a
college, or campus should have varies both within and between
institutions (Dressel, Johnson and Marcus, 1970).

Autonomy of a department and the authority of its chairman are
inadequately spelled out in many institutions. Both vary from
one college to another, and, in some cases, they vary markedly
from one department to another under the same dean (p. 220).

Many colleges and universities apparently prefer that ques-
tions of departmental authority and autonomy be decided by the
informal relations between department chairmen and other admin-
istrators. The "proper" locus of control will vary depending on
these and other factors.

A second major element of decentralization is decision-
making; i.e., what matters within the jurisdiction of administra-
tors, faculty, students, professional nonfaculty staff, or clerical
staff and what consultation is necessary on matters where more
than one of these groups needs to be involved? There are few
issues remaining which are solely under the jurisdiction of one
of these groups. Keeton (1971) believes there are four basic claims
for involvement that must be heeded: (1) those whose special
interests and lives are most affected by campus activities should
have a voice in their control; (2) those who are most competent to
do the work should have a voice that ensures the effective use of
that competence; (3) those whose cooperation is essential to
campus effectiveness should have a voice to facilitate their con-
tinuing cooperation; (4) those whose sponsorship and resources
created and sustain the institution are entitled to protect and
further their purposes and interests.

He goes on to list six problems in sharing authority (pp.
113-117): (1) there appears to be an unwillingness of those in
power to share authority; (2) is the unwillingness of the various
constituents to trust their peers to represent them adequately; (3)
shared authority is often granted to avoid violence rather than to
achieve increased involvement; (4) the scarcity of time and re-
sources for senates, committees, and councils to perform their
work; (5) how to persuade and elect those best qualified to serve; (6) rapid turnover and resulting lack of continuity of the members of the various committees created to share authority.

The third element of decentralization is the proper means of control. Earlier on, two views of managerial accountability were discussed; legal and constitutional. The legal view argues for a formalization of control mechanisms through a rule of law and specified procedures; the constitutional view is that administrators should have discretion to interpret policies within the broadest possible guidelines and be held accountable only in general terms and over time.

These, however, are only an aspect of the means of control. Of equal importance are the proper techniques of control; i.e., program planning and budgeting, formulas to determine the allocation of funds, criteria specifying faculty productivity and workloads, management information systems, and systems analysis. Many fear the centralization of knowledge required to implement such techniques and believe it will result in increasingly centralized decision-making. Presumably, such increased centralization would allow stricter assessment of accountability and would defeat the ends of decentralization. Centralized control over line item budgets, excessive codification of operating rules and procedures, and detailed pre-auditing of minute decisions could defeat the autonomy and freedom that are supposed to result from decentralization.

Decentralization of higher education is rapidly assuming the status of unassailable virtue because it is often equated with the generally desirable ends of smaller size, increased participatory decision-making and greater individual freedom. The criticisms Feeler (1965) directs at the concept of decentralization in public administration also are relevant to higher education. First, in the minds of many, decentralization has become an end in itself rather than a means to achieve an end; e.g., if centralization is bad, decentralization must be good. He argues that one should view governance systems as being on a continuum between centralization and decentralization and that most will be in a dynamic rather than static condition. Some decisions and activities will be centralized and others will be decentralized.

Second, decentralization is not so absolute or good that one's responsibility can be discharged by operating from the premise that the more decentralization the better. Centralized control of costly services and equipment, e.g., educational technologies and data-processing equipment, may result in their more effective and
efficient use while having minimal effect on individual or departmental autonomy.

A third point of criticism is the belief that the values of democracy and freedom are closely linked with decentralization. It should be clear from preceding discussion that decentralization of locus of control and increased involvement in decisionmaking at lower levels will be frustrated if the means of control are relatively centralized.

A fourth, and related point is that a central authority often has to assume much of the responsibility for assuring the realization of the ends that decentralization is supposed to serve. For example, it is quite clear that some sections of the country would choose not to integrate black with white children if this decision were theirs to make. Within a college or university, many departments choose not to involve junior faculty and students in departmental decisionmaking. In the absence of central review, a department may choose to exclude certain viewpoints from its course offerings and its faculty, thereby limiting the intellectual freedom of students. Decentralized faculty personnel practices may violate basic constitutional freedoms, such as the right of due process and free speech.

In short, the discussion on decentralization tends to be unaware of the essential and proper checks and balances between the institution's legitimate concern with control and accountability on the one hand and individual, college or school, and departmental autonomy on the other. This is not entirely the case. Some proponents of decentralization advocate it on a selective basis (Hodgkinson, 1971).

Decentralization of everything is certainly no solution to the problems of governance. Selective decentralization might be at least a step in the right direction. For example, many campuses now practice what could be called "general education by the registrar's office," in which the curriculum of most students is determined to a large degree by certain requirements in general education. This area should be decentralized immediately to the level of the individual student and his advisor (p. 7).

Presumably a policy of selective decentralization would allow for central control over such costly support services as computer centers, educational media, and recordkeeping and still provide for sufficient autonomy at lower levels.
To summarize this section on internal accountability, the conflict between formal and functional authority is particularly acute in colleges and universities. Pressures to formalize codes of ethics and/or codes rights and responsibilities and faculty-administrative relations appear to be on the rise. These developments represent, at least partially, attempts to hold internal constituents more accountable for both their individual behavior and for their behavior when they act as agents of the institution. The standards used to judge these actions are often similar to those used by the courts and other external agencies.

The proponents of behavioral accountability are urging colleges and universities to adopt student learning as their primary goal, to specify learning objectives in measurable terms, and to relate them to some measure of resources.

Finally, the paper states that the debate over the degree of centralization or decentralization should take into consideration three major factors; the proper locus of control, the various constituents who ought to have a voice in decisions, and the means used to achieve decentralization. The fundamental problem is how to achieve an acceptable balance between demands for accountability on the one hand and individual and subunit autonomy on the other.
5 Accountability in the Next Decade

The term accountability does not appear in the Education Index until June 1970, so predictions about future trends are hazardous (Morris, 1971). This concluding section makes seven predictions about the impact of pressures for accountability. While the impact of one governmental agency or management technique may not persist over time, the combined effects of the many factors cited in this paper seem to indicate some definite directions.

1. **Rising societal and legislative expectations and the rulings of the courts will be key factors in holding institutions accountable for providing equal access to women and minority groups.** Equal access may not require open admissions but it probably will require the removal of any admissions quota or other standard that may result in de jure or de facto discrimination against women or minorities.

   Antidiscrimination regulations and policies will permeate all aspects of college and university operation. Hiring policies and practices will be closely scrutinized by external agencies, as will residence hall policies, financial aid to students, and faculty salary levels.

2. **The combined impact of external pressures to be more accountable will push higher education closer to the status of a quasi-public utility** (Kerr, 1971). Executive agencies of government, the legislatures, and the courts will interject their conception of the public interest into decisions governing higher education.

   The public utility concept rests on two basic assumptions that appear to be on the rise among executive and legislative
agencies. First, institutions of higher education tend to protect their own vested interests to the detriment of the broader public interest. There is, therefore, a basic conflict of interest between the public and individual institutions. Second, higher education is a commodity or service, similar to electricity and telephones, to be provided to the public at a regulated cost. Whatever one's views on the validity of these two assumptions, it does appear that the regulation of higher education by external forces will proceed apace.

3. There will be more concern about the management of higher education and attempts to relate managerial efficiency to educational effectiveness. The emphasis on more efficient management is related to the declining financial health of higher education. Such management techniques as program planning and budgeting, management information systems, systems analysis, and cost-benefit analysis will increase in importance. The expertise and control of information that these techniques require are likely to result in more centralization of the management functions of colleges and universities. The assumption that this will result in greater efficiency and more certain accountability may lead to consolidation of certain state systems, such as recently occurred in Wisconsin and North Carolina.

There will be great pressure to relate efficiency to educational effectiveness. Administrators and faculty will be pressed to demonstrate, in measurable terms, that occasional inefficient use of resources leads to greater educational effectiveness, e.g., that smaller classes result in greater student learning or satisfaction. In the absence of such justification the pressure to be efficient will take precedence over educational effectiveness.

4. There is likely to be further codification of internal decisionmaking processes. If the courts continue to expand their review of academic cases, their rulings will become standards for internal procedures and policies. Student disciplinary procedures already have begun to incorporate standards of due process and essential fairness, but there will be more emphasis on codifying faculty rights and responsibilities through formal codes of ethics and similar devices. Some legislatures will require such codes, while in other cases institutions will find it useful to develop their own. Formal standards of faculty productivity or workloads will become more common. Legislatures may increase their activity in this area, unless checked by the courts, and many institutions will seek to anticipate their legislatures. Private higher education will not be immune to any of these developments.
Collective bargaining will become more widespread in the 1970s and will further codify faculty-administrative relations. Grievance procedures, salaries, promotions, raises, and other terms of employment will become part of a legally negotiated contract. Some observers believe that the scope of contracts will expand significantly beyond terms and conditions of employment to include such items as class size, faculty involvement in decision-making, and the selection and review of administrators.

Even in the absence of collective negotiations, institutions will find it necessary to codify their internal procedures and policies to conform with the rulings of administrative and legislative agencies and the courts. Presumably this codification will specify behavior for which administrators, students, and faculty can be held legally accountable.

5. Behavioral accountability will achieve greater importance in the 70s. Although elementary and secondary schools currently are bearing most of the pressure for behavioral accountability, colleges and universities are not far behind. Federal and state guidelines for the allocation of funds will continue to stress performance objectives stated in measurable terms and related to expenditures. This emphasis on student learning and other output measures will increase. Colleges and universities will experiment more widely with techniques to evaluate student learning, such as credit by examination and credit for experience gained in nonacademic pursuits. They will develop degree programs less tied to traditional residence requirements in an effort to award degrees that reflect what a student knows rather than how much time he has spent going to classes.

6. The importance of management and educational technologies will be enhanced by the emphasis on more efficient management and behavioral accountability. In the management functions of colleges and universities the importance of middle management personnel will increase as it is recognized that they will develop the techniques and generate the information necessary to be more efficient. Media specialists and other support staff will be necessary to develop the technologies to be used in nontraditional study and off-campus learning faculties.

7. The management functions of colleges and universities will be more centralized and the academic functions more decentralized. Managerial accountability will require centralized control of information and of the support services necessary to operate efficiently. Demands for decreased size and scale, for increased
professional and individual autonomy, and for involvement in academic decisionmaking will rise and result in selective decentralization of some academic matters, such as student advising, independent study, and the specific requirements necessary to earn degrees. Such decentralization is more likely to occur when it can be demonstrated that efficiency will not suffer substantially.

In summary, the directions that pressures for accountability will take will be multiple and sometimes conflicting. There appear to be some inevitable tensions between legitimate demands for accountability on the one hand and desires for institutional and individual autonomy on the other. The challenge of the next decade is to find a balance which assures both the protection of the public interest and of the educational environment so critical to effective scholarship, teaching, and service.


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