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ABSTRACT

The notion of particularism is used in this study to relate the choice of reciprocal action to the previous exchange situation. Initial encounters were manipulated by exposing 80 female subjects to affective and monetary outcomes provided by 2 male peers. Treatment conditions varied in feedback level (high vs. low) and mode of interaction (positive vs. negative). Subjects were provided a subsequent opportunity to choose one of four reciprocation options pairing a preferred target person with either resource class. Choice patterns revealed an ordered contingency matrix reflecting a systematic tendency for subjects to match the particularity of their action to the particularism of prior encounters. The findings are described in terms of a structural taxonomy of social exchange.

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FOR LOVE OR MONEY: PATTERNS OF RESOURCE COMMUTATION  
IN SOCIAL INTERCHANGE<sup>1</sup>

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A traditional assumption in social exchange theory has been that people are motivated to maintain equity and that optimal balance is achieved through repayment in kind (Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1961). While a considerable amount of research attests to the ubiquity of exchange in kind, relatively little is known about the exchangeability of different resource classes or those facets of on-going interchange which serve to mediate the decision of what to exchange with whom. Moreover, attempts to study this type of choice contingency have been hampered by the failure of exchange theory to provide the formal guidelines necessary to generate specific predictions (Weinstein, DeVaughan, and Wiley, 1969).

In a recent theoretical article Foa and Foa (1971) have proposed that a variety of social com be ordered on psycho-logical coordinates, and that this structural model provides a formal conceptualization of preferred patterns of social interchange. In this model a structure is conceived as a pattern of interrelationships among the variables belonging to a set, in a space of stated coordinates (Foa and Turner, 1970). Earlier research has dealt with the general relationship of this theoretical order to perceived similarity among the different resource classes and resource exchange patterns in the reciprocation of benefits (Turner, Foa and Foa, in prep.); and to resource

exchange patterns in retaliatory aggression (Foa, Turner and Foa, in press). Results of these investigations support the notion that spatial proximity in the order is predictive of relative preference for alternative resource exchange patterns in ongoing interpersonal transactions (Foa, 1971).

#### Love as a Resource Class

In the present study, attention was focused on two resource classes which prior findings had indicated were least commutable, love and money. Although gain or loss of money as an exchange outcome is self-evident, classification of love as a resource class requires further clarification. In the Foas' taxonomy, love is defined as an expression of affectionate regard and emotional attachment with components of warmth, concern, trust, and tenderness. As a resource class, love is distinguished from status or esteem which is an expression of deference or evaluative judgment regarding another's attitudes, traits, beliefs or abilities. Love is also distinct from more general constructs such as "social approval" and "attraction" which typically include elements of both respect and affection. While recognizing that respect and affection frequently co-occur, such is not always the case and there is some empirical justification for emphasizing their distinctiveness (e.g., Aronson, 1970; Jones and Jones; 1966; Rubin, 1970; Brown, 1965).

In the present study love was conveyed through a romantic disclosure form which emphasized feelings of warmth, affection, rapport and the desire for future intimate affiliation. Taking away love, or

disaffection, was expressed by emotional rejection which stressed a lack of empathy, negative feelings, and repudiation of the opportunity for more intimate association.

#### Particularism as a Dimension in Interpersonal Transactions

As noted earlier, the resource taxonomy proposed by Foa and Foa orders social commodities in terms of their proximity on psychological coordinates. One such basis for classification is the dimension of particularism (cf. Parsons, 1951). A principle connotation of particularism is that exchange outcomes are more or less phenomenally personalized by the parties involved such that the quality of their relationship determines the extent to which that outcome has the desired interpersonal consequences. Jones and Davis (1965) make a similar point when they distinguish between "hedonic relevance" and "personalism" as variables affecting social inference and attribution processes. The Foas' argument, however, proceeds from a different theoretical perspective in which the particularism dimension is introduced to distinguish among the characteristic exchange properties of different resource classes. Thus, the more particularistic the exchange commodity involved, the more will subjective interpersonal considerations serve as salient discriminative stimuli contributing to variance in outcome utility. In general, the amount of variance attributable to this interaction between resource content and the person source will be maximal in transactions involving love and minimal in those involving money. In love exchange, for example, the interpersonal significance value of a given action is very dependent on who mediates that action. In contrast, monetary

outcomes have a relevance and value which transcends their linkage to a given source and there may often be little reason for preferring one exchange partner over other available alternatives.

In some respects this development of particularism is similar to Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) concept of "comparison level for alternatives." It qualifies this notion, however, in predicting that whether a person will remain in an exchange relationship with a specific other is, in part, determined by the particularism of the relevant resource class. As the level of resource particularism increases, potential access to alternative relationships decreases.

While the Foas use particularism to classify resources, other aspects of social interchange can also be seen as varying on this dimension. Relevant to the present discussion are such facets as feedback regarding prior outcomes, the directional mode of interaction, and the persons available as exchange objects. Thus, proceeding from the notion that particularism implies variation in resource utility as a function of the relationship between actor and object, a condition of reduced feedback regarding prior outcomes can be expected to produce a less particularistic transaction than one involving extensive feedback. Similarly with regard to mode of interaction, a positive action should be facilitated by personalistic cues while negative, aggressive behaviors are more likely under conditions of interpersonal anonymity (e.g., Zimbardo, 1970). Finally, an object-person associated with previous love exchange will be seen as a more particularistic target than one responsible for a previous monetary outcome.

This extension of the notion of particularism to various facets of an interpersonal exchange enabled us to devise a matrix of alternative reciprocation contingencies in which both the experimental treatment conditions and behavioral options available to subjects varied in particularism. Proceeding from this design we thus attempted to influence the relative particularity of the reciprocation option chosen by manipulating the particularistic implications of the situational context. More specifically the hypothesis was that:

The more particularistic the exchange situation the more likely it is that a person will prefer a particularistic form of reciprocal action.

#### Overview of Experimental Design

The particularism of interaction outcomes was manipulated by exposing half of the subjects to a sequence of experimental episodes in which two confederates each provided her with a distinct reward experience. One of these "relevant" individuals responded to an interview with the subject by communicating his feelings of positive affect toward her. The other, in turn, made strategic concessions in a game situation where it was apparent that he was voluntarily giving her his share of experimental earnings. The remaining subjects encountered these two individuals under equivalent conditions but experienced negative outcomes with one expressing negative affect toward her and the other deliberately cheating her out of her rightful share of money.

The explicitness of feedback regarding these outcomes was also manipulated such that half of the subjects received explicit and detailed

feedback (either positive or negative) at the conclusion of each episode. The remaining subjects were exposed to the same cues during interaction but were told that they would not know precisely what the other person felt about them, or the amount of money they had received, until the experimenter had tabulated the data.

Following these encounters the subject was informed that the experiment was over but was subsequently solicited to aid another experimenter whose assistant had failed to show up. This unrelated experiment provided a sanctioned setting in which the subject had to make two choices regarding her reciprocal action: (a) Choose one of the two persons with whom she had previously interacted; and (b) choose either love or money as the resource to be used in reciprocation toward the chosen person. The other resource was to be employed in dealing with a third "neutral" person.

In summary, the particularism of the exchange situation was manipulated by varying mode of interaction (positive vs. negative) and feedback level (high vs. low) giving four treatment conditions which differed on this dimension. The reciprocation options available involved choosing one of two relevant individuals (affect-relevant vs. money-relevant) and in allocating a specific resource (love or money) to the person chosen. Thus each subject was assigned to one of four treatment conditions and subsequently allowed to choose one of four reciprocation options with each aspect of both treatment condition and choice option representing different degrees of particularism.

Since affective disclosure was a distinct outcome in the present investigation, individual differences in subject's need for approval might affect the extent to which they reciprocate this resource class. Of particular concern was the likelihood that approval-dependent individuals in the negative reciprocation sequence would show a systematic tendency to avoid direct reciprocation of negative affect toward the relevant target (cf. Conn and Crowne, 1964). To examine this possibility all subjects were administered the Marlowe-Crowne Social-Desirability Scale as their initial introduction to the experiment. This task also served to pair the subject with a "neutral" confederate whose task was merely to remain in the same room with the subject while completing his own questionnaire.

## Method

### Subjects, Confederates and Experimenters

The subjects were 80 female undergraduates at the University of Missouri, assigned randomly to the different experimental conditions. All were volunteers from introductory psychology classes who received "credits" for participating in experiments.

Six undergraduate males were hired to serve as confederates. Assignment of confederate to condition was counterbalanced so that each played a given role approximately the same number of times. Prior to beginning the experiment all confederates were instructed in the necessity for standardization of their behavior and were required to study a "script" which provided a structured outline for the various roles. In order to anticipate problems and provide appropriate training, nine rehearsal sessions were run as a pilot study, involving both male and female subjects, none of whom are included in the present analysis.

Both the senior author and one other graduate student in social psychology served as experimenters with each conducting approximately one random half of the experimental sessions. This second experimenter was naive with regard to the predictions which have been advanced and was provided with only a very general description of the purpose of the study to assist him in the debriefing session.

### Procedure

Introduction to experiment and exposure to "neutral" target. Shortly after arrival of the female subject the experimenter entered the waiting area and confirmed that all present (i.e., subject and

three confederates) had volunteered to participate in his experiment. It was then noted that the three males had signed up for two hours of experimental credit while the female subject had signed up for only one hour. They were then informed that each would be participating in a series of different experiments and that each study would involve some type of interaction between two randomly paired subjects. Consulting an elaborate chart the experimenter, in apparent confusion, identified each accomplice by name several times. The "neutral" confederate and the subject were then each given a "Personal Reaction Inventory" (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964) to complete, and the two other males moved to another part of the building.

Besides administration of the Marlowe-Crowne Social-Desirability Scale, this initial "scene" was designed to enhance the credibility and salience of later manipulations. Thus the subject could now identify by appearance and name three persons, two of whom would later be relevant to her, and she had been led to believe that they had volunteered for a second hour of research which was unrelated to the present study.

After approximately twelve minutes the experimenter returned to the conference room, removed that confederate, and led the subject through two adjoining experimental rooms. After being shown a one-way mirror arrangement the subject was seated adjacent to the non-vision side with the justification that "We want the other subjects to see you under conditions where they know that you can't see them." The experimenter then consulted his chart and pretending confusion (e.g.,

"I'm really terrible about remembering names") solicited the subject's aid in identifying the appropriate person for her first encounter. For both the affect-relevant and money-relevant manipulations the subject's ability to identify that male was clearly established prior to initiating that episode. Half of the subjects in each treatment condition were exposed first to the affect episode and then to the money episode, with the sequence being reversed for the other half.

Given these controls on the sequencing of episodes the experiment consisted of two basic stages. Stage I consisted of making the subject a susceptible recipient of affective and monetary outcomes while Stage II provided her the opportunity to choose the target and resource most preferred for reciprocal action.

Stage I: Subject as recipient in love and money transactions.

The affect-relevant episode was introduced with the following instructions:

"This experiment is a study of self-disclosure and romantic attraction. To put it bluntly, we're interested in why and how people become romantically interested in one another and what kinds of cues or information are most important in eliciting this type of attraction. In this study we have tried to set up a situation where two strangers get to know one another under somewhat artificial, but controlled, conditions. I am going to give each of you several questions which you can use to obtain information about your partner. Using only these questions you will be alternately asking and answering the questions for approximately twelve minutes. I will then ask you to fill out some forms indicating your personal feelings

toward one another. Please keep in mind that we're mainly interested in obtaining your reaction to the other as a potential romantic partner. We realize that this is a somewhat awkward situation to place you in, but hope you will feel free to be completely frank and honest both in answering the questions and in indicating your initial feelings toward one another. Also, I should inform you that we will be tape-recording the interview session."

The questions made available to the subject and accomplice were selected from a list prepared and standardized by Worthy (see Worthy, et al., 1969). The subject's list consisted of 10 relatively non-intimate questions which were overlapping with regard to content. The accomplice, however, was given a list which had been rated as highly intimate and which covered a broad range of personal information. The subject's list, for example, contained such items as "what sort of things do you most enjoy talking about to others" and "what topics are you and your friends prone to discuss." Examples of the accomplice's questions are "Do you consider your sexual adjustment satisfactory? Why or why not?" and, "How does your attitude toward men differ from your mother's attitude toward your father?" This discrepancy was introduced to establish an inequity of disclosure and to increase the vulnerability of the subject to subsequent acceptance or rejection. To further enhance this discrepancy, the accomplice gave short standardized replies, while always encouraging the subject to elaborate or clarify her responses.

Following twelve minutes of interaction the interview was terminated and a "Romantic Attraction Questionnaire" distributed.

The front side of this questionnaire contained four rating scales which dealt with: (1) The degree of affection they felt for the other person; (2) The desirability of the other as a dating partner; (3) Willingness to initiate less superficial contact with the other; and (4) The degree to which they felt the other person liked them. They were further instructed to use the back side of the questionnaire for "additional comments and a more personal elaboration of your feelings."

After about three minutes the accomplice noted that he had finished his questionnaire and was removed. Upon returning the experimenter informed the subject that there was no need for her to finish the questionnaire as her ratings weren't really of concern in the study. He then indicated that he would be gone for a few minutes "to check on another experiment" and that while she was waiting she could examine what the other person had to say about her if she so desired. All subjects expressed an interest in this information and after handing them the questionnaire the experimenter immediately left the room.

The ratings and comments on the questionnaire were standardized and either highly positive or negative depending on the treatment condition. In the positive affect condition "personal comments" emphasized that the subject possessed "a rare combination of qualities that I personally find extremely attractive," and went on to elaborate on the positive feelings which he felt toward her as a person. In contrast, the negative affect comments emphasized that the subject had elicited mainly negative feelings and that she was "not the kind of person I personally find attractive or enjoy being with."

The contextual setting for the money-relevant episode was the same as for the affect encounter, with the subject being placed on the non-vision side of a one-way mirror. After the accomplice had been brought in, the experimental task was introduced in the following manner:

"This experiment is a study of social co-operation. The two of you are going to be playing a very simple game which provides each of you the opportunity to earn some money. Now you (indicating accomplice) have played the game before so you should be familiar with how it works (accomplice indicates that he does understand). The only difference is that this time there will be \$4.00 at stake instead of just points." Directing his attention to the subject the experimenter then remarked "Please listen very carefully, I'm only allowed to read the instructions one time." He then read the following "instructions":

"Each of you will receive a deck of 20 cards. A trial will consist of both of you choosing either a red or black card from your deck and placing it face down in the message slot. I will then remove the cards and record what you each chose. For every trial in which you play the same color you will each receive \$.10. If you play different colors then one of you will receive \$.20 on that trial and the other nothing. For the first five trials opposite color cards will result in the person who plays the black card winning the \$.20, for the second five trials this will be reversed with the red card winning the total amount, and so on, for every five trial sequence until 20 trials have been completed."

Having read these ambiguous and confusing instructions the experimenter noted that he had to leave for a few minutes to "check on the other subjects," and that they could discuss the game, if they so desired, until he returned.

During this time the accomplice noted his previous experience with the game and sought to convince the subject that if she played in a certain pattern he could anticipate her choices, and that this was the only way that they would each be assured of a fair share of the money. A few minutes later, the experimenter returned and began the game. Upon concluding the 20 trials, the outcomes were tabulated and each player given the money they had earned. Beneficiary subjects received 90% of the \$4.00 while victims received only 10%. During the distribution of money the accomplice was asked if he had any particular reason for playing the way he did. His reply depended on treatment condition. Beneficiaries, for example, overheard the accomplice remark that "Well, I could see that we didn't have the same number of red and black cards, so I wanted to help her win as much money as I could."

Victims, however, heard the accomplice say "Yeah! the way I figure it, it's every man for himself. I was out to get all I could." This manipulation was included to give the subject clear reason to believe that the other's actions were clearly intended to either benefit or harm her.

*could have  
manipulation*

Manipulation of feedback. The above discussion describes the "explicit-outcome" conditions. Half of the subjects, however, were given minimal information regarding their outcomes. These "non-explicit"



treatment conditions were as described above with the following exceptions. Following the interview session the accomplice was removed and the experimenter returned in the apparent process of examining his comments about the subject. After noting that her ratings of him were not relevant to the study she was told: "It is necessary in order to keep the experiment standardized that you not see this just yet. If you like perhaps you can take a look at it before you leave today." As an apparent afterthought the experimenter then noted: "I can see one thing, he's certainly not indifferent toward you." The only cue provided subjects was that the experimenter delivered this latter comment either brightly (i.e., implying that the comments were favorable) or very seriously (i.e., implying that the comments were negative). Similarly, upon conclusion of the money game, the confederate was removed and subjects were told: "You'll be given the money you earned before you leave today. It's possible that he either let you take most of the money or that he tried to get most of it for himself, but given the card decks you both had available it's impossible that you could have split the money very evenly." At this point, the experimenter briefly glanced at the outcome sheet and noted either: "Looks like he treated you very well" or "looks like he didn't treat you very well," depending on treatment condition.

Stage II: Subject's opportunity for reciprocation. Upon conclusion of the above episodes, the subject was removed to a conference room and led to believe that she had fulfilled her experimental obligation. The experimenter then left for a few moments and returned to ask

If she would mind taking just a few minutes to help "Dr. Rucker, an industrial psychologist here at the Center." It was further explained that his research assistant had called in sick and that he needed a female assistant for the first ten minutes of his experiment. After agreeing to help, subjects were given brief instructions regarding the purpose of "Dr. Rucker's study" and their role as an experimental assistant.

Building on an earlier deception that the males had signed up for two hours of experimental credit, it was explained that they were also subjects for an "Industrial Incentives Study," and that her task would be to deliver "incentives" to two of these persons. The third person was to be in a no incentive control group. It was further noted that the study was concerned with comparing "social" and "material" incentives but that she could choose the type she preferred to administer to each "subject." A brief description of the alleged incentive alternatives was then provided.

Subject beneficiaries were told that they would be administering positive incentives in the following manner:

"Dr. Rucker will be interviewing you and asking you to make certain judgments with regard to his male subjects. Now the subject concerned is going to "accidentally" overhear part of this interview over an elaborate intercom system that Dr. Rucker has hooked up in his experimental rooms. If the guy is going to get a material incentive, for example, he will supposedly by accident, overhear you telling Dr. Rucker that he's your choice to receive \$3.00 in payment for experimental participation. If the guy is going to get a social

incentive, however, he'll overhear you telling Dr. Rucker that you have a very positive affectionate attitude toward him."

It was then explained that these interviews would actually be read from a prepared script, but that she would be required to act very spontaneous as "the subjects must be entirely convinced that you are personally responsible for what happens to them." She was also told that in order to keep the word from getting around, these subjects would never be told that she was actually an experimental assistant.

Subject victims were told that they would be administering negative incentives in the same manner. Thus they could either choose a person "who will definitely not be paid the \$3.00 he was promised for being in the experiment," or "he'll overhear you telling Dr. Rucker that you have a very negative and hateful attitude toward him as a person."

After familiarizing the subject with her alternatives the experimenter gave her "one of Dr. Rucker's forms" on which to indicate her assignment of subjects to incentive conditions. As an apparent afterthought the experimenter then exclaimed, "Oh! I almost forgot... Dr. Rucker said to be sure that \_\_\_\_\_ (the neutral accomplice) was assigned to one of the incentive conditions. For some reason he doesn't want him to be in the control group. OK." He then left "to see if Dr. Rucker has all the equipment set up for the interview. "Approximately three minutes later, the experimenter returned, collected the subject's choice form, and proceeded with a post-session interview which culminated in debriefing her regarding the actual purpose of the experiment.

## Results

Effectiveness of the manipulations. Since deception was crucial to the success of the manipulations it is first necessary to establish that the subjects were, in fact, appropriately deceived. A review of notes taken during the post-experimental interviews revealed that no subject was aware that the males were actually confederates playing roles. Similarly, virtually all subjects reported accepting the notion that they were involved in a series of different experiments and that they had been spontaneously solicited to assist in Dr. Rucker's study. Apparently, the only major source of suspicion was the general feeling of a number of subjects that they were merely being used to elicit responses from the males and were, in fact, not "real" subjects.

Immediately prior to debriefing, subjects were asked if their choices in the incentives study were in any way affected by what had occurred in previous encounters with the two males. Although the scoring of these subjective reports is admittedly tenuous (i.e., suspiciousness had usually been aroused by this point), there was tendency for high need-approval subjects in the negative reciprocation conditions to deny any connection whatsoever. In contrast, low-need-approval subjects in this condition were frank to admit that their choice was motivated by anger and the desire to retaliate. This finding is consistent with Conn and Crowne's (1964) report that approval dependent persons are more reluctant to recognize and express hostility toward others. In the positive reciprocation conditions there was no discernible difference between subjects differing in need-for-approval.

Most subjects in these conditions readily admitted to being more or less influenced by the desire to repay specific persons for benefits incurred.

Effect of need-for-approval. In order to assess the effects of need-for-approval on subject's choice patterns, it was necessary to establish that each treatment group had, in fact, received a random assortment of subjects differing on this dimension. A preliminary comparison of median need-approval scores within each treatment condition with the overall median, and with one another, revealed no significant discrepancies between conditions. It was also clear from this preliminary examination that although frequency with which a given reciprocation option was chosen varied considerably across treatments, the mean need-approval score associated with a given option was relatively consistent across treatment conditions. It is thus possible to combine the various treatment conditions in discussing the effects of this need state on subject's choice patterns.

Across all conditions there was a highly significant tendency ( $t = 3.45$ ,  $p < .001$ , two-tailed test) for low-need-approval subjects to reciprocate the resource-salient target chosen within the resource class associated with him, while persons high in need-for-approval characteristically assigned him a less appropriate outcome. Also approaching significance ( $t = 1.76$ ,  $p < .10$ , two-tailed test) was the tendency for those subjects who provided a monetary outcome to the money-relevant target to have a lower need-approval score than those who opted for direct reciprocation of affect, even though both of these groups were below the overall mean in need for approval.

Since high- and low-need-approval subjects were equally represented in the four treatment conditions, we also examined the total matrix of choice frequencies separately for each group. Comparison revealed that the relative size of cell frequencies followed the same pattern for both high and low need-approval subjects. It thus appears justified to consider the experimental results separately from the effects associated with need for approval.

Experimental results. The primary interest of the study was in the effects of the varying conditions on subject's choice of reciprocation alternatives. The frequency with which the four available alternatives were chosen is shown in Table 1. Looking first at

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Insert Table 1 about here

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the total frequency with which the various options were selected over all treatment conditions, there is a significant tendency (51 out of 80,  $p < .02$ ) for subjects to reciprocate within the same resource class, a slight preference for the affect-relevant target (45 out of 80, n.s.), and no overall preference for either of the two resource options (43 versus 37, n.s.).

As the distribution of cell frequencies in Table 1 reveals, however, there was considerable variation both within and across treatment conditions in the frequency with which a given option was chosen. More precisely, each one of the two manipulations, feedback level and mode of interaction, affected different aspects of subjects' choice patterns. The target person chosen by subjects varied significantly across interaction modes ( $X^2 = 9.85$ ,  $p < .01$ , see Table 2)

but was not influenced by feedback level (see Table 3). In contrast,

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Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here

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the resource class selected was a function of feedback level ( $\chi^2=11.51$ ,  $p<.001$ , see Table 4) but unrelated to mode of interaction (see Table 5). Thus regardless of prior outcome certainty, beneficiaries tended to choose to repay the affect-relevant person, while victims preferred to retaliate against the monetary-relevant individual. Moreover, both victims and beneficiaries showed preference for the affective form of reciprocal action when prior outcomes were certain and for monetary action when previous outcomes were more ambiguous. This pattern of relationship between experimental manipulations and subjects' choices is reflected in the ordered frequencies of responses presented in Table 1. By converting the rows of this matrix into percentage frequencies, thus eliminating differences in overall preference for a given option, it becomes feasible to examine the relative preference for a specific reciprocation alternative both within and across treatment conditions. This distribution of percentage frequencies generates a circularly ordered matrix in which the diagonal cells have the highest percentage frequency while other cells, in both rows and columns, show a systematic decrease as a function of their distance from the diagonal. There is nothing mysterious about this neat ordering of the frequencies. We have seen that particularism of the interaction mode affects particularism of the choice of target person (Table 2), while particularism of the other manipulation, feedback, affects the particularism of the resource chosen

(Table 4). Thus in the diagonal entries of Table 1 the particularism of each manipulation is matched to the particularism of the outcome aspect which is relevant to it. In the diagonal at the top left corner, for example, both manipulations are highly particularistic and both aspects of the outcome are highly particularistic; in the diagonal on the second row, one manipulation (mode) and its respective aspect of outcome (target person) are particularistic while the other manipulation (feedback) and the outcome aspect relevant to it (resource) are both non-particularistic. This double matching of manipulation to outcome in the diagonal cells produces the highest relative frequencies. In the two cells bordering the diagonal, either by row or by column, the particularism of one manipulation matches its relevant outcome, while the second manipulation does not; in the second column of the first row, for example, interaction mode and target person are both high in particularism, but feedback level is low while the resource chosen is highly particularistic; hence frequency is lower here than in the diagonal. By this criterion the first and last entry of the first and last rows and columns are also neighbors and the order of any given column or row is circular. Finally, in the cell two-steps removed from the diagonal, neither manipulation matches its respective outcome aspect, hence the frequency is lowest here.

It was assumed that since initiating action toward the "neutral" target was a sanctioned demand characteristic of the setting, what happened to this person would be a relatively minor factor in subject's choice patterns. Both the post-session interviews and the analysis of choice

patterns lend reasonable support to this assumption with regard to the low-need-approval subjects. Approval dependent subjects, in the negative reciprocation sequence, however, may have been significantly affected by knowledge that they would be delivering undeserved punishment to a virtual stranger. While granting this possibility, it does not explain why approval dependent subjects expressed negative affect toward the money-relevant target when choice of the affect-relevant target would have resulted in the same outcome to the neutral person. Similarly, it offers little in the way of explanation for why approval dependent subjects in the positive reciprocation sequence were prone to give money to the affect-relevant person rather than the monetary-relevant target when both contingencies had equivalent significance for the "neutral" individual. These considerations thus lend support to our reasoning that the "neutral" person was relatively unimportant, if not irrelevant, in determining subjects reciprocation patterns.

### Discussion and Conclusion

Building on the general notion that affective disclosure is a more particularistic behavior than delivery of monetary outcomes, it seems feasible, according to the results obtained, to order the reciprocation options available to subjects in the present experiment on the basis of this dimension. Thus direct reciprocation of affective disclosure is the most particularistic alternative; direct reciprocation of money the least particularistic, with the other two options of intermediate particularity. Moreover, the results suggest that the experimental treatment conditions can also be ordered on this dimension. It thus seems that a positive exchange sequence is characteristically more constrained by considerations of resource particularity than a negative exchange sequence. Consummation of an on-going aggressive response sequence is less restricted to specific actions and targets than completion of a beneficial exchange sequence. Apparently this difference stems from the fact that consummation of beneficial exchange is contingent on the recipient's valuation and receptivity to the pro-offered reward. Delivery of a harmful outcome, however, is typically a unilateral decision of the actor in which the recipient's ability to nullify or de-value the outcome is a much less potent factor in exchange consummation (Heider, 1958; Schopler, 1969).

The cues available for the evaluation of another's behavior appear also to be linked to the particularity of reciprocal action such that we will expect subjects receiving explicit feedback to

prefer a more particularistic form of reciprocal action than those subjects who are less certain of the extent of their social indebtedness.

These considerations, however, do not explain why interaction mode should affect the choice of exchange object but not the choice of resource class, while feedback level affects the resource chosen but not selection of the target person. Frankly, we do not have an adequate explanation to offer on this unexpected finding. Nevertheless it is of interest to note that the generality of the particularism dimension enabled us to establish a conceptual link between the structure of the exchange setting and the structure of the behavioral response patterns of subjects. Thus, once both domains of interest were mapped on a specified dimension it became possible to test a structural hypothesis which related an ordered set of stimuli to an ordered set of responses. The more general value of this approach lies in the possibility it offers for exploring complex relationships among multiple independent and dependent variables in terms of underlying structural units which relate them to one another. For studying the multifaceted reciprocal effects of ongoing interpersonal behavior this may be precisely the type of research needed.

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#### FOOTNOTE

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Table 1

Frequency with which Reciprocation Alternatives were Chosen  
within and across Treatment Conditions

Reciprocation Pattern Chosen		Experimental Treatment Condition						Total all Treatments
Target Person Chosen	Resource Chosen	Interaction Mode: Feedback Level:	Positive High	Positive Low	Negative Low	Negative High		
Affect-relevant	Affective disclosure		13 (43)	9 (30)	2 (7)	6 (20)	30 (100)	
Affect-relevant	Money		2 (15)	5 (38½)	5 (38½)	1 (8)	13 (100)	
Money-relevant	Money		2 (10)	6 (28)	1 (43)	4 (19)	21 (100)	
Money-relevant	Affective disclosure		3 (19)	0 (0)	4 (25)	9 (56)	16 (100)	
		Total	20	20	20	20	80	

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage frequency across rows.

Table 2  
 Resource-Relevant Person Chosen for Reciprocation as a Function  
 of Interaction Mode

Person Chosen	Mode of Interaction		
	Positive	Negative	Totals
Affect-relevant	29	14	43
Money-relevant	11	26	37
	40	40	80

Note. ---  $\chi^2 = 9.86, p < .01.$

Table 3  
Resource-Relevant Person Chosen for Reciprocation as a Function  
of Feedback Level

Person Chosen	Feedback Level		
	Explicit	Non-explicit	Totals
Affect-relevant	22	21	43
Money-relevant	18	19	37
	40	40	80

Note. ---  $\chi^2$  0.00, ns.

Table 4  
 Resource Directed toward Relevant Person Chosen for Reciprocation  
 as a Function of Feedback Level

Resource Directed toward Relevant Person Chosen	Feedback Level		
	Explicit	Non-explicit	Totals
Affect	31	15	46
Money	9	25	34
	40	40	30

Note. ---  $X^2$  11.51,  $p < .001$ .

Table 5  
 Resource Directed toward Relevant Person Chosen for Reciprocation  
 as a Function of Interaction Mode

Resource Directed toward Relevant Person Chosen	Mode of Interaction		
	Positive	Negative	Totals
Affect	25	21	46
Money	15	19	34
	40	40	80

Note. ---  $\chi^2$  0.46, ns.