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ABSTRACT

This 7-day unit, intended for use with secondary students, contains a statement of rationale and objectives, lesson plans, class assignments, teacher and student bibliographies, and suggestions for instructional materials on conflict resolution between individuals, groups, and nations. Among the six objectives listed for the unit are: 1) explain why the actions of both individuals and nations differ due to differences in their cultural experiences, values, perceptions, goals, and expectations; 2) identify the reasons that conflicts occur in the present international system; and, 3) list and compare the kinds of alternative techniques available in the present international system to deal with conflict. A variety of classroom experiences are utilized to help the students achieve these objectives, including presentation and discussion of the film, Little Island; use of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study; role playing; and classroom games to illustrate bargaining techniques. A reading on conflict resolution and accompanying exercises are also provided. (JLB)

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION UNIT

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CONTENTS

1. Rationale and Objectives
2. Lesson Plan
3. Class Assignments
4. Suggested Bibliography for Teachers and Students
5. Little Island Discussion Guide
6. Reading on "Conflict Resolution" with exercises
7. Classroom Games to Illustrate Bargaining Techniques
8. Explicit v. Tacit Bargaining Exercise
9. Reading Guide for Thirteen Days by Robert Kennedy
10. Cuban Missile Crisis--Class Discussion Questions
11. Role-playing Exercise
12. Decision-Making Sheet for Role-playing Exercise

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION UNIT

I. REASONS FOR STUDYING CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1. Each of us is confronted by conflict situations whether as a participant in inter-personal ones or as a concerned spectator in international crises.
2. In a world which is so interdependent, it is important that all peoples understand why conflict occurs in order to determine what kind of international system would be most viable and to work toward achieving it.
3. Because we are involved, an awareness of the behavior of both individuals and nations is necessary for an understanding of the conflict and the alternatives which exist for its resolution.
4. By understanding conflict and its behavioral variables, we can influence the behavior of others in such a way as to affect the outcome of the conflict.

II. OBJECTIVES IN STUDYING CONFLICTS AND THEIR RESOLUTION

At the end of the unit, each student should be able to:

1. explain why the actions of both individuals and nations differ due to differences in their cultural experiences, values, perceptions, goals and expectations;
2. identify the reasons that conflicts occur in the present international system;
3. explain how the international system and its members react to various conflict situations, for example, superpower confrontations and small power disputes;
4. understand that there are both opposing and common interests among adversaries in most conflicts and be able to differentiate between them in any conflict presented him;
5. discuss the nature and role of bargaining in the international system;
6. and list and compare the kinds of alternative techniques available in the present international system to deal with conflict-- for example, force, negotiations and diplomatic exchanges.

III. LESSON PLAN*

- Day 1: Show film "Little Island" and conduct a directed discussion.
- Day 2: Continuation of discussion of the film. Presentation of ways of viewing conflict, variables involved in it and its resolution.
- Day 3: The bargaining process in conflict. Play some of Schelling's games to show differences in bargaining situations.
- Day 4: Discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
- Day 5: Role-playing activity of the alternatives for US action presented in the Executive Committee meetings.
- Day 6: Debriefing of role-playing and discussion of system models.
- Day 7: Evaluation of learning using either a scenario which the students will react to, or asking them to write their own description for a viable world system.

*This plan is based on 50 minute periods.

IV. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

The following are suggestions for types of assignments which could be given to your students.

1. For Day 3. The handout on Conflict Resolution which has been abstracted from Schelling's ideas for high school classroom use.
2. For Day 4. An account of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy's Thirteen Days is the most concise and most easily read by students. It should be assigned at least a week in advance to allow time for everyone to read it.
3. For Day 6. Pages 27-60 from Fisher's International Conflict for Beginners.

V. SUGGESTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Teacher

1. Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict.
2. Haas, Ernest. The Web of Interdependence. Esp. Chapter 1.
3. Frankel, Joseph. International Relations. Esp. Chapter 4 and Chapters 5-7.
4. Fisher, Roger. International Conflict for Beginners.

B. Student

1. Fisher, Roger. International Conflict for Beginners, pp. 27-60.
2. Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days.
3. Abel, Ellie. The Missile Crisis.
4. Any of the other accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis which can be found in Sorenson, Schlesinger or Hilsman.

LITTLE ISLAND
DISCUSSION OF THE FILM

This animated film is about three men who each believe in a different idea-- good, beauty and truth. The film begins with the three landing on an island. From the time of their arrival to their departure, one sees the attempts which the three make to communicate and interact with one another. All of their attempts fail and at the end of the film the three are seen leaving the island.

The film can be used effectively with very few introductory remarks. Because there are no words, students have to be encouraged to look for other cues about each of the three characters and their activities. Some of these cues are colors, music, symbols and movements. Before starting the film, it is helpful to introduce the three characters and the ideas they represent. This can be done by putting the following information on the blackboard:

Good

Truth

Beauty

3

1

2

The numbers are the order in which they appear individually in the film.

The first part of the discussion should be general enough to let each student begin to organize what he has seen and his thoughts about what happened. The discussion should vary with the points which the students raise. Some of the points which should be brought out either by individual students or by questions from the teacher are:

1. What happened in the film?
2. Why did the three characters leave the island in the end?
3. How were each of the three ideas represented?

Here, the students should be encouraged to think about the differences in:

1. colors -- e.g. the colors for truth were strong and bright while those for beauty were pastels.
2. music -- e.g. the waltz-type music associated with beauty as compared to the church organ and choir music of good.

3. symbols -- e.g. beauty wanted everything to be symmetrical and beautiful like the picture of the nude woman and the flowers, while good was associated with the church and angels with the idea that if you are "good" you will go to heaven.
4. movements -- e.g. beauty was very graceful as compared with truth whose movements were mechanical and often-times erratic (remember, the mad scientist image).

The second part of the discussion should be directed more toward the conflict which took place and how it was resolved.

1. What kinds of interactions took place during the film?
2. Did the characters try to communicate with one another? How? What were the results?
3. Were their attempts at communication understood or misunderstood?

Note: The most glaring misunderstanding took place when the fist kept pushing "good" down until he became a devil symbol. Beauty, seeing this, tried to shoot the fist with an arrow apparently attempting to save good. But good misunderstood beauty's actions when blood from where the arrow had penetrated the fist fell on good. Good blamed beauty for the blood and a conflict erupted between the two which escalated until they were deterred by the image of the bomb which truth had created. The message which the bomb communicated to all of them about total destruction was the only thing which all of them understood throughout the whole film.

4. Can conflict result from misunderstandings or misperceptions of another's beliefs or intentions?

Note: It should be brought out here that each of the three characters believed in positive values. But, throughout the film we see not only the conflict between these positive values but we see the negative aspects of each of them.

5. If men and nations cannot communicate and cooperate with others in such a way as to avoid conflicts or settle them peacefully, do they have the same option of leaving the island or the system as the three characters did?

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict is often viewed today as a bargaining situation in which each side has an interest in resolving the conflict in such a way that is advantageous. Oftentimes, the gains in the resolution of conflict are mutually advantageous with each side gaining in terms of its own interests and goals. For, in order for conflict to take place in the contemporary world, there must be common as well as opposing interests among the participants of antagonists. Common interests exist in conflicts because of the mutual dependence of the antagonists. In today's world, the overriding common interest is survival given the threat of nuclear destruction.

If we view conflict as a bargaining situation, then we must analyze some of the maneuvers which are used in bargaining, such as commitments, threats and promises, and the communication of them. But why should we be interested in studying conflict at all? Conflict is a phenomena which is not confined solely to relations between nations. It is inherent in any relationship whether between individuals, groups, or nations. All relationships are both cooperative -- ~~and~~ integrative--~~and~~ conflictual--~~and~~ disintegrative. Dr. Robert North has pointed out that:

Almost any aspect of conflict, however destructive, requires interaction between the antagonists, considerable communication, and the establishment and maintenance of many reciprocalities and subtle understandings. Conflict thus functions as a binding element between parties who may previously have had no contact at all.¹

By analyzing conflict and the behavior which participants exhibit in bargaining, we learn not only about conflict and its resolution but we learn also how the behavior of antagonists might be influenced in order to bring about desired outcomes.

Communication is necessary to the resolution of conflict situations because it is the means by which each side makes known to the other side its interests and goals as well as the means it will adopt to attain them. Communication can be either tacit or explicit. Explicit communication means direct verbal or written communication between two parties. Two historical examples of explicit communication are the Declaration of Independence, in which the colonialists made known to Britain their desire for independence, and the Fourteen Points, in which President Wilson outlined the kind of peace settlement he advocated. Tacit communication is utilized when direct or explicit communication is either impossible or insufficient. It is dependent on each side believing that they have something to gain from cooperation and from resolution of the conflict. These gains will not necessarily


be the same for both sides but communication will take place if both sides feel that they have something to gain. The resolution of most conflicts today is not simply a case of winning for one side and losing for the other; each side gains something relative to what it had before and what it might have had given another outcome.

The following are some examples which Thomas Schelling uses in his book, The Strategy of Conflict, to illustrate the utility of tacit bargaining to attain an outcome mutually advantageous to both sides.

1. When a man loses his wife in a department store without any prior understanding on where to meet if they get separated, the chances are good that they will find each other. It is likely that each will think of some obvious meeting place, so obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure that it is "obvious" to both of them. One does not simply predict where the other will go, since the other will go where he predicts the first to go, which is wherever the first predicts the second to predict the first to go, and so ad infinitum. . . . What is necessary is to coordinate predictions, to read the same message in the common situation, to identify the one course of action that their expectations of each other can converge on. They must "mutually recognize" some unique signal that coordinates their expectations of one another. We cannot be sure they will meet, nor would all couples read the same signal; but the chances are certainly a great deal better than if they pursued a random course of search. Where would you choose to meet in the same situation?

2. Two people parachute unexpectedly into the area shown on the map below. Each has a map and knows that the other has one but neither knows where the other has dropped nor are they able to communicate directly. They must get together quickly to be

saved . Can they study their maps and "coordinate" their behavior? Does the map suggest some particular meeting place so unambiguously that each will be confident that the other reads the same suggestion with confidence?



The above examples were of situations in which both sides would gain equally from the successful resolution of their situations and both would lose equally if they could not resolve their predicaments through cooperation. But what about the case of divergent interests whereby each side can gain more with a different outcome? Does any basis exist for cooperation in which they will both gain, although perhaps not equally? Try to think of an example from either contemporary or historical situations in which the antagonists had divergent interests out in which the conflict was resolved to the satisfaction of both. What could have been done by the characters in Little Island to resolve their situation?

1. Robert C. North. VIOLENCE: INTERPERSONAL, INTERGROUP AND INTERNATIONAL. Stanford University, Center for War/Peace Studies, March 15, 1968. p. 1.

CLASSROOM GAMES TO ILLUSTRATE
BARGAINING TECHNIQUES

The purpose of using these exercises is to help the student understand the conditions under which bargaining can take place. Tacit bargaining is utilized because there are elements and techniques found in tacit bargaining situations which are important to understanding explicit bargaining situations.

I. Tacit Bargaining of Common Interests

1. Ask a few groups of two to write down individually where they would meet their counterpart if lost in a department store.
2. Using the map exercise which was in the reading assigned for the day's activities, ask the entire class where they would go to meet the rest of their classmates and to be rescued.

Note: Almost everyone will choose to meet where the roads all cross over the river. Change the positions of where the two parachutists land and ask them where they would meet then. The students should understand that no matter where they land on the map, they will still meet where the roads meet in crossing over the river. Why?

3. Name "heads" or "tails". Tell the class that if they all name the same one, then they will all receive a prize.
4. Tell the class to choose one of the following numbers:

7 100 13 261 99 555

If they all choose the same number, then they will all win a prize.

Note: Try to get them to understand and explain their reasons for their choices.

5. Tell the class that they will all be meeting in New York City during their vacation. However, no one ever mentioned where they would meet and that there is no way for any of them to communicate with anyone else to find out. Therefore, they will have to guess where they are going to meet and go there hoping that the guesses of the rest of the members of the class will coincide.
6. The time for meeting in New York City was not decided either. Therefore, each member of the class must guess the exact time when he would expect to find the rest of the class there.

7. Choose two groups of two students each. Tell the two members of each group that they will get \$100.00 if they each choose an amount which when totaled does not exceed 100 dollars. Find out what each member of the group chooses.

Note: Most members of the group will choose 50 dollars because it is one-half of \$100. If either chose more or less than fifty, try to get them to determine why.

After doing the exercises, the students should discuss the following questions using examples from the exercises.

1. What did each of these bargaining exercises and your choices exhibit?
2. Why were a majority of you able to come up with the same guess without any form of communication?
3. Were your guesses random, or was there some reason behind each of your choices? What were the reasons, if any?

Note: Students should see that in each of the examples there is a cue or "focal point" which suggests how they can coordinate their behavior to win or successfully resolve their dilemma. The "focal point" is usually prominent or conspicuous--for example, the point where the roads cross the river on the map is the only place where all of the roads meet. Students should understand that even without any verbal or explicit communication, antagonists can arrive at similar choices when it is advantageous for them to do so.

II. Tacit Bargaining of Divergent or Conflicting Interests

In the previous examples, each person would win or lose the same amount as everyone else in the group. Therefore, each of them had a common interest in making the same choice as everyone else. However, in most conflict situations, people and nations do not win or lose equally because of divergent or conflicting desires.

1. Choose one student to be "A" and another to be "B". A and B are each to choose heads or tails without communicating. If both choose heads, A gets 3 dollars and B gets 2 dollars; if both choose tails, A gets 2 dollars and B gets 3 dollars. If they choose differently, neither gets anything. Ask them what they choose.

Note: Usually both will choose heads even though it means that B will get less money than A by choosing it. The rationale for the heads choice is that it is a more common reply than tails. And B chooses heads because he would rather have 2 dollars than none.

2. Choose one student to be A, one to be B, and one to be C. Ask each of the three to write these three letters in any order. If the order is the same on all three lists, the person whose letter is first on the three lists gets 3 dollars, the person whose letter is the second on all three lists gets 2 dollars and the person whose letter is third gets 1 dollar. If the order is not the same on all three lists, then no one gets anything.

Discussion Questions:

1. What determined the outcome in each of these cases?
2. Would each person win or lose the same amount no matter what they chose?

Note: The important point here is that coordination is still required for anything to be gained even though there are different alternatives which would mean different gains for each participant. Neither side would have gained by trying to outsmart the other. Each loses unless he does exactly what the other expects him to do. The need for agreement overrides the potential disagreement over the different outcomes and gains to be made.

III. Application of These Techniques to Explicit Bargaining

Although at first look, the "coordination" which we saw as playing a prominent role in tacit bargaining may not appear applicable to explicit bargaining situations when communication can take place, Schelling argues that there is evidence that some similar influence such as "focal point" is working in explicit bargaining. Schelling's argument is that,

... our analysis of tacit bargaining may help to provide an understanding of the influence at work; and perhaps the logic of tacit bargaining even provides a basis for believing it to be correct. The fundamental problem in tacit bargaining is that of coordination; we should inquire, then what has to be coordinated in explicit bargaining. The answer may be that explicit bargaining requires, for an ultimate agreement, some coordination of the participants' expectations. The proposition might be as follows.

Most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. In such a situation any potential outcome is one from which at least one of the parties, and probably both, would have been willing to retreat for the sake of agreement, and very often the other party knows it. Any potential outcome is therefore one that either party could have improved by insisting; yet he may have no basis for insisting, since the other knows or suspects that

he would rather concede than do without agreement. Each party's strategy is guided mainly by what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet each knows that the other is guided by reciprocal thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to retreat; yet the main ingredient of this expectation is what one thinks the other expects the first to expect and so on. . . . These infinitely reflexive expectations must somehow converge on a single point, at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.

If we then ask what it is that can bring their expectations into convergence and bring the negotiation to a close, we might propose that it is the intrinsic magnetism of particular outcomes, especially those that enjoy prominence, uniqueness, simplicity, precedent, or some rationale that makes them qualitatively differentiable from the continuum of possible alternatives. We could argue that expectations tend not to converge on outcomes that differ only by degree from alternative outcomes but that people have to dig in their heels at a groove in order to make any show of determination. One has to have a reason for standing firmly on a position; and along the continuum of qualitatively undifferentiable positions one finds no rationale. The rationale may not be strong at the arbitrary "focal point," but at least it can defend itself with the argument "If not here, where?"

. . . some explanation is needed for the tendency to settle at focal points. But the proposition would remain vague and somewhat mystical if it were not for the somewhat more tangible logic of tacit bargaining. The latter provides not only an analogy but the demonstration that the necessary psychic phenomenon-- tacit coordination of expectations-- is a real possibility and in some contexts a remarkably reliable one. The "coordination" of expectations is analogous to the "coordination" of behavior when communication is cut off; and, in fact, they both involve nothing more nor less than intuitively perceived mutual expectations. Thus the empirically verifiable results of some of the tacit-bargaining games, as well as the more logical role of coordinated expectations in that case, prove that expectations can be coordinated and that some of the objective details of the situation can exercise a controlling influence when the coordination of expectations is essential. Something is perceived by both parties when communication is absent; it must still be perceptible, though undoubtedly of lesser force, when communication is possible. . . .

But, if this general line of reasoning is valid, any analysis of explicit bargaining must pay attention to what we might call the "communication" that is inherent in the bargaining situations, the signals that the participants read in the inanimate details of the case. And it means that tacit and explicit bargaining are not thoroughly separate concepts but that the various gradations from tacit bargaining up through types of incompleteness or faulty or limited communication to full communication all show some dependence on the need to coordinate expectations. Hence all show some degree of dependence of the participants themselves on their common inability to keep their eyes off certain outcomes.

This is not necessarily an argument for expecting explicit outcomes as a rule to lean toward exactly those that would have emerged if communication had been impossible; the focal points may certainly be different when speech is allowed. But what may be the main principle in tacit bargaining apparently may be at least one of the important principles in the analysis of explicit bargaining. And, since even much so-called "explicit" bargaining includes maneuver, indirect communication, jockeying for position, or speaking to be overheard, or is confused by a multitude of participants and divergent interests, the need for convergent expectations and the role of signals that have the power to coordinate expectations may be powerful.

(The above was taken from Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 78-84.) It was reproduced so extensively in order to give the teacher a background for relating tacit and explicit bargaining.

The same exercises which were used in Part II for demonstrating tacit bargaining of divergent interests can be used here to demonstrate the effects of communication in the bargaining process.

1. Using the example of the ordering of A, B and C, choose one student for each letter. Then give them the same directions as were given in # 2 of Part II but allow them to talk about their decision. Then ask for their individual choices.

Note: The likely outcome of their communication in this bargaining situation is that they will agree on one order of the letters and will agree to split their winnings three equal ways so that each person will get 2 dollars. Ask them why they have chosen to do what they've done.

2. Using the same exercise, choose three different people to represent the letters. Tell one of them in private conversation not to agree to divide the winnings equally and have that person say that "I am going to put down the order of CBA (the person who is saying this is C) no matter what you decide." Let the three argue some more and then cut off the communication and ask them what order they each would put the letters in.

Note: If C has been persuasive in saying that he will put down CBA because he wants to win the 3 dollars, then B and A will have to put down CBA too if they want to win anything at all.

Explicit v. Tacit Bargaining Exercise

Below are some of the laws, declarations and actions of Great Britain, the American Colonies and other European nations during the years 1760-1780. Choose three and state what each (1) explicitly communicated (2) for whom and to whom it was communicated and (3) what it may tacitly have communicated and to whom.

- (1) Stamp Act of 1765
- (2) Repeal of the Stamp Act 1766
- (3) Townshend Acts of 1767
- (4) Boston Tea Party
- (5) Committees of Correspondance
- (6) Private emissaries to France prior to 1776
- (7) Declaration of Independence 1776
- (8) U.S.-France Treaty of Alliance 1778
- (9) Armed Neutrality Act of 1780

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

In our study of conflict resolution, we are going to use The Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study. Some of the questions which you should think about after reading Thirteen Days, RFK's account of what happened, are:

1. Does the Crisis fit our model of a bargaining situation which we developed and discussed in class two weeks ago?
2. What were some of the mutual interests which the US and USSR shared which led to the resolution of the crisis?
3. What were some of their divergent interests and goals which led to the conflict?
4. What kinds of things were communicated by the US to the USSR during the crisis? (i.e. threats, commitments, promises) And to the US?
5. Was their tacit as well as explicit communication?
6. What were the perceptions of the US and the USSR of one another? Did these perceptions change?
7. Was the crisis resolved in the best way?
8. What were some of the alternative outcomes which might have occurred?
9. Was there a winner and a loser? If so, who?

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Some of the tentative conclusions which are reached by students from the bargaining exercises are useful in examining the Cuban Missile Crisis. In this conflict, as in most others, there are elements of both tacit and explicit bargaining. Prior to the role-playing of the Executive Committee discussions, it is important that the students have a general idea of the time involved in the crisis and what happened in this superpower confrontation. It therefore might be helpful for the class to outline the general order in which the crisis developed.

After establishing a chronological outline, the class should discuss some of the following questions:

1. Was the Cuban Missile Crisis a conflict in which the outcome could be determined by bargaining?

Note: Bargaining is successful in conflict resolution when a situation exists in which there are a range of alternative solutions.

2. Were there mutual as well as divergent interests between the antagonists?
3. What do you think was the overriding interest of the United States? Of the Soviet Union?
4. Give some examples of the different bargaining techniques used during the Crisis such as threats, promises and commitments.

How were these communicated? Did they provide cues about how each side was planning to act? Did they provide cues about how the other side was expected to act?

5. What were some of the things which were not communicated between the US and the Soviet Union but understood by both?

ROLE-PLAYING

The following role-playing exercise is suggested as a way of promoting a better understanding of the alternatives for action available to the United States in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The day before the role-playing is to take place, each student should be assigned one of the following alternatives of action which were open to the United States.

1. invasion of Cuba
2. surgical air strike to remove missiles only
3. blockade
4. diplomatic negotiations
5. sending of a personal emissary
6. no action at all

Role-playing should be explained to the class so that each student will be able to defend his alternative in the most convincing way he can. Some students will react to their particular assignments by saying that they cannot think of any defense for them. At this point, it must be reiterated that each of the alternatives was strongly defended during the meetings of the Executive Committee.

At the beginning of the class when the role-playing will be done, ask each student to fill out the decision-maker's sheet which is enclosed. This should help them to organize their arguments and should help the teacher evaluate both the understanding and the preparation of each student.

The role-playing should be introduced as a meeting of the Executive Committee which has been asked by the President to submit policy recommendations. The decision-makers who support a particular alternative should verbally list the strengths of pursuing the alternative. After the strengths have been presented, the other decision-makers can question the efficacy of pursuing that particular alternative. Each alternative should be presented and defended in a similar way. The teacher should act as a questioner when some of the liabilities of the different alternatives are not brought up by members of the class.

In the debriefing of the role-playing, the students should be encouraged to discuss the various alternatives and the efficacy of each of them. Throughout the debriefing they should be asking themselves what action can be taken next if their alternative fails to remove the missiles from Cuba.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

DECISION-MAKING

State the alternative which you are defending in the Executive Committee meeting:

State the benefits of pursuing this alternative:

State the risks involved in pursuing this alternative:

How do you expect the Soviet Union to respond to this action:

If your action fails to bring about the desired outcome of removing the missiles, what alternatives could still be pursued by the United States without giving the appearance of backing down from its original stand which you advocated?

GAMES OF STRATEGY

Games of strategy are defined as those where "each participant is striving for his greatest advantage in situations where the outcome depends not only on his actions alone, nor solely on those of nature, but also on those of other participants whose interests are sometimes opposed, sometimes parallel to his own."

-Oskar Morgenstern in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences

By using the matrix of values given below in Figure 1 and running a series of moves, one can demonstrate the various factors contributing to decisions of a strategic nature. The matrix is arranged in such a way that each player must exhibit considerable trust in the other player in order to arrive at the most beneficial long-range solution, i.e., both players receiving 3 points on every move.

The exercise involves two students sitting at the front of the room facing the blackboard. On the blackboard, the matrix of values is in view. A move consists of each of the two players, designated Player I and Player II, indicating whether he chooses Red or Black. There is no communication between the players, and they are asked at the same time to hold up either a Red or Black card.

The teacher then records the results move on another portion of the board, using a scoring grid similar to the one given in Figure 2. The scoring in the matrix of values is as follows. The first figure in each box is the score for Player I, and the second figure is the score for Player II. For example, if Player I chooses Black and Player II chooses Red, the Player I receives zero points and Player II receives 5 points. These points are recorded as "move 1." The object is to obtain the highest possible number of points and to outscore your opponent.

After running a series of moves (usually 8-10 moves), there should be a debriefing session with the students and the teacher attempting to analyze what was happening. The players can be asked to explain their motives and their strategy for various choices they made.

FIGURE 1

| | | | |
|----------|-------|-----------|-----|
| | | PLAYER II | |
| | | Black | Red |
| PLAYER I | Black | 3,3 | 0,5 |
| | Red | 5,0 | 1,1 |

FIGURE 2

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|
| | | Move Number | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| Player I | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Player II | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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