DOCUMENT RESUME

ABSTRACT
            Planning, both as an academic field and as a
profession, is in a dilemma involving the adoption of two
contradictory public philosophies. The more established philosophy
orients itself to the efficiency of the whole system, while the
second orients to particular groups and claims that adequate
participation in the system is denied these groups as well as those
for whom planners play an advocate role. This paper argues that the
efficiency of the whole system and the needs of disadvantaged groups
must be furthered. Two kinds of knowledge can contribute to solving
the dilemma: (1) concepts and measurements of the attribute and
benefit distribution through the system and across groups and
localities; and (2) theories capturing the dynamics of redistributive
processes, linking the fortunes of groups to characteristics of the
whole system. (Author/MLF)

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DISTRIBUTIONS AND REDISTRIBUTIVE PROCESSES: TWO FOCI FOR PLANNING EDUCATION AND PRACTICE

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DISTRIBUTIONS AND REDISTRIBUTIVE PROCESSES: TWO FOCI FOR
PLANNING EDUCATION AND PRACTICE

This paper is about the directions planning education might take in the
next ten years. From our thoughts about education we also describe some im-
plications for the effects of the profession on American society. Our
position is that planning--as an academic field and as a profession--is in a
dilemma, the resolution of which will require particular kinds of exchanges
with the more traditional social sciences.

In brief summary, the dilemma involves the adoption by different parts of
the profession of two contradictory, overly-simple, and in the long run, un-
tenable, public philosophies, each with attendant academic and research
traditions. One of these, the more established one, is an orientation to the
efficiency of the whole system which carries with it an assumption of a uni-
tary public interest stated by a consensus arrived at in the political system.
The second, rapidly coming to prominence, is an orientation to particular
groups, sub-systems, for which it is claimed adequate participation in the
system is denied and for whom planners play an advocate role. Our argument is
that both the efficiency of the whole system and the needs of disadvantaged
groups must be furthered, that neither of the two positions contributes ade-
quately to both, and that the way out of the dilemma is to specify the types
of knowledge that can contribute to solving and articulating the two problems
simultaneously. If this can be done, the result will be to create roles for
planners which bridge the present gap between those advocating system effi-
ciency, on the one hand, and the interests of particular groups, on the
other. We think the kinds of knowledge we should focus on are two: concepts
and measurement of the distribution of various kinds of attributes and
benefits through the system and across different groups and localities; and
theories capturing the dynamics of redistributive processes, linking the
fortunes of groups--subsystems--to characteristics of the whole system. If
planners can develop and use these kinds of knowledge, then they can take on
roles at both the system and subsystem level which reinforce one another and
contribute to common theory and information resources despite conflicts on
particular issues.

I.   Rationalism and System Efficiency

One of the moving forces of modern industrial society has been the rapid
development of technical ways of solving problems. This technology is now
established in the social system in large-scale organizations--to some extent,
in municipal bureaucracies. It is relevant to this, in fact, that one of the
important technical expressions of the municipal reform movements in the first
half of the twentieth century was the development of city planning, with at
least the rudiments of rational techniques. More recently, techniques of

decision-making and information processing have emerged as a manifestation of
the still underlying technical theme./1 Planning schools have participated in
the development of these new techniques, and have applied analytical efficien-
cy concepts to the fields of urban planning and regional development/2

   These innovations in ways of thinking have notably improved upon the tra-
ditional concepts embodied in the profession. We have broadened our concerns
far beyond physical problems in city planning. We have moved from concentra-
tion on a plan, a document that specifies end states, to concentration on the
process of changing states./3 There is still conflict over these issues both
in and out of the schools, but--with regard to technique--the dominance of
the more sophisticated view seems certain./4

   In a more fundamental sense, though, the new decision theorists and the
traditional planners have a good deal in common. Basically, they both depend
on a belief in a consensus of values, a public interest. They assume not
only that there is a single set of rules to which everyone agrees, but
further that there is basic agreement about the goals of society, even about
the division of spoils. Planning agencies are directed to consider alterna-
tive actions, estimate likely outcomes, and evaluate these outcomes from
some public estimate of goodness. The system seems to break down when it is
required to take into account a set of values external to formal authority./5
It is hardly necessary to think beyond the kinds of opposition that neighbor-
hoods have on occasion put up against city-directed urban renewal programs.
Here, essentially, the same outcomes are being evaluated by two value
systems: that of the city-hall, and that of the neighborhood.

   We should note that use of this rationalistic process implies an essen-
tially conservative philosophy, for it precludes or at least ignores changes
in distribution of rewards or changes in the rules. Many critiques of
planning have really been leveled at this assumption of clear public
interest, with a necessity only for rationality to improve policy-making./6

II.   Advocacy Planning

   Along with the emergence of powerful managerial tools, American society
has witnessed the appearance or perpetuation of groups of people not benefit-
ting in any discerable way from the new techniques, stranded from the main
body of the country./7 As a result, in the area of urban development and in
other areas of social policy there has in many quarters developed the view
that rational decision processes as currently developed, and perhaps social
science generally, are not part of the answer. The problem of improving
public decision processes is conceived not as one requiring narrow rational-
ity, but conscious identification of special, neglected interests. This
critique of the rationalistic approach has been made by proponents of
advocacy planning, social planning, and field work. The most widely adver-
tised aspects of this approach are its anti-research bias and its great

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problem orientation./8 It also results in conflict: It inevitably leads to
reaction from planners of the previous viewpoint./9

    Like the traditional planners, those who hold the advocacy position pre-
sume to know what the problems are, and to a great extent what the solutions
are: again, the problem is mainly implementation. In fact, there is consid-
erable convergence on methods and techniques: a good deal of physical
planning, much use of federal programs, etc. But, of course, the two planners
are often trying to implement different things. Unfortunately, there is
little theoretical guidance available for those who would espouse the advocacy
position, despite encouragement of their efforts as a practical course.

III. New Emphases for Planning Education

    Our view is that neither of the two positions just described will lead us
much further. Further development of rationalism from the "efficiency" per-
spective is truly a continuing process in our society, but the main problem
for us will be to understand it and its distributive effects, not to form its
leading edge in the most modern sectors of society./9 On the other hand,
simple advocacy of the interests of sub-groups--which amounts to a policy of
redistribution considered apart from system efficiency--cannot lead very far
either. The stark contrasts in the two positions, while cathartic, mask any
viable routes to power for those groups the advocate planners would represent.

    In the meantime, we have managed to contain--however unstably--these two
traditions within the profession and in our professional schools. As long as
this remains the case it is a worthwhile hope that new types of exchanges
with social science will occur with the potential to re-invigorate planning
education and give a sense of direction to the profession. We will try in
what follows to identify some possibilities.

Distributions

    One of the fundamental problems that must be faced directly is the study
of the distribution of things: of people, of economic opportunity, of in-
vestments, of well-being. These are the issues being contended by advocate
planners working for disadvantaged parts of the system, yet neither they nor
partisans of the "establishment" make systematic use of concepts, measurement
techniques, or data which might contribute to resolution of the issues.

    One area of planning, however, has contributed to some extent. Urban
and Regional Spatial Theory, an integral element of most planning training,
has at times probed deeply into the more economic aspects of distributions.
/10 Developments in urban economics, geography, regional science, human
ecology, and other fields concerned with the location and movement of
people and their activities, besides being centrally important in urban and
regional planning, seem in their treatment of distributions to complement and

provide context for the shifts we have seen from "efficiency" to "advocacy".

However, most urban and regional theory has shied clear of controversial
distributional questions, just as most of it has ignored the difficulty of
redistributive implementation. Most of this theory is equilibrium-biased,
assuming relatively uniform distributions of political power, economic
resources, and information, so that minor disturbances are righted auto-
matically. It is normally assumed by the theory, for example, that
investors will move into low-wage areas, causing wages to rise, and that
migration will similarly tend to equalize and stabilze wage levels, returns
on investment, and general development patterns. Of course, we know from
more careful observation that such adjustments do not always happen. Big,
high-wage cities often seem to regenerate growth while small ones decline./11
Neighborhoods are locked into relative social levels, and when they shift it
is often not simply a small adjustment to a new equilibrium, as the human
ecologists would claim, but also a dramatic shift in population and style.
The most satisfactory static explanation of these rigidities and shifts seems
to be that power, resources and information are in fact not uniformly spread
among participants, but are skewed and concentrated in a number of ways:
some groups have the capability of compounding their advantages, while others
are unable to resist erosion of the few they have.

Nevertheless, there has been some useful work in urban and regional
theory. The fact that many policy decisions are made on the basis of measures
of relative regional welfare has forced analysts in this field to work simul-
taneously with aggregative, national indices of welfare and sub-national
distributive measures./ 12 A good deal of work has attempted to measure local
economic impact of public investments, such as highways. There are a number
of abstract growth models that show shifts from region to region and sector
to sector./13 Also, there has been extensive and deep concern among scholars
in this field with problems of stranded groups, such as the poor of Appalachia
or Nova Scotia, the blacks of urban ghettos, or the poor of working class
neighborhoods./14 Because locational characteristics are fundamental to the
identification and understanding of some of the problems facing these stranded
people, city and regional planners have struggled with their problems. Such
concerns have led to the development of accounting techniques for sub-
national areas, which have illuminated previously unidentified problems and
isolated important influences. Descriptive statistics, primarily from the
census but also from other sources, have been widely used to indicate relative
levels of income in neighborhoods and in small town and rural areas, in order
to measure the effect of public programs on their inhabitants./15

Also, new concern with growth and development internal to small social
systems has appeared in urban and regional studies. Controversy over the
mechanisms of regional development has spawned research into the role of in-
stitutional factors in development, and has challenged traditional development
theories./16 For example, there have been interesting speculations about

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capacities of different cities to produce and accept entrepreneurs,/17 others
about dynamic movement of ethnic groups into controlling positions in urban
industrial sectors./18 Finally, where urban and regional theory has cautious-
ly moved into social planning, particularly while looking at health systems,
deep examinations of efficiency questions have forced re-examination of dis-
tributional questions. For example, measures of the efficiency of ambulance
service must contend with various viewpoints when defining outputs: response
time to different neighborhoods, costs to different clientele, various kinds
of services, assignments of costs to levels of injury and sickness./19

     With all this, distribution and its measurement remains a secondary con-
cern in spatial theory. A majority of theorists are concerned with efficiency
and accept the ideology of the unitary public interest. Only a minority share
the concerns we have mentioned above. The point is that there is much to be
exploited in the field, and much more than at present should be done.

Redistributive Processes

     A further area needing exploitation is the study of the processes by
which changes in distribution occur. If there has been insufficient emphasis
on the distributive aspects of urban systems in urban theory, the avoidance of
the process of redistribution is largely an abyss, a subject tabooed for public
discussion in most circles. Aside from the common sense observation that all
interest groups tend to struggle for a share of the benefits of public policy,
which has had a good deal of attention from pluralist political theorists,
little notion of the fundamental processes of redistribution percolates to
political decision-makers or planners. They know that urban renewal, neigh-
borhood parks, and zoning laws benefit the poor less than they are supposed
to, but they have little in the way of a theory that would tell them why this
is, or how they could improve the situation in the future.

     Planning researchers can approach this problem, it seems to us, from two
directions, for both of which suggestions have been advanced in the social
science literature. First, they can undertake empirical studies of particular
kinds of public policies to determine their distributive effects. From such a
descriptive approach, one might expect to gain insights into the causes of
changes in distributions, if one were looking for them. Alan Altshuler
recently suggested such a tack: policies should be analyzed for their
potential "trickle-down" of benefits to the poor or various groups./20 He
argued that analysts tend either to assume that policies aimed at system
efficiency have pervasive benefits (the efficiency approach); or they assume
trickle-down is counter-productive for the poor and focus on direct programs.
Nevertheless, he argues, it stands to reason that some system-oriented
policies have more trickle-down than others, and it will be advantageous to
know what these are. Improvements in air terminals as well as improvements
in metropolitan highways may both be elite inspired projects; but the side-
benefits to the poor of the latter are apt to be much more direct. Janet

Reiner's analysis of the impact of public policies on various client popula-
tions is in a similar vein./21 If there is a main stream tradition in
"social planning" it is perhaps in essentially similar analyses of the
impacts of particular programs and projects on particular disadvantaged
populations. Often, the impacts described are for particular groups and the
redistributive impacts over the whole system are not adequately accounted
for, but there is something of a beginning that can be improved upon here,
nevertheless.

In a somewhat different vein from these empirically grounded approaches
to understanding redistributive processes, there are theoretical schemes
which may prove fruitful if tested in situations of interest to planners.
One such scheme which we have had particular interest in predicts the
emergence to prominence of particular groups on the basis of the development
of group solidarity and characteristics of the larger system and the groups'
standing in it./22 The solidarity dimension points up one element usually
missing in efficiency approaches. Those schemes aimed at the whole system
are usually beset with the necessity to assume that all segments of society
can somehow partake of general growth. For the disadvantaged, this has
implied either a filtering down and adoption of benefits meant for general
consumption (for example, improved learning technology developed in middle-
class schools); or upward mobility opportunities which could be seized by
particular members of disadvantaged groups. Left out of the formula has
been any concept of the social support necessary for such adoption or
mobility--as, for example, is often supplied by the parents of high-achieving
school children. Solidarity provides this and even more. In addition to
indicating how the disadvantaged might "fit into the system", it suggests that
they might develop the force to actually modify the way the system is con-
structed or develops.

The second factor, characteristics of the larger system and the sub-system's
links to it, represents a conceptual bridge between the usual concerns of the
planner with system efficiency, and the concerns of advocate planner with a
particular subsystem. One intriguing aspect of this formulation suggests that
external aid--which might include flows of funds, externally supported change
agents, or the coopting of leaders in higher level politics--can be disrup-
tive to group solidarity, rather than a positive factor in group development.
The details of this theoretical approach are impractical to relate here, but
two implications for our dilemma can be stated. First, the nature of the
model both supports and in some senses contradicts parts of the advocacy
approach. For example, although external activists might supply some re-
sources useful for a neighborhood's successful participation in a Model
Cities program, they might at the same time break down internal organization
by providing too much linkage to city hall, coopting leaders and encouraging
them to compromise when more might be gained by conflict. Actually, our ex-
perience is ambiguous on this issue, but our main conclusion is that any
theory which links the activities of those in central positions in the larger

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system (e.g. how to distribute patronage and other discretionary rewards, when to intervene in subsystems, how strictly to stick to rules) to those in control of subsystems (e.g. whether to compromise, or fight on an issue; whether to spend time on internal activities or, instead, on contacts with potential allies or sources of funds) has the potential to link the effi-ciency and the advocacy subcultures now existing in the planning profession. Theoretical links between system and subsystem activities and attitudes seem, in fact, to be one of the main needs we have as a profession and field of study. Without them, it is all but impossible to make the transition to a real subsystem concern (e.g. useful activity in support of the poor, blacks, etc.). For example, repeatedly successful "agents" of social change are often successful because they are able to recognize conditions under which the component social system (neighborhood) is ready to pop, when some exter-nal resources may help, and when the larger system can be attacked successfully.

IV. Will Planning Change?

What we have been describing are, of course, only possibilities for a union of two planning subcultures through an infusion of ideas now developing in social science. What governs whether this will occur? Do the concepts and theoretical schemes mentioned above represent a trend in social science; if so, can planners effectively link up to them? Or can planners themselves have an impact on the kinds of ideas that develop?

Actually, our impression is that the normal course of social science dis-ciplines is quite conservative, and that ideas of the sort we have described have developed in spite of, rather than because of, the dominant biases in fields like economics, sociology and psychology. Regional and urban studies have never been prominent in these fields, and have been facilitated as much as anything by the departments of planning, regional science, and other inter-disciplinary fields. This generalization is perhaps particularly true should we extend our interests to social change, where the domain of sociology departments becomes a factor. Policy analysis of social change propositions (as distinct from purely descriptive and theoretical perspectives) is probably contrary to the main thrust of a social science, which is to remain unfettered by considerations of policy.

Both the supply of social theory and its consumption for policy purposes are more apt to be determined by developments in planning and other policy-oriented, interdisciplinary fields, than in the traditional social science departments./23 There is some reason to be particularly optimistic about planning departments in this context because of the juxtaposition of the efficiency and redistributive subcultures noted above.

In addition, the external environments of planning departments may impose demands for redistributive knowledge. To be sure, some have claimed the

contrary: the main response, they say, has been a technocratic elaboration
of methodology in response to some of the most bureaucratic institutions of
the society, perhaps epitomized by the program budgeting techniques first
introduced in the Department of Defense and later spread throughout much of
the federal establishment and to state and municipal bureaucracies./24 On
the other hand, we would point to the possibility that with the introduction
of great numbers of highly educated and relatively secure technical personnel,
bureaucracies may loosen their constraints on change and mobility./25
Without necessarily intending to, the educational processes supplying tech-
nically trained people are also enhancing entrepreneurial capacity in the
lower and middle reaches of the bureaucracies. Growing tendencies of public
employees to strike, and the near rebellions in the federal domestic estab-
lishment in the more recent stages of the Vietnam War are at least partly
explained by this interpretation. What has happened is that there are
larger numbers of people in the bureaucracies with more ideas of how to
respond to an ever increasing and more articulate set of clienteles.
Despite the official ideologies set at the top, these new program ideas of
these people have at least the potential of developing and creating a demand
for the redistributive concerns we have mentioned.

V.   Possible Impacts of Planning on the Society

The developments in the types of knowledge focussed on, should they occur
in planning schools, can have interesting implications for the profession and
the society. One is to move the profession into areas that have previously
been rigidly restricted: purposive social change of the whole system, a much
more delicate subject than advocacy for particular groups. With this, a
second implication: the great danger of social predictive power being used
on behalf of some parts of the system (e.g. elites) against others. Both or
either of these developments, if perceived, are enough to block any conceptual
extension of planning beyond the point it is now at, but we will pursue our
thoughts further in this direction, nonetheless.

As long as planners confine themselves to a concern with system efficiency
or with the needs of particular groups, their professional roles will be de-
finable: they can fall back on special bodies of knowledge (--land use
relationships, cost-benefit and other forms of analysis--) and their special
advocacy functions for their clienteles. What they can do and cannot do will
be fairly clear, to themselves at least. If, however, planners begin to
acquire the new knowledge in distributive measurement and redistributive
social processes we projected above, they will be in a position to suggest
changes in the way the system is constructed, including the relative power
of different parts of the system. This would constitute a capacity to be
responsive to different groups contending for participation and power in the
system; to communicate conceptually even with other planners, working as
advocates in the employ of the latter groups. One can imagine some degree of
circulation in employment between planners working on these problems at the

system level, and, intermittently, immersed in the employ of particular groups.
Such alternate employment in phases now occurs in many cities. We do not
suggest that the relations between system level and advocate planners would
result in compromise and cooperation very often. Conflict, hard bargaining
and confrontation would occur; it might develop into a more regular procedure,
in fact. But with the existence of planners equipped with data and a concept-
ual scheme which includes information on distribution, group solidarity, and
system linkages and other characteristics conducive to distributional changes,
it will both be easier for system level elites to respond to demands, and for
groups struggling for power to formulate them in ways that have a chance of
success.

Unfortunately, the notion of such a new type of _system_ level role for
planners may seem not to have a chance of being tried. While it has always
been legitimate to propose things for the greater efficiency of the system,
or for the interests of particular groups, attempts to recast the priorities
of the system are usually viewed as the exclusive province of the political
process and as something that happens as a result of a lot of smaller steps
boiled together in the lawmaking process, not something to be articulated at
one time by professionals. On the other hand, this probably varies with the
times, and in times of apparent crisis, lawmakers and others are apt to look
for ideas from any quarter, including planners./26   In
fact, our political norms and our professional restraint may be out of date
even now. We may have, in the near future, four major political parties
rather than two, each needing to formulate a picture of the whole system for
each city. In addition, higher levels of government as well as privately
based interest groups are increasingly interested in whole systems. This
may portend a demand for planners at state and regional levels with similar
interests to those working as advocates of non-governmental groups in cities.

A second objection that may be raised to the notion of planners concern-
ing themselves with redistribution is that techniques and measurement with
the ability to predict--say--group solidarity movements are more apt to fall
into the hands of elites than anyone else, and be turned as an instrument
against the real interests of such movements. There are two answers to this
which come to mind. One is that despite the short run concentration of new
techniques in the hands of a few, the inherent tendencies of scientific and
intellectual advances--in contrast to more primitive power resources--is for
relatively wide distribution. At the very least, one can look for elite
competition being increased by such advances.

Another argument, however, is more difficult. Despite such long run
--and limited--equalization, will there not remain a large number of persons,
left behind in any general advance in knowledge and whose main characteristic
is lack of access to any but the most primitive power resources: strikes,
hijacking, riots? What good will social prediction do them? The best answer
we have is this: the modern sectors will persist, nevertheless, and any

groups seeking power must recognize this. This being so, the only routes to power remaining open will entail alliances with groups who <u>do</u> have the capacity to understand and make political capital out of social prediction techniques. That such alliances are possible is not purely a matter of faith. Chavez and the grape strikers and the Black Panthers are but two groups who have found real or potential allies among the knowledge-oriented middle class or its radical offshoots. We expect more of this kind of productive activity in the future.

FOOTNOTES

1. Paul Goodman (1969) gives a frightening example of the use of statistical decision making in the Vietnam War.

2. See John Dyckman (1963) and Thomas Reiner (1964).

3. For different emphases see Francis Fox Piven (1970), T. J. Kent (1964) and Mel Weber (1963).

4. Francis Fox Piven (1970).

5. Thus, an emphasis on disruptive techniques for successful planning, Ibid.

6. In this same vein Wassily Leontief (1968) criticizes national policies maximizing economic growth.

7. This has been amply illustrated in well known works, such as those by Michael Harrington.

8. Chester Hartman, (July, 1970).

9. Wassily Leontief (1968), again has convergent views.

10. Much of this work is published under the auspices of the Regional Science Association.

11. For example, John Kain and Joseph Persky (1969) ignore critical issues of implementation in their discussion of alternatives to ghetto development. Thomas Vietorisz, in a United Nations document, cogently argues for recognition of positive--polarizing--feedback mechanisms that increase inequality.

12. See Koichi Mera (1968) and Thomas Reiner (1964).

13. See Thomas Vietorisz (1967), Koichi Mera (1968, 1970) and William Baumol (1967)

14. See Thomas Vietorisz and Bennett Harrison (1970), Stanislaw Czamanski (1969) and Hollis Chenery (1962).

15. See Barclay G. Jones and William W. Goldsmith (1968) and Emil Malizia (1969).

16. See Barclay G. Jones, et al. (1967).

17. Benjamin Chinitz (1961) has some intriguing ideas here.

18. See Stephen Rattien (1970).

19. Arnold Nadler (1970) suggested a number of these considerations.

20. Alan Altshuler (1969).

21. The most widely known statement is contained in J. Reiner, E. Reimer and
     T. A. Reiner (1963).

22. The underlying theoretical scheme is outlined in Young (1970). An example of
     a policy application is contained in Clavel, Capener and Jones (1969).

23. Campbell (1969) makes a persuasive argument for the potential strength of
     interdisciplinary research and teaching efforts.

24. Piven (1970) argues that recent changes in various professional curricula have
     been conditioned more by changes in demands for personnel made by institutions
     in their external environments than by internal decisions. See also Webber
     (1963).

25. Considerable support for this view is provided, at least implicitly, by
     Victor Thompson (1961).

26. Relevant to this, see the arguments made by Gans (1970) on the desirability of
     "policy catalogues", lists of goals for society drawn from different political
     perspectives.

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