Proposed as a chapter for a book, this document has attempted to survey the various points at which cognitive congruity theories impinge upon problems of ethnocentrism and intergroup relations. Some dozen such predictions have been presented, and have been italicized for scanning in the text. One hypothesis, that the more similar the outgroup the more it is liked, has been given extensive review including new, albeit secondary, data analysis. Other hypotheses receiving more than brief mention deal with the balance among regional sets of intergroup valences, the effects of forced compliance in the colonial and post colonial organization of territories upon group identification, and the resolution of incongruities in group esteem produced by contact with modern economic systems. (Author)
Ethocentrism and Intergroup Relations

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The research or work reported herein was performed pursuant to a contract with the Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare through the Chicago Early Education Research Center, a component of the National Laboratory on Early Childhood Education, contract OEC-3-7-070706-3118.

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ETHNOCENTRISM AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS

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Theories of cognitive and affective balance, of dissonance, of belief-system congruity, inevitably make predictions concerning intergroup attitudes. Some of these are surveyed here. The setting envisaged for the predictions comes from our cross-cultural study of ethnocentrism, in which cooperating anthropologists ascertain the traditional relationships and attitudes of a given group (here called the "ingroup") toward fifteen or so neighboring and more remote outgroups. In this setting, three general kinds of predictions are asked of each theory examined (Campbell & LeVine, in preparation):

1. What kinds of ingroups will be most ethnocentric, most hostile to their neighbors, etc.?  
2. For any given ingroup, toward which outgroups will the greatest ethnocentric hostility be directed?  
3. What will be the content of stereotypes about outgroups? For balance and congruity theory, it is the second type of question which is most relevant, and which will be treated in the first two sections that follow.

Prepared during the authors' joint stay at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Summer, 1966. The Cross-Cultural Study of Ethnocentrism is supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to Northwestern University. This paper will also appear as a chapter on "Cognitive Congruity Theories" in D. T. Campbell and R. A. LeVine, Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Relations: Propositions and Illustrations. New York: Wiley, in preparation. The authors are indebted to Marilynn Bolt Brewer for several of the points presented.
**Similarity and the Liking of Outgroups**

Basic to balance theories (e.g., Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1959, 1961; Harary, Norman and Cartwright, 1965; Davis, 1963) is the triad, \( \text{A} \rightarrow \text{B} \) where \( \text{A} \) and \( \text{B} \) are two actors, valuers, believers (tribes in our setting, persons in Newcomb's analysis of friendship and values, which we parallel at the group level), and where \( X \) is some object, value, item of belief, etc., toward which \( \text{A} \) and \( \text{B} \) have evaluative attitudes or identifications. \( X \) can be another tribe (person, actor) in which case its reciprocal valuings can be considered, and this is taken up in the subsequent section on Balanced Relations. In the present section, \( X \) is to be regarded as an item of culture, as a custom, belief, or artifact. Liking between \( \text{A} \) and \( \text{B} \) occurs when their valuing of \( X \) is similar, i.e., when both are positive toward it, or when both are negative toward it. Disliking accompanies dissimilar attitudes toward \( X \). All of such instances of liking and disliking are balanced. In diagram form, they are as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
A + B & A + B & A - B & A - B \\
+ + & - - & + - & - + \\
X & X & X & X
\end{array}
\]

Other possible relations are imbalanced, unlikely, and unstable:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
A + B & A + B & A - B & A - B \\
- + & + - & + + & - - \\
X & X & X & X
\end{array}
\]
In the pure balance form of the model, there is no casual asymmetry, the attitude of \( A \) toward \( B \) being as likely to "cause" his attitude toward \( X \) as his attitude toward \( X \) to cause his attitude toward \( B \). Attention here focuses on the latter type however. Considering the many \( X \)'s about which \( A \) and \( B \) both have attitudes, we can infer net degrees of liking as a product of likings induced by the many covalued \( X \)'s. The resulting prediction is that, from the point of view of any ingroup, the more similar an outgroup is in customs, values, beliefs, and general culture, the more liked it will be. Social distance and friendly commerce may be included among symptoms of liking.

Rokeah (1960, pp. 293-331) has proposed this for intergroup relations, and has tested it for intergroup attitudes among religious bodies in the United States. He finds a strong relationship between dissimilarity and rejection. He further finds that shifts of church membership, choice of denomination of college, and frequency of interfaith marriages are directly related to similarity. In subsequent research he has sustained the claim that even in Negro-White relationships in the United States, it is belief-disparity rather than skin color or biological race that is the target of the hostility (e.g., Rokeach & Mezei, 1966; Stein, Hardyck & Smith, 1965). In a study of the attitudes of Dutch children, Jaspers, van de Geer, Tajfel, and Johnson (1965) found the perceived similarity of another nation to The Netherlands to be strongly related to liking for that country. While perceived similarity rather than more independently assessed similarity was at issue, the same balance principle is involved.
In our own research arena, intertribal attitudes, strong and confirmation is also already present. Mitchell (1956) studied social distance among workers from 20 tribes in Zambia. Of several principles emerging, cultural similarity (matrilineal vs. patrilineal organization) was the strongest factor. Gordon Wilson (1961) has surveyed the attitudes of twelve tribal areas of Kenya toward each other, presenting data making possible a secondary analysis on this problem. We have selected three pairs of questions for this purpose, selected because presented in both positive and negative form: "Which of the above tribal groups do you feel will present the greatest [least] problem to internal security after independence?" "Which of the above tribal groups do you feel are the most friendly [unfriendly] people?" "If you were forced to leave your own tribal group for some reason, among which of the above tribal groups would you most [least] like to live, other than your own?"

In each area there were interviewed one hundred persons, 93% male, predominantly urban and small town, only 15% with no education, only 7% self-employed in agriculture. As the main pooled index of attitude, the average percent giving the favorable response (Wilson, 1961, Tables 8B, 9A, 10A) less the average percent giving the unfavorable response (Tables 8A, 9B, 10B) has been used. These values are presented in Table 1.

Groups have been classified in three degrees of similarity. Thus for the Kikuyu, the Meru and Embu were judged similar, all other Bantu groups (Abaluhya, Coast, Kamba, Kisii, Taita) as intermediate, and the Luo, Masai, Kalenjin, and Somali as dissimilar. For the Luo and Somali, all other groups
were classified as dissimilar, and they thus do not contribute as judges to this analysis. The Masai and Kalenjin were judged of intermediate similarity to each other, with no similar groups present for either. Among the other Bantu groups there were two similarity pairs: Coast and Taita, and Kisii and Abaluhya. From the viewpoint of the Kamba, the Meru, Embu, and Kikuyu were judged similar, other Bantu groups intermediate, and the non-Bantu groups dissimilar. Linguistic grounds and belief in common origin were primary bases of classification, other cultural factors supporting these.

Figure 1 portrays the outcome, with results that dramatically support the principal of liking and similarity. The "all outgroups" line is an average of averages. For each ingroup, the average percent of mentions for outgroups of each degree of similarity has been computed. These three values have then been averaged for the eight ingroups having outgroups of all three levels of similarity. The result is a strikingly consistent effect of similarity. Of the 24 opportunities for reversal (8 of $S<I$, 8 of $S<D$, 8 of $I<D$) only one occurs, (an $I<D$). There are two other comparisons available, $I>D$ for Masai and Kalenjin, and both of these are confirmatory.

Another prime interest in the analysis was the effect of proximity. While degree of proximity produces no clear-cut trends when similarity is controlled, there is a special interest in adjacent outgroups, for which interaction should have made attitudes more stable. For five ingroups, all three levels of similarity were available in the adjacent outgroups, and Figure 1 presents these averages too, again confirming the principle.
There are a number of weaknesses in this analysis which could obscure relationships or create spurious ones. Most conspicuous is the great variability in number of mentions received by various outgroups, due to fame, visibility, or generally shared beliefs. Thus on the first question the number of mentions received from the sum of all other tribes varies from zero to 454 (for the Kikuyu). In an effort to correct this, an analysis was done in terms of Votes Received, rather than votes given, so that in any given direct comparison, all attitudes were being expressed about the same outgroup.

This analysis used columns from Table 1 whereas the New Favorability analysis used rows.

Figure 1. Average net favorability to outgroups as a function of cultural similarity (secondary analysis of data from Wilson, 1961).
Table 1

Net Favorability in Wilson's 1961 Survey of Intertribal Attitudes in Kenya

(Adjacency is indicated by *, one degree removal by +.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting By</th>
<th>Kikuyu</th>
<th>Kamba</th>
<th>Meru</th>
<th>Nandi</th>
<th>Luo</th>
<th>Kisii</th>
<th>Abaluhya</th>
<th>Kalenjin</th>
<th>Masai</th>
<th>Taita</th>
<th>Coast</th>
<th>Somali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>-2*</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-25*</td>
<td>-27*</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-13*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>32*</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-42*</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-18*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>28*</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-30*</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-32*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embu</td>
<td>34*</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>21*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-22*</td>
<td>28*</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-36*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-16*</td>
<td>-47*</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-6*</td>
<td>28*</td>
<td>-6*</td>
<td>-20*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abaluhya</td>
<td>-69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-13*</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>-1*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>-62*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-14*</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>39*</td>
<td>-2*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masai</td>
<td>-18*</td>
<td>-3*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-8*</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>-7*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taita</td>
<td>-37*</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>-1*</td>
<td>-1*</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-7*</td>
<td>32*</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>-1*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>-12*</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-10*</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>21*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Received Votes analysis confirms, although with less clarity, the similarity-liking correlation, as shown in Table 2, which also reports on the number of instances of inequalities in a given direction (including instances from ingroups having incomplete sets of outgroups). For adjacent outgroups, both analyses support a direct relationship. For the comparison between Intermediate and Dissimilar, the All Groups analysis by Received Votes finds no difference, actually a slight reverse trend. For this analysis

| Table 2 |

**Similarity and Favorable Attitudes: Three Indices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Dissimilar</th>
<th>Inequalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S&gt;1</td>
<td>S&gt;D</td>
<td>I&gt;D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Favorable:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>8/8 8/8 9/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Favorable: Adj.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>5/5 6/6 6/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received Votes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8/8 8/8 7/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received Votes: Adj.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>4/5 6/6 7/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

there is a trend toward an interaction between adjacency and similarity: remote groups are better liked if they are dissimilar. Probably this is a product of the then current political alliances, as discussed below, which
produced favorable images of the Luo and Kalenjin (dissimilar to most judges) on the part of remote groups which would not otherwise have known of them at all.

Another potential weakness, although not one which we believe invalidates the clear-cut finding, is the recurrence of the same target group in the same location for a number of ingroups. Thus in the adjacent outgroups analyses, for those five ingroups having all three levels of similarity among adjacents, the Dissimilar outgroup is always the Masai, due to the Masai's great geographical dispersion. The Masai, moreover, are generally disliked. This may be due to the fact that they are so strikingly dissimilar, in which case no artifact is involved. But it might be for an irrelevant reason, here multiply represented. Certainly for statistical purposes there is a great reduction in effective degrees of freedom through this repetition. Due to the ambiguity on such points, we have not attempted the probability statements to which the tallies of inequalities point.

As to the political party alliances current at that time, these, of course, may be regarded as products of attitudes, but it is also clear to any Kenya expert looking at Table 1 that attitudes have been caused by them too. At this time, the KANU party was headed by the Kikuyu-Luo alliance, unpredictable on similarity grounds, but showing up in favorable attitudes. The competing KADU alliance was formed by smaller tribes out of fear of domination by the two largest, and it too cut across similarity lines, allyng, in its leadership, the Bantu Abaluhya and Coast with the Nilohamitic Kalenjiin
and Masai. Of the high similarity relations, only Kisii (belatedly KANU) and Abaluhya fall into separate camps. In general, the effect of political alliance works more against the similarity-liking hypothesis than for it, accounting for a bulk of the exceptions.

**Balanced Patterns of Intergroup Relations**

One use of balance theory, particularly as developed in the signed graph tradition (e.g., Harary, Norman, and Cartwright, 1965; Flament, 1963; Davis, 1963; in press) to predict patterns of interpoint relationships where the relationship can take the values of positive (e.g., liking) negative (e.g., disliking) and absent. While such theory is usually applied to persons as points, it can readily be applied to relationships among groups, as Harary (1961) has done in a model prediction of international attitudes in the Middle East. The presentation here will be essentially non-mathematical, and depends heavily upon Davis (1963).

The basic prediction is that regional patterns of intergroup relations will be "balanced." The concept of balance is in its mathematical statement a complex one, which we shall not give fully, but will rather illustrate. Here are some commonsense statements about triads:

- An ally of an ally will be an ally.
- An enemy of an ally will be an enemy.
- An ally of an enemy will be an enemy.
- An enemy of an enemy will be an ally.
To give further relevance to the problems this abstract algebra attempts to cover, we can quote from an amazing chapter on "Political Geometry" in Zimmer's survey of the philosophy of ancient India.

The principal Hindu formula for the arrangement of foreign alliances and coalitions is based on a pattern of concentric rings of natural enemies and allies. Each king is to regard his own realm as located at the center of a kind of target, surrounded by "rings" (mandalas) which represent, alternately, his natural enemies and his natural allies. The enemies are represented by the first surrounding ring; these are his immediate neighbors, all alert to pounce. The second ring then is that of his natural friends, i.e., the kings just to the rear of his neighbors, who threaten them in turn through the very fact of being neighbors. Then beyond is a ring of remoter danger, interesting primarily as supplying reinforcement to the enemies directly at hand. Furthermore, within each ring are subdivisions signifying mutual natural animosities; for since each kingdom has its own mandala, an exceedingly complicated set of stresses and cross-stresses must be understood to exist. Such a plan of mutual encirclement is to be cast, carefully weighed, and then used as a basis for action. It delineates and brings into manifestation a certain balance and tension of natural powers, as well as touching off periodic, terrific outbursts of widely spreading conflict. Taken for granted as a universal social principle is the propensity of neighbors to be unfriendly, jealous, and aggressive, each biding his hour of surprise and treacherous assault. (The science of the mandala, "the circle of states," is discussed in Kautiliya Arthasastra 7.) (Zimmer, 1951, pp. 114-115.)

In this, an assumption that the relations of immediate neighbors are hostile is combined with balance considerations. These do not combine readily, as the middle sentences indicate, and under usual circumstances, the alternative rings of enemies and allies will not be balanced.
If we take from the mandala theory an ingroup, one of its immediate neighbors, and the group on the far side of that neighbor, balance holds, for the enemy's enemy is an ally and the ally's enemy is an enemy. But this balance does not hold for an ingroup and two adjacent immediate outgroups. For these, if the mandala ring is to hold for each in turn, the two outgroups being adjacent to each other would be enemies, and an unbalanced all negative triad would result, for the enemy's enemy would be an enemy.

Figure 2. Balanced mandala of four-sided territories. Groups of type A are enemies of type B's, and allies of other A's.
The requirement for balance in a triangle (or any other cycle) is that the product of the signs be positive.

Thus \[ o + o \text{ and } o + o \]

\[ + + \text{ and } - - \]

\[ o \text{ and } o \]

are balanced, while \[ o - o \text{ and } o - o \]

\[ - - \text{ and } + + \]

\[ o \text{ and } o \]

are unbalanced.

For larger sets of points, the most usable statement of balance for our situation is that all triangles be balanced. (Other statements require a complete set of points, whereas for any regional survey of intergroup relations, unrecorded relations will extend on all edges.)

There is perhaps but one regular pattern providing both balance and mandala circles. This is one in which each ingroup has but four adjacent outgroups, contacts at the "corners" not counting as adjacency. Figure 2 provides such a diagram. While such a territorial pattern is unlikely, it may exist for street gangs organized around intersections, as in Figure 3.* For larger numbers of adjacent outgroups than four, balanced mandala circles seem to be unavailable.

* We are indebted to Robert Abelson for this point.
Figure 3. Balanced mandala of street gangs centered at intersections of city blocks. Type A gangs are enemies of type B gangs, and allies of other type A gangs.

Figure 4 illustrates the nearest we have been able to come with a balanced mandala-like ring pattern for six outgroups. In it, all A's are surrounded by hostile B's. The B's, twice as numerous, have as immediate neighbors half A's and half other B's (i.e., half friendly, half hostile). For the A's, their closest allies (other A's) lie beyond the immediate ring of B's and conform to the enemy's enemy rule. Half of those in this second ring are, however, enemy B's. The very uneven sizes and shapes of actual group boundaries make such ideal types of little practical value.

Balance theory in its simple algebra predicts that all positive fields (that is, all ally fields in which every group loves every other) should be
more likely than all negative fields (in which each group hates each other). The former are balanced, the latter are unbalanced. The prediction of all positive fields goes so against common observation that balance theorists have not paid much attention to it. All negative fields, in which each ingroup distrusts all foreigners, seem more likely, and even to be predicted in the standard presentations of ethnocentrism (e.g., Sumner, 1906). Heider in his original presentation hedged on this point, and trends in the modification of balance theory are to score such patterns as balanced (Davis, in press).

Given that there is a mixture of positive and negative valences between groups, the balance theory prediction is that the groups will fall into but two cliques, with friendly relations within each and hostile relations
between. This condition is illustrated in Figures 2, 3, and 4, and in the mandala circles concept, in which the odd-numbered concentric circles would be one clique, the even-numbered and the ingroup, another. Bipolar tendencies in world alliances provide anecdotal confirmation. At the same time, the rigidity of this prediction is something of an embarrassment to applied balance theory, and Davis (in press) is attempting to weaken the requirements so that several-clique outcomes can be incorporated.

In the work of Davis, and Abelson (1967) among others, statistics for the degree of approximation to balance for a set of points are being achieved. These have not been applied to the data of Table 1, but could be. For Abelson's suggestion that balance be tested by extraction of a single bipolar factor, degrees of liking, such as provided in Table 1, could be used, although row and column asymmetry should be first achieved.

If there were perfect balance, then one could order the tribes of Table 1 so that the members of each clique were listed adjacent to fellow clique members, and so that there would be two areas straddling the diagonals that were all positive, with the away-from-diagonal quadrants all negative. We have tried to arrange Table 1 in this way, and with attention also to party. The first six tribal groups belonged in 1961 to KANU (Kikuyu, Kamba, Meru, Embu, Luo, and Kisii) with the Kisii present ambivalently because of their felt closeness to the KADU Abaluhya. The KADU group are listed next, Abaluhya (late in joining), Kalenjin, Masai, Taita, and Coast. The uniformity of the pattern is reduced by the very general popularity of the Taita and the
very general unpopularity of the Masai and the Somali. The degree of balance is somewhat increased if the Kisii be moved to the KADU group. If this be done, and if the Somali's be assimilated to that group too, some 76% of the signs are in accord with balance (84/110, omitting zeros).

In the simplest balance theory, the valence between two points is + or -, a single value relating A to B and B to A. In fuller treatments (e.g., Harary, Norman and Cartwright, 1965) A's valuation of B is treated separately from B's valuation of A. Such is actually the case for Table 1, where the valence of each tribe for the other is recorded separately. In this situation, balance theory predicts that reciprocal attitudes will tend to agree, either both members of a pair like each other or they dislike each other. This prediction can be derived by assuming that each group likes itself. Thus there is a basic A to A bond, and when B dislikes A, balance is achieved by A disliking B, etc.*

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{A} \quad + \quad \text{A} \\
\text{B} \quad + \quad \text{B} \\
\end{array}
\]

When one examines Table 1 for this, eliminating pairs where either of the values is zero, 66% of the remaining 42 pairs are in agreement. Of the 23 pairs where both percentages are +5 or larger, 74% of the pairs agree.

From balance theory also come predictions, illustrated by Harary (1961) that wishes as to intergroup relations will show more balance than will

* We are indebted to Dr. Jorge Garcia-Bouza for this suggestion.
actual relations, and that perceptual distortions will be in the direction of
greater balance. One area of major differences among the various balance
models is the relative emphasis on intrapersonal, perceived balance or inter
personal, objective structural balance. Heider's theory is purely intrapersonal,
Cartwright and Harary's primarily interpersonal, and Newcomb's A-B-X
model is presented in both forms, a distinction being made between intra-
individual and collective "systems of orientation" (Newcomb, 1959; 1963).
Newcomb emphasizes the role of communication in mediating the two types of
balance. In the absence of communication, perceived similarity is likely to
be distorted to agree with initial attraction, but after a period of inter-
personal communication perceived similarity is more closely related to ob-
jective similarity, with attraction adjusted accordingly. Newcomb's extended
longitudinal study of interpersonal attraction (Newcomb, 1961) confirmed this
predicted development. The expected relationship between communication
and accuracy of perceived similarity could account for the more direct re-
lationship between similarity and liking among adjacent groups than among
non-adjacent groups in the previously reported data.

Future developments will no doubt free balance theory from the unit
valence assumption, substituting mathematics using degrees of positive and
negative valence, as Harary (1961) suggests. Further developments may also
provide differential rules for induced valences. Writing on the subject of
intergroup relations, MacCrone (1937, p. 253) suggests one: "Furthermore,
the existence of the outgroup as an object of hostility itself leads to an
increased intensity of identification between members of the ingroup, since a common object of hate is, in some respects, a stronger bond between individuals than a common object of love."

**Degrees of Ethnocentrism**

A basic class of predictions sought from social science theories in the ethnocentrism study asks which group is, or what kinds of groups are, most ethnocentric. Such predictions do not come as directly from balance theory as do those of the previous sections, but they are available. In addition, dissonance theory, so far not considered specifically, makes still other predictions.

Some such predictions come from the application of balance theory at the level of persons to clique formation (e.g., Davis, 1963; in press) and then translating "cliques" for our purposes as ingroups and outgroups. Given that all persons have some negative and some positive interpersonal valences, and treating a pool of persons including ingroup and outgroup members, the following prediction results: The more mutual liking there is within the ingroup, the more ethnocentric the group will be, defining ethnocentrism for this purpose as degree of hostile attitudes toward outgroups. The causation could be in any direction. Thus, the presence of threatening hostile outgroups, hated in parallel by all threatened ingroup members, induces positive interpersonal attitudes among ingroup members. In thus predicting more ingroup solidarity under greater outgroup threat, balance theory concurs in one of the most ubiquitous of social science predictions, one we have treated under

Working again on the group level outcomes of applying to persons principles of balance theory which we have already applied directly to the group level, a parallel prediction emerges: The more homogeneous the belief-systems of the ingroup members, the more homogeneously hostile toward outgroups will be these members. Internal agreement on belief systems represent parallel valuing of a large number of "objects" or "X's." These parallel valuing induce balancing positive interpersonal bonds. These positive intragroup bonds force all the hostilities or negative valencings by ingroup members (given that there are some) on to outgroup members.

Shifting to group-level application again, we can predict that in any local set of groups, the most dissimilar ingroup will show the most hostility toward outgroups. This is but an application to the "which ingroup" question of the similarity-and-liking principles of the first section above. In that presentation we spoke as though similarity was causal of liking, but balance theory allows balance to be achieved through adjustments in any direction. Sumner hypothesizes a reverse causal relationship, from hostility to cultural uniqueness: "Ethnocentrism leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is peculiar and which differentiates them from others. It therefore strengthens the folkways" (Sumner, 1906, p. 13). Leach (1954) has presented in detail a social system in which historically arbitrary linguistic differences are preserved for such purposes.
**Congruity Model**

Although it leads to similar conclusions about interpersonal perception, the congruity model of cognitive consistence (Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957) developed from a very different conceptual background than the other balance models. Osgood equates cognitive elements with the affective meaning of concepts, particularly on the evaluative dimension as measured by the semantic differential. The semantic differential provides a scale of the evaluative meaning of a concept running from +3 (extremely good) through 0 (neutral) to -3 (extremely bad), the direction of evaluation referring to the sign (positive or negative) of a scale position, and polarization to its distance from 0, regardless of sign. Unlike the structural balance models already discussed which define balance in terms of relations between cognitive elements, the congruity model deals with the direction of relation between two elements and the affective value of the elements themselves. The structural element of the theory is an assertion which relates two concepts, either associatively \((A + B)\) or dissociatively \((A - B)\).

Assertions may be linguistic \((A \text{ approves of } B; A \text{ is a friend of } B; A \text{ refuses to support } B)\), behavioral \((A \text{ is seen holding hands with } B)\), or inferred \((A \text{ likes } B \text{ which is related to } C; \text{ therefore, } A \text{ likes } C)\).

The basic assumption of the congruity model is that when two or more concepts occur near-simultaneously, only one cognitive reaction can be made to both or all of them. Thus, if \(A\) is positively associated with \(B\), the evaluative meaning of both \(A\) and \(B\) must be the same, in both direction and polarization.
If the evaluations of the two elements before association are unequal, the point of congruity (equal polarization) will be a compromise between the two original values. Evaluations of both elements will be modified, but the degree of modification of each will be in inverse proportion to its original polarization. The congruity formula predicts the point at which two associated elements will reach equality:

\[ c = \frac{|p_1| (p_1) + |p_2| (p_2)}{|p_1| + |p_2|} \]

where \( |p_i| \) is the absolute evaluative score of element \( i \) and \( (p_i) \) is the algebraic evaluative score of element \( i \).

Applying this formula, the association (+3) & (+1) is incongruous and will be resolved in the association (+2.5) & (2.5), where both elements are equally polarized. The point of congruity is a weighted average of the values of the component elements, where weights are determined by degree of polarization of the component values. The congruity formula is such that when a neutral element (evaluative score = 0) is associated with a polarized element (evaluative score ≠ 0), the point of congruity is equal to the value of the originally polarized element.

Although the formulation of the principle of congruity was based on intrapersonal cognitions, Osgood himself points out that "we can at least hypothesize that laws governing the thinking and behaving of individuals also govern the 'thinking' and 'behaving' of groups.... The analogue of a cognitive element for an individual is what we may call a cultural meaning (stereotype, public image, etc.) for a group" (Osgood, 1960, p. 363).
Extending the congruity principle to intergroup relations leads to the following prediction: the direction and polarization of evaluation of outgroup $X$ will be equal to the evaluation of all the groups with which $X$ is associated. This prediction holds whatever the nature of the associative bond between $X$ and each of the other groups. Thus, the recognition that $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ are military allies would require congruity of the evaluations of all three groups, but so would any other perception which brought them into a common cluster. The fact that it is perceived rather than objective association which determines congruity may provide an explanation of the apparent paradox in the mandala ring discussed earlier. If, with respect to the circle of adjacent outgroups, it is not the incongruous fact that enemy $X$ is an enemy of enemies $Y$ and $Z$ that is most relevant to the ingroup, but rather the fact that $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ are all enemies of the ingroup, which implies an associative bond among them, then the equal evaluation of $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ is consistent with the congruity principle.

The equality of direction and polarization of evaluation of any perceived cluster of outgroups (or of outgroups and ingroup) follows from the fact that congruity is predicted to hold no matter what the nature of the associative bond between cognitive elements. The theory makes no distinctions in relative strength or degree of association. However, the congruity principle holds only while two or more elements are relevant to each other. It is possible to make distinctions between sets of elements according to the relative probability that associations among them will be relevant at any point in time.
Thus, the fact that outgroup X is a military ally of outgroup Y may create a different probability of X being associated with Y than the fact that X and Y cooperate in an annual religious ceremony. With respect to any set of groups, some are more likely to be included in the same cluster more often than are others, depending on the nature and quantity of associative bonds among them.

The congruity model can also be extended to the prediction of the nature of intergroup stereotypes and attraction. The direction and intensity of evaluation of outgroup X will be equal to the weighted average of all the characteristics associated with that group, and, conversely, any characteristic associated with outgroup X will have the same evaluation as X. As Osgood points out, "if we are good, kind and fair and they are our enemy, then psycho-logic dictates that they must be bad, cruel and unfair" (Osgood, 1960, p. 365).

**Dissonance Theory**

Many, perhaps all, of the above predictions could also have been derived from that specific cognitive congruity theory known as dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). In these terms, it is a dissonant cognition to recognize that a liked and respected person disagrees with you about some third object, or about your valuation of self. Changing your attitudes toward the objects, or changing your valuation of the person, are obviously ways of reducing cognitive dissonance. Dissonance theory makes, in addition, other predictions which we might not arrive at from the balance model. These are presented here in terms of the "which ingroups" or "what kinds of ingroups" question.
One aspect of dissonance theory is an emphasis upon congruity between the valuation of an attitude object and the effort or sacrifice made in the service of the object. Thus a group is more valued the more cruel and painful the initiation rite, that high value being required to achieve congruity with the pain endured (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959). This leads to the prediction that the more suffering, cost, and effort that members have endured in association with their group membership, the more loyal and ingroup-esteeeming they will be. This principle has been often noted. Hitler, for example, believed that World War I had "welded together" the German people (Walser, 1964, p. 38). The principle seems separate conceptually from the effects of external threat, although in actual situations external threat and subsequent suffering for the ingroup often will be confounded.

Even more frequent in dissonance research is the forced compliance, fait accompli, effect (e.g., Brehm & Cohen, 1962). Several studies suggest that when economic and political conditions change so as to increase both the scope and intensity of coordinated activity, cognitive aspects of ethnocentrism (group labels and stereotypes) subsequently become consistent with the new boundaries implicit in the new forms of coordination; when economic or political conditions change in the reverse direction, however, group labels and stereotypes consistent with the wider coordination are retained.

Our own investigations in Kenya reveal that the territorially separate and autonomous peoples, whose only interethnic contacts were intermittent ones with the immediately adjacent peoples, did not develop full-blown
stereotypes of most of the groups in their region, despite sharp discontinuities in language and culture, until they began to be incorporated into the superordinate economic and political system imposed by the British; they then developed rich stereotypes similar in many respects to those of modern societies like the U.S. Other observations (e.g., Mitchell, 1956; Colby and van den Berghe, 1961) indicate that the incorporation of diverse tribal peoples into a modern, urban occupational status system gives the formerly perceived labels and boundaries new stereotype content based on the new status categories. Moerman (1965) found that in Northern Thailand, where linguistic and cultural variations are considerable but with no sharp and mutually congruent boundaries, contemporary ethnic labels appear to be derived from a series of defunct states, each with its capital city, which once integrated (at the political level) diverse populations.

This type of evidence might be accounted for in terms of cognitive dissonance, as in the following two hypotheses:

1. **When a population has imposed upon it economic or political structures that entail compliance to a new set of organizational demands entailing an alteration in boundaries between groups or statuses, then group labels and stereotypes will be altered so as to be concordant with the newly established boundary conditions.**

2. **When such economic or political structures decay without being replaced by organizations making new demands, group labels and stereotypes concordant with the defunct structures will persist.**
In terms of dissonance theory, the key point is the compliance involved. When a state develops in or is imposed on a formerly stateless population, the members of the population, whatever benefits of security they may derive from the new organization, find themselves having to comply with a whole new set of regulations concerning law and order, military service, taxation, and deference to authority. At the same time the state, or its leaders, have to define who must comply and who need not, i.e., the boundaries of the state. Members of the new state are faced with the dissonance between their own compliance and the noncompliance of those who are not included. Why should they comply with the state's onerous demands when others need not, and when in fact they themselves did not in the recent past? They reduce this dissonance by defining themselves primarily as members of the state, diminishing the salience of their other group identities (e.g., those based on kinship, language, culture) and by exalting the state and membership in it so that non-membership is seen as inferiority. Should the state disappear there is no need to alter the identity until it is replaced by another agency requiring similar compliance. The persistence of an identity based on former state membership is particularly likely where, as in Northern Thailand, all other bases for identity are inconsistent with one another and would tend to raise the level of cognitive dissonance.

It also follows from this line of argument that once state boundaries are firmly established and the state is exalted as an entity, other bases of group loyalty (e.g., those based on the primordial ties of language, kinship,
religion, etc.) that are not congruent with state boundaries because they include outsiders, would come to be seen as dissonant with the state membership as ethnic identity, and efforts would be made to eliminate them and homogenize the population. This would predict that states would move more rapidly in the direction of linguistic and cultural homogenization than stateless societies.

If the imposition of a superordinate state on diverse ethnic groups occurs simultaneously with the introduction of a modern occupational system, however, it is possible to reduce the dissonance more easily by reinterpreting old linguistic and cultural differences in terms of occupational status, especially if ethnic groups have differential access to occupations (Campbell and LeVine, 1965, mimeo and in preparation; pp. 124-127). The boundaries that formerly defined ethnic identity come increasingly to define status differentiation within a single state-bounded nation. Since status differentiation is not dissonant with the modern state, on the contrary is perhaps even required by it, the simultaneous development of the state and the modern occupational system will promote the perpetuation of reinterpreted ethnic boundaries.

In this situation, unless there is rapid incorporation of the bulk of the population into the modern occupational structure, instability is likely to occur, for groups finding themselves rated low in the new status system before they have given up their traditional occupations will find it more dissonance-reducing to redefine themselves as autochthonous tribesmen desiring secession and a state of their own. When (and only when) they have complied with modern
occupational demands to such an extent that there is no going back, will they look for a means of reducing the dissonance of their new found low status position within the new poly-ethnic state rather than in a tribalist retreat.

This cognitive dissonance between the traditional and modern evaluations of groups, and their political attempts to reduce it, are dramatically illustrated in the phenomenon of nation-building in contemporary Africa. The rapid establishment of new states with boundaries embracing a multitude of recently autonomous tribes--all of whom are called upon to participate in the national polity--has been accompanied by the slow and uneven incorporation of the population into modern occupations. It is typically those groups that have a strong traditional basis for high self-esteem but did not become educationally and economically modernized during the colonial period, that experience the most intense dissonance between traditional self-evaluation and low evaluation by other groups in the new nation. Such groups often become the dissident regionalists and secessionists in the African states and represent threats (of varying magnitude) to their fragile national integration.

The Masai of East Africa, for example, have long been noted for the pride they take in their own pastoral way of life, despising their agricultural neighbors and others who eat vegetable foods. In recent years, however, they have found themselves not only dominated by their more politically active agricultural neighbors in the new states of Kenya and Tanzania, but also despised in turn as backward non-participants in national status systems based on literacy, education, and ability to take advantage of modern occupational
opportunities. In a 1965 survey organized by the authors, the Masai were most frequently mentioned by other Kenya groups as being not only the most backward and uncivilized but also the most dirty and stupid. (In northern Tanzania, the Masai and Gogo—another pastoral group—were most frequently named.) By refusing to climb the new status ladders, they have—in the eyes of those who have climbed—come to occupy the bottom rung.

The Masai have not accepted this new evaluation of themselves. Despite the famine and impoverishment that have afflicted them in recent years, Masai respondents to the survey in both Kenya and Tanzania named their own group as "most wealthy." This judgment must be based on number of cattle owned, their traditional measure of wealth, in which they still exceed their more prosperous (by any other standard) neighbors. Thus they reduce the dissonance between their traditionally high evaluation of themselves and the low evaluation they receive in modern economic and social terms (which they can hardly fail to perceive) by adhering rigidly to traditional standards of evaluation by which they rank highest. The majority of Masai are still able to put this into action by remaining pastoralists and refusing to enter the modern occupational system, thus protecting themselves from dissonant self-evaluations. Those that have become educated and are more involved in the national life both economically and politically have given support to the regionalist KADU party (now defunct) in Kenya and have produced proposals for a Masai state, uniting the Masai of Kenya and Tanzania and reasserting independence of the other ethnic groups. These proposals for opting out of a
national unit in which a modernized status system prevails can be seen as efforts to reduce the extreme dissonance incurred by the contempt which the Masai and other pastoralists experience in the new states.

An even more striking illustration of this phenomenon can be found in Nigeria, where the federation has been seriously threatened by the refusal of certain groups to accept the political subordination that their lack of educational and occupational modernization would tend to give them. The Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria had strong sources of pre-colonial pride in their successful conquest states and their Islamic orthodoxy. The colonial administration protected their high self-evaluation by treating their traditional rulers with respect, granting them authority, and keeping missionary influence and modern education (sources of countervailing norms) to a minimum. At the end of the colonial period the Hausa-Fulani were far behind the Southern Nigerians in educational and occupational modernization and were regarded by the Christian Southerners as unsophisticated, backward people. The dissonance between the subordinate status they would have in a society dominated by Southerners and their own untarnished sense of religious and cultural superiority led the Hausa-Fulani rulers to refuse to go into a federation unless they could dominate it. Since they controlled a majority of the Nigerian population (albeit the least politically active segment), their claims were stronger than those of minorities like the Masai in other African nations, and they did control the federal government from 1959 to 1966 (Coleman, 1958; Sklar, 1964; LeVine, 1966). After two revolutions in 1966, the federal constitution
under which they governed no longer exists, and Hausa-Fulani unwillingness to be subordinated to "modernized" Southerners has been expressed in ethnic violence directed against Southerners as well as in persistent demands for a federal as opposed to unitary government. In a federal structure, with direct economic and political competition between Northerners and Southerners minimized, the Hausa-Fulani can reduce the dissonance between their high evaluation of themselves and the low evaluation they experience when measured by the modern standards of Southern Nigeria.

It must be emphasized that, from the viewpoint of dissonance theory, the regionalist and secessionist tendencies of groups like the Hausa-Fulani and Masai are not due simply to the dissonance in group evaluation being determined also by these groups not having developed a strong commitment to modern occupational roles (even if low ones) prior to national self-government. Our interpretation of dissonance theory predicts that groups whose members have moved en masse into the modern structure (although in low positions dissonant with their traditional self-image) will attempt to reduce dissonance by efforts to move up within the structure rather than to secede from it. Hagen (1962) has developed an elaborate theoretical formulation based on this idea and presents many historical examples. In Nigeria, groups like the Ibo seem to exemplify this phenomenon, and other examples as well suggest that the general hypothesis that when a relatively disadvantaged ethnic group experiences national self-government before modernization, they will choose secession or regional autonomy as a means of dissonance reduction, whereas if
they experience occupational modernization first, they will attempt to reduce dissonant evaluations of group status by increased competition within the national framework.

Summary

This chapter has attempted to survey the various points at which cognitive congruity theories impinge upon problems of ethnocentrism and intergroup relations. Some dozen such predictions have been presented, and have been italicized for scanning in the text. One hypothesis, that the more similar the outgroup the more it is liked, has been given extensive review including new, albeit secondary, data analysis. Other hypotheses receiving more than brief mention deal with the balance among regional sets of intergroup valences, the effects of forced compliance in the colonial and postcolonial organization of territories upon group identification, and the resolution of incongruities in group esteem produced by contact with modern economic systems.
References


