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ABSTRACT

The keynote address discusses "Politics and the American Family." "The Changing North Carolina Family," the topic of the second address, discusses population, families, marriage and divorce, births and deaths, economic situation, education, and welfare. Fifteen statistical tables are appended to this address. "Family Trends in North Carolina" and "Urbanization and Changing Family Styles" describe urbanization and the family in human history, urbanization and the family in the machine age, and new family styles and their implications. The 1966-67 executive director of the President's National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty, Dr. C. Bishop, discusses some of the commission's findings and recommendations. A panel discussion of "The Family and the Communications Industry" and a final address on "Emerging Trends in the American Family" complete the conference proceedings. (JM)

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URBANIZATION AND THE FAMILY

1968 Conference Proceedings
of the
North Carolina Family Life Council, Inc.

Edited by Kate B. Garner and
Andrew W. Gottschall, Jr.

Brooks Hays
Joseph Himes
David Mace
C. E. Bishop
William Kenkel
Others

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PREFACE

This publication is a "dream come true." The 1968 annual conference of the North Carolina Family Life Council -- its twenty-first -- was outstanding in the timeliness of its focus on urbanization influences on the family and in the superiority of the speakers. As the program took shape the value of preserving in print the content of addresses presented by these authorities became increasingly obvious, inasmuch as participants in the conference would be only a small portion of the people who should have access to such information. For those in attendance, reading would be a means for mental refreshment and contemplation of details later. Publication was, no doubt, a worthy goal; but practical matters made it appear almost unachievable.

Mr. Clyde Collins, Jr., Vice President of Southern Life Insurance Company, recognized the excellence of the program plan and made the goal possible by committing the service of his company for printing conference proceedings. It is in genuine gratitude that we acknowledge that service, both from the North Carolina Family Life Council as an organization and from each individual beneficiary. Storage and mailing will be managed by the Behavioral Sciences Center, Bowman Gray School of Medicine, Wake Forest University; and we hereby express appreciation to Dr. Clark Vincent, Director, for those services.

The theme, "It's Happening: The Urban Impact," was so inclusive that program topics could have ranged the gamut of interest areas, but limitations were imposed by the conference span of less than two days. In such a short period, it would not have been possible to provide depth in many of the specialized areas of social change affecting the institution of the family as a result of urbanization processes. The objective, therefore, was to offer an overview in more generalized divisions: historical perspective (Mace), interrelationship between rural and urban factors (Bishop), current demographic status of change within the state (Himes), governmental involvement (Hays), massive influences on change (panel: Barron, Jones, Wallace, Niven Henderson), and projection of future family developments (Kenkel). A few of the interest areas were included in workshops which are not reported herein.

One of the speakers emphasized the importance of clear understanding of what is happening to and within families in order to help people prepare to live successfully with changes. On behalf of the North Carolina Family Life Council and the innumerable persons whose various services made the conference successful, we are pleased to present these proceedings as a contribution to a greater understanding of what is happening.

Mrs. Kate B. Garner, Council President 1967-68
Mr. Andrew W. Gottschall, Jr., Program Chairman

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POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY

Some of us are old enough to remember the covered wagons moving west, covered with tarpaulin and horse-drawn, their occupants looking for land and wood and water. We have lived long enough to see a reversal of this movement: covered wagons, covered not with tarpaulin but with hard-top, not horse-drawn but motor-propelled, not moving west but moving generally north and east, and looking not for land and wood and water but for jobs and homes and opportunities. This basic fact in modern America underlies many of the problems that challenge those who seek to be imaginative and compassionate and effective in the field of social work. Politics, of course, is very much involved. This is a period in which the tough, recalcitrant man seems to be in the ascendancy. Those who use the soft words of theology and social work have to struggle more vigorously than ever to secure forums to present the needs of people as victims of the condition of our time. I speak not so much of the problems of the family as the biologically established unit in society but rather of the larger framework in which the social worker must exhibit concern, that is, in terms of the entire *human* family.

I journeyed to northwest Pennsylvania not long ago to a reunion of the Hays family, and I stood at the graveside of William Hays. He rode into Venango County from Westmoreland County in 1796. I thought my grandson would be interested in the story of William Hays, but apparently he was not. Perhaps he will never be really interested in William Hays, the first; and I could tell him so little about his great, great, great, great grandfather. Then, I recalled that living in that same period were sixty-three other people who contributed as much to the biological heritage of this grandson of mine as did William Hays. Just four generations further back, there were one thousand and twenty-four people living who were also in the line of his heritage. Look at this in the future, three hundred years hence. If the Hays name is preserved and some little fellow is named Brooks Hays, more than one thousand people who are living today will have contributed as much to his heritage as I.

So, each of us is a member not only of the little cell of human life that we love and cherish as our immediate family, but all of us are members of the great human family; and each family flows in and out of the human family. Why some are so indifferent to the concept of the oneness of this family and why so

little intellectual energy is given to making that family stable and to establishing the conditions by which it can be advanced and enriched is puzzling. This, to me, is one of the great challenges of the times.

What has this to do with my subject of family and politics? It is that, under modern conditions, political influences will greatly affect the progress that we make. All people concerned with ameliorating the impact of adverse conditions upon family life must take into account the kind of politics that we have. Too often there has been an indifference to this supremely important subject of politics, and we are not distinguished by this.

In Washington, during the seven years that I was in the Department of Agriculture working for a sounder land policy and for just treatment for tenant farmers, I was known as Will Alexander's boy. That name may mean something to some of you: Will Alexander, a protege of W. B. Weatherford, a friend of Howard Odum. I remember the injunctions of Howard Odum and the eloquent plea that he could make for the Southland. He loved the South. One difficulty has been that we have become too sentimental. We allowed ourselves to become sentimental about the South when we should have been applying critical judgments. Dr. Odum did not make that mistake, and all of the South is under a heavy debt to the Chapel Hill group: the Odums, the Alexanders, the Weatherfords, and of course that name that stands out like a bright star, Governor Aycock. They always thought of improving conditions for the common people of the Southland, the dispossessed, the disadvantaged, white and colored. They were able to indict the Democratic party for being wrong on the issue of slavery. They were able to indict the Republican party for being wrong on the issue of the tariff. They were able to indict both parties for being wrong on the matter of race. They were able to indict that little party that offered hope at one time, the Populist party, since at first the Populists responded to the aspirations of the landless people, the poor people of the South; but they finally turned against the Negro poor. So the South lost another opportunity to emancipate itself from the age-old fallacies in the fields of economics and social policy.

All this does not mean that I am unaware of the qualities in the Southland that are attractive, that give us a distinctive place among the regions of the nation, and the right to be heard. We agree, though, that we have no right basically to complain if we are criticized.

Of all the things that have been said about me, one that pleases me most perhaps is the reference of Bob Allen in one of his books, "Mr. Hays has never ceased to love the rural South which nurtured him." But we are no longer rural people. We have been urbanized. I found a forum once to plead with those in the North who held some of the power of the nation through Congress. It was in the Kestnbaum Commission to which Mr. Eisenhower appointed me. I pleaded with them day after day to recommend federal aid for the poorer states. It cost the South one billion dollars in a ten-year period to educate the children who, becoming adults, moved to urban centers of the North and East. I called Governor Driscoll's attention to it. New Jersey, profiting by their tax-paying ability in their adult years, owed something to the stricken areas from which they came. I convinced Governor Driscoll that I was right. One of the thrills of my legislative career was when the Vice President of Cornell University, a member of that commission, laid down his pencil after that two-hour argument on the question of federal aid for education and said, "I am convinced that there is a basis for the favored states of the East to help the less favored states of the South."

In return, the South owes it to the nation to promise that the money we receive from the federal treasury will be honestly distributed. We have not always distributed it honestly. I have not forgotten something that happened in my state when a friend of Negro education said to me long before the Brown decision of 1954, "I can take you to a city in this state where not one dollar of money raised by local taxation is spent upon Negro schools. Not only that, they reach into the fund that is sent from the state treasury, on the per capita basis, and take nine thousand dollars out of that sum to spend for the white schools." It took the power of the federal government to correct this gross injustice. Why should white people complain about the appeal to Washington? If anyone says in condemnation of the minority race that they could bring their grievances to local and state forums, it must be remembered that, in the light of history, the Negro did what his white neighbor had told him to do by example. When the farmers of this nation were imposed upon by fallacious policies, they went to Washington; and Washington through

Congress and through the courts provided relief. In my state, when Negro prisoners were condemned to be executed without a Negro on the jury, they seemed helpless by state processes of law to correct it. A judgment of the United States Supreme Court was required to provide relief against that injustice. The landmark decision was from my state of Arkansas. No condemnation is due the Negro for recognizing that we live now in a national community. That was the import of my references to people uprooted and moving into new homes and seeking assimilation in a new culture, because they were entitled to new opportunities.

Let me be specific. I supported in its final form, but not in its original form, the Taft-Hartley bill to provide some measurements for justice in the field of management-labor relations. Our northern friends asked why we rural representatives were concerned with industrial policy. My answer was again based on the interlocking, interrelating complexion of our community and national life. If there is a maladjustment we all suffer. If there is a slowing down of production in the automobile and steel factories in the North, the farmers in my area suffer. They do not have the tractors and the automobiles to which they are entitled, so we are interested in industrial prosperity. Then came the Civil Rights controversy; and our southern friends asked, with the same inconsistency, why northerners were concerned with the problems of race relations. There in the cloakroom, to the extent that I was able, I tried to influence my southern friends to see that we do live in a closely interwoven society. Constituents in northern cities are concerned about race justice and race harmony, and they believe there should be a national policy in this area.

I have not always been brave. I have not always drawn the line as carefully as I should in the delicate business of compromise; for statesmanship does necessarily take into account that give-and-take that we call compromise, honorable compromise. When I finally realized that I had proceeded as far as I could in the Little Rock situation and was willing to submit my position to the people on the basis that nine Negro pupils must be admitted to the Central High School -- and suffered defeat by reason of it -- if this atoned for past mistakes, I am one of the happiest politicians who was ever defeated for public office.

Men must confront moral issues with concern for justice and fair treatment and for this quality which I have tried to describe, that the races are interrelated and that the regions are interrelated and that the generations that make up this human family are bound together with perfect solidarity. This is my theme. Do not let the demands of expertness or the technical requirements in administering the programs of your community and state blind you to the need of those larger policies that make for a peaceful nation and a peaceful world.

Do not leave out of account the demands that must be made of our churches. Among the things that Howard Odum said which cannot be forgotten was his enumeration of the things that make up the strength of the South. He said we have great human resources, great natural resources, growing financial resources, great technology, and finally institutional resources. Here, of course, he would have mentioned the churches and the schools. We are not known as the Bible Belt without good reason; our people believe in the Biblical faith, the Judeo-Christian faith that dignifies man and recognizes the divine purpose in human exertions. I do not hesitate to speak in these quiet days of my life now, the afternoon of my life when I am free from the pressures of politics, of the relationship between theology and government; and I am glad that I can. When I spoke of it to a student body in West Virginia recently, one of the professors of political science said, "Mr. Hays, you are a fusionist. Obviously you believe that religion and politics must be appropriately and effectively fused." I answered that it can be done without parading piety. When George Washington said in his farewell address, "Do not be deceived, my fellow countrymen, there can be no public morality without the inspiration of religion," he was not bidding for the Episcopal vote in Virginia. There are considerations here far above advantage to an individual or to a party, and they are the bases for the good society to which I have alluded. This is the spiritual and moral basis for a political strength that America must recapture. This is the issue of the hour. Shall we have moral content in our political life or shall we let the opportunists run riot? Shall we allow our moral power to be decadent so that opportunism and cynicism take hold? But this political science professor said, "You are a fusionist. You have spoken of this molding of the two together, into an intergrated power. But," he added, "you are not the first. Plato advocated that." I replied that Plato and I are on pretty solid ground. I am glad to have Platonian support for the ideas of theology.

How could I avoid mentioning theology? I remind myself in my own meditations of the need for making love triumphant over hate, and good will and tolerance triumphant over suspicion and misgivings. The South has much to be thankful for. I know the tortures and struggles of the leadership of the minority group, as they look to us for an understanding of their problems as they try to deal with threatened violence in their own community. We would have been able to give them better advice and more help if we had put down the violence in the white community when it first exhibited itself. But, we have a common cause. Let us recognize our common enemies: juvenile delinquency, disease, illiteracy. Let us acknowledge our common humanity. Let us exalt our common faith.

Abraham Lincoln, in the same context, with a nation torn apart, contemplated these great theological and religious principles and tried to draw upon them to unite the regions. (Among the most poignant and beautiful things he said was that reference to our beleaguered and suffering South when he said, "I have not suffered from the South; I have suffered with the South.") Lincoln put it like this:

"The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our task is new, we must think anew and act anew, for the dogmas of the quiet past are not adequate for the stormy present. The fiery trial through which we pass will weigh us down with honor or dishonor. To the latest generation we meanly lose or nobly save the last best hope of our earth."

My hope is very strong that this faith, this experiment, this nation will survive.



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THE CHANGING NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY

American families have long been in process of change.¹ Some of these trends have continued out of the past and may be expected to extend into the foreseeable future. In addition, the last decade has witnessed some new forces and trends of change.

A series of circumstances, some national in scope and others restricted to the South, affect North Carolina families. Growing affluence has come to North Carolina and from North Carolina cities is spreading to the state's rural communities. The urban and white collar sectors continue to grow faster than the rural population. Racial desegregation has admitted increasing proportions of the state's nonwhite population to the mainstream of economic and social life. The continuing Vietnam conflict exerts a widening and deepening influence on the state's youthful population.

North Carolina families have responded by change to these and other circumstances. The exact nature, rate, and direction of such family changes, however, are not yet fully known. One purpose of this paper is to probe, even if only superficially, some aspects of this new front of family change in our state. Perhaps all that can be claimed for this discussion is that it may help in some measure to clarify and refine the problems and issues of family change.

In this paper an attempt is made to identify and describe briefly the leading demographic trends in North Carolina families. We will examine some data in a time sequence relating to population composition, family units, marriage and divorce, births and deaths, economic circumstances, education, and dependency. We ask in reference to these areas: What has been happening to North Carolina families; and on the basis of this knowledge, what can we expect in the immediate future?

Population

The growth and projections of North Carolina population are shown in Table 1. It will be seen that, with only two exceptions, growth has been continuous and relatively regular. The low percentage of increase between 1965 and 1970 results from a change of method of computation. The extremely high growth rate

between 1970 and 1975 is unaccounted for and is clearly unexpected. These figures suggest that for the next two decades at least the population base of North Carolina families will continue to increase steadily.

When population growth rates are computed by color, as shown in the last two columns of the table, it is seen that the white sector outstrips the nonwhite. At each enumeration period, 1950 through 1965, the white population grew faster than both the total and the nonwhite sector. After 1950 growth rates of the nonwhite population were in the order of three and a half percent each half decade, about half as fast as growth of the white sector.

This differential in growth rates has important family linked consequences. It will be shown below that although both birth and death rates in the nonwhite population exceed those of the white sector, net growth rates are approximately equal. We have found that the main explanation of the low rate of nonwhite population growth is a high out-migration rate.² Out-migrants tend to be young persons of marriage and parent ages. Thus, the nonwhite population is not only growing slower than the white sector; it is also losing potential spouses and parents faster than the white population. This fact tends to influence the organizational, support, and other characteristics of nonwhite families.

The North Carolina population continues to become progressively more urban. In 1940, 27.3 percent was classified as urban, although by 1960 the percentage had risen to 39.5. The figures in Table 2 confirm this urbanward trend. In addition, however, this table reveals something of the source of new urban population. The data make it clear that the urban sector of the state's population grew faster between 1960 and 1965 than both the total and the rural sector. This trend suggests that in the future, family phenomena and issues may be more and more centered in the urban environment.

More particularly, the exhibit shows that the rate of natural increase exceeded the rate of population growth for the state as a whole. (See Table 1.) This fact suggests, contrary to general belief, that these metropolitan communities have high birth rates and many children. On the other hand, in three cases only, Charlotte, Fayetteville and Raleigh, the net migration rate exceeded the average rate of statewide population growth. In the other metropolitan areas growth by migration was slower than the increase of general population. These data have two family-linked implications, viz., (a) the state's largest urban areas are over-reproducing themselves and (b) only three of these are acquiring new populations of immediate marriageable age.

The percentage figures in Table 3 reveal trends in the family-linked age composition of the white and nonwhite population sectors. It is seen that the proportion of white children remained fairly constant during the twenty years, 1940-1960, constituting around 30 percent at both dates. However, the percentage of children in the nonwhite population increased by one-seventh from 35.5 in 1940 to 41.0 percent in 1960. That is, although as noted above, the nonwhite population as a whole grew slower than the white sector, the proportion of children grew substantially faster. We will see later that this fact is even more striking when associated with the decline of young marriage- and parent-age persons in the nonwhite group.

This table also shows that persons in the marriage ages, 15 to 29 inclusive, declined in both population sectors. However, the decline was more precipitous in the nonwhite than in the white sectors between 1940 and 1960. At the end of the period there was actually a smaller percentage of such persons in the nonwhite than in the white population. This fact is, as noted above, especially significant when associated with the increase in the proportion of children under 15 years of age.

At the same time, the proportion of older persons in the state's population has grown steadily. Between 1940 and 1966, individuals 65 years old and over increased from 156 thousand, or 4.4 percent, to 362 thousand, or 7.2 percent of the total. As shown in Table 3, however, the aged sector of the white population increased faster than the corresponding category of nonwhites. These are the individuals who, because of their age and circumstances, constitute a special kind of family situation and problem. Moreover, since this population sector will doubtless continue to increase in size and proportion, the related family issues will also grow in importance.

Families

As the population of the state increases, the number of households and families increases. Although, as shown in Table 4, the total number of white households almost doubled between 1940 and 1960, nonwhite households increased only slowly. Meanwhile, the proportion of true families, i.e., husband-wife units, actually declined during this period, from just under 90 to just over 75 percent. For example, in 1960 only four-fifths, 81 percent, of the white and two-thirds, 65 percent, of the nonwhite households included both husband and wife.³ In other words, from one-fifth to one-third of the state's households contain broken families. What is even more significant, it seems very likely that most of these households are headed by females. In addition, as will be shown later, many of these female heads are unwed mothers with their illegitimate children.

During the same twenty years the number of members per household declined. This trend is associated with the decline of the birth rate to be discussed below. In addition, at present, households tend to include fewer collateral relatives and unrelated persons than was true at an earlier time. As a consequence, although there are more households now than in 1940, there are fewer members, particularly children, than at the earlier date.

These data suggest that there are probably more broken families and more artificial residential units in the state at present than at an earlier date. As noted above, increasing numbers of young people can afford to establish independent households before getting married. The Vietnam conflict draws some young men out of their families for foreign military service, leaving quasi-broken families behind. The upward trend of illegitimacy, to be examined below, is also reflected in the increase of the proportion of husbandless families. At the same time, these and other trends function to reduce the average number of members per family or household.

Increase of the number of broken families and female heads of households is related to the dramatic growth of the proportion of female wage earners. Ruth Searles noted that between 1940 and 1960 the number of gainfully employed women in the state increased by 80 percent.⁴ At the same time, their median age rose from 30 to 38. Searles reports that in 1960 there were 120,190 female heads of households in the state. Moreover, 20 percent of all working women in the state had children under six years of age.

Further examination of Table 4 reveals that in both population sectors the number of households increased faster than population. During both decades, 1940-1950 and 1950-1960, white households increased almost twice as rapidly as white population, although nonwhite households increased more slowly in relation to population. In this connection it must be remembered that white population has been growing substantially faster than nonwhite population in the state.

Differential rates of increase of households tend to reflect socio-economic differentials between the white and nonwhite population sectors. Whites doubtless have experienced growing affluence earlier and more extensively than the nonwhites. As a consequence more young whites than nonwhites could afford to establish households before getting married. Economic disadvantage causes more "doubling up" among nonwhite than among white families. In addition, as already noted, a substantially larger proportion of young nonwhites than of whites migrates from the state. There are therefore fewer young nonwhites than whites present to enter marriages or establish households. To put it another way, we can state that a larger percentage of young whites remain in the state to establish households. Differential participation in growing affluence may encourage young whites to establish independent households before marriage; by the same token young nonwhites may be discouraged from both establishing independent households and from early marriage, a prelude to householding.

The figures in Table 4 confirm the downward trend in the size of average households. However, it is seen that the decline is more rapid among white than among nonwhite households. For example, between 1940 and 1960 average white households shrank by four-fifths of a member. However, nonwhite households declined by only about one-third person.

Part of this decline in household members results from declining birth rates which are examined below. Part results from the exclusion of persons other than children. For example, relatives of heads of white households (other than wife or minor child) declined from 19 to 11 percent, while among nonwhites decline was only from 24 to 22 percent. At the same time white nonrelatives declined from 3 to one percent, and nonwhites from 6 to just over two percent. That is, nonwhite households remain larger than white, not only because of higher birth rates but also because they include more secondary relatives and unrelated persons.

It seems likely that the trends portrayed here may continue into the immediate future. In that event, while the number of households may double in another generation, the proportion of true families and persons per household will decline. Moreover, the data indicate that in the years ahead white households will increase in number and decline in size faster than nonwhite units. One consequence of this development may be significant alteration of the racial composition of the state's population.

Marriage and Divorce

We saw above that during the quarter of a century under study the number of households increased faster than total population. At the same time the proportion of husband-wife families among these households declined, particularly after 1960. However, these trends are not altogether consistent with changes in the state's marriage and divorce rates.

The marriage trend is presented in the first half of Table 5. After declining from 1955 to 1957, both the number and rate of marriages rose without further interruption to the end of the eleven-year period. During this period the number of marriages increased by almost four-fifths, from about 26 to over 45 thousand, but the marriage rate rose only about 60 percent. This finding suggests that the general population base increased faster than the number of marriages. If these trends continue, it seems likely that the 1967 marriage rate may double in about twenty years.

This upward trend of marriage is associated with changes in the social and economic situation. Both the size of total population and the marriage-age sector have been increasing steadily. Growing general affluence permits young people to marry and establish households. Prevalent custom tends to favor universal and early marriage.

Current data show that most marriages occur before young people are 25 years of age. In a study of the 43,482 marriages consummated in 1966, it was found that 76.9 percent of the grooms and 88.6 percent of the brides were under 25 years old.⁵ Although almost twice as many brides as grooms were between 15 and 19 years of age, there were almost 25 percent more grooms than brides between 20 and 24. Over four-fifths of both the brides and grooms had never been married before.

The right-hand side of Table 5 shows the record of divorces in North Carolina for the 13 year period 1955 through 1967. It is seen that although the state's divorce rate remained relatively low, nevertheless both the number and rate doubled between 1958 and 1967. A somewhat larger than usual jump in both numbers and rates occurred between 1964 and 1965, when the state changed the divorce law to permit one instead of two years separation as grounds for divorce.

The meaning of these data is illuminated when North Carolina is compared with other southern states. In 1962 the ranking was as follows:

Florida	4.1	Very High
Tennessee	2.5-3.6	High
Mississippi	1.9-2.4	Medium
North Carolina	1.4	Low
South Carolina	1.1 or less	Very Low

Of the 11,320 divorces granted in 1966, 9,087 or 80.3 percent were white and 1,864 or 19.7 percent were received by nonwhite persons.⁶ In the case of both population groups, one-year separation was the leading ground alleged, accounting for nine-tenths or more of all divorces granted. Of 9,173 white couples receiving divorces in 1966, two-thirds, 65.9 percent, had one or more children. On the other hand, of the 1,872 nonwhite couples granted divorces, three-fifths, 60.6 percent had one or more children. Thus, it is evident that most divorces affect families with children and hence are of concern to the community at large.

Births and Deaths

Another aspect of family life in the state is revealed by trends of birth and death rates. As a general rule, although birth rates may fluctuate from year to year, we have come to expect that they will decline generally. The North Carolina trend since 1940 is shown in the left-hand section of Table 6. Beginning in 1940, both the white and nonwhite birth rates increased to the middle 1950's and then declined thereafter. The white rate of 21.3 rose to a high of 24.1 in 1955 and then declined steadily to the low of 18.3 in 1965. During the same 25 years the nonwhite rate rose from 25.8 to a 1955 high of 34.3 and then fell off to 26.2 in 1965.

It seems reasonable to expect that both white and nonwhite birth rates will continue to decline in the immediate future. However, it may turn out that the nonwhite rate will tend to decrease faster than the white rate. The downward trend of births may be reflected in smaller average families and households and in a slowly declining rate of net population growth.

Ordinarily one would expect that a higher nonwhite birth rate will indicate a higher nonwhite than white rate of population increase. However, we saw above that the white population, in spite of the lower birth rate, is increasing much faster than the nonwhite population. It is thus evident that different rates of population growth do not result from different rates of net increase, i.e., excess of births over deaths. As pointed out above, the high birth rate among nonwhites is offset by a high out-migration rate.

These contrary trends doubtless affect the composition of the white and nonwhite populations in contrasting ways. The nonwhite sector would be under-represented by young adults and over-represented by young children. On the other hand, the white population retains its young adults and gains relatively fewer children than the nonwhites. Such dynamic family processes tend to create significantly different family situations in the white and nonwhite populations.

The percentages of live births that were reported as occurring out of wedlock are shown by color in the last two columns of the table. These figures indicate that at each enumeration date the proportion of nonwhite births out of wedlock is eight to nine times as large as the white percentage. The figures show that although percentages for whites fluctuated during the two and a half decades, no definite trend is revealed. The nonwhite percentage, after declining to 1950, increased steadily, being almost half again as large at the end as at the beginning of the period. In other words, these data indicate that whereas one in fifty white births in 1940 was illegitimate, the ratio has increased to about one in thirty. The corresponding ratios among nonwhites rose from a low of about one in six in 1950 to over one in four in 1965. Moreover, there are more multiple illegitimate births in nonwhite than in white families. For example, according to the records, in 1964 there were 10,874 illegitimate births, of which 1,988 were white and 8,886 were nonwhite.⁷ Of the white illegitimate births 66.6 percent were first births. However, only 51.0 percent of the nonwhite illegitimate children were first births.

While one cannot be certain that such reports reveal the volume and rate of illegitimacy in the state with full accuracy, there is little reason to doubt that the incidence is higher among nonwhites than among whites. This means that at any time there are more fatherless families in the nonwhite than in the white population. When it is remembered that the husbandless mothers of these families tend to be young, badly educated and poor, illegitimacy is seen to have important family-linked consequences. Moreover, if the trend of the last 25 years continues unaltered into the future, the racial differential will soon become staggering.

The data also show that illegitimacy rates for all population sectors are higher in urban than in rural areas. For instance, in 1964, total white and nonwhite illegitimacy ratios were higher in the state's "metropolitan" counties considered in the aggregate. At the same time, of the state's eight metropolitan areas, only Durham and Winston-Salem among the whites and Greensboro-High Point and Raleigh among nonwhites showed ratios below the state average.⁸

Most unwed mothers tend to be young. In 1964 the ratio of white illegitimate to all live births was twelve times as great for mothers under 15 as for mothers of all ages, and twice as high in the 15-19 age group.⁹ Concentration in the lower age brackets was less sharp in the nonwhite group. In 1964 the ratio of illegitimate to all live births among girls under 15 was four, and among the 15-19 year olds two.

Infant and maternal death rates are of special significance to family life. Twenty-five year trends in neonatal (under 28 days), infant (under one year), and maternal death rates are shown in Table 7. Two impressions are immediately created by the figures in this exhibit. First, death rates for all three categories have declined dramatically during the quarter century shown. Second, in each category and at all dates the nonwhite rates are higher than those for whites. Thus, it is evident that both birth and death rates for the white population are lower than corresponding rates for the nonwhite sector.

Closer inspection of the columns of figures reveals some slight and perhaps significant differences between death rate trends of the two population groups. Among whites the neonatal and infant death rates tend to level off in the latter years of the time period. However, among nonwhites, both these death rates reveal slight rises around 1960 before settling back into the downward trend. Relatively high nonwhite death rates are associated with the socio-economic disadvantages of these people. For example, in 1964 while 99 percent of the white babies were delivered by doctors in hospitals, only 84 percent of nonwhite babies were born under such auspicious conditions.¹⁰

We have reason to expect that both the white and nonwhite death rates will continue to decline in the years just ahead. For a while the decline among nonwhites may be faster than among whites, and the rates may tend to approximate each other. We noted above that nonwhite birth rates tend to be high. It is seen that these high birth rates are offset, in part at least, by high death rates. One consequence of these relationships is the slow rate of nonwhite population growth observed above.

Economic Situation

A clue to the changing economic fortunes of North Carolina families is provided by the trend in per capita incomes. The first column of Table 8 contains these figures at five-year intervals for the 1940-1965 period. Per capita annual incomes in the state rose steadily throughout the entire period, being over six times as great at the end as at the beginning.

Meanwhile, the number of workers in the state and workers per family also tended to increase. These twenty-five years were distinguished by a substantial growth in the number of women workers, including especially working wives. Ruth Searles notes that, "Between 1940 and 1960 the number of employed persons in North Carolina rose 33 percent; the number of employed women rose more than 80 percent."¹¹ In 1960 over 600,000, 37 percent of all females 14 years old and over, were gainfully employed, forming 34 percent of the state's labor force. At the same time, as will be shown below, there was a rather startling increase in the number of minors granted permits to work. As a consequence of these trends, collective family incomes increased more rapidly than per capita incomes. For example, between 1950 and 1960, median family income increased from \$1,868 to \$3,344.¹²

Such improvement in the economic situation of North Carolina families is related to general economic advances in the state. The twenty-five years under consideration constitute a period of continued and rapid growth of industry, urban migration, and educational advancement. Simultaneously, North Carolina participated increasingly in the growing tide of national affluence. Present evidence suggests that these trends will continue into the immediate future and that North Carolina families will experience continued economic improvement.

However, all individuals and families have not shared equally in the growing prosperity of the state. Indeed, some families became both relatively and absolutely worse off. The plight of these families was exposed and examined in the early 1960's during the administration of former Governor Terry Sanford. Writing about this situation in 1964, Ruth Searles asserts that, "A substantial amount of employment in the state is exempt from the North Carolina Employment Security Law (about 25 percent of nonagricultural employment), the North Carolina Minimum Wage Law, and the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act."¹³ Searles estimates that 185,000 women were exempted from the state's minimum wage requirements. Many of these female workers were also heads of families. The North Carolina Fund and its multi-faceted anti-poverty programs issued from this debate and planning.

Some, though not all, of the state's poor families are supported, in part at least, by public assistance grants. For example, in 1965 there were some 26,000 families with dependent children receiving public assistance and constituting two percent of all households. The last three columns of Table 8 show the trend of public assistance grants in the three main programs during the twenty-five year period. It is seen that although Old Age Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children grants increased apace with the growth of per capita incomes, they remained pitifully low at every reporting date. For example, if the average family with dependent children in 1965 had no financial resources other than the \$94.58 per month, its annual income was only \$1,133.96. However, if that family had been supported by the average per capita income of the same year, it would have had \$2,041.00. Moreover, this annual public assistance grant was well below the median North Carolina 1960 family income of \$3,334.

There is evidence to suggest that a body of North Carolina families, many of them nonwhite urban dwellers, is falling behind economically and is trapped within the "cycle of poverty." Traditional welfare and emergency anti-poverty programs seem to be making little headway in solving the economic problems of such families.

It was noted above that the number of gainfully employed women has increased dramatically during the last two decades and more. However, the pay differentials between male and female workers remain very substantial. Table 9 gives some figures on wage differentials for the year 1959. In each occupation, women typically are paid less on an average than men. The differentials are greater in some cases than in others, especially in the professional and managerial fields that have long been the monopoly of male workers. These wage differentials not only indicate differential treatment of male and female workers; they also suggest that many women are, or are treated as, the secondary worker in a family, one whose income is not essential to the maintenance of the family. These ancillary incomes tend to raise family levels of living rather than assure basic family maintenance. If, however, as is true in thousands of cases, the female wage earner is the main support, the family may be economically disadvantaged.

While this table also shows that in some occupations, e.g., operatives, little difference was found between wages of men and women, in several of the occupations incomes of all workers were relatively low.

Our final exhibit in regard to the economic situation of the family is the record of work permits issued to minors. These figures are presented in Table 10. The significant and perhaps startling fact revealed by this table is that, while per capita and median family incomes increased, the number of minors receiving work permits fluctuated and then increased dramatically at the end of the period.

One might ask: Who are these minors and why do they want to work? Part of the answer may lie in the fact that with worsening economic circumstances of poor families, minors had to seek after school and summer employment to help the family out. At the same time, it seems very likely also that many of the minors came from economically advantaged homes. They got permission to seek jobs to share in the growing affluence. Work, having spending money, being financially independent are part of the new youth culture. Perhaps some combination of these and other factors explains the upsurge of work permits for minors. In any case, the sharp increase in the number of working minors can be expected to affect the general family situation.

These data outline some significant family-linked economic trends that may continue into the immediate future at least. Most families tend to prosper, thanks to increasing per capita and collective incomes and to the employment of wives and minors. However, as some research has already shown, these altered roles and relations will doubtless affect the context of family life. On the other hand, some families have fared very badly in this period of growing affluence. The evidence suggests that, in spite of improved welfare and anti-poverty programs, their lot may worsen and the resultant strains on family organization and relations may intensify.

Education

Every available index indicates that the educational level of all sectors of the state's population is steadily rising. One such index is elementary and high school enrollments. In Table 11 these figures are shown for the years 1940-1964. After increasing slowly in the 1940-1950 decade, elementary school enrollments grew rapidly during the next ten years only to taper off after 1960. On the other hand, high school enrollments actually declined between 1940 and 1950 but virtually exploded during the next 14 years. These changes are related to both the baby boom during and following World War II and to changing evaluation of education.

During the same period, average number of years of schooling completed by persons 25 years old and over climbed steadily. These figures are shown by color for the two decades 1940-1960 in Table 12. Although both population groups added two years to the median educational achievement, the nonwhite people remain over two and a half years behind the whites. This differential is traditional and may have significant implications for family life in the state. Furthermore, some studies indicate that although median educational achievements of both groups will continue to climb, the gap between whites and nonwhites will tend to widen.¹⁴

What is even more striking is the fact that university and college enrollments have burgeoned dramatically during the period under consideration.¹⁵ The dramatic growth of higher education reflects important cultural changes in American society. There is every justification to believe that the upward trend in educational achievement will continue and accelerate in the near future.

All these data augur well for North Carolina families. They mean that young people entering marriage and initiating families are steadily better educated. Even though they may not all or indeed perhaps only few may have had any family life education, in any case increased basic education contributes to improved family life.

What is even more significant is the fact that all indicators clearly point to increasing school attendance in the years ahead. Part of this increase issues from the growth of the school-age sector of the population. Much of it, however, reflects the increasing emphasis on education as a social value. Although such improved education will accrue directly to improved occupational and income conditions, it will also undoubtedly redound to improved human and family relations.

The figures in Table 13 reflect some of the educational differentials that distinguish the white and the nonwhite populations. By every index used it is clear that the nonwhite population is educationally disadvantaged *vis a vis* the white sector. For example, in 39 of the sample 84 North Carolina counties whites reported an average of 9.5 or more years of schooling, while in 40 of the same counties nonwhites showed an average of only seven or more years. Or again, in 32 of the 84 counties average per pupil expenditure for white children was \$220 or more, while in 38 of the counties the per pupil expenditure for nonwhite schools was only \$185 and over. The data also show that higher proportions of white than of nonwhite pupils are headed for college or university. These facts suggest that while all groups are making significant educational advances, the rate and extent is less among nonwhites than among whites. Family-linked benefits accruing from education therefore can be expected to be less among nonwhites than among whites. This is significant for we have already indicated that the nonwhite population reveals some unique family-linked problems for which increased education may be one remedial approach.

Welfare

In one sense all the foregoing discussion has been a comment on the welfare of North Carolina families. In some respects, say economic and educational characteristics, many families are substantially better off than families were twenty-five years earlier. At the same time, other families are more disadvantaged at present than a quarter century earlier, say in material circumstances or social organization. In this last section we want to use public welfare data to portray another facet of North Carolina families. Table 14 shows the number of old age assistance recipients and families receiving public assistance together with the number of children involved. Column one of the table shows that the number of old age assistance recipients remained relatively constant between 1959 and 1966 in spite of the steady growth of population and especially the growth of the aged population sector. This trend suggests, among other things, either elderly persons are finding other ways to maintain income, or that criteria for granting such assistance are becoming more stringent. There is reason to suspect that the former condition is true. Old age insurance benefits cover more retired workers more adequately and such benefits are supplemented by more and better private pension programs. It also seems likely that more retired people now than earlier are able to make some contribution to their support after retirement from savings and gainful employment.

The exhibit also shows that the number of both dependent families and needy children has fluctuated only little throughout the period covered. We noted earlier that dependent families composed between one and a half and two percent of total households in the state in recent years.

While these figures provide some commentary on the extent of economic deprivation in the state, they suggest that this problem is declining relatively in extent. However, recent investigations of poverty indicate that many hard-core needy families are not served by public assistance. Some of these, having limited economic resources, are just above the level served by public welfare. Others refuse to resort to public assistance even when in dire need. There seems to be little doubt that economically, socially, and culturally needy families comprise a leading problem of the state and its communities. While the size of the problem may not be increasing, it becomes more and more difficult to find justification for such problems of any size and type.

The last table shows the number of children placed in families and institutions in the ten year period 1957 to 1966. This exhibit gives a heartening picture of expanded services for homeless children. In spite of some fluctuations, the number of children received in foster accommodations has tended to increase and especially in the last few years.

Summary

We may now summarize major findings of this study to portray leading trends of North Carolina families. Our data show that although total population continues to grow, the white sector increases almost twice as fast as the nonwhite. Expectedly, urban areas are growing faster than rural localities, but unexpectedly urban growth results mainly from natural increase rather than migration. At the same time marriage-age persons (15 to 29) declined in both sectors; children (persons under 15) increased faster in the nonwhite sector; and old persons (65 and over) increased faster in the white sector. All these population trends function to expand and alter the demographic base of North Carolina families.

Other data revealed that although the number of households tends to increase about as fast as total population, both the proportion of normal families (those with both husband and wife present) and average number of members per household have been declining. At the same time, both the number and rates of marriage and divorce have been increasing, divorce faster than marriage. Our analysis showed that, among other things, such trends seem to be related to population changes, out-migration of young persons, growing affluence, the continuing Vietnam conflict, the rising rate of illegitimacy, and changing attitudes toward sex and marriage.

Further, it was found that during the last quarter century, both birth and death rates have declined, although at each enumeration date both these rates were higher among the nonwhite than in the white population. Meanwhile, illegitimacy rates have increased in the nonwhite population group and remain eight to nine times higher than corresponding rates among whites. These birth and death trends both reflect and accentuate disadvantage among nonwhites and feed unique and chronic problem conditions into many families of this population sector.

Our data show that family incomes have increased, both because of rising per capita earnings and because more women and minors have entered the labor market. At the same time, it was observed that some families, particularly hard-core urban nonwhites, have grown economically worse off. Our analysis indicated that although growing affluence functioned to improve the material conditions of family life, gainful employment of multiple family members tends to affect systems of family relations and function.

All indicators show that the educational level of all sectors of the population is rising steadily. However, the data reveal that nonwhites lag some two years behind whites, that the gap is wider at higher levels and that it is likely to increase even more in the years just ahead. We judge that increasing education will accrue favorably to the welfare of North Carolina families, yet nonwhites will derive less benefit than whites from this resource.

Finally, available data indicate that the number of individuals and families on public welfare has changed little in recent years. We cannot ascertain for sure whether this reflects rising general affluence and well-being or whether it reflects increasing stringency of welfare regulations. All the evidence points to the existence of a continuing hard core of economically and socially disadvantaged families. Whether or not the number of such families is increasing, we find it more and more difficult to ignore or tolerate their problems in the midst of affluence and advancement.

1. See among other sources Cavan, Ruth S., The American Family (New York: Crowell, 1963).
Himes, Joseph S., The Study of Sociology (Glencview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1968) pp. 217-220.
2. In The University of North Carolina News Letter, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, December, 1963, "Population Movement To and From North Carolina," Table 1, it is shown that between 1955 and 1960 the state had a net loss of 33,706 whites and 42,829 nonwhites.
3. Eighteenth Census, Characteristics of the Population, Vol. I, Part 35, Table 49, pp. 35-168.
4. Searles, Ruth, "Women Workers in North Carolina," The University of North Carolina News Letter, Vol. 48, No. 4, October, 1964.
5. North Carolina Board of Public Health, Vital Statistics 1966, Section A, Table A-6, p. 28.
6. Divorce Statistics Analysis, United States, Vol. XXI, No. 7, National Center for Health Statistics, H.E.W., p. 4 and p. 35.
7. National Center for Health Statistics, Trends in Illegitimacy, United States 1940-1965, Series 21, No. 15, Table 6, p. 32.
8. Ibid., Table 18 and 19, pp. 51, 53-55.
9. Ibid., Table 15, p. 46.
10. Ibid., Table 26, p. 79.
11. Searles, op. cit.
12. Eighteenth Census, Characteristics of the Population, Vol. I, Part 35, Table 66, pp. 35-183.
13. Searles, op. cit.
14. In this connection see Broom, Leonard and Glenn, Norval, Transformation of the Negro American (New York: Harper and Row, 1955) Chapter 5.
15. Hamilton, Horace C., in The University of North Carolina News Letter, Vol. LI, No. 3, September, 1966 has predicted that between 1966 and 1975 enrollments in institutions of higher learning will increase between 25 percent (low projection) and 46 percent (high projection).

TABLE 1

TOTAL POPULATION, AMOUNT OF CHANGE AND PERCENT OF INCREASE BY COLOR WITH PROJECTIONS OF NORTH CAROLINA POPULATION 1950 - 1985.¹

TOTAL POPULATION				PERCENT INCREASE	
Year	Population*	Amount of Increase	Percent Increase	White	Nonwhite
1950	4,062			18.7	7.7
1955	4,319	257	6.3	7.3	3.6
1960	4,556	237	5.5	6.1	3.4
1965	4,816	260	5.7	6.0	3.5
1970	4,978	162	3.3		
1975	5,596	618	12.4		
1980	5,948	352	6.3		
1985	6,386	438	7.3		

¹ Sources: Population for 1950 through 1965 from North Carolina Vital Statistics 1966, Section A, Tables A-1, p. 12, and A-2, p. 13.

Population estimates for 1970 through 1985 from 1980

Population Projections for North Carolina Counties, North Carolina Department of Conservation and Development, 1964, Table, p. 3.

*Population stated in thousands.

TABLE 3

PERCENT OF POPULATION UNDER 15, 15 - 29, AND 65 AND OLDER BY COLOR, NORTH CAROLINA 1940 - 1960.

Year	WHITE			NONWHITE		
	Under 15 ¹	15 - 29 ²	65 And Older ³	Under 15	15 - 29	65 And Older
1940	31.3	29.5	4.6	35.5	31.4	3.9
1950	30.4	26.2		37.4	26.2	
1960	30.8	22.7	7.9	41.0	21.5	5.4

¹ Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Characteristics of the Population, Vol. 2, 1952, pp. 33-40.
For 1960 figure, U. S. Bureau of the Census, North Carolina Detailed Characteristics, 1960, Table 94, pp. 35 ff.

² Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1950, p. 37.
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1966, p. 27 for 1960 figure.

³ Sixteenth Census, 1940, Characteristics of the Population, Table 8a, p. 274.
Eighteenth Census 1960, Characteristics of the Population, Vol. I, Part 35, Table 17, p. 35-42.

TABLE 2

TOTAL POPULATION, PERCENT INCREASE AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE IN EIGHT NORTH CAROLINA METROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES, 1960 - 1965.¹

City	1960* Population	1965* Population	Percent Change	Natural Increase	Net Migration
Asheville	130	143	9.7	7.0	6.0
Charlotte	317	360	13.7	29.0	15.0
Durham	112	123	10.0	8.0	4.0
Fayetteville	148	193	30.2	24.0	20.0
Greensboro-High Point	247	267	8.4	20.0	1.0
Raleigh	169	195	15.2	14.0	11.0
Wilmington	92	95	3.3	6.0	-3.0
Winston-Salem	189	207	9.2	15.0	2.0

* Stated in thousands.

¹ Statistical Abstract of the United States 1967, Table 15, pp. 18-20.

TABLE 4

NUMBER AND PERCENT INCREASE OF HOUSEHOLDS, PERCENT INCREASE OF POPULATION, AND PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD, BY COLOR, NORTH CAROLINA, 1940 - 1960.¹

Year	Number ²		% Increase		% Increase of Population		Persons Per Household	
	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite
1940	586	205	—	—	—	—	4.31	4.82
1950	758	236	29.3	9.3	16.2	6.4	3.79	4.63
1960	954	250	25.8	9.7	13.8	7.2	3.44	4.50

¹ Source: P C (1) - B -- General Population Characteristics, Table 19.

² Stated in thousands.

TABLE 5

MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES WITH RATES PER THOUSAND, NORTH CAROLINA, 1955 - 1967.¹

Year	MARRIAGES		DIVORCES	
	Number	Rate	Number	Rate
1955	—	7.3	—	—
1956	26,345	6.0	—	—
1957	25,882	5.8	—	—
1958	27,266	6.1	5,392	1.2
1959	29,986	6.7	6,369	1.4
1960	31,663	6.9	6,047	1.3
1961	32,158	6.9	6,440	1.4
1962	33,968	7.3	6,879	1.5
1963	35,450	7.5	7,319	1.6
1964	36,790	7.7	7,225	1.5
1965	40,667	8.4	11,160	2.3
1966	43,482	8.9	11,414	2.3
1967	45,145	9.2	11,983	2.4

¹ Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Special Report.

TABLE 6

LIVE BIRTHS PER 1,000 OF POPULATION ¹ AND PERCENT OF ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS ² BY COLOR, NORTH CAROLINA 1940 - 1965.

Year	LIVE BIRTHS		PER CENT ILLEGITIMATE		
	Total	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite
1940	22.5	21.3	25.8	2.0	19.0
1945	24.9	23.7	27.9	3.0	18.0
1950	26.2	23.5	33.6	2.0	16.0
1955	26.7	24.1	34.3	2.0	18.0
1960	24.1	22.1	29.8	2.0	19.0
1965	20.3	18.3	26.2	3.0	26.0

¹ Source: North Carolina Department of Public Health, Vital Statistics 1966, Section A, Tables A-1 and A-2, pp. 12-13.

² Source: North Carolina Department of Public Welfare, Selected Indicators for Maternal and Child Health Programming in North Carolina, February, 1967, Figure 6, p. 21.

TABLE 7

NEONATAL, INFANT AND MATERNAL DEATH RATES,² BY COLOR, NORTH CAROLINA, 1940 - 1965. ¹

Year	NEONATAL		INFANT		MATERNAL	
	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite
1940	30.6	39.5	49.8	73.8	39.6	75.7
1945	23.1	28.7	37.5	55.5	18.7	49.1
1950	18.6	25.7	26.7	49.7	6.4	22.3
1955	16.5	25.6	22.6	45.8	3.1	18.8
1960	16.5	28.2	22.3	52.4	2.1	12.5
1965	16.9	26.5	22.0	48.2	1.8	8.6

¹ Source: North Carolina Board of Public Health, Vital Statistics 1966, Section A, Table A-2, p. 13.

² Rates per 1,000. Neonatal = under 28 days, Infant = under 1 year.

TABLE 8

PER CAPITA INCOME AND AVERAGE MONTHLY PAYMENTS FOR OAA, FADC AND APTD, NORTH CAROLINA 1940 - 1965.

Year	Per Capita ¹ Income	OAA ²	AFDC	APTD
1940	\$ 328	\$10.00	\$15.79	—
1945	821	11.84	22.96	—
1950	1,012	21.82	42.74	—
1955	1,285	30.91	60.97	\$36.48
1960	1,562	39.56	75.67	44.50
1965	2,041	52.42	94.58	60.01

¹ Source: Biennial Report, Department of Labor, North Carolina, 1964-66, Table 2, p. 2, stated as an annual figure. In 1965 North Carolina per capita income equalled 74 per cent of the national average.

² Source: Biennial Report of North Carolina State Board of Public Welfare, 1964-66. Table 1, p. 26, stated as monthly grants.

TABLE 9

1959 MEDIAN EARNINGS BY SEX AND BY OCCUPATION ¹

Occupation	Male	Female
Professional, technical, and kindred	\$5,374	\$3,425
Managers, proprietors, officials	5,374	2,521
Farmers and Farm managers	1,249	696
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred	3,587	2,380
Operatives and kindred	2,888	2,179
Laborers, except farm and mine	1,740	1,232
Farm laborers, except unpaid, and farm foreman	616	527

¹ Source: Ruth Searles, "Women Workers in North Carolina," University of North Carolina News Letter, 48:1, October, 1964, Table 2.

TABLE 10

WORK CERTIFICATES ISSUED TO MINORS AND PER CAPITA ANNUAL INCOME, NORTH CAROLINA, 1955 - 1965.

Year	Work Certificates ¹	Annual Income ²
1955	24,295	\$ 1,285
1956	24,224	
1957	21,251	
1958	19,927	
1959	26,536	
1960	25,043	1,562
1961	23,122	
1962	26,640	
1963	30,436	
1964	33,115	
1965	40,604	2,041

¹ Source: Biennial Report, Department of Labor, North Carolina, 1960 - 1962, Table 34, p. 81, and 1964 - 1966, Table 31, p. 71.

² Source: Biennial Report, Department of Labor, North Carolina, 1964 - 1966, Table 2, p. 2.

TABLE 11

PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, AND PERCENTS OF INCREASE, NORTH CAROLINA, 1940 - 1964. ¹

Year	Elementary	Percent Increase	Secondary	Percent Increase
1940	684*	—	202	—
1950	704	2.9	181	10.4
1960	844	18.3	261	44.2
1964	848	.5	319	22.2

¹ Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1965, Table 170, p. 123.

* Stated in thousands.

TABLE 12

MEDIAN NUMBER OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING COMPLETED FOR POPULATION 24 AND OLDER BY COLOR.¹

Year	Median years completed	
	White	Nonwhite
1940	7.7	5.1
1950	8.6	5.9
1960	9.8	7.0

¹ Source: For 1940, U. S. Bureau of the Census, Characteristics of the Population, Vol. 2, Table 20, pp. 33-34.

For 1950, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1960, p. 111.

For 1960, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1966, p. 114.

TABLE 14

OLD AGE ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS, FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN, AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN, 1959,¹ 1962² AND 1966.³

Assistance Category	1959	1962	1966
Old Age Assistance	49,447	45,254	39,800
Dependent Families	26,029	27,845	25,700
Dependent Children	79,595	85,878	80,700

¹ Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1960, Table 381, p. 290.

² Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1963, Table 411, p. 307.

³ Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1967, Table 434, p. 305.

TABLE 13

RELATIONSHIPS OF FAMILY INCOME, EDUCATION OF ADULTS (25 AND OLDER), AND PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE WITH HIGH SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATES (PERCENT 14-17 ENROLLED), COLLEGE ENTRANCE RATES, FOR WHITES AND NEGROES, 1963.¹

Socioeconomic Variables	No. of Counties		Percent Counties with High School Enrollment of .78 or Over		Percent Counties with College Entrance Rate of .33 or Over	
	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite
Family Income						
\$4,500 or More	24		62.5		79.2	
\$3,500-\$4,499	41		51.2		48.8	
Below \$3,500	19		36.8		21.1	
\$2,500 or More		23		73.9		69.6
Below \$2,500		61		78.6		88.1
Median Education						
9.5 or More	39		39.0		7.44	
Below 9.5	45		44.4		31.1	
7.0 or More		40		65.0		57.5
Below 7.0		44		29.5		47.7
Per Pupil Expenditure						
\$220 or More	32		53.1		62.5	
Below \$220	52		50.0		44.2	
\$185 or More		38		65.8		63.2
Below \$185		46		39.1		43.5

¹ Source: N. Richard Cramer and Satoshi Ito, "Research Report on School Dropouts," University of North Carolina News Letter, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, November, 1963, Tables 1 & 2.

TABLE 15

TOTAL CHILD PLACEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1956 - 1957 THROUGH 1965 - 1966.¹

Year	Total Placements
1956-57	1,563
1957-58	1,677
1958-59	1,686
1959-60	2,317
1960-61	2,068
1961-62	2,214
1962-63	2,362
1963-64	2,419
1964-65	2,463
1965-66	2,678

¹ Source: State Board of Public Welfare, North Carolina, Biennial Report, 1964-66, Table 19, p. 62.

DISCUSSION: "FAMILY TRENDS IN NORTH CAROLINA"

Mrs. Elizabeth C. Corkey, MD, MPH
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Projected figures for population change and growth are interesting, and I always hope I will be alive to see how truly the statisticians prophesied. The expected population increase between 1970 and 1975 appears to be based on the assumption that present fertility rates will apply to the females already born but who will reach the childbearing age in that period. I question whether this will be so. The figures from our family planning clinic indicate that the age group 20-29 is best represented in the clinic population with the cohort 15-19 close behind. An estimated sixty-eight percent of the eligible non-white population have enrolled. A community survey shows that comparable numbers of white women in this age group are using birth control from various sources including the clinic. With increasing availability of dependable and acceptable methods of birth control, I expect a decrease in fertility rates among young women.

In our experience the fertility rates for young married women appear to have decreased faster than those for young single women which may account for the higher *percentage* of illegitimate births observed. We can hope for a decrease in repeat births to unwed mothers as birth control methods are more acceptable. Once she has proved her fertility, a woman may be less willing to "take a chance."

The larger number of one-parent families, usually headed by women, in the non-white population may be related to the fact that non-white women tend to keep their illegitimate children. White illegitimate infants are more likely to be adopted into stable families, often superior in affluence and/or intellect to the families of the natural parents.

One cannot disagree with Dr. Himes' conclusions that despite rising educational levels and levels of per capita family income, there remains a continuing hard core of economically and socially disadvantaged families.

It is tempting to suggest simplistic solutions, e.g., no childbearing until marriage, no marriage until family income is adequate for minimal decent living standards, and no divorce until a way is found to support two households instead of one! Such a highly "reasonable" or "moralistic" approach does not meet the temper of the times or the nature of the people. Another simplistic approach is the guaranteed annual income irrespective of employment. No one in this country mentions the approach of totalitarian countries in which everyone is employed where the state wants him at the state-determined wage.

A number of questions suggest themselves. Would increased income encourage unwed fathers to marry the mothers of their children and set up stable homes? Would the unwed mothers want to marry the fathers of their children? My impression from talking with these men and women is that many of them would not. Despite the influence of poverty and poor education, the basic family problems are failure to establish affectional relationships which can withstand the divisive pressures of time, human fickleness, disagreements, illness, and whatever else comes. These problems exist in families at all levels of affluence but undoubtedly poverty increases the pressures. Only among the saints do we find poverty strengthening the bonds of affection. And, as the little girl asked, "Mother, why are all the saints dead?"

DISCUSSION: "FAMILY TRENDS IN NORTH CAROLINA"

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As a new-comer to the state of North Carolina, I appreciate this fine paper concerning changes in the families in this state. In many respects the changes that Dr. Himes describes are typical of changes that are taking place in families across the nation. Even the divorce rate is approaching the national average. An interesting question can be raised here: do changes in the divorce laws of a state always result in a change in the number of divorces granted?

One of the important trends in North Carolina is that the family is becoming more urban. What implications for family life will this have in the coming decades in terms of family stability, housing, female employment, and family size?

Dr. Himes noted that the non-white per capita income is not keeping pace with the white per capita income in North Carolina. One aspect of this problem is that there are more non-white children under fifteen years of age than white children. Thus, there is a smaller proportion of non-white wage-earners to support the non-white population.

It was also noted that the differential in the level of education between whites and non-whites is increasing. The higher rate of migration of non-whites out of the state, presumably among younger and more educated persons, could partially account for this growing differential.

We who are interested in the family should be grateful to Dr. Himes for his detailed study and for his calling our attention to the facts of the inequities among the families of North Carolina.

DISCUSSION: "FAMILY TRENDS IN NORTH CAROLINA"

The Rev. Alvord M. Beardslee
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
I am neither a family man nor a North Carolinian; but as an envious outsider and neighbor, I am pleased to make some comments on the value implications of changes like these.

We are always in danger of assuming we know what we mean by our word or implied judgment of "immoral." Is it immoral to change from the old ways? Do we know eternal values from which any change is wrong? Change is not wicked, but honest evaluation of reality can be therapeutic and useful. Examples of these factors are seen in such phrases as "true families," "female head of household," and "universal and early marriage."

Social and moral attitudes toward illegitimacy -- perhaps more common among black young women -- and abortion -- perhaps more common among white women -- suggest a different attitude toward visible and invisible sin. Perhaps peer support replaces social approval in making illegitimate activity legitimate.

Our Human Relations Council in Roanoke, Virginia, has worked as many other similar groups have done to get the pictures of black brides into the local newspapers. The importance of this minor social change can be seen from the comments of white churchwomen I have approached on the matter: "Oh, I didn't know that they got married. I thought that's why we had to spend so much tax money on welfare!"

In regard to the "female head of household," the magazine articles written for women are revealing. The woman blames herself and not her absent husband for her unsuccessful (homosexual or alcoholic) son, blaming herself for not being a father to him too.



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URBANIZATION AND CHANGING FAMILY STYLES

What I have to say regarding urbanization and family styles will confine itself to a broad historical and international perspective and will convey my general impressions as a world traveler. One of my friends once said that, whereas most family study and research today is undertaken with a microscope, I tend to approach the subject with a telescope!

First, I will sketch the relationship between urbanization and the family in the broad span of human history. I will then focus somewhat on urbanization and the family in what Floyd Dell described as "the machine age." Finally, I will look at the new family styles that seem to be emerging as a result of urbanization and their implications for family workers and specialists.

Let me explain the sense in which I will use the terms *rural* and *urban*. In their generic meaning, these words are geographically oriented; they refer respectively to the country and to the city. What we are concerned about here, though, is not geography but life styles; so I shall use the words in a cultural framework. I prefer to talk about "rural-agricultural" and "urban-industrial." The word "urban" comes from the Latin word *urbs*, which means a city. Cities were in existence long before the industrial era. Before Rome, there were the Greek city-states; and even the most ancient civilizations had cities. Those cities were not urban in our modern sense; they were simply centers of organization for rural communities. The city was surrounded by, and supported by, the farming communities for which it provided a geographical center. The city served four purposes. It was the seat of government, and it stood for order. It was the channel of communication -- if one wanted to know what was going on, he went up to the city; or if he wanted to consult an authority on some question, he was likely to find him there. The city was also the center of commerce, providing means for the exchange of goods. It was also the focal point of defense -- when invaders ravaged the land, the people took refuge in the city which was usually surrounded by a wall and provided with means for organized resistance.

The life style of these ancient cities was, however, rural. It was the coming of industry and technology that brought about the change. Lenin said that Russia would become a modern country as soon as electricity was carried into the villages; and he proved to be right. Modern technological inventions like the automobile, the telephone, and the mass media have extended the urban-industrial life styles out into the country. The United States Census Bureau defines a community as rural when its population is under 2,500 persons. Even when it is talking about rural communities, it divides them into farm and non-farm. Implicit in this distinction is the fact that plenty of people living in rural territory are highly urban in their way of life.

Urbanization and the Family in Human History

The history of man can conveniently be divided into three major eras, separated by two major cultural mutations. First was the nomadic era, although the fact that people wandered about was not so central as the fact that they secured their food by gathering and hunting it and therefore had to be mobile. This was the stage that has been dramatically delineated by a recent British writer who talks about the "naked ape." Man was poorly provided with defenses, and his life was one long battle against the superior forces of nature which threatened to destroy him. His struggle was constantly for survival.

This era came to an end in the cultural mutation in which man discovered he could do better by settling on the land. He learned to cultivate its produce and to domesticate some of the animals. With crops and herds, he could provide himself with a stock of food and develop some security. Instead of fighting a hostile nature, he had learned now to cooperate with nature. The bare struggle for survival had become a planned way of life in which man could achieve security and continuity. This rural-agricultural era spans most of recorded human history, and it has had the most profound effect upon the shaping of all our human institutions.

The third era is the one in which we are now living, the urban-industrial. It was ushered in by what we call the Industrial Revolution which has spanned a mere two hundred years. The second cultural mutation came when man discovered that he could do better than cooperate with nature. By his scientific insight he could harness nature and subdue it to his will. Now it was that people flocked from the land to the cities, and a new and complex pattern of life began to develop. Now the goals of security and continuity began to be surrendered for those of the "good life" and the enjoyment of abundance.

We are interested in the role of the family during these phases of human development. We know little about the first era, except that logic strongly suggests that mutual support, cooperation, and survival would have been better provided by family groups than by the isolated struggles of individuals. Since well-defined family patterns occur widely among sub-human species, we can be fairly certain that the family played a role in that early human period.

In the rural-agricultural era, however, we know that the family became the central institution. The Old Testament furnishes a clear example of this. The Hebrews were called the "children of Israel." This was no use of poetic language. It was the literal fact that the whole nation emerged from the loins of one man, and the people were bound together in a deep solidarity based on mutual kinship. This is the almost universal pattern of early and primitive human communities: they are related by blood within family constellations which remain familial in character even when they grow into large clans and tribes. For the most part they live on the land and find their strongest focus of unity in territorial defense.

We need to remember that the family is closely related to human culture and that the family and the culture must be in tune with each other and must support each other. The role of the family is to produce new individuals who will take up the tasks of the culture and defend the mores. The family must therefore raise children who believe in the goals of the culture and accept its rules and standards. Where the family and the culture are out of harmony with each other, a grim battle must be fought until equilibrium is re-established. We have seen this going on in the Communist cultures of our time.

Because the agricultural way of life is static and depends upon a hierarchical pattern of relationships, rural-agricultural families have always tended to be authoritarian and usually patriarchal. Their qualities have been those that supported their endurance. They have been static, conservative, and strongly opposed to change. They have been closed groups, exclusive and suspicious of strangers. They have exercised an iron rule over their members, ruthlessly casting out those who asserted their individuality as rebels or as innovators. The resulting structure has made for great strength, stability, and continuity.

These characteristics of the rural-agricultural family style could be extensively illustrated. Mate selection, for instance, is undertaken by "arrangement" by the parents, for the purpose of marriage is seen not as individual satisfaction but as the preservation of the family tradition. Marriage is structured to avoid interpersonal conflict, by making one of the mates dominant over the other and by keeping their functions separate and distinctive. Parenthood consists essentially in the task of "molding" children to be obedient conformists, dutifully performing their prescribed roles. There is no need to elaborate further.

The coming of the Industrial Revolution threw this compact and rigid structure into the wildest disorder. As families left the land and streamed to the cities, their traditional patterns were strained to the breaking point and proved to be unserviceable in the new conditions. Blake, the English poet, spoke of the "dark satanic mills." Gandhi, the Indian visionary, seeing the chaos wrought by industry, called India back to the simplicity of the spinning wheel. But nothing could stop the momentum that industry had set up, and a whole new and strange way of life opened up for the human race.

This spelled doom to the patriarchal system, at least in its overt form. Rigid institutions could no longer survive, for the test of survival now was adaptability and not stability. Besides, as closed cultures gave way to open cultures, the task of the family underwent subtle change. It was as if, for all practical purposes, the human race had been violently plucked from the planet to which they had adjusted themselves and thrown down on a new planet where the environment for living was vastly different.

We are in the midst now of this vast cultural mutation, and I do not need to describe it in detail. What we are seeing is the emergence of what Clark Vincent has called the "adaptive function" of the family. Individual families are breaking down, sometimes to an alarming extent; but it is dangerously inaccurate to say that the family itself is breaking down. It is, in fact, adjusting to radically changed conditions, which is a very healthy process. Faced with the alternatives of bending or breaking, it is choosing to bend.

Sometimes the rate of change is too fast, and there is confusion. I have a favorite story about a boy who was given a chameleon as a present. Fascinated, he proceeded to put it to the test. He laid it on a red rug, and it turned red. He put it on a green rug, and it turned green; then he put it on a blue rug and it obediently turned blue. Delighted, he then thought of a more severe test. Fetching his aunt's tartan rug from the closet, he put the chameleon down. The chameleon turned, in rapid succession, red, green, and blue -- and then exploded!

I have seen this happen to families undergoing social change too quickly in African cities and in some Asian cities also. Violent detribalization has the immediate result of breaking down family ties so severely that relationships between men and women disintegrate in chaotic disorder. But after a while, a process of polarization tends to occur; and there is some regrouping of primary relationships into family constellations, although the constellations tend to be different in character because of the changed environment.

We need to stress the fact that the changes in family structure that we are seeing about us are healthy and hopeful. The old type of family was magnificent within its rural-agricultural setting; but its survival today would serve no useful purpose. Most of its utilitarian functions have already been stripped from it and are assumed by the wider community.

The old family gained strength by its hostile attitude to the "out-group," an attitude impossible to maintain in an international and ecumenical era. The old family resisted change with stubborn determination, an attitude which today would be the enemy of progress. The old family suppressed

individuality, which today would be regarded as highly anti-democratic. The plain, inescapable fact is that the family of the new era has profoundly different roles and functions than those which were the glory of the past.

Anyway, it is useless to resist the vast processes of change in which we are all caught up. A community that refused to accept electricity, like the Amish farmers in Pennsylvania, may hold out for a while in a last heroic defense; but refusal to enter the Twentieth Century is a barren and abortive application of human energy and effort.

Urbanization and the Family in the Machine Age

Many Americans do not realize that it is quite hard to see at firsthand the real meaning of the vast changes from rural-agricultural to urban-industrial patterns of living for the simple reason that the United States is now in the very last stages of the continuum. One simply has to go to the developing countries to be confronted with the realities. No description can really convey the experience of living for a time in an extended family in the Orient or in an African kraal.

What are the facts about American urbanization? In 1810, the population of the United States was ninety-three percent rural and seven percent urban. A century later, it was fifty-four percent rural and forty-six percent urban. Since 1910, there has been a vast flight from the farms, which competent observers describe as the greatest single migration in the whole of human history. In the twenty years from 1940 to 1960 seventeen million people moved away from the farms, and fifteen million remained.¹ For the present decade, 1960 to 1970, the sources I have consulted vary in their estimates. One estimate, based on the 1960 Census, predicts that ten million more people will leave the farms in this period.² Senator Abraham Ribicoff reports that eight hundred and fifty thousand people left the farms in 1967, that at the present time fewer than eleven million people remain on the farms, and half of those may be expected to leave in the next fifteen years.³ No matter which figures we accept, they all point relentlessly in the same direction. The President's Budget Message in 1965 said, "Farming alone cannot be expected to provide a decent living in the future for more than one million farm families, even with government assistance."

What is happening can be pinpointed. In Louisiana, a rural state, there were in 1940 a total of one hundred and thirty-five thousand persons employed on the land but in 1960 only thirty-two thousand, a reduction to less than one-quarter. Even more dramatic are the figures concerning Negro farm workers. In 1910, eighty-one percent of all American Negroes lived in the rural South. By 1960, only twenty-seven percent were left there, the remaining seventy-three percent being located in cities, mainly in the North.⁴ Since Negro families have never recovered from the effects of slavery and are manifestly insecure, and since the city ghetto probably represents the most destructive conditions in which families can try to survive, it is little wonder that Negro families are in trouble.

Recall now that I said at the beginning that geographical movement does not correspond with cultural change. It is not simply that people from the country have moved in vast numbers to the city. What is really significant for us is that the family style of the city has now almost completely invaded the ranks of farm workers. I recently talked with a research man in the Department of Agriculture whose task is to estimate farming potentials by use of the computer. In other words, today's farmer is scientific in his orientation. As Wattenburg puts it, "Once, perhaps, our farmers and farm areas were rustic, secluded, and separate . . . Today, our farmer not only has close kin in the city but, like the rest of us, is assailed, informed, persuaded by urban television, urban politicians, by a thoroughly urban culture . . . The farmer's wife too is now exposed to the big, citified world . . . Apparently she yearns to take part in the city life but is, in fact, stuck out on the farm."⁵

Even this is not the whole picture. The concept of a straight-line migration from country to city is not correct. The change must be represented by a nearly-closed circle. In fact, the 1960 Census showed that the big cities are static in their populations. What has been happening for a long time is that impoverished groups have moved into the cities and provided cheap labor until they could better themselves and afford to

move out into the suburbs. This has happened with successive waves of immigrants, and in a sense the Negroes in our cities today *are* immigrants from a foreign sub-culture who will in due course follow the recurring pattern of moving out to the suburbs. The movement is not only to the suburbs. It is likely ultimately to be back to the rural areas but with completely different life styles and family styles from those that were traditionally rural-agricultural. I take the view that this trend should be actively encouraged as the real solution for our big city problems today; and I am supported by a recent Gallup poll which showed that only half the people living in central cities today would continue to live there if they had a choice.

I have indicated that nothing in the American scene can truly delineate the change that has overtaken families in the machine age. In order to dramatize my point, let me share with you the findings of a seminar I conducted in Kenya, in East Africa, earlier this year. The members of the seminar were twenty Africans, from eight different countries, with whom my wife and I lived continuously for one month in a training and learning experience. One morning we had a kind of "brain-storming session" in which the group, from their own experience and observation, listed the main contrasts between family living on the land and in the city. In the thirteen areas which they readily identified, the contrasts were so great that they were in most cases opposites. That list follows:

RURAL AND URBAN FAMILIES IN AFRICA

FAMILY FEATURE	RURAL-AGRICULTURAL	URBAN-INDUSTRIAL
Source of Livelihood	Land produce (exchange)	Income earned by labor
Housing and Furnishings	Plentiful and cheap	Scarce and very dear
Work Patterns	Together - mutual dependence	Separate - - independence
Formal Education	Not important - farming skills sufficient	Important for earning power
Recreation	Home-produced, inexpensive	Mass-produced, expensive
Type of Marriage	Polygamy favored	Monogamy favored
Family Type	Extended family favored	Nuclear family favored
Mobility	Undesirable, difficult	Desirable, Unproductive
Children	Inexpensive to raise, productive	Expensive to raise, unproductive
Social Life	Concentrated- - together	Fragmented- - separate
Kinship Ties	Strong and tight	Weak and loose
Economy	Producing unit	Consuming unit
Primary Goal	Physical survival, mutual protection	Emotional security identity

New Family Styles and Their Implications

Because space and time are limited, I will condense what I wish to say about new family styles and their implications. We have seen clearly that, in this period of cultural transition, family roles are changing. Some are diminishing in importance, some are increasing. Let me give some illustrations in each category, listing the decreasing roles first.

The *traditional utilitarian functions* are decreasing. The first of these is survival, followed closely by protection, health, and economic security; then come education, training in work skills, religious faith, recreation, and a host of others. Nearly all of these functions have been progressively moving from the family, to be provided by the highly organized urban community of today.

Decreasing is the *rigid control of man-woman relationships*. Since in rural-agricultural cultures all errant sexual behavior was regarded as a direct threat to family security and solidarity, moral standards were firmly and rigidly imposed; and sexual freedom outside marriage was forbidden and driven underground. Freedom of divorce was limited and strictly controlled in accordance with family goals. In place of this, we are seeing today the emergence of a pattern which I have described as the "three-layer cake." This consists of the flexible co-existence of three tolerated patterns. The first is that which is practiced by a group of people who find their sexual satisfactions, and their love relationships, outside of formal marriage and tend to move freely in and out of liaisons. The second layer consists of persons who consider themselves justified in moving in and out of marriage according to their wishes and preferences, the quality of relationships they achieve being for them a stronger imperative than the need to maintain stability. The third group consists of those who follow the traditional loyalty to lifelong and faithful monogamy. Whether we like it or not, our society is already divided into these three layers, and the traditional legal restraints which tried to keep everyone at the third level have become increasingly ineffectual.

Exclusive parental functions are decreasing. There is a widespread misconception in our Western cultures that the nuclear family is the human norm. This in fact is not so. Anyone who knows the extended family in the East, and the African *kraal*, is aware that children in these traditional settings, while their primary links are to their mother and father, grow up in fact with multiple identifications with parent figures. This has obvious advantages which are lost in the tight, close-knit nuclear family, which is excellent for good parents and terrible for bad parents. The evidences are strong that we are now returning to the concept of multiple distribution of parental functions. The child of today is born in a hospital, spends a good part of his early years in a day-care center, begins his education earlier than previously in a kindergarten, spends a twelve year stretch in his most impressionable stage of development in a school, and in the summer often goes off to camp. Margaret Mead has even gone so far as to say that children of today are raised by the mass media and the peer group, while their parents look on helpless and bewildered!

There are other family roles that are greatly increasing in importance. *Marriage as companionship* is notable in this group. Everyone familiar with the traditional rural-agricultural family patterns is aware that the term "relationship" applied to husband and wife often had a very tenuous significance. The solidarity of the kinship group was such that a husband would discuss his affairs, and his troubles, with a male relative rather than with his wife; and the wife would find her companionship and emotional support among women of the household. Marriage was not identified with romance and was not expected to yield personal fulfillment, unless as an unexpected bonus.

Today, as Burgess and Locke have reminded us, companionship has become the goal of marriage. Paul C. Glick has expressed it well. He says,

"The more I study the subject, the more apparent it becomes: marriage is regarded as the happiest, healthiest and most desired state of human existence. We get divorced not because we don't like marriage but to find a better marriage partner. We live longer and are healthier if we are married. More of us are getting married, more of us are staying married longer and we are getting married younger. Marriage is the central fact of our lives."⁶

So the focus in marriage today is to achieve success in what I call "relationship-in-depth." To this end we are amassing new knowledge, we are striving to provide better marriage preparation, better marriage counseling services. The emphasis is on quality. Insofar as stability in marriage is still our goal, we are recognizing that it must be achieved by internal cohesion, for we can no longer procure it by external coercion.

Creative parent-child relations are increasing. In this area we are in the midst of a painful transition. The old concept of parenthood as the task of molding the child to a predetermined pattern is proving more and more unworkable, as it should in an era in which personal identity and autonomy are the primary values. However painfully, the shift is taking place; and we are seeing highly successful patterns of parent-child relationship in some of the enlightened young families of today, where the hostilities and enmities are replaced by close and warm cooperation from the parent in the child's developmental task of learning to handle freedom with responsibility.

This development comes none too soon. In an affluent, leisure-oriented, noncompetitive society, individual motivations and goals will be not toward achievement and advancement but toward creativity and the capacity to relate significantly to others. The massive task of raising children for this kind of life will have to be performed by parents who are equipped for it.

Emotional security and support are increasing. In the big, highly complex world that is now taking shape, relationships are in danger of sinking to a limited transactional level. The air hostess will be charming during the flight but totally indifferent to the individual passenger once he has disembarked. The clerk in the store will be solicitous in helping the customer furnish a bedroom but will have no concern for what goes on in it after it is furnished. What Robert Ardrey calls the "amity-enmity complex" may be dissolving into a vague and pervasive atmosphere of superficial goodwill; but if this dispenses with our need for enmity, it does not meet our craving for amity. So the new function for the "in-group" is not to provide survival and protection from disaster but to provide affection, intimacy, acceptance, identity, and a continuing sense of personal worth. All the evidences are that this need will be progressively intensified as our world becomes more vast and more impersonal.

As I see it, our great need as family workers and specialists is to understand very clearly what is happening to us, as we settle down to the urban-undustrial era and the changes in our way of life which it inevitably involves. We need to understand the emerging new family life styles and to realize that they are not manifestations of failure or degeneration, but they are the results of healthy adaptation and are appropriate to the new world in which we are learning to live. From that comfortable acceptance, we can move to help people to prepare themselves for these new family styles and to succeed in them. This, then is our task; and I believe it can keep us fully and fruitfully occupied for a long time to come.

Perhaps I can appropriately close with a stanza from an American poet and philosopher, James Russell Lowell:

"New occasions teach new duties;
Time makes ancient good uncouth;
They must upward still, and onward
Who would keep abreast of Truth."

1. Wattenberg, Ben J., This U. S. A.: An Unexpected Family Portrait . . . (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965) p. 77.


2. Ibid.

3. Ribicoff, Abraham A., "Needed: New Directions for Rural America," Reader's Digest, September, 1968, p. 108.

4. Wattenburg, op. cit., p. 78.

5. Ibid., p. 79.

6. Ibid., p. 83.



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RURAL ROOTS OF URBAN DISORDERS

Most of us grew up believing that if we really wanted something we could set our minds to it, work hard, and get it. In other words, we believed that we had the power to achieve that which we desired. There is an ever increasing number of people in our society, however, who do not believe that. They say that people are poor because "the system" makes it impossible for them to escape from their circumstances. As I heard this over and over in testimony before the President's National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty, I asked myself, "What are these people trying to tell me? What do they mean by 'the system'?" I concluded that they were talking about the lack of power. Their view was that the poor do not have within their control the economic, social, or political power to rise above their present circumstances.

We cannot say to a man, "This much of what you are is the result of 'the system' and this much of what you are is the result of your own decisions and circumstances." We do know, however, that in our dynamic society structural changes over which individuals have little or no control and which do in fact have quite serious implications for them are continuously taking place. Unless we understand the processes of development we shall be unable to understand and choose wisely among the options that will be available to us in the future.

This nation has been able to achieve an abundance of food and fiber through the commitment of large amounts of resources to discover and use ever more productive means of producing and distributing farm products. We take our food and fiber for granted. We know that there is an abundance, but we do not stop to ask how it was obtained.

Most of the improvements in production are capital-using. They increase the productivity of capital and provide incentives to use more capital in production processes. On the other hand, the changes in technology are labor-saving. By increasing the productivity of capital relative to that of labor, they provide incentives to substitute capital for labor in production processes. Many of the improvements in technology require large investments. This is particularly true of machinery and equipment. Much of it cannot be purchased economically if it is to be operated only for short periods of time. The purchasers usually seek to

obtain a size of business consistent with efficient operation of the machinery employed. Thus, technological improvements not only make it possible for a man to produce more but provide an incentive for him to do so in order to use the technology efficiently.

The vast improvements in technology have given us an abundance of food and fiber and they have been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the amount of capital employed in farming, destruction of farm jobs, a transfer of human resources from agriculture, and widespread merger of farming operations; but the forces have not stopped at the farm boundary. They have altered the entire structure of rural America.

These forces have made similar impact upon many industries in the United States. The impact has been particularly heavy, however, in the natural resource-based industries of farming, forestry, fishing, and mining. All of these industries are located predominantly in the rural areas. Since other jobs have not been created to offset the decline in employment in the natural resource-based industries, technological change has been accompanied by a decrease in employment in the rural areas. Technological changes also have had a very pronounced impact upon rural communities. The new techniques of production, transportation and communication have greatly increased the market area served by firms. Today, a distributor of farm equipment services a much larger area than he did in the old days, and a buyer of farm products has a much larger market area. What we have done is to pull activities out of small towns and regroup them into larger towns and cities.

The Commission on Rural Poverty had access to one study showing that for some of the midwest, the economically viable community today is one hundred times as large as it was fifty years ago. As many farm related jobs have been transferred from rural villages, they have been left behind as empty shells having little or no economic viability.

Because economic growth has been more effective in destroying jobs than in creating jobs in rural areas, a large share of our counties in rural areas have fewer people working today than they had twenty-five years ago. The rural areas, therefore, face a real dilemma. The people living there want the same goods and services enjoyed by people living in other areas; but, when employment is less than it was twenty-five years ago, there is little likelihood of being able to provide even the basic services.

There has been less change in local governmental structures than in economic and social structures. We are trying to perform our governmental services with the same basic structure that we had in 1915. There is, therefore, widespread evidence of inferior public services in the schools, hospitals, libraries, and roads. Our government structures are clearly out of context with the economy and with the society in which we live.

The structural changes in rural America have resulted in a massive exodus of people from farms and small villages of the nation. In the 1940's we had 1,300,000 people per year leave the farms to search for jobs elsewhere, a million per year in the 1950's and 750,000 last year. The process continues. The migration during the last thirty years probably represents the most massive migration of human beings ever recorded. The net movement off the farms, not to mention the rural communities, amounted to almost thirty million people, a massive exodus. But it did not concern us as a nation. What did we do to guide these people? What kind of public policy do we have to assist them in deciding where to go?

Off-farm migration operates largely through an informal process dependent largely upon friends and relatives. The results are evident in the patterns established by migrants. The significance of established streams of migrants is demonstrated clearly in a study by Kain and Persky as follows:

"The typical rural Negro lifetime migrant tends to move to large urban areas (greater than a million in population) outside of the South. The white movement is more diffused and has a marked orientation toward medium sized northern cities and the metropolitan areas of the South itself. Fifty-eight percent of Negroes born in the South Atlantic Division and now living elsewhere, live in the four North Eastern SMSA's greater than a million (Buffalo, New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh). Similarly, about forty percent of the Negro lifetime migrants from the East South Central Division have moved to the five East

North Central SMSA's greater than a million (Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Milwaukee). Finally, about thirty-seven percent of the same group from the West South Central Division live in the four Pacific SMSA's greater than a million (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, and Seattle). Thus, not only have Negroes from the South moved to large metropolitan areas, they have moved along clear-cut lines to their destinations, forming at least three major streams, one up the Eastern Seaboard, another up the Mississippi River of Ohio and Michigan, and one westward to California."¹

The migration from the rural areas went on unassisted, undirected and largely unnoticed until in recent years when it exploded in our faces with vengeance. Many of those who fled to the cities became frustrated as what they thought was hope turned to hopelessness. This hopelessness intensified as migration continued and as structural changes began to make an impact upon the central cities that we had not anticipated.

In the last few years, there is increasing evidence that technological and economic changes have altered the role of the central city in society. Even while we were experiencing large scale migration into the central cities, an increasing share of the additions to employment in manufacturing was moving into the suburbs and into the smaller cities. During the late 1940's and early 1950's much of the expansion that took place in manufacturing occurred in the industrialized states of the North -- Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois. These states had fifty-five percent of the employment in manufacturing in 1953. The pattern of growth in manufacturing employment changed significantly beginning in the late 1950's. Between 1956 and 1966, manufacturing employment in the United States increased 1,840,000. In the seven industrial states mentioned above, manufacturing employment increased only 37,000. In contrast, during the same period, manufacturing employment increased 465,000 in the West and 1,026,000 in the South.² Much of this increase occurred in cities of 25,000 to 500,000 population.

The most rapid growth in employment opportunities in the central cities is in the professions. Manpower is needed that is well trained and highly skilled; but the vast majority of those moving from the rural areas to the central cities have little formal education and few skills. They seek employment in unskilled and semiskilled occupations, but the jobs are not to be found. What has emerged is a terrible mismatching of human skills and employment opportunities in the central cities. Many of the people who could not get satisfactory employment in the rural areas and who have moved to the central cities are still seeking satisfactory employment. Many have become disillusioned and frustrated in the promised land.

There is a basic difference, however, in poverty in the central cities and in the rural areas. In the central cities the poor are concentrated, organized, and vocal. They make their wants known, and they get assistance. In contrast, the rural poor are the invisible poor, sparsely settled, unorganized, without leadership; and they are not vocal. Consequently, they receive little assistance. In the rural areas, the low income whites outnumber the nonwhites by three to one; yet they are the most unorganized and unnoticed. They participate least of all in current programs. Unfortunately, most people in the United States now hold the erroneous view that the poverty problem is a problem of black people in central cities. This view affects the kinds of programs developed to fight poverty and the allocation of funds to various areas.

The National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty was disturbed by the concentration of our efforts to combat poverty in the ghettos. It suggests that attempting to fight poverty primarily through a "gilding of the ghettos" is a self-defeating if not a disastrous policy. Assume that we are successful in improving conditions in the larger central cities and that the problems begin to disappear. What happens? Immediately we will create a vacuum into which we will suck untold millions of people coming out of the areas beyond the central cities. In the process we will complicate the very problems we are trying to solve. We cannot escape the fact that there are more poor people in the rural areas than in the central cities.

Of even greater concern to the Commission was the fact that through a policy of concentrating assistance to the poor in the central cities, the nation is saying to the people outside of the metropolitan centers, "If you want assistance, you must move to the large cities or must get better organized. You must

also use more dramatic means of making your wants known." This is a tragic message to send out across the nation. It could have tragic consequences. If we are to avoid such consequences, we must develop programs that are equally effective for all of the needy regardless of residence.

If we are to meet the needs of the poor, we must decide what these needs are. It is frequently stated that, "The poor want food in their stomachs, clothing on their backs, and a roof over their heads." I believe that the poor have four more basic wants. First, and perhaps foremost, they want personal respect. Many of those who have suffered hardships by the structural changes outlined in this paper were ill-equipped to transfer to other occupations. In addition to the economic hardships suffered, many of the poor have encountered insurmountable barriers of economic and social discrimination in seeking alternatives. The poor want to be respected as people. Secondly, those who are poor are seeking social justice. This is a concept that is awfully difficult to define, but basically they seek the same privileges and opportunities enjoyed by others in society. Third, the poor are seeking economic opportunity, a way of earning their own way. Many of them own nothing other than their labor. They are looking for a way to increase their productivity and to obtain satisfactory employment. Fourth, the poor want a political voice. They desire to help to determine their own destiny. They want to be sure that the people who represent them are really making their wants known. In our efforts to develop a program to meet the needs of the people we must keep these needs clearly in mind.

It should be made clear that the Rural Poverty Commission did not regard the development of a peasant agriculture as an effective means of combating poverty in rural areas. People are not going to stay on very small, low income farms over the long pull. Neither did the Commission advocate the development of a village economy. Our society is not structured that way, thanks to modern technology, efficient transportation and swift communication. The Commission felt that the nation must show more concern for industrial location and for more effective ways of bringing people and jobs together.

The Commission gave consideration both to the problems of the rural poor and to the problems of impoverished communities. The immediate needs of the rural poor are emphasized, but the necessity for changing conditions that have made them poor is given even greater emphasis. If we are going to fight poverty successfully, we are going to have to get back to the roots of it. If we concentrate only upon the symptoms we shall fail. We must alter the conditions that create poverty at the same time that we seek to meet the needs of the poor.

The recommendations of the Commission will be discussed under four headings.³ First, the Commission placed emphasis upon creating an environment that will enable all people to have opportunities consistent with their economic potential. It recommended that the nation take such steps as are necessary to assure residents of rural America equality of opportunity with all other citizens. This should include equal access to jobs, medical care, housing, education, welfare and all other public services, without regard to race, religion, or place of residence.

The second major category of the recommendations concerns income support and maintenance. Every effort should be made to provide employment opportunities for those who are able to work. While the Commission emphasized the importance of private enterprise in providing employment, it recognized that private enterprise may not be able to provide employment for all who are willing and able to work at the established minimum wages. The Commission noted many opportunities for expansion in employment in the public sector. It recommended, therefore, that the federal government stand ready to provide jobs at the national minimum wage to every person willing and able to work.

Individuals who cannot earn an income large enough to lift them above the poverty level must be provided with assistance from public sources. Most people probably would prefer assistance in cash to assistance in kind. Cash benefits provide the recipients with greater freedom to choose what they will consume and place more responsibility upon the recipients than do benefits in kind. The Commission recommended that primary emphasis be placed upon cash benefits.

The Commission was concerned over the extreme variation among states and counties in the benefits provided under income support programs. In order to correct some of the basic weaknesses in current programs, it recommended that public welfare programs be operated in accordance with a nationwide needs standard and that the federal government provide the funds to meet the basic needs and the costs of certification in the programs. The state and local governments could supplement the federal support if they choose to do so.

In the case of the food stamp program the cut-off point for families in some states is at a much higher income level than for families in other states. Furthermore, some of these programs are controlled by unsympathetic local governments. As a result some of the most needy counties do not choose to participate. In some welfare programs such as the Aid To Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) and Old Age, Survivors', and Disability Insurance (OASDI) we impose heavy penalties upon those who choose to work. Let me illustrate some of the bad characteristics of the AFDC and school lunch programs by testimony from a lady appearing before the Commission in Memphis. This lady was unemployed. After several years of assistance from AFDC, she enrolled in a job-training course. Upon completion of that course, she could not obtain employment and was advised to take a second and different course. After graduation, she obtained employment. In the process, she had given up any claim to AFDC assistance. After only three weeks of work, the plant released her when it experienced a sharp decline in orders. This left her without income but with children in need who were too proud to admit that they could not pay for what they needed. When questioned about participation in the school lunch program, she replied:

"My son, right now, he is going to school and he can get free lunches, but he don't want them because he feels that his playmates are going to say that he has to accept free lunches. I tell him, 'You get free lunches, eat them, or you don't eat all day.' He won't go in there and get a free lunch because he is thinking about what his little buddies may say. Children are like that."

Unquestionably, this family had been heavily penalized in trying to emerge from the welfare rolls and to earn a better living. Such heavy penalties obviously discourage labor force participation and perpetuate heavy dependence upon the welfare programs. It is my hope that we will change our programs so that the self-image of children and other unfortunate people will not be destroyed. Welfare programs should be structured so that labor force participation is encouraged rather than penalized as in current programs. In order to encourage labor force participation, it was recommended that public assistance recipients be permitted to earn a base amount without reduction in benefits, and that thereafter benefits be reduced not more than fifty cents per dollar increase in earnings. A change of this nature in the benefits schedule would encourage participants to earn as much of their living as they can.

Third, the governmental structure of rural America must be modernized. The piece-meal, fractionated planning programs of the present will not suffice in coping with the problems of low income areas. The Commission recommended the creation of developmental regions throughout the United States, with each region made up of coterminous multi-county area development districts. Each area development district should be delineated in such a way that it contains a developmental center, or it should receive a commitment from the federal government to provide the funds necessary to develop the infrastructure for such a center. Federal grants and loans should be provided to the development districts and regions for planning purposes. Special subsidies should be provided for area development districts and regions that develop and carry out effective planning programs. The use of industrial development subsidies by local government should be discouraged, but the federal government should be asked to liberalize investment tax credits and depreciation schedules for firms locating in or expanding in area development districts which include redevelopment districts. Emanating from the growth centers, programs should be developed to provide access to family planning, health, education, and manpower services for the people living throughout the area development districts.

The fourth major category of recommendations concerns human resource development. It is imperative that we do a better job of occupational preparation in our schools. General education must be improved; training programs in rural areas must place more emphasis on nonfarm vocational training; testing and

counseling programs must be expanded in schools in rural areas; and there should be effective coordination of counseling with representatives of the Employment Service and the Extension Service to assure due consideration of farm and nonfarm employment opportunities.

A massive human reclamation program is needed, including expansion of preschool for children, compensatory education programs in the elementary and secondary schools, intensive occupational preparatory programs, on-the-job training programs, special programs to upgrade skills, and programs of relocation assistance. A nationwide comprehensive manpower program should be initiated to provide improved job information to potential employees and labor supply information to employers. In order to help guide migration, the Commission recommended that the program of Relocation Assistance of the Department of Labor be expanded, and that assistance be provided for workers who cannot find gainful employment where they now live but for whom jobs and training opportunities can be located in other labor market areas. The greatest need for this program should be for inter-county, within-state mobility. Public subsidization of the development of growth centers and assistance in relocation of those centers should greatly decrease the long-distance migration in the United States. Through concentration of public investment in the development of the infrastructure and of housing in growth centers, providing incentives for industrial development, and assisting people to be relocated to the areas experiencing growth, many of the evils of long-distance migration can be overcome.

Our focus is upon two of the most fundamental questions now confronting our nation. Where shall the people live and work in the future? How shall the people share in the progress made by this nation? Serious attempts to answer these questions have been delayed for too long. The poverty problems will not be solved until we have removed the conditions creating poverty. This involves restoring confidence in the future of the nation and planning for the orderly development of it. Appropriation of a limited amount of money to help those currently in need certainly will not provide the solution. A piece-meal approach is doomed to failure. Even a coordinated attack that seeks to alter the system and to help man adjust to changes within it will not bring immediate abolition of poverty. At best, the costs of a realistic and meaningful approach will be astronomical. But the consequences of failure to adopt such an approach are totally unthinkable.

1. Kain, John F. and Persky, J. J., "The North's Stake in Southern Rural Poverty," Chapter 17 in Rural Poverty in the United States, National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty, 1967.
2. Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, February, 1968, Chapter 4.
3. The People Left Behind, Report of the President's National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., December, 1967.

PANEL: "THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY"

Moderator, Mr. Richard Barron
Executive Vice President
WSJS Stations
Winston-Salem

Prior to World War I when the American automobile industry was mastering the techniques of mass production and the assembly line was beginning to be a practical reality, the pioneers of the industry were looking forward to the time when every family would own a car. That industry succeeded beyond its greatest dreams, and today the two-car family is commonplace and even the three-car family is emerging. Mass media have had a major role in creating the market for these cars, so that today we are the most mobile families in history. As a result of our mobility, there are complaints that the home is little more than a way-station where we pause to catch a few hours sleep, to refuel on instant breakfast, frozen pizzas, hot dogs and TV dinners, and then to tear off to the office, supermarket, school, garden club, music, circle meeting, art lesson, church meetings, hangout with the gang, or any one of a thousand pursuits that make up the weekly activity of the "average" American family. The warning has been made that our mobility is causing the family as a unit to disintegrate.

Mass communications, particularly advertising through radio and television, are blamed for creating an unreal dream world to which we all aspire. Certainly the family is constantly exposed to innumerable suggestions, messages, ideas, and advertisements every day both inside and outside the home. Vance Packard in one of his controversial books, *The Waste Makers*, said that there are advertising men who proudly call themselves the "merchants of discontent." On the other hand, General David Sarnoff, chairman of the board of Radio Corporation of America, says;

"Through the decades the advertising community has shown both wisdom and flexibility in its quick response to new developments in communications. This has been particularly true in its adaptation to the new dimensions open in radio and television broadcasting. The association between broadcasting and advertising began almost by accident in August, 1922, when station WEAJ broadcast the first radio commercial. It described the virtues of a real estate enterprise in Queens, New York, and the message ran for ten whole minutes. It cost the advertiser a staggering hundred dollars."

"From that humble start in the twenties, the advertiser and the broadcaster have jointly fashioned the mightiest marketing force in the history of communications and commerce. In the process, they have not only brought prosperity to themselves but they have contributed materially to the vitality of the entire national economy."

Prior to broadcasting, the newspaper industry had already established advertising as a major force in the economy of American society. Sensibly, the advertiser has not permitted a preoccupation with a new medium to restrain him from older means of conveying his message. He has oriented himself to think in terms of all media, whether visual or spoken. He has treated every advance in communication, from the rotary press to color television, not as a separate advertising vehicle but rather as an additional channel for delivering his message to the public.

Criticisms have been strong, however. Newspapers are accused of not being really objective at all because of reporters' misinterpretations and failures to present more than one point of view, and charges are made that distortion and sensationalism cause radio and television often to "tell it like it isn't." Carl Rowan, former head of the United States Information Agency, spoke on that issue during the William Allen White Centennial Seminar on Mass Media in the Free Society last spring. He said:

"Much of the wrong in American mass media today can be attributed to some kind of fear: fear of controversy, fear of advertising, and most of all the fear of disapproval by the editor's or publisher's peer groups . . . by 'the boys down at the club'."

"It has become commonplace for us to deplore our communications failures. We know that Lyndon Johnson is not getting through to Ho Chi Minh, that Americans are not on the same wave length as the mainland Chinese, that black Americans are not communicating with white Americans, that poor people of all races feel alienated from affluent Americans of all races. We deplore all of this out of suspicion that Boston might have survived an era in which the Lowells talked only to Cabots, and the Cabots talked only to God . . . but that neither this world nor today's cities can survive the festering animosities, the violent explosions that erupt largely because we do not, or will not, communicate with each other."

Are we communicating with each other? Are we practitioners of mass media and communications -- the seventeen hundred daily newspapers, nine thousand five hundred weeklies, nine thousand periodicals, seven thousand broadcasting stations, and two thousand advertising agencies -- living up to our responsibilities and helping to open channels of communications in those areas that need better understanding? What impact are mass media having on the American family today?

Panelist: Mr. Abe D. Jones, Jr.
Editorial Page Editor
The Greensboro Record
Greensboro

I am impressed by the fact of the urban impact on our business as well as on the family. At every point of our lives, we find that it is an urban culture that we live in. Even if people live in a rural area, they are reading the daily paper from the city; and they are watching the same television programs and seeing the same movies.

North Carolina is still, I think, a rural state. We will know more when we get new census figures, but we are changing very rapidly and this impact is upon us in the rush, the pace of life. We are confronting new pressures and new conditions, and we need to be informed about what is going on.

In a small community, this is not as much of a problem as it is in a city because people see other people in other walks of life daily. Each is not so involved in his own particular field that he cannot have his communications lines out. This can still be done in the city -- our cities are not all that large yet -- but it is becoming more of a problem to contact those whose routine is different from ours: those who do not go to our church or our P. T. A., or do not shop at our supermarket. The need in this case is all the greater -- the need to know things.

The means are at hand. We like to brag in this business of communications about not only newspapers but television and radio coverage of news and how information is so accessible to us. This is true, but the sheer volume is a great problem, I find; and most people concerned with communications with whom I have talked find it an increasing problem.

Our haste makes us miss the news or scan the paper over a cup of coffee. This puts a greater importance on the editing, whether it be of film or copy, because the editing is a necessity. We need to cut; we cannot present everything. Yet, when we do cut details, we are going to make people angry. We are going to show something that someone else would not show, and we are going to reduce in a way your view of the world.

This means that we have to be very fair about editing. We have to have a sense of taste. We have to have a sense of what is important and what is simply lively and entertaining. This puts a burden on us that we at times are not too conscious of, even though we try to be. It is a burden for you because, when you get your newspaper, you want all the news the editors have; yet, you are going to skip something in your reading -- you have to -- and you are going to leave the room when Walter Cronkite or Huntley and Brinkley swing into another phase of the news. You are going to miss something. This business of trying to get at what is important is difficult.

It seems to me that the debater who did not have much time to prepare, and therefore prepared his opponent's side of the argument, had the right idea. He knew his own bias and predilections. He could pretty well argue his own side, but he needed greater comprehension about the other fellow's. Many of us listen and read only to reinforce our own prejudices. Tolstoy in *War and Peace* speaks of one of the Russian generals, Koutouzov, who knew ". . . how readily men incline to draw inferences that fit in with their desires, and to reject anything that contradicts them."

Herbert Brucker, former editor of the *Hartford Courant*, wrote of individuals who are ". . . looking upon the buzzing confusion of the world [and] see only what they want to see, or can see, or have been taught to see. And they are passionately determined that everyone shall see that truth too, and none other."

It was said of C. P. Scott, the famous Briton who edited *The Manchester Guardian*, still one of the outstanding newspapers of the world, "He insisted on treating his audience as an audience that respected reason and wished to be convinced and instructed, and not merely to be excited and entertained." The business of convincing and instructing is one of our most challenging roles. The others are there, too; but I wonder if you are either convinced or challenged by what you read and see? If not, perhaps you should try some new reading and seeing. Switch to another channel, try another newspaper. This is hard, I know. You want to see your hometown newspaper, but do look at something else. Sometimes you may reinforce your knowledge that way. It may be you will decide that it was not a good idea in the beginning and will prefer to stay where you were; but at least you will know something about the other side.

Also, you can challenge us. I find frequently that people will complain to me about something in the paper, and I will say, "Why don't you write us a letter?" They answer, "Oh, no, I don't want to be in there with all those nuts." We do have some nuts who write letters, and they are used occasionally; but the letters columns are a way for anyone to be heard.

There are other ways to make your voice heard if you do not like something, or if you think something is unfair or unreasonable. If you do not want to write a letter, call and try to find somebody who is responsible; they will be surprised and you, too, will be surprised. They will be surprised that you have a reasonable presentation to make and are not just another caller who says, "Why do you print that kind of mess?" and hangs up. You may be surprised to find that the writers are interested and are trying to do a very difficult job.

Perhaps we have to some extent lost touch with the average person in our society. It may be we have "joined the Establishment." Some have, but some still have not. We are still trying to find out what people are interested in; but it does not necessarily mean that we are going to agree with them, at least not in my end of the newspaper business. We probably will be arguing with them, trying to convince and challenge them.

There is something of a credibility gap, a popular term applied to politicians but which can be applied to part of the press too. It is a sort of selective credibility. Let me explain by relating an incident with a Chicago newspaper. They had a phone call from a nice lady who wanted to know why they did not write about the nice things in the newspaper. "All we get," she said, "is bad news." The editor asked, "What nice things should we write about?" She answered, "Wasn't it nice of Mr. Nixon to call up Mr. Humphrey after he got nominated? And then Mr. Humphrey called Mr. Nixon too; and Mrs. Humphrey and Mrs. McCarthy went to a party, and they were nice to each other. Ike is getting better, and it sure was nice the way the Czechs resisted the Russians, wasn't it?" The editor agreed and then asked, "Where did you read all of this?" Then the lady exclaimed, "Oh, dear, what have I done to my case!"

So there is a selective approach, and I suggest that there be a little more of it. It is a good thing. But when you are picking and choosing, notice not only your side but what you call the other side, too.

Panelist: Dr. Wesley Wallace
Chairman
Radio, Television and Movies
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill

Although there is general agreement that mass media have a great deal of influence on our lives, I shall present some arguments to indicate that this effect is neither as great nor as long-lasting as most of us, both critics and supporters of mass communication, would indicate. Those of us who deal with this subject all of the time are probably less dogmatic about it than about almost anything else. We can be quick with answers to you with regard to the slums and Czechoslovakia and all the others; but in the area of our speciality, which is the effects of mass communication, we are a great deal more cautious.

There is much disagreement among the people who have experimented, tested, and examined the scene as closely as they possibly can with regard to the effects of mass communications. An outstanding sociologist in Chicago, Daniel Bell, takes the position that the mass media provide the only unifying national symbols in our entire society. What he is saying is that the church and other institutions no longer do it. Universities probably come closer for some people than other institutions, but they do not touch many areas. He said that the symbolization that is used in the mass media -- newspaper, radio, television, magazines -- the things that we talk about, are more likely to be the areas of our concern that were present in the mass media. We can talk to each other and, while we may not agree, we can understand each other on the basis of that symbolization carried on a national basis.

Daniel Lerner, professor of International Communications at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, takes the position that the mass media have contributed to a changed characteristic in the society which affects families, that because of mass media we have greater psychic mobility than we have ever had before in our lives. The mass media have permitted us to empathize with people elsewhere, to understand and appreciate and to some degree be sensitive to their needs and wants. It is the process by which the mass media bring the world to us through an open window instead of our going out and experiencing it in all of its everlasting details.

Let me turn to the other side of the effects. Joseph Klapper, who is a most outstanding social scientist, published a book called *The Effects of Mass Communications* in which he summarized as best he could determine all the research that had been conducted to that time. It includes all the media, not just television and radio, and the effects they have had upon society. He attempted to draw some conclusions which I shall share with you to paint the other side of the picture. In the first place, Dr. Klapper maintains that by themselves mass media in most instances do not have direct effects upon the society. On occasion, when certain kinds of things are either present or absent, there may be some direct effects. Secondly, the media which work through and with other factors in the society -- family, church, school, peer groups, and other social groups -- have tremendous effect upon people and the mass media simply work as one of the factors to produce habits, attitudes, biases, beliefs, and knowledge. The mass media function as one of these factors, and they work generally in the direction of maintaining the status quo; they reinforce what exists rather than to promote change although there are events which indicate that perhaps the mass media do operate directly and by themselves at times. As an example, in 1938 there was a broadcast on CBS radio of a program called, "Invasion From Mars." An invasion was supposed to have been happening when actually, of course, it was purely and simply a drama. The effect was greater than it would be now on television because minds went to work. It created a great deal of panic in the New York-New Jersey area, and there was much irrational behavior in many ways. There were some people who were killed in traffic accidents who otherwise would probably have been in their homes. It is not known exactly how many deaths were caused directly by reactions to the program. While the "Invasion From Mars" was the triggering device, it was not solely the cause of the effect upon the society. The society had been prepared for this by the amount of unrest that was already present.

I have been precise about Dr. Klapper's conclusions. He himself adds, "Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that constant exposure to mass media and the messages which they contain do not have effects upon the society." He said what we really need to do is to study these. As of now, we can be much more positive about a lot of other things, but we can not be positive about the effects of mass communications. There are contradictory evidences all along the way.

Panelist: Dr. Harold Niven
Vice President
Programming and Development
National Association of Broadcasters
Washington, D. C.

Television cannot escape the reality that it is a medium of intimate and dynamic communications, providing entertainment, information, culture, and education to over ninety percent of the American public. It not only mirrors our way of life but it is an instrument often responsible for change in our society. Such change, frequently the result of conflict and choice, forces us to seek objectively a balance between conformity and independence, competition and cooperation, security and a desire for change, and others. Television for children -- if it is to be in harmony with the values of our society -- mandates the cultivation of such a balance. Television, at its ultimate, should complement the development of the child into an adult who is able to find his life satisfaction with this scheme of diversity and unity. It should be the business of television to provide one of many bridges across which the child may pass from his fragmentary fantasy world to the reality of adult life and social maturity. To do this requires that television for children find a balance between certain shared and certain conflicting desires of broadcasters, parents, and children.

To the end of affirming and securing the rights of the child in connection with television to which he is exposed, we should consider how children use television, what we do or do not know about the effects of television on children, and what is our responsibility as parents, teachers, and broadcasters regarding television and our children.

Children have a high affection for television. It is the medium that the majority feel they would miss most if they were deprived of the mass media. Television becomes a whole part of the life of the child, not merely a small portion satisfied by an occasional program. One out of three children is watching television at the age of three, four out of five at age five, nine out of ten by the time they are in the first grade. In the early grades the average time a child spends with television is about two hours a day; thereafter, it rises to a peak of three to four hours about the sixth or seventh grade, and it falls slowly throughout high school.

Social scientists tell us that up to about age ten, children's media habits are very closely related to their parents' media habits. After the age of ten, the girls begin to discover they are girls and the little boys too begin to discover the presence of girls a little later. The influence of the parents tends to be diluted by the influence of peer groups. Children develop new concepts of the roles they are expected to play. It is during this period that children depend less on television as a fantasy medium and find it more a source of reality experiences. It is at this time and from this exposure that television plays a part in the formation of the modern child's conceptions of the world around him and of his pattern of adjustment to that world.

Television offers many appeals for children; it offers the satisfaction of being in the know, of going behind the scenes and learning about the world and about people. On the emotional side, television appeals in different ways to different children, as it does to adults. It offers security and reassurance through the familiar format and themes of many of its programs. It offers constant change, excitement, and suspense. It provides escape from everyday demands with lightheartedness, glamour, adventure, and romance; and it permits the child to identify himself with different romantic heroes. Television also offers the appeal of personalities, presented more intimately and in more everyday terms than in other media.

We must be cautious when we consider the effect of television on the child. Anthropologists point out that each time in our century when mass communications have acquired a new medium, the older people have blamed the new medium for all the defects they see in the young. The distrust of new technical inventions tends to be seen as bringing about a change for the worse, a lowering of standards and behavior. In this atmosphere of distrust the picture of television's true effects is distorted in that the intrinsic power of the medium is exaggerated and the resilience of children tends to be underestimated. The same factors operate in reverse with those people who welcome the medium and are among the first to use it.

This feeling of unrest has generated innumerable investigations and research studies to try to find out exactly what the influences of television are. Little effect has been demonstrated in these studies to date. Two of the most significant studies -- one in Great Britain and one at Stanford University -- draw similar conclusions that television, so far as results show, is of itself neither very good nor very bad in changing the development of children. The relationship is always between a *kind* of television and a *kind* of child in a *kind* of situation. Always behind the child there are other relationships of importance, notably with family and friends, church, and school.

The British study reports television has postponed the average bedtime of children about twenty minutes, but there is no sign of worsened eyesight or health. There is no sign of any harmful aggression being created. It makes the slower learner a bit more informed, and it may perhaps take the more intelligent child away from some reading that might better inform him. Those children who seemed to make behavior problems in their first year of television were found, for the most part, to have had corresponding problems before they got television. The influences of television on children's leisure, interests, knowledge, outlook, and values were demonstrated to be less colorful and dramatic than popular opinion is inclined to suppose. Effects occur in each of the various fields but not to a degree that the children were fundamentally changed.

We should not be satisfied with the results of research efforts to date, however. A medium that involves so many hours of use is certain to have an effect on the child's views regarding environment, values, and tastes. These effects are likely to be long-range in nature and will require additional and extensive research to determine and more fully understand.

The Stanford study describes a need for long-term research to determine the effect of excitement on children's perception of reality and whether television makes children too passive. Rather conclusive information has been gathered about the physical effects of television on children; more information is needed about the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral effects of the medium.

Television has proved itself better at stimulating interest than at stimulating intellectual or creative activity. This task calls for cooperative and organized efforts. It calls for understanding and for certain responsibilities, on the part of parents, broadcasters, teachers, and other persons influential in a child's life.

Let me suggest an area of programming in which the broadcaster might better serve the television rights of the child. In addition to continuing to create programs with elements of exploration and adventure, fantasy, children's literature (all of which primarily satisfy the needs of the younger child) the need is to create better programs to fill the gap between this early childhood period and the years when the child is ready for adult fare, to develop programs with concern for Man's world, natural and physical science, hobbies, and so on. The same skills so successfully used in creating programs of a fantasy medium should be devoted to creating programs that will serve the adolescent with sources of reality experiences, to provide for him an intellectual stimulation comparable to that furnished adults.

Most broadcasters are cognizant of their responsibilities. They have voluntarily subscribed to the Television Code of the National Association of Broadcasters, which reads in part:

"Television and all who participate in it are jointly accountable to the American public for respect for the special needs of children, for community responsibility, for the advancement of education and culture, for the acceptability of the program materials chosen, for decency and decorum in production, and for propriety in advertising. This responsibility cannot be discharged by any given group of programs, but can be discharged only through the highest standards of respect for the American home, applied to every moment of every program presented by television.

"In order that television programming may best serve the public interest, viewers should be encouraged to make their criticisms and positive suggestions known to the television broadcasters. Parents in particular should be urged to see to it that, out of the richness of television fare, the best programs are brought to the attention of their children."

Specific attention is paid to the responsibility toward children in the section of the Code that states:

"The education of children involves giving them a sense of the world at large. It is not enough that only those programs which are intended for viewing by children shall be suitable to the young and immature. In addition, those programs which might be reasonably expected to hold the attention of children and which are broadcast during times of the day when children may be normally expected to constitute a substantial part of the audience should be presented with due regard for their effect on children."

"The broadcaster should afford opportunities for cultural growth as well as for wholesome entertainment."

"He should develop programs to foster and promote the commonly accepted moral, social and ethical ideals characteristic of American life."

"Programs should reflect respect for parents, for honorable behavior, and for the constituted authorities of the American community."

Guidelines are also included in this section that call for the intelligent and careful handling of the subjects of violence, crime, suspense, and mystery.

Parents and broadcasters have a mutual responsibility to establish and maintain lines of communication with each other. The men responsible for television programming are quite sensitive to comments from their audiences. They have often waited and listened in vain for support when they have ventured to try a new kind of children's program of higher quality or experimented with different and stimulating program formats. All too often there is no feedback from parents regarding these efforts. Parents have the power to make their opinions felt. Any significant outpouring of intelligent opinion will be listened to and can make a difference as to whether a program is continued or dropped.

Television is but one influence; compared with the effect of the family, the effect of television can hardly be dominant. We as parents are responsible to a large degree for the kind of child we allow to be exposed to television. If we use television as a baby sitter, at the cost of other human contacts, we are obviously remiss. If we do not introduce our children to books, simply because television is so easily available, then we are being foolish. If we do not encourage our children to establish healthy contacts with their peers, simply because television "keeps them at home," then we are doing them a grave disservice. Our responsibility for our children has in no way been reduced by television.

This is our gravest responsibility -- giving the child a chance to develop healthily and fully, so that the child will be prepared to use television with wisdom and stability. At the same time, we are responsible as parents for what he selects from television.

The years have not diminished the validity of an observation made at the 1950 White House Conference on Children and Youth:

"We cannot insulate our children from the uncertainties of the world in which we live or from the impact of the problems which confront us all. What we can do and must do is equip them to meet these problems, to contribute their part to total effort, and to build up their inner resources of character which are the main strength of American people."

Panelist: Mr. William Henderson
President
Bentley Advertising Company, Inc.
High Point

Information as well as news is disseminated through mass media, and this gets into my business of advertising. If advertising needs any defense, it is in terms of the free enterprise system. It is the market-oriented system that has made American economy the greatest in the world. Our people have enjoyed and continue to enjoy receiving an increasing bounty of benefits from free enterprise through mass markets. This is a matter of basic economics; but apparently many people, even many merchants and manufacturers, do not understand the principles of a market-oriented economy nor the basis of mass markets.

Mass markets can only result from mass production, and mass production can only be supported by mass markets. Mass markets can only be created by the most effective means of disseminating information regarding products and services. Our economy would break down if we did not have a very efficient and effective mass communications system. The system is not perfect because it is man-oriented; but we must be careful not to condemn advertising without examining its function.

Regarding dissemination of information, some of us really understand that this country believes in pluralism, that we believe in variety. While I abhor and am shocked and offended by much that I see on television or hear on the radio or read in the press, at the same time I believe in the basic principle of pluralism. I believe there is a right for someone else to have different tastes from mine. It is a matter of freedom of choice. I have yet to find anyone who is so wise as to determine just what we would have if we were to come to a one-kind of society with one kind of literature, one kind of entertainment, one kind of product, and one kind of service for our people. Yet, if this is taken to its conclusion, the protestations that many people level at the mass media would do just that. The genius of democracy and progress has been in decent dissent wherein there was the right to select and choose in personal matters. There are, of course, some areas wherein the national interest and health and safety require a discipline apart from those that are involved in disseminating information, generally.

Some of the principles established by the Association of American Advertising Agencies should be discussed. We have been negligent in communicating this kind of information.

First is the evaluation of personnel, because this is the only product we have inside of our shops. We look for people who have a professional attitude, who take their work seriously, who feel that there is a contribution that they can make to society through the field of advertising, and who have a certain impatient dissatisfaction so that everything they do is directed toward an effort to improve.

Second, we look for people who are business-oriented, contrary to what the general public might believe. It is necessary that we develop ten-thousand-dollar solutions for ten-thousand-dollar problems and not ten thousand-dollar solutions to one-thousand-dollar problems and vice versa.

Third, we want people who are creatively effective. If I were to seek gold today and only prospected where everyone else was looking, I would not find any more than just the average amount of gold. If we are to improve and make more effective the business of advertising, we must have people who have courage to seek gold where no one else is seeking it. This sometimes makes us look a bit odd, unusual, or peculiar, but all the progress of civilization has come about this way.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, we are looking and seeking people who are characterable. That requires a definition. It means that we want people who are honest, who see that the client gets what he is paying for and that the agency and all of the areas covered by them are paid for what they do. We want people who are honest to the business they are involved in, which means when a client wants to do something that in our collective opinion we know is wrong, then we must with all diplomacy and tact have the courage to tell him. This gets over into the area that many people would like to police today. There have been many real struggles in the mass media -- newspaper, radio, television, or agency -- where they have been confronted with misguided and misinformed and at times even unethical clients about this area of honesty. As surprising as it might seem, we are looking for people who believe in God and the country and motherhood and Boy Scouts and apple pie, though not necessarily in that order; but certainly we want people who are deeply committed to these kinds of convictions because these are the only kinds of people who can be sufficiently sensitive to our society that they can produce particularly effective and meaningful communication. They simply are not in touch with the audience otherwise, except for the fragments.

There is another side of the coin. What kind of clients do agencies look for, since we are consciously and aggressively looking for clients? There are three qualities, mainly. One is profitability. Profit is necessary although many people act as if there is some real sin in profit even when it may be honest and legitimate. It may be of interest to you that the agency business carries about the lowest profit of any business in the United States. Last year, they had an average of 1.8 percent profit on their volume of business.

In second place, we are seeking clients for whom we can perform a service of merit, and agencies often turn down clients for this reason. When they evaluate the needs of the prospective client in relation to their own capabilities, they come to the honest conclusion that they cannot perform a service of merit.

Third, we are looking for clients with whom it is a pleasure to work. Not a matter of fun and games, the basic business reason is that we are working with creative people; and creative people cannot be productive to their highest extent unless they are in a pleasant atmosphere.

Most agencies will subscribe to these three qualities. Most of them, however, realize that it may be somewhat impractical to expect all three; but they do expect at least two of them, one of which must be profitability. There are cases when an agency, because of prestige or some other internal motivation, may accept a client that is not profitable, a public service kind of client. Agencies do more public service than any other kind of organization in our business community today, including the other mass communications media. But we must have a profit and clients that are profitable, fun to work with, and for whom we can perform our services well.

How does all of this relate to family life? Discussions of the preceding speakers apply for the advertising media. Essentially, it is a matter of education which involves many areas of influence. So far as changing principles or changing values and whether we reflect them or whether we just simply mirror them in society and its people, particularly in children, we must acknowledge the influence of the home, the influence of the school, the influence of peer groups, the influence of religious instruction, and the influence of the mass media. The first four must come before the mass media; because if they do not, individuals, especially children, are not sufficiently prepared to be selective regarding the information to which they are subjected through the mass media.



DR. WILLIAM KENKEL

Current: Professor, Sociology, University of Kentucky
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY

The word "emerging" refers to something that is coming forth or that is gradually coming into view. A trend is some more or less general tendency, or state of affairs, or conditions that are regular and common, although not necessarily universal. Putting the two terms together, it seems that I am supposed to deal with conditions and characteristics of the American family that are just now coming into view. They are not yet general or commonplace but presumably will become so. I have approached this task with trepidation because, in a sense, I will be predicting the future from mere glimpses of the present.

If one knows enough about cocoons and moths, it is not too difficult to predict that what seems to be emerging from a cocoon will indeed be a Lunar moth. Even so, it will not be until it has emerged that one can say whether it is a male or female, well-formed or malformed; and it will not be until considerably later that one will know how well or how long it lived.

Let me state what I will be attempting to do regarding emerging trends in the American family. From what I see now happening, I will predict what will continue, will become a trend, and what will not. There are sources of error and difficulties with this task. The first is that my perception may be faulty, that is, I do not really see what is going on, or do not see it in totality, or do not understand or interpret correctly what I do see.

A second source of difficulty lies in what I term "the self-defeating prophecy." Sociologists have for some time used the concept of self-fulfilling prophecy by which we mean that a false definition of a situation can produce behavior that will make the original false prediction come true. To use a simple example, if a child's parents and teachers falsely reach the conclusion that he is a slow learner or somewhat retarded and is not destined to achieve well academically, and if they daily react toward him as if this were true, the odds would seem quite good that he will become a truck driver and not a surgeon. The prophecy of his parents and teachers will come true precisely because they made it in the first place. It seems to me that there is an analogous concept of self-defeating prophecy. What I mean is that some predictions are bound to be wrong precisely because they are made. There are common examples of this phenomenon too.

To use a homey example, if it is predicted that there will be severe flooding in the suburbs, new storm sewers might be constructed so that the original prediction of flooding will not come true precisely because it was made in the first place. For the self-defeating prophecy to work, it must be made known, it must be believed, and some sort of corrective action must be taken to assure that it will not come true.

Some of the emerging trends of the family about which I will be talking may not, in fact, come true. Some I hope will not, in the sense that the self-defeating prophecy will come into play so that corrective action will be taken to assure that the emerging trends will not become commonplace. There are dangers in predictions and in trying to isolate trends. An alternative is to wait until the trend is well-established and then merely describe it, which would hardly be necessary because it would be widespread. There is a risk, therefore, in predictions; but there is an irresponsibility in not making predictions, particularly with regard to areas like marriage and the family that affect the lives of all of us and the entire fabric of society.

After considerable thought, I decided not to try to deal with many family trends but to select a few and handle them in somewhat greater detail. The trends I have selected concern (1) the childbearing function of the family, (2) the regulation of sexual behavior, and (3) the generation gap. I will not be content with describing the trends but will try to explain why I see the trends emerging and then evaluate them. Evaluation is a touchy subject among social scientists for it implies that we are judging things to be good or bad, better or worse, and so on. Family trends can be evaluated, however, from a relatively objective standpoint. All cultures, regardless of their specific political organization, economic institutions, or family organizations, must contain elements that in their totality accomplish three things: (1) they must provide for the physical survival of the group and its members, (2) they must provide for orderly and satisfactory group living, and (3) they must provide for the fulfillment of the psychological needs of the society's members. It is from this framework that I will attempt first to describe the emerging trends, then evaluate them, and when appropriate offer suggestions for corrective action so that the trends will not come true.

To provide for the survival of society, every culture must endorse the general value that childbearing is desirable and must invent ways to insure that it does in fact take place. It is simply not true that all reproductive values and practices are equally good. For example, if our ancestors in the dim past had not endorsed the value that high fertility was good and had not developed methods and sanctions to insure that much childbearing took place, it is doubtful whether the entire species would have survived. If any specific society endorsed the value that very little childbearing should take place, the survival of that society would be in jeopardy. Today we have the opposite concern that the family is "overachieving" its childbearing function, not just in this society but in many places all over the world.

The basic trend for the United States, as I see it, will be toward smaller families. I think the trend will come too late and that, meanwhile, there will be serious problems. Sociologists and demographers have done a reasonably good job of predicting what the total size of our population will be at specific future times and under specified conditions. It has been estimated that the current practice of having about three children per family will produce a population of three hundred and twelve million by the year 2000 and of six hundred million by 2050. We have done a reasonably good job of informing the public of the sheer statistical predictions; but we have done a far poorer job, I believe, in trying to describe to the masses what life would be like with millions and millions more people in the United States. I am not referring to wild extrapolations for three hundred years hence and the grim conclusions that our progeny will all be eating seaweed, meanwhile gasping for breath as they vie with one another for a place to stand. I am referring to a much shorter time -- about thirty-two years from now-- and the intense problems that a hundred million additional people in the United States are likely to produce.

While my general views on life are really optimistic, I am pessimistic about the willingness and ability of our society to deal with a growing population. I infer this from our past and present failures. Just in terms of numbers, we have not been able to cope with our present population growth which has resulted in over two hundred million people. Technology has not rescued us. The masses are worse off, not better off, than they were twenty-five years ago with regard to the time it takes to commute to and from work. It is becoming harder, not easier, to find a place to spend one's leisure time, and reservations must be made

further and further in advance. Despite our "great American know-how" it is becoming harder, not easier, to have automobiles and household appliances repaired, and it takes longer. There are too many people with the same needs. Longer and longer are the lines at check-out counters where people wait for the privilege of paying for their purchases. The examples are countless. The essential point is that we seem unable or unwilling to cope with the number of people we now have. I see no cause for the optimistic conclusion that somehow science will save us so that we will be able to cope with three hundred million people in the future even though we cannot cope with two hundred million today. I hope I am wrong.

To help defeat this gloomy prophecy, we need to give more attention to the basic, philosophical questions such as, "To whom does the planet, Earth, belong?" Ignoring practical problems of population pressures, what makes us think that the planet belongs only to the species *Homo sapiens* who has a perfect right to destroy other species that interfere with his progress or his progression in number? I seriously question the assumption that *Homo sapiens* should be considered the exclusive landlord of the planet, that having been handed over the deed to the planet he is free to place whatever restrictive covenants he, as species, desires. Such a view assumes that trees, butterflies, mice, grass, flamingos, and other living things have no real claim to life, that their attempts at survival as individuals or as a species are subject to the whims of the landlords, *Homo sapiens*.

The assumption that man is the exclusive landlord of the planet has led to thinking mostly in terms of *maximum* population sizes instead of *optimum* population sizes. There is really considerable difference between the concepts of maximum and optimum. An optimum population size for a family, a city, a country, or the planet would be that which is best for any of the aggregates. Best would have to be defined in terms of the kind of natural environment we feel it is desirable to have and to preserve. Best would have to be defined in terms of the population size and density that would provide the good life for individuals and families. Concepts such as optimum population size and the good life are not impossible to define and operationalize; it is merely extremely difficult to do so.

I suspect that in many instances the optimum population size would be less than the maximum and that in some instances the optimum size has already been exceeded. To be specific, it could well turn out that the best population size for Winston-Salem is what it is now or what it was ten years ago and thus additional growth should be discouraged. This is Chamber of Commerce heresy of the worst kind.

A modified view of the exclusive landlord concept holds that while other living species are important and while we should strive not to destroy the balance of nature "too much," people after all are the most important inhabitants of the planet. This poses a new question, namely, "Which people?" Does the planet belong to those who are now living on it, to those who will someday live on it, to those who have ever lived on it, or in a somewhat mystical sense, to all who have, are now, and will ever live on it? The fact that these are hard questions to answer does not excuse us from trying to grapple with them. If we were able to come up with even tentative answers to these questions, we would be better equipped to deal with more practical matters.

I believe, for example, that our population pressures of the present can be traced to certain basic assumptions. The concept of *responsible parenthood* had, at first, a strong economic emphasis. The "message" seemed to be that couples should have no more children than they could feed and house, equip with dental braces, educate, and otherwise support economically. The concept of responsible parenthood later was enlarged to include the ability of the parents to meet the emotional needs of their children and to provide a good social environment in which they could grow as individuals. Only recently and rarely has the concept of responsible parenthood been enlarged still further to include responsibility for determining the impact of parenthood decisions on the population today and in the future. More rare still is the concept of responsible parenthood that takes into account the optimum size of a population, either for the present or the future, instead of the concept of maximum population size. It would seem apparent that any couple's decision on the number of children they would like to have would vary according to what "responsible parenthood" means to them.

I am in entire sympathy with programs that are trying to help those who have, or are afraid they will have, more children than they can support in an economic sense or more than for whom they could provide a proper emotional atmosphere. I am suggesting, nevertheless, that by concentrating our efforts on these groups and by failing to stress responsibility for future generations we are practically assuring that we will have severe population problems in the future. The way to destroy this prophecy, of course, is to devote more serious thought to the broadest possible concept of responsible parenthood, to clarify it as best we can, and to try to introduce it into the thinking of the masses and not just the poor and underprivileged.

All societies must somehow, in some way deal with the needs and desires of their members for sexual expression. Certainly, there have been groups that have not accepted this proposition, such as the religious group of Shakers who believed that all sexual behavior was bad and unnecessary, under any circumstances, for all people. For reasons which are understandable, this religion never became very popular. Today, near Harrodsburg, Kentucky, their restored but empty buildings give silent testimony to the failure of the group to provide for its own survival. I am not challenging the right of the Shakers or any other group to develop its own system of sexual values. What I am saying is that it is simply not true that every system of sexual values is as good as any other system if we grant the assumption that all societies that wish to survive must care for the physical needs of survival, must maintain orderly group living, and must provide for the psychological needs of its individual members. With this in mind, what can be said about the emerging trends in the American family with regard to sexual values and behavior? I am sure that I do not have to dwell at great length on the fact that there has been a change in sexual mores of the United States. There seems to be essential agreement that on the attitudinal level more people are questioning the traditional value that sexual behavior, and not just attitudes, has undergone a profound change. I believe that a sizeable proportion of the unmarried generation do not believe it is necessary or desirable to wait until marriage in order to have sexual relations and that they are putting this value into practice by engaging in sexual intercourse while unmarried. I will not attempt to estimate the size of the population that subscribe to a freer sexual code or how frequently they put their values into practice. First of all, if the general conclusion is correct, I think it is not particularly relevant to discover the average number of times per month the unmarried have sexual intercourse or even to discover the precise number of people who subscribe to and put into practice a freer sexual code. In addition, I could not supply this sort of statistical data if I wanted to!

It seems more relevant to try to determine what effects, if any, the newer sexual code will have on the American family generally. One effect that I can see is that in the short run of a generation or two, there will be an attitudinal carryover into marriage of a permissive sexual code with undesirable consequences for marriage. We have heard many times that our horrid sexual education of the past resulted in poor preparation for marriage. Girls were taught that sex was nasty and that they should enter marriage pure as the driven snow. Meanwhile, back at the pool hall, boys were learning that sex is fun and that more sex is more fun, only they should be careful and choose as partners girls they would not care to marry. After marriage the girl as pure as the driven snow would turn out to be equally as frigid; for it was hard for her to learn that now, legally wed, sexual intercourse was supposed to be beautiful and that in this blissful and mutual enjoyment, husband and wife were achieving the ultimate in their expression of genuine love. The man, because of his premarital conditioning, found it hard to relate sexually to his respectable wife. While this in an oversimplification of the matter, the essential point is that we have assumed that sexual attitudes and practices acquired before marriage carry over into marriage and affect the marriage relationship. By similar logic, and unless we learn differently, I am convinced we must assume that the freer sexual code of the unmarried today will likewise be carried over into marriage. Can we honestly expect a generation to grow up with the attitude that sex before marriage is permissible or at least not all bad and then, suddenly after marriage, substitute a code of strict monogamy? Do we honestly believe that a girl who accepts the value that sex before marriage is good, who has had even a few pleasant experiences with a few different men before marriage, will find it any easier to change her sexual values after marriage than her mother and grandmother found it to counteract their premarital sexual conditioning? I find it more logical to assume that we can continue to expect an attitudinal carryover into marriage of premarital sexual values, whatever the specific content of these values.

If the foregoing logic is correct, we will see more marital infidelity in the next generations than we have had in the past. It is hard to imagine the consequencess of this emerging trend, let alone to know how to deal with it. Our present knowledge tells us that almost everywhere adultery is discouraged, with greater and lesser degrees of success; but a society with a fairly high rate of marital infidelity would be a rarity. I find it difficult to imagine beneficial effects of such a state of affairs. I am convinced that a high rate of marital infidelity would not be in the best interests of producing emotionally healthy individuals, good families, and an orderly society.

There are ways of helping to assure that the prediction of greater marital infidelity will not come true. Basically, the various ways would go back to the kind of attitudes and values we help to develop among the unmarried. Considerable effort is being devoted to trying to discover what we should be teaching about sexual values and how it should be taught. We simply need more efforts in these directions and in the admission that we should be concerned with life-long sexual values. In other words, instead of merely asking how we can help young people develop sexual values that will serve both them and society well for the few years before marriage, we should seek again and again ways of helping them develop sexual values that will serve them and society for a lifetime.

Not unrelated to the matter of sexual values is the phenomenon that has been dubbed the "generation gap." This hardly qualifies as an emerging trend, for there has always been a generation gap in all human societies. If any society were successful in passing on its values and way of life completely and totally to the next generation, then there would be no change. If we want change and progress, however we define these terms, we have to be in favor of a generation gap. What actually concerns us today is the size of the gap, that is, the magnitude of differences between generations, and the content of the gap, that is, the kinds of values about which the generations differ. Assuming that a generation gap is desirable, and anyway unavoidable, I have collected a few propositions about generation gaps: (1) the faster the rate of change generally in a society the greater is the potential for a sizeable generation gap; (2) the greater the age span represented in a society, the greater is the potential for a generation gap or gaps; and (3) the more the society, through its childrearing practices, recognizes the rights of the individual and his right to develop his unique potentialities, the greater is the possibility of a generation gap. There probably are more factors that affect the magnitude of the generation gap. The three factors I have isolated apply to modern American society, are of relatively recent origin, and are all likely to continue. In the foreseeable future we should expect to see a larger generation gap than we have now.

The most desirable feature of a generation gap is that it forces all who will listen to face up to basic questions. For example, one of the most important things that the younger generation is saying is that the ills of society are subject to correction. They are saying that something can be done about war, poverty, and racial discrimination and that we do not have to put up with these and other miseries simply because they have appeared and reappeared in human societies with distressing regularity. The younger generation wants action on these problems, and plenty of it. They reject the cliché of some of the middle-aged, who with a mixture of humanism and cynicism say, "There is no solution; seek it lovingly." The younger generation is saying, "There must be a solution; seek it lovingly or unlovingly, but seek it now." There is a world of differences in these philosophies, and the simplest explanation for the differences is that the generations have had different life experiences.

Carved into the memories of many people still living are World War I, the inflation of the 1920's, the depression of the 1930's, World War II, more inflation, the Korean War, the War in Vietnam, and on and on. There is no way possible that the older generation can relive their lives, erase these memories, and see things the way the younger generation sees them. Perhaps what appears to be cynicism on the part of the older generation is not a basic, ingrained cynicism, but rather that in the only life they have lived major social ills have been following one another with heart-rending predictability. I do not believe that the older generation honestly believe we now have the best of all worlds, nor do I think the older generation has given up the struggle for a better world. They are willing to continue trying to solve social problems but are not fully convinced they are capable of solution in a short time.

The younger generation cannot change the experiences of the only life that they have lived either. There is simply no way that they can live through the depression and experience the long bread lines, the absolute hunger of a large number of people, widespread unemployment, and then even in a tentative and guarded way admit that the older generation has solved some problems of economic injustice. The economic injustices so labeled by the younger generation are, for the most part, real enough; but they are different from the economic injustice of an earlier age. Try as each generation will, each finds it exceedingly difficult to view the economic injustices of today from any but its own perspective.

Most of all, we cannot expect the younger generation to erase the lessons that we have tried so hard to teach them. We have tried to make them seek their own identity and have almost forced them to ask themselves, "Who am I? Why am I really here?" We have tried to develop a questioning, scientific, outlook to life. We have invited a generation gap.

I do not believe our societal goal should be to close or remove the generation gap. Rather, we must all learn how to work with it so that it will be to the advantage of society. A more urgent problem is to try to close the communication gap between generations. Because of our different life experiences this is probably not completely possible, but we can strive harder to make it possible for each generation to learn and understand what the other is trying to say. Young people have been saying, "Tell it like it is." That is precisely the same question I ask of them. Let me give you an example. A few years ago a graduate student complained to me that the Selective Service system policy of drafting students who were failing in college, but not those who were passing, was interfering with his role as a teacher. He felt he was under undue pressure when it came to grading students. As we talked, I sensed that he was not telling it to me as it really was. I knew that a large proportion of the students in his class was girls, that athletes have been known to pressure for higher grades to retain their eligibility, and that there have always been pressures of various sorts when it comes to determining final grades. The teaching assistant eventually sorted out what was really bothering him. He admitted that he could not honestly say that the draft system was interfering seriously with his role as a teacher, but rather that (1) he felt the draft system was basically inequitable and (2) he was morally opposed to the war in Vietnam. Real communication between the generations implies that both groups try honestly to tell it like it really is. I feel it is wrong to assume that it is only the older generation who are guilty of double-talk, hypocrisy, dishonesty, or whatever else the current charges may be.

Another message I get from the younger generation is that they feel a redistribution of power is urgently needed in American society. They want to be in on the decision-making. We, the older generation, have failed to teach them that with power goes responsibility. Only rarely have I heard a "demand" that responsibility and work need to be redistributed in our society. Student protest groups often demand more power, more say-so over what is being taught and how it should be taught, and then say, in effect, that it is up to the Establishment to take the responsibility for making the changes and doing the work.

With regard to the generation gap, therefore, I do not think our societal goal should be to remove it or to close it. Even if we tried to do so, we would be cheating ourselves of fresh ideas and of new approaches to the solution of old problems. Better and more honest communication between the generations would seem to me the key for putting the inevitable generation gap to its most useful social purpose.

Let me summarize my remarks by expressing a few hopes regarding the emerging family trends with which I have been dealing. I hope that the prediction of disastrous effects of too extensive childbearing will not come true. I hope that the prediction of more extensive marital infidelity will not come true. I hope that the prediction of a continued generation gap will come true, although with rather important modifications. I have tried to make it clear that it was not my intention to present a mass of data on what is now going on in the American family but, rather, to suggest a few glimpses into the future. Whether you agree with the basic assumptions with which I started or my interpretations, my overriding hope is that you will give these matters serious thought.

THE NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY COUNCIL

The Council was organized in 1949, incorporated in 1965, and officially ruled a tax-exempt, nonprofit educational organization in 1966. Membership is open, upon payment of dues, to individuals, couples, local organizations, and state organizations concerned with marriage and the family and who subscribe to the purposes of the Council. Those purposes are:

- . To bring together family-minded organizations and individuals to exchange ideas and concerns.
- . To provide an opportunity for consultation and cooperation to all organizations and individuals working with families.
- . To provide a means for developing statewide plans and action on the goals, needs, and problems of the family.
- . To stimulate, interpret, and assist the development of needed services for families.
- . To participate in comprehensive research and planning to achieve the goal of wholesome family life.

Activities of the Council include an annual conference on a theme relevant to its purposes and current interests, publication of a newsletter semi-annually, identification and honor of services to families through the Irwin V. Sperry Award, and provision of consultation and services when feasible.

Further information and membership applications may be obtained by writing the

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