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Order and Freedom on the Campus. The Rights and Responsibilities of Faculty and Students.

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Descriptors-*Academic Freedom, *Activism, Faculty, *Governance, *Higher Education, Institutional Role, Student Characteristics, Student Participation, *Student Role

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These papers deal with the nature of student-faculty-administration relationships and the resulting discontent and tension on college and university campuses. Specifically, they are concerned with the problem of simultaneously maintaining individual freedom and campus order. Frederick Rudolph describes the changing patterns of authority and influence in American academic history. Some rights and responsibilities of faculty are outlined by Ralph Brown, with the assumption that the two are necessary concomitants. Primary is the right and responsibility to cherish and exercise academic freedom. An analysis of the dismissal of University of Illinois Professor Leo Koch is presented in "Case Studies in Academic Freedom." The Dean of Students at the University of Minnesota discusses the rights and responsibilities of students, emphasizing that students must learn to assume responsibility if they are to gain additional rights. The Free Speech Movement at Berkeley is discussed by 2 students and 2 faculty members at Berkeley in a panel discussion moderated by Terry Lunsford. The results of a study comparing the characteristics of participants and non-participants in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement are presented by Paul Heist. Paul Potter, past president of SDS, discusses student discontent and campus reform. Finally, the President of City College in New York City explores the question of "Who Runs the Institution.?" The publication is available from WICHE, University East Campus, Boulder, Colorado 80304 (\$3.50) (DS)

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ORDER AND FREEDOM ON THE CAMPUS

The Rights and Responsibilities of Faculty and Students

The papers and discussions of the Seventh Annual Institute on College Self Study for College and University Administrators held at the Hotel Claremont at Berkeley, July 12-15, 1965. Sponsored by the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, Boulder, Colorado, and the Center for the Study of Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, California.

Edited by
Owen A. Knorr and W. John Minter

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
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Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education

University East Campus Boulder, Colorado 80304

October, 1965

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FOREWORD

The Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education presents here the papers of the Seventh Annual College Self Study Institute for College and University Administrators, which was held at Berkeley, California, in July, 1965. This is the sixth year of this continuing series of conferences and publications sponsored by the Commission and the Center for the Study of Higher Education at the Berkeley campus of the University of California.

In 1959, the Commission, with the co-sponsorship of Stanford University, conducted the first formal conference on institutional research for college and university officials to be held in the Western region. This workshop addressed itself to the subject of *College Self Study*. Since 1960, the Commission has joined with the Center to co-sponsor workshops in a number of areas of interest to administrators in higher education. Publications resulting from these conferences are *Research on College Students* (1960), *Studies of College Faculty* (1961), *The Study of Campus Cultures* (1962), *The Study of Academic Administration* (1963), and *Long Range Planning in Higher Education* (1964).

The combined staffs of the Center and the Commission decided early in the fall of 1964 in planning the program for the annual Berkeley Institute that it was time to turn attention to student-faculty-administration relationships. The timeliness of this decision was borne out by the many campus events that occurred across the country during the academic year 1964-65.

WICHE and the Center are proud to bring this material to the educators of the West.

October, 1965
Boulder, Colorado

T. R. McConnell, Chairman
Center for the Study of Higher
Education

Robert H. Kroepsch, Executive Director
Western Interstate Commission for
Higher Education

INTRODUCTION

The papers of the Seventh Annual College Self Study Institute for College and University Administrators represent all the addresses and the most fruitful of the discussions emanating from the 1965 Berkeley Institute, edited for brevity and clarity from tapes of the conference.

After choosing the topic of the conference, the WICHE and Center staffs met at Berkeley on 7 December 1964 to plan the program. It is of interest that the planning meeting had to be postponed several hours because of an all-university convocation in the Greek theatre on the Berkeley campus which resulted in a disturbance that has become a milestone in American higher education and that provided a useful mood and background for the planning of the conference.

If the student-faculty-administration dialogue is encouraged by this publication, it will have served its purpose.

Owen A. Knorr,
Institute Director

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| Foreword | iii |
| Introduction | v |
| Changing Patterns of Authority and Influence | 1 |
| Frederick Rudolph Professor of History Williams College | |
| Rights and Responsibilities of Faculty | 11 |
| Ralph S. Brown Professor of Law Yale University | |
| Case Studies in Academic Freedom | 23 |
| Walter P. Metzger Professor of History Columbia University | |
| Rights and Responsibilities of Students | 33 |
| E. G. Williamson Dean of Students University of Minnesota | |
| The Berkeley Case | 41 |
| Terry F. Lunsford Associate Specialist Center for the Study of Higher Education University of California, Berkeley | |
| Intellect & Commitment: The Faces of Discontent | 61 |
| Paul Heist Associate Research Psychologist Center for the Study of Higher Education University of California, Berkeley | |
| Student Discontent and Campus Reform | 71 |
| Paul Potter Immediate Post President Students for a Democratic Society | |
| Institutional Privilege and Accountability | 89 |
| Buell Gallagher President City College of the City University of New York | |
| Institute Faculty and Staff | 97 |

CHANGING PATTERNS OF AUTHORITY AND INFLUENCE



*Frederick Rudolph, Professor
Department of History, Williams College*

This year's institute has taken as its theme the most mysterious of subjects: the nature of order and freedom on the American campus. The questions that are raised by this subject stagger the imagination, although they flow from our sponsors with challenging relentlessness: What are the historical antecedents of today's pattern of authority and influence in the college and university community? What forces account for the changing patterns of authority and influence? Have the rights and responsibilities of faculties changed since 1900? What are the changing manifestations of the career of academic freedom? Should the college community extend to students the same rights that they have as citizens outside the college? In the Berkeley disturbances what issues were involved—educational, philosophical, ethical, social, legal, and administrative? Is campus reform more likely to result from traumatic uprisings or as a result of an evolutionary process? By what means are colleges and universities held to account for their actions?

Happily, I am not to be held accountable for answers to all these questions, but even those that have been tossed my way for tossing on to you seem to me to be not only tough questions but questions that are filled with mystery. Order and freedom may indeed be concrete and real, but surely no one would deny that the rise of baseball and football is much easier to chart. Authority and influence certainly reside somewhere on a campus, and always have, although most institutional histories have chosen only to tell us where the president lived. Like other human beings, college professors have indeed possessed certain rights and responsibilities, but asserting the obvious is not the same thing as determining which of these rights and responsibilities are incidental to their

*A portion of this address also appears in an essay entitled "Neglect of Students as a Historical Tradition," prepared as a background paper for the 1965 Annual Meeting of the American Council on Education to be held in Washington, D. C. October 6-8.

roles as grown men hired to do a job or peculiar to the job they have been hired to do. We have become so accustomed to speaking of academic freedom, by which we have meant "for professors only," that perhaps we have avoided probing such interesting mysteries as non-academic freedom or whether students should be allowed to grow up. As for the Berkeley disturbances, well, I for one have come to listen. The historian certainly should have no difficulty in accounting for campus reform, which he will recognize as sometimes being evolutionary and sometimes revolutionary in origin, but when confronted with the phrase "traumatic uprisings," then once more he knows that he is in the neighborhood of mystery. Yet, perhaps we must honestly admit that there is no mystery as to the means by which some colleges and universities are held to account for their actions: for, once a college begins to listen to Mrs. Grundy or her husband—perhaps we might call him Senator Grundy—its actions as a college have lost meaning. To be accountable to Mrs. Grundy is to deny the nature of the community we seek to understand.

History of Order and Freedom in Higher Education

Toward the end of this institute, I suppose that someone will have solved our mystery, but I am prepared to confess that here in the opening session I propose at first only to deepen it. The serious historical work in this area, for one reason or another, is embarrassingly inadequate. Who has yet to give us a study in depth of eighteenth and early nineteenth century food riots? What would such a study tell us about the locus of authority, the tenuous balance of campus power? How much would a really solid study of the various tugs-of-war that we know took place between college administrators and politicians tell us about the early days of the state universities and land-grant colleges, especially about the lasting influence

of one year's politics over next year's curriculum? How much active authority was exerted by the various religious denominations over the little nineteenth century church colleges that literally were starving to death? How much active authority could they afford to exert in a situation where the non-denominational appeal of the denominational college was often its strongest asset? Who was the typical nineteenth century benefactor—John D. Rockefeller, who gave William Rainey Harper free reign to develop a great university in Chicago, or the Leland Stanfords, who almost strangled their university at birth and along with it the president and the faculty? Intriguing as these questions may be, I am not at all certain that they are the most important ones to address to the past and certainly they should not be the first ones. For if we are going to find out about order and freedom, authority and influence, on the campus, we should first have some sense of what society at large, the culture itself, has to say about such matters.

It seems to me that no one since has really improved upon the description that Alexis Tocqueville gave us in 1835 of the American way of doing things. "To evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and, in some degree, of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and doing better; to seek the reason of things for oneself, and in oneself alone; to tend to results without being bound to means, and to strike through the form to the substance—such," wrote Tocqueville, "are the principal characteristics of what I shall call the philosophical method of the Americans." By the end of the century this method would have a name—pragmatism; it would be explained by the historian Frederick Jackson Turner as being a product of the frontier experience; and, in turn, it could be used to explain the development of such American phenomena as John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company and J. P. Morgan's United States Steel Corporation. What is the significance of this method for our inquiry into the nature of order and freedom on the American campus?

In the first place, I would suggest that we take Tocqueville's insights as a warning. "If it is order you are looking for," he seems to be saying, "don't expect to find too much. These Americans are a dynamic people, bound neither by today nor yesterday, very much on their way to tomorrow." "Do not expect their institutions," he is advising, "to be those tidy organic accumulations of system, custom, form, and tradition that are characteristic of older and more stable societies." He is almost saying, "Don't expect them to know altogether what they are doing, although they may know where they are going and be quite unconcerned about how they get there."

While Tocqueville was not writing about the particular institutions and the peculiar community that concern us, his observations are pertinent to our inquiry, for it is just this formlessness, this absence of certainty and custom, this open-endedness, if you will,

that make the academic community such a baffling historical phenomenon. These rootless Americans about whom Tocqueville wrote actually succeeded in creating rootless institutions.

To a significant degree our future-mindedness, our almost merry unconcern about the past, have helped to shape institutions that often give the appearance of having been born yesterday. It is a commonplace that students are addicted to establishing "first annual" traditions and that an old custom is very old indeed if it survives the four years of an entire college generation. Only with the greatest of difficulty can a sense of a continuing past be developed and nurtured in an American college or university, and this condition is not a consequence of the on the whole rather miserable institutional histories that have accumulated across time. On the contrary, the historical record is sparse and inadequate precisely because we have had so little use for it, precisely because we have not cared to know who we once were, how we got here, and who indeed we are today. But then along comes some apparently remarkable event—the disenchantment with fraternities at the eastern colleges, the rash of student riots everywhere—and we look into a mirror, hoping to see there some reflection, some clear picture, of all the years that have brought us to this inexplicable day.

While the nature of authority at an American college or university may therefore be a mystery, there is nothing strange about the reasons why. Our institutional life is so alienated from the past that a college or university is most inept at revealing almost anything about itself. But we must, nevertheless, try to fathom what we can.

Let us first see what we can learn by looking in a somewhat searching way at the mid-nineteenth century American college. If we are to identify any pattern of authority and influence in such an institution, I would suggest that we pay no attention to the college laws, be not too impressed by the existence of required daily chapel—except as evidence of the skill of college officials in making trouble for themselves—and that we recall Tocqueville's observations on the tendency of Americans "to strike through the form to the substance." In other words, it is not the form of the college—the laws, the regimen, the administrative organization—that should engage our attention if we, too, are to strike our way through to the substance of what concerns us. What I propose to do is to take a look at Williams College in the middle decades of the nineteenth century when it was presided over by Mark Hopkins who has become something of a symbol of one understanding of authority and influence on the American campus. You realize, I know, that Williams College and Mark Hopkins are not new subjects to me, although I have never before quite had to look at them from the point-of-view required by our institute. But you may not realize that the aphorism on which Hopkins' fame rests—"the ideal college is Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the other"—developed out of a public controversy over the locus of authority and

influence in the American college, and in the background of that controversy hovered a student rebellion and all of its shadowy consequences.

The occasion that inspired the aphorism was an 1871 gathering of the New York alumni of the college. The aphorism originated as a retort to a scorching criticism of the effectiveness and authority of the college's president by a member of the faculty. Casting a shadow over the proceedings, as I have said, was the great student rebellion of 1868. Here, then, were the classic contenders for authority—president, faculty, students, alumni—all somehow involved in giving birth to a rather simple defense of the old-time college. The defense was made by a then obscure Republican politician, James A. Garfield, who found the professor's complaints incompatible with his own understanding of the ideal college—"Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the other." The professor, John Bascom, had played a role in the controversy of 1868 when, as faculty secretary, he had promulgated to the students a faculty ruling on class attendance that had been found particularly obnoxious by the students; the faculty had chosen a time when Mark Hopkins was out of town for asserting their authority, and the students, taking advantage of the faculty's poor sense of timing, withdrew from classes and were in open rebellion on Hopkins' return.

Indeed, in the rebellion of 1868 and in the polite debate at the New York alumni meeting of 1871 was a question more profound than who was running the college and how its constituent members might reach agreement as to how authority was to be shared. Although power was clearly in contention, the use of that power in determining the very style and quality of the institution was central to both events. Matters of curriculum and discipline, of morale and of morality, lurked in the background, indeed sometimes in the foreground, but they were incidental to that subtler and more all-encompassing consideration—the very identity of the institution, as it was revealed both to itself and to the outside world.

Like other typical small liberal arts colleges, Williams was both religiously oriented and publicly supported. Its religious orientation, although nominally Congregational, was really non-denominational—"safe," as Hopkins once described it—and all that it really meant was that the boys were exposed to proper Christian influences, the official purposes of a college being primarily moral. Public support took the form of a generous exemption from local real estate taxes as well as occasional grants from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Neither the church nor state or local government, however, played a significant role in shaping the identity of the institution or in contending for authority over it. To the outside world Williams College was Mark Hopkins, just as a great many other institutions also seemed to be the lengthened shadow of a man.

Within the institution, however, there was some sharper sense of the locus of influence and authority, but none sharper than that revealed by the students

who, after a recess or vacation, would return to Williamstown and announce that "college is back." The identity of the institution was in the hands of those on the ground, and the question therefore is not one of the influence of an absent church or government or governing board but of the authority of president, professors, and students in defining the institution's spirit and style.

The Era of Student Authority and Influence

How close to the truth were the students in defining the college as themselves, in recognizing the great strength of their own authority and influence in defining the college's identity? I have concluded that, in a sense, these nineteenth century collegians, in taking charge of themselves, took charge of the American college and shaped it according to their wishes. They took what, in the case of Williams and its many counterparts, were pale imitations of English residential colleges, given over to what was certainly more religion than most students could bear, and they simply reformed them. What is remarkably instructive about what they did is how much more effective they were than the would-be reformers in the ranks of the presidents and the professors.

In the 1820's and 1830's a great many people knew that something was wrong with the American college and that it needed reforming. In Nashville Philip Lindsley struggled heroically and unsuccessfully to create a great university that would both serve the people and develop standards of intellectual excellence. At Amherst Jacob Abbott and a faculty committee proposed a set of reforms and were allowed by the board of trustees to carry some of them out. But the reforms did not keep, any more than they did when George Ticknor tampered with the structure of life at Harvard and James Marsh overhauled the course of study at the University of Vermont. Nor did Thomas Jefferson's bold departure at the University of Virginia, nor the hopeful launching at New York University of an institution intended to be seriously dedicated to learning, live up to their founders' expectations or seriously influence patterns of higher education elsewhere. What these frustrated reformers had been hoping to do, of course, was to make some vital connection with American life and society and to make some vital connection between the curriculum and their students as human beings. This country is going to be a country of businessmen, George Ticknor argued, and why should Harvard insist on adhering to a course of study of no earthly use to businessmen? French and German are the useful languages of the future; Latin and Greek are the dead languages of the past—so argued the Amherst faculty, as, indeed, did a good many young men outside the colleges who simply could not see much relationship between what went on in a college classroom or chapel and what was going on where the roads and canals and railroads were being built, where the forests were crashing down, and where the fascinating life of commerce and trade and manufacturing were being carried on. But the weight of tradition

was against institutional reform. As the Yale faculty announced in 1828: "Our prescribed course contains those subjects only which ought to be understood . . . by everyone who aims at a thorough education." Yale carried the day and, as far as the colleges were concerned, there was to be no reform. What had been was still to be. But they reckoned, as colleges so foolishly and so often still do, without the students, who proceeded to take matters in their own hands and in the process to reshape completely the intellectual, social, and physical purposes of the American college.

Fraternities

When Greek letter fraternities were moving into the life of the colleges in the 1830's and after, Mark Hopkins was shaking his head and ineffectually corresponding with President Humphrey of Amherst as to whether there was something they could do about it. Later, when he decided that there was not, he had at least one word of congratulation: he thought that the fraternities had been responsible for improving undergraduate manners. Of course he was right, but, because of his failure to direct any searching questions at the whole phenomenon of fraternities, he did not know why he was right. He missed entirely the symbolic relationship of manners to a whole set of values and preferences which fraternities were institutionalizing on the campus. This concern with manners may well have been a proper subject for congratulations, but, more important, it was an indication that the college was being reformed, that students were institutionalizing in their fraternities new prestige values, the attributes of a successful man of the world, *this* world, at the expense of those various signs of Christian grace—humility, equality before God, and morality—which it had long been the purpose of the college to foster. If Philip Lindsley and George Ticknor and Jacob Abbott and James Marsh could not bring the colleges to life, the students were prepared to prove that they could bring life to the colleges.

Athletics

In the 1850's and 1860's another generation of students forced the gymnasium movement on bewildered boards of trustees, and still later, while faculties floundered in search of some rationale of control, students created the vast fabric of intercollegiate athletics. No one will argue that the American college was quite the same as it once had been after fraternities and intercollegiate athletics had carried out the reforms which their appearance portended. Conceivably the colleges were better because of the change, but the instructive fact for anyone connected with an American college or university today is the completely uninvited, uncontrolled, un-directed nature of these revolutionary innovations. Williams under Mark Hopkins and other colleges did not decide to have fraternities. They did not ask to be split into bands of competing Greeks, cliques of self-important little boys playing grown-up. No board

of trustees met and asked: What can we create as a diversion for the students, something to provide them with a time-consuming outlet for non-academic interests? No one asked: How can we best teach snobbery, prejudice, and conformity, or, indeed, self-reliance, business management, and good manners? Nothing of the sort. Nor did the rise of athletics represent a conscious ordering of collegiate life by the governing authorities. Fraternities and athletics essentially happened *to* the colleges and they happened because students, left to their own devices, decided that they would.

The Effective Agents of Campus Reform

The agents of influence were the students. The particular groups to whom law and tradition had presumably assigned the identity and purposes of the colleges—the presidents and boards of trustees and the professors—stood aside, indifferent or ineffectual observers, and failed to address themselves to the questions which should always be raised on an American college campus when any extracurricular development is stirring. For if a college cannot keep ahead of its students, students will surely get ahead of their college. Neglect demands response; the young do not refuse to act merely because they are not understood.

Governing boards and faculties cannot be expected to turn the tide of history, even if they are so inclined, and in the case of both fraternities and intercollegiate athletics there is no question that powerful and healthy undergraduate needs and desires were being expressed, needs that a backward-looking unimaginative official orientation insisted upon frustrating. These needs and desires could not, and should not, have been throttled. It was quite another matter, however, for collegiate corporations and faculties to be fundamentally unaware of what was going on and remarkably unprepared to channel and direct such needs and desires within the context of some conscious notion of what the college was doing and where it should have been going.

The most sensitive barometer of what is going on in a college is not its president, who is the victim of demands no six men could handle ideally. Nor is a board of trustees any more reliable. They trust the president to keep them informed, and they are both too busy and generally too honest altogether to trust themselves in matters that, after all, require some sense of continuing familiarity with the nature of an academic community. A faculty cannot, either, be counted on to record with clarity the prevailing climate. On the whole a faculty is likely to be too engrossed in its often rather narrow interests, too wedded to habit, or too accustomed to being ignored in matters of fundamental policy to be always dependable reporters of the academic weather.

The Campus Barometer—Extracurriculum

The most sensitive barometer of what is going on at a college is the extracurriculum. It is the instrument

of change, the instrument with which generations of students, who possess the college for but a few years, register their values, often fleetingly, yet perhaps indelibly. It is the agency that identifies their enthusiasms, their understanding of what a college should be, their preferences. It reveals their attitude toward the course of study; it records the demands of the curriculum, or the lack thereof. It is a measure of their growth. And because it is the particular province of lively, imaginative young men and women not immobilized by tradition, rank, authority, and custom, the extracurriculum is likely to respond more quickly than any other agency of the college to the fundamental, perhaps not yet even clearly expressed, movements in the world beyond the campus and to the developing expectations of society. For this reason a whole range of what in time became respectable academic subjects received their first significant encouragement in the colleges from students, their clubs, their journals, their glee clubs, their dramatic groups, their libraries. For this reason a boys' club or a student-run settlement house or an undergraduate branch of the YMCA was an earlier manifestation of the progressive movement on the campuses than was the adoption of course programs in sociology.

Intellectual Life

In recognizing that we would not have fraternities and football teams if students had not introduced them to the campus, we sometimes forget that, were it not for students, we would also have had to wait much longer for books. The student literary societies enshrined intellect at a time when the colleges' clear preference was for piety. They welcomed books to an environment so hostile that both Mark Hopkins of Williams and Eliphalet Nott of Union could unashamedly admit that they never read books. Not only did the literary societies often outstrip the college libraries in numbers of volumes, but the wide range of subject matter allowed far greater opportunity for the play of intellect than did the narrow religious fare of the usual college library.

In a sense, the literary societies and their libraries, the clubs, journals, and organizations which compensated for the neglect of science, English literature, history, music, and art in the curriculum—this vast developing extracurriculum was the student response to the classical course of study. It advanced the convincing argument that, whereas the curriculum is dead, students are alive. It brought prestige to the life of the mind. It helped to liberate the intellect on the American campus, and it argued so persuasively that in time the colleges assumed responsibilities they earlier had refused. If student reformers also introduced institutions of a non-intellectual, even anti-intellectual, character that would one day be of serious challenge to the intellectual life of the American college and university, it is also true that, on the whole, students first gave to American higher education any serious intellectual character at all. If the boys insist on playing ball and getting drunk, administrators and professors should remember that even before it occurred to us—they wanted to read books.

The Significant Role of Student Influence

So what did James A. Garfield really mean, what was he saying about the nature of authority on the American campus when he defined the ideal college as Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on another? I am now inclined to believe that he was saying a great deal more than we usually regard him as saying, for the tendency has been to place too great an emphasis on the first part of what is clearly an equation, too much emphasis on Hopkins himself who clearly must be regarded as a symbol of the paternal authority of the old college. In Hopkins resided the moral commitment of the institution, the *in loco parentis* tradition of the residential college, the promise to return to their parents generations of young men skillfully and lovingly guided past the shoals of growing up. But what about that student on the other end of the log? How great was his authority? How essential was he to the life of the institution? How far did he go in asserting, in contradistinction to the paternal authority of the president and professors, an adolescent authority of his own? The answers to these questions, I believe, are already clear. If I say that students were essentially in charge of the old-time colleges, I do not believe that I exaggerate. If I exaggerate, it is but very little. The inexhaustible energy of students, guided by an unrelenting will to prepare themselves for the American experience, delivered the colleges over to a world of fraternities, athletic teams, libraries, and courses of study intended to fulfill needs beyond those that could be left to the care of Mark Hopkins and his faculty contemporaries.

In 1871 when the Williams alumni were meeting in New York, John Bascom's catalogue of complaints suggested that he had decided that the time had come when the college itself would have to respond more effectively to what had become a clear record of adolescent initiative and authority. In this light, his demand that the college assume some greater measure of responsibility for libraries and laboratories, his proposals for improving the quality of instruction—even the 1868 faculty ruling intended to raise the level of academic work at the college—these indications of unrest and change may be regarded as aspects of a nascent interest on the part of the faculty in asserting some significant authority of its own. Yet the era of the college, those years before the great universities assumed a major role in defining American higher education, was a time when student authority was firmly established in academic practice. This authority was neither formalized nor often recognized for what it was, although it seems to me to have had more to do with shaping the history of American higher education during those years than did presidential or professorial authority, religious or government authority.

The Era of Faculty Authority and Influence

The era of student authority was followed by an era of faculty authority that coincided with the development of the great universities. While I recognize the dangers of simple labels and while I do not

wish to suggest the absence of influence and authority in other constituent groups of the academic community, the essential nature and spirit of American higher education were subjected to revolutionary influences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Just as the revolutionary forces in the early day of the colleges were unleashed by students, the revolutionary forces in this new era were unleashed by a new breed of professor. Thorstein Veblen populated this later age with captains of erudition, but, however fascinating his analysis, his tendency to find a big bad businessman in every academic situation obscures the far more fascinating fact that late in the nineteenth century professors began to push colleges and universities around in just the ways that students once had.

Responding to a variety of forces—among which, indeed, was student discontent with the course of study—the professors, in the decades after the Civil War, took firm charge of the classroom and redefined it with such devices as the elective curriculum and the new courses of study that students had for so long wanted. The old-time professor was gradually but persistently replaced by men who could claim the Ph.D., a mark of professional competence and intellectual rigor that had not been characteristic of the old order. In the 1880's and 1890's academic institutions set up their ladders of status achievement, rewarding those who were best able to live up to the ideals, rules, and habits of scientific Germanic scholarship.

The creation of a hierarchy of professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors, etc., was a function, in the first place, of that awesome proliferation of knowledge which enlarged the scope of a particular area of human understanding and required the labors of two or three men where one had sufficed; and, second, of that ever-increasing undergraduate and graduate enrollment which in some places called for platoons of instructors where, also, one had sufficed.

To the apparatus of hierarchy was also added the concept of departmentalization, a symbolic statement of the disunity of knowledge which was never made by the old colleges. The specialization which this departmentalization was intended to accommodate permitted the professors to develop a set of emphases and values that was foreign to the old-time college. For that catholicity of outlook and acquaintance with universal knowledge which had seemed so often to be a mark of the best of the old-time professors there was substituted a specialist's regard for the furthest refinements of his own interest. Publication became a guiding interest of the new academician. Each book, each article, paved the way to promotion, gaining prestige both for the individual and the institution to which he was attached. The tendencies of the new scholarship and its organization on university campuses made the new professor loyal to professional standards but often indifferent to the fate of the institution to which he might temporarily be attached and indifferent even to the fate—moral or intellectual—of

unknown students who passed through the lecture halls. In 1923 a Yale undergraduate, commenting on the lecture courses that had become standard fare, lamented: "Instead of being a person . . . I am now merely a suit of clothes pinned together by four or five seat numbers."

A New Campus Orientation

The new professors established a new orientation on the campus. Intellect rather than piety was their touchstone; ignorance rather than immorality was their particular challenge. What distinguished them from their predecessors was a deep-seated dedication to the advancement of learning. Out of their devotion there developed standards of freedom and tenure affecting the capacity of the American college and university to support effectively the life of the mind. These are notable achievements, but they are not the only achievements of the new professors. Among other things, by seizing on intellect as the primary focus of their concern, the professors sharpened a division within the academic community and, in a sense, for the first time established a body of influence and authority that could effectively challenge student authority and influence. The new professors in fact gave the colleges and universities something to do other than prayers, and they even went so far as to expect students to engage in serious intellectual endeavor at the expense of those various institutions of student authority and influence—the fraternities, the clubs, the teams—that had grown up in the era of Mark Hopkins. The professors, therefore, proceeded to take firm charge of the classroom, but the students remained in charge of much of the college as it had been passed on to them from the collegiate era. The consequence of this somewhat paradoxical situation was to create among the professors the belief that the young men who passed through their classrooms became graduates of the curriculum, while among the students themselves the belief developed that they would become graduates of their fraternities, their clubs, their teams—of all those aspects of college that really mattered. A struggle for authority over collegiate identity and purpose was thereby initiated, a struggle that has nowhere been resolved.

Now it may seem remarkable to some of you and irresponsible to most of you that I should here advance the idea that as far as the history of authority and influence in American higher education are concerned we have experienced two eras, one in which student influence was established and dominant, and one in which faculty influence played an increasingly creative and significant role. Moreover, I advance this interpretation of American academic history while assigning only peripheral work-a-day influence to such legendary repositories of power and authority as college presidents, boards of trustees, regents, state legislatures, private benefactors, alumni, and religious bodies. For in the end an academic community is students and teachers, to whose service these other groups make their contribution. Of course on occasion these groups that I regard as peripheral played roles that made a difference in the fate of a particular

institution. Yet the essential identity of the institution was fundamentally a reflection of student and faculty preference. The American college and university, as we know it, is a sensitive record of student and faculty influence brought to bear on defining the nature of the academic experience. This experience has been serviced by presidents, deans, alumni, legislators, religious bodies, and others, but it has not really been defined by them.

Current Patterns of Authority and Influence

If we are to understand the nature of influence and authority on the American campus today, therefore, I suggest that we not concern ourselves too much with distinctions between public and private institutions, with legislators and coordinating bodies, benefactors and religious bodies. We must look to the students and the professors in the present, just as the historical record suggests that we should look to them in the past if we would locate the source of determining energy and influence.

And as I look around me today I am struck once more by the assertion of student initiative, by the power of student reform and influence. Among other things, just as they once founded fraternities in the colleges of the East, students have for some years there been in the process of abandoning them. They have not yet abolished football and it is quite unlikely that they will, but there are platoons of students who someone expected to play football but somehow who never do—although here and there one finds a flourishing rugby club that the colleges refuse to take official recognition of.

And while undergraduate curriculum committees—which you can be sure were *their* idea, not ours—have not yet stormed faculty meetings, in many institutions curricular stirrings in faculty meetings rest on an appreciation of the fact that someone is knocking at the gates. Even the growing number of transfer students on American campuses is the result of no official encouragement, and the undergraduate leave of absence is only an official response to what is fundamentally an assertion of student need. Undergraduate riots and rebellions may be variously interpreted, as they surely will be at this institute, but surely a fundamental ingredient is student dismay at discovering that the ideal college is no longer Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the other. Mark Hopkins? Who was he? In one sense, much of what is now happening on the American campus seems to me to be a delayed response, now encouraged by the enormity of the numbers and task involved, of students to what happened to American higher education after their authority and influence was challenged and significantly superseded by faculty authority and influence.

Today's every undergraduate protest, every demonstration against authority, every effort to proclaim "We are here. Do not forget us!" derives in part from the extent to which earlier generations of students were succeeded by professors in shaping the

academic environment. A Williams undergraduate in the 1840's amused and informed himself as a member of the student science club by mounting a set of the birds of Williamstown in poses after Audubon. A world in which a student might play taxidermist after Audubon must have been rather comforting, a world peculiarly encouraging to individual growth and mastery. But the future belonged not to student science clubs but to the new professors, not to playing taxidermy but to demanding lecture and laboratory courses, and one consequence is that the opportunities for individual creativity and imagination have been circumscribed. The more the professors take charge, after all, the less in charge are the students—even of themselves.

When the new professors moved the colleges and universities toward serious and responsible intellectual purpose, not only were they required to make a kind of innocent but deadly assault on much of the intellectual life of the extracurriculum; they also were required to change the nature of the professional role and of the teaching and learning experience. The Mark Hopkins ideal cannot really be sustained by a coaxial cable, and probably no one seriously believes that it can, but the nature of the loss to students has not fully been appreciated. The *in loco parentis* tradition of the residential college, the college professor as friend and moral guide, the liberal arts as a passport to wisdom and self-knowledge—these dominant characteristics of the nineteenth century college no longer define higher education for most American young men and women. Not yet is it possible to take an identity crisis to an IBM machine or to the great but distant professor who fills the lecture hall. Perhaps the *in loco parentis* tradition of the collegiate way required the colleges to "care" too much, but the outcome of institutional growth, an overwhelming intellectual purpose, and a professionally oriented faculty has been to create an academic environment insensitive to many of the human needs of growing adolescents. In every way the nineteenth century was probably a happier time for experiencing the mysterious needs and desires of growing up than is today, and probably no institution better served those needs and desires than did the old colleges.

The Need for a New Combination of Freedom and Concern

A glance back across American academic history suggests that students knew how to use a college as an instrument of their maturation. The university has become a less wieldy instrument for that purpose, often a most disappointing instrument; in some ways it has served the professors more effectively than it has the students. Students have strangely always had to insist that they are humans. In the old days, when their insistence took the form of a most intricate extracurriculum or of a rebellion against some especially stringent application of the official code of discipline, they were encouraged either by a benevolent neglect or by some common-sense president or professor. Today neglect takes on new forms: neglect

has become a function of size and of a shift in professional commitment rather than of administrative absent-mindedness or blindness. And as a substitute for the paternal concern and guidance of the collegiate tradition there is now the sensitivity to public relations and the assertion of power by academic governing boards, who in a simpler day assumed, quite correctly, that presidents and professors knew more about students than they did. Even the debate over parietal rules at residential institutions depends far too much on official concern over what Mrs. Grundy will think than on why students think what they do.

The absence of any rationale for student academic freedom in the old colleges rested in part on a carefully reasoned and consciously nurtured paternalism that was intended to help pave the way to freedom, and it was supplemented by that climate of laissez-faire that encouraged the free development of the

entire extracurriculum. The absence of any effective guidance and concern in the contemporary university rests on no rationale at all, but the consequence is to deliver over to students, in the form of neglect—even in the classroom—the kind of freedom that breeds license. There emerges from this reversal of emphasis the impression that perhaps, like all the generations before them, today's students would actually prefer a happy blend of freedom and of order. It was just such a blend that they achieved as nineteenth century collegiate reformers and that they helped to carry into the early university movement. Whether the contemporary university can create that combination of freedom and concern is perhaps its greatest challenge. As usual, the challenge has been there for quite a while, but it has required students to draw it to our attention. And what is most distressing of all is how often in our history students have had to tell us of their presence—of their needs as young human beings discovering the limits of their individual destinies.

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RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF FACULTY



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In the central areas of faculty concern, rights and responsibilities are in no sense opposites. They are the same; responsibilities are a part of and flow from rights. Rights are essential for meeting responsibilities.

The Primary Right and Responsibility

The primary right and responsibility of the academic man is always to exercise and cherish academic freedom. There are classically three aspects of this combined right and responsibility, though they may of course be stated in different ways. The first is the right and responsibility to diffuse knowledge through teaching. The second is to augment knowledge through investigation and publication. The third is to attain expertness and to apply that expertness to the problems of a discipline and of society.

These three familiar rights and responsibilities are, of course, interrelated and overlapping. Perhaps the attainment of expertness should be put first, since the capacity to teach and investigate depends in large part on the attainment of professional competence. But there is no need to quibble about priorities of definition in such familiar declarations of the primary mission of a faculty member, all of which I gather together under the over-arching right and responsibility to possess and exercise academic freedom.

A complement to the right and responsibility to teach conscientiously and to investigate freely is another set of rights and responsibilities, namely, to share in the government of colleges and universities. In a simple—and anarchic—state of nature, this set of rights and responsibilities would perhaps be unnecessary. But one may doubt whether academic pursuits have ever been wholly anarchic, although they may seem that way even now. Even in the first academy, that of classic Athens, there must have been some minimal administration—of space in the Stoa, of status as pupils, and of sustenance for the master.

With the vast and increasing complexity of modern academic life, problems of administration and governance touch every aspect of teaching and learning. I will therefore argue that the role of faculty in academic government, however difficult it may be to define, is another instance where right and responsibility flow into and from each other. Faculties have a right to participate in practically every aspect of university affairs. They have a responsibility to do so, limited by considerations of efficiency and division of labor, for there are many concerns that can best be discharged by other specialists, within the boundaries of educational policies which the faculty has helped to make. I do not propose to make claims for exclusive faculty rights, but I will argue that an institution of learning cannot properly ignore the counsels of the faculty in any significant aspect of its operations.

Areas of Current Concern

Let me now, having staked out large claims for faculty rights and responsibilities, expand and illustrate a few areas of current concern. Hemmed in as I am on our agenda by historians, I shall not attempt to measure degrees of change since 1900, or any other date. And I shall try to be wary of characterizing the extent to which good or bad practices prevail. It may well be that you, ministered to by organizations like WICHE, and consuming as you do the professional journals of education, have an accurate perception of major trends in the organization of higher education. My own exposure, when I emerge from the comfortable shelter of my professional interests, is to the tempests that attract the attention of the American Association of University Professors or, less frequently, the American Civil Liberties Union. Even when these tempests cannot be contained in a teapot, they are, one likes to think, exceptional. Behind the storm clouds there must lie placid areas where the well-placed observer can see ideal combinations of

continuity and change, like the boundaries of fields and the course of a river through a summer landscape.

Without such a vantage-point, one must take the cases that reach the *New York Times*, or the investigating committees of the AAUP, as representative. Even if they represent only that overworked exposed part of the iceberg, still there seem to be relatively few overt interferences with freedom of teaching and scholarly inquiry. In the central area of academic freedom in teaching and research, one may be pardoned a degree of satisfaction, if not of complacency. I can recall only a scattering of published cases in the last decade that could be said to involve the classroom utterances or published work of academic persons.¹ Partly because of the tendency of AAUP's Committee A to dispose of cases on sometimes narrow grounds of procedural due process, no AAUP case in recent years has squarely turned on a direct invasion of academic freedom. Such issues may have lain beneath the surface. I have no way of estimating the extent of covert repression and of real or groundless fears of repression. It would be fatuous to suppose that the teaching of sociology is not inhibited in institutions in the South, or the teaching of Marxism in other institutions anywhere, or the teaching of comparative religion in still other institutions. But it may not be fatuous to assume that there is pretty general surface adherence to the essential propositions of the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. So many weighty associations and learned societies have subscribed to the Statement that it would take a really independent (or ignorant) mind to deny that "the teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and the publication of the results," or that he is "entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject." I have, of course, left out the "buts" in these statements, and I will return to some of them.

It would be fatuous to assume that this amiable state of affairs is likely to be eternal. The historians of the subject, who are with us at this meeting, have told how severe periods of national and local crisis have almost always been damaging to academic freedom. Our last such impressions were, of course, the somewhat delayed lacerations of World War II, in the McCarthy era that substantially ended ten years ago. Even then, overt direct infringements were fairly few. Faculty members did tell Lazarsfeld and his associates that they felt less free as the result of direct and indirect pressure.²

Will the current co-existence of racial and international crises lead to direct infringements? I will undertake neither to be Cassandra nor Pollyanna. One may observe that powerful material incentives, especially those of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, may buy academic freedom in the South where it could not be freely given. On the international side, despite the rather frightening isolation in which the academic and intellectual opponents of our Vietnam involvement find themselves—if we are to believe the polls and the President—there have been, I believe, no noticeable reprisals against those

academic figures who, possessing professional competence, deplore our position in Southeast Asia.

So far I have been speaking, and have been taking care to speak, of direct assaults on academic freedom. When we turn to the utterances and actions of faculty members that are a little or a lot less than *ex cathedra*, the situation becomes rather less sunny. We then enter into the realm of indirect infringements of academic freedom, or we face borderline expressions that may not fall within the charmed circle at all.

Before turning to these problems, difficult because they do stand at the margin, perhaps a little more should be said about the main stream of rights and responsibilities. I have suggested that the primary rights of expertness, of teaching, and of investigation are reasonably well respected. What about the responsibility to exercise these rights that I claim is inseparable from them?

The Right and Responsibility to be Expert

First, as to the right and responsibility to be expert, which in our age means to be a specialist. Surely, the incessant deprecation of excessive specialization would seem to answer any thought that faculties are not avidly pursuing expertness. We might rather ask whether academic expertness is brought to bear on questions of sufficient breadth to inform students, fellow scholars, and the varied publics that are willing to listen to information and advice from academic people.

I venture the wholly impressionistic opinion that never has so much been said by so many. I put to one side the question as to whether what is said is always as intelligible as it should be. It is easy to make fun of jargon, and there is much to make fun of. At the same time, it is idle to ask a nuclear physicist, unless he is willing to make the effort for a particular purpose, habitually to translate his concepts into homely metaphors that will only falsify them. Problems of communication aside, we have a tremendous volume of shared knowledge, especially in the spheres of public affairs, political, social, and scientific. The same professoriate that is criticized for undue absorption in trivial specialization is equally criticized for downright intrusiveness in public life. Of course, the inconsistency of such criticism is distorted by treating the professoriate as homogeneous. There are specialists who pursue the infinitesimal into the infinite. There are generalists who pontificate without exposing themselves to all the forces that play on policy-makers. There are, most unfortunately, those who from a very narrow base offer themselves as experts on practically everything. But when I consider, bringing to mind only local colleagues in New Haven, the vigorous crusades of economists like Robert Triffin to straighten out the international money muddle, of political scientists like Robert Dahl to put forward the democratic ethic of reapportionment, of constitutional lawyers like Alexander Bickel and Charles Black to uphold the Supreme Court when it is right and to set it—and each other—back on the right path when

it is wrong, or of a physician like Lee Buxton to demolish the archaic Connecticut birth control restrictions, I cannot say that the public is being deprived of the special insights of experts.

The Right and Responsibility to Teach

As for the right and responsibility to teach, to diffuse and transmit knowledge, it is often, indeed usually nowadays, bracketed with the third right and responsibility, to discover new knowledge. They are bracketed in current discourse because teaching is said to be starved by the demands of research. Here again, I wonder—without expertness, I have to say—whether the flash floods of research in the natural sciences, fed by cloudbursts of federal money, have not engrossed our view. Logan Wilson, addressing your institute in 1961, vividly reinforced this note of skepticism by reporting two detailed surveys of publications by faculties of large universities. In the more favorable of the two surveys, covering a convenient one thousand persons, “32% had not published any articles and 71% had not published any books.”³ It may be that this evidence is inconclusive because it refers only to publications. Perhaps the thousand scholars are deep in research but were hoarding the results—a rather unlikely thought. I would not minimize what we read about the situation in scientific departments in major universities, where we are told there are swarms of highly-placed professors who don't teach undergraduates at all and who, when pressed to identify the graduate students they are said to be training, do not know their names. It may be reasonable to suggest that some self-correction is taking place. Structurally, it is to be found in some of the new colleges, like the Santa Cruz campus of the University of California, where teaching in close relationship to the students is to be emphasized. In any institution, if those in power want more and better teaching, I suggest they can get it by taking steps to identify and reward those who do teach well.

Rights and Responsibilities Outside the Classroom

After this survey—perhaps over-sanguine—of the primary rights and responsibilities of faculty, let me return to some of the marginal problems that I raised earlier. These arise from speech and conduct outside the classroom or other professional settings. This is where a lot of the current talk about faculty responsibility, or the lack of it, seems to be generated. Here there are suggestions, typified by some of the questions in your workbook, that a body of responsibilities exists, not entwined with rights, but creating a special set of disabilities on faculty members. These supposed responsibilities—or disabilities—are justified in the interests of public relations, of setting a good example for students, or simply for good decorum. President Eliot, apostrophizing academic freedom in 1869, declared: “The Corporation demands of all its teachers that they be grave, reverent, and high-minded, but it leaves them, like their pupils, free.”⁴ In our

sport-shirt society, the frock-coated image of gravity and reverence seems quite remote. But there is a residual feeling, even if it is not definable or enforceable, that faculty members ought to behave with dignity.

Coming closer to present concerns, the 1940 Statement of Principles has a much debated paragraph which I will read.

(3) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinion of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.⁵

Professor Metzger, I understand, is going to probe into a recent case that illuminated the ambiguities of this admonition, to which should be joined another one in the preceding paragraph, which, after asserting “freedom in the classroom,” reminds the teacher that “he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject.”

There is an interesting piece of legislative history about Paragraph 3, in that the 1938 draft contained an additional sentence which read: “The judgment of what constitutes fulfillment of these obligations should rest with the individual.” Although this sentence disappeared in the final version,⁶ there is a cautious “interpretation” attached to the 1940 Statement by representatives of the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges, reiterating that in bringing charges based on a violation of Paragraph 3, “the administration should remember that teachers are citizens and should be accorded the freedom of citizens. In such cases the administration must assume full responsibility and the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges are free to make an investigation.”⁷

I should refrain from going at all deeply into the question of extra-classroom utterances because I do not want to intrude on Professor Metzger's exposition. I will observe that, until you have heard from him, the best formal statement—indeed the only one that fully develops the implications of the faculty member's rights and responsibility as a citizen—is the paper by Professors Emerson and Haber, “Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as Citizen,” in the valuable symposium on academic freedom in *Law and Contemporary Problems*.⁸ The analysis of Emerson and Haber is subtle and intricate; I would do it violence if I attempted to summarize it. While it takes very seriously the proposition that a teacher does have

the full freedom of a citizen to express himself, in a context derived from First Amendment principles, it also recognizes certain limitations in support of order within the university community. It develops an interesting proposition that some communications may be the subject of discipline if they have "an immediate traumatic shock effect on the average student listener." Examples where such a shock effect may occur are: "obscene material; derogatory statements about race and religion."⁹

In the realm of conduct as distinguished from expression—a distinction that is not always easy to make—we face for faculty members, as for students, a question of both practical and jurisprudential import. If the behavior in question may be and is punished by the civil authorities, should the university take independent disciplinary action? For faculty members, some initial guidance may be obtained by fixing one's attention on the general standards of the community with respect to sanctions by employers for misbehavior off the job. Emerson and Haber also develop these problems and arrive at this formulation:

Overt action, both on and off the campus, prohibited by laws which are generally enforced, may also be prohibited by the university where such overt action violates the type of relatively stable and generally accepted moral standards of intra-university behavior which call for additional non-legal sanctions, or which according to such moral standards of general conduct held by the national community call for such additional informal sanctions.¹⁰

This is a highly compressed statement and is probably not entirely comprehensible without reference to the underlying discussion to which I again refer you.

It may be appropriate to add, by way of caution, that although community standards and practices are a useful point of reference, they may not be decisive. Employers in a particular community, unless restricted by law or by collective bargaining agreements, may hold and act on arbitrary notions about their privilege to add the sanction of dismissal from employment to the formal sanctions of the law. That is one reason why Emerson and Haber refer to standards of the "national community." A college or university should not be dominated by parochial or provincial mores. I know that this is easier for me to say than it is for presidents and trustees to live by.

When the college town is inflamed by some unpopular expression, it is hard to maintain a lofty position that the college is not a creature of the community; that it has an obligation not to be swayed by ephemeral passions. This problem is poignantly illustrated in cases that come to the attention of the AAUP. For example, there was the case of the instructor in Lincoln College in Illinois who picketed the town Post Office during the Cuban blockade crisis, carrying a placard that read: "Stop U.S. Aggression. Must Cuba be our Hungary?" Some heckling and disturbance resulted. The trustees announced that the instructor would not be reappointed at the end of

the academic year; this led to turmoil on the campus, hostile to the administration. It also led to the censure of the trustees of Lincoln College by the AAUP.¹¹ As I have suggested, one can sympathize with trustees who feel that they are under heavy community pressures; but one cannot excuse hasty action that infringes on freedom of expression.

Standards of Speech or Conduct on and off Campus

In pursuing the equality of the teacher and citizen, one must also ask whether conditions on the campus may require different standards of speech or conduct than obtain off the campus. I put to one side the standards of conduct that may be equally enforced on students and faculty because of the special characteristics of the institution, such as restrictions on smoking and drinking in a strict denominational setting. Ordinarily, freedom of expression would be expected to be less constrained on campus than outside. After all, that is one of the ideals for which a campus exists. From time to time, special restrictions are imposed. A current example is the prohibition of speeches by outsiders who are considered subversive or otherwise unacceptable. Should the faculty member be obliged to acquiesce passively in such repressive measures? Here again, we have a problem of some philosophical significance, since it raises the question of obedience to rules that may be unconstitutional and are certainly hostile to the spirit of free exposure to ideas. Another recent AAUP case illuminates some of these problems in a somewhat odd way. A teaching assistant at Ohio State University took an active part in a controversy there over a proposed appearance by a left-wing figure. When, on rather hair-splitting grounds, permission for the speaker to appear on campus was denied, the teacher arranged for the speaker to appear in his own back yard. He was then under contract to become the following year an assistant professor in Wayne State College in Nebraska. Publicity in Nebraska followed the events in Ohio, and the state board controlling Wayne State broke the contract. Censure of Wayne State board followed.¹² Some observers think that the wrong administration was censured.

In essence, and without the benefit of extended analysis, I will assert that there is no case at all for putting disabilities on teachers that do not rest on other parts of the population. It is this discriminatory aspect that makes loyalty oaths so especially repugnant. To the extent that students have been drawn into submission to loyalty oaths as a condition for one form or another of federal bounty, the discrimination extends to the whole academic community and is the more outrageous. When teachers in public institutions have to make special declarations of loyalty or disclaimers of disloyalty, along with other public employees, the discrimination is shared with a larger class that is in a position to be victimized by the electorate and its representatives. I mention loyalty oaths, without analysis of the extent to which the

Supreme Court is chipping away at them,¹³ simply as an egregious example of discriminatory constraints. It is a right of the academic community to be free of such impositions and a responsibility of all those who cherish freedom to seek their abolition.

In the realm of expression of ideas, teachers should not only be free of discriminatory constraints; they should and do claim a degree of immunity from sanctions and pressures that may rest on non-academic people. When a teacher is speaking on a subject within his professional competence, that immunity is simply another way of describing academic freedom. Difficulties arise, as we know, when exercise of freedom may arguably have no foundation in competence. I observed earlier that I know of no reprisals against the students of government and international relations who have challenged our Vietnam involvement. No more do I know of reprisals against the teachers of English or chemistry who may have joined these protests. It has been reported that the energizing force for the teach-in of a few weeks ago came from anthropologists and social psychologists. The nuclear energy here was probably supplied by some specific anthropologists of strong political convictions in international affairs. That motivation would be irrelevant if we could conclude that anthropologists have expertness about Vietnam, as some of them must, or that social psychologists have special competence about propaganda and persuasion, as some of them must. Even if public sentiment turned so belligerent that general criticism of administration policy came to be repressed, we would still be obliged to argue for freedom of criticism for those with some competence to speak. Who has such competence? When is an expression intra- or extra-mural? When is a teacher exercising "appropriate restraint"? It is on grounds of this sort that attacks on academic freedom may be mounted. It's not what he says; it's the way he says it. How he teaches art is his own business, but what about that beard? Questions like these, even if sincerely raised, can be as effectively damaging as direct assaults on freedom.

The Role of Academic Tenure

We come then to the special role of academic tenure, and the continued need for it. The economic argument for tenure, as Machlup suggests, is no longer valid.¹⁴ With the surging increase in numbers of students and the attendant demand for teachers, it is time we got rid of any lingering depression or civil-service mentality about tenure. If, in economic terms, it is simply a substitute for money, on economic terms we will take the cash and let the credit go. It is no longer appropriate, if it ever was, to pay teachers with a promise of job security and an opportunity to retire in 35 years on a modest pension.

But if jobs are so plentiful, why the need of tenure in defense of freedom? I have heard it seriously contended, but always by people in secure and humane institutions, that tenure is unnecessary and serves only to make it impossible to get rid of people who have

become incompetent. I do not think that these arguments would carry much force to the faculties of Lincoln College or of Wayne State College, or, for that matter, of Ohio State University.

There are also rumblings from those volcanoes, the presidents of major universities who make up the Association of American Universities, that the rigid rules of tenure in the 1940 Statement are, for them, unduly confining. The seven-year period has, it may be suggested, nothing more to commend it than the magic inherent in the number seven. Seven may be the most potent throw in a dice game, but that hardly commends it as a symbol of academic impregnability. More seriously, the acquisition of tenure is not yet adapted to the sub-faculty—language instructors, for example—or to the growing armies of research people whose financial lifeblood comes from an artery that runs all the way back to a sometimes whimsical Congress.

These and other criticisms must be examined, and perhaps some measure of accommodation reached. It may be necessary to explore the limits of interpretation of the 1940 Statement. One quails at the thought of revising the text of a document that is now so encrusted with adoptions and endorsements. But after all this is said, tenure, especially because it requires orderly and full procedures to terminate it, remains as a valuable right. Without it, the responsibility to exercise academic freedom might require more fortitude than most of us poor weak creatures possess.

Rights and Responsibilities in Academic Government

Let us return to the subsidiary right and responsibility for a share in academic government. I say "subsidiary" not in a patronizing way, but because administration, as I think we all realize, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for higher, indeed for all, education. Students, other than students of administration, don't learn anything or create anything by exposure to the registrar's office. But at another level, few would deny that faculty can be jolted out of old ruts by the galvanizing influence of a dean or a president. Administration is essential, and it is important. I speak not to deprecate it, but to claim a significant role for faculty in it.

Even if the abstract claim is acceptable, there remains the formidable problem of defining the faculty role and beyond that the even more difficult problem of seeing that it is played with some measure of efficiency. Performance we cannot do much about at a meeting; definition we can attempt.

Defining the Faculty Role

At this point, I can no longer avoid the dizzy variety of American higher education. In earlier parts of this paper, I spoke lightly about *the college* and *the university* as though they were undifferentiated entities. This was perhaps not entirely a falsification when we were speaking of academic freedom, because

the rights and responsibilities of the teacher and the investigator are still individual rights. The rise of the research team in the sciences, and the occasional appearance of the research "factory" in the humanities, may in time give rise to corporate rights. But so far it is the individual scholar whose rights are recognized or infringed. He confronts the institution of whatever type or size with the bundle of rights and responsibilities I have sketched. With the troubling exception of institutions with an explicit religious commitment, the entity that is the college or university has a correlative interest in complete freedom.

But when we consider the role of faculty in administration, we can no longer, in honesty, invoke two-dimensional symbols. We have to consider the differences in organization and complexity of junior colleges, four-year colleges, technical schools, minor universities, comprehensive universities, and unattached professional schools. Most of the categories are cross-cut by the public-private cleavage, and the private sector is segmented again by the various intensities of church affiliation or disaffiliation. How is it possible to establish, except in the most general terms, principles of faculty participation in such differing communities?

AAUP Principles of Faculty Participation

The AAUP has made an earnest attempt to reconcile the need for some rudimentary principles of faculty participation in university government with the bewildering diversity of institutions. The current result of that undertaking is a statement of principles on "Faculty Participation in College and University Government" which, having been approved by the Council, is a source of guidance for the AAUP staff and officers. Formal adoption of that statement by an annual meeting has been deferred while the possibility of a joint statement is explored. There is currently a drafting committee, composed of representatives of the American Council on Education, the Association of Governing Boards, and the AAUP. I cannot comment in any detail on the work of that committee, though I may be permitted to draw an inference or two from its progress thus far.

The current AAUP Statement has gone back and forth from committee to council to chapters and to annual meetings to an extent remarkable even for a cautious—some might say fussy—organization like the AAUP. Its history and background are succinctly stated in the recently published report of the Self-Survey Committee of the AAUP, which comments that: "It would appear that only the policy of limited service on it enabled Committee T, as a corporate body, to survive the rigors of literary composition which marked the evolution of the Statement." The result is described as "burnished by five years of incessant attention."¹⁵

The AAUP Statement, discussing in a preamble the joint responsibilities of faculties, administrations, and governing boards, observes that the qualifications of both administrative officers and faculty members have led to a sharing with them by governing boards

of the legal powers conferred on the boards. It asserts faculty competence "in both making and carrying out educational policy."

It then attempts to set down succinctly some guiding principles. The key to the AAUP formulations is to be found, I think, in the choice of verbs in the respective paragraphs, a choice that was a very conscious part of that burnishing process to which the self-study report alludes. With respect to educational policies, the statement declares that "the faculty should have primary responsibility for determining the educational policies of the institution." But the claim is not an exclusive one, in that the power of final decision retained by the governing board is recognized. Nor does the phrase "educational policies" take in the total life of a university, as it might be considered to do, if the university were as totally engrossed in education as it is supposed to be. The term "educational policies," which may not be an altogether happy one because it seems to say too much, is defined as including "such fundamental matters as the subject matter and methods of instruction, facilities and support for research of faculty members and students, standards for admission of students, for academic performance, and for the granting of degrees." A distinction is then made between these matters and others "that may directly affect educational policies." One of the examples is "major changes in the size of the student body." On these matters, the critical verb is the declaration that "the faculty should actively participate in decisions."

Active participation, normally reinforced by faculty concurrence, is also the critical term in declaring the faculty role in decisions on faculty membership. The same phrase, but without the requirement of concurrence, is used in calling for faculty involvement in the selection of presidents and deans.

Participation in Budgeting

The paragraph on budgeting, which refers rather more broadly to financial considerations than the label "budgeting" suggests, was one of the most difficult to draft in any coherent way. The successive draftsmen and their critics were all, I believe, persuaded that the power of the purse would sooner or later set all other ascriptions of power at naught. Yet it was our impression that, with rather rare exceptions, the raising and spending of funds was the ultimate citadel of the president and the board. The draftsmen did not charge the faculty with the responsibility for raising money—although you will find in the conclusion of the Statement a cautious exhortation to the faculty to be concerned with the "material welfare" of the institution. But, without suggesting that the faculty wrest the purse strings from the president, those who struggled with the Statement believe that the faculty should have some say in these matters. Apropos, there is an interesting passage in Professor McConnell's contribution to your 1963 institute, in which he reports that President Millett's broad-gauged essay on *The Academic Community* initially gave the faculty no voice in budgetmaking and building pro-

grams. The work as published in 1962 made what Professor McConnell characterizes as a grudging concession to the need for consensus in the use of financial resources.¹⁶ When AAUP's Committee T met two years or so ago with the American Council on Education's Commission on Administrative Affairs under the chairmanship of President Millett, it was highly gratifying to discover substantial acceptance by the presidents and deans there gathered of the paragraph on budgeting. Indeed, a number of them declared that it was a little pallid.

Reflecting the uncertainties about the permissible thrust of a faculty salient into the budgetary stronghold, the key verb in this paragraph is certainly not that the faculty "determines," although there is a somewhat tricky sentence stating that funds that are "allocated to educational purposes should be budgeted and expended in accordance with the educational policies that the faculty has determined within the areas for which it is primarily responsible." Aside from this mandate, the paragraph calls for the faculty to be "informed," "consulted," and to have means to "express its views." Here, you will observe, there was a shying away even from "actively participate."

I do not know what some future dissertation candidate—I am assuming that posterity will not otherwise have a consuming interest in this document—will make of the change of language in this paragraph. I would surmise that one consideration leading to restraint was an awareness that financial acumen is not a notable field of faculty competence. There is some sting in the familiar jibe: "If you're so smart, why ain't you rich?" Also, in budgetary operations, as elsewhere, the little man on a high stool is being replaced by a computer. For many of us, the sheer manipulation involved in planning and fulfilling a budget has become hopelessly esoteric.

More seriously, it may be said that here we have another example of entwined right and responsibility. The faculty is not responsible for assuring the continued solvency of an institution, or rather, in the case of most private colleges, for skating over the thin ice of chronic insolvency. It would therefore be presumptuous to assert its right to control the disposition of funds, especially where major decisions that mortgage the future are involved. Yet it is those decisions that may have the most significance for educational policies. As Professor McConnell pointed out in his paper to which I have just referred, "The choice between a field house and a library is a choice in educational values . . . It would be a hollow victory for a faculty to attain consensus on educational policy only to discover that in making the budget the president or other administrative officers had invalidated the faculty's plan."¹⁷

Participation in Coordinating Agencies

Recognition of the diversity of college and university administration comes in the paragraph of the AAUP Statement which suggests agencies for faculty participation. This paragraph is highly permissive

and in general offers only suggestions, most of which, I regret to say, are for various forms of committees.

There is one respect in which the array of suggested devices simply does not meet an important trend in higher education. I refer to the seemingly recent emergence of what are often called "super-boards." I say that their emergence *seems* recent, because I have just been enlightened, by some papers presented at the 1964 meeting of the American Council on Education, about the relative antiquity of some of these organizations. Quite aside from the unique example of the Board of Regents of the State of New York, created in 1784, it appears that statewide boards were created in Florida in 1905 and in Iowa in 1906.¹⁸

In the descriptions of none of these coordinating bodies, whether voluntary or endowed with statutory powers, do I see any provision for direct faculty participation. It is perhaps not fair to say that the AAUP Statement ignored this situation since it does call for faculty agencies reaching up to a "university system as a whole"; and the powers of some of the statewide boards are such that they do create a single university system. The difficulty here lies not in any want of proclamation of a faculty interest in these supreme governing boards but in the unfeasibility of achieving it. On these boards, presidents and regents may sit as members, or they may appear as suitors. In either case, the representative or federated character of these assemblages seems almost to preclude any direct faculty participation. You may say that faculties will be represented by their presidents, as they normally are before the boards of their own institutions. Yes, but with a difference. The AAUP Statement proposes to insure channels of communication between a particular faculty and its board. I am not confident that any means has even been sketched for assuring communication between a faculty and a super-board with real power to loose and to bind.

Let me give one example of the growing distance between ideals and practice. In the central paragraph on educational policies, the AAUP Statement asserts primary faculty responsibility for determining standards for admission of students. In the next breath it calls for the faculty to participate actively in another set of decisions, including "major changes in the size of the student body." It has not escaped the attention of friendly critics that a change in the size of the student body, not faculty determined, may necessarily alter standards for admission. It is already the case, and likely to be more prevalent, that super-boards will determine the location of new units, their size, and the size of existing units in the system. Admission standards will have to fall in line. In such a situation, there is not much scope for faculty participation in these critical decisions, except in the most attenuated way. Much of what I am now groping to express is simply a reflection of the increasing bureaucratization of universities and the attendant increase in the number of layers in the hierarchy. Professor McConnell, again, after noting that the lengthening chain of administration impairs morale at both ends of the chain, weakens presidential influence on events and, I might

add, faculty influence on policy, makes the pregnant suggestion that we should keep striving for a "flat structure."¹⁹ I was much struck when the president of Yale, in a recent interview in the student newspaper, declared his hope that every student should be personally known to someone who was personally known to the president. This is a noble, perhaps a quixotic ideal, because it calls for a very broad span of administration. That is, with a "flat structure" you cannot adhere to any comfortable rubrics of public administration prescribing four or some other small number of persons reporting directly to an executive. Nevertheless, I agree with the implication of Professor McConnell's observation that we should try to truncate the pyramid, even at some cost in apparent efficiency. The alternative from a faculty standpoint is either a disappearance of faculty influence or an inordinate commitment of faculty time to hierarchies of committees which make everyone unhappy.

Critique of the AAUP Statement

Now that I have touched on some of the characteristics of the AAUP Statement and mentioned some of its surface shortcomings, it seems only fair to ask whether such a statement can be useful. Has it, in order to accommodate all sizes and shapes of colleges, been pushed to excessive generality? Is this generality disguised but not concealed by the enumeration of examples, which are perhaps incomplete and of varying applicability? Does it not bite, if it does bite, only because it is an *ex parte* statement of faculty claims? If a document could be produced that would win the acquiescence of other interested parties, notably presidents and trustees—I say nothing of students, alumni, and the public clientele of our universities—would a joint statement not be weakened to an extent that left it toothless and with no bite at all?

These questions all have some point. I will try to answer them as follows:

1. As for generality, it is better to have some principles than none. We should indeed proceed to construct inductive outlines of government by types of colleges and universities. One might thus develop a scheme with such headings as this: Type II-C: Private, weak denominational control, 1200 students. The structure of governance for such a type would assuredly be quite different from that of Type I-A, which we will call the University of California. Until we have such a classification, we can profit from a general statement of good practices with which to match our observations of the real world.
2. As for the *ex parte* character of the AAUP Statement, that does not necessarily make it distorted; and I would argue that the tone of the statement shows that it is not strongly biased even if the principles are presented from a faculty standpoint.
3. As for the risk of watering-down to achieve consensus, there may be some substance to such a concern. Though I cannot comment in detail on the current joint enterprise, I can perhaps say without

impropriety that the drafting so far does lean pretty heavily on words like "consensus," "dialogue," and other fashionable ecumenical labels.

Such an approach, hortatory rather than commanding, has independent claims of merit. There is a plausible case for it, well made by Dean Axelrod in the American Council on Education's papers on *Emerging Patterns in American Higher Education*. He sees and applauds a counter-movement to excessive standardization in curriculum and other matters. He then extends his view to faculty-administration relations, which he says have become increasingly formalized and impersonal in the last decade, so that much of the interchange between faculty and administration is "formal or threatening or bitter."²⁰ He thinks that decentralization of big complexes will help, but he chiefly calls for "humanizing" faculty-administration relations.

Nobody wants to be inhuman, so I cannot object fundamentally to this approach. But I do say that politeness and good will are not enough. The deficiency of faculty participation in major decision-making is, I believe, sufficiently pervasive to justify some modest assertions of right. I have a gloomy belief in original sin, or, if you will, in the persistence of innate depravity. Since we all, or almost all, have lodged in us this darker side of human nature, I charitably concede that not all wickedness dwells in administrators and trustees. But they have their share. Unless claims of right and responsibility are made with some authoritative backing, they will often be ignored.

A code of some constitutional status is also helpful in strengthening the hand of those who are well disposed to the recognition of faculty rights and responsibilities. Doubtless most of you know better than I how useful it is to be able to say to those few of your compatriots who have not seen the light, "I know that Professor X is a pest and perhaps a loafer, but if we try to fire him, the AAUP will be on our backs." It might be equally useful, to sooth the hurried officer who finds his bold plans slowed down if not obstructed by a faculty committee, to be able to say, "We have to have faculty participation, or we will be violating the principles agreed to by all the best educational organizations."

Finally, some of you may well ask whether the faculty would discharge the responsibilities of active participation in decision-making. You could point to the familiar conservatism of faculties regarding what they consider their vested interests—an attitude that is not peculiar to faculties. You could allege that many faculty members are unskilled or uninterested in college and university government. You could suggest that a faculty oligarchy could be as tyrannical as a presidential autocrat. On this point I agree. I am sensitive to the corrupting potentialities of power, and for that reason I do not advocate unchecked faculty control but a sharing of power. As for ineptitude and indifference, there is no need to require or even expect every faculty member to engage in that active

participation of which we have spoken. I do suggest that much seeming indifference may stem from a belief that a faculty member is powerless. Presthus makes this charge with more fervor than I would in his *Organizational Society*, when he uses teachers, whom he views as exploited and excluded, as his type of the Indifferent Man in a society of large organizations.²¹ The way to reverse this kind of indifference is to use the faculty, not for trivial busy-work, but to enlist its representatives in the shaping of major and long-term plans.²² Here again, the recognition of rights will, I think, become welded to a recognition of responsibility.

¹Ralph C. Barnhart and Joseph C. Pray, "Texas Technological College," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring, 1958), p. 170.

²Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958. See chapter II, pp. 35-71, and also pp. 251-56 for a summary and assessment of numerous "incidents" harmful to academic freedom. See also R. S. Brown, *Loyalty and Security*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958, pp. 120-34.

³Logan Wilson, "The Academic Man Revisited," in *Studies of College Faculty*, Boulder, Colo.: The Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1961, p. 5.

⁴Quoted in Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, p. 394.

⁵"Academic Freedom and Tenure: 1940 Statement of Principles," as cited in the *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Fall, 1964), pp. 251-52.

⁶Hofstadter and Metzger, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

⁷"Academic Freedom and Tenure: 1940 Statement of Principles," *loc. cit.*, p. 252.

⁸Thomas Emerson and David Haber, "Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as Citizen," *Law and Con-*

temporary Problems, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1963), pp. 525-72; also published in book form by the Oceana Press, 1964.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 570.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 572.

¹¹The report of the investigating committee is found in Sheridan Baker and Howard R. Burkle, "Academic Freedom and Tenure: Lincoln College," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Fall, 1964), pp. 244-250. The AAUP voted censure of Lincoln College during its Fifty-first Annual Meeting, April, 1965, as reported in the *AAUP Bulletin*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), p. 314.

¹²The report of the investigation is found in Bertram Morris and Gordon H. McNeil, "Academic Freedom and Tenure: Wayne State College (Nebraska)," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Winter, 1964), pp. 347-354. The AAUP voted censure of Wayne State College in its Fifty-first Annual Meeting, April, 1965, as reported in the *AAUP Bulletin*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), p. 314.

¹³See *Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction*, 368 U.S. 275 (1961); *Baggett v. Bullitt*, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).

¹⁴Fritz Machlup, "The Defense of Academic Tenure," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer, 1964), p. 119.

¹⁵"Report of the Self-survey Committee of the AAUP," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May, 1965), pp. 169-70. On p. 169, there is a useful list of *AAUP Bulletin* citations to successive versions of the statement.

¹⁶T. R. McConnell, "Needed Research in College and University Organizations and Administrations," in *The Study of Academic Administrations*, Terry F. Lunsford, ed., Boulder, Colo.: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1963, pp. 122-3.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸Logan Wilson, ed., *Emerging Patterns in American Higher Education*, Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1965, p. 89. See generally Part 3.

¹⁹McConnell, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

²⁰Joseph Axelrod, "New Patterns of Internal Organization," in Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-55.

²¹Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, pp. 239-52.

²²See Mary Woods Bennett, "Changes Within the Liberal Arts Colleges," in Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| Academic Freedom—Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History | Ralph F. Fuchs |
| Academic Freedom—An Emerging Constitutional Right | William P. Murphy |
| Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths | Arval A. Morris |
| Academic Freedom in the United States | Ernest van den Haag |
| Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as Citizen | Thomas Emerson and David Haber |
| Academic Due Process | Louis Joughin |
| Academic Freedom and the Academic President | Harold W. Dodds |
| Massive Subsidies and Academic Freedom | Russell Kirk |
| The Implications of Research Funds for Academic Freedom | Charles V. Kidd |
| Toward a Standard for Student Academic Freedom | Phillip Monypenny |
| University Autonomy and Academic Freedom in Latin America | Luigi Einaudi |
| Academic Freedom in the United Kingdom | Lord Chorley |

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ACADEMIC FREEDOM: An Analysis of a Recent Case



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There are pleasures and perils in speaking about academic freedom. It is a pleasure to discuss a professional ideal before a group of fellow professionals (and I trust that no one will deny that professors and administrators constitute one, not two, professions). At the same time, this unifying and delightful exercise runs high soporific risks. By articulating shared ideals, a speaker can avoid having to defend his first assumptions, which is always an unnerving thing to have to do. But by being too companionable with his hearers, he is tempted to utter all the right clichés, and nothing could be intellectually more appalling, except, perhaps, to utter all the wrong ones.

The Leo Koch Case

The suggestion of the organizers of this conference—that I analyze academic freedom cases—seems to offer a way out of this dilemma. A concrete incident, replete with life's own drama, can be worth a thousand bland and abstract lectures. A controversy arising within the walls can show how men, united in rhetoric, can fall out when they are tested by deeds. Modifying the suggestion in only one respect, I have chosen to concentrate on a *single* case. The Leo Koch case at the University of Illinois, which was investigated and reported by the American Association of University Professors in 1962, has so many interesting facets that it is really many cases wrapped in one. In addition, it serves the purpose of risk-reduction, since it presents both a professor and a president in a rather unflattering light and raises a set of freedom issues on which even staunch libertarians have disagreed.

Let me make an obvious *caveat* at once: an academic freedom case does not describe the experience of the average teacher in America, let alone the experience of the average teacher in so large and major an institution as the University of Illinois. In America, academic dismissals on any ground are infrequent,

academic dismissals based on utterances more infrequent still. In the major institutions, intra-mural relationships have a benign, if not halcyon, appearance. What is significant about the extreme example, the case that seldom happens, is that it illuminates morbid tendencies that lie beneath the smiling surface and often escape our view. As an analogy, presidential assassinations are rare in our country; but the Oswald case has exposed pathologies—the lawlessness of law enforcement agencies and the trauma of isolated men—that have long remained *sub rosa* but cannot safely be ignored.

Facts of the Koch Case

The crucial facts of the Koch case are not disputed, and it is possible therefore to recapitulate them without prematurely taking sides. On April 7, 1960, Leo F. Koch, Assistant Professor of Biology, was suspended from his academic duties by the president of the University, David D. Henry, two weeks after a letter written by Koch had been published in the *Daily Illini*, a student newspaper. Koch, a botanist who specialized in fungi and mosses, had come to the University in 1955, was still serving in his probationary period but had been informed, prior to this incident, that his current contract, due to expire in June, 1961, would be his last. It should be noted that, if the authorities had not taken interim action but had waited for the contract to run its course, Koch would have been removed with the same finality, but without the discomfiture and pathetic stardom that accrue to the principal in a dismissal case. But he would not have been removed as expeditiously, and something made the Illinois authorities too upset to wait. What that was they freely conceded: in this case, unlike many others, the outside inquirer does not have to search for the provocation. It was the letter that got Professor Koch into trouble and so troubled the administration that it reached for its harshest weapons—suspension and discharge for cause.

The Critical Event

What was the missile that provoked dismissal? It was a letter written in reply to an article in the *Daily Illini* on the smooching habits of undergraduates. The student authors of this article had deplored the rampant petting that went on at the gates of the sorority houses, and they castigated the boys and girls for actions too unprivate to be deeply felt. Professor Koch, in reply, commended the authors of this article "for their courage in candidly discussing the sexual problems of college students," but he found their perspective "narrow-minded":

Their discussion omits entirely any reference to the social meleu [sic] which compels healthy, sexually mature human animals into such addictions (of which masturbation is likely the least objectionable). . . .

The first hazard encountered by the frank discussion in public of sexual problems is the widespread moralistic attitude that where there is smoke, there is fire. Anyone who insists on speaking about sex in public, say the orthodox moralists (unless it is condemned soundly), must be a sexual deviate (a Queer) in their orthodox view. The second, and by far the more important, hazard is that a public discussion of sex will offend the religious feelings of the leaders of our religious institutions. These people feel that youngsters should remain ignorant of sex for fear that knowledge of it will lead to temptation and sin. Hence we have the widespread crusades against obscenity which are so popular among prudes and puritanical old-maids.

The crux of the problem, thought Professor Koch, was not hinted at by the student authors: "Their article would lead a casual reader to believe that the evils portrayed by them are due only to the depravity of the individuals they observed, whereas, in fact, the heavy load of blame should fall on the depraved society which reared them."

I submit that the events described . . . are merely symptoms of a serious social malaise which is caused primarily by the hypocritical and downright inhumane moral standards engendered by a Christian code of ethics which was already decrepit in the days of Queen Victoria. College students, when faced with this outrageously ignorant code of morality, would seem to me to be acting with remarkable decorum, and surprising meekness, if they do no more than neck at their social functions.

And he ended with this advice:

With modern contraceptives and medical advice readily available at the nearest drugstore, or at least a family physician, there is no valid reason why sexual intercourse should not be condoned among those sufficiently mature to engage in it without social consequences and without violating their own codes of morality and ethics. A mutually satisfactory sexual experience would eliminate the need for many hours of frustrat-

ing petting and lead to much happier and longer lasting marriages among our younger men and women.

Leo F. Koch
Assistant Professor of Biology

In my view, this is not a literary performance of which an academic person should feel very proud. It is not exactly St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans; it is more a sophomoric letter addressed to sophomores. I put aside its wandering syntax and atonal phrasing; I do not expect every botanist to be a Chesterfield. But I cannot believe, taking only the substance of what he says, that so much aggressive simplicity is customary in the greenhouse.

It would seem to me a questionable proposition that all there is to sex is sex. But this proposition seems not to be questioned by Professor Koch. I do not mean that he recommends sexual union at the end of every paired encounter or that he would subordinate every other campus enterprise to a program of coitus un-interruptus. The crudeness of his biologism emerges rather through what he does not say. Nowhere in this letter is it suggested that a "mutually satisfactory sexual experience" should be supported by a mutually satisfactory human relationship; nowhere is there any mention of the aesthetic gain that may come from discrimination or the maturing effects of love.

Furthermore, it is a naive mistake to lay the repressions of our culture to a few external villains—to the leaders of religious institutions and to "prudes and puritanical old-maids." The forces behind libidinous repression are both stronger and weaker than that: stronger in the sense that they arise in the matrix of the family and are rooted in strong internalized tabus; weaker, in that our post-industrial society, with its pressures toward expenditure and self-indulgence, has long been at odds with the old morality, which gave support to sensual denial and delay.

And what should be said of the supposition that college youth is a monolith for which promiscuity is a panacea? Even an expert in mosses might have known that the effects of premarital incontinence are not known with scientific exactness, with or without means of contraception. And any teacher might have been expected to appreciate the unwisdom of random psychologizing. In the counsellor's chambers, where advice can be gauged to the client's capacity, freer behavior may be condoned with some appropriateness. But addressed to students in all conditions—to the confused, the clear, the infantile, the mature, the bright, the unintelligent—this pronunciamento of Professor Koch suffers from what might be called the Rose Franzblau or Abby Van Buren effect: it has the curiously grating sound of a megaphone attached to a self-styled oracle.

The Issues

You may not agree with my opinion of this contribution to journalistic letters. Indeed, I hope you do not: libertarians need the grit of controversy. But to agree or not to agree is not to settle the essential

question of whether Koch's punishment was deserved. In any assessment of the verdict, three issues must be confronted. The first is: Did Professor Koch have the constitutional right to speak as a citizen without suffering academic sanctions? The second is: Did he have the professional right to speak forcibly, even intemperately, outside the classroom and not be penalized by his institution? I shall confront these two issues later. The third is: Did the authorities act with poise and sagacity and with true regard for the larger interests of the institution when they ejected Professor Koch for what he said? It is to the issue of administrative prudence that I wish to address my next remarks.

The Issue of Administrative Prudence

We cannot codify prudence, but we can tell, through intrinsic and pragmatic tests, whether it was present in a particular course of action. For example, we might ask: was the letter so offensive that the author can be said to have invited punishment? Was it, for example, pornographic? No: the administration did not contend—and no accurate reader could conclude—that it catered to prurient interests. The words and imagery were circumspect. The argument, though it dealt with fornication, was about as stirring to the lewd imagination as a treatise on the reproductive ways of moss. Erotic stimulation was much more generously supplied by the sight of briefly clad coed cheer-leaders, but no one at the University of Illinois proposed that these evocative nymphs be covered or the chief of football ceremonies be removed.

Was the letter defamatory? No: the administration did not contend—and no fair-minded reader could conclude—that the author used a poison pen. No particular individuals were mentioned, let alone insulted. Certain groups were singled out for criticism, but unless "prudes and puritanical old-maids" recognize themselves as such and would resent his references, and unless "orthodox moralists" know themselves and would feel maligned, no libel was committed. The very sweep of Professor Koch's social theories kept him from inflicting painful wounds.

Was then the letter, though not in itself offensive, likely to have dangerous effects? The administration *did* contend that the letter encouraged immoral actions and that its own response was designed to avert these evils. Whether its decision can be justified on this pragmatic ground would depend on an appraisal of several issues: the probable consequences of the written words, the probable deterrence caused by punishment, the probable effects of a different response. Though one must deal with a formidable set of "probables"—infallibility is not vouchsafed to a second guess—one may conclude, with reasonable assurance, that the decision was imprudent by this test as well.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said that every idea is an incitation to action, including illegal and immoral action. But, he argued, if the evil that may flow from an expressed idea is remote in time and

hypothetical, the expression of that idea should not be punished. Whether the consequence is immediate and probable, or temporally remote and thus unlikely, would partly depend, he said, on context. Shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre is much more likely to induce an instant panic than shouting the same word on an empty street corner. This "clear and present danger" formula was by no means the maximum claim that could be made for free expression. But by even so moderate a pragmatic test, the punishment of Professor Koch seems uncalled for. Let us assume that he did advocate sexual license. Still, unless the atmosphere on the campus of Illinois was so egregiously erotic that a suggestion spoken in the morning would have carnal effects that very night, it is hard to see a close tie between advocacy and action. The same words, more or less, could be found in the Illinois library in the volumes of Bertrand Russell and Wilhelm Reich, but no one feared that the perusal of these books would work on students as an aphrodisiac. It may be said that there was a contextual difference between an idea set forth by grey-beards and stored on a library shelf, and an idea advanced by a teacher in the columns of the student press. But the difference—assuming that students read books—is that the remote and eminent authority is likely to carry greater weight. The Illinois Board of Trustees was to condemn Professor Koch for not dissociating himself from his institution, and for capitalizing on his academic title so as to give his words a spurious prestige. But Koch's reference to his institutional connection was probably redundant in the circumstances, and the prestige of his academic title was hardly such as to win him followers. It is as well known to students as to others that the tribe of assistant professors does not speak officially for their institutions, and it belies what we know about student skepticism to presume that the word of any one of them would impress collegians as authoritative and indisputable. In all this, I have taken it for granted that Koch intended to encourage liaisons; he himself, however, argued that he desired merely to condone them under certain circumstances; and the wording of the letter leaves the question of intent somewhat in doubt.

I do not say that Koch's words should have gone unchallenged. I do say that, in the absence of an emergency, the challenge should have been expository, not punitive. It was Justice Louis Brandeis who declared that "if there be time to expose through discussion falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." This is at least as prudent a remedy for a university as it is for the community at large. Since there was time, should not the wiser professors of Illinois have answered the foolish one in the student press? Was Professor Koch ignorant of the human psyche? Let the psychologists prove it with their better facts. Was Professor Koch sociologically unlettered? Let the sociologists demonstrate their greater literacy. Such a course would have had much to recommend it: it would have provided an intellectual debate on a subject certainly worth

debating (and a subject which had been furtively debated long before Koch's effusions); it would have given the students an instructive lesson in the way the scholarly disciplines rebuke ineptitude and correct mistakes; and—not least—it would have avoided the tactical error of exalting a poor pundit into a martyred prophet. The gods seem to have it in for censors: they so often make their actions boomerang. Koch told the students that the orthodox moralists were intolerant, and, sure enough, so they proved to be. He warned that iconoclasts like himself would be answered not by argument but by decapitation, and, sure enough, so he was. In the end, the coercive gesture was self-defeating: Koch won a wider audience through his punishment than he ever could have acquired through his pen.

To give the formal argument its due, I have treated it as a closed juridic problem. But I am aware that institutional decisions are not made in a social vacuum. Certainly, this one was not, as the following extract from the report of the AAUP investigators makes clear:

The publication of Professor Koch's letter . . . created an immediate stir at the University and beyond. . . . The letter was widely discussed on the campus and in the local press. Under date of March 25, the Reverend Ira H. Latimer, of the Institute of Economic Policy, Chicago, and a member of the University of Illinois Dads' Association, sent a four-page communication to the parents of a substantial number of women students. In this letter Mr. Latimer reprinted the Koch letter and denounced it as "an audacious attempt to subvert the religious and moral foundations of America" which followed the "standard operating procedure of the Communist conspiracy." As a result of the Latimer communication and the other publicity, the University authorities received numerous letters of protest. . . .

On April 7, the president wrote that Professor Koch's appointment was "prejudicial to the best interests of the University" and "will be terminated at the University at the end of the academic year." Motives are elusive things, but it does not take clairvoyance to see that it was public relations, more than sexual relations, that caused the president fitful nights.

Pressures from Relevant Publics

I hasten to explain, lest you write me down as another pharisaical professor, that I do not regard adherence to principle as a quality native to professors and absent in university presidents. I do not hold with original purity and sin, and I do not believe in inherent class distinctions. I believe, rather, that social role defines behavior, that what we do is often what we must do *ex officio*. The president of any institution of higher learning—and particularly the president of a large, tax-supported, multi-purpose institution—has many relevant publics, that is, groups upon whose approval he depends for the maintenance of his position and the successful fulfillment of his

tasks. Usually, his publics are more numerous and diversified than those of a faculty member, who may look only to his colleague-groups for guidance, approval, and support. In command of an institution that is constantly self-expanding but never self-supporting, the president must enter into dependent contact with all who give and can withhold—with state and federal legislatures, with government agencies and foundations, with business corporations, and private benefactors. Adding to the role of fund-getter the historically given role of priest-philosopher, he enlarges his field of reference by serving as the master of communal ceremonies and the public exemplar of communal ways. And this is not all: he must also defer to his internal publics; to the faculty, to the students, to the governors, and to the various factions each contains. In so large a relevant world, the president must perforce be an accommodator; given the relative simplicity of his allegiances, the professor can afford to be an intransigent.

Selective Response to Pressures

Still, with all due sympathy and sociology, it is hard to justify the policy of accommodation that was evidently adopted in this case. There is such a thing as being selective about the pressures one adjusts to, even if those pressures are complex: a minister who preaches on economics and a number of nervous Dads are not, it seems to me, the most legitimate critics of a university and need not have been considered a resistless force. There is such a thing as outlasting one's dilemmas: had Koch been allowed to serve his term, the matter might soon have been forgotten, for, while the public mind can be quickly agitated, the public memory is short. And there is such a thing as weighing not only short- but long-term costs: the national reputation of an institution, which determines its ability to recruit eminent professors, may be in the long run more important than the local reputation of the institution, which affects the next legislative appropriation. I know that it is all too easy to be a general in someone else's battles. But similar battles have been fought before, and the lesson they yield is not a cheerless one. To the extent that past experience is a guide, one may predict that a president who appeals from the community drunk to the community sober will be thanked by the community in a sober day, and that a president who defends the integrity of his institution and teaches his varied publics to do the same will have better, not worse, public relations, for good relations are founded on respect and not on one-sided submission. I conclude that the decision to oust Professor Koch was imprudent, even by this final pragmatic test.

"Academic Due Process" and Procedural Issues

The procedures used to effect this ouster raise a separate issue. The statutes of the University of Illinois provide that no teacher on indefinite tenure and no teacher on temporary employment prior to the expiration of his term—this would apply to Pro-

fessor Koch—may be removed without being presented with written charges by the president. If the accused teacher feels that his academic freedom is being threatened by the proposed removal, he may be heard in his own defense, first before a committee of the faculty and then before the governing board. Though neither tribunal is bound by formal rules of evidence, both are required to follow certain “established rules of procedure,” which include the right of the accused to be represented by counsel and to offer evidence to rebut the charges.

The rationale for dismissal procedures such as these—for what the profession calls “academic due process”—is woven out of many desiderata. The need to formulate explicit charges, and to substantiate them in an open way, protects the innocent teacher from false or malicious incriminations. The communication of the judgment of the faculty to the trustees is a way of insuring that lay opinion will be informed by professional expertise. The requirement that the office-holder must be fairly prosecuted before he can be dislodged protects his office from the spoilsman and him from demoralizing attacks. But fairness, competence, and efficiency are not the only desiderata; if they were, other techniques might be preferred. A commercial business does not usually adjudicate its dismissals, yet its personnel practices may not be inefficient. The civil service does not institute peer-group trials, yet its disciplinary actions may not be uninformed. As for fairness, a contest judged in a neutral setting—such as that provided in a court of law—may have decided advantages over an on-site trial. But no institution other than a university puts so high a premium on the employee’s right to dissent, while conceding the employer’s right to dismiss; and it is this double motive that makes academic due process *sui generis*. Primarily, its purpose is to safeguard academic freedom by insuring that infringements of it will not be allowed to masquerade under other names. This is the main reason why the charges must be stated specifically, the evidence analyzed professionally, and the sifting process completed before the punishment takes effect. Moreover, the clarification generated by these procedures is supposed to be helpful for the institution as for the individual. Just as an administration may hide an improper motive by casting aspersions on its victim, so a professor, justly dismissed, may—if there has been no pre-inquiry—blacken the motives of the administration in order to shield his guilt. Academic due process is meant to spare the unoffending employer, even as it does the innocent employee, the injury of a false report.

Considering the potential value of the method, it is saddening to observe that it has not been universally adopted. Many institutions of higher learning have dismissal rules so elliptical that procedures must be improvised on each occasion. In other institutions, where the rules are adequate, they are not infrequently circumvented or misused. In my study of the academic freedom and tenure cases, I have not encountered one example of a truly impeccable judicial process within the halls of higher learning, though I

admit that I study only the worst miscarriages and my standard of impeccability is high.

Reasons for Improvised Procedures

Why, one may ask, are these procedures not employed more widely and more perfectly? One reason, it would appear, is that many administrators and professors prefer to rely on personal understandings and on the protections afforded by happy precedents than on the seemingly mistrustful articles of an impersonal and formal code. This reason seems to be operative in the worst and the best of our institutions, in those where the president is a paterfamilias and the faculty are his compliant sons, and those of such urbanity and equanimity that dismissals occur but rarely and then in a smooth and genteel way. I attribute the absence at my institution of anything like the procedures recommended by the AAUP to the long absence of a seriously disturbing case. But a *gemeinschaft* serves well when it is not tested—in the interstices between crises as it were. When a difficult case arises, professors and administrators often realize that they need the routinized procedures that guard against intolerance and error, and the rationality and predictability that are the gifts of a rule of law.

Perhaps an even more important reason for the failure to construct an adequate judicial system is the reluctance of the several parties to play a truly judicial role. When the president is a charge-maker rather than a discharge-maker, he puts himself on a level with the professor he accuses; it takes self-restraint and a full supply of self-confidence for a man with great hierarchic power to assume the role of a humble adversary. When the trustees conduct an impartial trial, they must regard the word of the president, who is their agent, as presumptively neither true nor false: it takes a great deal of dedication to the principle to treat one’s own deputy as a plaintiff and be perfectly just to either side. Nor are professors always eager to do their part, to forget their personal loyalties and rivalries when they judge the credentials of a colleague, or—and this is essential if a faculty tribunal is not to degenerate into a grievance body—to bring charges when necessary against their own. The trouble with academic due process is that it thrusts the notion of equality into an essentially asymmetrical situation and asks of intimate colleagues that they adopt an impartial stance. But, there, the glory of academic due process is that it asks for this high degree of self-transcendence.

Procedural Issues in the Koch Case

With this as background, we can better understand the procedural issue in the Koch case. The rules of the University of Illinois were moderately good—not as explicit on the matter of notice and cause for suspension as the AAUP would like to have them, but more precise and suitable to the objective than those of many institutions. Moreover, Koch availed himself of the machinery created for such situations, and was heard first by a Senate Committee on Aca-

ademic Freedom elected by the full professors and deans on the Urbana campus, and then by the governing board. A rare example of unblemished academic justice? Unhappily, no. In his eagerness to eject the offending Adam, the president stepped outside the rules by announcing, prior to the hearings, that Professor Koch would be discharged. Furthermore, the president released this statement to the press. Then the faculty trial began, but inevitably it proceeded on corrupted terms. For, with the president having assured the public that the question of Koch's employment had been disposed of, it remained for Koch not merely to prove his innocence, but to reverse a *fait accompli*, and for the faculty body not merely to debate the charges, but to consider the president's public face. Even so, that body ruled that Koch's offense did not warrant his removal, but merely an official rebuke. The trustees, however, confirmed the announcement of the president, after a second and final trial. The end bore out the prophecy of the preamble.

Nothing in the charter or the statutes of Illinois compelled the governing board to accept the verdict of the faculty. And nothing in the professional code demanded such acceptance. The 1940 Statement of Principles on academic freedom and tenure jointly written by the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges is silent on the weight to be accorded the "lower-court" findings of the staff. The 1958 Statement, also by the AAUP and the AAC, says merely that trustee acceptance of such findings would be "normally expected." But when academic freedom is at issue, spirit counts more than scripture, appearances more than formulas. By overturning the judgment of the faculty on the basis of identical evidence, the board exposed itself to the suspicion that its concern was ideological, not educational. By taking an hour to reverse a decision on which the faculty body had spent a month, it appeared to treat the faculty body with contempt. Prudence would have required that the motives of the lay authority appear, as well as be, above reproach.

Judicial Neglect of Academic Freedom

Following his defeat in the university, two options were open to Professor Koch. He could seek redress in court, and he could appeal to his professional association for an inquiry. Koch did both, and in each arena raised significant questions.

In court, Koch sought not only an action for a breach of contract—this is the usual objective in such cases—but also reinstatement on the ground that his dismissal abridged a right guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution—and this was something rather new.

In *Words and Phrases*, the dictionary of judicial usage, the term "academic freedom" is cited only once. "Academic freedom," it says, quoting a New York State Supreme Court judge in 1940, "is the freedom to do good and not teach evil." Such profundity surrounded by a void is an indication that this free-

dom had hardly received judicial notice, let alone been accorded the solemn status of a constitutional right.

There are several reasons why academic freedom suffered from judicial neglect. For one thing, professors who litigated their dismissal found it difficult to convince the courts that the grounds for dismissal were reviewable. Having ascertained where the power lay, the courts were reluctant to declare just how that power should be exercised, and their restraint was reinforced by the diversity of institutional aims and types. The public university, being a creature of the state, was one type on which the restraints of the Constitution might have been deemed to fall. But for a long time the courts upheld the doctrine that public employment was a privilege that could be commenced, continued and terminated on such terms as the government might determine, without infringing constitutional rights. A recent reiteration of the doctrine of privilege in public employment was given in *Adler v. Board of Education*, a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1951. In upholding the constitutionality of a New York law that provided for the disqualification and removal from the public school system of teachers who belonged to organizations that advocated the overthrow of the government by unlawful means, Justice Minton thus answered the plaintiff's argument that the law violated First Amendment rights: "Such persons have the right under the law to assemble and speak as they will. . . . But they have no right to work for the state in the school system under their own terms. They may work for the school system under the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere." One might call this the perambulatory definition of academic freedom: it guarantees the outspoken teacher the freedom to take a walk.

It was not surprising that the Supreme Court of Illinois denied Koch's claim to a breach of contract: the statutes of the university, held to be embodied in the contract, allowed for dismissal for cause. Nor was it surprising that the Illinois Court denied that Koch's rights under the federal Constitution had been infringed. What was surprising was that the Court failed to perceive that Koch raised a serious constitutional issue. For, by 1962, when it handed down its decision, fresh winds of constitutional doctrine were in circulation, and if they were not strong enough to knock down the judicial barriers, they were strong enough to be noted in this case.

Arguments for Protection of Teachers' Freedoms

Anticipations of a new approach came early in the decade of the fifties. In dissenting from the majority in the *Adler* case, Justice Douglas argued that the sensitive nature of education required greater protection of the teachers' freedoms, not more coercive

regulations. "The Constitution," he declared, "guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it, and none need it more than the teacher. . . . It was the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to protect. . . . We forget (the) teachings of the First Amendment when we sustain this law."

In *Wieman v. Updegraff*, a case invalidating an Oklahoma statute that permitted punishment for the innocent membership of teachers in allegedly subversive organizations, the idea that the First Amendment was especially relevant to teachers as a class was expressed in a concurring majority opinion. Moreover, it was in this case that the Court articulated a constitutional objection to the concept of state employment as a privilege. The state as an employer, it held in effect, was no more entitled to be arbitrary and discriminatory than the state as a political unit.

In *Sweezy v. New Hampshire*, a case decided in 1957, academic freedom advanced another notch. Paul Sweezy, an avowed Marxist, had been convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions put to him by a state official concerning the contents of a lecture he had delivered at the University of New Hampshire. Reflecting the post-McCarthy reparative mood, the Warren Court overturned this conviction. For the first time, the Supreme Court found that a teacher's "liberties in the area of academic freedom" had been invaded; and while Justice Warren, speaking for four, reversed the conviction on more narrow grounds, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for two, would have made "governmental intervention in the intellectual life of the university" the basis for the reversal.

The subsequent case of *Barenblatt v. United States* gave boundaries to *Sweezy*. Here the Court declared, by a narrow majority, that a professor was properly convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions concerning his Communist connections before the House Un-American Affairs Committee. The purport of this decision was that the academic community was not immune to the pressures of inquiry when national security was at stake. But even in this limiting case, the spokesman for the majority, Justice Harlan, paid respects to academic freedom as a constitutionally-protected right.

These cases had to do with restrictive action originating in the legislature, not within the university. The next step was one which the Illinois Court in the Koch case refused to take: to declare an academic dismissal, based on an administrative decision, unconstitutional because it restricted speech. But the ground has been prepared for this progression. One can almost predict the features of the case that will one day achieve what Koch's did not. It will involve the dismissal of a professor from a state-supported institution: under the "state action" concept, the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment does not yet extend to private institutions. It will clearly involve an ideological dismissal: the courts would be reluctant to intervene if the factor of incompetence were intermixed with the factor of unorthodoxy. In

his dismissal, the professor will have been accorded due process: otherwise, the court might decide to reach the procedural defect and not the broader substantive issue. The professor will have been punished for something he said, rather than for something he refused to say: the courts have been inclined to hold that failure to answer the questions of a superior may rightfully constitute grounds for discharge. And the punishment-provoking speech will probably deal with racial or political matters, for which judges have protective sympathies, rather than with that disturbing and repelling subject, sex.

Dilemmas of Legally Enforced Academic Freedom

But when the time comes that a professor can repair with confidence to the Constitution, the profession will not have reached the millenium. No doubt, the law will afford the victim firmer remedies than any other avenging agency can now provide. No doubt, the academic freedom of professors will gain more respectful attention when it becomes a legally enforceable right and not simply a professional desire. But the drawbacks will also be considerable. Constant judicial review of the disciplinary actions of universities will not only curb the arbitrariness of administrators but the independence and autonomy of universities. The special standing of the state-supported teacher will divide the academic profession into less and more privileged groups. And litigation will be costly, both in monetary and spiritual terms. Much of what has been gained by persuading the academic guardians to do all that their conscience tells them may be lost when the guardians are alerted to do only what their lawyers advise.

Above all, when the constitutional law becomes extended, new constitutional conundrums will arise. A professor exercises his academic freedom in three separate contexts and capacities: in the class room, as a teacher; in his research and publications, as a scholar; and in the public forum, as a citizen. What is the scope of the protection to be accorded him in each capacity; to what extent are these contexts interchangeable? Should the professor have the constitutional right to use the language of the beer-hall in the classroom? The result would be livelier lectures, but a grosser professional style. Or should he be restricted to decorous language in every sphere? The result would be that everyone—lawyers, truck-drivers, even students—would have broader constitutional rights than the professor. Or should a constitutional distinction be drawn between the (less free) intra-mural utterance and the (more free) extra-mural utterance? If this is done, a host of subtle problems, similar to those that have arisen around the question of search and seizure, will accompany this new distinction between inner and outer freedom, between the more and the less private sphere.

Such dilemmas are not yet before the courts. But, as a matter of professional ethics rather than of constitutional law, they have constantly been before the

professors' association; and this body faced them head-on and dividedly when Professor Koch came to it with his case. I come now to the third and final part of the story.

Academic Freedom and Irresponsible Utterances

The president and trustees of the University of Illinois took the position that the principle of academic freedom, to which they avowed complete adherence, did not protect irresponsible utterances, and that they penalized Professor Koch not for the substance of what he said, but for the undignified way in which he said it. My concern now is not with the sincerity of the argument, but with the soundness of the principle it presents.

With respect to extra-mural freedom, the 1940 Statement declares that a college or university teacher should be free from institutional censorship or discipline. But, it also says, "his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman." At another point the Statement holds that "if the administration of a college or university feels that a teacher has not observed these admonitions . . . it may proceed to file charges." Still, in pressing those charges, the "administration should remember that teachers should be accorded the freedom of citizens." In short, the 1940 Statement embodies a set of cross-cutting assumptions, born of negotiation and compromise, and likely to engender controversy when applied.

Both the AAUP investigating committee, headed by Professor Thomas Emerson of the Yale Law School, and Committee A of the AAUP, the body that oversees investigations, agreed that the Illinois authorities had failed to give Professor Koch the due process to which he was entitled and had imposed a heavier sanction than was warranted by the offense. On these grounds the Association, at its annual meeting in 1963, censured the Illinois administration. But there was a strong division between the Emerson committee and the parent committee, and also within Committee A, over whether "irresponsible" public utterances provide, as a matter of principle, a valid basis for official discipline. Professor Emerson believed that the 1940 Statement laid down ethical precepts for the individual to consider, not for the institution to enforce. He argued that to concede to the university the right to censor the tone of speech is in effect to concede to the university the right to censor the contents of speech, since form and substance, manner and matter, cannot truly be dissociated. He thought that "traditional guild pressures" would maintain a "respectable level of discourse" among academics, yet he would not even sanction the

Senate Committee's recommended reprimand, because he believed that even this much official pressure would impair the civil freedom to which academic teachers were entitled. Most of the members of Committee A saw the issue differently. They believed that the history of the 1940 Statement indicated that the Association did yield to the administrators of colleges and universities the right to bring charges against professors who were irresponsible in their public utterances. They pointed out that the profession had no other instruments to enforce its canons of propriety: the AAUP does not discipline professors for violating its code of ethics—indeed it has never drawn up a code of ethics; the state cannot revoke the license of professors—indeed professors are not usually licensed. The majority of Committee A believed that rights were tied to responsibilities, and that where administrations guaranteed the one they had legitimate interests in the other. These professors hoped that the faculty would play a significant role when disciplinary power would be exercised, and that proper procedural safeguards would protect the teacher against undue control.

A Perplexing Issue

I was the only member of Committee A who felt too perplexed by the issue to come down firmly on either side. On the one hand, I could see good reasons for not conceding to administrators the right to police a teacher's public words. If the individual surrendered his discretion in this matter, on what matters could he insist on private choice? Would he need presidential approval of his wife and children, would he need decanal approval of his style of dress? I could argue too that organizational aggrandizement did not even serve the interest of the organization. When a university punishes professors for certain utterances, it takes responsibility in the public eye for all the utterances it tolerates. It thus entraps itself in the paradox of being ever more compromised the more it struggles against being compromised. Finally, I could argue that the factors the Committee thought would prevent abuses were not very likely to do so, and that its hope reflected the over-sanguineness of professors who had seldom been personally involved in academic freedom battles.

But the arguments I could muster against the Emerson position were of equal power. In his AAUP report—a later article on the subject treated the issue less absolutely—he proposed a kind of exclusionary rule: an administration, or a faculty, may never use the public expressions of a professor against him, no matter how they reflect on his mentality or character. I could not agree that such evidence was inadmissible in a dismissal trial. The idea that professors retained the rights of citizens when they left the academic gates rested on the perception that wherever civil liberty was a value, and civic participation a virtue, any enterprise that greatly restricted them would be downgraded and despised. But to hold that professors retained the rights of citizens was to open a door, not to create an area of immunity. It was to say that the

norms of neutrality and obedience, which were binding on the professor as pedagogue and bureaucrat, did not apply to the professor as a public man; but it did not say that the professor as a public man was bound by nothing but his own sense of propriety. I could put this argument more dramatically: if Koch's letter had been grossly anti-semitic or Negrophobic; if it had been filled with obscene utterances that managed to fall within the law; if the campus had been so

orgiastic that his words would have had an immoral outcome at the next nocturnal opportunity, I could not say that its admission into evidence would have been unwarranted.

So I was recorded as not voting, and I remain uncertain on this point today. It may not be entirely inappropriate to end a discussion of academic freedom, our all too axiomatic value, on an equivocal note.

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STUDENTS' RIGHTS MODIFIED BY CORRELATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES



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I limit myself in this paper to freedom of expression. My academic discipline is psychology, and I have been a counseling psychologist for years. These background experiences bear upon my view of the topic. I think and speak as a counseling psychologist, as we say in the trade, one devoted to aiding students to achieve maturity through education.

The Legalities of Student Rights

Some students experience confusion concerning the legalities of their rights within the academic community, in contrast with their status as citizens, both on and off campus. Some of this confusion arises from their assumption that their rights as citizens are unchanged and unmodified by acquiring status in the academic community. In the political community they are, of course, along with other citizens, the residual source of political power and they also enjoy freedoms and rights as defined by tradition, statutes, and the federal and state bills of rights. But few students have even heard about their rights and responsibilities within the college, as determined by the exercise of power granted by charter to the trustees who serve as the legal entity of the institution. For centuries the exercise of this power was almost unrestricted in daily use. But recent court decisions have spelled out limitations in such matters as due process in dismissal cases; the relevancy of an administrative disciplinary action to the mission of the institution; the relationship of an action to the seriousness of the offense; and the reasonableness of the use of the institution's authority. Other restrictions on the exercise of charter authority perhaps will be formulated in future years. Nonetheless, if students enjoyed only their legal rights within the academic community, they would be severely limited in the scope of their activity.

We need, therefore, to look beyond the legalities of students' rights within the academic community, to other sources for fruitful delineation of rights and

responsibilities. For example, the tradition behind the Latin phrase, *in loco parentis*, is one such source, but that phrase often arouses, among college adolescents, resentment about the supposed continuation of their status as dependent children, subordinate to the authority of parents. Regretfully, this phrase has too often come to be a derogatory one. But when we couple it with another Latin phrase, *alma mater*, we reinstate the very rich tradition and history of the helping and caring relationship and the glorious story of the institution's exercise of fiduciary responsibilities for the student. To be sure, there are extant some vestiges of the "sink or swim" distortion of the Germanic tradition of relationships between students and teachers. But for the most part, the elaborate counseling and student personnel services to be found on most campuses today have evolved out of compassion to help the student achieve at the optimum level of his capabilities, to attain that measure of maturity—intellectual, personal, and otherwise—that epitomizes the ideal accomplishment of an institution of higher learning.

Yet on some campuses, even today, one identifies irritating vestiges of the colonial pattern of *in loco parentis*, in which repression and regimentation were for too long the pattern of a custodial relationship. Such regimentation was expected to mold character, according to the then-prevailing standards of piety and morality. In appraising today's student revolts, we need to remind ourselves that, instead of producing orderliness, some repressive measures, too long employed in past decades, produced rioting, resentment, and a good deal of unpleasantness and, as well, little intellectual creativity.

A more productive source of character and intellectual development is the traditional mission of the faculty to do a good job of teaching. As Virginia Gildersleeve has said, "Students are entitled to the best education the faculty can give." In some institutions this teaching mission of high excellence may

have been weakened by the expansion of research and graduate instruction, replacing the use of facilities and faculty for teaching the undergraduate in the old tradition of the liberal arts college. Indeed some data indicate, through the observable reactions of some students, that such neglect of undergraduate teaching may serve as a source of alienation, a phenomenon which needs to be carefully studied by the social scientists and by student personnel workers. Let me observe that the concept of alienation, as used in many "explanations" of the Berkeley phenomenon, is such a seductively global concept that we need to guard against "explaining" more than we understand about the current dynamics of student life on many campuses.

The Rights Students Are Demanding

With regard to students' rights, almost all news media report current demonstrations expressing students' attempts to win those rights that are to them, hopefully, inalienable. And some students, on different campuses, demand such rights as:

1. The right to invite speakers of their own choice to speak on any subject.
2. The right to organize to advocate causes of their own choosing.
3. The right to adopt resolutions advocating a cause.
4. The right to organize demonstrations and picketing as means of advocating certain positions and assertions about divisive issues.
5. The right to editorialize on any subject or issue.
6. The right to help make institutional decisions concerning rules governing students.
7. The right to be consulted about all policies, not only those affecting students in their own out-of-class activities but also those involving broader academic matters.

Contrary to the impression resulting from some news stories, on a large number of campuses nearly all of these rights are presently enjoyed by many students, according to the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators (NASPA) study. For example, on more than 70 per cent of our campuses it is alleged that students are free to discuss and advocate even "unpopular" opinions concerning each of 14 listed controversial issues, such as: "Abolition of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities" or "local fair housing legislation." And 71 per cent of the college presidents participating in the study responded that policy or tradition permitted their students to invite speakers of their own choice, including speakers of a wide range of advocacy. On a few campuses (3 per cent of our national sampling), nearly all of the rights listed are reportedly enjoyed, as perceived by presidents; but at no institutions did all respondents agree that students fully enjoyed *all* of these rights. In contrast, in 15 per cent of the colleges surveyed, editors reported

that they had been censored within the two-and-one-half years included in the survey, and in 6 per cent editors had reportedly been removed from office within the same period. In only 35 per cent of the colleges did presidents report that their policy would be "quite permissive" toward students organizing a group to advocate an "extreme" position on a controversial issue. It is clear then that much remains to be done on many campuses before some of these desired rights are enacted by official appropriate action.

Means of Establishing Students' Rights

Let me turn to a brief review of several means currently used on many campuses to establish students' rights.

College students, being of an inventive turn of mind, currently employ many methods to formulate and establish their rights. One may delineate the following:

1. Students *demand*, both vis-a-vis and through the student newspaper, that rights be recognized, rather than granted, by the source of institutional authority.
2. They assert that they do, in fact, enjoy those rights that are established by adoption of their own resolutions, which in turn assert that they do possess specified rights.
3. They imitate adults by employing pressure tactics borrowed from the community at large: labor strikes and sit-ins, as well as other forms of work stoppage.
4. Students also employ, as one of their rights, methods of confrontation about moral and societal causes, decisions, and issues.
5. After a cause is found, discovered, or uncovered, often as a result of some administrative action without prior consultation, and indeed often in imitation of students on other campuses, students demand the right of consultation about such administrative actions.
6. Fortunately, on an increasing number of campuses, the conversations and consultations concerning causes and issues have become regular and continuous rather than emerging only from disruptive episodes.

This latter method of establishing students' rights would seem to be the most appropriate one to be used in an institution of higher learning.

Increasingly one hopes that, following sober and thoughtful consultation in some intellectual depth, on all campuses there will emerge institutional consensus and then official enactments of those student rights which are currently judged appropriate, and indeed necessary, to achieve the institution's mission of higher learning.

In employing the first five of these identified means to "win" their rights, students seem to imitate their elders, particularly those involved in labor strife in

which demands are made upon management, often beyond the legalities involved. Also, in imitation of their elders, students neglect the correlative of rights—their responsibilities as maturing citizens in the academic community. Indeed the American labor scene has long served as a role model of inalienable rights, usually with much less attention directed to responsibilities or accountability. While in some instances such means may seem to be the only available way to “win” concessions, surely their employment in colleges debases the character of higher education and brings limited respect and little support to the cause of students’ rights. Indeed, for some students, the struggle to secure rights seems to be equated with anarchy.

The Responsibility of Student Personnel Workers

I believe we deans of students and others in student personnel work are partially responsible, by inaction, in not seeking actively to aid students to employ more appropriate means of establishing rights and correlative responsibilities. I believe also that we need to seek to perfect ways of aiding students to learn alternative concepts of freedom, which learning may well lead to an *orderly* enactment of rights congruent with maturity of status, both as students and as citizens in American society. I conclude that in the social studies in high school and social sciences in college, we have not yet succeeded in teaching the necessity of the *coupling* of appropriate student rights with responsibilities in the exercise of those rights. In support of this hypothesis I commend for your careful study an article by Robert O’Neil, “On Teaching the Bill of Rights.” Perhaps students thus only continue to imitate adults in demanding their rights within the academic scene.

I conclude that we in education must turn to the unsolved problem, i.e.: “Who introduces students to the implied and explicit responsibilities in their status as students, if they have not learned the coupling of rights *and* responsibilities in the home, in high school, or in college?” What means are available for helping them to learn that for every right there is a corresponding societal, as well as personal, responsibility? Indeed, if they have not read Jefferson deeply and have only scanned the federal Bill of Rights, then they may well come to the task of maturing with the notion that their lifetime must be spent wresting rights from oppressive authority figures, with no accountability to anyone, beyond their own conscience, for the ways in which to exercise those rights. I firmly believe that this is the great unsolved educational problem behind some past and current picketing, trespassing, violence, and rioting. These activities are the symptoms arising from the basic cause, i.e., many students are committed to a concept or philosophy of the nature of rights as extreme permissiveness, as freedom to do as they please, as license to employ any means to gain whatever they desire. Such a thoughtless and superficial employment of the

tyranny of force is scarcely evidence of maturity. In addition to debasing the character of the higher learning and thus replacing the academic way of thoughtful study of divisive and controversial issues and advocacies of causes, the above-identified five methods of establishing rights rather reinforce the tendency of many students to neglect and even to deny the correlative institutional responsibilities of students in their status as students. But what can and should we do to substitute reasoned dissent and confrontation for force?

Means of Academic Citizenship Education

Let me turn to an exploration of a few of the simple means that I have observed employed on some campuses in seeking to aid students to understand that citizenship in the academic community is not simply a matter of enjoying demanded rights but that it also involves holding themselves accountable for the use of those rights. To many these means may seem to be simple-minded, but they do summarize my own experience of two-and-a-half decades as a dean of students, one who has thus far survived within the vortex of the continuing strife about students’ rights.

Continuous Involvement in Review of Rights and Responsibilities

The first means of teaching some students the concept and consequences of responsibility is the simple one of *continuous* involvement of students in deliberation, delineation, and review of rights and responsibilities, thereby hoping to induce students to thoughtfully commit themselves to both rights and responsibilities. These learnings might well involve the periodic and guided re-reading of the basic authority of the trustees and, in depth, the history of the faculty’s and students’ struggle for academic freedom, all occurring within the authority structure of the basic charter. The lesson to be learned is the responsible sharing of the exercise of charter authority rather than that of faculty or students seeking to wrest power from the trustees and administration.

Such a profound learning may also involve thoughtful seminar excursions into the history and philosophy of freedom of the individual in the wider American culture, embracing such historical accounts as Muller’s and Edman’s volumes on freedom and also the anthropological literature describing the authority of every group over the individual member. Here the student is aided in learning of the paradoxical ways in which group membership yielded the freedom of individuality, of achieving one’s potentiality, *within* restraints imposed by the group. Such efforts to learn may also involve the appointment of students as full members of faculty and administrative committees, with the right *and* responsibility to participate in the delineation of institutional problems and in the formulation of policies, including the adoption of proprietary rules for residence halls. Parenthetically, some 60 percent of the NASPA responding deans reported the practice of student membership on standing faculty committees; and students reportedly enjoy full voting

privileges in 84 per cent of the committees on which they hold membership.

In such a continuous seminar students may also analyze the problem of how to enjoy one's individuality within the restraints of membership in organized groups, but especially within education as a societal institution.

The year-long seminar may well cover the literature of decision-making in reference to exercise of authority of the many over the few and of the few over the many. We need to remind ourselves that this relationship of authority, external to the student and his evolving individuality, is an often confused one for many adolescents as they seek to delineate a new identity apart from their dependency status as children of their parents.

Many other methods of continuously helping students to learn the mature coupling of responsibilities with rights serve as teaching opportunities available to deans of students, as well as to other administrators and to faculty advisers of student organizations, within every academic year rather than waiting for a disruptive episode. For example, for years my staff has systematically initiated at least one or two "program" reviews with the officers of the 400-odd chartered student organizations. These reviews provide opportunities both to be helpful staff advisers and also to explore with the students their accountability to the mission of the institution.

Off-the-Record Background Sessions

I call attention to one special, but nevertheless fruitful, difficulty in teaching the coupling of rights and responsibilities. Every college administrator and many faculty who serve as department chairmen or chairmen of important policy committees understand that in all human affairs decisions are compromises among many options, each of which takes its toll or requires the paying of a price of some sort. Unfortunately, in our culture, to be called a "compromiser" is to be characterized as one without moral character or without "principle." But we need to recall that Aristotle stated a dictum centuries ago that "politics is the art of the possible," and former Chancellor Strong has imaginatively defined this to be the task of the administrator. The professor or student, without administrative decision-making responsibilities, can afford to adhere rigidly to what he considers to be basic principles—with no compromises to be made. But the president, and often the dean of students, who sit at the vortex of many vector forces bearing upon them in their decision-making responsibility, know well that they must choose what price they are willing and able to pay for whatever decisions they make among conflicting and opposing options awaiting their choice. If the president says to the dean of students, "Yes, we will have George Lincoln Rockwell as a speaker," then the community demands that this particular advocate of genocide be denied the taxpayers' platform. If the president says, "Yes, the Socialist Club may bring Herbert Aptheker as a speaker," then

those of the rightist persuasion demand that the decision be reversed. If the president recommends to the trustees an increase in tuition, then the students demand that the decision be reversed because they contend that they do not have the necessary money and must leave school.

Even a president fully committed to students' freedom of discussion and advocacy cannot often make his decisions with *full public* discussion of competing options because some of the vector forces may be identified only at a high price, even though freedom is worth a high price. This is a fact of life. But it is a wise president, and his dean of students, who finds ways of communicating selectively "off the record," and thus sharing with students and faculty alike some references to the complex situation in which he finds himself. Such a sobering off-the-record discussion hopefully leads to an evaluation by some of the uninformed students of the many hidden forces that may be ignored only at a given price. Such a communication may result, if possible, in the making of a workable decision. Honest and sincere behind-the-scene information-giving about a policy or event or decision-in-the-making is an art in itself. The technique has one important and sobering effect—it dignifies the importance of dissident students and often wins their assent, as well as sometimes attaining consensus, of a sort, without destroying students' status as leaders rather than as administrative stooges.

Clearly, the president and dean of students must avoid sacrificing able students and causing them to lose their effectiveness as sincere advocates of students' causes. Indeed, sometimes the student leaders must publicly oppose the administration, although they understand from private briefings that the scales for decision-making are tipped one way or another. I am advocating what would be considered off-the-record briefing sessions or backgrounding sessions in journalism, and my experience leads me to conclude that, when skillfully and *sincerely* employed over the years, they will win a larger measure of assent, even if not enthusiastic support.

Seminars—The Most Effective Method

But I suspect that perhaps the most effective method of helping students to learn the mature paradox of rights within responsibilities, or freedom within restraint, will result from informal and continuous seminars about that philosophy of higher learning which involves *the moral duty of each student to become his potentiality*, especially to become a *devotee* of the academic virtue of thoughtfully reviewing all available relevant evidence and knowledge and of remaining open to reconsideration as new data become available. This is *the* collegiate style of living—to be a thoughtful individual, especially about the nature of academic freedom.

It is obviously not easy to organize such a thoughtful seminar in the midst of disruptive and frenzied conflict, and therefore *continuous* dialogue must be the order of the day. As the content of annual previews of anticipated conflicts and issues in many staff-

student sessions and retreats, through the student newspaper, by meetings of residence hall councils, by traveling seminars in fraternities and sororities—in a host of ways almost continuously maintained—basic questions can be raised by a well-trained staff informed about the philosophic implications of rights and responsibilities in Western culture. Especially is it necessary to engage in continuous dialogue with those students who are identified as struggling with emotional and ideational conflicts and queries about the nature of freedom in our form of democracy and the acceptability of authority figures. Each such individual obviously needs assistance in thinking about basic problems of maturity of understanding of his relationship with authority to replace his over-simplified urge to substitute his own autonomy for institutional authority.

Relationships with "Trouble-makers"

I close with a brief identification of one special problem which perplexes every dean of students, who, perforce, must operate even within the ecology of hostility.

I refer to a complex of puzzling relationships with what we in the trade categorize as "the trouble-makers," the type of adolescents who are revolting against authority figures of parents and deans of students. These students, loosely categorized, present an especially difficult teaching obstacle. They do *not* wish to learn the history and philosophy of the struggle for rights and responsibilities but rather do they insist on employing the method of *demanding* what they consider to be their just rights. Grace Coyle said, "Every adolescent must come to terms with authority." But many rebellious adolescents demand that these terms be of their own dictation and are thus not willing to attend thoughtful seminars. Their concept of rights springs from conflicting concepts of freedom; that is, they define their rights in terms of their assumption that in our democracy students, as citizens on the campus, are entitled to inalienable freedom from external restraint. They have not yet learned the paradoxical concept of freedom *within* both external and internal restraint.

In the case of such "troublemakers," the arbitrary and unilateral exercise of charter authority merely reinforces and even sanctifies resistance to authority. Firmness, of course, is at all times necessary to aid the student to come to terms with authority. But there is no substitute for benign patience on the part of those assigned authority, as they seek to exercise every opportunity of personal relationship to raise philosophical questions, as a means of aiding the students to think about the implications and complications and consequences of unilateral employment of their own concept of unlimited freedom.

Since no dean of students can win all controversies, and should not, he must be prepared, between riots and demonstrations, to seek rational and thoughtful discussions in a friendly atmosphere with these dissenters. He must not seek to trick them into obedience and conformity, but rather he should use thoughtful, kindly, patient, long-suffering methods of the seminar approach to aid them in understanding dissent and diversity of perception of the problem of growing-up in search of identity, congruent with full potentiality and with humane stature of living. Especially should the dean and his staff strive to relate with all students, even those who do not respond, with the dignity that befits students as potentially of worth and of full humanity.

After two and a half decades of battling with this problem of exercising authority, often with scar tissues resulting from my own faulty judgment and tactics, I know of no simple magical and certain formula to prevent or even to diminish a Berkeley phenomenon, only the way of the life of continued patience and hopefulness. But especially do I advocate fraternizing with the "troublemakers" over a cup of coffee—between riots!

In case this technique of the *kaffee klatsch* fails, then one has recourse to two *advanced* administrative techniques: 1) leave the campus to deliver a prearranged speech on students' *freedom* on another dean's campus; and 2) *in extremis*, moving up graduation exercises in order to share, earlier, the student "rascals" with the "real" world of the marketplace.

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THE BERKELEY CASE

Panel Presentation by:



Stephen Weissman



David Kolodney



Sheldon Wolin



Martin Malia

Moderator: Terry Lunsford

A special panel on "The Berkeley Case" was held at the Institute because of the great interest expressed in the student protests there and in their background. An extensive file of reading materials was prepared for Institute participants, spanning a range of viewpoints. (See the bibliography in this volume.) No attempt was made, however, to assemble a panel balanced between speakers for and against the various aspects of the Berkeley situation. Instead, panel members were invited whose differing viewpoints and experiences could provide the Institute audience of university administrators with opportunity to ask questions and gain a deeper understanding of the student protestors' views, and some of the problems they raise. The panel statements and discussion with the audience are presented here with only slight editing, on the premise that both those agreeing and those disagreeing with particular speakers will be better off for knowing their views.

LUNSFORD: First, I would like to tell you who the panel members are and then I will tell you something about what I hope will be our ground rules. Martin Malia is assistant professor in the department of history at the University of California, Berkeley. David Kolodney is a student who was involved in the 50-member executive committee of the Free Speech Movement and was a delegate from the independent non-affiliated students, young people who were not involved in any of the campus political organizations prior to their involvement in FSM. Sheldon Wolin is a professor of political science who also was here all through the year and who, as you know from your packet of written materials, has written something on this in connection with Professor Scharr. Stephen Weissman was a member of the 12-man steering committee which made the major decisions on behalf of the Free Speech Movement. He was a graduate student in history here at the university. Let me say that the identification of the speakers by institution is only for purposes of identification and does not imply any sponsorship of their remarks. We have purposely not attempted to pre-

sent you with a rounded view of the Berkeley events in the past year. I held out for this for a number of reasons. One is that I don't think it would be workable. Second, most of you are people in administrative positions in universities and colleges, and I think that you are more likely to think of questions you want to ask some of the people on this panel than you would want to ask some of the other people who would agree more nearly with your views. This is a panel which has considerable diversity in the views that its members have of the Free Speech Movement and the events over the year and of critical issues about universities and colleges. I also think they are people who can bring insights to the analysis of those events which you could not easily get if you were talking to someone who had been, let us say, working in the administration here at Berkeley during the past year. This is an attempt to give resources for discussion of the issues and events, and it is not an attempt to reconstruct history whole or live. We won't attempt to dwell on details, and we won't even go very far, I hope, in trying to settle any disputed issues of fact. This is simply not workable

in this context, and there are many such disputed issues of fact.

I should also say that there are also here, as participants, other people who were at Berkeley and other people from California who know something about the Free Speech situation here. For example, I am told that Peter Van Houten who worked in the Dean of Students' office is here as a participant, and we encourage his comments or questions at any time. The same is true of Ron Anastasie, who was a member of the executive committee and the steering committee of FSM. While he is not on the panel, we have asked him to be available for comments and questions. Marston Schultz was in the FSM and has worked on this project with me, getting together materials relevant to the FSM's activities. In addition, there are other people who might give you what might be called the student point of view: Paul Potter who is going to speak to you tomorrow morning, and Michael Neff who is here as a resource person. I think also that Bob Glasser, the president of the UCLA student government, could give you some interesting insights into student thinking.

The focus which I will attempt to give the discussion, and I am subject to correction by the panel and you, will be upon significant implications of the events as they occurred which are of import for universities and colleges to the extent that they are special, that they have distinctiveness, and particularly to the extent that these implications run for governance in the broad sense—which I take to mean more than government, more than administration, more than politics—but some meld of all of those together because precisely what is involved there is one of the things at issue.

So we will here attempt to understand the events of the year, and it is my conviction that we can best do that if all of us sedulously avoid two bad things. One would be any patronizing or accusing or contemptuous attitude toward one another's views (and believe me there are very strong disagreements in the views that we will give this afternoon); and, secondly, the tendency to pretend that there are no differences and to be polite and to slough over and to find simple answers and syntheses. I will have the luxury of being kind of a polite, sneaky gadfly to everybody in asking what I think are dirty questions designed to reveal their assumptions with the intent of helping us all see what some of the implications of our different positions are. I have asked each of them to state the two or three things that they think should be known as significant about the events at Berkeley during the past year, with special relevance to the nature of universities and their governance. I have left it just that free. We have agreed on that as a *modus operandi*. I will use my option to sneak in dirty questions. We will have full discussion for more than an hour after the last person has spoken, so our panel presentation will be a beginning rather than an ending. If that is suitable to everyone then the first person I want to ask to speak is Stephen Weissman.

WEISSMAN: I was wondering why I got put on the extreme left of the table. I am not sure whether I was invited to be the devil's advocate or the devil or perhaps put another way, Daniel or the lion. In presenting two or three points, I would like to make it clear that I am not here to enlist any of you in the student revolutionary army. I think we have some very basic differences, disagreements, and what I would like to do is state what I consider to be two or three of those and to ask that you attempt to understand them but not particularly to agree with them.

The point has been made that the civil rights struggle has been very important to what happened in Berkeley, that in a sense civil rights and even what is happening now in Vietnam make it impossible to understand the student movement as merely a group identity crisis. We cannot merely look at it from the point of view of psychology—and vulgar psychology at that. I think it is very important that administrators understand the impact that the civil rights movement has had on the entire two generations of students that I have gone to school with.

The particular issue which motivated the crisis at Berkeley, I think, was directly related to civil rights. Whereas at first all political activity was prohibited if it would lead to off-campus political activity, as the negotiations moved, it became clear that the only activity which the administration was intent upon stopping was advocacy on campus which would lead to illegal actions off-campus. Now it might be held that students have no legal right to free speech on campus when the corporation executive, the president of the university corporation, says that this is not the proper time for that speech to take place. At no point did we argue that we had a steadfast legal right to speak at the times that we wanted about the subjects that we wanted. This was a political struggle. We were not arguing about what the nature of the law was. We were arguing about what the nature of the constitutional relationship on campus should be. This is an important distinction, and I think most of the students realized it. We thought perhaps we could win in court after two or three years, but that did not matter. So this was one thing we were learning from the civil rights struggle: that we had to have responsibility to our own consciences sometimes to go outside of channels.

The second thing I think we learned from the civil rights struggle is this whole thing about the politics of the possible. Protest outside of channels is a way of enlarging the possibilities. Whereas it was impossible for the administration to grant us certain rights on December 1st, it became possible for them to grant us those rights on December 5th. I think that we have to look at the role of protest in American society, historically, of at least serving the function of changing people's perspectives about what was possible.

Now I think we moved, each of us at our own speed, (and there were a lot of FSM's—we cannot speak for them—everybody had his own experience) from arguing that a particular rule should be changed

or eliminated to asking the basic question, "Who has the right to make rules within the university?" Now this is a question that challenges the assumption that the university community derives its authority from the charter granted by the state legislature or by a public charter of a group of regents to have a private university. I think we began to say that the university should not be considered as a corporation which derives its power from its legal charter but rather that it should derive its power from a community of students and faculty.

Now I can't develop this in a very short time, but I think that this division between the way we look at universities is essential. I do not personally agree with Dean Williamson's definition of a university as a corporation. I agree that that is the way it is now and that the president has the final say, but I am in the position of challenging whether that is the way it should be. Outside the area of instruction and faculty-student relationship, I would be willing to say that I think that there should be no power on the part of an administration to throw people out of the university or to discipline them for their conduct.

Now this is a key difference. I believe many administrators, and I think Dean Williamson is a very good example, see administration as part of the teaching process. I think his presentation was excellent in that respect. My feelings are that the rules that concern students' lives, dormitory rules, drinking rules, sex rules should be a matter for the collective group that lives in the dormitory or resides on the campus and that they should set their own norms. If a student breaks a rule outside of that, it should be up to the civil authorities. Taking that a step further, it seems to me that when an administrator talks about the basic mission of the university being disturbed, he defines that basic mission in terms of a set of interests which come closer to representing what I would consider the interests of the board of regents or the powers that be in any state, rather than in terms of my own interests. For instance, I think students are more interested in Socrates, although they think maybe he should have left jail, than in Aristotle, who worked for Alexander the Great. I think that maybe students are more interested in Camus than in Malraux, who now works for the French government. The point is, I don't think that students—or at least I as a student—don't want to be taught that I have responsibility to a corporate hierarchy, but rather my responsibility—and I think freedom entails responsibility—should be to a community in which I have the right to make decisions. This is another basic difference.

Now the last difference, I think, is that I am very much afraid that more and more of American society is becoming a large bureaucracy, whether it is public housing or public welfare or education or large corporations, and that what the style of education we now have in the large university does is to teach people to be responsible to authorities which set the conditions in which they have to live. You feel the responsibility to follow the rules of the corporation rather than to question whether the corporation has

the right to set those rules, and I think that this is teaching us to adapt to a system which I see becoming more and more pervasive in American society. The definition of accountability that Dean Williamson uses stems from corporation law. I have a different concept of liberty or freedom. I think it entails responsibility, but responsibility to the group that makes the rules of which a person is a part. I am very much afraid of the kind of notion of freedom that on one hand says freedom from restrictions. We are getting more and more liberal; you can stay out later at night, you can drink more. There is more freedom *from* but there is not the freedom *to* come together and set the alternatives in which you live. I think that that should be an important part of education, and I don't think it is at present.

LUNSFORD: If someone has a burning question he would like to throw at Steve, I will take one or two.

QUESTION: Would you apply the same principles to high schools and secondary schools?

WEISSMAN: No, I would not, but I do feel that there is far too much of an authoritarian relationship throughout the educational system in America. I think people are beginning to define away what is meant by a free man more and more, so that it is quite possible that my conception of education would be obnoxious to large numbers of students who come to college from the high schools. I would only ask that the people who want to have the freedom to set their own alternatives should have the right to do so.

LUNSFORD: I think we will go on. Dave Kolodney, would you say what you thought was important?

KOLODNEY: I think that when we try to answer the questions, even the very immediate questions that arise in the FSM, the political dispute or any of the issues about the topic, "Freedom and Responsibility," we are ultimately going to have to decide questions about the governance of the university, about the nature of the university community. But I am not immediately concerned with those questions, although I am very much inclined to agree with Steve on them. I think those questions are really much too easy to answer. I do not mean that they are too easy to answer in one way or the other, but they are easy because they are distant. They are easy because they don't have to be faced for perhaps another 20 years. I don't know how optimistic or how pessimistic one wants to be about when we are going to have to face those questions, and I think that one of the dangers when one looks at the Free Speech Movement, when one looks at political protest on campus, is to look at all the difficult questions, to look at all the questions that we are not going to answer now, and thereby avoid the questions which are clearer and perhaps more telling, about the decisions we have to make right now.

That is why—as Steve mentioned—you cannot deal with the political struggle, the civil liberties

struggle on campus in terms of crude psychology. I think you can deal with it in terms of psychology. It might be very interesting, but this does not remove the fundamental substantive issues and these issues demand decisions. They demand that we each take a stand on them whatever we think about the psychology. All of the irrelevancies that have been raised, from the crude irrelevancies of red baiting to the enlightened and sophisticated irrelevancies of anomic, have served to enable one to forget about the substantive issue, to forget about the fact that for whatever reason the students at the University of California, the students across the country are asking for very specific things, that if these things were granted that fight would have been over whatever the motivation of that fight was. And each of us has to decide whether or not, for example, one should have the same political rights on the campus as off the campus. Each of us has to decide whether the resolution passed by the faculty at Berkeley on December 8th, which stated that the university shall not regulate the content of speech on campus though it may regulate the time, manner and place of speech, thereby leaving any regulation of the content, any judgments as to excesses, to the civil authorities in political matters . . . each of us has to decide whether we agree with that or we don't. This brings us to the, I think, real difference on a very immediate level in perception between us and thou—or something—whoever we are.

It reminds me of David Hume. He said that everybody in every society agrees that the good is desirable and that is fine and then it only leaves you with the minor details of working out what the good is.

I heard this morning a list of, I think, seven freedoms that students have, and I almost had the impulse to say, "well, now that we have agreed that students have these seven freedoms, we can all go home. We have settled the most pressing issues." But then I realized as time went on how differently we perceive a list of seven freedoms. For example, as far as I am concerned, when you grant a freedom, when the first amendment grants freedom of speech, it grants it absolutely within the area that is protected. Some speech is not protected. Libel at the moment is not protected. Justice Black thinks that all speech should be protected. But wherever speech is protected, it is absolutely protected. There remains no discretion on the part of the authorities, whoever the authorities are, to limit speech in that area. That is the way I understand these seven freedoms, but it is not the way they are understood by university administrators evidently.

The other thing that puzzled me is that, having listed these seven freedoms, we went to talk about ways of achieving them. There were five ways the students might go about achieving these freedoms. But my response to that is bewilderment because it seems to me that, since we all agree on them, we should simply write them into the rules as soon as we can get back to our respective campuses. There should not be any further question, and there should not have been a question of protest on the Berkeley

campus. There should not have been a question of means and methods and whether the ends justify the means, if we all in this enlightened way agree that the students have these seven freedoms. But again it seems that, having admitted that these are freedoms the students should have, we perceive the implementation differently. It seems to me like a clear issue.

The students have been further accused of being uncompromising, of not seeing the other fellow's point of view, of not being willing to give and take. But I cannot look at freedom as being a question of splitting the difference, of saying, we agree that these are the freedoms that one justly has and we have four of them now and I want six, so let's have five for the time being. It just is not that kind of question to me, but again it seems that we are supposed to have a give and take.

We are uncompromising, I think, on matters that are not suitable for compromise. This morning an example of compromise was given. It was a question of tuition and possibly a very nice compromise (I don't know all the details) \$100,000 going to scholarships. But with political rights we are not dealing with money; we are not dealing with something that can be quantified and doled out. We are dealing with an "either-or" matter. *Either* I have the right without anybody's sufferance, without the grace of anybody's discretion, to speak on campus without the content of my speech being regulated, *or* I don't, and there is not a middle ground of "Well, we will let you say what you want except when prudentially matters become too tough for us to let you." That is not freedom at all. That is license, as a matter of fact, in a moot sense.

And finally there is the question of responsibility. How do we perceive responsibility? Personally, I think that the whole lexicon here of freedom and rights and responsibilities is unfortunate. They are historically difficult rubrics to work with, but the fact remains that a freedom, when you set aside an area of speech and you say, this speech is protected, there is *no* responsibility. That is just the point. That you can say anything in that area not libelous whatever, you can say anything and you are not accountable to anyone, just the minute you become accountable to someone, then it is no longer within the area of free speech. Then you have taken it out of the area of protected speech or protected activity in general. So there are many interesting questions about what the responsibilities of students are, and more interesting questions of whom they are responsible to. But these questions again are questions that are interesting but can be left open while we all sit together and agree that the content of speech on campus should not be regulated by the university. Responsibility does not have to be decided before we can decide that freedoms should be allowed.

LUNSFORD: I would take a question or two, or I have a question myself for Dave. I think one of the things we will want to discuss a little later is what you mean by "within that area." It is one of the

things that's going to trouble us. It doesn't integrate your last point about what you can decide first. If I understood correctly, the kind of thinking you are saying in the FSM rhetoric of the year, was that it was a question of whose discretion ought to solve borderline problems and the FSM was saying these freedoms should be absolute so far as anybody in the university doing anything about them, but that you were willing to submit to court determination of gray areas around what is called protected speech. Am I correct in characterizing yours as the FSM's position?

KOLODNEY: Let me first make clear what border the courts are defining when they define the border-line. The line they are not defining is the line between protected speech used responsibly and protected speech used excessively. As long as it is protected, there is no possibility of excess that is criminal libel. It may be stupid or in some other way it might be considered irresponsible, but it is out of the purview of the policy-makers to limit it. The line they are trying to draw is between protected speech and unprotected speech. Now that is an unfortunate line, that is a difficult line, but the Free Speech Movement did not go so far as Mr. Justice Black and deny that the line could be drawn. We said so long as we still have to draw this line, let the courts decide it. It is their competence to decide it and they are the arm of authority that should decide whether speech is protected or is not protected.

QUESTION: In interpretation, what do you mean by free speech, what is protected speech? This is a basic question. How are you using the terms?

KOLODNEY: Do you mean what speech is protected? Well, as I say, we leave it to the courts to decide what speech is or is not protected. We do not pre-judge the issue. We simply demand that no one else pre-judge the issue either.

LUNSFORD: Sheldon, I will ask you to speak next for your allotted time.

WOLIN: Let me begin with a general reflection which I think forms the background to the few remarks I would like to share with you this afternoon. The general reflection is, I suppose, that most of us as individuals and most of us, in terms of observing the operation of groups and institutions in society, are probably impressed by the vast number of contradictions that we as individuals, or institutions as operating practices, tend to carry around at the same time without those contradictions either getting in the way of each other or ultimately rendering the institution or the individual dysfunctional in some sense. However, the beauty of crisis is that it tends to expose those contradictions, contradictions which we either plaster over or can manage to live with under relatively normal circumstances. My overwhelming reaction to the events of last fall, indeed of this year, this *homo mirabilis* has largely been in terms of a certain amount of amazement at the extent to which academic insti-

tutions, faculty members, students, administrators, all of us are really, so to speak, capable of shouldering enormous numbers of contradictions in terms of our lives and practices but that suddenly a moment comes when these contradictions tend to be exposed. My conclusion, and it is only a very tentative conclusion, is that the events and crises of this year did expose a large number of contradictions; and what we thought a university was, or what a university had come to be, had exposed contradictions in what each of us as faculty members was doing in terms of spending his professional life. It exposed too, I think, some very uneasy and rather discordant feelings among the students themselves as to what it means to be a student A.D. 1964-65.

In terms of the faculty, if I can turn to that for just a moment, the feelings I suppose were of this kind, at least in terms of people and groups that I mingled with during this year. First of all, there was an understanding that a university such as Berkeley was in many respects a most admirable and really a quite fantastic achievement in terms of the quality of the individuals which it had attracted, in terms of the excitement, intellectual excitement that generally is a characteristic part of the university scene. But we knew too that we were being asked as members of a modern university to do a lot of things and to follow a lot of different motivations, some of which did not either sit very well with each other or served to militate against what many of us had previously entertained as a kind of ideal image of a professor. Many of these notions I am sure you are familiar with: the tugs between research and teaching, the tugs between doing the kind of research that genuinely attracts your intellectual interest, and the kind of research that one does in terms of external stimuli, of a kind which may be perfectly respectable and perfectly necessary but somehow or other is not necessarily the genuine kind of choice one would make if one were perfectly free. Then in terms of the distribution of one's time among the multifarious functions that one was called upon to perform as a professor, fragmenting and spreading one's time to the extent that one finally began to believe that nothing one did was either very important or very significant, or above all very good, because there were so many conflicting and competing demands.

Finally, and in a certain sense above all, the question of what it meant to be a member of an academic community became a most urgent question to a faculty member because to be a member of a faculty community, if one took the word seriously, meant in some sense participation. But participation is not only a demand—it may even be an ideal, but it is also a cost. It is a cost which we learned in terms of the kinds of processes and struggles one had to undertake in order to achieve very modest objectives and indeed objectives which one thought a university could often take for granted but under certain circumstances, namely the Berkeley circumstances, one could not, but the cost of achieving even very limited goals was a very high cost indeed. The num-

ber of thoughts that were not thought, books that were not written and articles that were not read, the number of students who were not taught during the year represents, I think, a truly appalling cost. But the point is I don't think it is simply the cost that comes from a university in crisis. It comes, I think, even in more normal times, given what the definition of normality is in a large-scale institution such as the one we are living with now. One does not simply once a week or once a month participate dutifully for two hours in a faculty meeting, deliver one's self of Roman sentiments as a good Roman senator should, and then return to laboratory or library secure in the knowledge that one has done one's political duty. Political involvement at a university level in a complicated structure such as this one is time-consuming and inevitably the question comes up, as it always does when one has contrary tugs, which game is worth which candle? And the answer is simply, of course, that there is no answer. The answer is that one has to, in some sense or other, or one seems condemned in one sense or another, to carry along these kinds of conflicting obligations feeling equally guilty about all of these matters, about the time one gives to research when perhaps one should be in a faculty meeting or the time one gives to a student when one should be giving it to research, or the time that one should perhaps spend saving the university, which was the popular phrase that many people comforted themselves with during the year, instead of doing things that are more supposedly representative of what faculty members ought to do.

Similarly, as one thought about the university during this past year of wonders one sought here also interesting kinds of contradictions, contradictions which appear interesting from hindsight and agonizing when one watched them unfold in the fall. One saw, for example, I think it's fair to say, that the university in terms of its administrative officials, in terms of responsible faculty opinion, and responsible faculty officials who spoke for the faculty, that this was not in any sense a diabolical or evil sort of structure, that in many respects it was a tribute to the things that in a kind of generally liberal society we regard as good things. People did try, to the best of their lights, to be tolerant; people did try to be fair. There was much talk—and even some practice—of due process, consultation, ready attempts to talk seriously about rights. All of this, to be sure, was frequently embittered by the accusations cast from either side but on the whole, in many respects, the university was almost a kind of paradigm of how a liberal society ought to respond in times of trouble.

The difficulty was it was not enough. The difficulty was that the procedural processes which did exist in some instances, did not in others, but were recognized to be a problem even where they did not exist, the procedures which were established and which were utilized to some degree, did not seem to be capable of coping with the depths of the problems being exposed; depth of problems which cut to the core of what it meant to have a university in a dynamic,

aggressive kind of society in which knowledge was truly the key to power and to affluence and to all of the other good things of life, questions which cut to the core of what it meant to be a student, to be a member of a university community, to take some responsible part in the society in which one was committing a large percentage of one's life. As the months wore on, one really began to have very fundamental doubts as to whether the kind of vision embodied in an arrangement such as the University of California—and I don't think in many respects it is special in this matter but is characteristic of large-scale institutions—whether it is not in a certain sense an institution which, by a very curious course of events, has come to be ungovernable in many respects. It is doing too much. It has too many people in it. There are too many incompatible services and functions, all of them probably respectable and worthy of being pursued. The real question is of their being housed within a single institution called a university.

Finally, the question of the students is an equally complicated question which I think in many respects the crisis there too sheds interesting and again not wholly reassuring light. The students, to some of us at least, had the important function of mirroring some of our own disappointments, hesitations, and doubts about the contemporary university. They pointed to things in the classroom; they pointed to things in terms of faculty behavior; they pointed to things in terms of the ostensible purpose of the university which we found legitimate. Criticisms may not have agreed with the diagnoses in terms of the language that was used or the rhetoric that was employed, but it was serious criticism and it deserved serious hearing. In many respects, I think, it found its mark. But there were other kinds of problems which the students raised concerning their own relationship, both to the academic community and to the larger community as a whole. I simply want to draw attention to only one of these.

The contemporary student, as I suspect many of you know better than I, is a type of person very, very deeply preoccupied with himself. This has very many problems from the points of view of deans of men and deans of women, and I am not either competent or particularly desirous of commenting on these matters. One thing does concern me in terms of the personal concern of students, and that is the very personal view they hold towards the nature of teaching and towards the nature of knowledge. Knowledge, I suppose to many of us of an older generation, represented a certain amount of detachment, a certain amount of objectivity, or at least these were the conditions for the pursuit of knowledge. They meant, in short, a certain denial of self. Now, to put it in a nutshell, the pursuit of knowledge traditionally has meant to the academic the pursuit of something which calls upon one to get outside oneself to limit and perhaps even repress aspects of the self which interfere with or even in some sense perhaps pervert the pursuit of knowledge. But the contemporary student has a very different demand. To his mind, I think—

and I recognize the pitfalls of generalization—to his mind the only kind of knowledge which is significant in many respects is knowledge which is authentic in a personal sense. Now I do not have a great deal of time to pursue this kind of problem. Perhaps it will be pursued in discussion. But it again, like so many things that happened this year, calls into question a whole series of fundamental assumptions and questions of contradiction which I think we have perhaps all too easily, maybe even smugly, carried around for too long a time.

LUNSFORD: Are there questions to Professor Wolin? If not, we will go on to our final formal statement. Martin, will you carry on?

MALIA: Mr. Weissman began by expressing a suspicion that there might be some significance in the fact that he occupied the extreme left end of the table. I feel the same way about my position at the extreme right end. I would say that it is completely justified because in the panel speakers here I would no doubt be farthest from the FSM and what interested it last fall and the most equivocal in my attitude towards it. However, I should add, if the full spectrum of opinion that exists at the university were represented here, we would need a much longer table and in that case I would be rather towards the middle, if not a little bit left center of the table.

Essentially the kind of faculty member that I feel closest to (I would not say that I could speak for any of them here today) would take a much more relativistic attitude towards the principles involved in the controversy of last fall and the results that came from it. Essentially from where I sit the question of the extent of student political rights on campus is a function of the nature of society and the level of student demands at any given historical moment. Therefore I cannot say that I personally, and I suspect that this is true for a very large segment of the faculty, was unduly scandalized by the situation that existed before September of last year in which students did not in fact on the Berkeley campus have full constitutional rights of speech and advocacy. I should go on to say that I also feel, in the same relativistic spirit, that when the level of student demand reaches a certain point, then the only practical way to proceed is to re-adjust the situation to take account of the people one is living and working with. As a result of these attitudes I, like quite a number of faculty members in the fall, did not follow the free speech controversy very closely, did not become particularly involved in the issues being debated until the university itself more or less came apart at the seams in the month of December. Until then I think it is fair to say that what impressed me most about the whole thing was what I felt to be the rather abstract character of the goals being pursued.

As I understood it, the line of reasoning followed was essentially this: A university as an institution devoted to the life of the mind and the ideal should have perhaps higher standards of freedom than the

rest of society. The fact that the University of California at Berkeley restricted the political freedoms of some of its members, namely, the students, was therefore a violation of the integrity that should exist in a university. No one therefore could rest until the integrity of the university was restored by gaining full political freedom for the student body. I saw the point of all this. However, the practical political implications students have in this kind of freedom on campus or not having it were relatively slight. I don't think it made a vast amount of difference in their effectiveness in participating in the civil rights movement, for instance, and for this reason I felt the whole thing to be somewhat abstract. Or another way of putting it, it was an all-out and excessively idealistic pursuit of an absolute and total purity. And I think this feeling was shared by a fair number of the faculty.

Another aspect of the movement that struck me at the time was that, in the pursuit of this absolute purity, the primacy of tactics came to be increasingly prominent in the whole movement leading up to the month of December when the whole place came to a grinding halt. This was becoming an extremely disturbing feature. It was only after matters had reached this pass that those such as myself who had remained relatively on the sidelines in the fall began to become somewhat more active because they were concerned; concerned with certain possible negative consequences of the Free Speech Movement and its rather stunning victory in the month of December.

Now if I emphasize for the rest of my remarks only these negative aspects that struck me and others like me at the time, I don't want you to think that I felt these were the only aspects of the movement and the results that it brought about. If I had more time and if the composition of the panel was somewhat different, I would spend considerably more time in listing what I think are a number of benefits to the university as a whole that I think it derived from the experiences of last fall. Given the situation as it is here, however, I wish to concentrate rather onesidedly on those elements in the movement that to my mind gave, or perhaps in some cases still give, cause for apprehension.

First of all, there was the question of tactics themselves. I think that one can view what happened at Berkeley last fall in the sense of revolution in microcosm within a given community or sub-society of our society. On the whole, I think that most people who occupy the position I do would feel that what occurred was inevitable in a certain sense, that the adjustment which was finally made was one that had to be made and that therefore up to a certain point the use of revolutionary, if you want, disruptive coercive tactics was justified. However, tactics of a coercive sort which may be justified or are legitimate, let us say, as a transition cannot be so as a permanent state of affairs or as a way of life. Therefore the problem after December was to consolidate the situation that existed after the transition on the basis of a new legality, if you want, or new norms

generally accepted by most members of the community, and it was not until sometime late in the spring, after a number of hassles over obscenity, Spider Magazine and what not, that at last the new norms that had been tentatively set up seemed to be receiving sufficient respect from most members of the community to be workable. So this problem of moving out of a revolutionary transition into a new normalcy, if you want, was one that preoccupied a number of people considerably during the spring term.

Another negative aspect of the movement that struck a number of individuals who occupy roughly the kind of position that I do was the extremely primitive concept of the nature of intellectual life and the purposes of the university which many of the students involved in the FSM seemed to have and which continued to exert pressure on the whole institution throughout the spring term. This concept was roughly one that has already been alluded to a number of times, namely, that the knowledge sought after by the academe, in order to be full and real, must have some useful bearing on the problems of

society. Corollary to this amelioristic view of the university's function, that the university must contribute to the uplifting of society, was the view that the university should be essentially oriented towards meeting the human and educational needs of that segment of the community that felt these concerns most intensely, namely, the undergraduates. Well, this was something of concern to a good part of the faculty who had absolutely nothing against the improvement of undergraduate education but also wanted to insist rather firmly that the university was in addition, perhaps primarily, a research faculty and a training school for graduate students and that these activities should not be lost sight of in the course of making this transition. Obviously in the long run the rather primitive notion that the university must be made to serve directly and immediately the social concerns of society stands no chance of triumphing. However, in the short run it can generate considerable pressure on the university of a sort which I unfortunately feel would be a detrimental one and in some senses an obscurantist one.

"Berkeley Case" Discussion

QUESTION: You say that students and faculty ought to decide their own rules. How do we square this with the society's right to set these rules and watch over them?

WEISSMAN: They certainly have the legal right at present. The question really is whether I would contest that right in some political fashion. I would, to this extent: when we talk about society coming together to build a university we are not talking, for instance, about the people that I work with in West Oakland, the poor people in public housing; they are totally unrepresented. When a university is set up it mostly represents the "leading elements" in the state.

This can be very dangerous. The university is the major educational institution in society, but under domination by the large land owners or the space industry it won't produce people who will challenge the very structure of society. I see at least part of a university, not all, as having a very destructive function—that of the Socratic gadfly. Now the dean of men in each of the various universities will have different notions of what constitutes maturity, what virtues are necessary, what kind of citizen we want to produce. But these definitions will represent the norms of the people who are most influential in that state. I think there has to be a balance to that. And one of the best ways to make that balance is for society to set up autonomous universities, which will not only supply the scientists, the engineers, and so on, but will also supply people who constantly question the assumptions under which society operates.

QUESTION: In saying that the university should not regulate the content of your speech, are you

saying that you have, for example, a right to libel as against the university?

KOLODNEY: The library does not regulate the content of my speech; the supermarket doesn't. It isn't the university's job to regulate the content of my speech. It may be someone's job; that is a different question. I simply say that it is not the university's job.

You seem to be assuming that anything you do that is wrong by any standard should be wrong under the standards of the university. But I don't think that the jurisdiction of the university is that pervasive. The absence of university discipline for libel isn't such an obtrusive absence. It doesn't mean the university is condoning libel any more than it condones any of my actions that simply are not relevant to it. In other words, I don't have a right to libel with respect to the university, but the university doesn't have a right to regulate the content of my speech, either.

QUESTION: Mr. Weissman, if the university were granted the autonomy that you wish for it, so that it could become a gadfly of society, what would be the concept of law within that autonomous society?

WEISSMAN: To begin with, I don't think that the university is going to be granted that autonomy. I think it is going to have to be stolen.

QUESTION: But assuming it were.

WEISSMAN: Right. Well, in the process of stealing authority, an organization gets built up to fight. While you are fighting the battle for rights, you are building up a democratic institution to decide at what points you will fight. I see a structure including students, faculty, and administrators—

people who live on the campus and have a political community, rather than being part of a corporate bureaucracy. There would be voting—one man, one vote.

QUESTION: But how is law established in that autonomous society?

WEISSMAN: The people would come together as they did in the founding of any town and decide that there would be certain rules. They would set up the rules themselves. They would be limited by the rules of civil society. For example, they could have a rule against drunkenness, but they could not make a rule saying that drunkenness is good and everyone has to get drunk on Friday. The sheriff would come. But the rules would be those of an autonomous community, enforced by administrators who were agents of that community rather than agents of the state.

QUESTION: But you have a new group of students every four years, and a changing group all of the time. Would the law made in 1965 hold in 1967?

WEISSMAN: First, I think the faculty should be a part of the process, so that there is continuity. Secondly, I am a great advocate of Jefferson's notion that each generation makes its own laws. Finally, I think there are far too many rules around now; so you wouldn't need that many.

QUESTION: I recognize that there must be some intellectual discomfort and non-conformity on university campuses if they are to contribute to growth and progress. We have been addressing ourselves to rights and freedoms. But I am a little concerned about the rights of the majority of students on our campuses, whose main desire is calmly and quietly to acquire an education and to seek truth in the directions of their own choosing—and at their own pace. Are not their rights being infringed when the campus atmosphere is one of constant turmoil? Should they be forced to cross picket lines to enter classrooms and libraries, and be jeered at or urged to take positive positions on controversial issues when they feel that they are not yet ready to take such positions?

KOLODNEY: You seem to be talking not about our rights but our methods of gaining those rights. In part this turns on whether you consider the rights that we ask for are ours; if you do, I think you have to chastise the university administration for disrupting the university, because the disruptions could have been ended on approximately 30 minutes' notice simply by the acceptance of what we then would have agreed was a just solution. On the other hand, without a just solution by agreement of the administration, we simply aren't in a normal situation.

Once you had a just solution, you might say the mere enjoyment of our rights places in jeopardy the educational function in a university. We can make some nice general statements about that: for ex-

ample, that you can't have a full educational function in a university unless these rights also exist. But more practically, I think the burden of proof is on the person who wants to restrict a freedom for prudential reasons. He must not be merely speculating. Let the university administration experiment with the exercise of those rights, and then show by experience whether they disrupt the classrooms and the psychological ease of the students who aren't interested in politics.

WOLIN: I'd like to say a few words here, though I have no easy answer to the question. I don't think any faculty member would say a university that is in constant turmoil is a university in which the significant and important things, the things that matter most in a university, could ever get done. But I think the very abstract formulation of the gentleman's question is difficult to translate into operations. For example, we might try to set up a body of rules which would permit the student interested in quietly obtaining an education to obtain it without a noisy or obstreperous minority's interfering. But I think that the dangers in that for stifling that atmosphere of a university might be very great indeed.

I am struck also by still another consideration. If a university is truly an educational institution, its education means more than simply knowledge acquired through books, lectures, and research. It means also, in some sense, personal growth and a striving towards maturity. And I'm not so sure that it's wholly undesirable for any individual at some time in his career to be compelled to make a choice. Maybe the quiet student would learn something if he were compelled to pass a picket line. Maybe he would learn something if the issues posed by a controversy were genuinely fundamental to the nature of his life, the life of the university, or the life of the society. If he were compelled to think about such issues, not as research paper themes but as themes which involve his choice as a genuine person, I'm not so sure his growth would be inhibited by such an encounter.

Let me repeat emphatically: I am not arguing that the university ought to be a hotbed of sedition and agitation. But I also cannot believe that the full meaning of an education is served by a quiet and unobtrusive passage through four years of even the best institution.

WEISSMAN: This morning Dean Williamson talked about ongoing seminars on freedom. At Berkeley we might have had one kind of a seminar by letting university staff members work with us, and by discussing how we could have got the best compromise within the channels. We would have heard how the legislature might cut the university's funds, and how the investigating committees would breathe down our necks, and so on. We heard all of these things. And this is one notion of freedom: that you can try to change things here if you don't like them, but if they don't change you can go somewhere else.

But we engaged in a different kind of education. We brought a bunch of people together and we went through the channels. And they began to learn that you should not use democratic rhetoric to describe the university. They learned very quickly by reading President Kerr, by going to negotiating sessions, that the university was a corporation. And I think that students come to the university with a very different notion; they don't think that they are answering to the corporate bureaucracy until four years later. But through this process they discovered it very quickly this year.

The second thing they learned, which I think also is part of an education in democracy, is the primacy of freedom of speech. All of the students whom you are talking about, sir, have the right to hear notions other than the conventional wisdom. And I think that we proved the importance of speech, because the FSM used free speech as a means for a minority to become a majority. I think the theory of free speech, or one of the important theories, is that it is a self-correcting mechanism for the majority.

Now I think that many of the ideas that America has are badly outmoded. If you talk to people in the undeveloped countries, or even in Western Europe, you find that we have some ideas here that at least have to be defended more strongly than they are, because they go against ideas that people all over the world have. And if the society that sets up the university has a real need to have most of its assumptions challenged, free speech is especially important. The problem is that we have been too successful, and when institutions are too successful they very often overlook some of their own inadequacies. I would hate for the United States to go through the kind of crisis that Berkeley went through. I'd rather find the contradictions before that happens, and I think that the university is a place where that can be done.

QUESTION: My only point was that the majority has some rights along with the minority.

WEISSMAN: Returning very quickly to Professor Malia's analogy of a revolution: most revolutions begin with a small group of people thinking that they have something that a majority, or an effective majority, will accept. The American Revolution was started by a group of conspirators. We were a group of conspirators, who took on ourselves the moral responsibility of thinking that we could get not just a majority of the students but a majority of the faculty on our side. It's a heavy moral responsibility.

QUESTION: The conspirators behind the American Revolution very quickly found that they had the responsibility to carry on some kind of government. I still don't see where you move from being a conspirator to trying to see a law set up which will allow the society, or this university, to move on. I get only the sense from you that you must constantly move

along the conspiratorial path, leaving it to someone else—I don't know who—to create the kind of normal restraints that we operate under in a small community or a larger society.

WEISSMAN: Many of us in the FSM, which started as a small group, took it as a part of our responsibility to develop mechanisms by which more and more of the students could affect the decisions made by the FSM. For a time the FSM was running a certain aspect of the campus. But its decisions were being made, not by 12 of us on the Steering Committee, but at much larger meetings. We were having meetings of four or five hundred graduate students come out to cast the seven votes the graduates had on the FSM's Executive Committee. So we were affecting the FSM's government.

However, I do think that at the present time the situation I would want in the university is conflict. I would want the students to say that they have interests different from those of the people who are programming them through the university, and that they determine their own definition of maturity and responsibility. Hopefully they would determine that they should be responsible to the groups that make decisions if they are part of those groups, and would fight against groups which try to make decisions for them. I would hope for that. But I believe that the present situation calls for an education in the kind of freedom that I think is important. And I think for that there should be conflict.

The conflict doesn't have to be open. I would hope not; it's exhausting to sit in. A lot of us would rather have been disruptive by continuing our studies, by being intellectually disruptive. But I think the student body has to consider itself a union and not a part of the consensus. Then it should go to the bargaining table, not with leaders selected by the administration, but with people that the student body selects. I think it also has to define its own charter of government, not merely accept one that is based on the charter given by the administration.

QUESTION: Would you also include the educational process itself in the area of student determination?

WEISSMAN: I purposely excluded that when I began my remarks. I have some very serious questions about that.

I think the classroom atmosphere is too authoritarian. We accept the authority of the professor because he's a professor, not because of our own judgments of his qualities as a man or his peer group's judgment of him as a scholar. The balance between faculty control of the classroom and the student's right not to be a part of that classroom deserves a great deal more questioning than it's getting.

I'd suggest that one place to look for possible experience that's relevant is the experiments going on

in Mississippi with freedom schools. A lot of people who are leaving your universities and going south are working in the freedom schools. A freedom school takes a group of people who have been too long accepting the fact that they're not qualified to lead their own lives—people who believe that they are second-class citizens—and allows them to set the environment in which education takes place. The professor tries to move with them. In a sense, you teach Negro history in such a school by starting in Mississippi and working back to Africa, rather than by starting with a discussion of Africa and going the other way. And you use the experiences of the people themselves. I won't say the university should be this way, but I think that all of us should look at these experiments and ask the question that you asked with a little bit more information behind us.

MALIA: I want to go back to the earlier question that was asked. There obviously is a conflict between the pursuit of one kind of right and the guarantee of another kind of right. But this is clearly not going to be worked out by the establishment of some sort of code. In practical terms, a situation has to be devised whereby the minority of students who are interested in activist politics can do this without restraint on the campus, and the majority of students who are simply interested in going to college and getting an education for whatever purpose, can do that simultaneously on the campus. I think this is the way matters will work out.

Now questions have been raised about re-structuring the internal constitution of the university, so as to give, let us say, a "troika" of administration, faculty, and students the management of affairs—or to give students some part in the organization of the educational process. At Berkeley last fall the abstract issue of free speech was given concreteness and a social and political dynamism on the campus because of its very close association with civil rights. Once the free speech issue had been resolved in a fashion, and this had occurred by December, it made possible the kinds of civil rights activity that had originally given the movement its impetus. And I think a great deal of steam went out of some of the other issues that had become associated with this.

One of the main issues that had been associated with it was that of educational reform. This is a very new issue for students to take up, in the history of American radicalism. Usually they're concerned with political matters proper. One of the peculiarities of the Berkeley situation last fall was the student attack on the system, the educational factory—the cry for reform of this system, for humanization and democratization. Mr. Weissman's suggestion of imitating the freedom schools in some measure is one of the more extreme or thoroughgoing suggestions that have been made for reforming the university. But I don't think that this issue of educational reform can generate anything like the steam that free speech associated with civil rights did. It

will be a persistent issue over a number of years. But it will be met largely by slow, cumbersome faculty adjustment over a period of time, because as a practical matter the reform of an educational curriculum is a much more complex affair than the kinds of issues that were involved last fall. Essentially, it has to be carried out by professional educators—responding, obviously, to the people with whom they are working in educational processes.

QUESTION: The application of the Jeffersonian principle to a university sounds fine, but the student may back out and leave if he discovers there's something wrong. In fact, he does leave after four years. The faculty member may also leave. But the administration that must administer the laws, and the Board of Regents, must remain. So how practical is the application of Jeffersonian principles?

LUNSFORD: Along the same line, Dean Williamson this morning referred to administrators' responsibility to the institution, saying: "After all, we work here." I gather that the FSM's rhetoric opposed that by saying: "We *live* here, for good parts of our lives." The argument may reduce to one about the significance of four or seven years in a life. But I agree that precisely this is a basic issue.

KOLODNEY: I think the question reduces to what segments of the university community are the most relevant. If you look at the university as an entity, and ask what the fundamental reality of the university is, one point of view seems almost to take the charter as the fundamental reality. That was the dominant image of this morning's discussion. And the embodiment of the charter, or its representative on this earth, is the administration—from the Board of Regents down. The less essential attributes of the university, then, are the students and the faculty; they come and go, but the essence of the university is the administration and the charter.

Quite obviously, we take the reverse position—that the fundamental reality of the university is education. And the manifestation of education, the immanence of education in the university, is the teacher and the student. Quite naturally the teacher and the student have to make sure that they don't have two classes running in the same classroom and that the buildings are maintained, and so on. Therefore, the subsidiary function of administration comes in, and the teacher and the student have administrators as their agents.

But even with such a conception one might still argue on practical and prudential grounds that you can't run a real institution that way; you can't structure it politically along the lines that you conceive it ideally. And if you want to structure it in any viable way the administration has to be the core of authority.

I think that a lot more imagination and a lot more experimentation and sincere endeavor could go into testing that thesis than has gone in so far. I would

suggest further that we must be sure that we don't have other motives than sheer practicality—some of the other motives that might make a society as a whole want a university run by a Board of Regents rather than by an academic senate. If these motives didn't come in, and we sincerely experimented with making our ideal conception of the university become reflected in its structure, I think we could go a long way towards realizing that structure.

LUNSFORD: I'd like to ask a related question of the panel. One of the most disturbing things about the year's events at Berkeley, as a number of people have indicated in different ways, was the fixity with which all of us (I include myself) found ourselves playing out social roles which we somehow simply could not escape. I have wondered whether there was not, underneath the FSM protests, an assertion that social roles are dominant in the determination of behavior—that to know how someone will act you need only look at his position in society, and the motives and behavior will flow from this. You don't expect him, in other words, to be able to use a free will, or to have a lovely free-floating reason or free communication with others. The FSM seemed to assert that people act on the basis of their interests, and that those are determined primarily by their positions in a fixed institutional structure. Would someone comment on that?

KOLODNEY: I'd like to get away from roles in the abstract and refer again to Dean Williamson's talk this morning. On the one hand, we heard about the relation between the administration and the students. Ideally, this was to be a rational dialogue. Whether it was to be a dialogue among equals was a little vague, but it was to be rational. On the other hand, there was mention of the relation between the administration and the other forces with which it has to contend. And there the image of vectors, and the resolution of vectors, was introduced. Now the first thing about this second set of relations is that they most certainly are not rational dialogues. When William Knowland calls up a high administrative officer in the university and makes his desires known, it isn't that he presents blindingly persuasive arguments; that is not what gives his vector its tremendous length. And as long as that is the reality of these relations, it becomes practically incumbent on the students to make sure that their vectors also have a sizeable impact on the ultimate "resolution" of the forces.

In this way we can forget about unconscious role-playing. We can't look at the administrator as a free, rational agent, because he admittedly isn't. He admittedly has motivations that he can't tell us about, or that he can tell only a select few about. So as long as that situation persists—and possibly beyond—it is self-deception and a deception of others to characterize the relations between administration and student as a rational, disinterested dialogue. The students and the administration do have different interests. I would say that the administration has

irrelevant interests, and these simply have to be reckoned with. Possibly, once you have balanced off the vectors of power, you may have the kind of a situation where you can sit down and talk without reference to roles.

WEISSMAN: I accept the notion that you can predict large numbers of actions in the university community by the roles which people find themselves in. The reason that we were able to prepare for a struggle and to tell people what was going to happen next was that we had this analysis.

But by setting up an ideal of the university, a Utopia, I am trying to present a justification not primarily for administrators but for students, and maybe some faculty people—and maybe also for some administrators who might want to resign.

I'm very sincere about that. We were willing to resign, to stop our Ph.D. programs. Maybe that's not too much to ask of other people, when your principles are involved. So we are setting up a rationale by which these groups can feel justified in trying to take power away, not from you particularly, but from the people that you administer power for.

The question is: will the taxpayers stand for this? Well, the production and distribution of knowledge, we are told, is the fourth largest industry in the U. S. Professors and administrators and good students are extremely important for the services they can perform for the people who can pay for them. I think that if students and faculty said, "This is the way we will work or we will not work," you would find that people would begin to re-evaluate how much they need the university, and they would continue to pay for it.

I think California, for example, could have a much more liberalized institution—less restrictive, far fewer rules, more innovative—and still turn out very fine engineers, very fine teachers, very fine managers. And I think society would be willing to pay for it.

LUNSFORD: Would you allow free elections in the university to decide whether it should become a public utility or a social critic, and so on?

WEISSMAN: My only feeling is that there should be freedom for students and professors who want to teach in a free manner, and want the right to speak and to listen, and who perhaps don't want to give grades. I think that much of what goes on in the university is not to give people knowledge. It is to socialize them so they'll fit into the large bureaucracies. It's trying to get people who know enough about culture and so on that they'll fit in. And what we're really asking is room enough in the university for us who want to be non-conformists. I don't really think there is sufficient room as yet.

QUESTION: Professor Malia, would you comment further on the tactics of the FSM?

MALIA: The tactics used were, of course, sit-ins, strikes, and so on. These are, after all, coercive

tactics. They are non-violent; it's not direct physical coercion. Nonetheless, it is coercion. And I would say, generalizing from my experience as a historian, that no organized community or society can function for any extended period if coercive tactics become a regular thing. This is one of the rough or crude sociological laws.

Now, to be sure, there are all sorts of semi-coercive tactics in certain societies and communities that eventually become legal, and therefore ritualized, such as the industrial strike. Well, the legalization and ritualization of these tactics makes them something predictable and therefore within a context of established norms. I would accept a certain legitimacy for coercive or disruptive tactics in periods of extraordinary transition. And, historically speaking, this is the way many radical transitions come about in modern societies.

However, in each case these tactics—while they do effect the ends they are designed to achieve—are used only at a certain price. That price is a more or less painful and protracted period of getting back to some kind of established and predictable norms, which organized societies and communities must have to operate over any extended period.

This is what I had in mind when I said I was disturbed by the use of these tactics in the university. Moreover, I think that they are particularly inappropriate in a university. After all, even after certain kinds of coercive tactics get generalized and accepted in society at large, it doesn't mean that they are automatically applicable to every kind of professional activity. For instance, take the right to strike, which at first was illegal in industry, and which got to be legal only because it broke the law and the law was changed. This process is now occurring with respect to sit-ins and civil disobedience of various sorts—when used in the pursuit of certain very specific political and social ends. However, the industrial strike, even though technically it may be legal for all professional activities, has never come to be regarded as fully legitimate by a certain number of professions. One of these, I think, is the teaching profession—or, at least, the teaching profession at the university level. Others would be physicians, clergymen, and so on. Although on occasion Belgian doctors may strike, this is somehow regarded as having a much lesser degree of legitimacy than when steel workers do it, because of the nature of the professional activities involved. Therefore, I don't think one can argue the sit-in is necessarily transferrable wholesale and on a permanent basis into the university. The very peculiar character of the university makes this a significantly more dangerous thing in that kind of a community than in the community at large.

WOLIN: I suppose my reaction to the tactics I observed was different from that of most people. Very deeply involved as I am with the fate and fortune of an academic institution, my response to the existence of such tactics is really not so much

a concern about their legality or illegality. My real concern is the symptomatic quality of them. That is, an institution where this seems to be a genuine problem, where the institution's life and functions are seriously threatened by periodic or threatened outbreaks of this sort, is an institution in trouble. And an institution in trouble, I assume, has some serious things wrong about it, or at least serious misconceptions about what is wrong with it.

So I frankly can't get terribly agitated about whether strikes or sit-ins should be allowed on the campus. I get terribly concerned about what could possibly have happened to an educational institution of acknowledged quality to ever lead it to a situation in which its main components are glaring at each other over what seems at least a metaphysical barricade. The question is how an institution supposedly dedicated to the good of the mind, to rational discourse, and to human communication should have allowed itself to be hemmed into such a corner—a corner where one party threatens to bring down the punitive arm of the state on an important element in that same community, and where the threatened element threatens to bring the whole machine to a grinding halt. Those seem to me the fundamental questions, so that I can't be very concerned about the legality or desirability of this or that tactic. I wish the problem were that easy.

KOLODNEY: I just want to point out that these tactics had a magnificently creative effect on the faculty. Many of them hadn't really been following the issues closely, but on December 8 they came out with a wonderfully creative commitment on the issues. It took four months and it took these tactics to do that. It was unfortunate that it did, but it started the first rational dialogue on the issues among the faculty.

Beyond that I would say that the best answer for the governance of the university would be an institutionalized method such as the democratic one we've been suggesting. But in lieu of that, we have to take pot-luck in finding ways to activate the university in creative channels.

LUNSFORD: I think it would be only fair to note that "creative" is a positively loaded word. There are other people on the campus who think that the December 8 resolutions were a result of "fear and intimidation."

QUESTION: Professor Wolin, as a fellow laborer in the vineyard of social science, I am wondering how you relate the criterion of personal interest to the criterion of objectivity.

WOLIN: I think there is a great deal of trouble in that. I'm no longer so naive as to believe that one can easily separate the pursuit of knowledge from problems of the characteristics which ought to be encouraged in apprenticing others to pursue knowledge, and in practicing it yourself. On the other

hand, I think the problem is not so simple as some students at times seem to suggest. An academic institution can very easily become a cacophony of confessionals, in which each of us testifies what is important in his personal experience.

There are many students now who—for legitimate or illegitimate reasons—have become quite out of sorts with what used to be thought important virtues. Discipline, self-denial, objectivity, detachment, even neutrality used to be talked about with hushed tones when I was a young student. These are not deemed to be the kinds of things that attract students to the pursuit of knowledge today. Different questions are being asked by the present generation. In most fields of inquiry, one is concerned with the adequacy of certain methods of inquiry and research as opposed to other methods. But the first question apt to strike a contemporary student is not so much which method is preferable, as what it means to me to commit myself to a highly demanding, exacting form of inquiry. And this is what it means to me as a person, rather than as a political scientist, sociologist, or what-have-you, with a possible contribution to make in a particular field.

I don't claim to have resolved this question. I do think that I have recognized a problem. In terms of my classroom experience, the only way I can see to confront the problem honestly and genuinely is to see if I can communicate to students the personal satisfactions and fulfillments that come from dedicated commitment to a body of knowledge, with all its exacting demands. Perhaps personal development or personal response and the demands of subject matter are not irremediably committed to oppose one another.

QUESTION: What do you think has produced the present students' lack of self-discipline?

WOLIN: I don't know what one would recognize as evidence here. My evidence comes primarily from my contacts with students. But I think one can see evidence in other things, particularly a sort of intellectual idols that students admire. Generally they are in areas of literature, and don't fit so deeply into an academic classification. Students have a fondness not simply for the protestors but for romantic types of expression, for expressions that seem more concerned with the self. They will pick these from religion, from philosophy, from literature, and so on. But it is not the ideal of the selfless, disciplined researcher that they choose, either on the scientific model or on the Platonic model, in which the philosopher undergoes a severe personal purge in order to be permitted to participate in the quest for the ideal. Now, whether that is evidence I leave up to you.

WEISSMAN: These are the kinds of questions that show the creative or positive aspect of the disruption that took place at Berkeley. I don't think that many of us would suggest we are going to answer such

questions by sitting in your offices. But I think that we really do have to think a lot harder about the relationship of the objective, of knowledge-where-it-is, and the process of internalization. I would hate to see people in my own field, which is Latin American history, look at the FSM and discuss everything that happens in a Latin American institution—or to see people look at everything in terms of their context at Berkeley, participating in the FSM.

But I think that students begin to feel they don't have a context of their own. This might be true of middle-class youth generally. The freedom-school approach I mentioned starts with the student where *he* is. It tries to get to the point where the student will apply self-discipline, rather than trying to give him discipline because he is going to be graded for it, or because a professor will smile. You see, I think that what happens in a university today is not self-discipline but externally imposed discipline.

The real question is why students don't feel that they own their own life. It may also be why professors, or administrators working in large bureaucracies, don't. Why is it that there has to be such a great affirmation of the personal? I think part of the reason is the definition of freedom we are beginning to develop, which we heard developed this morning. Freedom is seen as the right to adjust to a context, or to alternatives posed by other people. For example, someone this morning said: "I wouldn't expel people unless I was told to." Well, that bothers me somehow. Maybe it's because in the civil rights movement the emphasis is on personal commitment so much. But when the Dean of Men at Berkeley came out and tried to upset a table where Spider Magazine was being sold, right in the middle of a rally which 3,000 people were attending, I saw the university exploding. And we didn't want that to happen. This was in March. But he told me: "I don't want to do this, but I'm paid to do this." I got very scared.

I think maybe what we have to ask is whether we shouldn't re-examine the present arrangement of these large bureaucracies, where nobody knows who is setting the context in which you have to make your decision. And while I don't have the answers, I think that we have to look into ways that people cannot only choose between alternatives but have the right to set those alternatives as well.

QUESTION: Does the FSM now embrace a majority of the students and/or faculty, as was implied earlier?

WEISSMAN: The FSM was put to sleep because most of us who were involved in it didn't want to become either professional student politicians or "assistant chancellors." So we accomplished the goal that we set, and we disbanded. There's a group on the campus called the Free Student Union. It is not engaged in disruptive activities, but is trying to build up a membership. I believe they now have about 3,000 people.

QUESTION: Let's suppose we had this ideal community of yours and the students overwhelmingly voted to restrict some of this free speech. After discussing all this, they came out against some of the ideals we are talking about here. You have made your own rules, and I think beforehand you agreed whatever this group votes is the way we'll operate. What would you do? Would you break your own rules in an attempt to change them, or would you follow the prescribed pattern you set up?

WEISSMAN: I think there are certain rights that are inalienable; that is a value judgment that I make. One of them is the right of speech. It's extremely important to me and, I think, to groups in general. On the other hand, I would feel a much stronger responsibility to stay within a group in which I had a say in the decisions than a group which imposed decisions from above. The moral decision to step outside channels in the situation you posit would be a much greater moral burden.

QUESTION: What criteria would you use for who gets into your self-determining group?

WEISSMAN: Maybe, as was suggested earlier, in a university as large as the University of California you can't have community. But after people are admitted because of certain academic qualifications, there should be a process for their finding others with whom they share some basic principle, around which there could be organization. I think it should be people who share common assumptions. I think that presently you already have such people in your activist groups. But at present those groups don't really have the right on campus to act as a community.

I am not here to say that I have all the answers. But I really think we might begin to look at a place of 27,500 and ask how we can help people to create their own communities within the campus. I think computers will be very helpful in doing that.

QUESTION: If the leaders of the FSM had the opportunity to start all over again with your objectives and procedures, are there objectives and procedures which you might offer?

WEISSMAN: There are two, in my case. I think we should have spent more time organizing a more democratic group of undergraduates, so that more people could participate in making decisions. If you posit that one of the great lacks in the university is that people don't have the right to make their own decisions, then your movement has to give them the chance to do that. I think that, had we done that with the undergraduates as we did with the graduate students, there would be a stronger union on the campus at present. Second, I think I would have been in favor of stating from the beginning more specifically that we were challenging the right of the administration to make decisions, rather than

merely challenging one decision which they had made. I would be more radical, not less.

KOLODNEY: To make one point clear, I might say that the undergraduates were elected in the FSM at a very large meeting. The continuing structure of democratic responsibility was hard to maintain, but that is very incidental for the goals and objectives.

I think it is interesting that the events conditioned our goals and objectives. The initial issue was a very specific, clear-cut issue of civil liberties. But it raised all sorts of other issues, concerning educational reform, university governance, and so on. I am sure there is some kind of fallacy involved in saying it would be nice to go back to the beginning with all the experience we had at the end, and to condition our objectives in that way. But in any case, at this point I think our objectives have been sharpened and at the same time diversified.

QUESTION: What are the faculty members' conceptions of student participation in the decision-making process of the university?

WOLIN: I think one has to distinguish areas of the university in degrees of participation, and specify what things one is deciding. There are some areas, ostensibly, of professional judgment, and other areas where it is important to elicit as wide a response from as many people as possible. Some people believe that students have absolutely no business, much less competence, in determining anything resembling an academic curriculum, or the instructional calendar of a university, or anything of the sort. Others think students ought to be full-fledged members of the university, deciding on all sorts of academic questions. I cannot say I am sure that the truth lies in between; I only know that I am not much taken with either extreme. I think one has to talk about single areas and single functions and single problems in which students might be extraordinarily helpful. Presumably even an educational process can be improved.

I would not deny that there are dangers, however. The students who are most active in talking about things that I regard as important are a very small percentage of the university. If the hands of certain students were placed upon the living body of an academic curriculum or department, it could be a very disastrous business indeed. By indirection that situation existed some decades ago. But the question demands really serious and concerted consideration. I have a very open mind on the matter.

QUESTION: Someone asked what the FSM leaders would do if they had it to do over again. I would like to hear the faculty reactions.

MALIA: It is almost an impossible question to answer. I suppose that at the various concrete junctures I was confronted with in the course of the year, given what I am, I probably would do roughly

the same thing over again. My real wish is that I had been confronted with a better set of choices. I have good answers for situations of that sort but not for these situations that actually existed.

WOLIN: I don't suppose my reaction in this general form is very different from Professor Malia's. I suspect I would do what I did in the fall; I probably would do it a bit sooner. Most of the faculty members that I conspire with were never quite willing to believe that the administrative structure of the institution could be or was, in fact, so indecisive and so really confused. As it was, I believe that there was more confusion than malice, and that direction was desperately needed. The faculty itself should have taken a much more active role as a body than it did, and a more responsible role. I suspect that is primarily where I would revise.

But a thing one must always remember about the events last fall: they moved so quickly and so furiously. In deciding what one would do over, one gives to those events in retrospect a kind of leisurely pace which they did not at all have at that time. Things were often in the saddle, rather than men. And there is not much you can do about that even with hindsight.

QUESTION: Can the administrators who are here look forward to peaceful years ahead? Or are the student activists turning their attention to the substantive issues which Professor Wolin mentioned earlier?

KOLODNEY: I think, first of all, we can assume that university administrators across the country will not suddenly promulgate a student bill of rights. In other words, such an action would be symptomatic of what we see as a present impossibility in the university system. Whether issues such as university educational reform can generate the same kind of interest when they don't have the impetus of the civil rights movement behind them—well, there is a question of prediction and there is a question of desire. I hope that students are interested enough in their education, in the governance of their life, to make a larger commitment to it. Hopefully it would turn out not to be so much a disruptive process. Whether they do have such a commitment or not is one of the things that history will tell—although we can do our best to make or to influence history.

WEISSMAN: I think there is going to be more and more heat generated on the university, because I don't think the civil rights struggle is over. I think that you are going to find students becoming more and more involved in the whole question of the war as the casualty lists begin to mount during the next year.

Students will be engaged in action which violates the consensus that says "the ends of civil rights are good even though we disagree with the means."

People are going to be against the ends of student protest also, on some of your major campuses. I think that means university administrators are going to find more heat and perhaps see more light during the coming year. In the face of that, I think it is ridiculous to think that university administrators are going to really do anything more than be more beneficent.

The thing that scares me is what happens after the external protest, or in a period of lull in the civil rights or peace movement—which I think have really been generating the activity on campus. What happens if the beneficence of the administrators is sufficient not to remove the symptoms and the contradictions and the really serious problems in the university but to make it impossible to crystallize any symptomatic protest? What I am afraid of is that Dean Williamson, after peace movements and civil rights movements slow down, will be successful. Then we may be able to continue without seeing these contradictions in the university. That means the next blow-up will be even bigger. These are the things that bother me.

COMMENT: The thing that is disturbing me is that the students take it for granted that those who administer are for a *status quo* that is not beneficent or not good. They seem to argue that the forces, the vectors, at work on those who have administrative posts are evil in themselves. They imply that a society can be built within a university that can be free of these vectors. But the students themselves are aiming to become a vector.

COMMENT: I suspect that the administrators and the whole structure of society which has responsibility for the University of California and other universities will examine their rules and regulations and their laws from which things are run. The university regents and presidents will have to clarify their functions so that they know how to act clearly in all cases. They will learn to set up rules and regulations that will prevent and clarify situations such as this, rather than allow a segment of the university, students and faculty, begin to run the university.

I am a little bit surprised at this struggle for freedom here, inasmuch as there are those of us who walked about the University of California for years in what we thought was complete freedom of movement, happiness, and tranquillity—subject to certain authorities and regulations. Apparently this is a struggle against authority on the part of anyone to regulate. And I am surprised to hear you say that university regents really have no authority to regulate the operation of students or faculty on the campus. I'm pleased to hear you say that you were subject to the society in which you live, which means the people of the State of California. By legislative act and by the constitution the people have given the university certain rights and responsibilities, among which are the governance of the university, under regulations which have the effect of law so long as they are not inconsistent with the law.

WEISSMAN: Are you saying, sir, that the students at Berkeley should not set themselves up as an obstacle to the enforcement of rules which they disagree with? Or are you saying they cannot?

COMMENT: I am not saying either one. But I think that if the students set themselves up as an advisory body to the administration, to point out to the administration what is wrong with the university, it is good. I think the administration needs this kind of advice. But if you say the administration or regents have no right to regulate and govern the university—that the president has no right to carry out and execute the regulations of the Board of Regents—I think that is somewhat on the basis of anarchy. It will come to no good purpose other than frustration among the students, because society will not allow it.

KOLODNEY: Quite clearly we are not unaware that the regents have legal authority over various matters at the University of California. We are uncomfortably aware, as a matter of fact, of that authority. The further question of whether they ought to have that authority or whether the authority should be vested rather in the educational community itself—we have expressed our position on that and you presuppose a contrary position.

How will the state react? I gather you think that the state is going to respond by taking a hard line. It's going to re-assert the authority by putting down restrictive, tough regulations. That remains to be seen. There has been some trouble making the new regulations but they seem to be coming out slowly. Tough regulations would set things back, and we would have the same business over again. But what worries me more are increasing signs that slowly the State of California, the legislators and the regents, are showing that they do not want to pay the price of a great university in terms of the university's function as critic, as a sanctuary for dissent. They raise the tuition, they pass various laws, they cut back on various parts of the budget. All of these things are happening very slowly, somewhat unobtrusively. Professors leave, students leave or don't come. And I am afraid the result of the state government's re-asserting its control might be the slow ruination of the university, until it becomes a tame institution, a safe institution. I think it will be realized too late that this does not even serve, for example, the economic interests that are pressing in this direction.

LUNSFORD: I am going to take the liberty of closing the formal part of the discussion, without any homilies. I want to thank all of you personally for the courtesy that you have shown one another. I hope you agree that this panel has been productive.

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INTELLECT AND COMMITMENT: THE FACES OF DISCONTENT



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The realm of higher education has been under attack on many fronts in recent years. Not the least of these attacks have come from small and scattered minorities of students. To judge by evidence available from numerous investigations, the mass of students, at all levels of ability, seem to be satisfied and amazingly complacent. But when the "voice" of small clusters of men and women in a relatively limited number of colleges is sampled, one obtains a ready picture of a self-selected minority of persons who are highly critical of their educational experiences and often of other aspects of the American society.

It perhaps can be offered as a sad commentary on higher education, and on the basic interests and motivation of most faculty and students, that critical analyses have been made in relatively few schools. In spite of the bombardment from without, very few institutions have as yet been moved to diligent self-examination. The rare initiation of improved learning experiences to meet a felt need probably explains the surprise and amazement of many administrators and faculty at the student promotion of "free university" programs in the past two or three years. To judge by isolated developments on different campuses in the last seven or eight years, there seems to be some indication that, by one means or another, a minority of students will receive most of the credit for any new horizons in the hallowed halls of learning.

However it was initiated, it seems fair to say that colleges and universities find themselves in a transitional period. The earmarks of this transition can be fairly easily identified. Nevertheless, a major question seems to be whether the problems, the pressures, the turmoil, and the developments of the current decade can lead to necessary and significant changes, to more meaningful education for a diversity of youth, and to growing experiences which are no longer unrelated to the reality of existence and the major issues of our times.

Over the years since the 1930's the sources and expressions of serious discontent in the many educational camps seemed few and far between. Over most of these years an exceedingly small number of faculty, to the best of my knowledge, have ever been known even to question seriously, let alone examine, the results and effectiveness of their teaching. And over most of the past three decades, the involvement and protestation of students, with the exception of individual voices here and there, was almost equally rare. One might conclude that all parties in the enterprise were achieving their ends, that the diverse facets of higher education in our nation were operating as designed, that the centers of learning were propagating substantive knowledge while also helping to advance all of mankind toward the benefits of a greater society. I say one *might* draw such a conclusion, except that the facts and evidence available do not lend themselves to it. Nor is such a conclusion supported by an increasingly audible student voice, a voice of frustration, agitation, and discontent.

The Committed Minority

In attempting a historical review of serious student protests and movements in this century, especially those of social significance or serious consequence, one must skip the period between the 1930's and the late 1950's. This maneuver takes us from one very noteworthy period to another. Serious student activity in recent years seems in large part to be related to the sit-ins first conducted by Negro youth in the South. These affronts to persons whom they saw as maintaining an anachronistic establishment in one region of the nation precipitated, or certainly encouraged, isolated protestations by Caucasians and Negroes of college age in scattered settings.

The knowledgeable reader is aware of a considerable increase of intramural and extramural activity

on a growing number of campuses, different in nature from the spirited activity generally seen as typical of college youth. In fact, mild protests, questioning of traditional regulations, and even strong political advocacy have erupted since 1960 on a few campuses where they would have been least expected. The fact that some institutions have had a more continuous manifestation of student activity and involvement, often anti-administration or political in nature, is perhaps less well known. On a few campuses in the United States conflict and a degree of turmoil seem to be taken as a matter of course; and may even be defended as part of the "design" of an effective educational program.

The truth is that the colleges or universities that see greater student activity and more committed support of off-campus causes draw a student clientele that is measurably different from the student bodies in the great mass of institutions. In these relatively few schools a notable concentration of students of high ability and non-conservative values often tend to set a pattern for activism or some degree of protest. One is found in the colleges and universities that led other schools to join them in protesting the loyalty oaths required of students receiving NDEA loans, even to the point of refusing to administer the loans. Needless to say, a number of administrators and faculty members supported students in this opposition to a national program.

In recent years several of the research projects at the Center for the Study of Higher Education have provided opportunities to look through or over the ivy of a number of colleges and universities. Since these studies were conducted over the period of one student generation, it was possible to make fairly discerning appraisals of the activities of students and faculty. Some of the findings have particular relevance to the underlying topic of this paper since these institutions varied greatly in the aptitude, intellect and commitment of students. Great differences in the measured ability of students are generally understood and need no elaboration, and the student bodies we have studied, ranging over 80 percentile points in *average* SAT scores, exhibited wide differences. Perhaps of greater interest has been the great diversity also found in the functional intellect and commitments of students. These differences are partially related to the variations in measured ability but probably as much to the religious background and family philosophy of a majority of students on these campuses.

The differences among students in commitment or basic values need to be described as gradations on more than a single dimension. For one thing, it has been amazing to find the extreme variations on a characteristic which can be called intellectuality, that is, degree of interest in the learning-reasoning process as well as in the world of ideas. A second important characteristic in which differences are found is general perception, which may be seen in people's reaction to the environment and as ranging from an open- to a closed-mind approach to most experiences encountered. Another focus of commitment has been on

an inner-versus other-directed orientation, where the essential thing is the degree of concern for the lives and welfare of others.

Thus, among the schools in which the students were surveyed and studied in several Center projects, some had an over-abundance of intellectual, experience-seeking, and somewhat other-oriented youth. One college had a very large proportion of bright, semi-intellectual, but strongly other-oriented students. Some institutions had a great majority of average-ability, conforming, non-intellectual, and somewhat more egocentric students.

A number of pertinent observations and findings regarding the students surveyed in numerous settings are generally related to a recent interest in the major characteristics of students in the Free Speech Movement. However, discussion of findings will be limited here to the leaders and leadership groups who participated in protest movements on three campuses. In the first case, student activities were directed toward or against the administration. In the other two colleges, movements developed as opposition to existing social problems or issues in the larger community. The first of these examples was an outgrowth of change in administrative policy which students saw as inimical to their best educational interests. The second consisted of a long campaign on a segregation issue where the rights of Negroes were presumably being curtailed. In the third instance a major conference was organized to examine and protest the nation's peace policy.

There appeared to be no strong faculty involvement or opposition in the initiation of these developments or movements. In the segregation case the faculty in time became a source of major support. The opposition to the students came from the general political community and eventually from governmental and police authorities. The peace conference project in the third institution did receive administrative opposition and discouragement; much of this development was "engineered" without the early sanction of any college authorities.

In all three developments, as both students and neutral observers saw it, the students were successful in the accomplishment of their objectives. The administration, in the first instance, permitted a public "hearing" and respected the students' request to the extent of a thorough examination of the issues. In the second case, problems of segregation were forcibly brought to the attention of a whole state and one obvious aspect of it was terminated. In the last situation, a series of excellent peace conferences has resulted in succeeding years.

Of relevance in this brief examination is not the fact of general student involvement, which occurred in each situation, nor the results of these spontaneous, extra-curricular activities. Rather, I shall deal here with the motivation and personalities of the student bodies and of the key leadership involved. It is doubtful that over 5 per cent of the colleges and universities in the early 1960's could have been blessed or dis-

rupted, depending on the reader's orientation, with constructive, persistent protests, especially activities demanding leadership and broad student participation over weeks and months. Even then, as today, such developments, since they generally evolve unencouraged or unsanctioned, demand a concentration of students with a fair degree of intellect and with sufficient concern to take the risk and the time to become personally involved in something beyond the routine curricular or extracurricular realm. Needless to say, reference is not being made here to protests regarding such matters as dormitory food, curfew hours, or dating privileges.

Let me concentrate on one major ingredient of the particular activities on all three campuses—the matter of the spark, the initiative, and persistence of some leader. The men and women who actually did play the forefront roles in these instances were identified, most of them were interviewed, and a variety of assessment data available were analyzed. Across the three colleges, the *key* leaders or leadership groups comprised no more than eleven people. It was of considerable interest to examine whether these eleven were in some way special or different, especially within the context of three rather unique student bodies. What characteristics, if any, would distinguish them from their classmates and other peers? What composite of traits and attributes might have been basic to their motivation or willingness to take the stands they did or provide the necessary initiative?

In somewhat summary fashion, these leaders, viewed as a group, were significantly brighter than the average students in the respective colleges, though at least three had SAT scores that would place them near the average. They came from a diversity of homes and their fathers were in a variety of occupations. All eleven, however, came from homes where the religious affiliations were of a liberal nature or perhaps could be described as tenuous or unimportant. Over half of these students classified themselves as agnostics or non-religious as entering freshmen; two others were members of the American Friends Society; none of them were active or participative in a denominational group at the time of graduation. I hasten to add that, in a generic sense of the term, one might be in error to glibly describe them as non-religious. We came to know them and understand them as men and women morally concerned about numerous social and political topics and given to examining the ethical bases of their decisions and behavior.

The characteristics which differentiated nine (out of eleven) from the general student bodies were the level of cultural sophistication, the degree of sensitivity and awareness, the extent of a libertarian orientation, the intensity of intellectual disposition, and the state of readiness to be involved or to be active in behavior beyond the campus norms. From a standpoint of observable activity, dress, and style of life, only three or four were ever classified as practicing non-conformists. By philosophy and general commitment, however, all would have to be seen as in-

tellectual non-conformists, or as capable of taking this role when and if the occasion demanded.

In brief, at least nine or ten of these students were rather special and extraordinary. Though generally respected, they were understandably not always appreciated on their own campuses; such individuals often provoke thought and responses in topical areas in which many of their fellows are unaccustomed or unpracticed. To end this brief account of these somewhat atypical students, let us turn to their academic records, their activities, and attainments since receiving a B.A. degree. Nine are still pursuing a life of scholarship, which incidentally, characterized their undergraduate days also. Six have finished or are completing their doctorate. Two will be entering their fourth year of medicine, one with the intention of pursuing a special research interest and the other with the idea of working with or for the World Health Organization, in the area of depressed and undeveloped countries.

Some Dynamics of the Free Speech Movement

Research findings, if such they may be called, of the type just reviewed, perhaps gave us a little different perspective for observing the development last fall of the highly publicized Free Speech Movement on the Berkeley campus. Having worked with and studied atypical students in other settings, and having talked with a number of devoted liberals on the Berkeley campus over the years, I can say with something more than hindsight that the FSM developments from the beginning did not appear to be as controversial, as threatening, or as flamboyant as they apparently were to certain segments of the immediate and the more remote society. In a discussion with two colleagues in October 1964, it was suggested that the students, especially those committed to ongoing social-action groups, were reacting quite predictably to the circumstances and the situation within which they suddenly found themselves in September.

At that time, we assumed that the small nucleus of supposed liberals belonging to Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, Congress on Racial Equality, Committee for Non-Violent Action, Young Democrats, and one or two other groups, some of whom had seen action in picket lines, were similar to the bright and committed individuals we had come to know on other campuses. Consequently, definite protests and some of the sequence of events were anticipated. However, what information we did have on the Berkeley undergraduate population in general would have negated any predictions about the developments which occurred in the months to follow. In fact, there was little reason to believe, during the initial days of student reaction, that more than a small nucleus of highly committed students, perhaps 50 to 100, existed on this campus, and speculation centered mostly on whether a relatively small group could obtain a hearing with the administration.

The continuing commentary is not intended as a defense of FSM. Its record and accomplishments

seem to speak for themselves, at least to many who have attempted an objective appraisal or who have been willing to read discerningly. Instead, a brief examination will be made of available information about some of the major characteristics of the young men and women who initiated or participated in this campaign. In a sense, the Free Speech Movement provided an important window for many staff people on the Berkeley campus, giving them new insights to the diverse composition of the undergraduate and graduate population, some understanding of the number committed to tackling certain problems of society and mass education, and some introduction to the reasons for disgruntlement and dissatisfaction among serious students at all levels. Gradual understanding of the movement and the participants may also have led to some insights and greater respect for many in the intellectual, non-conformist group camp, and also to a greater willingness to consider the characteristics, the desires, and needs of a scholarly minority. It perhaps should be mentioned that the so-called non-conformist and scholarly minorities are not exclusive categories, and such brief terms lead to an inadequate description in either case.

Early Hypotheses About Members of the Movement

Some time in November, after weeks of fluctuating developments and numerous unsatisfactory exchanges among administration, faculty committees, and students, there appeared to be some bases for several tentative hypotheses about the participating students. These conjectures at that time were premised in part on the persistence of the movement, the observed composition of the growing numbers at noon rallies, and the frequent quality and content of the speeches by the leaders and other participants. These early hypotheses were also encouraged by a look at the characteristics of thirteen participating graduate students who had been former subjects in research projects on other campuses. The variety of information on this very small segment of the FSM was the first eye-opener on what had been surmised by some members of our staff.

Among the FSM constituency, to judge by these transfer students at the graduate level, were some very dedicated people who had established enviable records in undergraduate settings before coming to Berkeley. In this small group were a few who had earlier been identified as very exceptional students and two who had been rated as highly creative. A couple of others had gained previous recognition as liberal activists. Almost all came to Berkeley with sound undergraduate training and a record of high grades. As intimated, the measured characteristics of these thirteen as a group, as well as the knowledge of their backgrounds, intensified our interests in their present affiliation with FSM.

With some data about a limited number of graduate students and with weeks of observation, several off-the-cuff hypotheses were stated. This was done mostly

to focus growing interest in another student campaign but also to promote some analytical discussion. The several hypotheses were listed in the following order:

- a) The persons participating in the FSM, as compared to the average or non-participating students:
 - (1) are more autonomous and independent of their cultural past;
 - (2) have stronger and broader intellectual dispositions (and furnish a larger supply of students for serious scholastic activity); and
 - (3) are better students and obtain higher grade point averages.
- b) The membership of the FSM is composed of a larger proportion of transfer students than of students who enrolled at Berkeley as entering freshmen.
- c) A majority of the transfer students in the FSM come from selective liberal arts or private and public universities.

Survey of Students Involved

For some months, these speculative hypotheses served largely as conversational topics. They only began to serve as a focus for an exploratory project after being "driven" to the task. The chief motivation grew out of what was considered to be a fairly continuous misinterpretation of what the FSM meant and represented and the frequent derogatory descriptions of the students involved. Interpretation and misinterpretation from the press is to be expected; in fact, varied, and quite diverse explanations would necessarily be coordinate with most persons' perception and general orientation. And most interpretations were naturally based on what was seen or highlighted by the press and television.

However, the persistent lack of objectivity and frequent unfairness in such reporting, especially where more of the facts could have been ascertained, promoted a see-for-yourself policy. One felt obliged to discover whether selected characteristics of the students in the movement were in line with what we had surmised or more like the impressions and convictions of most of the public. Thus, a sample of students was drawn and surveyed approximately two months after the December 2nd arrests, to determine some of the characteristics and the general calibre of FSM participants as potential students. The particular sample was drawn from the list of more than 800 persons arrested.¹

In addition to surveying the sample of students arrested on December 2nd, two psychological instruments, a biographical questionnaire and an attitude inventory, were also completed by a smaller sample of FSM students suggested by members of the arrested sample. This resulted in a second group of approximately 60 participants who were not drawn

at random. A little over 30 per cent of these persons had also been arrested.

During this same period a sample of current seniors, selected at random from the directory, were also invited to complete the questionnaire and the inventory. This senior sample actually comprised a third *reference* or comparison group on which much identical information was available, the other two being an entering class at Berkeley some years back and a sample of seniors from the spring semester, 1963.

A slightly earlier study of FSM members, most of whom were also arrested, had been completed by William Watts, Assistant Professor of Education, and David Whittaker, a graduate student in Educational Psychology, during the past year.² The distribution of students participating in the Watts-Whittaker FSM group and in a cross-sectional control sample, as shown in Table 1, provide a mutual basis for some analysis of the representativeness of both FSM samples. Judging by the information presented in Table 1, the combined FSM samples in the CSHE survey appear to be fairly similar to the distribution in the Watts-Whittaker sample. But, in the study reported here, members of the sophomore class appear to be over-represented; and the smaller number of graduate students in both FSM samples (Watts-Whittaker and CSHE) is somewhat in line with the lower participating ratio at that level.

The distribution across major programs, in the lower half of Table 1, is also generally consistent for the two samples. The under-representation of students from three different programs appears to be very similar.

The representativeness of this *arrested* sample was also checked against the non-respondents in the original FSM sample drawn by comparing grades received (cumulative GPA) at the end of the fall semester (1964-65) and the proportions in the different major programs. The two distributions on the latter categories were also very much alike, and on the GPA criterion only the non-responding freshmen had lower grades than their counterparts.

The findings regarding the last two hypotheses stated above, one suggesting that the majority of FSM participants were transfers and the other that the transfers came mostly from a non-random sample of institutions, can serve as an introduction to the story about the participants' major characteristics. In the total FSM sample of 188, 49 percent were transfers and 51 percent had initially enrolled as Berkeley freshmen. If the freshmen who fell into this sample are not considered, the figures are somewhat reversed, and we find that approximately 55 percent of the remaining group were transfers. When the graduate sample is also excluded, the distribution is again a close 50-50 balance. Since the exact proportions of these two total groups on campus has not been determined, one can only conclude from these data that a large proportion of the participants had enrolled in the University after one or more years in other colleges and universities.

The results regarding the collegiate origins of the transfers were very much in agreement with the last hypothesis. Approximately 47 percent had spent one or more undergraduate years in one of the better-known, selective liberal arts colleges or in private, "big image" universities. Another 15 percent came from or through other well-known liberal arts institutions, mostly in the Eastern or Middle Western schools which are not quite so selective as the first group or so productive of future scholars. An additional 32 percent spent at least a semester at other University of California campuses or at highly respected out-of-state public universities (e.g., Wisconsin, Michigan). And 10 percent either started or spent some time in the New York City Colleges (e.g., CCNY, Queens, etc.). These backgrounds, together with the 7 percent from foreign universities and 5 percent from institutes of science and technology, would seem to indicate that the majority of transfer students in FSM did not come from the "rank-and-file" of American higher education. (The figures listed above total more than 100% since a proportion of FSM students had been in two or more previous institutions.)

The question regarding the degree of autonomy and general independence of the FSM constituency, stated as part of the first hypothesis, resulted in a very positive answer. At least this is true insofar as the scores on three measured characteristics can be used as evidence.³ The two larger FSM samples ("Volunteer" and "Arrested") listed in Table 2, singly or combined, were significantly higher (at the .01 level) than all reference groups on measures of the degree of autonomy, religious orientation, and impulsivity. A general interpretation of these combined results, especially when seen in light of the scores on several other scales, suggests a higher level of cultural sophistication, a greater release from the institutional influences of the past, and a greater openness and readiness to explore the world of knowledge and ideas. These scores also explain the students' strong liberal orientation and perhaps, in part, explain why many support or work with organizations like CORE or SNCC. However, for the majority of these men and women, such affiliations are seen as largely secondary to their stronger disposition to be serious students and to pursue their academic goals.

The latter point suggests the second part of the first hypothesis, or the particular interest in the students' intellectual disposition. The highly supportive evidence here can be drawn from the data in both Tables 2 and 3. In the first case, the difference in scores on the first four scales (Table 2), between the two FSM samples and the reference groups, serves as the basis for describing a majority of these students as very much more interested in several facets of intellectual activity than is true of the freshmen and senior students.

The essence of these differences is portrayed in Table 3. Here we find the students categorized by the degree of their intellectual disposition, which repre-

TABLE 1

**REPRESENTATION OF RESPONDENTS: PERCENTAGE OF FSM MEMBERS AND STUDENTS IN COMPARISON
SAMPLES DISTRIBUTED BY ACADEMIC YEAR AND MAJOR FIELD OF SPECIALIZATION**

| Samples | YEAR IN SCHOOL | | | | | | Graduate | | | |
|---|------------------|-----------|--------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Freshman | Sophomore | Junior | Senior | Graduate | | | | | |
| U.C. Cross-section Watts-Whittaker (N=145) | 9.0 | 12.4 | 20.4 | 24.1 | 34.5 | | | | | |
| FSM Watts-Whittaker (N=173)* | 14.5 | 16.8 | 20.8 | 23.7 | 19.0 | | | | | |
| FSM (Respondents) CSHE (N=188) | 13.3 | 24.1 | 18.5 | 22.6 | 21.3 | | | | | |
| | MAJOR FIELD | | | | | | | | | |
| | Bio. Sciences | Business | Fine Arts | Earth Sciences | Edu- cation | Engi- neering | Humani- ties | Mathe- matics | Phy. Sciences | Soc. Sciences |
| Cross-section Watts-Whittaker (145) | 8.5 | 5.0 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 0.7 | 12.8 | 16.4 | 5.7 | 8.5 | 36.8 |
| FSM Watts-Whittaker (173) | 9.4 | .0 | 5.6 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 18.8 | 3.8 | 8.1 | 50.6 |
| FSM CSHE (188) | 7.8 | .0 | 4.5 | .0 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 27.4 | 8.4 | 5.6 | 44.8 |
| Sr. Comparison CSHE (93) | 6.4 | 5.3 | 8.6 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 12.7 [†] | 25.7 | 5.3 | 2.1 | 31.3 |

The Watts-Whittaker samples are taken from a completed research project by William A. Watts and David N. E. Whittaker. Their article, "Some Socio-Psychological Differences between Highly-Committed Members of the Free Speech Movement and the Student Population at Berkeley," will be published in the *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*.

*These percentages do not include 5 percent of the sample who were not registered students.

TABLE 2

**AVERAGE STANDARD SCORES ON A SET OF PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS (SCALES)
FOR VARIOUS SAMPLES OF STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA (BERKELEY)**

| Scale Names | Entering | Senior | Senior | FSM | FSM | FSM | FSM | FSM |
|-------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-----|
| | Freshmen (2500+) | Sample ('63) (340) | Sample ('65) (92) | "Volunteer" Sample (58) | "Arrested" Sample (130) | Leader Sample (4) | "Reliability" Sample (15) | |
| Interest in Ideas (TI) | 51 | 54 | 55 | 62 | 63 | 65 | 62 | |
| Theoretical Orientation | 51 | 52 | 54 | 60 | 60 | 66 | 56 | |
| Estheticism | 50 | 52 | 52 | 57 | 61 | 61 | 63 | |
| Complexity | 51 | 53 | 54 | 63 | 66 | 67 | 65 | |
| Autonomy | 51 | 55 | 61 | 68 | 67 | 68 | 68 | |
| Religious Liberalism | 49 | 55 | 58 | 65 | 64 | 66 | 63 | |
| Impulse Expression | 50 | 53 | 54 | 60 | 64 | 64 | 65 | |
| Social Alienation (SF) | 50 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 52 | 51 | 53 | |
| Social Introversion | 49 | 52 | 53 | 56 | 56 | 50 | 56 | |
| Lack of Anxiety | 52 | 52 | 51 | 50 | 48 | 45 | 46 | |
| Response Bias | 51 | 52 | 53 | 51 | 49 | 50 | 48 | |

The midpoint of these standard score distributions is 50 which is equivalent to the average raw score for a large sample of college freshmen in the normative sample. The following standard score-percentile equivalents may help the reader who is unacquainted with standard scores: 50=50; 55=70; 60=84; 66=95; and 70=98.

sents a complex index composed of six semi-related scales.⁴ This index or combined measure permits a rather expansive distribution of students across eight categories, extending from a high degree of intrinsic intellectual involvement to a general rejection of what is often described as the life of the intellect.

For the FSM group we find almost 70 percent in the top three categories and none in the bottom three. The number of persons in these upper categories in the two senior samples amounts to 25 and 31 percent. The extent of a self-recruitment process of some form to FSM involvement seems very evident. The Free Speech Movement drew extraordinarily larger proportions with strong intellectual orientations at *all* class levels (freshmen through graduate). Seemingly, a commitment to the FSM causes and issues, and related activity, did not appeal to students of lesser or non-intellectual interests.

Regarding the remaining hypothesis, what about the academic achievement for these students? If one looks only at the cumulative grade point average *after* the fall semester, 1964-65, all FSM class sub-groups in the undergraduate years have average GPA's above the University average. The seniors in FSM, for example, achieved a significantly higher average GPA than the 1965 seniors in the reference group. The sophomores, juniors, and seniors received significantly higher grades than is represented in the average GPA of the University. The graduate stu-

dents in FSM received grades at a level equivalent to their non-participating colleagues and significantly above the graduate school average established over the years. Since many of the students interviewed state that their grades dropped for the 1964-65 fall term, the differences in favor of the FSM group could possibly be greater.

Thinking back over the several forms and varieties of information, the Berkeley students who gave much time, thought, and effort to the causes of FSM, to the extent of being arrested and convicted, are a collection of peculiar people, not so much as the press and public would define peculiar, as in their positive deviation from most college student norms and from those norms of the screened and selected student body on this campus. It would really not be hazarding a guess to say that a student body composed of the approximately 800 students who were arrested would provide a unique nucleus for a college or university. Fortunately, such a collection or assemblage has probably never before thronged the halls and classrooms of any *single* institution. I say "fortunately" for it is doubtful that a faculty could be assembled in one place to meet the challenge and responsibility, the serious expectations, the intense desires, and the genuine commitments. In the colleges studied in several projects at the Center for the Study of Higher Education, the most selective schools have not drawn such a concentration of students at this level of intellect.

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENTS IN SEVERAL UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (BERKELEY)
SAMPLES AMONG EIGHT "INTELLECTUAL DISPOSITIONS" CATEGORIES
(Percentages)

| (Categories: Degrees of Intellectual Disposition) | Entering Freshmen (2500+) | Senior Sample 1963 (340) | Senior Sample 1965 (92) | FSM Sample (188) |
|---|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Broad, diverse interests with strong literary and esthetic perspectives.* | 0.6 | 1.8 | 3.0 | 18.0 |
| 2. Broad, intrinsic interests, oriented toward use of symbols and abstractions. | 4.4 | 6.7 | 6.0 | 26.0 |
| 3. Interests emphasize problem solving and rational thinking. | 8.2 | 16.6 | 22.0 | 25.0 |
| 4. Interests tempered by achievement orientation and disciplinary focus. | 15.3 | 19.7 | 26.0 | 17.0 |
| 5. Interests in academic matters hedged by means-ends emphasis. | 24.6 | 23.9 | 28.0 | 13.0 |
| 6. Interests vocationally oriented. | 32.6 | 21.3 | 8.0 | .0 |
| 7. Limited or no intellectual interests; low receptivity to ideas or esthetics. | 9.5 | 4.8 | 4.0 | .0 |
| 8. Oriented toward the pragmatic and concrete; essentially anti-intellectual. | 5.6 | 5.1 | 2.0 | .0 |

*The definitions stated for several categories are somewhat arbitrary and included only to give an idea about the "dimension." However, the definitions are in line with the validation of this categorization system.

Summary

A few comments to effect some integration and interpretation: A type and quality of discontent that Plato would have appreciated—that will or should win the respect of scholars and teachers in our modern halls of Academe—will probably not plague more than a handful of institutions on the higher educational scene. It is suggested that the *necessary combination* of enough youth of intellect and commitment, in the context of a disturbing circumstance, be that local or extramural, will be limited to relatively few institutions. As it was expressed by a respected administrator in one of our rapidly growing academic kingdoms, speaking to his deans and fellow administrators: "I know we all feel we are fortunate that what is occurring in Berkeley is not happening here, but I am also sad when, with a tear in my eye, I admit to you that it could not happen here." For him the clustering of students with sufficient motivation and concern to create the Free Speech Movement was seen as an enviable though probably fortuitous situation.

The objective in this paper has been to suggest that the development of FSM, with all the turmoil and agitation it represented, was secondary to the fact and the existence of the students who made it possible, secondary to what it should mean for the major purposes of higher education. The FSM probably served—or should have served—a major function in introducing the Berkeley professoriate to a significant and highly potent minority. The chief nucleus for exceptional academic and scholastic promise on this campus was concentrated in a minority of youth who have been sentenced for pursuing the dictates of their commitments. I believe that most of them well understood the price they might pay for that privilege.

In the transitional state in modern higher education there seem to be healthy signs, including some activity and contributions from faculty and administrators, that we have broken our anchorage and fixations and that the sanctity of many traditions is open to scrutiny. The scattered minorities of exceptional youth, occasionally concentrated in a few institutions, encourage those of us in the college and university establishment not to be reluctant to re-examine the future course of education and not to overlook the relationship between education and the important problems and issues in the real world.

Students to be feared? Feared, indeed—but only as we fail to recognize their tremendous needs and fail to provide the meaningful education they seek.

¹A 33 percent sample of the arrested youth were invited to participate in this additional survey of an already well-studied group. Since this survey was started at a time when the court cases were also commencing, it was decided not to follow up on the first request to the total sample and to settle for whatever return was thus made available. One day after the letters of "invitation" were sent out, the telephone chain for the arrested students transmitted a message warning the students about participation in a study of "this type" at the particular time. However, over the next three weeks almost 50 percent of the original sample drawn asked for the materials and completed them.

²William A. Watts and David N. E. Whittaker, "Some Socio-Psychological Differences between Highly-Committed Members of the Free Speech Movement and the Student Population at Berkeley." (publication forthcoming in the *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*.)

³The attitude scales included in this study are defined as follows: *Thinking Introversion (TI)*: Persons scoring high on this measure exhibit a liking for reflective thought, particularly of an abstract nature. They express interests in areas such as literature, philosophy, and history. Their thinking tends to be less dominated by objective conditions and generally accepted ideas than that of low scorers. The latter extroverts tend to evaluate ideas on the basis of their practical immediate application.

Theoretical Orientation (TO): This scale assesses the degree of interest in using scientific methods in thinking, including interest in science as such and in scientific activities. High scorers are generally more logical, rational, and critical in their approach to problems than those scoring at the average or below.

Estheticism (Es): High scorers endorse statements indicating diverse interests in artistic matters and activities. The content of the statements extends beyond painting, sculpture, and music and includes interests in literature and dramatics.

Complexity (Co): This measure reflects an experimental orientation rather than a fixed way of viewing and organizing phenomena. High scorers are tolerant of ambiguities and uncertainties, are fond of novel situations and ideas, and are frequently aware of subtle variations in the environment. Most persons very high on this dimension prefer to deal with complexity, as opposed to simplicity, and seem disposed to seek out and to enjoy diversity and ambiguity.

Autonomy (Au): The characteristic measured is composed of non-authoritarian thinking and a need for independence. High scorers are sufficiently independent of authority, as traditionally imposed through social institutions, that they oppose infringements on the rights of individuals. They tend to be nonjudgmental and realistic.

Religious Liberalism (RL): The high scorers are skeptical of religious beliefs and practices and tend to reject most of them, especially those that are orthodox or fundamentalistic. Persons scoring around the mean and lower are indicating various degrees of belief in general and their subscription to specific tenets and dogma.

Impulse Expression (IE): This scale assesses the degree to which one is generally ready to express impulses and to seek gratification either in conscious thought or overt action. The high scorers value sensations, have an active imagination, and their thinking is often dominated by feelings and fantasies.

Social Alienation (SF): High scorers (above 70) exhibit some attitudes and behavior that characterize socially alienated persons. Along with frequent feelings of isolation, loneliness, and rejection, they may intentionally avoid most others and experience feelings of hostility and aggression.


Social Introversion (SI): High scorers withdraw from social contacts and responsibilities. They display little interest in people or in being with them. The social extroverts (low scorers), on the other hand, seek social contacts and gain satisfaction from them.

Lack of Anxiety (LA): Persons scoring high on this measure indicate that they have few feelings or symptoms of anxiety and do not admit to being unduly nervous or worried. Low scorers admit to a variety of these kinds of symptoms and complaints.

Response Bias (RB): High scorers respond to a majority of the statements in this scale in a way which is typical of experimental subjects who are asked to make a good impression. The responses of low scorers are similar to those of subjects instructed to make a poor impression. Scores between 40 and 60 denote valid scores on other scales.

⁴Interest in Ideas, Theoretical Orientation, Estheticism, Complexity, Autonomy, and Religious Liberalism.

STUDENT DISCONTENT AND CAMPUS REFORM



Paul Potter
Immediate Past President
Students for a Democratic Society

On April 17th of this year, in Washington D.C., 25,000 people, mostly students, gathered to protest American involvement in the war in Vietnam and to demand an end to that gruesome and repressive struggle. The demonstration, which on the whole was played down by "responsible" media, constituted one of the most dramatic manifestations to date of what people have come to call "the student movement." By any standards it was large, three times as large as the student march in 1962 to demand an end to nuclear testing. But more important than size was the fact that the demonstration stood in polar opposition to some of the country's most sacred and deeply held principles—its unrestricted, unquestionable, unchallenged right to wage holy war against what it calls communism in whatever way, with whatever tools, seems most expedient. What happened in Washington in 1965 would have been called treason ten years earlier and may well be called treason ten years hence. Even five years ago it would have been difficult enough to get 25 people to that kind of demonstration—not to mention, or even imagine, 25,000.

If you can understand why the March on Washington happened in 1965, then you can understand a great deal of the basis of student discontent on the campus today. But comprehending Washington and the mood of the students who protested there means coming to grips with much that many Americans, including far too many of your own ranks, would rather ignore or simply write off with some such sweeping term as "communist-inspired," or "beatnik," or "misguided." In fact, one characteristic of the problems I want to discuss here is that so many otherwise intelligent people refuse to admit their existence.

I have noted the size and intensity of the march on Washington as a foreword to underscore the

fact that what we are talking about is real, is growing, and demands much more than categorical dismissal. In fact, the reality of a student movement has begun to challenge those who would dismiss it. The students who marched in Washington, or struck at Berkeley, or protested on numerous other campuses across the country, or left their schools to help organize movements in the South or among the urban poor in the North are, in a real sense, the actual conveners of this conference and similar gatherings, formal and informal, across the country.

And it is in this sense that I want to speak to you today—as one of the thousands who helped to call you here. In doing so, I do not propose to describe or represent to you the entire diversity of groups and reactions that exist on the campus today. Nor will I attempt to give a presentation which has academic authority or style. Rather, to the extent possible, I want to speak to you with the voice and out of the experience of a person who has participated actively in the construction of the current movement and who believes deeply in its integrity and validity. If my tone is not detached, it is because I find it difficult to detach myself from what I say and do, and I find with my compatriots one source of concern—a world in which men so easily detach themselves emotionally from the things they create. If my comments are not always friendly or if I seem to fail at times to seek some common ground with you, it is because I see the distance between us as great and perhaps insurmountable, and I can see no virtue in constructing here a false sense of our capacity to reconcile our worlds through words or "understanding."

The Sources of Discontent

It is a popular occupation these days for detractors of the student movement to concentrate their attack

70/71

on the participants' dress, cleanliness, and length of hair. Out of the accumulated residue of such reactions comes an impression of student radicals as some sort of rabble scraped from the bottom of the American social heap. Disregarding for the moment the accuracy of the physical descriptions and the nature of a society that responds to basic challenges by commenting on the dress of the challengers, let me begin this presentation by stressing how false an impression that description gives of the background of most student radicals.

Interestingly enough, the "rabble," which the pundits so meticulously dissect, turns out to be the sons and daughters of the American dream. Most of us were reared in families that had acquired the tools to harvest and enjoy the abundance of the world's most abundant society and were given all that good Americans are supposed to want—money, suburban living, cultural opportunities ranging from home environments carefully developed to provide stimulus to whatever potential we had, to summer camps and trips to Europe. Our parents were well educated, were most frequently professionally employed, and had acquired moderately high, almost comfortable status. We grew up believing that we would inherit all of these things—money, status, security, cultural abundance—taking them for granted, which was a reasonable thing to do, given their rich and bountiful array around us.

We grew up as well believing that we lived in a great nation which had harnessed itself to the will of its people, providing them with education, the highest standard of living in the world, equality of opportunity, democracy, and the great middle class. We believed ours a humble nation that awkwardly and reluctantly shouldered the responsibilities a much more corrupt world forced upon her, but dispatched those responsibilities, once shouldered, with integrity, honor, and the most peaceful intentions.

We were, in short, the first post-depression, post-war generation to emerge into the world with all the assists of the mildly permissive (in some cases almost progressive) family culture of upper-middle-class America. If our parents sometimes despaired at our inability to understand the austerity and struggle that made possible their achievements, they were nonetheless pleased with the generally enthusiastic and alert products of their work.

Somehow, and for reasons that are not entirely clear to me, this group of young people, who had everything that their society could give to them, found that gift hollow and rejected it. In their rejection they began to fashion a movement which has comprehended many issues and touched on a number of the nation's most exposed nerve ends.

The experience of students in universities has had a great deal to do with their disaffection. Somewhere earlier they had already begun to understand that much of what they were supposed to cherish and emulate was sham. The jolt of the college ex-

perience has been for many, however, the event that brought discontent to the surface. That reaction may stem partly from the fact that many of us had high expectations about what college would mean. There was an excitement about finding an intellectual and personal seriousness in universities which we frequently had not found in high schools, and there was a sense that college offered independence in directing our education and lives that had previously been missing. There was a vague yearning for something in college that we had begun to sense was missing from our backgrounds.

The reality of universities was, to a great extent, the opposite of what we had hoped for. In the place of intellectual and personal seriousness was substituted the academic grind of large classes, intense competition for grades, exams that were irrelevant and intellectually damaging, and an environment in which the chief academic occupation seemed at times to consist of learning how to beat the system and "psyche" out professors and exams. In place of personal independence in shaping life and education were substituted numerous requirements characterized mostly by dullness and massiveness, the confining and degrading existence of dormitories and their regulations, and the general recognition that less personal freedom was extended in the university than there had been in the home. Independence, university-style, meant isolation in an environment that was essentially callous to personal needs. For most, it was the first encounter with the full inflexibility of mass bureaucratic organization, the first experience with the rat race and a system of external pressures and deadlines that substitute for internal initiatives or concerns, the first invitation to take on the garb of hipster, to ask questions that you didn't really care about, to "bull" your way out of situations that were embarrassing or threatening. If, on occasion, students found good teachers or exciting classes, it did little more than underscore their sense that the rest were bad or useless.

Perhaps the most difficult thing to assimilate, however, was the phoniness of the presentation of the university experience. Most institutions insist on clothing themselves in liberal rhetoric, for whose benefit it is difficult to say. They begin with applauding the virtues of liberal education, continue with much ado about the importance of the student's assuming his educational responsibilities as an adult (the conclusion is difficult to avoid that adults are people who have learned to function well in such systems), and end with a system of junior residents who, the students soon learn, write regular reports that are kept in some central place; house mothers, who are most frequently caricatures of mother surrogates; counsellors, who help the misfits adjust; and disciplinarians, who mete out justice in a system that students soon learn is arbitrary, although somewhat manipulable with the aid of parents or through effectiveness as a hipster. On the whole, colleges seem to try to present themselves as permissive and mildly parental when in fact they are neither. The

tired and elaborate rationalizations for keeping things as they are, are soon seen as just that.

I want to make it clear that I am talking about a very general experience. The terms I use to describe it are not necessarily those that most students would use to depict their experience, nor are these necessarily the areas in which student discontent is focused. What I want to stress is that, in general, the university experience outside of the classroom is the catalyst that begins to give students new insights into the way the society operates, the way people are treated, and the way cultural values are misrepresented. At some point students begin to understand that they have lived in a capsule which the university attempts to duplicate; its failure sharpens the discontinuity between past personal experience and aspiration and what the society has, in fact, to offer. It makes the student aware, consciously or unconsciously, of the simple fact that educational institutions exist to fit him to the system and not *vice versa*, and that is a recognition that all of his careful socialization to upper-middle-class values has ill prepared him to accept. We grew up, feeling reasonably potent in influencing our personal milieu; and without our parents' deeper needs for economic and status security, we are in a much better position to challenge a society that promises to make us impotent.

The Expression of Student Discontent

To say that these feelings and discontents are widely shared among certain, if not all, groups of students is not to explain why in the 1960's they have crested in the current movement, or why in the 1950's they remained untapped or were directed into less socially significant arenas. I do not want to attempt to review the accumulation of forces that changed the fifties into the sixties. I want only to say that, by 1958 or earlier, the first signs of revived student interest in social and political issues had begun to appear. By 1960 they had built up to the point that unleashed in the same spring the sit-in movement, the San Francisco demonstrations against the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the West Coast vigils against the execution of Caryl Chessman. The same spring saw the awakening on a number of other campuses of more campus-directed reform activity, but in overall significance it paled beside the off-campus issues. Nonetheless, on a number of campuses, significant battles were being waged against compulsory ROTC, fraternity and sorority discrimination, and the loyalty and disclaimer affidavits in the National Defense Education Act—three of the more obvious and vulnerable indignities that universities had been content to tolerate.

The kinds of issues that came to the fore that spring, and for the most part since then, suggest that the university system was at once more encompassing and more difficult to get a handle on. Student life was a kind of gumpot that was difficult to move in

or gain clear insight into. Students more and more found it easier to direct their protests off campus.

What has emerged out of five years of growing protest is a clearer critique of the society, a more articulate enunciation of some of the contradictions in American life. The naive belief in the myths of freedom and abundance that suburban life and patriotic school teachers had inculcated could now be confronted by the stench of southern justice or the burning flesh of children napalmed by American bombs in Vietnam. The myth of the great American middle class, which projected the image of an endless prosperous suburb, could be counterposed to the fact that 30 million Americans still live in poverty and that millions more live at the margin, with economic insecurity a constant element in their lives. Students could begin to appreciate the irony of being called rabble by the press, since the real rabble, the poor and dispossessed, were excluded systematically from the opportunity represented by university education because of the prejudices of class- and status-oriented education, not to mention just plain lack of money with which to purchase the educational tickets.

The myth of American benevolence in international issues stands exposed against the reality of American intervention in Vietnam and the ruthless subjugation of that nation to the game of power politics, the repression of the revolt of constitutional forces against military dictatorship in the Dominican Republic, and the public fabrications, distortion, and attempted control of information that have become a part of pursuing these policies. The myth of political freedom is juxtaposed to the reality of the persecution of unpopular political sects, the existence and continued operation of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the constant surveillance and frequent harassment of left-of-center political groups by local "subversive squads," the ready chorus of red-baiting which greets any serious questioning of the operation of the existing system. And out of all this comes a growing sense of a social, economic, and political system that has lost its ability to be responsive to the needs of ordinary people.

What is essential to understand here is that those problems which the existing movement has helped to dredge up for public scrutiny are not viewed by most students in the movement today as simple malfunctioning of a basically sound system. Students have been quick to understand the complicity of liberal institutions in the maintenance of those problems—for example, the extremely limited, yet dogmatically defended, concepts of education that do exclude the poor, do freeze the class system, do cut millions of people off from participation in the mainstream of society. The disaffection that has grown over the last few years is deeper and more dramatic than most people like to admit, and its roots are as deep in the middle-class institutions of the society as they are in the agenda of social problems this generation of students has exposed.

The first bold acts of protest in 1960 helped to establish a dynamic that has shown no sign of playing itself out. For what those protests did was to break through the kind of isolation existing in universities which made people feel that effective political participation is impossible or self-destructive. It has helped to create an environment in which the accumulated discontents, not only of students but of Negroes and other poor people—and increasingly of faculty and other professional groups—could be expressed without fear that the statement of radical concerns would lead to political persecution. An independent political community is being built in this country which has the power to sustain those who want to challenge the great Johnsonian consensus or who want to at least partially dislodge themselves from the tyranny of the institutions on which they are dependent for work.

There is another critical function that the movement has performed for its adherents. It has created for us all a greater sense of the reality of America; it has provided a tool with which to cut through the shrouds of sophistry that allow people to rationalize their dehumanization and that of others. It accepted as one of its tenets a moral and logical clarity and an insistence on the unity of ends and means that have made its demands and its critique clear and uncompromised on the one hand and on the other have kept it away from the pitfalls of striving for respectability and institutionally sanctioned legitimacy. It was the clarity and simplicity of the sit-ins and the Chessman vigils that drew so many students to them—students who in many cases had seemed apathetic when approached by the safer, more legitimate round of campus political disputes and student government politics. The arguments were simple and to the point. Segregation was a clear evil and should be ended, regardless of what the law said or local custom dictated. No society had the right to take the life of one of its members, to perform such an ultimate and irreversible act on even the most tortured of its creations. And the clarity of the issues was critical in exposing the unclarity in the society that had allowed these issues to lie submerged so long.

It is part of this search for clarity that has sent students into the cotton fields of Mississippi and the deep South, and into the urban slums of the North. These reservoirs of social repression and neglect represent to us much of what is most real about America. It is in attempting to understand what this society does to the people whom it can't incorporate into the system that one can begin to comprehend the extent to which this society is in need of change. It is the assertion that, so long as the least of us remains exploited and repressed, all of the rest of us must be dehumanized by the construction and justification of a system that allows his exploitation. And there is a determination to build on that assertion the kind of movement that will bring about a decent society for all people.

It is the same search for the reality of America that has led so many students into absorption with the war in Vietnam. For in understanding that war, one must begin to understand the way society has come to believe that its own freedom can only be defended by sacrificing the lives and opportunity for self-determination of an entire nation of people.

There is a very deep sense that the country has lost its capacity to tell the truth, that the honesty and integrity of people will be evoked only by cutting through cultural lies and by beginning to speak what seems to be true, regardless of its acceptability, regardless of its consequences.

What I hope you begin to see from this picture is that the kind of discontent which is emerging on the campus is neither sporadic and disconnected nor inexplicable. I hope that you will attempt to understand as well the depth of the disaffection which I am describing.

The actual amount of energy that to date has been directed at campus reform has been relatively slight. Berkeley has come to symbolize an important wave of protest, but it is only the beginning and not necessarily a representative example of what has come before or what will follow. There are good reasons why the campus has been relatively neglected. In the first place, the issues at stake on the campus seem less important than the national and international problems which have absorbed so much student energy. And second, as I have already indicated, problems on the campus are too close, too difficult to define, too integral to the personal biography of the students to easily gain insight into or leverage on. There is a kind of inarticulateness that plagues the movement when students begin to talk about their own situations and what they want to do to change them.

I was recently in a conversation with a number of thoughtful, well versed, deeply involved student radicals, and the conversation turned to the question of why students join the movement. There was a real hesitation among all the people in the room to bandy around the glib formulations that most frequently are offered to answer that question. But, try as we would, no one was able to get beyond the old formulations, to add a new dimension to the discussion that had only to come from reflection on one's own experience.

That strange muteness about ourselves and our needs is remarkably contrasted to the articulate and exciting insights that these students and many thousand others have developed in talking about the political and social problems of the nation.

It is this inarticulateness that has kept students from dealing effectively with their own condition, and all I can do by way of explanation is to suggest that the accumulated experience of living in a society that refuses to look at people and take them seriously *as people* eventually destroys the individual's capacity to take himself seriously. What the

movement provides is a new experience to dislodge students from their old self-conception (or lack of it) and make possible the beginnings of something new. It is the dialectic of new experience constantly counterposed to what went on before that makes me confident that the next few years will see a marked increase in the capacity of students to deal directly with their own condition in the university.

In a way Berkeley provided an insight into how much of this may come about, not so much in the nature of the action as in the source of the action, the basis for militant and uncompromised student action. It is essential to understand that there would not have been a Berkeley Free Speech Movement, or at least not a movement of any proportion, if there had not been a civil rights movement. It was the interference of the administration in the capacity of civil rights groups to carry on their struggle—to continue to deal with one of the few things students are confident is real and worthwhile in the society—that triggered the confrontations and led thousands of students to support these groups. In a sense the Free Speech Movement is a misnomer for what happened in Berkeley, for it implies that what moved students was an abstract concern for free speech. In fact, what moved students was a passionate concern for the very immediate, very real struggle in which they were involved, and what infuriated them was the notion that petty bureaucratic regulations could be allowed to interfere with that struggle.

Free speech, I suspect, can never be an issue if no one has anything to say. What the last five years have demonstrated is that, when people really do have something important to say, they will find a way to say it, even if that means losing a job or going to jail or dying.

The reason why the Filthy Speech Movement failed to arouse the kind of support that the Free Speech Movement elicited was not that it lacked an issue or principle. Anyone who bothers to explore the history of the Filthy Speech episode will find that, contrary to the impressions press reports gave, there was merit and principle involved in the issue. Students were not so much demanding the right to shout filthy words as they were illustrating another piece of the hypocrisy of the system. Students failed to support the effort massively because the issue, although principled, was not that important, was not that central to anything that was happening. Similarly, the failure of students as yet to challenge massively the content of courses that are taught in classrooms, or the status system that keeps people in a university from talking to one another, or the mountains of banality that corrode the university in dozens of areas and make life there unrewarding, has occurred because all of this too, ironically, seems irrelevant.

But of course, it isn't irrelevant, and that is precisely the point. Gradually students are seeing just how it isn't irrelevant. For example, the introductory economics course, which seems stupid and dull, must

increasingly be seen as more than that—for it is dangerous as well. More frequently than not, it is directed at rationalizing the necessity for an economic system that has failed—that has created hard-core poverty and "structural" unemployment as well as the abundance that the textbook talks about. It is important to find some way to break through the academic intrigue long enough to appraise people of the fact that the economic system has failed and to see if there is anyone who is interested in reconstructing it. There must also be ways to begin thinking about questions such as these: Must work always be organized from the top down? Must men always be trained to spend their lives doing tasks that damage or destroy their human potential? Can we create an economic organization in which men do work, not from necessity or through coercion but because it is fulfilling? These are not abstract questions. They are only abstract in the encapsulated, make-believe "real" world that thrives on defending and entrenching the *status quo*. In the world that the student movement is trying to create, where problems are not hidden, these questions and endless more like them must be faced and answered.

Reconstructing Universities

One of the debates that goes on constantly within the movement, you will be interested to know, is whether or not it makes sense to attempt, in a major way, university reform. There are many who have felt for a long time that the university is too formidable and entrenched an adversary for students to take on. There are others who feel that the kind of compromises we can exact from the universities are so minimal in their nature as to make the effect of gaining those concessions and making commitments to explore them distracting and thus destructive to the basic work of building a political and social movement for basic change.

Both of these arguments contain interesting insights which I want to explore. Let me begin by saying that very few, if any, schools in this country exist for their students. Those liberal arts colleges which are most frequently credited with being student-centered are still built around an image of what they want to do for students or, as the jargon has it, what kind of a finished product they want to produce. Whether that image is shared with the students is a matter that can never be determined, since the students are almost never consulted or, if consultation does take place, it is done within the context of a system whose basic assumptions are already incorporated as given. It seems to me not a disrespectful thing to say that institutions of higher education exist to prepare students to take their place in the going system and that even the most liberal of institutions are concerned with developing an "enlightened" commitment, but nonetheless, a commitment to it. To say that they exist to pursue truth, or some such higher value, is naive and unbecoming to many of the distinguished intellectuals who propound that statement.

The influence of organized corporate and institutional interests on the universities is clear, as is the willingness of the universities to cooperate in numerous ways with almost anyone who has the money to buy their facilities. Students more and more call this whoring; others call it research. The federal government continues to be the biggest buyer; and, although there are occasional rumblings about the distorting influence of government spending on the whole structure of higher education, no one as yet has mustered the political or financial will to really come to grips with the impact of federal involvement. In the end, it seems simplest to accept the close and historic ties between the university and established power and values, not necessarily as immutable but certainly as dominant and entrenched in the existing situation.

Educators enjoy emphasizing the unique qualities of the university as an institution, but what I have just noted in conjunction with other aspects of the university makes it worth while to understand the extent to which the university can also be viewed as a photograph of the existing system. Universities, especially the large ones, have more and more come to resemble the giant corporate entities that now dominate our educational system. This phenomenon has been described by many people, but I note it here again just to underscore the difficulty that confronts anyone who is interested in serious reform or reorganization of the university. We are talking about a highly organized, bureaucratized system that is controlled from without, that is primarily responsive to external pressures, that is involved in inter-institutional competition for resources, and that is mightily committed to the going system.

However, this barrier is matched by another closely related factor, the internal organization of the academic life of the university and, within it, the place of the student. I touched on this subject earlier, but I want to explore the problem further at this point because I think it is central to the development of any significant reform effort on the campus. As yet, I know of no significant effort directed at the academic organization of the university. It is important to understand why this is so.

Probably the most intimidating and effectively stifling element of any university is the environment that exists in the classroom. From the outset the student is reminded that he is in the university to gain some minimal exposure to the accumulated wisdom of the various disciplines with which he will come in contact. He is made to understand that the most he can hope to master as an undergraduate is some small appreciation of the complexity of the fields he chooses to concentrate in. He is frequently told by professors that, if he wants to take up their time during office hours to discuss some point raised in class, he should come fully prepared to enter into academic discussion. Under no circumstances should he disturb a professor if it is only to display his ignorance. In short, he is made painfully aware of

his status as an untested and unworthy novice who can only hope after years of work to acquire the tools to talk intelligently about some area of specialty. Students who fail to respond to these warnings, who instead persist in asking ordinary questions that come out of natural curiosity and not out of the intention to comprehend the discipline, are subjected to withering comments and looks. They are embarrassed or, if they refuse to be embarrassed, are ignored.

Not all professors, of course, are this severe in their description and enforcement of the academic system, but most come close enough to accepting these terms to concede the definition of the classroom experience to their more vocal colleagues who do quite literally subject the undergraduate to the kind of harangue just described. There are very few teachers who can always resist the temptation to pull academic rank in order to put down irritating questions or in order to feel more secure in front of a class.

After awhile, even the professors who want to break through the constraints of the system are confronted by students who have been so well socialized to it that they re-impose constraints and seem to feel more comfortable within the protective confines of the system. I once had the opportunity of sitting in on a seminar in which the teachers were obviously quite anxious to stimulate a free-wheeling discussion of a number of social problems. Throughout a semester, the students refused to detect many cues to this effect and kept bouncing back with academic concepts and jargon which no one particularly understood or cared about.

The student who seeks practical insight into personal and public issues is frequently cautioned against any attempt to connect his classroom experience with life experience. Political scientists go to great lengths to make their students understand that their courses have nothing to do with practical politics. Introductory psychology lectures most frequently start with the caution that it is a dangerous thing to go around attempting to apply concepts learned about neuroses and such. And then, of course, the lecturer goes on to discuss the nervous system of the rat.

Middle-class child-rearing habits are credited with preparing children to postpone gratification, and it is fortunate for the universities that this is true. Few undergraduate classes I know of could be endured a day without that capacity. It is amazing how many students start off on their academic apprenticeship convinced that they must learn to like it, anxious for the day when they too will be able to speak the language and manipulate the esoteric symbols of their discipline. Some don't last, like my friend who finally gave up after three years of waiting for psychology courses to move from rats and flatworms to people. Others, of course, do make it, winding up in senior honors seminars, sounding like young professors and having forgotten long ago any genuine questions from their own experience that they

might have wanted to answer, once they got the tools.

Graduate students should have a more open and exciting educational experience, according to the terms of the system. But again, in the vast majority of cases, this seems not to be true. Indeed there is much to be said for the notion that the graduate student is the most cruelly exploited member of the academic community. He is completely exposed to all of its pressures, being more often than not dependent upon it for money and, more important, the kind of recognition that will lead to a good thesis committee, good recommendations, and a chance to get into the publishing scramble with the junior faculty at some good university. He is aware that professors talk about their graduate students and thus is hesitant to offend any of the fraternity by impertinence lest they brand him a trouble-maker. He is aware that a teaching assistantship is the kind of low-status brand that may make it difficult for him to gain access to the powerful professors in the department. He is aware of the competition he is locked into with every other graduate student in the department, and he is therefore an active participant in the competition that has deprived many of the "best" graduate schools in the country of any graduate student community.

At least we might hope that the student is now more free intellectually, but again this turns out not to be true. Internal competition and the expectations of professors place a heavy emphasis on internal documentation of papers and the selection of subjects, not by interest or importance, but by their capacity to be thoroughly researched and convincingly presented. Nor is the graduate student's relationship with faculty necessarily improved.

By way of illustration, let me tell you about a friend who, after much preliminary investigation, came up with some hypotheses for a doctoral dissertation and then went to the most logical member of the department to see if he would oversee her thesis work. After much fumbling, he agreed to act as her thesis advisor, but he announced at the outset that she should expect very little help from him. When she asked why, he finally admitted that he was deeply interested in the area she had selected for her thesis topic, hoped to publish in that field some day, and had a number of ideas which he was concerned she should not steal. Therefore he found it impossible to talk.

That, of course, brings us to another dimension of the problem. Faculty are themselves locked in their own kind of competition for grants and academic honors and for the kind of research record that leads to promotions and prestige. Eventually the pressure of the system reaches a point where a professor is no longer willing to explore his ideas with his students, and undoubtedly his colleagues as well, for fear they will steal from him all that he has—his intellectual productions. What kind of academic community can exist in a situation such as this? And what kind of learning can go on where people find

that what is new inside themselves and in the process of creation must be hoarded, like space in an air raid shelter, against all those who might benefit from sharing it.

Any university reform that is worth the name must deal with this problem. It is little wonder that students have balked at entering this arena. How, after all, can one challenge the system of intellectual competence that allows the professor to lecture from the front of the class after years of study and diligent application? Students do sense their ignorance, are quick to doubt themselves and the worth of their own ideas, are fascinated by the academic flourish that some professors manage to acquire. There must be something powerful that motivates students to challenge a system that so effectively reinforces itself and so convincingly challenges the student's own self-confidence.

And as I indicated earlier, the movement has begun to provide those kinds of questions, is giving students the equipment and the conviction to challenge professors—not on an academic footing but in the human dimension that is so uniformly rejected by the university. This is something to stand on, and its appeal is strong enough to attract many faculty who are themselves fed up with the confines of the university niches and have themselves begun to question the relevance of their disciplines to the things in life that are important. The teach-in movement tapped a great deal of this sentiment and, interestingly enough, has split internally on the issue of how academic and correct the teach-ins should be. Out of this spring's experience has come a much more self-conscious group of young faculty who are in contact with one another and are looking for ways to expand their ranks and the scope of their concern.

Students too have come closer to a real engagement with the issue of education. The Yale protest over the firing of a good and popular teacher was a move in the direction of questioning the way classes are organized. In contrast to previous student efforts, which have concentrated much more on social rules and superstructural changes such as the representation of students on faculty and administrative committees, the Yale uprising was a direct challenge, although it still fell far short of a full-fledged confrontation.

Here we should pause once more, because a full-fledged confrontation entails the demand that higher education be progressive, that it be structured around the needs and problems that students define out of themselves and out of their own experience—and this is the exact antithesis of what we have today. The intensity of the struggle posed by the notion that higher education should be progressive is certainly much more severe than anything we have seen to date. And yet I genuinely believe that the day is soon coming when students will stand up in classrooms and demand that their professors lay aside their esoterica and begin to talk to them in their own terms about problems that can be jointly defined as important. A non-dramatic indicator of

what is to come occurred this year when a group of students at Oberlin began an effort to get the student body to hire its own professor who would be explicitly instructed to talk about the things that aren't discussed in the classroom.

What begins to emerge are two highly conflicting and polarized images of what higher education should be. The first, which exists today, is that of a university controlled externally by financial and political as well as social forces which are not responsive to the needs or interests of the people in the university, and organized internally around a system of very open competition, status sanctions, and authoritarian teaching methods. By contrast, I see emerging out of the movement today the demand for education that is directed toward the concerns of the people involved in it, organized democratically, and conducted in the most open and cooperative fashion. I do not believe that the educational system that I envisage can exist in this society. And I am in this sense pessimistic about the possibility of any reform movement actually accomplishing these goals.

It is this pessimism that has led many students to talk about the need for counter-institutions or the enactment of educational programs that deal with the problems we are talking about—with or without the cooperation of the university. There is a sense that a commitment to see reform accomplished within the existing system may be a commitment to never seeing the educational needs that people are beginning to express dealt with.

By counter-institutions I mean two things. First, an operation that works outside of the sanctions of the existing system. And second, a program that is designed to challenge the system it is rejecting by setting up an alternative in such a way that people in the system are actually challenged to leave it. Some of the teach-ins were good examples of what I am talking about. They were exciting educational experiences that broke down all sorts of barriers, but at the same time they were counterposed effectively against the day-to-day university routine, so that many students drew from the teach-in a clearer sense of what education could be. Counter-education in the long run becomes a tool for reform or reconstruction of the existing institutions. In the short run it becomes a way of thinking about problems that the society will not deal with and sharing in an experience that can give people more personal and intellectual independence.

Many students will choose and are choosing a more dramatic course. They are simply leaving the university and moving into full-time work in the movement where education comes from first-hand experience of the range of issues with which people are struggling. There is a hint of nihilism in this more sweeping rejection of the system and its sanctions which I sense is the most perplexing and disturbing aspect of the student movement for many liberal educators. But that negation was not created

by the movement. It was born in a society that refused to confront its most basic problems, and it is the inherited burden of this generation of students to play out that negation, to go to the verge of nihilism, and perhaps beyond, in their search for a positive that is powerful enough to overcome the negative.

There are many who anticipate the eventual repression of the movement, or its exhaustion through the unrewarded burning out of its own energy and who, out of genuine concern for their students, wish desperately that there was some way to protect them from the ruthless exposure they subject themselves to when they desert the university and their pedigree and their security to venture into the South or the urban slum or some other area of the movement. But there is no protection that can be accepted. All that can be offered is whatever commitment those people can themselves make to building and interpreting the movement, and in keeping the society from crushing it and the people in it. The only shelter we have is in one another.

But the great majority of students in the movement will choose to stay in the university and maintain some bond or connection with the system. And these are the students who will be involved not only in counter-education but in challenging the universities directly and more and more aggressively about their basic premises. If I have little hope of full success, I nonetheless feel that a movement to reconstruct universities, as part of a movement to reconstruct society, will gain constant and more compelling strength.

You may be wondering why I have said so little about college administrators and college presidents. A few years ago, I certainly would have spent a much more substantial part of my time hurling invectives at the way you manage to run universities. Although I have hardly retracted those sentiments, I am less inclined today than I once was to view you as a group of very powerful men who have considerable latitude in determining the way your institutions are run. I do not believe that, even if you wanted to, you could change your universities into the kind of institutions I have described or, for that matter, move substantially in that direction, *e.g.*, demand that your board of control rule that, for every new research dollar that comes into the university, an equal amount be raised for educational experimentation, the experiments to be determined by a jointly elected body of students and faculty who would review applications made by any individual or group in the university.

If my feelings are correct about the direction of campus protest, you may for the time being be exempted from much of the direct pressure of student discontent. When and if there are organized groups of students and faculty who have demands to make about how the university should operate, or when classrooms begin to get disorderly, or when a number of teachers in a department refuse to turn in grades,

or when students who have been crammed into crowded or inadequate classrooms and study space begin to appropriate research facilities for their own work and interest, you will have an opportunity to respond. But the time when just the administration and legal structure of the university were singled out for protest may be going. Still, it is an overly schematized version of what is happening to suggest that student protest will move consistently or in any one direction. Much of what happens is fortuitous—the administration or students unwittingly creating a confrontation in some area that comes to represent accumulated discontent and must be played to its conclusion. Nonetheless, the campus protest of the coming years is likely to be much less dependent on the response you make, *i.e.*, much more focused on the deeper issues, issues that cannot be circumvented by

a sophisticated response. As official arbiters and squelchers of conflict, you are likely to be most unsuccessful.

Still it is important that you understand that new forces are at work on your campus, raising most profound questions about the kind of education students are receiving there. Something that no one can stop you from doing is to take these new forces seriously, learn to listen to them, begin to toy with the notion most people are so quick to dismiss, that maybe the students may be right and America may be wrong, that the course the nation has charted may be opposite to the one we should pursue, that now in the mid-twentieth century the time may have come to ponder the possibility of reconstructing our schools and our politics and our society in a new image—this time in the image of man.

Discussion

QUESTION: My question to Mr. Potter is simply this. I wonder what he thinks we have been teaching for the last 40 years if not a certain measure of discontent with the status quo. I am certain that nobody here is entirely satisfied with the world as it is and I am also of the opinion that this movement has not been spontaneously generated but has been carefully nourished by some of us old guys. I would like to have your reaction to that.

POTTER: I don't know what you have been teaching for the past 40 years. My experience is much more limited. I have tried to think about that question in terms of the professors whom I had come in contact with or had classes with as an undergraduate or as a graduate, who seemed to me to harbor discontents and to try to think why I, to such a limited extent, feel that those are the people with whom I identify today. My recollection is that the problem was that discontents were so frequently stated in terms of adjusting the existing system to make it go better. I recall a very exciting professor in Oberlin, in some respects who was looked to by most of the students as one of the better, more sympathetic teachers there. His concern was that, I use this as an example, that there wasn't anything wrong with the Cold War. What *was* wrong was the way the United States was pursuing it; that we were not basically sophisticated enough, idealistic enough in our pursuit of the Cold War. What he encouraged students to do was to identify their own feelings of activism and discontent with the way the country operated, with a critique of its sort of efficiency in that operation. It's true, I suppose, that many of us were stimulated to some extent. I don't know how much. I think most of our stimulation came from one another, but to some extent from discontented professors or professors who projected a critique. I think we patterned the initial kinds of organization we formed around those ideas of reforming the existing system, making it work better. At some point we began to sense a new dimension to our criticism that was a much more basic kind of dissatisfaction, and it's there I think that we began to find that there was really explosive tension between ourselves and professors whom we had looked upon most favorably in the past. What I want to say is that if we were looking for models or instruction that maybe some of our initial models and instruction did come from the academic community but that only went to a certain point, and after that the "movement" itself really began to separate itself and to begin to do its own political critique, its own political thinking, develop its own forms of organization.

QUESTION: Mr. Potter, I think I probably express the view of most, if not all of us, in saying that it was a very brilliant paper and a most valuable experience. I for one would like to have you on the campus of my university. There are some very serious problems I think that need to be appraised. I think that you

have introduced an element of profundity into the discussion that it has lacked up until your paper. We are very much indebted to you because you have shown us the depth of the problem and have shown us that it is a problem that relates to the character of our society, its depersonalizing and dehumanizing tendencies, and so forth. This seems to me tremendously important. I do find your paper a rather strange and fascinating combination of sophistication and naivete, of profundity and dogmatism; that you have said many things that are very true but in your rather gross over-simplification of the problem, as in the description of the university generally, that you have produced some very great distortions.

The question that I want to raise with you has to do with the matter of the nihilism which you referred to toward the end of your paper. I felt all the way through the paper, at least up until you yourself referred to the nihilism, that this was going to be the conclusion because there is something about it that is remarkably like the current Existentialist philosophy. This performs an immensely important service to modern society by showing the massive predicaments that we are in and the way in which the social forces are destructive of human personality. The Existentialist philosophy, however, seems to offer very little by way of showing us how to get *out* of this predicament.

Now the question I raise with you is, what do you propose as a way of getting out of the predicament? Are you of the opinion that the compromise measures which are necessary for us to take in order to move, at least in some direction, rather than being completely frustrated, stultified in efforts to change and improve society or change and improve the structure and character of the university—are these worth taking or are you simply going to throw up your hands because you cannot have a perfect world and say that nothing can be done about the situation?

POTTER: I think that we are very frequently prone to give the impression that we are not at all interested in compromises or concessions that may be offered by the society; that we generate a sense of having an apocalyptic, revolutionary view of the kinds of changes that have to come. And to this I want to say a couple of things. First, most students, I think, who are in the "movement" today would identify to a great extent with Camus, distinctions between rebellion and revolution, would think of themselves as rebels rather than revolutionaries. I think that the area in which they do that is in being most insistent that ends and means be compatible at all points, that the movement itself does not become a new monster, does not become a new force for dehumanizing people. We come to that feeling largely out of a disaffection from past movements, and there is a sense in that what we are doing has to be justified here and now, it has to be worthwhile now or it is not worth doing. There is a rejection of the idea of constantly postponing gratification, of living for some millennial future that might be constructed out of the accumulation of our num-

bers and our force. There is a search for meaning and purpose and integrity in life *now* and I think that some of the most exciting things that the "movement" is doing is in terms of trying to create communities of people who, at the same time that they are challenging the society, are working for social change, working in relation to the existing system or trying to live more honestly, so that there is a very immediate character to what we are doing.

I don't want to give the impression that what we project is an apocalypse in which some day the universities will crumble and out of the ruins we will construct something better. I guess I believe, on the other hand, that that does not lead you therefore to say you should be committed to reformist politics. I think the best example of that would be the way the civil rights movement has affected this country. You see, we did not get a civil rights bill within the kind of liberal reformist politics that have existed in the South for years and years. That did not produce the civil rights bill or fair employment there. We only got those kinds of situations when students and Negroes throughout the South stepped *out* of the system, developed a new radical kind of politics that created a whole new political atmosphere in the South. I think what most of us believe is that relevant politics doesn't exist within the system today, that the kind of politics that can mobilize people, that can lead people to change their lives, to do things really dramatically different than they have done before, to make deep commitments to political goals can't be done within the liberal reformist rhetoric and style of political operation that has existed in this country.

Now what the creating of this left wing in America has done is to broaden the flexibility of the rest of the political spectrum. There are lots of people now in universities who are working on reform proposals that are finding them more satisfactorily received, I suspect because of Berkeley, than they were before. All I want to say is that the students and people should not be disinterested in various reform proposals. If they can do a better job of education—fine. The point is that the students forget what's made them effective if they start making deep commitments to those reforms. They begin to lose their political independence, I suspect, if they believe that the only way they can get reforms is to concede the other points they have been making, to concede the other principles or goals that they have been demanding. So in that sense there needs to be an uncompromising quality to what the "movement" is doing. At the same time, I think we can effect compromises. Does that answer your question?

QUESTION: It is very much to the point. I would like to raise just one more question, i.e., whether this is not going to suggest that, even if this is true it is not necessarily bad, that if students are unable to commit themselves to reform, do you mean they are unable to commit themselves to the principle of re-

form or to specific reforms? Now if they cannot even commit themselves to the principle of reform, the effort of institutions to gradually reform themselves, because it's a pretty good indication that we can't just throw out all of our institutions and have something in their place, isn't this likely to produce simply a kind of class of professional reformers, or rebels? As this become a kind of class of professional rebels—that this is your way of life? I don't mean to say that this isn't a good thing, either for you intrinsically or a good thing for society, but it is a kind of new phenomenon and therefore very interesting.

POTTER: We may well be producing a new class of rebels. I think that a lot of the experiments that are going on in communities now, urban slums in the North and in the South, are attempts to find out whether or not it is possible for people to live principled and political lives that allow them to continue to be rebels over a long period of time. What people are trying to do is to find ways of living economically so that they don't become economically dependent on the system and working with one another in such a way as to provide the kind of social and moral sustenance within a community that allows people to continue to function, so that they can continue to live in a fashion that people feel has integrity. More and more students are doing that. More students want to do that at this point than we can organizationally accommodate, and there is a tremendous rate of growth going on inside the movement of people who view what they are going to do indefinitely; what they're going to do with their lives is try to change the society.

Now whether people can in fact live that way, you see again, has to do with the fear that we have about the past and one of the things that the 30's did was to create a class of professional organizers and radicals who in their own time became the new exploiters of the people they were organizing, and there is a tremendous sensitivity within the movement now that we not do that.

Within SDS we have a group of people who do not work in what they call our traditional community organizing projects—they have existed for over a year and are now traditional—where we spend full time or as nearly full time as we can in the community organizing. They have said basically that this is a very artificial life style, it separates you from the community, and it forces you to try to extract from the community things that it may not be wanting to do. That is, we have to extract organizations to justify our existence and the communities may not be ready to organize in that sense. They have gone into Hoboken, New Jersey and formed what we call the Hoboken Non-Project. They have simply gone to live in the community and work there. They have regular jobs like other people in that community, and they are getting to know people and work with them in the same framework that other people live in. So this is a tremendously important question for us, one that we are constantly caught up in.

QUESTION: My question has to do with who or what might be the target of the "movement." I detected at least a note of hopelessness about your "movement," particularly in reference to the administrators and college presidents. You could conclude that the only thing we should do is to break down all the institutions and start over. You asked us to listen, but you are hopeless and tell us there really is not anything that we can do. In an effort to understand this, we would have a target.

POTTER: I think that when we look for targets we look for vulnerable areas in the society, places where, again as I said in the speech, we can dredge up things that have been hidden, bring up the muck from the bottom so that people will have to look at it, and deal with it, and we look for *ways* of doing that which forces people to deal with it. Our targets have hardly become in that sense refined. You could say, for example, that the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party has as a target the right to vote or has as a target the established Democratic Party in Mississippi. But that is sort of deceptive because that is not their real target. You see, their real target is much more comprehensive. Their real target is the entire system that created the existing Democratic Party in the state of Mississippi. What we are looking for is leverage points.

Now I guess what I think about the university is a little bit discouraging. You see, I think the universities are much more sophisticated systems, much more integrated powerful systems in the long run than is the state of Mississippi. That is anachronistic. We know that. It is written in the papers all the time, and it is more vulnerable because there is a lot of societal pressure against that anachronism, as well as the pressure that the "movement" is bringing up. You see, it's getting it from both directions. On the other hand, the universities seem to be becoming much more integral to the society, much more central. They are becoming really critical institutions in the society and in that sense to change the university means that you are much closer to changing what is central. That is why I have a sort of immediate pessimism. It is much easier, I suspect, to change the city government of Cleveland than to change the university because that too is a partly anachronistic system. That too is a system that's undergoing change from both directions. You see, the federal government has an idea of a war on poverty. This partly comes out of a conception of the necessity for modernizing the institutions that run our large cities, getting rid of the old social welfare and social work and educational institutions and building more modern ones in their place. You see that is why I have a real pessimism about the university because it is so hard to change.

QUESTION: Which do you think it would be easier to change in the university from your standpoint, the faculty or administration?

POTTER: I think that perhaps it may be easier to create real functioning bonds and communities among

groups of faculty and students at this time in counter-institutions and counter-situations in the university, than it will be to exact any major reforms from the university structure as a whole. That is, we can begin to create little centers of insurgency inside the university. I saw this done at the University of Michigan. The University of Michigan, by the way, has been for a long time a center of SDS growth. A number of SDS people went there in the fall of 1962 to be able to study and work together at a graduate level. The impact of those students on a group of faculty was very real, and I don't think it is at all accidental that Michigan was the place the teach-in started. I think that it is possible to begin to move to identify quasi-political constituencies in the university that will be composed of students and faculty; although they may not be able to exact major concessions, they will be able to use what flexibility already exists there to their advantage in accomplishing what they want to do.

QUESTION: Mr. Potter, you have identified your "movement." I think essentially of it as a movement of protest, and I note that when it was asked what your reaction would be to improvement in the university you did not use this term. You said, "Well, we would have to consider how we would react to compromises." So it would seem that, in effect, nothing short of professional perfection, some sort of full realization of an ideal which you cannot yet formulate, anything short of this is not an improvement but a compromise. Now later I noticed you saying that what you were searching for was an existence in which you could have integrity and I now sense that integrity in a life means a life in which there are no compromises and in which you are not satisfied with improvement but must constantly protest until an ideal, which you cannot formulate or reach, is achieved. I wonder therefore if you take the position that your movement is concerned with protest but let someone else do the work and compromise himself by merely improving society. But you will carry on your protest movement which gives you a sense of integrity, while perhaps it rather makes it more difficult for other people to live in a world in which there is integrity, the world in which they must live but in which you refuse to live.

POTTER: Well, if everyone would come and live in our world then we could deal with our problem together. That is a difficult question, and I am trying to think of a couple of examples that maybe I can use to illustrate it. I think that at times there is a sense that you talk about, that I have and other people have, that our job is the breaking away of chunks of the existing system, putting pressure on it and in some sense bringing it down, and as we do that it will automatically reshuffle itself in various ways, some better, some worse than what we are doing. One of the things that we all sense as a possibility is that as we create social protest against what I have called anachronistic institutions or systems, what they will be replaced with is simply more sophisticated

systems of manipulation and control. That is a real bind because that means maybe in the long run what you can do is create a more effective kind of authoritarianism or help to create the real basis for a Brave New World. I think that is one of the reasons that we are very reserved about getting caught up in this process of working in the reformed institutions that we have created because frequently we understand that those reforms themselves have to continue to be reformed, that they are simply points on a progression that we want to move through.

On the other hand, I think that we are interested in building positive structures, that we are interested in innovating where we can and where we feel we can do that without making any basic compromise, without losing a sense of perspective in the situation we are working in. All I want to stress is that most of us don't have that much confidence in ourselves to be certain that we won't be caught up in a situation that we get in building something new in such a way as to basically compromise what we are after. As an example, in the community where we are working the poor people who have organized most have come to the attention of a number of the liberal organizations in the community and they are now getting poverty money and they have hired a number of the people we have been working with. As soon as people get into that job situation a tremendous transformation takes place because they are suddenly working for an institution. They are suddenly working on other poor people; they are suddenly getting paid a salary that separates them in many ways from the people they have been working with and you can just watch those people change overnight. It isn't that somehow they become evil—it is that they put themselves into life situations where the day-to-day things that are relevant lead them to look at situations quite differently. That is why there is extreme reluctance to put ourselves into this situation, and you can call that a lack of confidence, if you like. I think that as we go through time we become more confident in our own ability to create things and to work in creative though ambiguous situations.

QUESTION: Mr. Potter, it strikes me that you are just afraid of looking to see just what really is at the end of the rainbow.

POTTER: No, I don't think so. It is very hard to look to see what is at the end of the rainbow. People talk about that though and have attempted to deal with some of those hard questions that are raised in the speech. Is it possible to create a society in which men do not work out of coercion or for economic necessity? Could you do that? What would it look like? Those kinds of questions are asked. I think that people are hopeful, a lot of people are hopeful, about the possibility of finding satisfactory answers to them, but are not afraid of coming up against situations in which they don't have satisfactory answers. For example, we had a discussion one day in which somebody said that, as far as he was concerned, a factory was an unthinkable situation for

men to have to work in. Somebody else said, "Well, maybe that's true but we have to think about it because chances are there are always going to be factories, or if we don't have factories there are consequences you don't want to accept, not and have that kind of system of mass production." That was debated, and finally the discussion ran, "O.K., if we have to have factories, then how can you run a factory so that it isn't such a terrible place to live and work in?" I guess that probably sounds really strange but that to me is a concrete illustration of both the fact that students understand that there are limits to the plasticity of society, that there are things that we cannot change in the way that we would like to and are ready to accept those limits and to work within them at some point.

QUESTION: I can well understand why you want to keep yourselves apart from some things that may be contagious and catching. However, as you talked, I was reminded of Calvinism and the insignia over the gate, "Abandon hope all ye who enter here," and I think we are all pretty well abandoned because we have entered into our system and into our jobs, the supervisory or administrative jobs. I think the thing that is discouraging from your point of view, as well as from ours, is the division of this Calvinistic world that you have created between those who are the elect and those who are condemned, and if the elect will not work with the condemned then there is no hope for grace, and I think that after all is the thing that is so hopeless for us. I protest that there is some grace at this time.

POTTER: I understand that and I want to protest that we recognize that. I think that one of the things that most of us believe very deeply is that we have to continue to be able to talk to people and explain what we are thinking about and maintain some connection, some basis of dialogue, at least, with people in all walks of life and in all areas of the society. That is why I am here, in part. The day when we sever that, when we no longer have a way of bridging our differences, things are over.

This is a problem we have internally as well because there are students who say, "Well, I'm not ready to really commit myself fully to this," and who feel very much devalued because of that feeling, and I don't want to see people driven into the movement by guilt. I want people to feel that they have the time to examine their situation and the steps that they are taking and the actions that they are involved in and that there isn't some great pressure that is generated from people who have fully committed themselves upon the people who are less committed. That is coercive. What I want to say to people wherever they are is that they should do whatever they can, whatever they feel capable of doing. If they sense that is what is right for them, then I have no basis of questioning them. What I constantly run into though is people who are asking me to legitimize their situation. I can't do that.

QUESTION: I understand that because, after all, the society is condemned. You said this yourself, so there are those who are caught in society. Now I ask you a question. What about free will in this society of the condemned? Do they have none? Are only the elect the ones and is the society condemned? Doesn't man have the power or the grace, and where do the ills come from but from man? It isn't society that is wrong. It's man himself.

POTTER: I think that you are extending that terminology too far.

QUESTION: I would observe that within the establishment and increasingly within the literature that crosses my desk the same hard questions you have posed are under serious consideration and have been for years.

POTTER: They don't become public questions and they don't get circulated. I mean public in the sense of a political public where people are trying to deal with them. To stay in that same example I used, the labor movement well understands that automation is changing the shape of the nation, that that is not a thing you can handle through collective bargaining. But the labor movement has done nothing because, I think, of its political relationship to the establishment, to the Democratic Party, to raise to a level of public political debate and organization ideas of how you have to re-organize the economic system that everybody is talking about, inside the labor movement. Why is that? Why is it that this cannot be a political issue at this time?

QUESTION: I question the hypothesis of the movement that the liberal concept of working within the democratic process is inadequate for fulfillment of your goals. First, let me say that I agree with you that a number of these decisions would probably not have been made at the time were it not for the extraordinary types of tactics. I feel the need for these decisions but I wonder if this society that is being condemned as being unable to solve its problems is really as inadequate as it is made out to be. Or whether it includes a process wherein the events you are talking about are events which bring the situation to a point where the type of tactics you engage in become possible. For example, consider the legislation on civil rights. One institution within the society is the Supreme Court of the United States. That certainly is part of the society we talk about. The Warren court has come down with a series of decisions that have set a legal framework for the civil rights movement. Secondly, the federal government itself is another institution in society that has taken action in relation to government and educational policy in the South which makes possible certain movements toward reform. And the very worthy work that many young people are doing in the slum areas is made possible by the anti-poverty act which provides funds for groups within the state. Isn't this society we are condemning really quite a viable and on-going thing?

POTTER: That is a good point to bring up because I make a distinction between the "society" and the "system." By the system I guess I would mean the mainstream of the society, the most central institutions and organizations in the society, the dominant institutions. But within society certainly everything is included, including ourselves. I don't think we are outside the society. My definition doesn't make that permissible and I don't think yours does either. I mean none of us believe we fashioned ourselves out of air. All of us are trying to understand the way in which we were fashioned by the society and the extent to which values that we have, ideas about organization, are products of the society. Certainly I don't think anyone would argue that we do not use certain liberal institutions that exist in the society to our advantage. I guess most of us would say that, in a larger context, we see those institutions as the kinds of modifiers in the society that make it possible for it to continue without dealing with its basic problems. I think that the areas in which student discontent will be least likely to emerge are in the areas where you have campuses with the most liberal institutions because students will continue to feel that they can work out their grievances inside of the system, whereas I would assert that there are a lot of things that are lying yet submerged that can't be worked out. But who am I to say, if the students are there and liking it.

QUESTION: You were speaking about the problems of members of the movement being cut off from different segments of the society and in this connection I believe there has been something in the movement about going back and forth between sectors, between institutions, etc. Could you elaborate?

POTTER: Some of that thinking was my own. I was fascinated a couple of years ago by a phenomenon that I saw taking place where kids would drop out of school for a couple of years to work in the movement, would come back to school, and would then be some place else for a year. There was a tremendous amount of mobility going on among students that seemed to be really creative in the sense that they were bringing back, into different institutional situations, experiences that were not compatible there and their influx in and out was a very exciting thing. A friend of mine and I were recently re-evaluating that scheme and decided that what it created was the image of plastic man who could stretch himself into any number of contexts and situations and still be perfectly mobile and complete. I still think to a certain extent that that is possible. That is one of the things that characterizes youth today: they are mobile; they can operate in a number of different contexts in and out of the universities, in communities, in work situations. They are, I think, finding less plasticity, less mobility as they come more concretely to terms with what they are facing, particularly in hard organizing situations. That too is a problem for me—to fly here from Cleveland and adjust myself to this group and then to return to Cleveland this evening and put myself back into the frame of mind that allows me to deal with people who

have no sense of, no capacity, no history of involvement with groups like this, who don't understand at all what I am doing. I can't explain to them who you are or why it is my life style is so separated from theirs. There has been a feeling on the part of a lot of people that they have sort of lost their wheels in the last few years; that really to deal seriously with the situation you have to put yourself into it and really stay there and commit yourself to it full time.

QUESTION: I would like to have you answer this question because I am a little confused. What makes you feel that your generation is greatly different from previous generations, including my own who, in turn, for thousands of years have believed that they invented sex, compassion for others, and freedom?

POTTER: Sometimes I don't. On bleak days I think that it will all be over in a couple of years. There's that terrible article in the Saturday Evening Post which had one part that amused me in which the author was talking about SDS people and he said his prediction was that in a couple of years they would all be working for General Motors. He said, "I mean, are they real? Do they really believe it?" I sometimes have my own doubts as to whether or not we have a capacity to endure what we are doing, whether we really are different or whether in another few years we will all be sitting out there listening to somebody else. I think there are indications that we are different. When I talk to people who organized during the 30's about what they did and the way that they dealt with people, I feel that we are different, and that sustains me. We will see.

QUESTION: In what way are you different?

POTTER: I think that we tend to be different in our de-emphasis of formal organization and our emphasis on the immediate situation the people are working in as being the defining context and as being the relevant context, in our emphasis on keeping future goals as important things that we are driving toward but not letting those subsume current values and current needs. As an example, one of the things that we discovered during this year is that a number of us had wrenched ourselves out of the academic niches we were in and gone into communities organizing and we were driving ourselves tremendously. At one point there came to be an understanding that we were destroying ourselves in a way; we had so narrowed our lives and so focused them, that we had to really worry about what the effect of that was. I think that other movements have failed to have those kinds of insights consistently. That has been their downfall. I think the healthiest sign about this movement is its attachment to the immediate situation and its concern for people here and now.

QUESTION: I wonder though, Mr. Potter, if that isn't one of the things that tends to be very disquieting to you and that is the fact that you have been successful in some of the things you've accomplished

—just as the civil rights movement has been successful. I don't think you ought to underplay the progress made there by some of the people in your movement. This will be seen by many outside our particular society as very clear evidence that we can make adjustments. At some point people in your movement who are as serious about this as you are are going to have to realize that the very fact that you address this kind of group, that you make the kind of progress you do in slum areas and civil rights problem areas, will be very hard evidence that this society has been able to make some adjustments. What do you do when you get to the point of realizing this?

POTTER: Maybe it will be seen that way and maybe it won't. I don't think that, looking back on the forces that changed feudal society into bourgeois society, I come to the conclusion that feudal society was progressive. I understand that there were new forces at work in the situation which changed it, and I suppose that there are two interpretations in that sense. One is that the society is working and the other is that there are new forces that have forced the society to change, and I suspect that there may be some of both. That is my feeling about it, that we are not talking about a totally corrupt society. We are not talking about totalitarianism or how you would change that. We are talking about a much more mixed situation. We are talking about a remarkably corrupt society—not a totally corrupt society. And I assume that history will see it that way and that other people will learn to see it that way if they can perceive us accurately.

QUESTION: Earlier you commented that the pre-occupation of the group with the future of the movement may lead to a slightly different conclusion than has thus far been presented. It has been said that one thing that man learns from history is that man doesn't learn from history. But in this particular context it is possible at least to see the lessons that are there even if we don't wish to learn them. I submit that the prophet needs to remember that the degree of his success as a prophet is justification for the aphorism that the tombs of the prophets are the ramparts of civilization and that the process whereby a movement goes forward to *real* success lies in the repetition of the age-long process whereby the prophetic insight becomes the basis for tomorrow's institutions and establishments.

POTTER: Yes. Did you want me to comment? I guess my reading of history, as you might suspect, leads me to feel that the beginning or the building of civilization on the basis of prophetic insights was frequently a step backwards; that prophetic insights when captured by institutional forces were lost. But I guess I agree in some sense that you are right, that at some point, whatever this movement develops is likely to find more solidified and institutionalized forms and one hopes only that those institutions will be more humane and decent than the ones we have now, and I think that people recognize that.

QUESTION: Are there any of the issues that students are involved in now that in some sense did not have their genesis in the university, and if that is so, how can the university be as bad as you make it out to be?

POTTER: That's a hard question to answer because of the sense that by definition you can say that everything came from the university, since virtually all of us were university students at one time, all the young people who feel themselves to be in the movement. In that sense, you can say, the university must be pretty good, but what I tried to say in my talk was that I feel that the university drew students together and drew them into an expression of these concerns by being bad. I recall once at Oberlin, when I was an undergraduate, talking to a friend who was very artistically inclined, and we were talking about the limits of the school and talking about a question that someone raised with me earlier as to why we go there if we think it is so bad, and I asked him, "Why are you here? You're an artist. You're very much an independent person, you are internally driven. Why do you come to such a restricted and well defined school as Oberlin? Why aren't you in a more fluid situation?" And his answer was that Oberlin provided him a structure to react to and that that was valuable to him in seeing himself with that concrete structure and that one of the things he didn't like about society was that things were so ambiguous, foggy, and blurred. I think that this is important. I think that the imprint of a clearer structure—you see there are sort of two prongs to this, because it is clear and it isn't clear. It is clear in a sense that it imposes itself on the student. It's not clear in that he cannot frequently see through it. He cannot get out of it. I tried to incorporate both of these elements in my speech. But the impact of that structure does create a reaction and that reaction, I think, has led in part to the movement. You can call that good if you want to, or you can be neutral about it, I guess.

QUESTION: When you work in Cleveland, what is their reaction to what you are trying to bring to them?

POTTER: I think that there are varied reactions. I

have been working in Cleveland in a poor white community and that is more difficult than working in a Negro community. When you go into a Negro community, people know that you are there because of the movement. They know about the freedom movement and the struggle and there tends to be a ready and sympathetic response. This does not mean that you don't get into troubles there, that people are not suspicious and you don't have to overcome a lot of distrust because they wonder who you are and what you're doing there and why did you come. But there is a basis of receptivity. You go into a white community and no one knows what to make of you. I think we found that people are nonetheless fascinated by the fact that there are people who have somehow become interested in them and their problems and that tends frequently in the short run but, if not, more frequently in the long run, to draw people out, to make possible a personal relationship in which people can talk about their own lives, in which we can try to explain what we are doing there. People can come to some sense of understanding of that and they in turn can begin to talk about the things that are bearing down on them. Together we can talk about things to do. I know when we started most of us were really surprised at the general warmth of people, the general openness of people in the area where we were working. There may be something disarming about us that opens people up. There's a fellow here in Oakland who goes up to peoples' doors (he's working at the SDS Oakland Project) and says, "I'm here because of bad playgrounds and the fact that there aren't enough jobs, and bad housing, and police brutality (runs through that whole list) and I am also here because I think that poor people should be organized in the society, but mostly I am here because I want to get to know you, because that is prerequisite to us doing anything together" (I don't think he uses that word). He has had a really good response to that last notion, that he is there to get to know people, that he wants to become friends with them. He says that right out. I guess people are opened up by that kind of candor about what we are doing. I think we are more and more forthright in presenting ourselves in that fashion.

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WHO RUNS THE INSTITUTION?



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In a flamboyant and revealing moment during the Berkeley sequence, Mario Savio shouted, "We shall see who runs this university!"

Speaking in the *U. S. News and World Report* of May 17, 1965, the California State Superintendent of Education used more words than Savio to make his point: "Now, you can't have two sets of people making rules for the same institution. Which represents a broader spectrum of the body politic—the relatively few students at the University, or the millions of Californians who support and uphold that University through their regents? Obviously, the more democratic approach is to have the regents make the rules. They represent the people. The students represent nobody but themselves. I think the students should be consulted. . . . But I also think that the people of California have to set the rules and the policies for the University of California—and the students are not the people."

So the issue has been joined. But if these were the only options before us, we should have a Hobson's choice indeed. It is my belief that there is more error than truth in both of these positions, that Savio and Rafferty are both grievously wrong, while each is just a little bit right.

Let me now trace the steps which have brought me to this conclusion. Who runs our colleges and universities? To whom are they accountable? And are any changes in order, or is the situation quite satisfactory?

The Legal Framework

The legal framework of higher education in the United States differs substantially from that which sets the patterns in most other nations. The typical continental university is an arm of government, with a Minister of Education or similar functionary serving as the actual operating head of the national university

system and professors having a status not totally unlike that of civil servants. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, although large subsidies come to the universities through the University Grants Commission, the government has relatively little to say about the running of the institutions. The typical British university is run by its professors, with a rotating presiding officer who is more of a ceremonial figurehead than an administrator.

The Latin American universities present a third pattern, quite different from the governmentally managed institutions on the continent and the faculty-managed universities of England. In Latin America rectors come and go with succeeding governments, but they have little power while in office. Real power rests somewhere else—and not with the faculty either. I know of only two Latin American universities which have full-time faculties. For the most part, teaching and lecturing are done by professional men who take an occasional hour out of court or parliament or medical practice or whatever to perform their scholarly duties. Meanwhile, the one substantial and continuing center of power is the student body—both the undergraduates and the alumni, together forming an age continuum from adolescence to senescence, and wielding their conscious power for direct ends. Not uncommonly the purpose is political, and if political it is sometimes revolutionary. Political and military coups have been hatched on campus with conclusive effect. Student demonstrations in Latin America are deadly serious and aimed directly at seizing power. Since students already run the institutions, their objective is to take over the government. Far from being responsible to government, the Latin American institutions are run by students and alumni—and they hold the government responsible.

Differing from all three of these, North American colleges and universities have been accustomed to operate under an unique device, the lay governing

board. Power and authority are not resident in government. By charter, full responsibility is vested in the governing board. Called trustees or regents or fellows or visitors or by whatever name, these laymen are unpaid volunteers whose legal status is as nearly absolute as anything in American life. Their powers and duties are sometimes spelled out in legislation. Boards are created by the State but are not to be regarded as creatures thereof. If one asks to whom the American college and university are responsible, the answer is clear: to the lay governing board.

It is quite uncommon for this lay governing board to have legally defined accountability fastened upon it. The terms of constitution or law set the bounds for the public institution—or rather, for its trustees. The terms of the charter and relevant law are the controlling guidelines for the private institution—that is, for its trustees. And whatever the governing board decides to do, within the limits of its very extensive powers, in the discharge of its total responsibility for the institution under its guardianship, that board has authority to do.

Certain consequences flow from this fact. Neither president nor faculty nor students have any rights and privileges except those which are enjoyed under the decisions reached within the board. The only responsibilities carried on campus are those which the board decides to rest there. The typical American college or university therefore starts with an almost military—certainly an authoritarian—chain of command, from the trustees through the president to the campus. A few tentatively bold experiments have been tried in this country, whereby the faculty itself is established as the legally constituted board of trustees, but this pattern is extremely limited in use. And the number of institutions in which students sit on the board of trustees is undiscoverable. The first consequence, then, which flows from the legally established power of the governing board is that whatever degree of democracy may be found to prevail has been superimposed upon an authoritarian structure. Not infrequently, it turns out to be not democracy but paternalism.

A second consequence is equally important. The lay board, by virtue of its absolute powers, also has an absolute responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the institution under its governance. And thereby hangs a tale. It is an uneven story, of venality and of heroic fortitude. The history of higher education in the United States is replete with instances in which extraneous and improper efforts have been made to determine institutional policies from outside the institution—and in which the lay board has stubbornly refused to yield. When a legislature gauges the biennial appropriation in accordance with the success of the football team, it takes something more than presidential protest to convince the legislators that the university ought to have a faculty and a library worthy of a winning team—and that they ought to have it win or lose. When a self-serving politician raises public hue and cry over the alleged political affinities of visiting speakers on campus, a strong president and

stalwart faculty may resist the politician's pressures; but unless the lay governing board, which has full authority, backs them up and defends the campus against such intrusions, the battle is lost. When Left Wing pressures attempt to take over a campus and make it a place congenial only to themselves, the final rock of resistance must be the governing board. And the same holds true of pressures from the Right.

The purposes of the university have to do with the discovery, dissemination, advancement, and transmission of knowledge. As nearly as it is possible to comprehend truth, this knowledge should be true knowledge. It is the first and greatest obligation of the lay governing board to protect the citadel of free inquiry from any and all efforts to subvert from within or to dominate from without. When a Lysenko twists genetics to make biological science conform to Marxist dogma, the Soviet university has no means of resisting the error. Indeed, since the university is merely an arm of government, as long as Lysenko remains in favor with the Politburo, his dogmas are labelled as Truth. There is in Russia no lay board of governors to protect the university against such brazen perversion of scientific findings. Not so in the United States. When Herbert Aptheker attempts to re-write the history of race relations to make this nation's story conform to the tortuous requirements of Marxist dogma, he has no more effect upon American campuses and intellectual life than did the late Senator McCarthy when, from his opposite extreme, he tried to hang the Communist label around the neck of Nathan Pusey. The American college and university are anvils which have worn out many a hammer—and the point is that the lay governing board, autonomous and independent, subject to no one but itself, is the iron of the anvil.

This protective function of the lay governing board is of the essence of its accountability.

It might almost be said that the board is responsible only to its own conscience. To the extent that this is true, it becomes imperative to make sure that board members are conscientious men and women, for the pressures on them mount. Increasingly, those who have an axe to grind try to force their prejudices upon the lay board by way of legislation. Teachers' lobbies have been known to work for objectives which the lay board frowned upon. Elected public officials have sometimes tried to usurp the prerogatives of the governing board or to place on the board persons who might be amenable to official suggestion and direction. There is, perhaps, no more serious infringement upon any lay governing board anywhere in this nation than the so-called "Brown Act"—named in honor of a legislator, not the governor—which makes it illegal to hold a meeting of any two or more members of the Board of Trustees of the State Colleges of California on any subject except personnel without the public and the press present. I know of no other instance in which legislative dominance has more completely eroded the competence of a lay governing board—but the City University of New York was saved only a few days ago, by the governor's veto,

from a piece of legislation which would have exceeded even California's Brown Act. Not only would all meetings have been held in the presence of the public and the press, but under the Act just vetoed in New York, "every person" was to have had the right to speak at will and at any length on any subject at the public Donnybrooks formerly known as meetings of a governing board.

Perhaps the strongest defense of the protective and custodial position of the lay governing board comes from our dual system of American higher education. If all of the strong private and independent institutions were removed from the scene, one wonders just how long the public institutions could withstand erosion by political forces. The presence of the private college, which is beyond the reach of venal legislative action, is a constant reminder to legislators that public higher education is not to be considered in the same manner as the Rivers and Harbors appropriation act.

To sum up the discussion thus far: I have said that the American college and university are responsible to a lay governing board, and that one of the consequences is that the governing process often tends to be more authoritarian than democratic; but at the same time, the board has an unparalleled responsibility to protect and defend the integrity of the institution. The board must therefore begin by making sure that its own integrity is not breached, as a means of making sure that the institution is enabled to get on with the real purposes of higher education.

Institutional Purpose

A moment ago, I said that the purposes of the university have to do with the discovery, dissemination, advancement, and transmission of knowledge. All but the last of these purposes could be accomplished even though there was no students on any campus. But one of the generally prevailing ideas is that a college is not a college without students, that a university has at least some passing reference to make to the younger scholars in its midst. For myself, I would argue that it is the presence of the student on campus which gives the university its real reason for existence. The purpose of the university and college is not merely to discover, disseminate, advance, and transmit knowledge. The purpose is also to enable the oncoming generation to enter into its full cultural birthright—and to keep on doing this with each successive student generation.

With these stated purposes before it, and charged with full authority for discharging its purposes, how does the lay board proceed? Accountable only to itself, how shall the board achieve an easy conscience?

First, the board must distinguish sharply between the setting of policy and the administering thereof. In theory, this is simple. In practice, it is complicated and difficult. But both in theory and in operation, it is imperative.

Policy has been defined as "anything you have to take up with the boss." By definition, then, the pragmatic test is found in this: whatever the board re-

serves to itself for decision *becomes* policy; whatever it delegates *becomes* administration, in the carrying out of policy. Happy is that board which has an agenda made up only of items which are properly classified as policy items. Unhappy is the board—and equally unhappy the institution under its care—which sits down to an agenda made up of a conglomeration of everything from the purchase of laboratory sinks to hearing of professorial appeals for promotion. And when a board, or individual members thereof, intrude themselves into the administrative processes, they step out of their proper policy-making roles, undercut the effectiveness of the administrative officials they have engaged, and bring the academic house of cards down on their own heads in a shambles of disordered confusion. Sometimes it takes a campus crisis to enable a board to see its job as policy-making, not administration. Sometimes this lesson is learned only when the board has wrongly stepped in to do the administrative job, has had its fingers badly burned, and then wisely retreats to its proper policy level.

The lay board which governs a college or university ought not to presume that it has insights and judgment on academic matters which are superior to those which could come from the professional educators on the campus. Most boards—and all of the good ones—delegate to the faculties the initiative and primary responsibility in all matters of curriculum and teaching. The best among the boards do not stop there. Faculties have not only the initiative; they also have the final jurisdiction, subject only to financial ability.

Likewise, many boards—and all of the good ones—refuse to get themselves involved in matters of student eligibility, either academic or other. All questions of student discipline, together with the fixing of the rules and regulations for student conduct out of class and off campus (if any) are delegated to the campus for decision. The board may lay down guidelines or general considerations, as it may believe to be appropriate or necessary, but these should be as minimal as possible. The policy decision of the governing board with reference to students should be that the best policy is to leave these matters to the local campus to decide. The reason is simple and convincing: there is no more reason to legislate at the board level with reference to student conduct than there is to select a physics textbook by board vote. The whole of a student's experience is part of his pattern of learning—whether in classroom and laboratory or on campus or off. And since it is presumed that the function of teachers is to direct and guide the entire learning process of all students, lay board members should keep their fingers out of that function. This means, of course, that faculties stand ready to assume the burden which this delegation places upon them—that faculties are ready to be held accountable for the structuring of the whole of the learning process of students. And just as surely as faculties must exercise their judgment and assume responsibility for assessing the academic progress of a student, so, also, they must be ready to assume the same kind of direct responsibility for the progress of the student in extra-

curricular and non-curricular matters. The best way for the governing board to discharge its responsibility for all matters of curriculum, co-curriculum, and student life, is to hold the faculties accountable. And the only way for faculties to make secure their own claims to academic freedom is to assume the burdens attendant thereon, among these burdens being the task of structuring the *entire* educational experience, not merely the classroom.

How, then, does the faculty give account for the discharge of these responsibilities, once they are lodged with them? Once again, the distinction between policy and operations ought to prevail. In most academic matters, it does. A faculty which has agreed upon the standards of performance which will lead to the conferring of a bachelor's degree does not as a faculty attempt to administer those standards in judging each candidate. It leaves to individual teachers the assessment in each course of study, and it leaves to administrative officials such as registrars the final decision as to whether a student is qualified to graduate. The faculty sets the policy: the registrar carries it out. But the registrar does not set policy: he only administers it. These distinctions are clearly recognized and routinely applied in practically every college and university of the land. Administrative processes which are quasi-judicial in character are established to take care of the marginal cases and to handle appeals. But at no point does the faculty presume to take over the administering for each student of the academic processes they have set up as policy. They delegate that to the proper administrative personnel and hold the latter accountable.

Precisely the same analysis should be applied to the co-curricular activities of students on campus, and to the structuring of student life off campus, where that is deemed desirable. There can be little question in anyone's mind but that some students learn much more, and frequently learn things of far greater value, outside the classroom than inside. And if this happens to some students some of the time, there may be instances in which it is happening to most students most of the time. A faculty which is unwilling or unable to assume its proper responsibility for student life outside the classroom is, in my judgment, unfit to be a college or university faculty. It might be a good staff for a research institution, but not for a college or university. It might be acceptable by Latin American standards, but not by North American.

For what does a student learn in university? His real learnings may include the subject matter of the lectures he hears; but, equally important, he learns how to pass the course—which is often quite a different thing. And the typical student of the Laodicean generation which until 1962 populated our campuses, was learning some horrendous things during his college days. He was learning that he should not presume to take any responsibility for others. He should play it cool, not get involved. He should assume no responsibility for the governing of his life or the managing of the society in which, for four years, he was resident. He was to do as he was told, live by

the rules, or not get caught in evading them, and prolong his infancy until graduation. And now comes John Keats with his interesting conclusion that graduate schools are thronged today in large part because, as undergraduates, students have learned well the lesson that their destiny is to be students for as long a time and in as passive a fashion as possible. Reduce this accusation to its proper dimensions, and there still remains a kernel of bitter truth. It is this: faculty members too generally refuse to accept responsibility for student learnings other than those which have to do with particular subject matter in particular scheduled hours. All the rest of student learning they leave to the limbo which they disdainfully refer to as "the administration." Only when the crisis is upon them do faculty members suddenly rally in indignation and self-righteousness to assert that they, the faculty, ought to be the ones to decide matters of student conduct, student rights, and student obligations. If faculties are to justify the trust placed in them, they must be held accountable for the whole gamut of student learnings, not only in the classroom but in all the rest of student life as well.

With reference to the curriculum, even Paul Goodman says that the faculty must be the final arbiter of what is to be taught. I would agree. And then I would go on to say that it is a wise faculty which listens to its students as judgments are being formed. With reference to the co-curricular life of the campus, it is a wise faculty which recognizes the learning process as something which goes on in clubs, student government, and other forms of student activity, both organized and informal. It is a wise faculty which takes a direct concern for the furtherance of student opportunity to learn how to become accountable for what a student does and what a student is, when the professor isn't lecturing at him.

In asking that the governing board delegate to the faculty the full authority and responsibility which academic freedom requires for the classroom, and the full authority and responsibility which sound learning demands for all other aspects of student life, we are asking that the faculties be held fully accountable for what is done—and what is not done—in all these areas.

A good faculty, in its turn, will seize upon the opportunity to structure the entire learning process—not just the classroom—so as to maximize the probability that each student will learn how to become a responsible adult, in his own right. The student has a deep need to know himself, to find himself, to discover what he really is, to escape from the compulsion to be a carbon copy of his father, to cut himself loose from an older generation, to make his own way, be his own self, make his own world. Thus it has ever been, and thus it is now and ever shall be. No faculty worth its salt will overlook these facts of human life. A good faculty will learn how to seize upon these deep-rooted needs of human nature and enable the student to learn well for good ends the lessons now so frequently learned poorly at great cost and for unworthy ends and purposes. After all,

the student is merely demanding human behavior from those who control his destiny, in order that he may, with Carlyle, come to know the meaning of the Duty and Destiny of Man.

If these be the proper functions of governing boards on the one hand and of faculties on the other, then what part is to be ascribed to administrators? In one simple word, the administrator is to be held accountable for carrying out the policies which the board and the faculty establish. The corollary is that neither board nor faculty have any business intruding themselves into the administrative process. Having set the policies, they should hold administrators responsible for carrying them out, back them up in seeing to it that the policies are carried out, but not vacillate between the roles of legislator and administrator.

This means that administrators will take their work—but not themselves—seriously, not to be measured by the usual yardsticks of efficiency and economy which are applicable to the industrial plant, but to be measured by the educative effect of what they do and how they do it and measured in terms of the actual learnings of students. I hold that the only educational administration which is acceptable is one which measures itself by educational standards and which is held accountable in educational terms for the results it produces.

Good teaching must be restored to its rightful place as one of the bases for faculty promotion, if the "publish or perish" threat is to be overcome. And effective service to the learning process outside the classroom must be recognized as a valuable, perhaps priceless, component of a faculty member's qualifications. The administrator who takes this position and holds to it, despite the pressures from anti-educational educators, will be able more nearly to say that he is fully accountable and has faithfully discharged his full obligation.

Just as I would urge each department to adopt a policy whereby the leading members of the department regularly assume major responsibility for introductory courses (perhaps on a rotating basis) rather than retreating to the laboratory and the advanced graduate courses only; just as I would urge each teacher to believe that his advancement in the institution rests not only with the record of scholarly production but also with his growing effectiveness as a teacher; so, also, I would stress the fact that the teacher who takes time to contribute his wisdom and experience to student life outside the classroom and the laboratory is only performing an essential function of instruction without which his tenure and promotion are less secure and his standing in the community of scholars is on a lower level of esteem. It is, I believe, part of the responsibility of the administrator to help restore to the campus, through actual performance of himself and his colleagues of the administration and faculty, that quality of respect for individual persons which sees the student not as a number in a particular seat in a particular class, but as a person whose life and growth extend far beyond

the selected hours of formal confrontation which the institution has scheduled.

As to the alumni—my suggestion is that they do well for themselves and the university when they have had the right kind of experience as students. We college and university presidents sometimes wear our alumni associations like a hair shirt, and we do well to do so. Each of us gets the kind of alumni he deserves. If, as students, they did not manage to grow up and to be responsible adults, by what right can we expect them to be metamorphosed on receiving a piece of the skin of a dead sheep? A college which has been on the right track will enjoy the support of its alumni as it continues that course. A college which has been on the wrong track may, with difficulty, win alumni support as it shifts course. But a college which stays on the wrong track in order to placate the alumni whom it has wrongly educated is eligible for the black list.

As for students, their place in the college and university is, by definition, the status of learners. What they learn, and whether they learn well what they learn, is in part their own responsibility. I have heard of students who managed to become educated in spite of the institutions in which they enrolled. But surely the learning process, if it is to be fully effective, must become a shared responsibility. The student has a right to believe that he is a human being, a person, to whom attaches that degree of dignity and respect which he merits by his performance. He has a right to expect from his teachers something other than condescension, something more than aloofness, something not in the weekly schedule and not in the syllabus. He can entertain the hope that somewhere during his undergraduate days he will come across at least one professor who sets his mind to whirling mightily; who activates his curiosity and then turns him loose; who stands ready to counsel and advise—and just to listen; who is interested in him not only as the occupant of a seat in class and an IBM number on the final roll of grades for the semester, but as a sometimes slashing and flailing and always exploring and inquiring person who wants to know what life is all about and what his part in making and remaking the world may hopefully be.

Where students do not find these values in their academic experience, they are ingloriously short-changed. They should then be held accountable if they did not bring these matters clearly to the attention of the faculty. Everyone recognizes this truth. Perhaps it is for that reason that the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley made so much noise about alleged dissatisfaction with the multiversity. It was a tactic which won immediate support from all quarters. But as the study by Professor Somers makes clear, the actual fact is that only 17 percent of the students at Berkeley expressed any degree of dissatisfaction with the way they were treated in the educational process. One-fifth were "very satisfied," and another three-fifths "satisfied." And when Somers singles out that group whom he calls "militants," the

hard core of the campus revolt, he finds that the ratio of dissatisfaction with their actual treatment in the educational process was no larger among the militants than among those whom he classifies as "conservatives" and "moderates." He found that in November 1964, after the October days of the student revolution, 92 percent of the students agreed with this statement: "Although some people don't think so, the President of this University and the Chancellor of this campus are really trying very hard to provide top-quality educational experience for students here." If Somers' findings are correct (and I have no basis for questioning them), it must be concluded that the well-spring of student dissatisfaction at Berkeley was not dissatisfaction with what was going on in the classroom and through formal instruction, widespread comment to the contrary notwithstanding. The actual roots of student revolt lay in two other areas: (1) a strong conviction on the part of the "militants" that they were capable of helping to make decisions of the university and ought therefore to be accorded some part in this decision-making process; and (2) an optimistic idealism about the type of society which can be shaped by the new generation, and an unwillingness to allow the paternalism endemic to college campuses to extend its coverage to the activities necessary for the furtherance of those ideals.

While I, for one, believe that the students under the leadership they followed, did not succeed in finding either the right method or the right spirit for accomplishing their purposes, I also believe that if Somers' analysis can be accepted, the students had full justification for refusing to remain silent. I have, at some length, dealt with this aspect of the current campus scene, in another connection, suggesting that the difference between the eristic and the heuristic controversy is the crucial point.

I would go so far as to suggest that there is not a more important question before American higher education today than the question on which its survival rests. For if we cannot attain the heuristic spirit, we will become more and more completely eristic—and that means we will be patterned after one or the other of two extremes of eristic control—the Russian or the Latin American. In either case, freedom of education will be lost, for we shall have become accountable either to the government or to the revolution, tomorrow's government.

I find no justification for the eristic conduct of any man at any time. I find full justification for what might have been a heuristic engagement on the Berkeley campus last October—if it had been rightly developed—and I find the same things to be true on any campus of which I have knowledge. We miss the boat when we talk only about increasing democracy. Democracy in higher education is not enough. The heuristic spirit *must* be present if academic freedom is to survive.

Accountability

Who, then, ought to run the institution?

The lay governing board is finally accountable for

everything that the university is and does. It discharges its responsibility best by doing three things: (1) after full discussion, careful inquiry, and extensive consultation, setting some policies of the institution and delegating to the campus full authority for setting other policies; (2) selecting with great care the ablest administrators it can find, to carry out these policies, and delegating to each campus the whole administrative responsibility for that campus—and keeping out of administration itself; and (3) protecting the institution, its president, its faculties, and its students from any and all intrusions upon institutional integrity. A governing board which does these three things well may be assured that it has rendered full account, answering the question raised at the outset of this speech. Neither Mario Savio nor Max Rafferty is correct.

The faculties, if they are to enjoy the privileges of academic freedom so dearly bought and so precariously defended, must stand ready to assume full responsibility for the whole of the learning process of every student. The curriculum, the co-curricular life, and the balance of student life are all a part of the experience through which a student learns. As surely as learning is a central concern of the university and college, just as surely this comprehensive concern for the learners must be accepted by any man or woman who seeks sanctuary and faculty status within *Academe*. Faculties which are willing and ready to be held accountable for the whole of the learning process of each successive oncoming student generation have the right to draw their pay checks and to claim the respect of their fellows.

Presidents and deans and other administrative persons discharge their obligations in a variety of ways: by refusing to lose the individual in the routines; by adhering to principle even when the easy compromise beckons; by holding faculty members and students accountable for respecting the policies of the institution—and rewarding those who do, as well as failing to reward those who do not; by exhausting their inventive ingenuity in discovering democratic alternatives for autocratic procedures; by being quick to recognize the phony, the four-flusher, the apple polisher, the summer soldier, the cheater, the brief-case professor, and the chiseling student—and giving to each his due; by being equally quick to recognize the man of integrity, whatever his station, and according full respect and dignity where it is due; by holding themselves accountable for carrying out their assigned duties with an educative purpose in mind; and by espousing the heuristic spirit, refusing to abandon it under provocation, seeking not to win over others but to win them over.

Students, in their turn, have no less difficult a burden laid upon them. Theirs is the task of wrestling from an obstinate educational process full value in effort amply rewarded.

Just how difficult this process is may be judged from the able and revealing paper presented this morning by Mr. Potter. In part, this new generation of protest is repeating the protests of the 1920's and 1930's. In

part—and this is the distinctive aspect of the 1960's—it introduces a new element. Without attempting to do justice in these few closing moments to a subject which cries for explication, let me throw out these suggestive words which may stimulate further analysis.

It may be said that the dominant mood of the student generations of the 1920's was euphoric. There was a widespread feeling of general well-being which actually glossed over a deep-seated *malaise*. The protest movement of the 1920's (and it *was there!*) might be called the anti-euphoric movement. It was a call to social health, social well-being; and it entertained the lovely hope that social gains could be achieved through social reform.

Then came the depression. The new breed of campus rebels rejected the reform ideas of their predecessors, raging that the earlier hopes had been utopian, and therefore soporific. Through the 1930's, campus rebels were not only opposed to the status quo; they were also opposed to the previous generation of campus rebels. They were the *anti-utopioriphic* generation.

Today's rebel, as typified by the Students for a Democratic Society, is likewise rebelling not only against society but also against all previous generations of campus rebels. They would hold that the proper name for the university is not the multiversity—not even the megaversity. It is the negaversity. All of its values are negative, its processes empty, its goals hollow, its pretensions hypocritical. The positive values of the SDS are not yet defined, and the movement shrinks from defining anything positively, lest

it suffer the fate of becoming institutionalized and identified with the corruption of the new Establishment. The word which best supports the character of today's campus rebels is dysphoria—the sense of general ill-being, probably just as specious as the euphoric well-being felt in the 1920's. The next rebels of the 1960's will appear when the protest movement of today becomes sufficiently mature, producing the anti-dysphoric movement, not dissimilar to the anti-euphoric movement of earlier times. The present dysphoric generation is managing to impress upon its elders the fact that the world as they have inherited it needs some radical improvement; but the student of today will not have discharged his responsibility if he ceases in his efforts to do more than protest and demonstrate. He must show by his actions and attitude that he has assumed—not that he is *ready* to assume, but that he *has* assumed—the accountability of adulthood. As long as the student fails to distinguish between irresponsible revolt and responsible action, just so long will the eristic miasma of campus life prevent the emergence of heuristic well-being. Every effort of the university in all its component parts, each at its proper level of policy and of operation, might well be concentrated on the effort to nurture and encourage the heuristic student in his never-ending search.

If these things are done well, we will produce the kind of alumni in whom we can take quiet pride.

And no one will then ask, who runs the university? It will be running itself.

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College Self Study: Lectures on Institutional Research, Given at Stanford University, July 19-25, 1959. Richard G. Axt and Hall T. Sprague, eds. Boulder, Colo.: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1960.

This volume contains lectures and reports on the background and organization of institutional research, research on students, faculty, budgets, academic programs, space and campus planning, and other special areas. Although out-of-print, this publication may be obtained through Inter-library Loan Service from any one of the depository libraries listed.

2nd Annual Institute, 1960.

Research on College Students: Institute Lectures Considering Recent Research on College Students' Motivation, Values and Attitudes, and Campus Cultures. Hall T. Sprague, ed. Boulder, Colo.: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1960.

Includes lectures and case studies on the sociopsychological position of the student and this in relation to the institution of higher education. Although out-of-print, this publication may be obtained through Inter-library Loan Service from any one of the depository libraries listed.

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Studies of College Faculty: The Papers Presented at the Institute for College and University Administrators and Faculty, University of California, Berkeley, July 31-August 4, 1961. Boulder, Colo.: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1961.

Lectures on the college faculty. Some of the areas covered include the "Academic Man," studies of faculty evaluation, research on faculty recruitment and motivation, the role of the faculty in college administration, and faculty expectations, satisfactions, and morale. This publication can still be obtained directly from WICHE. \$2.00.

4th Annual Institute, 1962.

The Study of Campus Cultures: The Papers Presented at the Fourth Annual Institute on College Self Study, University of California at Berkeley, July 24-27, 1962. Terry F. Lunsford, ed., Boulder,

Colo.: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1963.

Contains lectures and reports by Ralph Tyler, Burton Clark, Robert Pace, Theodore Newcomb, Martin Trow, Howard Becker, and Mrs. Jean Floud on diverse areas of interest including student stress, student culture, interactions between academic, administrative, and student subcultures, faculty culture, and the administrative implications of analyses of campus cultures. Out-of-print, but Xerographic copies are available from University Microfilms, Inc., 313 N. 1st St., Ann Arbor, Mich. \$8.95. Request should not be directed to WICHE.

5th Annual Institute, 1963.

The Study of Academic Administration: Papers Presented at the Fifth Annual Institute on College Self Study, University of California at Berkeley, July 22-26, 1963. Terry F. Lunsford, ed., Boulder, Colo.: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1963.

Now in its second printing, this publication includes the papers presented by Anderson, Dixon, Clark, Wicke, Stull, Wert, Wilson, and McConnell. Subjects include organization, authority structure, "Deans: Men in the Middle," "Leadership, the Integrative Factor," external constraints, and other topics. This publication can still be obtained directly from WICHE. \$2.00.

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Long-Range Planning in Higher Education: The Papers and Discussions of the Sixth Annual Institute on College Self Study for College and University Administrators, Held at the University of California at Berkeley, July 6-10, 1964. Owen A. Knorr, ed., Boulder, Colo.: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1965.

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