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THE POLITICAL INFLUENCES IMPOSED ON BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WERE DISCUSSED. FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, THE AUTHOR CONCLUDED THAT BOTH TYPES OF INSTITUTION ARE SUBJECT TO PRESSURE FROM POWERFUL, OFTEN SUBTLE, EXTERNAL FORCES, ALTHOUGH THE FORM AND ORIGIN OF ENCROACHMENT MIGHT DIFFER. SOME OF THE WAYS PRESSURES ARE EXERTED WERE DESCRIBED, AND A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS WERE MADE (1) FOR CHANGES IN THE SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING BOARDS OF COLLEGES, (2) FOR REDUCTION OF CONTROLS EXERCISED OVER THE PUBLIC FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR UNIVERSITY OPERATION, (3) FOR DETERMINATION, BY THE COLLEGE, OF THE SOCIAL NEEDS IT WILL CHOOSE TO FILL, AND (4) FOR COOPERATION AMONG INSTITUTIONS WITHIN A STATE IN INTERRELATED EDUCATIONAL NETWORKS. PROBLEMS OF PLANNING, COORDINATION, GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCE, AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY THAT HAVE DEVELOPED IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF BOTH GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA WERE ALSO PRESENTED. THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED FOR THE CONFERENCE ON "CAMPUS AND CAPITOL," BERKELEY, JULY 14, 1966. (AL)

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THE UNIVERSITY AND THE STATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY *

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**Center for Research and Development
in Higher Education**

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THE UNIVERSITY AND THE STATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Writing on "The Politics of Education", Lawrence A. Cremin, the eminent educational historian, pointed to a tension that has characterized popular education from the beginning. "On the one hand," he observed,

there is the prerogative of the public to set policy, determine direction, and fix support: we speak of public control, not merely public sponsorship or public influence. On the other hand, there is the prerogative of the teaching profession to govern its own work, set standards, and determine the nature of teaching practice: the teacher is committed to teaching truth as he sees it and to following the truth wherever it leads. Recognizing this tension, the late Charles Beard used to argue that a democratic society should support schools which should then be left free to criticize the society that supports them.¹

Cremin pointed out, however, that the lower schools have seldom enjoyed genuine freedom for social criticism. Only colleges and universities have won this prerogative, and even today their independence is by no means universally or completely secure. Weaker institutions are often subservient to political forces, religious pressures, or coercion by conservative private interests. The more distinguished institutions, large or small, on the other hand, have governing boards and administrative officers which protect faculty members with liberal or even leftist attitudes. Summarizing their data on the "Vulnerability and Strength of the Superior College", Lazarsfeld and Thielens reached the following conclusions:

The higher the quality of a college, the larger its proportion of permissive (liberal) social scientists. [Insertion mine.]

The higher the quality, the stronger the pressures and attacks from the off-campus community.

The higher the quality of the school, the better the performance of the administration in defending the academic freedom of its social scientists.

¹ Cremin, L. A., The Genius of American Education. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965, pp. 95-96.

The same authors then asked,

If the more distinguished colleges are more subject to pressure and more frequently the scene of controversial incidents, how is it, nevertheless, that their administrations perform better by all of our criteria, including the protection given social scientists?

They answered the question as follows:

For the most part the individuals chosen as trustees are selected because they are successful in their own enterprises . . . If they are responsible for a college, they want it to have prestige, so they appoint presidents who they hope will make their regime "successful", without going too deeply into the existing academic implications of the idea. The president, in turn, will build up a staff whose men and women command the respect of their peers and live up to the prevailing norms of the teaching profession. We have shown that a permissive atmosphere is a part of these norms . . .

Even if they themselves have conservative attitudes, it will be exactly those administrators who have built up successful colleges who will have the strongest personal and professional involvement in the prestige of their institutions, and be least willing to sacrifice good teachers in the interests of possibly temporary cycles in ideological mood . . . The more successful he has been in building up the prestige of his college, the more likely he will be to protect it now against the pressures upon it.¹

Attempts by both politicians and trustees to restrict or censure free teaching and expression by faculty members probably impinge more often on tax-supported institutions than upon those which are privately financed. Let it not be supposed, however, that privately controlled colleges and universities invariably escape attacks on academic freedom. From my experience in both publicly and privately supported institutions, I conclude that both are subject to pressure from powerful, often subtle, external forces, although the form and origin of the encroachment may differ. The fact that countervailing forces play upon the two groups of colleges and universities strengthens both in fending off attacks on their freedom. The dual system of public and private higher education in the United States

¹ Lazarsfeld, P. F. and Thielens, Wagner, Jr., The Academic Mind. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958, pp. 176, 178-179.

strengthens the independence and integrity of the whole.

Speaking of a trend toward monolithic control of American higher education, Logan Wilson declared recently:

As a firm believer in a dual system of higher education, I contend that this trend toward a monolithic scheme is neither desirable nor necessary. In view of recent developments in the control of public higher education, it seems to me more vital than ever before to strengthen the capabilities of private institutions.¹

Important as the private sector may be, however, the growing public, and especially federal, support for private institutions blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors, and threatens to subject the latter to political influence. I shall return to this point later.

One device for protecting the university's prerogative for social criticism is to insulate the institution from control by a government ministry or from direct popular control. The greatest degree of separation of the university from the body politic is found -- today almost exclusively -- in Oxford and Cambridge, which are still self-governing societies of academics, although both universities, as distinct from their constituent colleges, get most of their support from the state. Although they are formally self-governing, these ancient universities have not been completely insulated from external influences. Royal commissions have demanded reforms; they are subject to minimal controls by the University Grants Committee; and recently the Robbins Committee on Higher Education directed some sharp criticisms toward Oxford's organizational structure, administrative processes, and educational affairs. So pointed were these shafts that Oxford, fearing, it is said, that the Robbins Report might lead to the appointment of another Royal Commission, hastened to appoint its own committee to appraise its operations and to recommend desirable changes.

¹ Quoted in American Council on Education, Higher Education and National Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 21, January 23, 1966.

This was the Franks Committee, which recently issued a two-volume report which proposed that the University should streamline its structure and administration but retain its self-government. The report explicitly vetoed the Robbins proposal to add laymen to the University's governing body.¹

Academic self-government is not the American way. Almost without exception the government of colleges and universities in the United States is placed in the hands of lay boards of trustees which are invested by charter or legislation with supreme authority over their institutions, although the boards may, and usually do, delegate all or parts of their authority to their own officers and committees, the president and other administrative officials of the institution, and the faculty.

Governing boards of public institutions enjoy a measure of independence from political pressure by virtue of the fact that the members are appointed for relatively long, overlapping terms, a procedure which makes it difficult for a single governor to control the board's composition.

Terms of office, it may be noted, can be too long. Members of the Board of Regents of the University of California are appointed for sixteen-year terms, and in the past were often reappointed. It is not surprising that the sign which greeted you as you entered the campus is both literally and figuratively true:

PROPERTY OF THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

The Regents of this University have been notorious for intervening in administrative affairs which should be delegated to the executive officers and faculties of the institution. Fortunately, limited progress in this delegation has recently been made.

In the overwhelming number of cases, the members of governing boards of publicly controlled institutions are appointed by the governor alone, or

¹ University of Oxford, Report of Commission of Inquiry. Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966.

with the concurrence of the senate. It is widely believed that appointive boards are less susceptible to political pressure than are those whose members are elected by the people. In Illinois, where the governing board of the state university is elected, political partisanship has been tempered over a long period by the practice in both major political parties of accepting candidates nominated by the University's alumni association. This policy, however, has not always prevailed. It was a politically nominated board member, a former famous football star, who introduced the motion of no-confidence which led some years ago to the resignation of President George L. Stoddard. There are some political scientists and educators who believe that public universities should be directly responsible to the electorate and thus more intimately accountable to the people. But a much larger proportion of students of administration believe that the indirect form of representation is more effective in protecting institutions from the vagaries and impulses of the public will.

As noted previously, the governing boards of public colleges and universities in the United States are almost invariably composed of laymen. The instances in which faculty members sit on governing bodies of their own institutions are extremely rare. One of the exceptions was the University of Buffalo before it became a part of the State University of New York. There was no formal system of faculty representation even at Buffalo. However, the alumni of the University, from their own roster, elected one-third of the voting members of the governing board, and while I was Chancellor they could and did elect administrative officers or faculty members. Indoctrinated as I was with American practice, I looked on this situation with some misgivings. I must say, however, that experience dissipated my doubt about the desirability of having members of the University's staff among my employers. I concluded that their presence was a valuable means of communication in both directions between the staff and the governors.

The opportunity for an interchange of attitudes and ideas led to a better understanding of the nature of the University on the part of the lay members, and to a better appreciation of the relationship of the University to its public on the part of the faculty and administrative staff.

The American Association of University Professors has long pressed for faculty representation on governing boards, and I should like to see the principle widely adopted. The practice of the English civic universities in including faculty members on the Court has proved its value, and the seven new universities have followed the custom. As the colleges of advanced technology become universities, members of staff are also included in their governing bodies.

There is pressure in some of the universities in Ontario, where I visited recently, for faculty representation. The faculty of one institution, in fact, wanted a majority of the places on the governing board. This seems to me to be going too far; it would vitiate the principle of lay control, which, in spite of the abuses to which it has been subjected from time to time or place to place, seems to me to be essentially sound. Nevertheless, faculty membership on the boards of public institutions would, in my judgment, greatly improve the liaison between the people and the government on the one hand, and the colleges and universities on the other, and make the boards more effective buffers between the university and the state.

Public colleges and universities in the United States have been increasingly subjected to restrictive controls by state finance, personnel, and purchasing departments. Growing governmental control over the fiscal operations and, through fiscal intervention, over educational affairs as well, led in 1957 to the appointment of a Committee on Government and Higher Education to study the changing relationships between state governments and public institutions of higher education. This Committee's report

documented a growing threat to the corporate autonomy of state colleges and universities through close supervision by various state officials -- budget officers, comptrollers, purchasing agents, and legislative auditors. This intervention, said the Committee, amounted in many instances to a usurpation of the responsibility of those in whom it was legally vested.¹

Most public institutions or systems of higher education must submit their appropriation requests to a state department of finance for review and final incorporation in the governor's executive budget for submission to the legislature. The Committee found that state finance officers frequently made decisions, not alone on the general level of support which should be afforded higher education in competition with other governmental services, but also on specific items of proposed expenditure involving such fundamental matters as educational program, faculty salaries, and admission policies. The Committee passed forthright judgment on this practice when it said:

Viewed from a management perspective alone, it violates the canons of sound administration for a college governing board to be vested with legal and public responsibility for the conduct of educational affairs, while the real decision-making power resides at some remote spot in the state bureaucracy. The maxim that authority should be commensurate with responsibility is grossly violated on a campus where routine decisions on financial matters are in fact made by a state official. Carried to an extreme, as it has been in some places, such a system of remote control denies to governing boards and college presidents the power they are intended and entitled to have. In such a situation, public officials who may be ill-equipped to make educational decisions are moved into a position where they govern higher education without bearing any visible responsibility for its success or failure.²

One of the best examples of the assumption of the prerogatives of a responsible governing board by the officials -- and often subordinate rather than principal officers -- of an executive budget agency may be

1 Committee on Government and Higher Education, The Efficiency of Freedom. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, p. 9.

2 Committee on Government and Higher Education, *ibid.*, p. 12.

found in the administration of the California state college system. Three surveys have criticized the State Finance Department for such practices as requiring the institutions to submit line item budgets for approval, making a pre-audit of expenditures, and retaining control over transfer of funds from one item or classification to another.

In the Restudy of the Needs of California in Higher Education, published in 1958, I wrote:

. . . it is recommended that the State Department of Finance discontinue its pre-audit of expenditures after the budget for the state colleges has been approved and the legislative appropriation has been made. It is recommended, further, that the state college governing board be authorized to transfer funds from one item to another in the current operating budget, and to release funds from reserve or contingency categories as educational and administrative needs and operating efficiency dictate.

The Master Plan for Higher Education in California made the same proposals in 1960, and the Coordinating Council for Higher Education, which was created pursuant to the Master Plan, has strongly pressed for appropriate fiscal authority for the state college system. Nevertheless, the State Finance Department has persisted in its restrictive controls instead of authorizing the state colleges to establish a modern system of performance budgeting, and so has continued to impose on the institutions an inflexible, stultifying, and in my judgment, a fiscally inefficient form of operation.

The California Coordinating Council has repeatedly recommended that the trustees of the state college system should be given a large degree of flexibility in determining how appropriated funds can be most effectively used in carrying out the functions and programs of the institutions, and more specifically that a budget built around purposes and programs replace one composed of detailed line items, that the pre-auditing of expenditures be abandoned, and that the legislature make a single appropriation for operations to the state college system and that the trustees then allocate financial resources to individual colleges.

The Coordinating Council, and the state college system as well, has stated that the system should devise methods of effective program evaluation and efficient financial management, together with adequate reporting, plus a post-audit of expenditures, as means of accountability for the performance of its purposes and the stewardship of its financial resources. The Governor recently directed all State agencies, including those concerned with higher education, to go to a program budget, beginning in 1967-68. This is encouraging progress.

The Legislative Analyst recently recommended and in 1966 the legislature approved a limited transfer of fiscal authority to the state college system, and it is to be hoped that both the legislature and the Finance Department will accept the other recommendations of the Coordinating Council, the Master Plan, the previously expressed legislative intent to give the trustees authority commensurate with their responsibility, and modern methods of budgeting and administration that stress the effective accomplishment of mission rather than the limitation of expenditures.¹

Certain state universities, including those in California, Minnesota, and Michigan, have a special constitutional status which, it has been said, makes them a fourth arm of the government. These universities usually possess full power over the expenditure of legislative appropriations. The autonomy of the University of California was established in the section of the state constitution which begins as follows:

The University of California shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing corporation known as "The Regents of the University of California", with full powers of organization and government subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure compliance with the terms of the endowments of the University and the security of its funds.

¹ Staff Report for the Coordinating Council for Higher Education, Recognition of Fiscal Authority and Responsibility for the Trustees of the California State Colleges. March 29, 1966.

The section provides further that

said corporation shall also have all the powers necessary or convenient for the effective administration of its trust . . . and to delegate to its committees or to the faculty of the University, or to others, such authority or functions as it may deem wise . . .

No public institution, whether it possesses constitutional autonomy or not, can or should treat the legislature in cavalier fashion. So long as it must return to the legislature each year or each biennium, an institution is fundamentally accountable to the law-making body. If a university secured additional support for specific purposes, such as new educational programs, additional staff or higher faculty salaries, it would divert funds from these to other purposes only under the most extraordinary circumstances, and would properly have to justify its action the next time it approached the legislature for its operating budget. Thus, constitutional autonomy does not absolve a university from governmental accountability. However, responsibility and accountability do not require an institution to surrender to state executive officers the right to make decisions concerning the means by which it strives to attain its academic goals.

The fundamental distinction between appropriate and inappropriate fiscal controls by government agencies was stated by Arthur Naftalin when he was Commissioner of Administration for the State of Minnesota. Naftalin had been a professor of political science at the University of Minnesota before he entered the state government. As quoted in the report of the Committee on Government and Higher Education, he said:

I should divide the problem of fiscal control over state-supported higher education into two parts. First, there is the initial question of which section of the state's resources should be devoted to higher education, and second, the expenditure and internal allocation of the state support once it has been voted. With respect to the first stage, I believe this is wholly, appropriately and inescapably within the jurisdiction of the governor and the state legislature . . . But with respect to the second stage, once the elected representatives have spoken, fiscal control should become the responsibility of the academy itself, as represented and symbolized

by the regents or trustees or college board. It should be their responsibility to determine how the limited resources available shall be distributed among the infinite number of competing academic needs. To impose upon this process the will and direction of state fiscal officers constitutes an encroachment that is potentially extremely dangerous.¹

In spite of the warning of the Committee on Government in Higher Education, a new investigation would show, I feel certain, that state agencies have strengthened their detailed fiscal control even over public institutions that presumably possess constitutional autonomy. For example, by reviewing specific budget items, the State Department of Finance has tended to erode the autonomy and authority of the University of California. If my memory serves me correctly, about ten years ago the University submitted a list of building priorities in requesting appropriations for capital purposes. The State Department of Finance revised the priorities according to its own lights which, with all due respect to the intelligence of the officers concerned, could hardly be as bright as the lights of those intimately involved with the University's development and integrity. Since that episode, the surveillance over the University's operations and development has grown steadily. Both the Finance Department and the legislature have in effect eliminated or altered line items in proposed budgets.

In preparing the executive budget, the Finance Department has on occasion questioned the academic staffing structure, e.g., the proportion of faculty at the several ranks, of a particular department. This review, it is true, has occurred before the legislature makes the University's appropriation. But one wonders how soon the same kind of surveillance may be exercised after operating funds have been appropriated.

State funding of the University is on a monthly reimbursement basis. Not infrequently the Finance Department raises questions about the propriety of specific expenditures. To date, I believe, these questions have involved

¹ Committee on Government and Higher Education, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

supply and expense items, rather than personnel costs. Again, however, one wonders when the review will extend to academic and non-academic personnel items. It may be argued that surveillance of expenditures through the reimbursement technique is a post-audit. Perhaps technically it is; in any event, it is a swift one.

The legislature last year excised an item of \$100,000 for support of the University of California Press. If the state had to cut the University's request by \$100,000, it should have left to the University the decision as to where the sum should be saved. From the same budget request, the lawmakers cut the item for teaching assistants in the amount of \$600,000 and reduced by \$400,000 the provision for remission of out-of-state tuition for graduate students who met certain academic requirements. These measures supposedly did not refer to the University's mission or programs. They did, however, seriously hamper the University in mobilizing the means to carry out its recognized roles. Again, the legislature should have determined the resources to be made available to the University and then have left to the institution the effective expenditure of the funds. Unless the University of California stubbornly resists the trend toward more detailed budgetary control from the Statehouse, it will soon become politically subservient and its constitutional autonomy will become a hollow form. It will rapidly retrogress toward the unhappy situation of the state colleges.

Although public institutions should be free from restrictive budgetary controls, they must not be insensitive to the social, economic, and cultural needs of the people who support them. In the first article of the workbook for this conference, the author pointed to a difficult dilemma:

. . . the need of independence for an educational institution from the source of its sustenance . . . this independence must be achieved in such a fashion that the institution doesn't

isolate itself from reality and destroy its usefulness through ever-narrowing scholasticism.¹

Sir Eric Ashby, Master of Clare College at Cambridge, ran into the same dilemma. "The arguments for university autonomy," he said,

like the arguments for academic freedom, are weakened by querulous appeals to tradition and privilege. The only effective argument is the pragmatic one. A system of higher education, like an airline, is a highly technical organization. If experts are not allowed to run it without interference from the state, it will collapse. The only effective policy, therefore, is for universities, like airlines, to be left to manage their own affairs.

But then Sir Eric ran into a predicament. "The general difficulty is," he conceded,

that the state undoubtedly has the right to make certain demands on its public services, including its system of higher education, and to expect these demands to be met.²

Considering possible governmental prerogatives, President Murray G. Ross of York University, Toronto, in his recent annual report, excerpts from which are reproduced in our workbook, posed such questions as the following: Is it not appropriate for the government, either through its legislative or executive branches, to determine how many students publicly controlled colleges and universities should admit and what standards should be used in selecting them, what professional schools to establish and how many professionals to train, what buildings and equipment should be provided, what salaries should be paid to faculty and staff, what the distribution of faculty ranks should be, and what public services the university should perform?³ Presumably Sir Eric would reply that it is not appropriate

1 Arnold, C. K., "Higher Education: Fourth Branch of Government?" Saturday Review, January 18, 1964.

2 Sir Eric Ashby, "Some Problems of Universities in New Countries of the British Commonwealth". Comparative Education 2:1-10, November, 1965.

3 Ross, Murray G., "The President's Report" in These Five Years. Toronto, Canada, York University, 1965.

for the government to make final decisions on any of these matters, for he quoted Mr. Justice Frankfurter to this effect:

It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university -- to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who may be admitted to study.¹

Speaking on May 9, 1966, at a conference held by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Sir Eric admitted that the universities of his country, pursuing the "four freedoms", "have denied the opportunity for higher education to tens of thousands of British children who deserve to have one." He also observed that Flexner, reflecting the conservative tradition of the British universities, had been mistaken in issuing

. . . Jeremiads about the introduction of journalism and business studies into American universities.

Sir Eric went on:

I believe that to admit into the college curriculum new professional schools on our terms -- the terms of the faculty, not of the legislature or the alumni -- is an essential obligation of universities. But, let it be emphasized, on our terms, for we are the experts . . .²

My answer, too, is that the public university, not the state, should determine policy on such matters as whom to admit, what and how to teach, whom to appoint to the faculty and staff, and how much to pay them. This is not to say that the university should be insensitive to social needs. It is to say that the university must distinguish which of these needs it is appropriate for it to serve. If it responds to every strong pressure for some form of training, research, or public service, it will often find itself serving short-range goals rather than those of far-reaching

1 Sir Eric Ashby, op. cit.

2 Sir Eric Ashby, "The University Ideal". Address at the convocation on "The University in America", Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Los Angeles, May 9, 1966 (mimeographed).

significance.¹

Not only should the public university eschew short-range goals; it should decide what functions it will perform qua university, and leave to other institutions a wide range of educational activities which are necessary in the public interest, but which are inappropriate to an institution which is the capstone of a public system of higher education. I have proposed elsewhere that the major American state universities should in fact become institutions of learning of the highest grade, and that they should concentrate their resources and programs on advanced undergraduate, professional, and graduate education; on research; and on related levels of public service.²

If universities are to perform limited functions at the apex of a public system of higher education, they have the obligation, it seems to me, to encourage the creation or development of other institutions serving other significant social needs. It was with this obligation in mind that I said that the major state universities should transfer their junior college functions to junior colleges, and that they should encourage the development of public regional four-year institutions offering instruction in liberal studies and selected professions, and, I would now add, appropriate programs of postgraduate instruction. Such a system of higher education has been developed most fully, perhaps, in California.

The University of California, in company with Stanford University, has long supported the development, expansion, and improvement of community colleges, and the University of California, through the Coordinating Council, is cooperating with the state college system in developing a network

1 Morrill, J. L., The Ongoing State University. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960, p. 103.

2 McConnell, T. R., A General Pattern for American Public Higher Education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, p. 109.

of interrelated institutions performing both common and differential functions. Certain other states are now moving rapidly to bring a differentiated pattern of higher institutions into being and into productive coordination.

In Britain, on the other hand, the universities have until now maintained a monopoly on the awarding of degrees, and they have stubbornly protected their elite position in the whole structure of post-secondary education. ". . . by putting on the market, as it were, only Lincolns and no Fords, we have not fulfilled adequately our loyalty to contemporary society," is the way Sir Eric Ashby put it. Sir Eric went on to confess:

In our present social climate I don't believe excellence can be safeguarded (as we have tried to safeguard it in Britain) by keeping mediocrity out of higher education. This is simply unrealistic. I believe it must be safeguarded as you are trying to in America, by the peaceful coexistence of mediocrity and excellence. They have -- after all -- got to coexist elsewhere in society, and it is an educational commonplace that Gresham's Law does not hold for college degrees; indeed mediocrity is improved by association with excellence. Fords do not drive Lincolns off the market.¹

I do not like Sir Eric's reference to "mediocrity and excellence". As a matter of fact, his use of the word "mediocrity" is inconsistent with his statement that quality has to do with the integrity of an educational enterprise, with an institution's or an individual's own purposes and performance.²

In stating that Gresham's Law does not hold for college degrees, Sir Eric implied that British higher education should abandon its attempt to maintain the equivalence of degrees (although they are almost certainly not as equivalent as is often assumed).

I shall discuss later the bearing of the abandonment of the doctrine

1 Sir Eric Ashby, "The University Ideal", op. cit.

2 Sir Eric Ashby, "Some Problems of Universities in New Countries of the British Commonwealth", op. cit.

of equivalence in connection with the development of a non-university sector of higher education in Britain.

In an address on April 27, 1965, which was afterwards officially released by the Ministry, the Secretary of State for Education and Science created no small amount of consternation and opposition in British university circles by announcing that the government planned to establish what has come to be known as a binary system of higher education. By implication, Mr. Crosland, the Secretary, charged that the universities had been insensitive, or at least unresponsive, to social requirements, and declared that consequently "a substantial part of the higher education system should be under social control, and directly responsible to social needs." The Secretary also asserted that in Britain there "is an ever-increasing need and demand for vocational, professional and industrially-based courses in higher education" which "cannot be fully met by the Universities" and therefore "requires a separate sector, with a separate tradition and outlook within the higher education system." The Secretary went on to say:

. . . a system based on the ladder concept must inevitably depress and degrade both morale and standards in the non-university sector. If the universities have a "class" monopoly of degree-giving, and if every College which achieves high standards moves automatically into the University Club, then the residual public sector becomes a permanent poor relation perpetually deprived of its brightest ornaments, and with a permanently and openly inferior status. This must be bad for morale, bad for standards, and productive only of an unhealthy competitive mentality.

Mr. Crosland went on to say that it was essential to establish a vocationally oriented non-University sector which is degree-giving and with an appropriate amount of postgraduate work with opportunities for learning comparable with those of the Universities, and giving a first-class professional training. Let us now move away from our snobbish cast-ridden hierarchical obsession with University status.

The annoyance and even the anger of some sections of the British university community are not surprising in view of some of the Secretary's language and imputations. Although Mr. Crosland may now be somewhat rueful

about the manner in which he put his points, he has not deserted the substance of his case. At the end of May, a "white paper" from the Department of Education and Science appeared under the title of "A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges: Higher Education in the Further Education System".¹

The "white paper" announced that the Department of Education and Science would designate a number of polytechnics (perhaps 30) which will concentrate wholly or mainly on students of age 18 and over pursuing courses of higher education. In addition, certain specialized colleges, such as those in commerce, music, and art, may be designated as parts of the system or may be incorporated in the polytechnics. The Department also announced that it would add no new polytechnics to the list for ten years. Presumably, the Department believes that by freezing the status of institutions of further education it can stop what the Secretary referred to in his speech as a "continuous rat-race" to "ape the universities above", with the consequence of almost "inevitable failure to achieve the diversity in higher education which contemporary society needs". At the same time, the Department announced that there would be no new universities or accessions to university status during the same decade.

The polytechnics will not be empowered, in the beginning at any rate, to award their own degrees. But the traditional monopoly of the universities over degrees will nevertheless be broken. Students who satisfactorily complete courses approved by the Council for National Academic Awards, which was recently created by Royal Charter, will be granted degrees by the Council. The CNAA is the successor to the National Council for Technological Awards, which had been established to award the Diploma in Technology (as a presumably equivalent substitute for degrees) to students who were graduated from the Colleges of Advanced Technology or approved

¹ London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, May, 1966.

advanced courses in certain technical colleges.

In an effort to assure equivalence in quality with university degrees, the National Council for Technological Awards set very high standards for the "Dip. Tech." Apparently the CNAA plans to follow the doctrine (which, as I said above, is part fiction) of equivalence in standards (if not in content and emphasis) in approving courses for degrees in the polytechnics. In my judgment, this is undesirable. It will be necessary for Britain to educate a wider band of students, so far as level and type of aptitudes, abilities and achievement are concerned. To award degrees to such students will do something, at least, to make attendance at other than university institutions of higher education socially acceptable to students, faculties, parents, and employers.¹

The universities are disturbed by the creation of another system of higher education for several reasons. First of all, they believe that the government has not provided sufficient funds for capital and recurrent expenditures to enable them to meet the enrollment targets to which they are committed under the Robbins Report, and they are now fearful that the development of the polytechnics will divert resources to these institutions at the expense of university development and improvement. It is widely recognized that the Robbins Report underestimated the demand for higher education, and the universities are afraid that they will be held to the Robbins enrollment predictions and that the surplus of students will be directed to the polytechnics where, as some put it, the students will be educated "on the cheap". The universities thus envision a plateau of little expansion and limited development until the next big enrollment bulge appears in the 70's.

1 Reeves, Marjorie, "Prestige", in Marjorie Reeves (Editor), Eighteen Plus: Unity and Diversity in Higher Education. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1965, pp. 151-154.

The most thoughtful critics of the dual system of higher education object to it on grounds of divisiveness and rigidity. The bifurcated system appeared from the Secretary's speech to create a strict separation between the elite "autonomous sector" composed of the universities, and a "public sector" composed of institutions of higher education presumably more responsive to social and economic needs.

"This policy", said Sir Peter Venables,

has such an air of rigidity and of establishing a deep dichotomy in higher education as to raise serious concern about frustrating the national evolution of institutions and of fruitful relations between them . . . A higher education policy of "separate but equal" may be attractive at first sight, but it is at least possible that long-term needs can only be met by a unitary system of higher education.¹

The rigid separation between the "public" and "autonomous" sectors implied in the Secretary's address seemed to forestall plans for the development of higher educational complexes in Manchester, Sussex and Birmingham. Plans had been under way to associate in various ways the University of Manchester, the University's Institute of Science and Technology, the John Dalton Technical College, and colleges of education, art and music, all of which are located relatively close together in a redeveloped section of the city of Manchester.

The new University of Sussex has been built four miles out of Brighton. Half-way between Brighton and the University there is a regional college of technology, working almost entirely at degree level, and across the road from the University are the new buildings of the teacher training college. In Brighton the College of Art offers a large amount of advanced-level work. Plans have been under way to relate and coordinate the work

1 Venables, Sir Peter, "Confusion, Concentration and Clarification in Higher Education" in Comparative Education 2:11-18, November, 1965.

Lord Robbins has also objected to the proposed binary system on the same grounds. See Lord Robbins and Boris Ford, "Report on Robbins", Universities Quarterly 20:5-15, December, 1965.

of these institutions, including the development of cooperative courses leading to both baccalaureate and advanced degrees of the University.

In Birmingham the new University of Aston, created out of the College of Advanced Technology, is located in the center of the city. Beside it are the new buildings of the Colleges of Art and Commerce, both of which emphasize advanced courses. A new student union serves all three institutions. Arrangements have already been made and approved for affiliation between the College of Art and the University of Aston in a cooperative program in architecture leading to a degree of the University. The future will almost certainly bring proposals for other courses leading to degrees of the same University.

There is widespread fear that the effort of the Department of Education and Science to bring a summary stop to the "rat-race" for university status and to establish a second sector of higher education leading toward degrees of the Council for National Academic Awards will forestall fruitful relationships among different but interdependent institutions of higher education. Such relationships, it was said, might encourage experimentation and innovation. They might also promote greater flexibility in meeting the needs of students, for example, by enabling them to move more easily from one institution to another or from one program to another according to their interests, abilities and aspirations. Such movement is now very difficult.

The fears of the universities have been somewhat allayed by a paragraph in the "white paper" which stated that "there will be great educational benefit in close academic and other relationships between the polytechnics and other colleges engaged in higher education . . . within the surrounding area", and that the Secretary of State is anxious that "mutually advantageous links with the universities shall be developed through sharing of staff, joint use of communal and other facilities and in other ways."

Although this statement was cynically received in some university quarters, others accepted it at face value. In commenting on this varied response, the Secretary of State has declared that the statement was a sincere one.

It seems clear that if a flexible system of higher education is to be attained in Britain, rigid stratification, either horizontal or vertical, should be avoided. What Britain needs is not a less flexible system of higher education, but one whose parts are more interdependent and articulated. It remains to be seen whether stratification or flexibility materializes. Interdependence and articulation require the coordination of the elements of a diversified system of higher education. At the moment no scheme for collaboration and coordination at national, regional, and local levels between the university system and the polytechnics and specialized colleges has been devised or even proposed, although the Secretary of State has said recently that appropriate advisory bodies will be consulted when the new polytechnics are designated. The success of the whole enterprise of higher education in Britain may depend in the long run, not on the development of a unitary or monolithic system of higher education, but on a sensible division of responsibilities, cooperative planning in the development both of particular institutions and groups of institutions, and the evolution of a pattern of colleges and universities which reflects both the variation in students' interests, abilities, and aspirations, and the diversity of society's social, economic and cultural needs.

The creation of a second, separate system of British higher education teaches a clear lesson. Unless institutions or responsible educational bodies themselves lay down the outlines of a responsive, responsible and comprehensive system of higher education, the government will play a far more aggressive role in influencing or controlling both the direction and the operation of colleges and universities. After a visit to Britain in 1964, I predicted that the government would intervene more decisively not

only in the development of higher education as a whole, but in the affairs of the universities themselves. My visit in 1966 revealed that this prediction had come true. Not only had the Department of Education and Science established a second segment of higher education but, under government pressure, the University Grants Committee was conducting a cost study in the universities, the results of which will almost certainly be used by the government in allocating resources to the universities in competition with the other sector of higher education. This is only one example of the way in which the government, or the government through the University Grants Committee, will invade the universities' privileged sanctuary.

Leaving aside for the moment the desirability of a dual system of higher education in Britain, let us turn to the effectiveness of university coordination there. The instrument of financial liaison between the universities and the newly established Secretary of State for Science and Education is still the University Grants Committee. The UGC, a large proportion of whose members are academics, has been a highly successful buffer between the universities and the main source of their support. In spite of the fact that the British universities have become almost entirely dependent on the state for funds, they have managed to maintain an amazing degree of autonomy. In the minds of some British critics the universities have in fact maintained too great a degree of independence with too little accountability to the government and too little responsiveness to the social, economic and cultural needs of the country. The UGC has been a good buffer against governmental intervention in university affairs, but it has been relatively ineffective in long-range planning. As I have said elsewhere:

Whatever direction the Committee has given the universities has had to be exerted gingerly. As one official in a position to know expressed it, the coordination the UGC has attained has been accomplished either through the most delicate negotiation and persuasion, earmarked grants (which the universities have disliked), or outright bribery. The result is a system of higher education far short of the nation's

needs. Whether the government would have financially underwritten a bolder or more adequate national system of universities is admittedly doubtful, but in any event neither the UGC nor the universities themselves have ever come forth with any such plan. It is doubtful that they would ever voluntarily do so.¹

Although the full-time staff of the UGC has recently been considerably expanded, it is still inadequate to the complicated task of planning and coordination. The general stance of the UGC has also produced a deficit in leadership. When I was in Britain in the summer of 1964, I could find little recognition at the UGC, or among the heads of the universities, for that matter, that there will have to be purposeful planning of a system of higher education that is most unlikely to take form through voluntary means; that there will have to be more prudent allocation of resources if the increasing number of youth qualified for higher education are to be served and if the needs for specialized manpower are to be met; that higher education will have to become more responsive to social and economic conditions; and, finally, that the basis for planning and for allocating resources is continuing research.

In 1966 I found more concern about the allocation of resources, for which the cost analysis presumably was to be one basis, although this analysis had been conducted under governmental pressure. The UGC had expanded its committee structure. The technology subcommittee had been reconstituted; new subcommittees on Latin American studies and on town and country planning had been established; and a joint panel on business schools and a committee on audiovisual aids in higher scientific education had been set up in cooperation with other agencies. Other so-called subject committees had also been established for the purpose, presumably, of avoiding unnecessary duplication in specialized departments and courses among the

1 McConnell, T. R., "The Coordination of State Systems of Higher Education" in Logan Wilson (ed.), Emerging Patterns in American Higher Education, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1965, p. 130.

universities, and of allocating new subjects or specialties to selected institutions. These are certainly limited actions in the direction of planning and coordination, and I could only conclude that there was still little recognition of the necessity for planning a university system on a long-range scale and little conception of the range and depth of investigations necessary for producing a master plan for university development.

It is interesting to note how comparable problems of planning, coordination, governmental influence, and public accountability arise at the same stages of university development in different countries. All these problems are matters of debate in the province of Ontario, Canada, where they became the subject of the Frank Gerstein Lectures at York University, Toronto, in 1966.

The government of Ontario made grants to no fewer than sixteen universities in 1964-65 in the amount of 101 million dollars. It is pertinent, and I should think mandatory, to ask whether these grants were useful in particular institutions but essentially fortuitous with respect to the development of a comprehensive, differentiated, and coordinated system of higher education for the province.

In a paper on "The Evolution of a Provincial System of Higher Education in Ontario", Professor Robin S. Harris pointed out that

a provincial system of higher education involves more than the existence of a number of independent universities performing similar or related functions in response to a provincial demand. There must also be direction, coordination, and control.

How and by whom this direction, coordination, and control should be exercised is the subject of active consideration.

The provincial universities deal with the government through a Minister of University Affairs. Following British precedent, no doubt, a "buffer committee" has been appointed to provide independent advice to the universities, on the one hand, and the Ministry on the other, and to

provide a means of independent liaison between the government and the institutions.

As described by President Ross of York University, this is a body made up of able citizens [the members are all laymen, no academics are included] who donate their time to the work of the committee, but all of whom have many other commitments. The committee has taken an interest in many matters other than budgets. For example, it took the initiative in calling for a study of graduate work in Ontario universities, it is interested in a general policy for student financial aid in the province, it is concerned about the development of new professional faculties and schools, and it is interested in many other broad issues of higher education. It has, however, tended to deal with individual problems rather than with a comprehensive and detached study of the whole -- of which these individual problems, of course, are a part.¹

President Ross has also asked the types of questions which an adequately organized and staffed planning and coordinating committee should be able to answer:

Are these individual plans adequate for the demands of the future? Are the plans feasible? Do they overlap? Are there means by which some universities can specialize to avoid expensive duplication? Are there services . . . that can be centralized? Are the various graduate programs, professional faculties, areas of specialized study, related to each other and to the manpower needs of the future? Are all the universities in Ontario to be equal? . . . Can there be a master plan for higher education in Ontario?

It is apparent that the present Ontario Advisory Committee on University Affairs, as now organized, is far less capable than the University Grants Committee in Great Britain of planning the future development of higher education. Nevertheless, in his recent Gerstein Lecture, the Minister of University Affairs in Ontario put the matter squarely before the institutions when he said:

. . . if they cannot or will not accept those responsibilities and if, for example, large numbers of able students must be turned away because the university is not prepared to accept them or if, as another example, some of the less glamorous disciplines are ignored, despite pressing demands for

¹ Ross, Murray G., op. cit.

graduates in those areas, or if costly duplication of effort is evident, I cannot imagine that any society, especially one bearing large expense for higher education, will want to stand idly by. For there will inevitably be a demand, and there have been indications of this in other jurisdictions, that government move in and take over. . . . I have already stressed that I am, as much as anyone, in favor of free and independent universities, for to my mind, they will serve our best interest. But this belief will not take away the question as to whether our institutions of higher learning can meet the challenge. Only our universities will be able to answer that.¹

The statewide coordination of higher education has developed rapidly in the United States during the last two decades, but there is as yet little evidence on the effectiveness of various types of coordinating agencies and coordinating processes. Paltridge pointed out that the number of states with some form of coordinating agency has increased from 17 to 41 since 1940. During this period there have been significant changes in the structure, organization, and powers of coordinating bodies. First, there is a tendency for agencies created by statute to replace purely voluntary coordinating bodies, such as the Council of State University Presidents in Michigan, which, it is not unfair to say, were often established primarily as a means of heading off threatened statutory mandates to curb wasteful competitive practices. Second, purely voluntary methods of coordination which may have been useful at an early stage in the development of a state's system of higher education, but which proved to be ineffective to deal with more complicated problems, are being superseded by coordinating bodies with statutory status and authority.²

These statutory boards take two principal forms. One type has advisory powers only and is composed primarily of members representing institutions and governing boards, although there is now a tendency, as in the case

1 Davis, W. G., "The Government of Ontario and the Universities of the Province". Frank Gerstein Lecture, 1966, York University, Toronto (mimeographed).

2 Paltridge, James G., "Organizational Forms which Characterize Statewide Coordination of Public Higher Education". Unpublished paper (mimeographed).

of the Coordinating Council in California, to add or increase lay membership on these bodies.

The second type of coordinating agency is given greater or lesser degrees of authority over such institutional affairs as educational programs, budgets, admission standards, and tuition. Examples of such agencies are the Board of Higher Education in Illinois and the Ohio Board of Regents for Higher Education, which have the power to approve all new educational programs -- meaning any new unit of instruction, research, or public service, such as a college, school, division, institute, department, branch or campus, and which are required to make recommendations to state executive and legislative bodies concerning operating and capital budgets.

Ohio and Illinois have coordinating boards, which, in my mind, possess the minimally necessary powers. But such powers apparently do not guarantee productive institutional cooperation. Major state universities often resist coordination by super-boards, and so-called lesser state colleges and universities still struggle to take on the form, if not the substance, of the more prestigious universities. In 1959 the Center for the Study of Higher Education at Berkeley published the first large-scale study of statewide coordination under the authorship of Lyman A. Glenny, now the Executive Officer of the Board of Higher Education in Illinois.¹ It is now time for a second comprehensive investigation of the main problems in the development of higher education in the several states, the effectiveness of present means of planning and coordination, and more effective methods of promoting desirable educational development. After pointing out "that we seem to be plunging into all sorts of new arrangements without having asked and answered important prior questions", Logan Wilson has asked some of the questions that need to be answered. Among the questions he put were these:

1 Glenny, L. A., Autonomy of Public Colleges: The Challenge of Coordination. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

First, within a state, a region, or the nation, what kinds of decisions are best made by centralized authority and what kinds by localized authority? . . . How much of our traditional pluralism in higher education must we discard to become more efficient and effective? . . . Will the federal government's increased use of state agencies for the disbursement of educational support tend to promote centralization of authority or decentralization of authority? . . . Will the states' increasing use of statewide governing or coordinating bodies result in a more rational approach to the growing problems of support and control? . . . Does it tend to politicize what ought to be professional decisions?¹

Still another question that needs to be asked, as we have been reminded in this conference, is: What effect does placing a coordinating body between the state government and the governing boards of individual institutions or systems have on the relations of higher education to the state, and what influence does it have on the fundamental responsibility and accountability of institutions and governing boards? A final question for the moment: What is the effect of coordination, by whomever exercised, on educational experimentation and innovation?

The American Council on Education and the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at Berkeley propose to study these and other questions.

Problems of statewide planning and coordination are intricate enough, but new implications are on the horizon in the United States and elsewhere. To the north, the Canadian National Government now plays a minor role in financing provincial institutions, but its contribution is certain to grow, and ultimately it will assert a national interest in higher education. In the United States the federal interest has become a matter of far-reaching influence in the expansion of educational opportunity, the education of specialized personnel, the prosecution of basic and applied research, and

¹ Wilson, Logan, "Diversity and Divisiveness in Higher Education". Pp. 5-8 in Selected Papers. Forty-sixth Annual Convention, American Association of Junior Colleges. Washington, The Association, 1966.

the provision of educational facilities. The President and the Congress look upon colleges and universities as instruments of national power, as prime contributors to economic growth, as suppliers of specialists for government service, and as promoters of human welfare. Perhaps speaking too enthusiastically, Lord Bowden, head of the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology and erstwhile Minister of Science and Higher Education in the Wilson Government, wrote as follows about the interpenetration of society and the universities in the United States:

You may say that the government has taken over the American universities. In a sense this is true; at the same time the universities have taken over the central government, and the whole nature and structure of American government has been transformed. Dons are everywhere in Washington -- they run the science policy committees, they advise the President himself and most of his department heads.

They have in the process produced a new type of society, a new machinery of government unlike anything I have seen anywhere else. The universities themselves are an essential component of this new machine. The system depends on free and frequent interchange of staff between the government, business and the academic world. . . . There was once a time when scientists were content to live within the walls of their own laboratories; today they play a vitally important role in the formulation and execution of the national policy of every great nation.¹

What may be said of the relationship of universities and the national government may also be said of the growing interdependence of education and industry, which supports university research and employs faculty members as consultants in science, technology, and management.

The price of this two-way street between universities on the one hand, and government and industry on the other, cannot yet be assessed with any accuracy. However, in this interchange the universities have almost certainly lost some of their prerogative to criticize, some of their freedom to speak out on controversial political and economic issues. President Clark Kerr of the University of California, as did President Eisenhower

¹ Lord Bowden, "The Place of Universities in Modern Society". Comparative Education 1:45-62, March, 1965.

when he left office, warned that the alliance between industry and the Department of Defense might exert excessive influence on national policy. President Kerr might also have warned of the possible dangers to the integrity of the University from the military-industrial-university complex. How truly free is the University of California, which in 1964-65 obtained about \$375,000,000, including \$235,000,000 for Atomic Energy Commission installations, from the federal government for research, teaching, building construction, and other purposes, and which in the process received millions of dollars in overhead allowances?

I do not know of many overt instances (and the subtle ones are likely to be more significant) of interference by the federal government here, but I can give you two affecting the Research and Development Center in Higher Education. Until recently, the Center was asked to file with the Office of Education, for its information, copies of all questionnaires, tests or inventories used in investigations supported by funds from the office. Now, however, the Center must submit such instruments (except intelligence and achievement tests) for approval in accordance with the Federal Reports Act of 1942, and the Office has already censored certain items (and has tried to be helpful by suggesting revisions) in the Omnibus Personality Inventory, which was developed over a period of years in connection with the Center's investigations. It is ironic that the Omnibus Personality Inventory was developed primarily under subventions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York during the period when the present Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare was president of the Corporation. A second example of intervention is that the Office of Education reserves the right to approve the person appointed as Director of the Research and Development Center. Such controls seem to me to raise basic questions concerning the acceptability of federal support. Fortunately, the Center is not entirely dependent on federal funds for its operation. Multiple sources of support, both public

and private, are, I am convinced, essential to maintain freedom of investigation and independence from excessive external pressures and controls.

I shall take time for only one more example of impending and undesirable federal intervention. Higher Education and National Affairs for June 23, 1966¹ stated that "efforts to avoid an imbalance between teaching and research in the administration of federal research programs will be instituted by the Bureau of the Budget, as the result of recommendations by the House Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee." The balance between teaching and research is a continuing university problem, and there is no question about the fact that the availability of large federal research grants and contracts has led some universities to expand research at the expense of both undergraduate and graduate instruction. But, I submit, this is a problem for the universities to control, not for the federal government to regulate. In one breath the Director of the Bureau of the Budget stated that "It is primarily the responsibility of university administrators to apply restraints on the non-teaching activities of their professional staffs", but in another breath he declared,

Only in unusual and very limited circumstances should federal research support be provided in a form or amount such as to preclude any teaching by those engaged in research. While I believe this is a responsibility that must be shared by the agencies and the institutions, it would seem appropriate for the federal government to act on its own behalf to correct any imbalances that may be occurring.

Some of the dangers of allying the university with government and industry are obvious. Others are subtle. I believe that a careful study would show that, increasingly, the values of the academic man have become the values of the market place or the governmental arena and not the values of the free intellect. The age of faculty and university affluence has exalted economic advantage at the expense of human and humane values and to

1 Washington: American Council on Education.

the detriment of the true university spirit.

Whatever the dangers of greater interdependence between higher education and the federal government may be, it is growing apace. "The first great federal impact on higher education", President Kerr pointed out recently, "came a century ago with encouragement of the land-grant universities, a movement which dramatically changed all universities, private and public, in the United States."¹ The vast grants for research from the Defense Department, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and now the Office of Education have had a profound effect, not wholly favorable, on research and teaching and on the balance of studies in the nation's major universities and even in some of the smaller liberal arts colleges, and on the traditional division between public and private higher education. In 1963-64, approximately one-fourth of the current fund income of public institutions came from the federal government -- four-fifths of it for research. Even more -- a third -- of the current income of private universities came from federal sources. I have seen a statement that 80 percent of the budget of one private university comes from federal sources. This institution may still be formally controlled by its board of trustees, but it is obviously in many ways at the mercy of the government.

The Higher Education Act of 1965 authorized about 2.5 billion dollars over three years for a wide range of programs -- community service, library materials and research, aid for developing colleges, educational opportunity grants for undergraduates, guaranteed reduced-interest loans for undergraduates and graduates, expansion of work-study, a National Teachers Corps, fellowships for teachers, laboratory and instructional equipment, and undergraduate and graduate educational facilities. This was only a part of the manna from Washington -- there were additional grants

¹ Kerr, Clark, "Toward a Nationwide System of Higher Education", in Logan Wilson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 258-271.

for teaching, research, and facilities in the health sciences, for example. It has been estimated that next year the federal government's involvement, directly and indirectly, for research and other purposes in colleges and universities will reach four billion dollars.¹

With all this goes talk about a nationwide (which may not be synonymous with federal) policy for higher education -- although few concrete proposals have been adduced concerning how such a policy should be developed out of a congeries of voluntary and statutory educational organizations.²

Large-scale federal assistance is certain to have a profound impact on the relationships among educational institutions. This support will greatly affect not only the total resources available in a given state for higher education, but also the method of their allocation. It will also influence the roles which particular institutions may be expected to play in a statewide system, or in a region; the quality of education throughout the system; the development of graduate, professional, and postdoctoral educational programs; the access of students to different institutions and different levels of education; the mobility of students within the system, as well as among the states; greater centralization of authority at both state and federal levels; and a host of other consequences.

By selecting the recipients of federal largess, the government has already exercised a considerable degree of coordination, and it will bring about still more at both national, regional, and state levels. There is no time here to recount the methods already applied or to explore future means of attaining concerted effort. Suffice it to say that the relations of the

1 Spaulding, K., "The Relevance of Federal Programs to the Purpose of the Institution". Educational Record 47:139-147, Spring, 1966.

2 See, for example, Kerr, Clark, op. cit.; and Wilson, Logan, "Basic Premises for a National Policy in Higher Education" in Logan Wilson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 263-271.

universities and the government have taken on a new dimension.

We may expect to see the tension between institutional independence and public accountability grow in intensity. There will be greater stress between the desire for autonomy and the pressure for coordinated effort. It will take all the statesmanship the academic community and the government together can muster to enable colleges and universities to serve the broader public interest while preserving the identity, integrity, initiative, and morale of individual institutions and, especially, the intellectual freedom of faculty and students.