

R E P O R T R E S U M E S

ED 010 391

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STAFF CONFLICTS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

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REPORT NUMBER CRP-2537

PUB DATE

66

REPORT NUMBER BR-5-1125

EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.81 HC-\$20.28 507P.

DESCRIPTORS- \*SCHOOL ORGANIZATION, \*ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS, EVALUATION METHODS, \*TEACHER ROLE, \*ADMINISTRATOR ROLE, \*ROLE CONFLICTS, COLUMBUS, OHIO

SEVERAL CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL ORGANIZATION AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO STAFF CONFLICT WERE STUDIED. A SAMPLE OF 1,976 FACULTY MEMBERS IN 28 PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS WAS SELECTED FOR QUESTIONING AND INTERVIEWING. THE FINDINGS DISCUSSED WERE (1) TYPICAL PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION, (2) ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES AND CONFLICT, (3) DEPARTMENTAL ANALYSES, (4) CONTENT ANALYSES, AND (5) ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUALS. STAFF CONFLICT APPEARED TO BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION OF SCHOOL BUREAUCRACIES. CONFLICT APPEARED TO INCREASE IN THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF MORE PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. BUREAUCRATIZATION, HOWEVER, WAS FOUND TO BE A DIRECT RESPONSE TO SUCH OTHER CONDITIONS AS PROFESSIONALISM, ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY, AND STAFF TURNOVER WHICH, IN TURN, WERE DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH CONFLICT. A SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSION WAS, THEREFORE, THAT CONFLICT NOT ONLY REPRESENTS THE BREAKDOWN OF SCHOOL ORGANIZATIONS, BUT THE CAUSE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL TYPES OBSERVED. (RS)

ED 010 391

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**STAFF CONFLICTS**

**IN THE**

**PUBLIC SCHOOLS**

**Cooperative Research Project No. 2637 (5-1125-2-12-1)**

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**1966**

**The research reported herein was supported by the Cooperative Research Program of the Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.**

## PREFACE

This volume is the product of a convergence between the public's growing interest in education and the sociologist's renewed awareness that a theoretical understanding of all types of complex organizations and vital occupations is necessary for explaining modern society. This study represents one attempt to analyze schools as complex organizations operating on their own organizational principles, apart from the psychological and cultural factors already known to influence the educational process. Despite the important contributions which this approach has made to the study of business and other types of organizations, it has only recently become a prominent approach in the analysis of educational systems. However, education can benefit from much of what is known about other organizations; and the study of educational organization, hopefully, will contribute to our understanding of general principles applicable to organizations in many settings--business, government, military, and medical organizations alike. Persons interested in any of these organizations should benefit from this study.

Regarding education, in particular, sociologists have customarily concerned themselves with either limited facets of teacher-student relations in the classroom or with broader historical and philosophical developments that have shaped education as a social institution. The underlying structure of schools as social organizations, accordingly, has been largely taken for granted and treated merely as a means capable of serving any desirable ends devised by educators, or as a stubborn fact of life to be accepted and worked around. Traditionally, even most educational administrators seem to have been less concerned about the implications of organization for education than about improving morale, school-community relations, computing basic-foundation formulae, planning for building schools or improving efficiency.

But since the early 1950's, interest in educational organization has been gaining momentum. The coming-of-age of interdisciplinary scientific interest in organizations during the early 1950's--signified, for example, in the founding of the Administrative Science Quarterly in 1956-- -- had its counterpart during the same period in the writings of Halpin, Campbell, Griffiths, and others. With the first issue of the Educational Administration Quarterly in 1965, the study of educational organization became a fully assimilated part of the swelling interdisciplinary attack on the problems of developing general theories of complex organizations.

As yet, largely neglected implication of organizational theory lies in the long range prospect of an organizational theory of learning, a theory concerned with how learning is effected by organizational structure. The variables that would be prominent in such a theory include recruiting practices, organizational size, centralization, standardization, and boundary maintenance procedures and goal displacements; in addition to the more conventional topics of classroom interaction, teaching methods, and the personal backgrounds and values of teachers and children. The tension and conflict characteristic of complex organizations are also important elements, because of conflict's potential influence on the learning process and because conflict with conservative elements probably is necessary if improvement is to be made in teaching standards, and programs and services available to students.

The important role that organization plays in education was implicit in some of Dewey's writings, but his followers became more involved in implementing the practical facets of his theory than in tracing-out those principles of organization about which Dewey had written. This tendency of social scientists, to relinquish their theoretical interests in favor of the lure of immediate practical contributions, has been an unfortunate result of their otherwise

fruitful collaboration with educators. Before they will participate in research, teachers and administrators often demand of social science a promise of some immediate practical benefit; and social scientists, for their part, are vulnerable to the flattering belief that because they study society and social problems, they can solve, for example, such problems as those found in urban schools. However, the work of a Sam Shepard demonstrates that social scientists have no monopoly on solutions to educational problems. The distinctive contribution of sociologists, qua sociologists, lies not in their ability to solve the immediate problems, but in whatever middle-range theories they are able to evolve to help explain the social functions of educators, their social contexts, and, hence, the sources of the anomalies that face them. Such theories require unique perspectives which, when adopted by experienced educators who are close to a problem, can open new insights into their own problems. Theory is not a sufficient basis for practical action by any means, but it is necessary; and while theory is not always useful, in the long run it is probably the shortest path to solving educational problems.

Two major social developments prompted this study, the bureaucratization of society and the professionalization of work. It is primarily concerned with the effects of these developments on the statuses and of the relationships among personnel employed in these settings. In particular, it is concerned with the sociological bases of conflict in educational settings. Perhaps, in the process of exploring questions about the process and content of conflicts, and the modes of maintaining them within limits, it will become necessary to reassess the usual conception of organizations as essentially stable patterns of events. For the study explores the extent to which formal and informal organizational structures, dimensions of

organization that are commonly presumed to suppress conflict and assure stability-- help to explain conflict. An attempt has been made to separate personal backgrounds from the structural elements in order to assess their relative importance; comparisons of these two dimensions should have implications, too, of how changes in organizational structure would, for example, compare with revisions of hiring policies as ways to modify the incidence and content of conflict. The way specific combinations of background and the authority system contribute to conflict, may be of value to persons engaged in training staffs and to the administrators of many types of public organizations.

Specifically, it is expected that friction incidents and role conflicts are associated with the positions of the members of an organization, the diversity of their backgrounds, and differences in the bureaucratic characteristics and community contexts of an organization. While it is commonly assumed that interpersonal conflict is an expression of personality differences, the structural factors that support and contain them, need explanation as well. The likelihood that overt conflict and inconsistencies in role conceptions are associated with organizational structure and positions of leadership will help to identify the potential "sore spots" of organization, and should be of value to administrators and others in developing strategies for utilizing conflict to an organization's advantage.

More specifically, the project set out to answer these two questions: "What do teachers fight about?" and "How are their problems related to their organizational contexts--their positions within schools and the professional climates and activities of their schools?" Answers to them not only will help to illuminate the public school system, but hopefully, they will have broader implications for understanding the impact that bureaucratization and professionalization are having on American society.

These questions, however, have proven to be deceptively simple. In order to answer them, it has been necessary to work with measures which, despite a one-year project specifically for the purpose of developing these measures, were necessarily gross and crude. It has proved difficult to measure such dimensions as standardization, centralization, and organizational complexity, particularly since these variables, extremely complex in themselves, were but a few of the many variables being investigated. It has been even more difficult to simultaneously treat in qualitative detail, the more than two dozen organizations representing different locales with specific histories, and yet to quantify the findings sufficiently so as to at least tantalize the sociologist's instinct for generalization. Then too, it has been difficult to maintain a balance between structural variables and counterpart information on individuals. And as usual in such studies, an unbelievably large number of variables should have been controlled which were not.

There will be critics who--"hard-nosedly" and not satisfied with the "costs of doing research" dodge--will complain that a non-random sample of 28 organizations violates too many statistical assumptions, and is too small to be treated as anything but 28 case studies. There also will be critics who are dissatisfied with "soft" data where it is used--i.e., attitudinal measures and estimates of behavior based on second-hand reports. Yet, if one were to wait until all of these methodological problems were solved, the central questions probably would go unexplored. The most fruitful way to tackle the problem is probably to tackle it "head on." By treating a variety of specific measures as first approximations, in some cases as only crude indicators of complex matters, it has been possible to examine a larger context--to see the problem of conflict as a broader whole--than would have been possible otherwise. If this has been at the expense of more refined measures, it was a calculated risk. At this stage it is an essential one.

The first chapter reviews some of the fundamental theoretical and epistemological issues involved in the study of complex organization, as well as some premises of a conflict theory. In the second chapter, the literature concerning inconsistent expectations of professional employees employed in large organizations is reviewed in relationship to other forms of organizational conflict. Chapter Three then describes the research design, and considers some of the problems that were encountered in the field. The measures used, as well as the rationale behind them, are summarized in Chapter Four. Chapter Five reviews three alternative models of bureaucracy and defines patterns among organizational variables. Chapter Six reports tests of a series of hypotheses regarding the bureaucratization and structural crystallization of 28 schools in association with organizational tension and conflict, and Chapter Seven continues with a more detailed analysis of specific components of bureaucracy--i.e., procedures designed to maximize control and coordinate those elements which are potentially disruptive. Chapter Eight contains a parallel analysis of the thirteen types of academic departments in the sample. Chapter Nine helps to supplement the statistical analyses reported up to this point with a more qualitative analysis of specific types of problems typical to certain selected schools.

In Chapter ten the unit of analysis is switched from organizations to individuals, and selected hypothesis that were tested on organizational data are reanalyzed in relationship to the individual characteristics of the fifteen-hundred members of the sample; it also seeks to identify the characteristics of militant leaders. The study is summarized and some implications raised in Chapter Eleven.

I am grateful to the Research Branch of the U.S. Office of Education for making funds available for this research and for the considerate assistance and consultation provided by members of that agency. The research staff of this study is, of course, especially indebted to the more than fifteen-hundred high

school teachers and administrators who graciously participated in the study despite their busy schedules. Although they must remain anonymous, those of us on the project will long remember many of them for their confidence in us, and in a few cases, for their thought-provoking criticisms. Hopefully, their cooperation in this and similar projects eventually will provide better information about the public schools.

The competent and conscientious efforts of several students and colleagues have been instrumental to the project's completion. Dr. Lewis Walker's assistance, in supervising the development of the instruments in the earlier phase, was invaluable for the successful completion of the present study. The patient and responsible field work of Mr. Fredrick Brechler, Mrs. Sandra Sletto Swisher, and especially of Mr. Layton Thomas, have contributed much to the progress and success of the project. The persistence of Mrs. Swisher and Mr. Thomas, in the laborious task of coding 900 interviews, is greatly appreciated; their diligence and first-hand knowledge of the schools involved has been extremely helpful. Mrs. Swisher's work on teaching professions and unions also provided an especially important contribution. Special thanks are due to Mr. Dennis Kitts, whose intimate friendship with the computers on this campus, made it all possible. Most of the programs used in the analysis were specifically designed for this project by Mr. Kitts, whose technical skills, sense of professional responsibility, and sympathy with the problems of sociological research of this kind have been appreciated.

For their assistance at an earlier stage of the project, I am also grateful to Dr. David Clark, Dr. Lewis E. Harris, president of the Ohio School Board Association, Dr. John Ramseyer, Dr. Gerald Smith, Dr. Willavene Wolf, and to the Ohio State University High School faculty and administration. The consultation and assistance of several of my colleagues in the

Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the Ohio State University also is appreciated.

Finally, for their clerical, editorial and technical assistance, appreciation is gratefully extended to Mrs. Vicki Lankamer, Miss Ann Nardin, Miss Kathy McCarthy, Mr. Lester Netland, Miss Sherry Pomeroy, Miss Susan Israel, Miss Marcie Siegel and Miss Sue Strubel. Special acknowledgement is due to Mrs. Anya Schwartz, who has so dutifully supervised the painstaking details of manuscript completion, Mrs. Joan Rosenfield for editing, and Mrs. Judith Layman for her dependable clerical assistance. The sagacious counsel of Dr. Russell Dynes in professional questions as well as certain budgetary matters is also appreciated. The advice and assistance of Mr. Louis Higgs at the Ohio State University Research Foundation has been invaluable.

A revision of this report will be published soon by Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

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## CHAPTER 1

### CONFLICT IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS

Too many sociological studies of schools are, in fact, studies of the social life of adolescents, and little account is taken of the more or less tacit demands and pressures of the formal organization or school life and work. Even where the school is treated as a social system, it is usual to isolate for analysis particular roles, such as that of principal, or particular relations, such as those between teacher and pupil; it is rare to find an analysis "in the round" buttressed by accounts of the formal constitution and social environment of the school (Floud and Halsey, 1958, p. 186).

Floud and Halsey's comments could be extended to other settings as well. This tendency, however, of social scientists to forsake organizations for the individuals in them or to chop them up into unrecognizable components has caused other critics to observe that organizational analysis traditionally has over-emphasized the stability and harmony inherent in organizations. Asks Dahrendorf, "If...Utopia...is a product of poetic imagination divorced of the complexities of reality, how is it that so much of recent (empirical) theory has been based on exactly these assumptions...?" (Dahrendorf, 1958b). Within recent years, conflict has begun to receive more of the central attention that it deserves as an integral feature of organization, but it is still treated, as Coser (1956) charged, as a "disease" having primarily "dissociating and dysfunctional consequences." Indeed, charges Wrong, the question originally posed by Hobbs, "How is society possible in a state of war of all against all?" has been transformed by modern scholars into its opposite, "How is it that selfishness and conflict exist at all?" (Wrong, 1961). Much of the current interest in conflict, too, centers upon unique, large-scale events, such as war and strikes (Barnard, 1950), or on well publicized incidents which reach the newspaper (See the University of Alabama Press Case Study Series). Systematic, empirical study of the role of conflict in the daily routine of organized life is still relatively ignored.

By contrast, conflict theorists have insisted that conflict is integral to social life itself, peace being little more than a change in the form of conflict (Weber, 1947). Simmel proposed that conflict is essential to both the structure and process of group life, and that groups require disharmony as well as consensus to function effectively: conflict creates groups, provides a bond between opposing groups, provides a safety valve which prevents complete disruption within social structures, and reestablishes unity (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956). Simmel attributed conflict to group characteristics rather than personal hostility, which he believed was the product of conflict rather than its cause. Small, Park, Ross and others also viewed conflict as a central and integrating process. More recently, Dalton (1959), among others, has suggested that it is inherent to leadership positions, and Coser (1957) emphasizes the role of conflict as a source of flexibility and creativity within organizations.

#### THE PROBLEM

This study then, grows out of this latter stream of thought. It is believed that social institutions must be understood partially in terms of the organizational conflicts which shape them, and that conflict itself must occupy a more central position in social theory than it has previously. This perspective will be used in interpreting relationships among teachers in public high schools.

Public high schools themselves have assumed a new sense of significance in their own right. Within this century, educational organizations have grown from the least significant of institutions to one of the most prominent influences in our organizational society. They are of growing concern to tax payers and citizens. Public education is a 40 billion dollar enterprise, one of the nation's largest and, according to some estimates, one of its most productive capital investments (Schultz, 1961). During one-third of its waking hours, one-fourth of

the nation's population is involved in educational organizations in one capacity or another. Schools are the first organizations outside of the home with which children have extensive contact. And finally, concentration in education is as real as it is in industry: only 25 percent of the public schools educate almost 80 percent of the public school children.

Educational organizations are so much a part of the social fabric that it is safe to say that one's understanding of society is incomplete without an understanding of educational organizations; in the decades ahead, that statement will become even more true. The well-established ideologies and dogmas which have served traditional education so well are being challenged, and choices are being forced among the available and the emerging alternatives for its organization. The large scale growth and transformation of educational organization provides a natural setting for the study of the sociological consequences of such worldwide institutional, tension-producing situations as bureaucratization, professionalization, the rise of semi-autonomous groups, the growing interdependence of groups, and subordination and domination of groups within large-scale systems.

However, it is not just the growing significance of education that brings public schools to the attention of sociologists at this time. Education is fundamental to the functioning of any society. What is unique about contemporary education is the variety of organizational forms it has assumed in mass urban settings. The traditional psychological approaches to education, which emphasize how individuals assimilate their culture, are not up to the task of explaining many of the major educational processes in the large scale, bureaucratic educational systems that have emerged in an equally complex, unstable society. The social structure is so complex, in fact, that it has become nearly as problematic as the ability of individuals to assimilate it. Bureaucratic relationships have so altered and, sometimes, impeded sociological functions, and educational systems have assumed so many additional

burdens--of science, technology and vocational training--that the system itself has become a determining factor in learning outcomes. As Floud and Halsey (1959) have stated it, the problems of public education cannot be understood solely in terms of what is done to people; they must be understood in terms of the wider context of the structure that shapes educational functions.

These developments have made public education more subject to the perspectives of organizational theory. And while there is, perhaps, much that is unique about the objectives and processes of public high schools, their organizational forms so closely resemble those of the churches, the military, the political and the other complex organizations that it seems likely that a broad gauge theory, which includes a variety of organizational types, can be applied to the analysis of schools as well. Hughes has said, "While the purposes for which an organization is established may have some effect on its form and functioning, they do not make an organization so peculiar that it can be fruitfully compared only with others devoted to the same purpose and studied only by people devoted to that purpose" (Hughes, 1963).

### Objectives

With some of these considerations in mind the present study was conceived as a way of learning how certain patterns of educational systems aggravate or mitigate the problems of public education, and, in particular, the problems that arise among educators.<sup>1</sup> The study was designed specifically to: (1) identify friction incidents, including their frequency, their content and their locus within the organization; and (2) explore how friction incidents are associated with bureaucratization and professional employee roles within complex organizations, formal and in-

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<sup>1</sup>Although the nature of the data does not permit a direct test of the causal implications of this question, the question nevertheless has been useful in guiding the research.

formal status systems within organizations, and staff backgrounds. Hypotheses will be entertained concerning how certain measures of organizational tension and conflict in 28 public high schools are associated with their bureaucratic characteristics, with configurations of professional employee roles and with the joint effects of bureaucratization and professional orientation.

It is felt that the system of organization itself is responsible for at least some of the problems now aborting certain educational objectives. The problem has a vital bearing on several concerns which are central to both educators and social scientists.

### Significance of the Research

Analysis of conflict in the public schools should increase our understanding of the teaching profession by exposing those problems confronting educators which are due to the kinds of organizations in which they work. The organization of educational systems, perhaps, has more fundamental consequences for the long range learning outcomes than is commonly recognized. If so, a reorganization may be necessary in order to improve learning outcomes and to alleviate some of the more pressing educational problems now attributed to the inadequacy of teachers or to a lack of funds. In fact, the application of organizational theory to educational problems promises to generate a new theory of learning; a theory, the premises of which are organizational principles rather than psychological ones. Learning theories in education customarily have been concerned with the dynamics of individual growth and development, and much attention, consequently, has been concentrated on classrooms -- democratic teaching, reading readiness, set teaching methods and the use of lesson and teacher-induced rewards and punishments (Gordon and Adler, 1963). When sociologists called attention to the influence that peer group pressures have in the classroom, on the playground and in the home, teachers began to revise

seating charts, to make sociograms and to chart the interaction patterns of the students. In all of this, most of the time, the basic structure of schools was taken for granted. The theory of learning was addressed to human relations within given organizational settings; the consequences of these settings for learning were, for the most part, ignored. Although the principles of the structure of educational organizations themselves have yet to be explicitly incorporated into a learning theory, such a theory is now in the air (Corwin, in press; Boocock, 1966). While it is not the intent of present research to determine the relationship between organization and organizational conflict to learning outcomes, some of the hypotheses to be explored can be regarded as an initial necessary step in the direction of this long-range problem.

At a more abstract level of analysis, generally the issues that people fight over in organizations reveal the sore points of an organizational society. They expose the inconsistencies of life behind much of its drama and suggest what has been left undone in the way of organizing. Much can be learned about social organization in general by analyzing the disputes that take place in schools and other specific kinds of organizations. For example, do the issues primarily concern personal self interests and problems that are not directly connected with the organization's problems? Or, are they relevant to the solution of the organization's problems, to increasing its effectiveness? To what extent do disagreements and tensions contribute to flexibility? Does conflict merely create problems, or does it sometimes represent the solution to problems? These, too, are long-range questions which cannot be answered directly by a particular research project. Yet, each project will contribute to the understanding of some of them.

Finally, the problem of conflict touches upon an even more fundamental issue, one of the imposing riddles about society--the problem of "social glue", or what holds organizations together? How do organizations persist despite apathy on the one

hand and organized resistance toward official objectives, internal friction, intrinsic competition and, sometimes, on the other hand, radical cleavages within them? To what extent is it reasonable to assume that morale, harmony and consensus are the normal conditions of organization, and to what extent is it reasonable to consider conflict as the natural adjunct of organization?

If it is assumed that the absence of conflict, rather than its presence, constitutes the surprising and atypical, then what seems to be called for is a model of organization in which power and conflict between groups occupies a place that is at least as important as consensus; a model in which conflict itself, as a natural adjunct of power relationships, is seen as sometimes providing effectiveness and cohesiveness. It is hoped that the study of conflict in educational organizations will help to contribute to the development of such a model.

#### THE STATE OF ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

The ingredients of a model of organization which permits conflict are present in the rich heritage of organizational theory. In other words, although the heritage does not include a ready-made, tested model, its components are there. With a little ingenuity, they can be modified and assembled into a facsimile which is reasonably adequate for guiding the development of rudimentary theory of organizational conflict.

#### Sources of Modern Organizational Theory

A systematic and coherent theory of modern social organization of wide acclaim and proven usefulness has not yet matured in the social sciences. But one is fermenting; the intellectual soil is rich with fragments of potent ideas inherited from several streams of thought that now appear to be converging to form a model of complex organizations. However, in the present state, the theory is still eclectic and

is a source of confusion as well as direction. Although it is a formidable task to integrate existing theories, it is a necessary one.

The school of thought which Martindale (1966) calls positivistic organicism baptized a conception of social organization as an organic whole, with each part interdependent with every other one. Because a change in one element of the system alters its entirety, one must understand the system in order to understand specific properties of human behavior. Scholars of contemporary functional theory have accepted the premise that the system is the appropriate unit of analysis, but have taken a corollary from a formal theory by which the system is analytically broken down into more manageable parts: thus, subunits of the system are determined by the system of which they are a part. Functionalists have sought to understand the specific forms and functions of relations between subparts and to assess the capacity of a system to readjust to environmental change in order to maintain a state of equilibrium. This organic conception of mutually interdependent parts, however rudimentary and fragmentary in its present state, has become a permanent foundation of modern organization theory.

The functional premises have been supplemented in other ways and, in some respects, actually counteracted by formal sociology. In formal theory, the fundamental units of organization are considered to be the forms of social interaction, abstracted from the specific content, objectives or personalities involved (Martindale, 1966). This school of thought brings into focus the importance of formal relations (structures) within the total system and, more than any other, demonstrates the significance of analyzing organizations in terms of their abstract structures. It provides a set of concepts which can be applied universally and which place all organizations under a single rubric, despite the seemingly incomparable variety of distinct goals, values, histories, interests and tasks which separate them from one another. Among the intellectual legacy of this school are the concepts of domination-subordination, division of labor, sociability and the theoretical importance of group size.

Social behaviorism and, more specifically, social action theory challenge the functional-formal model of society by reducing larger structural entities to the behavior of individuals. More basically, these perspectives challenge the functional thesis that the system is prior to and superior to its parts. Although social behaviorists accept the formal premise that social relationships among individuals constitute the primary unit for social analysis, behaviorists insist that the subjective meaning of the relationship for the actors must be taken into account and thus, discount the possibility of a social science divorced from the attitudes and values of individuals. While these theorists admit to uniformities in group life, they deny that they are properties of the system itself and insist that they are simply customary patterns of interpersonal behavior.

Although the primacy given to the individual in this perspective probably has hampered the development of a distinctive theory of organization apart from the social psychology of individuals, the perspective and a related symbolic interaction framework have contributed to role theory. Role theory serves to bring individuals and organizations simultaneously into common perspective and hence has been helpful in explaining how the values and expectations of individuals become translated into group norms and value climates of organizations. Advocates of this view insist that "organizational characteristics" are ultimately derived from the behavior of the membership and should be understood in terms of the specific actions of the membership.

Some fundamental assumptions underlying behaviorism and functionalism are challenged by conflict theory. Where in the functional model value consensus is primary and conflict is a residual, exceptional event, conflict theory places less emphasis on value consensus and more emphasis on scarce resources and power as key variables (Coser, 1965). Also, in contrast to behaviorism there is less emphasis in conflict theory on personal attitudes. Contradictions within the social structure itself, not personal antagonism, are considered to be responsible for conflicts.

Like functionalism, conflict theory focuses on the structural interdependence of society and, as a type of formal theory, it concentrates particularly on the structural subdivisions. But, in contrast to functionalism, conflict theory stresses the potential conflict that is inherent in the very differentiation of social structure. Conflicts arise between persons and groups located in different parts of the system because of their competing positions. Harmony is a special case of disequilibrium in conflict theory, whereas functionalists treat disorganization as a special case.

Implications. Functionalism and behavioralism are idealistic; not only because, as in the case of functionalism, abstract systems are treated as holistic entities, but also because in both theories values are assumed to have causal significance -- cultural values presumably are prior to and responsible for integrating social systems. Behaviorism, especially, emphasizes the ideational and attitudinal components. There is, however, much more to modern society than is suggested in the notion of values and personal attitudes, as both formalists and conflict theorists have argued. Conflict theorists, in particular, have gone to an extreme where individuals merely reflect social categories; but the point is well taken that the collective interests of groups are not equivalent to a collective of individual interests.

Nor do the functional notions of value consensus, system integration and interdependence of parts adequately account for the ferment of tension, conflict, compromise and change within modern society. Conflict theorists have maintained that group competition and structurally induced conflict explain society better than either personal attitudes or cooperation and interdependence. Society, and social organization, itself, represent the present compromises to past conflicts, and inherent within the social arrangements themselves are the seeds of future conflicts. Social organizations, even relatively stable ones, represent coalitions of groups having some basic

conflicts of interest as well as common purposes. Conflicting principles of organization, the distribution of power, authority, subordination and social rank are keys to explaining organizational behavior.

Each of these theoretical perspectives, then, has contributed to an understanding of social organization. Yet, none of them provides a sufficient basis for a complete sociological theory of modern organization. The challenge is how to synthesize the most significant contributions of each perspective without unduly compromising the explanatory power of each perspective taken by itself. Martindale (1966) warns that "Monstrosities are created by the patch-and-paste procedure of attempting to put together the acceptable (from some point of view) features of a variety of theories...." There is little choice, however. The possible theoretical advances from a possible synthesis are too tempting to ignore.

#### Current Developments

Three models of organization seem to have been produced from convergences among these various streams of thought. One model is a compound of the emphasis on rationality found in Weber's writing and the prominence of value consensus and functional interdependence that characterizes Parsons'. Gouldner (1959) calls this the "rational" model; Dahrendorf (1958a) refers to it as the "integration" model. Social structure consists of a functionally integrated system of parts, whose equilibrium is maintained by rational applications of authority<sup>2</sup>, norms and recurrent patterns of interaction. A second model capitalizes on the personal meaning of interpersonal relations. In this "behavioralistic" model, the actions of individuals take priority over the system and, as a result, values are viewed from the standpoint of the individ

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<sup>2</sup>Authority refers to legitimate and acceptable uses of power.

uals who subscribe to them rather than from the standpoint of the culture. Social structure is a derivative of meanings implicit in interaction which is determined by personal attitudes and sentiments and value consensus between role partners. The third model is an amalgamation of elements of functionalism, formal theory and conflict theory. In this "natural systems" or "coercion" model, as it is referred to by Gouldner (1959) and Dahrendorf (1958a), respectively, social structure is differentiated into autonomous parts having competing objectives held together by domination, mutual opposition and constraint. Within itself the structure produces forces that maintain both stability and conflict -- stability, because of the control one group exercises over another and also functional interdependence among the parts; conflict, because the incumbents of positions subscribe to different objectives dictated by their positions.

The integration and behavioristic models have taken precedence until relatively recent times. Not so long ago, the study of large-scale organization was almost synonymous with the study of bureaucracy, i.e., the means of controlling and integrating organizations. Sometimes the rationalization of activity, and sometimes the not-so-rational ponderous red tape, has been taken as bureaucracy's central theme; but, in either case, social scientists, treating internal contradictions only parenthetically, were primarily concerned about the convergence of the way organizations actually function with ideal characteristics of bureaucracy. Although not strictly a functionalist himself, Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy emphasized the rational integration of bureaucratic components. The "ideal type" reflects both a kind of institutional favoritism, because of the exaggerated attention it gives to the ideals that dominate an institution, and an organizational bias, which refers to the tendency to view all behavior in terms of its instrumental and logical contributions to the general organizational ends. Weber's model of bureaucracy primarily consists of these features (Weber, 1947):

- I. Impersonal social relations by which authority and obligations are specified on the basis of job rather than on the basis of individuals; they separate work from private life.
- II. Specialization, with appointment and assignment of employees on the basis of their technical qualifications and with their careers consisting of regular promotions based on merit.
- III. Separation of policymaking from administrative authority.
- IV. A system of government based partially on abstract rules; and allocation of the organization's necessary duty to offices, which are ordered in a hierarchy in such a way that the higher office controls.

These ideal conditions are assumed to be more efficient than any other way of organizing large, complex systems.

Through repeated misemployment, the "ideal type" contributed to a number of misinterpretations, several of which have assumed the proportions of myths. Less than two decades ago it was almost taken for granted that: (1) Large-scale organizations are monolithic and, (2) rationally controlled by, (3) infallible rules and, (4) an impersonal authority system, (5) toward a single purpose (Lane, Corwin, Monahan, 1967). These myths appear to have been nourished by several assumptions, i.e., that the structure is well integrated and procedures are uniform and consistent; that designated officers have the required authority and are in a position to make the rational decisions necessary to maintain the organization's standards on keel with its official purpose; that every element of the organization contributes to the maintenance of the entire system; and that consensus of values among members who typically subscribe to the organization's purposes and procedures forms the basis of the structure. Organizations, in short, were assumed to be relatively rational and stable, the health of the organization depending upon the dedication and conformity of its employees.

Two approaches spun off from this and subsequent developments: First, the cen-

trality of rational, impersonal control in the integration model was well adapted to the purposes of industrial management. Industrial management, in fact, essentially consists of a set of techniques for improving the convergence between an organization and the ideal type. These techniques are based primarily on principles of supervision which capitalize on ways of impersonally controlling workers from the top and manipulating the formal structure, especially the span-of-control. Workers are assumed to be rationally motivated toward increasing their incomes and toward accepting the most efficient work procedures. The manager's function is assumed to be making logical decisions. Formal decision-making theory remains a prominent ancestor of this school. The industrial management approach to organization left a prominent impression on educational administration; most of the textbooks did, and still do, emphasize the mechanics of efficient school management, i.e., record keeping, trends in school house construction, efficiency in school transportation and purchasing and accounting procedures, rather than the principles of organization.

Through a well-known progression of events, however, which began as a series of experiments by Harvard sociologists in a Chicago factory, the attention of social scientists turned during the 1930's to the second feature which had been only implicit in the mythology of bureaucracy noted above, though it was vital to it. The focus of concern gradually shifted from the rational structure of organizations to the conformity of employees to that structure. The behavioristic model was more appropriate than the functional one for explaining the behavior of employees, and impersonal relations, which had been the trademark of the integration model, became transformed into distinctively human relations characteristic of the human relations approach. Efforts to capture the workers' loyalties have spurred nationwide studies on personnel management, which, in turn, have directed the attention of social scientists to the individual's relationship with his organization and, thus, shifted the explanations of organizational problems to the characteristics of deviant individuals.

There has been a corresponding tendency in educational administration to emphasize problems of morale (Campbell and Gregg, 1957), job satisfaction (Mason, Dressel, Bain, 1959), and styles of leadership and supervision (Halpin, 1956). Human relations diverted attention from organizational variables to human ones. Those problems which could not be explained in terms of the nonconformity of individual employees were explained in terms of their over-conformity. Hence, Argyris accuses organizations of stifling normal personality development (Argyris, 1957), and Merton attributes problems such as red tape and conservatism to the "bureaucratic personality" that is produced by a too completely efficient organization (Merton, 1957).

However, there is a growing disenchantment with the industrial management and human relations perspectives. One of the reasons is that these approaches so painfully neglected the problems of power. As Eisenstadt points out, "If one believes that a perfect equation between satisfaction and productivity can be achieved under permissive leadership, one does not have to study power; one has only to fight to accelerate its withering away." On the other hand, "If one believes that coordination, conformity to orders, and the will to produce can be brought about with only economic and financial incentives -- i.e., if the world of human relations is ignored altogether -- then power problems need not be taken seriously" (Eisenstadt, 1958, p. 149).

While these developments were transpiring, however, another stream of thought germinated and has had continuous, if sporadic, development. A flurry of clinical studies in recent years have shown that complex organizations are neither as rational nor as stable as they were thought to be, or at least not as they had been portrayed in the "ideal type". Page found bureaucracy's "other face" -- the personal relationships and deviancy that developed within the impersonal military setting (Page, 1946). Gouldner found that the way foremen enforce rules varies with the cooperativeness of

industrial employees, rules being "chips" used and withheld as rewards and punishment (Gouldner, 1954). And so it went.

Many of these authors, reinterpreting the "ideal type" in light of their findings, have suggested modifications which raise doubts about its validity. Following a suggestion by Parsons, Gouldner (1959) concludes that Weber wrote alternately of two bases of authority -- that of office and that of compliance. Udy (1959) says that Weber combined unrelated elements. It has now become unfashionable to conclude an investigation of large-scale organization without some reproach to Weber and a refinement of his model.

Some social scientists had become so disillusioned that they began to formulate a different model, one giving priority to power as the prime force driving organizations and holding them together. It should be noted that although rationality is primary in Weber's system, he did emphasize the tendency of bureaucracies to monopolize power and regulate the lives of individuals (Eisenstadt, 1958). But Micheles and Simmel exploited the concept more fully. Current advocates of this model include Gouldner, Blau, Crozier, Dahrendorf, Coser and, most notably, Selznick, whose pioneering contributions are among the most influential.

In contrast to the rational model, Weber's "ideal type" plays a diminished role in the natural systems or coercion model. The way organizations actually function receives the emphasis; social scientists are no longer as fascinated with the failure of organizations to conform to the "ideal type". This model does not draw upon the concept of "bureaucracy" in the traditional sense so much as the concept of "complex organization", which connotes the diversity of form, irrationality and power conflicts typical of large-scale social systems. These latter characteristics, rather than being considered "problems", are part of the model itself.

Thus, bureaucratic organizations are run by power in a context of power. They, in turn, have to generate power in their own behalf. Subordinates can function as

relatively free agents who can discuss their own problems and bargain about them, and who do not only submit to the power structure, but also participate in that structure (Eisenstadt, 1958). There can be no purely rational bureaucratic organization free from personal interests or power blocks, Eisenstadt maintains, for all organizations need to manipulate their environments.

This model explains organizations in terms of inconsistent principles incorporated in the organization itself. Starting with this premise, Dahrendorf takes the direct opposite of the integration model as the premise of this model: (1) Every organization is at every point subject to processes of ubiquitous change; (2) Every organization displays at every point dissension and ubiquitous conflict; (3) Every element in an organization renders a contribution to its disintegration and change; (4) Every organization is based on the coercion of some of its members by others. (Dahrendorf, 1958a). Contrasting the integration and coercion models, he concludes:

It is evidently virtually impossible to think of society in terms of either model without positing its opposite number at the same time. There can be no conflict unless this conflict occurs within a context of meaning, i.e., some kind of coherent 'system'. No conflict is conceivable between French housewives and Chilean chess players, because these groups are not united by, or perhaps 'integrated into', a common frame of reference. Analogously, the notion of integration makes little sense unless it presupposes the existence of different elements that are integrated.

In looking at social organizations, not in terms of their integration and coherence but from the point of view of their structure of coercion and constraint, we regard them as imperatively coordinated associations, they generate conflicts of interest and become the birthplace of conflict groups (Dahrendorf, 1958a).

### Sociological Perspectives

The task of a distinctively sociological theory is to produce proof that conflict is based on certain structural arrangements and, hence, arises when these arrangements are given (Dahrendorf, 1958a). Sociological conflict is produced by differences between social positions, and arises between persons only insofar as they occupy or are products of certain positions. It is the task of sociology to identify the

specific structural arrangements conducive to these conflicts; theories premised on the assumption that conflict arises primarily because people do not fully understand one another, or because people have hurt feelings or personal ambitions, and theories which ignore the impersonal issues on which much conflict is based, are inadequate for sociological purposes (Sheppard, 1954). Personality clashes and emotional disturbances, of course, must be recognized as important sources of conflict too; but conflict can be studied as fruitfully from the standpoint of organizational variables as from that of personality variables. More must be learned about the structural sources of conflict before the joint effects of personality and organization can be examined with sophistication.

#### TOWARD A MODEL OF COMPLEX ORGANIZATION

The question, "What causes conflict?", seems reasonable if peace is assumed to be normal. However, if it is assumed that conflict is normal, another question must be answered, "What causes peace, hence organization?" (Burns, 1953 and 1958). Burns proposes that far from being a natural element of organization, "routine" is a substitute for the more normal process of change. What is recognized as "social change" and "conflict" is actually the failure of routine substitutes. Structure may be viewed as a temporary curtailment of the more fluid, viable processes. From this perspective, conflict is a fundamental process, knowledge of which is not incidental to, but crucial for understanding large-scale organization.

What is needed is a model which incorporates the principles of both stability and conflict, one which places priority on the interdependence of formal components of the system, but in which conflict plays a central rather than a residual role. The model should take into account both formal structures and the way personal attributes are distributed among positions and organizations, and should provide for individual and group initiative as well as compliance; finally, it should simultaneously

take into account the values and norms endorsed by constituents of the system and the structural contents of the system. The following discussion outlines a tentative way of synthesizing these elements into a general model. The following components of such a model must be identified: an appropriate definition, the key variables, the primary unit of analysis, some of the conditions conducive to conflict, and the relationship of change and stability in the system.

### Complex Organization Defined

A definition of complex organization should identify the components which are primarily responsible for both organizational stability and conflict. An organization can be defined as: (1) stable patterns of interaction, (2) among coalitions of groups having a collective identity (e.g., a name and a location), (3) pursuing interests and accomplishing given tasks, and (4) coordinated through a system of authority.<sup>3</sup> Patterns of interaction among the members of an organization are partly determined by their positions which, together with the relationships among them, form the power and authority structures that are largely responsible for coordinating an organization's primary activities. Positions are comprised of work roles, consisting of families of norms, maintained in part by common expectations, and in part by sanctions imposed for conformity and deviation. The responsibility for performing the key processes of organizations is allocated via these roles.

Among the most vital relationships are those which define the system of control over work, and of one member over another. The control system, in turn, includes three components: the official status system by which the authority to issue commands is delegated through a hierarchy of positions, rules and procedures to provide

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<sup>3</sup>This definition follows some of the suggestions of Bakke (1959). See also Cyert and March (1959).

guidelines for coordinating the organization's parts and regulating the conduct of its members, and a division of labor, partially produced by and supplementing the first two elements. Whereas the status system refers to hierarchies of power and authority, the division of labor is determined by assignments of responsibilities laterally to distinct units or positions on the same level of the hierarchy. It establishes "who does what". In fixing responsibility, however, the division of labor also assigns prestige and power to positions, often on a basis somewhat different than dictated solely by the status hierarchy.

Organizations are composed of subdivisions. Responsibility for various aspects of work is divided and allocated among these pivotal elementary components. There is a tendency for subparts to become partially autonomous, to develop distinct and competing subgoals and activities, which means that organizations must be viewed as configurations of the subparts rather than as coherent wholes. To reintegrate the subdivisions, formal systems of coordination are instituted, consisting of supervision, rules, standard procedures, and administrative staffs. Some coordination also is accomplished informally through personal contacts among departmental members and bargaining. The objectives of the organization as a whole reflect the bargains made among its members and between its members and outside groups (Cyert and March, 1959). Thus, organizations are continuously in process, simultaneously expanding through delegation and bargaining, and then contracting as authority is retracted by centralized controls, close supervision, and standardization.

In order to maintain itself and perform its tasks, an organization must necessarily fulfill several functions or key processes:

- (a) Coordinate its division of labor.
- (b) Allocate its authority and power in a generally stable way, and devise procedures for regulating conflict.
- (c) Replace its members and procure other resources.

(d) Regulate its output and direction by constant readjustments in policy.

(e) Establish and maintain its boundaries against outside control.

However, although it is essential that organizations maintain these processes at some minimum, the precise level at which each must be maintained presently is not known. When organizations fail or lose effectiveness, it is probably because any one or several of these processes have not been sufficiently maintained. On the other hand, it is certain that most successful organizations do not regularly maintain each process at an optimum level. In fact, it seems plausible that an over-emphasis on any one process can be as detrimental as failure to perform at all, and that during certain periods, a degree of conflict, ambiguity, scarcity of supply, and floundering may be as beneficial as it is normal; it seems especially notable that organizations normally are conflict-ridden and that they vary considerably in the degree to which their policies are "goal directed" (Corwin, in press). However, overemphasis of some functions may help to compensate for the ineffective performance of other functions. In those cases where goals (such as citizenship training) are so abstract, or an organization's practices are so remote from its stated goals, that for all practical purposes the organization has little control over its direction or the nature of its product, the exceptionally effective authority structures or boundary defenses, for example, can help to maintain its effectiveness.

These components of a complex organization are not necessarily or consistently associated with one another. Using evidence gathered from cross cultural area files, Udy (1959) concludes that bureaucracy is a compound of two distinctively opposed characteristics which have been confounded in the "ideal type": bureaucracy (consisting of a hierarchy of authority, specialized administrative staff, and differentiated rewards according to office) and rationality (which includes limited objectives, performance emphasis, segmental participation, and compensatory rewards in return for participation). Perhaps both the layman's accusation that bureaucracy involves

inefficient "red tape" and the social, scientific conception of bureaucracy as a means of improving efficiency are, in one sense or the other, valid. The lack of correlation among bureaucratic variables has been noted by other writers as well. Using Likert-type scales, Hall (1963), for example, attempted to measure six "dimensions" of bureaucracy in ten organizations. The hierarchy of authority dimension was most highly correlated with the other dimensions, but at best, the highest rank order correlations did not exceed .68.

### Key Variables

There are four key variables which have dominated social science that must be assigned priority in any model designed to account for sociological phenomena. These are rationality, personal sentiments, power, and cultural values. Historically, sociologists have vacillated in the priority which they have given to each of these concepts. Originally, rationality was given preference. As previously mentioned, this particular model was convenient for analyzing the problems of industrial managers in factory work groups during the early part of this century. Social power and authority are central concepts in the system of Michels, Simmel, and Weber, even though the latter tended to emphasize the rational uses of authority more than the unauthorized use of power. However, rationality and power are not necessarily contradictory. The former can be considered as the limited case (a) where there is complete consensus on the priority of objectives, (b) where each central office and subunit has effective power and knowledge to achieve its commitments, and (c) where there is extensive organization-wide planning, involving consideration of several alternatives over a period of time. With less than a complete consensus, the amount of effective planning that can be done is inversely related to the power of the subunits. Extensive planning cannot be put into effect if subunits are autonomous enough to pursue their separate objectives. Assuming that a consensus is difficult

to develop in large-scale systems, and given unequal distributions of power, rationality is a limited, improbable case. Therefore, focusing on power relationships promises to be a more fruitful approach to the study of organizations than analyzing the logic behind administrative decisions.

Throughout the erratic development of organizational theory, the dominant underlying theme, perhaps the theme of all the social sciences, has been that man is distinctively moral and that, hence, his cultural values and goals are the ultimate keys to social organization. While men, at times, develop rational strategies and use force to achieve them, proponents of this view hold that basically all men are bound by moral tradition and act more because of a consensus on values rather than coercion. Personal attitudes or sentiments in particular, as personal reflections of the cultural values, were given central importance in the "human relations" approach; as mentioned, it includes such personal elements as friendship cliques, job satisfaction and group morale. From this point of view, a consensus on values, compatible attitudes, and sentiments, hold the society together, and dissent is its major curse.

Thus, each of these key concepts has had "its day", and each has had justification for priority. It is difficult to imagine a research strategy which could do equal justice to all of these variables, however. The explanatory power of the conceptual system seems to be affected by the system of priority among these concepts. How do the concepts "fit" together?

Tension is produced from differences in the distribution of power and from disparities between power and prestige. Overt conflict evolves from the efforts of groups to shift the balance of power in particular instances. However, the occasions for the use of power and the way it is applied, are determined largely (though not exclusively) by the moral system, and more specifically, by contradictions between alternative moral systems. Hence, morality plays a major role in provoking and

regulating conflict. The role of morality in social behavior raises the free will issue.

The Problem of Free Will. Models of social behavior have tended to portray man either as a volitional individualist or as a passive receptor responding automatically to social pressures. From the first perspective, man has a moral sense of purpose and the free will to exercise choice and thus, can be held responsible for his actions. From this point of view, men not only can be, but should be opposed to the worst features of their society. From the second, more mechanistic view, however, man complies to his society and is its reflection -- the other side of the coin, so to speak. In this view, there is little incongruence between man and society.

The issue, as stated, sidesteps the complex structural arrangements between individuals and their groups, which are vital to the resolution of the problem. The simultaneous existence of inconsistent moral principles, supported by different groups or, in varying degrees by the same group, provide legitimate, if opposing, alternative courses of action. To the extent that inconsistency does exist, conformity to one set of principles not only permits deviation from legitimate standards but requires it. Hence, individuals can be simultaneously both moral and immoral; they can both conform and deviate simultaneously. The mechanism at work is not simply incompatibility between individualistic interests and social standards, as Wrong (1961) suggests, but inconsistency among the standards themselves.

Individuals are free to choose their principles, but the extent of that freedom is limited by the degree of inconsistency among them, and by the weight of social pressure in favor of one moral system over another. Freedom of choice is maximized where there are two or more moral systems with nearly equal support. From this point of view, it is perhaps less important to determine which individuals uphold which

moral values than it is to ascertain the number of competing value systems and the degree of inconsistency among them.

Role theory provides one way to represent the problem. A role is a normative standard prescribing the way in which parties ought to conduct themselves as members of their positions. Although a major advantage of role theory is that it takes both individual and group properties into account, perhaps its even more important advantage is that roles in organizations can be divorced from other personal values and analyzed separately as distinct properties of the organization. The fact that individuals subscribe to certain roles can be treated as a reflection of a more fundamental organizational property.

The idea that roles can be identified by asking people for beliefs about the conduct appropriate to a relationship does not alter the fact that they are applicable to anyone occupying the positions involved and that they do not define unique situations for specific individuals. While individuals might be tempted to describe roles in terms of their own self interests and desires, they can hardly avoid taking into account the known beliefs and pressures of others. Furthermore, as roles consist of norms specifying the rights of one party and the corresponding obligations of the counter position, they pertain to a relationship between positions rather than to a single individual or position.

Roles, in short, constitute a moral system which arises from and regulates the power of positions in an organization. The standards prescribed for a position are objective facts to be reckoned with, regardless of whether they are completely internalized by its incumbents. Whether or not organizations hang together does not depend alone on members' acceptance of the dominant values, since control and coordination can be achieved by means of power, especially when dissent occurs. But the moral system is a major source of conflicts which at the same time sets boundaries and guidelines for the uses of power.

### The Primary Unit of Analysis

The primary units of analysis should be, insofar as possible, the components of the system. Focusing on components, of course, makes it more difficult to arrive at a picture of the whole, which is the advantage of holistic concepts such as Vershtan and Gestalt over analytical methods. However, the problems of component analysis notwithstanding, it is the structure of elements, formed from the components, that gives meaning to the whole (Tiryakian, 1965). Therefore, in practice, most social scientists have not been able to avoid making more refined analyses. Most methods of measurement entail subdividing a concept and somehow recombining the specific indicators.

There is, then, no other feasible alternative but to conceptualize organizations in terms of the patterns among their components. Their characters are particularly subject to the balance between autonomy and interdependence among subdivisions, and the degree of consistency among the status, power, and value systems. It is misleading, for example, to describe a school's relationship to its community without taking into consideration the specific parties involved and their autonomy and status within the organization. It makes a considerable difference whether a relationship involves influential superintendents of a powerful big city system, in collaboration with a big city political machine, or whether it is a prestigious coach or a first year kindergarten teacher in contact with the PTA.

### The Relationship of Conflict to Stability

The interaction network linking the parts consists of competing relations as well as cooperative ones, although organizations differ in the specific balance between cooperation and competition. To the extent that organizations are held together by power, the exercise of power creates subcultures and generates opposition (Dahrendorf, 1958a). The opposition that develops, in turn helps to regulate and compromise the functions of the various parts. The way in which the total system functions, therefore, depends as

much upon the amount of opposition among the parts as the amount of cooperation among them.

Since the parts are linked competitively and their functions are limited by tension, the distribution of tension throughout an organization is as responsible for coordination and stability as it is for disruptions. Reductions (or increases) of tension are likely to bring about corresponding modifications in the ways activities are performed, which in turn can create new tensions in other parts of the system. (For example, an English department can increase its status by dumping the poor students onto some other department). Recurrent outbreaks of minor conflicts, accordingly, help to maintain the existing system to the extent that they develop in defense of established procedures, and at the same time, are responsible for change when these procedures are successfully challenged. Organizations in this sense, exist in a state of "unstable and dynamic equilibrium".

Opposing principles of organization are responsible for much of the tension. Coalitions evolve around equally legitimate but conflicting principles, and in that sense, conflict is produced by the organization itself and involves one aspect of organization against another. It is in the daily round of routine friction that principles are eventually defended or defeated. Support for competing principles helps to maintain legitimate alternatives supported by different segments of the organization and prevents one part of the organization from overcoming the others. Thus, opposition among principles predetermines the spheres in which conflict is likely to occur and some of the forms that it is likely to take. Given these organizational tensions and other sources aggravating them, an organization's functions are shaped by the compromises that develop from the coalitions and competing subdivisions of the organization. This situation creates a system of checks and balances by which the separate parts of an organization can expand, but are kept within bounds.

The concept of "dynamic equilibrium", while suggestive and picturesque, does not

in itself clarify how the dynamicism is generated, nor how equilibrium is maintained in the face of dynamic pressures. The dynamic element arises internally from disproportionate power among autonomous groups subscribing to different moral standards and having different interests.<sup>4</sup> As long as there is consensus that power differences are legitimate (or authorized), little pressure for change will be generated. However, three types of disruption can take place. First, a change in activity made necessary by structural change may alter the distributions of rewards in relation to power. For example, either unanticipated increases in enrollment or the inability of schools to replace teachers who leave may increase the teaching load. If their power remains at the previous level, while they are assigned disproportionately more work, they will tend to resist. Although changes in activities can be agreed upon or imposed with the structure intact, it seems unlikely that a major change in activity will not alter the distributions of rewards and interfere with the existing value system.

Second, a change in activity may be logically required because of changing values. Changes in values can arise because an initial inconsistency becomes more prominent, or because new values are brought into the organization. For example, as newer, better trained teachers enter the profession, they may agitate for new teaching methods. Teachers whose status depends upon the existing procedures are likely to resist. In this case, the status difference between new and old teachers is no longer justified by the new value system, and older teachers continue to resist in terms of the older value system. The outcome depends on their relative power.

Third, a change can occur in power distributions while the prestige and value systems remain constant. For example, a coach may obtain disproportionate influence in a school because of the backing of a newly formed booster club. Teachers may be

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<sup>4</sup>This discussion will ignore the outside pressures to change, which arise from differences in power between outside groups and groups within the organization.

unwilling to grant him more prestige despite his influence. It seems plausible that inconsistencies between power and rewards are major sources of conflicts among peers, while between subordinates and superiors the major conflicts arise from discrepancies between power and values.

In view of the continuous changes that impinge on organizations, it sometimes seems less necessary to explain the instability of organizations than to explain their stability. Tension does not normally disrupt organizations, largely because of the ultimate interdependence among the parts. Each part depends on the others for assistance, for recognition and for its own power. For example, advanced algebra teachers depend upon teachers of elementary algebra, and coaches depend upon English teachers to excuse the boys from class for other events. In this sense, the organization is a bargain, a series of bargains really, between the parts. Sometimes it is a "live and let live policy"; sometimes it's, "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours". Hence, groups are kept within bounds, despite the tensions, by the realization of each, that its own work and its status will be jeopardized by alienating too many others. While some may wish to increase their bargaining position, once the bargains have been worked out, most members will find advantages in the existing system and would be threatened by too sudden or extreme change. This is especially likely when the dominant principles are those of the existing power structure and reward system.

In this model, the notion that conflict seriously impairs an organization, and in fact the entire notion of a "sick" organization, is difficult to comprehend. Certainly, the possibility that conflict may be discomforting to the individuals involved does not mean that it is detrimental to the organization; the opposite is more likely to be the case. And, in fact, to the extent that conflict is necessary to uphold valued principles, conflict can be personally satisfying to the parties involved.

## General Premises of Conflict Theory<sup>5</sup>

Some of the premises that promise to provide a foundation for conflict theory can now be identified and illustrated.

The Group Nature of Conflict. Conflict is a group phenomenon which has sources beyond the subjective attitudes of individual group members. Many conflicts, as well as forms of cooperation, arise from subordinates' interests in solving the organization's problems rather than out of selfishness or sheer emotion. Just as a thousand loves between soldiers and enemy women is not equal to peace, says Barnard (1950), so a dozen disputes between American tourists and French cab drivers is not equivalent to a French-American conflict. Parties in conflict may even display affection toward one another, as in the case of conflict between the sexes or age groups, and the numerous wars fought by "peace loving" people. Moreover, Barnard maintains, improving interpersonal relations by "getting people together" (as in the comprehensive school) does not necessarily reduce conflict; and in cases where enemies have something to fight about, getting them together may simply expose their basic differences and drive them to their extremes. Since conflict can exist independently of personal hostility, personal attitudes reveal little about group relations.

Cultural Relativism. Historically, the "good" people have fought the "good". The neighbors who dispute their property lines are probably "good" citizens. The good man is generally the supporter of his own group's values, while the "bad" man is on the opposing side. The problem, then, is not to determine which side is "good", but what the fight is all about.

Organization as a Balance of Power. What has come to be generally accepted as

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<sup>5</sup>The writer is indebted to Professor George Vold, whose insightful thinking on this subject is of utmost significance.

good usually has had a long history of struggle for acceptance. Christianity, for example, was at one time, the religion of a downcast minority. In this sense, the world, a society, or an organization, as each exists, is the outcome of historic power struggles, and exists under the shadows of remaining animosities. Since the defeat of an idea or a group seldom implies complete annihilation, history leaves cleavage and scars. Often conflicts boil from past wounds. Relationships among members of an organization are influenced by past disagreements and personal defeats. Informal organizations arise on the basis of this history, and consequently, there is not one informal organization, but several with different objectives, norms and relationships to the rest of the organization.

The fact that the established balance of power within organizations is subject to smoldering recurrences of disputes means that there is in all organizations an undercurrent of potential change, compromise and dispute. Complete understanding of the situation requires historical review.

Conflict Requires Cooperation. Sociologists realized early that cooperation and conflict are not polar opposites. Rather, conflict between groups promotes cooperation within them. Coser points out that Marx, in fact, felt that self-interest is detrimental to collective interests and that combination always has the double aim of putting an end to personal competition while enabling a group to compete as a whole (Coser, 1965). Because groups need to cooperate in order to wage conflict, the level of cohesiveness and discipline within a group reflects upon the disputes going on between it and outsiders. As new conflicts occur, new forms of cooperation emerge. Thus, even groups that are usually in competition may work together when their mutual interests are jeopardized by outsiders. This alternating current of conflict and cooperation among persons, as they identify with different groups, contributes to the element of flux in organizational structures.

Groups Must Be Visible To Wage Conflict. Conflicts cannot occur between groups that are otherwise unidentifiable by some means of physical or symbolic identity. Minorities that oppose the established order deliberately maintain distinctive appearances and public ideologies, and their members who do not maintain the symbols (such as Mennonites who wear lipstick, Beatniks without beards, and disciples of Dewey who condone educational T. V.) are disclaimed to prevent contamination of the group's identity, which is a more important explanation of why these groups prohibit certain acts more than the moral issues involved. Conversely, as groups in conflict lose their characteristic identity, the conflict between them declines. Probably, conflicts typically disappear without being resolved, particularly because of changes in group visibility.

The highest expression of a group's identity is the ideology it uses to justify its position. In the public schools the ideology of local democratic control over the schools bolsters local resistance to teaching professions and to federal influence, while both the government and the professions justify their interference on the basis of ideologies about raising the standards of education and professional expertise.

Conflict Influences Goals. Different members of an organization develop objectives which are not only opposed to one another, but which may be at odds with official statements of purpose. This situation leads to diversity of organizational goals and unplanned cleavages between departments, which further compromises the original goals. The operating goals are, consequently, partly forged out of the conflict process.

Structural Arrangements Influence Conflict. Whether or not conflict incidents actually materialize from structurally produced tensions, depends upon the convergence of at least these following structural arrangements:

- (a) Specialization and functional interdependence promote tension. White (1961) found that the drive for autonomy was greatest in those areas where hostility among departments was greatest and the inter-relation of tasks was highest.
- (b) Centralization is equally divisive to the extent that separate echelons develop autonomy.
- (c) Uncertainty is instrumental in conflict (March and Simon, 1958; Crozier, 1960; White, 1961). White found that every department is unable to tolerate certain kinds of uncertainty and is willing to trade less uncertainty in that aspect, for certainty in others. Crozier (1960) found that each unit of an organization struggles to prevent rationalization and control of its own activities while attempting to further the certainty and control of other parts of the organization.
- (d) Competing principles of organization, especially between bureaucratic-employee principles and professional principles, are responsible for contradictory norms being incorporated within the same organization, which can lead to conflict.
- (e) Inter organizational relations are influenced by the internal autonomy of subparts, and the tension that develops among these subparts is in turn, influenced by the organization's connection with other organizations in the environment.
- (f) Limited and "free-floating" resources are the subject of competition and conflict to the extent that the allocation system has not been completely routinized and legitimized (Eisenstadt, 1958).
- (g) The system of interaction and participation facilitates or prevents conflict by establishing channels for the expression of exist-

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ing conflict.

(h) Mobility patterns alter conflict by influencing the opportunity of malcontent subordinates to advance and hence to be siphoned off and co-opted; organizations in which mobility is uniformly blocked will be tension ridden, especially if the expectations of subordinates are rising (March and Simon, 1958).

(i) The recruiting system determines the amount of turnover and disruption in the organization and is responsible for interruptions in the system. It accounts for heterogeneity of its latent culture, all of which influence the amount of tension.

## CONCLUSIONS

There is growing awareness among sociologists that until recently, both conflict and social organizations have been relatively neglected as subjects of inquiry and research, in comparison to the discipline's preference for interpreting life within the framework of stability and from the perspective of individuals. Studies of conflict from the standpoint of the organizational principles involved should increase our understanding of organizations of all types; and the study of educational organizations, in particular, may eventually contribute to a distinctively sociological theory of learning, as well as to solutions of long-range educational problems. Therefore, it seems advisable to avoid reducing sociological problems of organization and structure to problems of individual psychology, and to work within the framework of organizational theory.

Modern organizational theory has a mixed parentage: positive organicism; functionalism; formalism; and two branches of social behaviorism: social action and symbolic interaction. These theories have variously endorsed several key concepts, including rationality, value consensus, functional interdependence, and social power. The first three terms are central to the rational, or integration, model of organization; the last two form the foundation of the coercion or natural systems, model. While both of these models pertain to organizational characteristics, a third, the behavioristic model, insists upon reducing organizational problems to the values and attitudes of individuals. The fundamental question about these models at this point, is not whether the integration or the coercion model is more "real to life" but rather, which model raises the more significant questions. In the conflict model, organization is problematic. By calling for an investigation of the question, "What causes organization?", this model challenges significant assumptions and hence, promises to be more fruitful. The study of routine conflicts in organizations may help to answer the question. The task of sociology, in particular, is to identify the specific

structural arrangements that are provoked by existing conflict, and that in turn, produce other conflicts.

When viewed as natural systems, organizations appear to be arrangements for coordinating the activities of subdivisions having a common identity; specifically, the coordination system regulates the division of labor and consists of a status system, and of rules and procedures. The way organizations function somehow depends upon their recruiting practices, how they deal with nonmembers, the allocation of status and the division of labor, and the degree of stability and control they are able to maintain over their respective directions. Responsibility for these processes is assigned to various roles.

The primary unit of analysis consists of the component parts of the system. Individuals are not included in this conceptualization because it is assumed that a theory of organization need not, and perhaps cannot, be derived from an aggregation of principles of human behavior. On the contrary, the principles of individual behavior are assumed to be mediated by and reflected in principles of organization. Organizational properties are assumed to represent an independent form of social life having a uniquely characteristic logic and dynamic. An organization represents a single unit in the total population of organizations at a given time.

Much tension in organization arises from opposing principles, integral to the organization itself. Conflict plays an important role in linking the parts together. Opposition helps to regulate and compromise the functions of the various parts and to keep them within bounds. In this sense, tension is as responsible for coordination as it is for disruption. Conflict, then, plays a pivotal role in organization; theories of organization must incorporate the principles of conflict theory. These principles recognize the group nature of conflict, cultural relativism, the notion that an organization consists of a balance of power, the cooperative nature of conflict, the importance of group visibility, the influence of conflict on

goals and organizational structure, and the influence that structural arrangements have on the forms and outcomes of conflict. Some of the implications of the last two principles will be the primary focus of this research reported subsequently.

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## CHAPTER 2

### PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE ROLE CONFLICT IN EDUCATION

A resurgence of militancy among the nation's public school teachers marked the year of 1963. There was mounting evidence that teachers are no longer content to rule only the classroom to which they are assigned. They want a hand in the assignment and a voice in the policy that controls their professional lives. They are not asking to run the schools, but they want their view heard and heeded (New York Times, 1964).

As work becomes professionalized--specialized around esoteric knowledge and technique--the organization of work must create room for expert judgment, and autonomy of decision making and practice becomes a hallmark of the advanced profession (Clark, 1963, p. 286).

Bureaucratization is one of the major developments of the century. Drucker terms this an "employee society," one formed of relationships between employers and employees (Drucker, 1952). As more and more people work for "bosses" in large organizations rather than directly for "employers," the system becomes increasingly impersonal and bureaucratic. Contemporary novels portray bureaucracy as a cruel, dehumanizing and overbearing system limiting the individual's autonomy, and compromising his integrity (Friedsam, 1954). In the romantic solution, the hero rebels; but it is the threat that man will succumb, will become an "organization man" or a "bureaucratic personality," which has alarmed the public.

There is surprisingly little resemblance between this spectre of oppression from monolithic organizations and the loosely integrated, tension-based structure portrayed in the preceding chapter. If there is any truth in this latter picture, the choices available to man cannot be entirely confined by such a system. For although complex organizations do require coordination and develop hierarchies of control to maintain it, the very complexity of the problems which provoke this system of control, creates alternatives and expands man's freedom of choice. If conflict is the normal state of modern organization, then it is unlikely that control

will outdistance diversity and initiative for long.

Most modern work environments, therefore, cannot be adequately described simply in terms of stratified chains of command and legal or official authority relations between employers and employees. The professionalization of employees, in particular, and the consequent competition between professional and employee principles of organization for dominance in educational organizations, complicates this official doctrine. Employees find power in professions; and professional responsibilities require of workers a certain amount of independence and autonomy from the strict, bureaucratic system of management. Professionals seek to regulate their own work standards and goals, and to control their members.

Competing requirements of professional and employee roles, then, are potentially major sources of tension in bureaucracies employing professional persons. Although some professionals employed by bureaucratic organizations, undoubtedly learn to straddle their dual professional roles without difficulty, for many, the status of professional employees is a turbulent one.

There are, then, sources of pressure generated by the organization itself which counteract developments toward "bureaucratic personalities." What is involved is one aspect of an organization against another. As Kornhauser states it, "The problems posed by the interaction between professions and work establishments are to be viewed from the standpoint of relations between two institutions, not merely between organizations and individuals. The situation of professional employees is misconstrued if they are viewed only as isolated individuals pitted against the crushing force of a powerful bureaucracy." (Kornhauser, 1962, p. 8).

#### THE MEANINGS OF THE TERM, "PROFESSION"

Generally speaking, a mature profession is an organized group having a legal monopoly to establish procedures for recruiting and policing members, for maxi-

mizing control over a body of theoretical knowledge, and applying it to the solution of social problems. Many similar definitions of the term "profession" are available. In an analysis of definitions advocated by nine authorities, Swisher found that systematic knowledge based on theory is common to all; the existence of a formal professional association characterized by strong group solidarity is common to six; five includes a predominantly service-to society orientation as opposed to self-interest (Swisher, 1966). Less than half of them include a code of ethics, community recognition of professional standing, plus a strong sense of individual responsibility and involvement. Only a few mention being consulted on public policy, having an unstandardized product, or relying on a system of monetary and honorary rewards symbolizing achievement.

Greenwood's (1957) definition includes five components:

- (1) Knowledge based on systematic theory--although some nonprofessions are more "skilled" than professions; professional skills are derived from theoretical knowledge and advanced through research.
- (2) Authority recognized by the clientele of the professional group--clients (as distinguished from customers) however, must rely on the professional's judgment and are not permitted to diagnose their own needs.
- (3) Broader community sanction and approval of this authority--a profession's authority is reinforced by community police powers, including accrediting systems and licensing procedures.
- (4) A code of ethics regulating relationships of professional persons with clients and colleagues--i.e., to obtain the right to a license, professions must demonstrate that their members are motivated less by self-interest and more by the impulse to perform maximally; hence competition for clients is out of place, and colleagues are expected

to support one another vis-a-vis "outside groups" and through consultation.

- (5) A professional culture sustained by formal professional associations-- i.e., networks of formal organizations, training and research centers and communication systems.

Goode (1961) reduces these characteristics to two essential dimensions: (1) prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge, and (2) a collectivity with a service orientation. Regarding the first element, employers or clients must believe that the theoretical principles exist and are useful; the profession must be the final arbiter in any dispute about knowledge; and the knowledge must be difficult enough to master so that a monopoly can be maintained. The service orientation, Goode maintains, is to be based on the needs of the client rather than self-interest. However, that does not imply individual "altruism", for professionals, as Parsons (1954) has pointed out, seek their own gain as much as any occupational group, that being one function of professional association. Rather, altruism can be maintained only if failure to conform to the code of ethics is less rewarding than conformity. In the long run, the profession's ability to maintain its license depends upon its ability to convince the public that it does have control over its membership.

Perhaps Kornhauser's (1962) definition taps the most relevant dimensions. Four criteria were identified: specialized competence having an intellectual component; extensive autonomy in exercising this special competence; strong commitment to a career based on special competence; and influence and responsibility in the use of special competence.

#### The Process of Professionalization

The above definitions refer only to the ideal structural characteristics of mature professions that already have been stabilized. Professions, however, can

also be viewed as vocations in process. A vocation's drive to professionalize is as revealing of its character as its actual achievements. Commenting on the problems of identifying professions, Hughes has said in an earlier study of real estate agents:

I started the study with the idea of finding out an answer to this familiar question, 'Are these men professionals?' It is a false question, for the concept "professional" in all societies is not so much a descriptive term as one of value and prestige....The movement to "professionalize" an occupation is thus collective mobility of some, among the people in an occupation. One aim of the movement is to rid the occupation of people who are not mobile enough to go along with the changes. (Hughes, 1958).

Historically, almost all of the mature professions including divinity, law, and medicine, have faced obstacles in their efforts to achieve recognition. Until quite recently, perhaps the primary enemies of professions could be limited to the state and to commercialism (Marshall, 1939). The political control of the state, in particular, represents a major threat to professional autonomy--so much so, that it is necessary for an occupation to control certain political machinery, such as accrediting agencies and licensing boards as a condition of professional status. In comparison to the threat of state control, Marshall contends that the employment of professionals in bureaucratic organizations had been of minor consequence.

However, while it is true that the individual practitioner is not the cornerstone of professionalism, the employment of professionals in bureaucratic organizations is of more importance than Marshall allows--not because bureaucracies challenge the economic independence of professional entrepreneurs, but because they represent as much of a menace to professional authority as government itself. Both the administrative system which governs an organization and the control exercised by laymen and their legal representatives on regulating boards usurp the authority of modern professions.

The fact that administrators themselves are seeking gains in their own professional authority while at the same time they are representing outside lay control

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over professional employees tends to make them doubly threatening. Consequently, it must be concluded with these writers that, "The dilemma can be stated simply: professionals see themselves as persons who are, or ought to be, guided by professional considerations, while in fact they are guided or threatened by superior organizational loyalty." (Blau and Scott, 1962, p. 244).

### Professionalization as a Militant Process

There is now a thrust within American society toward professionalization which is affecting teaching as well as many other, if not most, vocations in bureaucratic settings (Foote, 1953). During the initial stages, it is typical that only small segments of an occupation show concern about improving its status. But the leadership they exert eventually can change the complexion of the entire vocation (Bucher and Strauss, 1961). The key to their success is the amount of autonomy they can gain for the vocation and their ability to legitimize it with legal sanctions plus an exclusive license to practice. These guarantees provide the means of controlling the membership.

In order to increase its autonomy, however, a vocational group must challenge the parties which have been in control. And unless these authorities are willing to voluntarily relinquish their hold, the vocation will defy them by objecting, criticizing, or by legal action and more ambitious forms of militancy. Professionalization, in this sense, is a militant process--and a likely source of organizational conflict.

### SOURCES OF PROFESSIONAL-EMPLOYEE ROLE CONFLICT

The role conflicts that characterize professionals employed by public organizations have been documented in a variety of settings. Evidence of conflict among professional and bureaucratic roles is reported by Brown, who found that professional employees in a government laboratory resisted rules made for them by

persons outside of the professional group (Brown, 1954). Some of the interests and values of professionals in the laboratory conflicted with bureaucratic procedures. Many of the engineers in development and testing work resisted adapting to the large-scale bureaucratic procedures, even though they recognized the need for them more than the research scientists did. Some individuals partially insulated themselves from the organization by identifying with their professional colleagues outside of the laboratory. Even those engineers who otherwise generally accepted them resented the Civil Service System, management politics, and committee organization. The author conjectures, however, that professionals with lower national prestige than engineers would not be able to control their organizations as well as the engineers did.

Wordwell concludes in his discussion of bureaucratization that the bureaucratic principle of delegated authority, in particular, is inconsistent with the idea of professional authority, which presumably is independent of the employing organization's control. He believes that as bureaucratic and professional roles become more integrated, relationships with clients become increasingly impersonal, undermining the traditional basis of professional authority--the intimacy of the professional-client relationship. (Wordwell, 1955).

Other writers place less stress on the consequences of role conflict for clients and instead emphasize its impact on creativity, effectiveness, and long-range modifications of the organizational structure. McEwan (1956) notes incongruities between the professional and the bureaucratic roles of military persons (especially those trained in research). They stem from the fact that the professional research person's self-conception as an individual, capable of critical ability and capacity for original thought, could only be superficially followed in the structure of the military organization. Scientists interacted with officers on an equal basis in the research laboratory during part of the day, but later

carried the officers' groceries. McEwan, too, believes that such principles as standardization and subordination by rank are, in practice, incongruent with the need for creative thinking and equality relations which prevail between professionals.

Getzels and Guba (1954) investigated three hypotheses with respect to the role conflicts reported during two hour interviews with fourteen officer instructors in the military: (1) role conflict is a function of incompatible expectations placed upon or held by the actors; (2) the greater the intensity of the actor's involvement in role conflict, the greater, his relative ineffectiveness in at least one of the roles; (3) the intensity of an actor's involvement in role conflict is systematically related to personal and attitudinal characteristics. It was found that one of the major conflicts occurred between the officer role and the teacher role, performed by military persons in a military school. In general, the empirical findings supported the theoretical expectations.

The present author's study of several hundred nurses located in seven hospitals and four schools of nursing indicated that nurses, trained in collegiate degree programs, were more likely to hold strong professional role conceptions and were more critical toward the hospital than nurses trained in diploma programs more closely controlled by hospitals, which indicates the effects of independent training institutions on role conceptions (Corwin, 1961a). Parallel studies suggested that diploma and degree nurses' commitments to role conceptions were associated in different ways with their career plans and ambitions and lead to their subsequent disillusionment (Corwin, 1961b).

Sorensen (1965) developed scales, modeled after Corwin's, to measure the professional and employee role conceptions of accountants employed in twenty-four branch offices of four national public accounting firms, and found direct increases in bureaucratic orientations and decreases in professional orientations with rank from junior through partner. Less experienced persons in the lower positions felt there was too much bureaucracy, while the more experienced in higher positions felt that there

was too little. He also found that job satisfaction was effected more by bureaucratic orientation than by professional orientation; the CPA's with low bureaucratic orientations consistently tended to be less satisfied. Migratory and non-migratory CPA's differed little in professional orientations, but differences in bureaucratic orientations were distinct, with those planning to change jobs having significantly lower bureaucratic orientations than those planning to remain with their current firm.

#### Organizational Accommodations

Gouldner (1959) has emphasized the importance of the fact that administrators frequently supervise and evaluate employees (who are technically more proficient). This, then, is the basic source of organizational tension. The superior, wishing results, emphasizes achievement; the subordinate, on the other hand, concerned about his peers' judgments of his technical or professional competence, stresses quality and correct procedure. The superior's inability to judge his subordinate's competence also poses the problem of whether the criterion for promotion should be seniority and loyalty, or professional skill and competence. Since administrative superiors are not always competent to judge the specialists under them, they tend to rely on nontechnical criteria and the evaluations of people outside the organization. This poses a dilemma, for on one hand, the expert is expected to be loyal to the organization, but on the other hand, his primary source of esteem lies with groups outside the organization.

These and similar dilemmas have helped to compromise traditional forms of bureaucracy. For example, in contrast to the unilateral chain-of-command, Goss (1961) describes clearly delineated dual lines of authority between physicians and administrators in a medical hospital. The Administration had the right to make some administrative decisions: such as scheduling, chart review, the right to give advice; whereas the physicians reserved to themselves the right to accept

or reject administrative suggestions about patient care. It was up to the physician who was actually taking care of the patient to make the final decision. The administrator could not supervise in these matters, only give advice. This consulting relationship was even more bearable because the administrative positions were held by highly respected and qualified physicians. The physician's compliance with the advice depended on whether the sphere of authority in question was "administrative" or "professional" in nature.

Although, following administrative regulations was not very important to physicians when they conflicted with their professional task of taking care of patients. This does not mean that they never complied with administrative decisions or that they wanted to make all of them. On the contrary, by complying to administrators in strictly administrative spheres, physicians gained freedom from administrative responsibility, which they considered to be onerous. Goss concludes that although the hierarchical organization of the hospital in which professionals worked might appear to conflict with the essence of professional autonomy, in practice, the hospital avoided this conflict through adherence to separate spheres of professional and administrative authority.

In general, then, professional experts employed by large-scale organizations may expect to encounter conflicts between the expectations of the organization and of their profession. But beyond that general statement, organizations vary in their relative emphasis on employee and professional roles. Gouldner (1959), Bendix (1947), and others suggest that in some organizations knowledge is more basic to the authority system than in others. In such organizations employees are permitted more influence over decisions and more initiative and professional autonomy. Other organizations seem to be primarily organized around the principle of compliance in opposition to the principle of professional authority. Etzioni (1959) maintains that line authority in professional organizations, like universities, does not extend into

the professional spheres. There is, for example, probably less time spent in direct supervision of personnel in such organizations. However, there is also an extreme degree of variability among such organizations, which suggests that the amount of professionalism which organizations permit will vary even among organizations of the same institutional area.

The relative emphasis that an organization places on centralized authority, standardized work procedures, and specialization of personnel does influence the salience of professional and employee rights and obligations. Particular configurations of these variables help to account for an organization's uniqueness. For example, the group practice of medicine is characterized by highly specialized but uncentralized organizations. On the other hand, school systems and factories probably differ not so much in terms of how centralized or how specialized their personnel are, but in terms of the degree to which their work has been standardized.

#### Role Organization

Individuals also vary in the salience of their professional and employee role conceptions. The endorsement an organization gives to professional and bureaucratic principles of organization is a function of the way its members conceptually organize these roles. According to one writer, the man who seeks recognition from his professional group rather than from his employers is called a "functional bureaucrat" (Reissman, 1949). For him, the quality of his work is more important than his ability to use bureaucratic procedures. Because a bureaucracy is less important to him in all respects, there is no conflict between his professional aims and the organizational means that he uses. The "specialist bureaucrat," who is procedurely conservative and identifies primarily with the people with whom he works, normally is forced into his profession and is unaware of differences between bureaucratic and professional roles. The "service bureaucrat" is oriented

to the bureaucratic means but also seeks recognition from outside professional groups which support his professional ends. The "job bureaucrat" uses professional skills only as entrance requirements into a bureaucratic job from which he seeks departmental recognition and material rewards from the job. Technical competence is a primary source of satisfaction for him; he accepts the structure of the organization as it is.

Page describes similar ways in which college faculties concede to their bureaucratic roles (Page, 1961). The "ritualist" fanatically obeys all rules and regulations of the official organization; the "neurotic" frets about the discrepancy between the ideal roles and actual practices; the "robber baron" cuts "red tape" and uses the system for what he feels was its original professional ends; while the "rebel" disregards all bureaucratic rules.

Marvick was able to identify three career types in a federal agency carrying on a research-coordinating and research-subsidizing program for national defense (Marvick, 1954, p. 34): (1) institutionalists, almost all of whom were not professionals in the first place, and whose entire orientation was that of the organization; (2) specialists, slightly more than half of whom were professionals to the extent that they had higher degrees, and most of whom tended to maintain their professional orientations; and finally, (3) hybrids, of whom less than half had higher degrees and who seemed to have neither a professional nor an organizational orientation, but whose behavior was governed mainly by what was most expedient for their own individual careers.

Ben-David's typology of the medical roles of physicians employed in a bureaucratic setting is more elaborate (Ben-David, 1958). Those physicians primarily concerned about therapeutic efficiency he termed "bureaucratic" doctors; "service oriented" physicians were closely identified with a circle of patients; "science" oriented doctors sought more external status, had less regard for patient relation-

ships, and tried to dominate the patient more than did the service oriented physicians. The significance of this particular typology is that it begins to differentiate between those professional persons who are oriented to colleagues and those oriented to clients and other specific reference groups.

Corwin (1961a) found that nurses who simultaneously held both strong professional and employee role conceptions expressed a greater sense of deprivation of their ideal roles in actual practice than those having other styles of role organization. Sorensen (1965) also found that the CPA who simultaneously holds high professional and high bureaucratic status orientations experiences relatively strong status deprivation.

Convergence between teachers' and administrators' definitions of administrative roles was found by Bidwell (1957) to be related to teachers' job satisfaction. Although no relation was found among the high satisfaction schools, teachers' expectations in low satisfaction schools did diverge from preceptions of how administrators behaved, which in turn was associated with dissatisfaction with teaching. Both the deprivation of expectations in practice and the incongruence between role partners' conceptions represent significant types of role conflict.

#### A MODEL OF BUREAUCRATIC-PROFESSIONAL CONFLICT

To be meaningful, bureaucratic and professional roles should relate back to the concept of complex organization from which they derive. Complex organizations already have been described in terms of three dimensions: the degree to which work is standardized, the degree of centralized decision making, and the degree of specialization in the work performed. Each of these characteristics may be visualized as a separate continuum ranging from highly bureaucratic at one extreme to highly professional at the other (See Table 2-1). The opportunity that an organization affords its personnel to act professionally and the amount of pressure that

CONTRASTING CHARACTERISTICS OF PROFESSIONAL AND  
EMPLOYEE MODES OF ORGANIZATION

Continuum*	Bureaucratic-Employee Expectations	Professional Expectations
Standardization	Stress on uniformity of clients' problems	Stress on uniqueness of clients' problems
	Routine of Work	
	Stress on records and files	Stress on research and change
	Continuity of Procedure	
	Rules stated as universals, or rules specific	Rules stated as alternatives, as rules diffuse
Specificity of Rules		
Specialization	Stress on efficiency of technique; task orientation	Stress on achievement of goals; client orientation
	Basis of Specialization	
	Skill based primarily on practice	Skill based primarily on knowledge
Monopoly of Knowledge		
Authority	Decisions concerning application of rules to routine problems	Decisions concerning professional policy and unique problems
	Responsibility for Decision-Making	
	Punishment centered administration	Representative administration
	Centralization of Authority	
	Rules sanctioned by the public	Rules sanctioned by powerful and legally sanctioned professionals
Loyalty to the organization and to superiors	Loyalty to professional associations and clients	
Authority from office	Authority from personal competence	
Basis of Authority		

\*Note that the professional and the employee variables should be considered as separate variables, each ranging from high to low.

it exerts on them to behave as employees depends on the configuration of these variables. Thus, the more centralized, standardized, and the less specialized the work, the greater will be the pressure on personnel to act according to the expectations of employees rather than of professionals.

These organizational variables provide a model which helps to shape individual role conceptions, although individual conceptions are by no means equivalent to the dominant mode of organization. Not only can individuals hold conceptions of their roles which diverge from the dominant pattern of organization, but they can uphold professional and employee conceptions simultaneously by mechanisms of segregation. There are, however, parallels between existing patterns of organization and the endorsement which people give to the various principles which organize their work. Contrasts in organizational patterns should be reflected in the way role conceptions are organized. The major components of the model will be discussed below briefly and considered in more detail in Chapter 4.

#### Standardization

Standardization is accomplished through administrative routines assigned to particular offices. Professional status, on the other hand, is based on a common but specialized body of knowledge. In order to apply the knowledge effectively, the professional is given final authority and responsibility for his decisions. He is expected to use initiative and imagination in solving clients' problems. Thus, although both the assembly line worker and the surgeon are in some sense specialized, the degree of initiative expected of each in solving problems is quite different. Furthermore, the bureaucratic emphasis on files and records only reinforces the idea of routine continuity and stability of the organization, while emphasis on the professional's decision-making authority and responsibility for research reinforces the value of the new, the unique, and changeability.

### Authority

By virtue of the more standardized nature of their work, bureaucrats have less authority than professionals to control their work. Abstract and specific rules and procedures regulate bureaucratic work for the sake of efficiency and help to coordinate highly specialized functions; because each bureaucratic situation is presumed to be categorical and routine, a set of uniform rules is applicable. But, because the situations dealt with by professionals are assumed to be unique, professional service to clients is primarily based on the special capacity of the professional to solve his own problems. Therefore, efforts by the administration to standardize professional responsibilities challenge professional authority.

### Specialization

The relationship of the worker to the goals of the bureaucratic organization differs from that of the professional organization. As Francis and Stone state it:

"The emphasis in the professional mode rests upon the relation of an individual to the system of organization... (while) the bureaucratic mode of organization seems to stem from the relation of the individual to a specialized type of work." (Francis and Stone, 1956, p. 56).

The worker's goal of efficiency in the bureaucracy is parallel to the professional's goal of service to clients in the profession. In other words, while in bureaucratic organizations the worker's primary concern is to do his special job, he has no particular responsibility for the total product. But in the professional type of organization, the worker's primary responsibility is to serve the welfare of his clients. It is true that the professional's responsibility is also limited--i.e., he is responsible only for those problems that are within his area of competence. But he is not just responsible for the client's total welfare pertaining to that area (e.g., his health or his legal status), he is also concerned with every other facet of his client's life that may affect the type of welfare for which the professional is responsible (e.g., his former relations or his work when they are affecting

his health). Problems arise because the client's welfare is not always equivalent to the welfare of the organization. In these and other instances where professional and bureaucratic principles conflict, there will be a conflict of loyalty between professional standards and the employing organization.

Of course, these are ideal types and they do not usually exist in pure form; the characteristics of each are not necessarily exclusive and contradictory. Nevertheless, a situation in which both sets of principles are emphasized may demand that both types of principles be compromised.

#### PROFESSIONAL-EMPLOYEE ROLE CONFLICT APPLIED TO TEACHING

Contrasts between tradition and change in public school teaching are making the problem of professional-employee role conflicts and other status anxieties increasingly relevant there. There is a tradition of local control over education which is reflected in the image of the teacher as a "public servant" of the local community, and more specifically, a salaried employee of the school board and administration which control his advancement. This image continues to be reinforced by three conditions. First, a "community school" ideology exists which defines schools as service centers for local taxpayers; extreme localism continues to prevail in many communities. Second, the employee image finds advocates in colleges of education where vocational knowledge and ideologies are preserved and disseminated. Third, this image has been reinforced by the recent maturation of large-scale, complex educational bureaucracies which subject the vocation to a system of higher authority and standardized procedures. Laymen have delegated much of their traditional authority over teachers to administrators of these organizations. Because of their coordination functions, the power of administrators increases directly with the complexity of school systems.

At the same time, however, teachers are professionalizing and developing professional claims, including a claim to special competence which authorizes greater

control over their own work. These attempts at self-control can be expected to conflict with the traditional and bureaucratic sources of control. The dual perspectives of teachers' status, which have evolved from this situation, complicate the prospects of teaching's future. Each of the perspectives will be considered in turn.

### Bureaucratization

The bureaucratic status points in one direction. Dimmock defines bureaucracy as a way of life in which institutions overshadow individuals (Dimmock, 1965). Many of the educational issues of the day, such as educational T.V., the growth of required courses, and large size of classes, concern the presumed effects of standardization and centralization on education. The specific issues surrounding standardization include the importance of course guides, the appropriateness of required courses, the proper number and specificity of rules, job descriptions governing classroom routines and teachers' authority within the school, the desirability of state-wide adoptions of texts and courses of study, rigidity of job descriptions, the appropriateness of various official sanctions, the feasibility of certain teaching methods, and pressures to cover prescribed dosages of material. Despite ideologies of individual attention, there are salient pressures to justify standardization: high student mobility and teacher turnover rates, which necessitate uniformity of curriculum requirements and comparability of methods, and a promotion system which requires uniformity in order to articulate grade levels. Conant's (1961) proposal to require a standard curriculum compulsory for all "talented" youth thus reflects the times.

While there is not a consistent relationship, centralization often implies an increase in both the scope and size of the system. The increasing scope of education raises questions about the proper authority and influence of State Departments of Education, the effects of state and federal legislation on the curriculum and on school policies, and the administrative level ultimately responsible for educational

leadership. The evolving magnitude of education has also created considerable variability in the size of the nation's schools. The number of the smallest school districts decreased by one-half between 1947 and 1959. Currently, 20 per cent of the nation's schools educate 80 per cent of its children. Despite the many small schools that persist, the trend is toward mass centers as the population explosion concentrates in metropolitan areas. Besides the population growth, the impetus to centralize has originated from the cold war and caused subsequent increases in the scope of curriculum offerings and public pressures to raise educational standards uniformly. Conant proposes a minimum school size which exceeds the present mean size, and Mr. Eurich of the Ford Foundation charges that traditional ideas about the effectiveness of small classes are out of date (Conant, 1961; Eurich, 1958).

Those developments mean that teachers as well as individual students are overshadowed by the bureaucratic image. The growth of bureaucracy increases the problems of internal coordination, which are "solved" by more standardization of work, centralization of the major decisions, and a proliferation of regulations over work. As a result, it requires more education and technical skill to manage the operation, which elevates the status of administrators and, in turn, reinforces the traditional image of teachers and lower echelon administrators as employees of local communities. These trends jeopardize the opportunities of teachers to control their work.

### Professionalization

However, the professional image propels teaching against these forces in quite another direction. Behind the professionalization of teaching is the same "drive for status" that characterizes other emerging professions. It means that teachers will seek more control over their work, challenging the traditional ideologies of local control by laymen and their hired professional administrators. The status drive, however, is far from uniform and teachers as a group are ambivalent as to

how far they should go in attempting to increase their authority. On the one hand, they invite lay committees to choose the means of reporting grades, to regulate the disciplining of students, and to determine the proper amount of homework; but on the other hand, they resent "outside" influence from laymen and administrative controls. The immediate issues concern the amount of autonomy that should be granted to local boards of education, to administration, and to teaching professions. But the underlying issues are not peculiar to teaching; they pertain to the appropriate role of the professional-employee in complex organizations and to the place of experts in a democracy.

The ideological conflict, over the role of teachers as employed professionals can be expected to grow as school systems become more bureaucratized, as pressures for more efficient decision-making increase, and as the gap between pedagogical knowledge and lay wisdom increases. Solomon's protest not only illustrates some of the general problems that have developed, but in encouraging teachers to defy bureaucratization in 1961, he may have anticipated a general movement:

Large, centralized organizations are often associated with undesirable bureaucratic tendencies. Rules may become ends in themselves; administrators may pursue such goals as larger empires, greater security, administrative convenience, or smooth operation; control systems may frustrate creativity and initiative; and the rewards may go to conformists....

....The recipients of the educational service, students (or their parents), are not able to properly evaluate the educational process. Teachers could do so, but the influence they exert on standards may be slight because of their position as subordinate employees and the character of their group morale. Intangibility of product thus provides the opportunity for administrators to pursue bureaucratic goals at the cost of the educational process. In a school system where such displacement of goals takes place, many children may pass or graduate each year even though much less than the desirable, or the potentially achievable, amount of learning has taken place....

Perhaps the most crucial fact to be reckoned with in public education organization is the contradiction between the teacher's role as a subordinate employee and his role as a professional person. This contradiction affects significantly the teacher's relationships with administrators and with fellow teachers....

....A bureaucratic system tends to foster a controlled, routinized work situation, one that is not compatible with notions of professional autonomy or responsible participation in decisions relating to the work process, and certainly not compatible with the exercise of creativity or initiative. Thus the teacher, lost in the rule-bound system and having access to few effective channels by which to influence the remote (as well as the near) sources of authority, may eventually retreat to a more or less unhappy accommodation to the realities of his position....

....Teacher organization must focus on developing unified groups in the local schools. Teacher organization today is marked by superstructure without foundation. The goal of greater participation at the school level is barely evident. Little recognition is given to two interrelated ideas. First, that the fundamental aim of enlarging the professional role of teachers can be realized only through the organized school faculty. Second, that the power to achieve this aim depends on meaningful bonds among teachers, bonds that can be forged only where teachers interact on a face-to-face basis for common purposes....

....With strong, autonomous teacher organization, new boundary lines would evolve in accordance with new spheres of responsibility and authority. These lines, we hopefully expect, would evolve from what is necessary for the legitimate functioning of teachers and administrators in a more productive educational system....

We thus come up against the harsher realities from which responsibility cannot be disassociated: the imperatives of power and conflict. These are stark matters for teachers, a white-collar and mainly female group. They shy away from power and find the prospect of conflict an even more unpleasant notion. Teachers seem little aware of the vital, constructive role that conflict, properly channeled, can play in relationships between groups (B. Solomon, 1961).

### Bureaucratic-Professional Issues In Teaching

The developments described by Solomon are reflected in several types of issues now confounding public education. A few of the key specific issues can be identified immediately: continuity of procedure and compliance versus adaptability and initiative; the authority of teachers versus public control over them; the authority of office versus the authority of competence; specialization based on task versus specialization based on function; and training versus experience.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For further discussion of these issues see Corwin (1965).

Continuity of Procedure. In the professional role there is stress on change and variety of knowledge and technique. A profession's emphasis on research (the primary source of these changes) reflects its receptivity to variety and change. While teachers are slowly beginning to adopt a research orientation, less than \$25,000,000 is spent annually for educational research. Comparing education with large-scale industries and government, which profitably spend three to six percent of their total budget for research this means that education, a \$25,000,000,000 enterprise, should be spending \$750,000,000 to \$1,500,000,000 annually (Lieberman 1960). However, colleges of education do not prepare teachers for research, and local systems refuse to release teachers from administrative chores to participate in research or to pay for theoretical research which does not promise to solve a particular school's problem but which could be of benefit to everyone.

Decision-Making Responsibility. The more centralized the decisions and the greater the degree of hierarchical supervision, the greater the emphasis on discipline and compliance and the less initiative allotted to subordinates. In the face of such controls, professionals as a group seek more autonomy; but this does not mean that each individual has the right to make an independent judgment. That right is primarily reserved to the professional group; the conduct of a professional person is strongly regulated by his colleagues.

As Lieberman is fond of pointing out, teachers have little control over many of the important standards of their work--the subjects to be taught, the materials to be used, the criteria for deciding who should be admitted, retained, and graduated in the schools, the forms to be used in reporting pupil progress, school boundary lines and criteria for permitting students to attend, qualifications for teacher training and other characteristics that affect teacher status. The meager authority of teachers is reflected in the "chain of command" which locates authority

in the administrative rather than in the professional sphere. This not only means that critical decisions are made or reviewed at levels of authority above teachers, but also that policy is made by the person most removed from the daily problems of teachers, students, and classrooms.

Basis of Authority. Blau and Scott point out that one of the major dilemmas of modern organizations originates in the dual basis of authority. As they state it, "On the one side, it was administration based on expertise, while on the other, it was administration based on discipline" (Blau and Scott, p. 35, 1962). The dilemma they pose is between compliance and expert judgment. One of the major characteristics of employees is their willingness to suspend their own judgment and follow the directives of their superiors. In bureaucratic organizations, one derives his authority primarily from the position he holds (Gouldner, 1959; Parsons, 1956). While he may be competent as a professional as well, the amount of deference due him as a bureaucrat is based directly on his rank. The notion of hierarchical authority, on the other hand, is not central to professional ideologies. The status system among professionals is presumably based on superior professional knowledge and competence of the professional person, rather than on the official position in the organization. Solomon observes that in bureaucracies the superior has the right to the last word because he is the superior, while in professional matters, the last word goes to the person with greater knowledge or the more convincing logic (Solomon, pp. 253-264, 1957).

A professional's loyalty to his organization can be undermined by his commitments to the outside opinions of his professional colleagues and by his identification to the welfare of his clients, to which his sense of achievement and competence are closely tied. Blau and Scott report, for example, that the social welfare workers who were most oriented to their profession tended to be less attached to

their welfare agency, more critical of its operation, and less confined by administrative procedures (Blau and Scott, 1962). The present writer found similar attitudes expressed by professionally oriented teachers in collegiate schools of nursing (Corwin, 1961a). While professionals are obliged to serve the interests of their clients and to provide them with needed services regardless of other considerations, employees are expected to take the course of action that will most advance the interest of the organization; they are expected to avoid behavior inconsistent with organizational goals. Even if it were assumed that in most cases organizational goals do not conflict with the ideal of serving clients, there are cases in the public schools where the organization's welfare is clearly opposed to students' welfare; for example, consolidation requires the complete destruction of an organization for the welfare of its clients. As Carr-Saunders once observed, "The school teacher, for instance, can be devoted to his pupils, but he is limited in what he can do for them, since he must follow his employer's views on the matter or lose his post" (Carr-Saunders, pp. 2-9, 1966).

While professionals are pledged to serve their clients and the society in general, this fact, in itself, does not necessarily give clients and laymen the right to make their decisions. Professionals wish to answer only to their colleagues and jealously seek to avoid lay control, which is the natural enemy of professions and, as suggested previously, one of the very reasons for a profession's existence. Yet, professional teachers are hired by lay school boards and charged to carry out the "will of the community," and they (the teachers) have developed extreme sensitivity to public pressures.

Professional-employee role conflicts sometimes infect colleague relations as well. One problem is that a person can be a "good" employee without being either known or respected by his professional peers in other parts of the nation or region. On the other hand, most teachers cannot expect to advance very far in the hierarchy

of their own school system without entering administration and losing their professional identities as classroom teachers. The status system is so structured that teachers must exchange their professional status for a bureaucratic office in order to achieve substantial formal advancements.

The argument over merit and seniority as a basis for advancement reflects the professional-employee conflict in the public schools. While many teachers consider themselves to be professional in one sense or another, the fact is, in the vast majority of schools they are advanced on the basis of their seniority in the system (i.e., their loyalty to the system) rather than their demonstrated professional competence.

Basis of Specialization. As the public schools have specialized, increasingly fewer teachers have been responsible for the "whole" student. This problem, greater for the higher grades where teachers are frequently hired to perform very specific functions, makes it nearly impossible to hold individuals responsible for the total development and failure of students as "persons." In contrast to the difficulty of assessing a particular teacher's "contribution" to education, his efficiency is more easily assessed. Maintaining discipline in the classroom and generally operating a smoothly run, efficient classroom, accordingly, are key ingredients of a "good" teacher.

Monopoly of Knowledge. One of the major differences between craftsmen and professionals is the degree to which the former have specialized in terms of techniques and methods. While professionals must be skilled in the use of a variety of techniques, the major emphasis in their training is on an organized body of theoretical knowledge. The stress that traditionally has been placed on "methods" in teacher-training programs perhaps places teaching closer to other crafts. On the other hand, specialized training in the psychology of learning, the history and philosophy

of education, the sociology of education or, in the case of administrators, in administrative science, is more in accordance with professional education. Only if education finds a body of knowledge (as opposed to techniques) to monopolize, will it gain professional authority and recognition.

#### PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN EDUCATION

In one of the few studies of its kind, Colombotos analyzed the social backgrounds of teachers associated with their professional orientations (Colombotos, 1962). Using an index of professionalism based on technical competence, autonomy, and the service ideal, he found that the more professional teachers come from higher social class backgrounds; that Catholics are the least professional and active Protestants are the most professional; and also that male academic teachers are more professional than men in nonacademic areas. A rank order correlation ( $t = .43$ ) was found between the net increase in teachers' professionalism (reported as they looked back on it) and the school's professional "climate," (which is the descriptive component of the professional index items). This finding seemed to indicate that a faculty's professional orientation is explained better by the existing climate of a school than by the orientations of teachers originally attracted to it. He also found that the professional working climate of a school is directly associated with the socio-economic level of the student body ( $t = .71$ ), and that professionalism is inversely associated to proceduralism as measured by a one-item scale concerning whether or not teachers overlook the rules. Teachers with advanced training were found to be more professional than those less educated, and liberal arts graduates were more professional than graduates of teachers' colleges.

There was a relationship between the professionalism of men and the extent of their participation in the American Federation of Teachers, but not with their participation in the NEA. However, there was no difference between members of the

AFT and the NEA. Colombotos concluded that union affiliation neither promotes nor inhibits the development of professional orientation.

#### Role Conflict Among Administrators

Studies of role disagreement have shed some insight into professional-employee conflicts among public school administrators. Seeman identified several inconsistencies between segments of school superintendents' roles (Seeman, 1953). The status dimension of their position was associated with a conflict between the success ideology on the one hand and equality ideology on the other hand; the dilemma was responsible for a "leadership guilt," because of their special privileges which are alien to democratic expectations. Conflict, inherent to the authority segment of the superintendent's position, involved difficulties in maintaining a proper balance between the degree of dependence and independence of subordinates; many teachers and administrators want more voice in the system, but they are reluctant to accept the corresponding responsibilities. The institutional dimension involved a choice between universalistic (objective) as opposed to particularistic criteria of evaluation; a principal, for example, is supposed to be a "good Joe" with teachers, but at the same time should be objective in evaluating them. To avoid this type of conflict, administrators often avoid developing friendships with their subordinates. Finally, the problems associated with the means-ends dimension concerned the relative emphasis on getting the practical job done in comparison to the quality of the work done. Leaders, for example, must pay attention not only to the task to be accomplished, but also to the morale, interpersonal relations, and personal problems of the group's members. Seeman found that elementary school principals expressed more ambivalence than those at the high school level, but that on the whole, principals showed less ambivalence than teachers toward these dimensions in describing the "ideal leader."

Gross and his associates (1958) studied prevalent role conflicts in the public schools. In a sample of 105 superintendents and their school boards in Massachusetts, superintendents often disagreed between themselves (interposition dissent), and members of each school board also disagreed among themselves on specific role obligations (intraposition dissent). Role consensus between the two groups was low on sixty-three per cent of the items tested. In general, school board members and superintendents each assigned greater responsibility to their own position than to the other, and each group sensed different obligations to the community. For example, school board members felt less strongly than superintendents did that a definite stand should be taken against unreasonable demands of taxpayers. The two groups also disagreed about their responsibilities to teachers. For example, superintendents agreed more often than school board members did that they must help teachers achieve higher salaries. Both groups also differed among themselves; but there was greater consensus within the superintendents' sample, probably because superintendents are elected by more standardized procedures than school boards.

The same study showed that many of these conflicts involved professional and employee roles. Superintendents often appeared to be at the mercy of the school boards which controlled their jobs. Although most of the 105 superintendents agreed that there are some cases in which the superintendent can exercise his own judgment with respect to school board rules, 34 of them said that following rules strictly is the only way they can keep out of "hot water" with school boards; and 64 of them said that school board rules are absolutely binding on the superintendent.

Board members behaved in ways which superintendents considered to be unprofessional. For example, while most superintendents felt that a professional board should act as a unit only and not individually and should not give orders directly to the superintendent's own subordinates, nor engage in "block voting" or represent various special interests of the community, one-fourth to one-fifth of the superin-

tendents reported the disapproved behavior on the part of their board. Unprofessional behavior, sometimes, was requested of superintendents by their employers. Nearly a fourth of them reported pressures from school board members to award school contracts to certain firms in an unethical manner and to hire or dismiss teachers because of personal interests or prejudices. The sample was disposed toward employee self-conceptions: over half of them said that they believed the superintendent should carry out decisions of the school board even though he himself believed they were unsound, and about the same proportion said that they actually do carry out unsound decisions.

Gross and Herriott (1965) recently have investigated some organizational and interpersonal variables which influence the professional leadership of principals, as it was evaluated by teachers. It was found that the performance of teachers and teacher morale were both associated with the leadership styles of principals. Professional leadership was judged to be higher when the principal's immediate superior was determined to have high leadership abilities; when the principal participated in the selection of teachers; and when teachers were involved in the principal's decisions and had a share in determining, for example, the level of satisfactory student performance, student discipline policies, and supervision policies. Also, the more egalitarian a principal's relationship with his teachers, the greater the degree of support he provided his staff, the greater his support of teachers, and thus the greater his evaluated leadership abilities. Other factors related to professional leadership were the amount of "off duty" time that a principal devoted to his job and the intellectual ability he demonstrated while in college. There are implicit in some of these data intricate balances of relationships which could lead to dilemmas. For example, it is difficult for a principal to support his teachers if he himself is not backed by his own supervisor. Also, to what extent he is able to involve teachers in decision-making depends upon how much authority he himself is

permitted to have. In short, administrators do not always control the situations that are most conducive to their own leadership.

### Role Conflict Among Teachers

Peabody (1964) compared school teachers, police officers, and welfare workers on the stress which each group gave to two logically opposed bases of authority--the formal (bureaucratic) authority of position, and the professional authority based on technical competence. Two-thirds of the elementary school teachers and welfare workers placed emphasis on responsibility to clients, in comparison to one-fifth of the police officers. Moreover, the teachers (75 per cent of whom had graduate training and belonged to two or more professional organizations) stressed professional competence as a basis of authority, much more than did either police officers or welfare workers. The police officers cautiously questioned unacceptable exercise of authority, while teachers were more likely to discuss questionable practices with superiors and seek explanations. In fact, it was concluded that the most striking contrast between these three groups was the relative importance that the elementary school teachers attached to the authority of professional competence. Almost half of the school staffs singled out this basis of authority, as compared to 22 per cent of the welfare workers and 15 per cent of the police officers. Yet, their typical reaction to conflict was acquiescence to authority of position, particularly among the less experienced teachers in the sample.

From extended interviews with forty-one teachers in four school systems, Getzels and Guba (1975) identified three areas of role conflict in teaching: the socio-economic role, the citizen role, and the expert, or professional role. "Socio-economic" role conflict occurred because communities expected teachers to maintain the same standard of living as other professional persons, even though their salaries were too low to enable them to do so. Conflict involving the "citizen" role can

occur when communities exercise more surveillance over the conduct of teachers than they do over other professional groups. The major problems involving the "professional" role were related to professional-employee role conflict. The teacher's authority was constantly encroached upon by the administration or the public. An analysis of the personal backgrounds of the teachers in the sample showed that role conflict was associated with the teacher's social position outside of the school. Among other findings, there were differences in the patterns of role conflict between male and female teachers, between those with different numbers of dependents, between those who held part-time jobs and those who did not, and between those who perceived that the community in which they taught was different from their original community and those who did not perceive it.

Bidwell (1957) studied the incongruities between teachers' and administrators' definitions of administrative roles in connection with teachers' job satisfaction. Three types of statements were included in a questionnaire administered to 102 teachers in seven schools: those pertaining to "hierarchic" administration (where authority is attached to offices), those dealing with "democratic" administration (where authority is delegated upward to the administrator by the staff), and "outer-oriented" administrations (where clients are considered to be the source of authority--experts existing to satisfy clients). Among the high satisfaction schools there was no significant difference, but among the low satisfaction schools satisfaction declined with the amount of convergence.

#### Recent Evidence of Militancy in Teaching

Events in the past five years are intensifying some of the issues connected with the professional-employee roles. The grim picture of teacher subordination which Solomon noted in 1961 is, consequently, being altered. Teacher organizations have shown renewed signs of life--so much so, that an editorial writer for The

American School Board Journal in 1963 could warn: "The great challenge to public education as we know it today is not in the curricular areas; it is not the increasing demands for the tax dollar; it is not frills in building or the nature of professional courses for teachers. Rather, the challenge is in the rapidly developing conflict between the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers" (Jordan, p. 38, 1963). Through their organizations, today's teachers are increasingly active in such matters as civil rights, academic freedom, manpower needs, and international affairs. They have become vitally concerned about their rights and responsibilities in the development of the policies and regulations that affect their work conditions (Steffensen, 1964).

Teacher-initiated strikes, boycotts or walkouts in the past few years in Garry, St. Louis, Indianapolis, and Louisville where teachers called a 12-day strike in 1964 to protest a wage scale, are visible forms of collective actions. Two of these episodes achieved particular prominence: the threatened strike by the teachers of New York City during the summer of 1963, and a two-day walkout by the teachers of the State of Utah in the spring of 1964. The sanctions, invoked by the Executive Committee of the NEA in Utah, requested members of the teaching profession to refrain from seeking employment or entering into employment agreements with Utah boards of education until the controversy was settled. And these dramatic events, which reach the news headlines, are only the most visible forms of militancy. It is safe to assume that subtler, less dramatic but persistent tensions exist in the day-to-day routine of many systems.

However, the idea (implicit in the following American School Boards quotation) that these forms of subtle and more dramatic defiance can be attributed entirely, or even primarily to unionization, is not accurate. The NEA Affiliated Overseas Education, for example, has exerted a great deal of pressure on the U.S. Government to prove the alleged unsatisfactory conditions in the operation of overseas school

systems. Indeed, although the NEA precludes the use of strikes by teachers, it has used the almost identical practice of "sanctions"; the Utah and Tulsa walkouts were backed by the NEA; and the local NEA affiliate collaborated with the AFT local in the Jersey City walkout.

On the other hand, it is not accurate to assume that teachers' unions deal exclusively or even primarily with bread-and-butter salary and fringe benefit types of issues. The issues, over which unions have bargained, include the amount of community support of schools, class size, standards of employment of professional personnel, and other personnel policies, including transfer policies, in-service training, teacher turnover, educational programs, and curriculum development.

The superintendent of schools in New York City was quoted in connection with a potential teacher strike in September, 1963, as follows:

I'm convinced that the teachers don't want to strike anymore than I or anyone else in the city does. Money is only part of what the teachers want. Frankly, I think that what the United Federation of Teachers wants basically is more control of the school system. I mean that they would like to be able to have more say in every school and in every phase of the administration of the school system, a little more say-so in what goes on (Superintendent of Schools of New York City, 1963).

There is growing insistence of both professional associations and unions upon the right of teachers to participate with boards of education in determining the policies of common concern, including salary and other conditions of professional service. According to one source, New York teachers' contracts soon will specify how and when a principal or supervisor may talk with the teacher about classroom activities, and principals will not be permitted to observe or rate tenured teachers (Ball, p. 10, 1966). So, what is at stake is lay control and a potential change in the power structure of American education. The lay boards of control have shown few signs of concession thus far:

The National School Boards Association believes that...it would be an abdication of their decision-making responsibility for school boards to enter into compromise agreements based on negotiation or collective bargaining, or to resort to mediation or arbitration, or to yield to threats of reprisal; and that concern for the public welfare requires that school boards resist by all lawful means the enactment of laws which would compel them to surrender any part of this responsibility (Resolution adopted by National School Board Association, May 1961, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).

American school administrators have not been any more tolerant of the teachers' attempt to gain more control:

We believe that the right to discuss pros and cons and to participate in developing a program does not imply the right to make decisions. Although consensus should always be patiently sought and will often prevail between staff and school board, the board must retain its responsibility and legal right to make decisions (American Association of School Administrators, p. 13, 1963).

Both immediate and long-range prospects are revealed in this superintendent's statement:

We must realize conflict is here. Education is vital and anything vital has conflicts. In the future, I think we will have professional negotiators representing the board and professional negotiators representing teachers and a committee which comes behind and makes the decisions (Ball, p. 10, 1966).

#### Empirical Approaches to Overt Conflict

In contrast to the interest of social scientists in role disagreement, the study of some of these overt conflicts has been relatively neglected. However, a few detailed case studies of specific episodes have begun to appear. Thorough descriptive accounts of major conflicts have been compiled by the University Council of Educational Administration<sup>2</sup> and the University of Alabama press,<sup>3</sup> and other authors (Culbertson, Jacobson, and Reller, 1960; Sargent and Bailse, 1955).

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<sup>2</sup>For example, "Rondo of Discord," and "Role Conflict in Kent School District."

<sup>3</sup>For example, The Michigan Athletic Awards Rule and "The Lonesome Train" in Levittown.

A survey of the collective activities of teacher organizations, by Perry and Wildman, provides an initial step toward more systematic analyses of the formal structure of teacher-administrator conflict and negotiations. They found the AFT proportionately stronger in larger districts, especially in the Great Lakes states (where the present study is concentrated), that they were more likely to compete with NEA affiliated organizations (Perry and Wildman, 1966). Relationships between the school administration and teacher organizations were also more likely to be formalized in larger districts, and it was in such systems where persistent disagreement, or "impasses," were relatively more frequent. Very few collective bargaining documents mentioned specific issues, and those issues mentioned (which were usually in the AFT agreements) were most frequently the bread-and-butter issues--salary, grievance procedures, sick leave, sabbatical leave, interschool assignments, insurance, dismissal procedures, etc. Most of the more "professional" matters, such as the structure of in-service programs, instruction and curriculum, and health and safety of children, did not as yet appear to be subjects of such agreements. They concluded that the provision of collective bargaining agreements in education, so far, have emphasized communication of facts, as a basis for consensus, rather than power: "Misunderstanding rather than basic conflict is implied to be the source of disagreement. Power is rejected as a means of settling disputes." (Perry and Wildman, 1966, p. 148). But the reluctance of teacher organizations and administrators to admit that conflict exists does not mean that it does not exist.

As another approach to teacher conflict, Stroller and Groves asked respondents to list their major "problems," which sometimes turned out to include interpersonal problems or friction (Stroller and Groves, 1954). The 25 principals were asked to list their problems, which were then classified into seven major categories: instructional leadership, staff personnel, pupil personnel, provision and maintenance of space and equipment, school-community relations, the central office, and the

instructional problem. Leadership problems were divided into coordination of instructional activities and the content of the instructional program.

There was a relative dearth of problems reported in the above study of the general area of "instructional leadership," but another study was cited in which over 18 per cent of the problems, stated by new principals in the Middle-Atlantic states, occurred in the category they called "relationships with the faculty." An examination of daily diaries in the Stroller and Groves study showed that principals spent less than eight per cent of their time on child guidance and only five per cent on the health and safety of the pupils; although they would prefer to spend over 27 per cent of their time on these two functions. The authors concluded that the contemporary principal devotes considerable energy to the provision of space and instructional supplies to accommodate the increasing numbers of students; one of his major problems concerns the use of the school's facilities for services other than those provided for in the original design. They also reported that their evidence indicated that principals think that they do deserve a greater voice in policy than they actually have. One of the principal's own personal problems includes the lack of adequate clerical assistance.

The types of approaches illustrated in some of these studies have the advantage of efficiency, but only because respondents do most of the work; they are forced to generalize so much, that the investigator has little basis for checking their conclusions. And besides the fact that he is forced to rely on the observations and conclusions of respondents, the investigator must also accept the respondents' categories. Attempting to circumvent some of these problems, Flanagan (1954) used a "critical incident" technique to study schools. This is a means of collecting from respondents direct reports about specific behaviors of their associates. An "incident" is defined as an observable human activity that is sufficiently complete, in itself, to permit interferences and predictions to be made about the person.

Flanagan maintains that the technique requires the observer to make only simple types of judgments. Any patterns in the reports must be inferred by the investigator rather than the respondent. Reports from only "qualified" observers are included, and all observations are evaluated by an observer in terms of an "agreement of the purpose of the activity."

One of the major problems with this method is that it is difficult to develop a set of categories that do justice to the content of the incidents reported by the respondents; but the fact that it provides records of specific behaviors, reported by those who have been involved with the situations, makes it a useful research technique. A modification of the technique is to present respondents with descriptions of the incidents and then ask them to predict what they would do in the situation.

Perhaps the most notable attempt to date, to study actual "trouble cases" in educational institutions, is reported by Lazarsfeld and Theilens in The Academic Mind (1958). In the late 1950's, near the end of the McCarthy era, 2,451 randomly selected social-science professors in 165 American colleges and universities (also selected by random sampling procedures) were interviewed and asked to describe instances in which their own academic freedom, or that of their colleagues, had been threatened in any way. They were also asked to relate instances of "civil liberty cases," of "problems" on the campus, and of local events that had stirred up strong feelings.

The term, incident, was used by the authors to describe an episode, long or short, in which an attack, accusation, or criticism was made against a teacher, group of teachers or the school as a whole. Of primary interest were overt acts and a direct accusation or specific criticism; reports of "considerable tension" did not qualify as incidents unless respondents could document them. A single episode was considered to be one incident regardless of either the number of people involved or

the complexity of the situation.

A total of 990 incidents were identified in the 165 colleges. The total number found at any one school varied from 0 to 28, with over half of the schools reporting 2 to 10 incidents. No incidents at all were reported in 24 colleges, almost all of them being among the very smallest in the sample. The majority of charges involved political issues. The largest percentage of respondents reporting increased pressures were located in large private universities. About a fifth of the social-scientists reported a perceived increase in pressure from alumni, trustees, the community, and legislators or local politicians over the seven years prior to the study. The initial charges were leveled by outsiders (American Legion, state legislature, parents), by students, and by college administrators.

#### CONCLUSION

Bureaucracy is a system for controlling employees. However, two features of the modern work setting prevent close surveillance. One is the sheer complexity of modern organizations, which is responsible for alternatives that demand employees to use their judgment and initiative. The other is the professionalization of employees and their concurrent demands for more opportunity to use independent judgment. The fundamental problem, then, is not the conflict between individuals and organizations, but the inconsistencies among organizational principles, and especially the conflict between competing professional and employee principles that are inherent to modern organization itself.

A mature profession may be defined, structurally, as an organized vocation having a legal monopoly over procedures for applying a body of theoretical knowledge to social problems, which includes the occupation's control over the recruitment and policing of its own members. But it is perhaps more meaningful to look at emerging professions as vocations in process, rather than comparing them to fixed structural

standards. In this case a drive for status, including militancy, is the important element. Militancy, and other forms of initiative and independent judgment required of the professional role, conflicts with certain features of the employee's obligations to his employers. Thus, professional employees face the problem of reconciling their dual roles; and they seem to differ systematically in the way they endorse them.

To help systematize and to compare professional and employee role expectations, a model was developed using three major components of bureaucracy as its basis: standardization, specialization, and the centralization of decision making. There is some evidence that elements of conflict involving these dimensions do exist in public education as well as in other settings, although the previous research is scanty. Most of the existing research is concentrated on role conceptions, and despite newspaper accounts of major conflicts in public schools, there have been few empirical studies of them.

The present study, therefore, attempts to use several available procedures for studying routine day-to-day conflicts in the public schools. Interview reports will be compared with questionnaire information and a modified critical incident instrument. The relationship of overt conflict to role conceptions, role conflicts, and to organizational contexts will be examined. Previous role conception studies have usefully emphasized the internal inconsistencies and verbal disagreements among members of school systems; it is not known, however, that such inconsistencies materialize into overt conflict episodes. And too, there have been few systematic attempts to relate known overt conflicts to their organizational contexts.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

Perhaps self-selection makes it inevitable that the organizations we study are those in which bureaucratic rigidities are least pronounced. (Blau, 1964, p. 25).

The members of the organization know, of course, that management has given permission to conduct the study, and this creates another problem. The observer cannot escape an initial identification with management, since the assumption is that management must have a direct interest in the study. (Blau, 1964, p. 25).

Where would anatomy and surgery and dependent specialties be if Mondino, Leonardo, and Vesalius, and others had entirely honored the absolute of their day instead of haunting cemeteries and gibbets in their search for cadavers? (Dalton, 1964, pp. 59-60).

The above statements help to correct an impression that seems to be implicitly conveyed by the typical methodology book--that these problems of research design and procedure are technical matters. Social research is not governed by absolute procedural doctrine, nor are rigid moral standards always useful for resolving the problems which confront a researcher in the field. The social scientist and his research design are subject to some of the same social forces that govern the behavior of the subjects he is studying. At certain stages a research project may seem to take on a momentum--a life of its own--because its personnel are at the mercy of the will and interests of others, who either cannot be controlled or whose control raises serious ethical questions.

Since both procedural and ethical principles in themselves are originated and consummated in a social context, they must be looked upon as part of the incomplete and still-developing systems--systems for which each research investigator must assume some responsibility in fashioning, from day-to-day field experiences and his values. This sense of indeterminateness and lack of clarity makes research viable,

but it also leaves almost any decision open to criticism. Perhaps, then, the least that can be expected of a researcher is that he fully recognize the unsolved problems which his research has raised. Some of these problems will be considered during the course of this chapter.

### THE SCHOOL SAMPLE

The sample consists of 28 public high schools located in Ohio and three other midwestern states.<sup>1</sup> More than one-third of the 1,976 faculty members of these schools were interviewed, and over three-fourths of them returned lengthy questionnaires.

These data were collected in two phases. Seven schools were included in a one-year feasibility study, conducted during the spring of 1962. It was on the basis of this part of the sample that most of the instruments and procedures were designed and tested.<sup>2</sup> An additional 21 schools were visited between November of 1964 and April of 1965. After treating the two sub-samples separately in some of the preliminary analyses and finding that conclusions reached from both parts were uniform, it was decided to combine the samples.

The criteria used to select the school sample and respondent samples, plus special problems encountered during the process, will be described below.

#### Selection Criteria

Since one of the objectives of the study was to examine the association of organizational characteristics with staff conflicts, an attempt was made to select a sample with diverse organizational characteristics. Therefore, the selected schools represent a broad range of sizes as well as locations. Although the size of a teaching faculty is not strongly related to the relevant organizational variables, it is

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<sup>1</sup>Ohio (24 schools), Michigan (2 schools), Indiana (1 school), and Pennsylvania (1 school).

<sup>2</sup>Reported in Corwin (1963).

modestly associated with many of them (see Chapter 5), and for that reason, school size appeared to be the single-most efficient and convenient sampling criterion.

The distribution of staff size in Ohio public secondary schools was tabulated from official records and arbitrarily divided into five categories (shown in Table 3-1).<sup>3</sup> Three or four schools in each category were selected at random and are invited by letter to participate in the study.<sup>4</sup> To reduce community influences, an attempt was made to exclude schools serving families of uniformly high or low social status; most schools in the study served families whose annual incomes ranged between \$4,500 and \$9,000. However, some variation in economic base was unavoidable because of economic differences between small towns and large cities. In five large city schools, for example, the economic support per pupil exceeded \$450, and it was as low as \$250 in four schools located in small towns. The complete range was from \$626 in the largest school in the sample to \$94 a pupil in one of the smallest schools. The schools likewise varied considerably in the proportion of their total receipts derived from state subsidies--from 50 percent in four cases to less than 15 percent in four other cases.

Except for variations in economic base, however, there is not a correspondingly high variation in proportion to students who drop out before graduation (which reaches 15 percent in only two cases). There is more variation in the proportion graduating from college; the figure tends to fluctuate from 35 to 45 percent, but in one case it is as high as 91 percent and in three cases it covers nearly 60 to 65 percent.

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<sup>3</sup>The tabulation was based on a 30 percent random sample of schools in Ohio listed in the State of Ohio Educational Directory (school year 1962-1963); in systems having two or more high schools, every third school was included.

<sup>4</sup>Except for two of the smallest schools, which include a junior high, only schools with grades 10-12 were included.

TABLE 3-1

THE SCHOOL SAMPLE

SIZE OF SCHOOL FACULTY		RESPONSE TO INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE									
		Number of Teachers	Percent of Schools in Ohio	Agreed to Participate <sup>a</sup> .			Refusal and No Response			Total	
1st Year	2nd Year			Total	Schools included in Study	Schools not included in Study <sup>b</sup> .	Refused to Participate	No Response	No.		%
		No.	%								
Very large	107-168	.05	1	4	5	.18	7		7	.58	
Large	87-106	.01	1	5	6	.21	8	4	12	.67	
Medium-large	52-86	.12	2	4	6	.21	9		9	.56	
Medium-small	40-51	.15	1	3	4	.14	6		6	.55	
Small	14-39	.67	2	5	7	.25	11	2	13	.62	
			7	21	28	.40	41	6	47	.60	

a. 40% of the schools invited agreed to participate; 36% of the schools invited actually did participate.

b. These schools agreed to participate during the first year, but scheduling conflicts prevented their inclusion in the study.

A letter of invitation was sent to school superintendents, which in most cases was forwarded to the school's principal for a final decision.

Principals who consented were written further details. In some cases, a member of the project staff conferred with him by telephone; in three cases, it was necessary to make special visits to show the instruments to the administration and describe the study more thoroughly. In five cases intermediaries acted on behalf of the research project to help persuade the administrators involved.

Of 78 schools invited, 31 agreed to participate, or 40 percent of the schools invited.<sup>5</sup> Delany was able to obtain only a 60 percent rate of participation of public agencies, after securing prior approval of the questionnaire and deleting controversial material (Delany, 1961).

#### Characteristics of Schools in the Sample

Since the purpose of the study was to examine varying types of organization in relation to conflict in the teaching profession and not to assess the prevalence of conflict in the region, the sample does not reflect the distribution of high schools in the region.<sup>6</sup> It was more important to include a heterogeneous sample than to assure geographical randomness.

The sample intentionally underrepresents small high schools in the region and overrepresents large high schools (Table 3-1). Comparing the size distribution of

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<sup>5</sup> During the first year, three schools which accepted could not be included in the sample due to scheduling problems.

<sup>6</sup> This, of course, reduces the utility of statistics. A statistic is of utility to the extent that it permits generalization from a random sample of a universe. Although this sample is not drastically different from a random sample of high schools in many respects, generalizations must cautiously be drawn from it. Technically, the present sample might be considered to be a random sample of some "hypothetical" universe (i.e., one which has the characteristics of this sample), but it might be more realistic to look at it as 28 case studies.

schools in the sample with that of schools in Ohio, the sample is approximately representative of middle size schools; however, schools with more than 86 teachers are over-represented in the sample by 20 times while there are fewer than half the expected number of small schools. Consequently, the median number of teachers per school in the sample is twice that of Ohio high schools (30 teachers).

Even though the typical school is comparatively small, the typical teacher in the United States is already employed in a relatively large school, and in view of the rapid growth of public schools in the recent past as well as the prospect of continual growth in the near future, the sample in one sense represents the future.

### Sampling Problems

There are a number of problems associated with this sample of which the reader should be aware. They concern its size and representativeness, the lack of control over some elements of the field work, and occasional respondent antipathy.

Sample Size. Although over 1500 respondents answered questionnaires, only 28 organizations were involved in the study. There is, of course, a limit to the extent of analyses that can be done with an N of 28. The cost of such research, however, prohibits using larger samples unless some of the scope and intensiveness of analysis that this sample has permitted is sacrificed. The sample, in any event, is a great deal larger than the case studies or comparisons of one or two organizations on which most of the research on complex organizations has so far been based.

Representativeness. The element of self-selection on the part of school administrators probably has affected the representativeness of the sample. Table 1 shows that the highest proportion of refusals (two-thirds of those contacted) falls in the "large" category (87-106 teachers) (see Table I). Many of these schools have their own research staffs already imposing on teachers' time; in a few cases, the invitation

was forwarded to the director of research for the system, who may have considered this study to be in competition with the time of teachers or with his own work. Although the "very large" schools also have self-contained research units, the somewhat higher rate of participation in this category (42 percent) is due possibly to more advanced specialization and centralization in these schools; which on one hand could help to alleviate time pressures and on the other hand probably requires less consultation with the faculty about their willingness to participate.

Perhaps the nature of the problem being studied (staff conflict) also has affected the representativeness of the sample, but the role of this element is not clear-cut. Some administrators, curiously, seemed so confident that no problems existed in their schools that they participated partly for the reason of demonstrating it. In three schools, principals who had accepted the invitation reconsidered after they saw the questionnaire. However, the most conflict-ridden schools did not necessarily refuse to participate. In at least three schools, principals apparently were coerced into the study by the superintendent's office.<sup>7</sup> While interviewing at these schools, it became apparent that the study was threatening to some school administrators precisely because they were involved in serious conflict with faculty members and/or the superintendent. Two of these situations produced informal resistance to the study on the part of the school administration and, in turn, on the part of substantial segments of the faculties involved; their rates of questionnaire return (approximately 33 percent) were far below that of the other schools (see Table 3-3). Lack of cooperation in the third school could be traced to the fact that one segment of the faculty was in open rebellion against the principal. His supporters, in loyalty

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<sup>7</sup>At one other school, where the principal admitted to some pressure from the superintendent to do the study, he appointed a committee of teachers hostile to the study. He and the committee were able to devise a polemic against participating that apparently convinced the superintendent.

to him, refused to cooperate fully. Teachers in that school either were against the principal and for the study, or for the principal and against the study. For similar reasons, the interviewers sometimes were able to establish better rapport in schools with low morale.

Because the study itself has become marginally involved in certain conflicts, the reliability (and perhaps the validity) of the findings probably have been jeopardized by the very conflicts being studied; that is, schools with the most intense conflicts were likely to be the least reliable sources of data. The problem was whether to omit the organizations which were likely to bias the conclusions, or to include them because they represented certain types of conflict that otherwise would be ignored and hence, bias the validity and representativeness of the sample in that respect. In view of the difficulty of gaining admission to the most "conflictful" schools, the decision was made to include them in the study regardless of the problems.

Compromise and Lack of Control. A related problem occurred during the negotiations with certain administrators who were indecisive about participating. They attempted to seek assurances and to stipulate conditions before they would consent to the study. The effect of these demands would have been to modify the research design. For example, during a conference at one school, the school's representatives demanded permission to circulate beforehand, among the entire faculty, the questionnaire and a statement of hypotheses. They had a legitimate rationale, but, since at other schools, teachers had been instructed not to discuss the questionnaire among themselves and were not informed of the hypotheses beforehand, the administration's conditions could not be met, and the school was excluded. In other schools, however, the problem was not as clear-cut; it is possible that the central administration of a few schools communicated some information to the faculty, despite the fact that they were instructed against it. It was not possible to control that element of the design.

Despite the fact that every participant in the study was explicitly informed that information about particular schools would be guarded in the strictest confidence after the field work had been completed, administrators from two schools requested information pertaining to their schools. One principal, in questioning the interviewer for information, mentioned that the contracts of several teachers would not be renewed and implied that he would like some information particularly about them. Another principal, more candidly seeking what he called a "return on the time his school had invested in the study," pointed out that the information collected about his school would be of immediate practical benefit to both administrators and teachers (e.g., to reward teachers judged by colleagues to be "superior" on an evaluation that was included).

However, there was already reason to believe that some teachers suspected that the project had been instigated by their school boards for selfish reasons. In one system, the board had previously recommended that students evaluate their teachers using a form similar to the one used in this study. The coincidence aroused the suspicions of a few wary teachers, and subsequently it was rumored that the local teachers' organization was considering an investigation of the study and might have taken steps toward it; the president of the teachers' association involved, however, reportedly was in favor of the study. In this climate of opinion, the communication to administrators of any special information gathered in the study, however innocent and well intentioned, would have served to confirm such suspicions. Therefore, at the cost of an opportunity to be of practical service to a cooperative administration, the school was denied the information it sought.

Respondent Antipathy. The wisdom of this decision had already been confirmed in the first year of the study, during which personal contacts had been used to secure the participation of a few schools. Since one of the project members was acquainted

with the principal of a school being invited to participate, his personal influence was used to secure that school's cooperation. When one teacher in the school learned of this acquaintanceship, however, she and two others became suspicious and withdrew from the study, despite the assurances by project personnel of the professional integrity of the parties involved. Hence, this personal contact--which had been useful for securing the administration's cooperation--alienated several teachers and perhaps biased some of the findings.

### THE RESPONDENT SAMPLE

#### Characteristics of Respondents

The typical respondent in the sample (94 percent in the sample) is employed full time. He comes from a city of nearly 100,000 persons, is now teaching in the state where he attended high school (60 percent), and attended college in the same state as well (75 percent). He has taught in one or two other systems, has been in the present school less than four years and in the present system eight years, but this latter figure varies among different schools from an average tenure of four years up to 15 years. His salary is \$7,000 (the sample mean), which also varies from \$3,500 to \$7,600 for particular schools; one-fourth of the sample earns less than \$6,000 a year, but a comparable proportion earns over \$8,000 per year. He also thinks that he should be earning more money. His father's estimated annual income is about \$6,500, with about one-quarter of the sample coming from homes where the average annual income is less than \$5,000. The sample is divided equally between persons who have and those who have not resided in their present community prior to their present jobs.

The sample is predominantly male (60 percent) and married (75 percent). The average teacher is 37 years old, but one in five is over 50, and one-third is under 30 years of age. For particular schools, their average age ranges from 30 to 48

years. The respondents average about five years of education beyond high school. Over one-third of them have earned an M.A. degree, but in some schools as many as 58 percent have an M.A., while in one only nine percent have an M.A. These teachers are not always in a position to use their advanced subject-matter training however, for about one-third of them report that they frequently or occasionally have taught one or more courses outside of their college major.

Nearly all members of the sample belong to teachers' organizations; one in five has held office in a local association, but only one percent have held office in the national organization. Eight percent are also members of a teachers' union, but some schools have no union members, while in one, nearly half of the faculty are members of a union. Also, on the average, teachers in the sample subscribe to at least three professional journals and devote five hours a month to reading them. Only about 10 percent of them report having published articles in professional journals. About 30 percent of the sample have also held offices in local community organizations.

#### The Sample Compared to Ohio and National Norms

Table 3-2 shows the average characteristics of teachers in the sample compared to samples of Ohio and national teachers.<sup>8</sup> Since these data have been collected at different times and for different purposes, they are not strictly comparable in many respects. However, they serve as a general bench mark for estimating the representativeness of the respondent sample.

The mean age of the present sample (37) approximates the national median age of secondary teachers in the nation (35.9). Compared to sex ratios reported in a sample of certified personnel in systems of Ohio, the sample is representative, although

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<sup>8</sup>These percentages were compiled from a variety of sources published by the National Education Association, the Ohio Education Association, and the Ohio State Department of Education. See Table 3-2.

TABLE 3-2

## CHARACTERISTICS OF TEACHERS IN THE SAMPLE COMPARED TO NATIONAL AND OHIO NORMS

Characteristics of Teachers	The Nation*		Ohio		Sample Total
	Total	Secondary	Total	Secondary	
Age		35.9 (Median)	NA	NA	37.0 (Mean)
Sex Ratio					
Percent Men	31.4	53.0	34.0 <sup>e</sup>	58.0 <sup>e,g</sup>	60.0
Percent Women	68.6	47.0	66.0 <sup>e</sup>	42.0 <sup>e,g</sup>	40.0
No. of Years of Teaching Experience	13.4	11.4	12.9	12.2(c)	(Since BA) 12.5
Marital Status					
Percent Single	24.3	NA	NA	NA	20.0
Percent Married	70.0	NA	NA	NA	74.0
Widowed or Divorced	5.7	NA	NA	NA	4.6
Years of College Completed					
Total	NA	5.1 (Median)	*4.2(c) (Mean)	*4.6(c) (Mean)	4.9 (Mean)
Highest Degree					
% Less than BA	14.6	2.0	17.3(e)	1.8(c)	3.0
% BA, BS	61.9	62.1	65.0(c)	68.6(c)	57.0
% MA	23.1	35.1	17.7(c)	28.4(c)	38.0
% PhD or D.ED	0.4	1.0		0.26(c)	1.0
Type of Institution Attended					
% Public		65.9		65.7	52.1
Membership in Teachers' Assoc.					
% Active		55.9			59.0
% Inactive		41.0			37.0
% Nonmembers		3.1	6.0(d)		2.0
Membership in Teachers' Union		10.3%		8.3%	
Mean Salary for Classroom Teachers--Total	\$6235	\$6503	\$6050	\$6400	\$7000

\* From the AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER, D960-61, Research Monograph 1963. M2 Research Division, NEA; (based on a sample of 2104 teachers randomly selected from a stratified random sample of 343 school districts).

<sup>a</sup> Reported only where information for secondary schools is not readily available.

<sup>b</sup> i.e., Listed member only, dues paying members only, and those who "attend" conferences occasionally in professional associations.

<sup>c</sup> The Ohio Education Association Research Report, OHIO TEACHER PREPARATION AND EXPERIENCE, 1963 (April, 1963).

<sup>d</sup> Included only certified teachers and administrators.

<sup>e</sup> Estimated from TEACHER CERTIFICATION IN 1962, State of Ohio, Department of Education, 1963.

<sup>f</sup> For all instructional staff, 1962-63; NEA Research Report, ECONOMIC STATUS TEACHERS, 1962-63.

<sup>g</sup> For all certified personnel

NA Not available

the proportion of males (60 percent) is about seven percent above the national average. The sample's 12.5 years of teaching experience is comparable to that of Ohio secondary teachers, and only one year more than the national norm for secondary teachers. In marital status also, the present sample is close to national teacher norms, overrepresenting married teachers by only four percent.

The mean years of college completed by the sample (4.9) is comparable to national samples of secondary teachers (5.1, Median) and only slightly higher than the Ohio mean (4.6). However, when compared to Ohio teachers, the sample overrepresents teachers with M.A. degrees by about 10 percent (38 percent vs. 28 percent) and underrepresents B.A.'s in Ohio to some extent, although both of these figures are comparable to national norms. The sample underrepresents the proportion of teachers who have attended public institutions of higher education as compared to private ones ( 14 percent).

The proportion of teachers in the sample who were classified as active in teacher's associations (59 percent) is roughly comparable to a study conducted by the NEA which concluded that about 56 percent of the teachers in the nation are "active" in teachers' associations. Similarly, the 37 percent of the sample listed as dues-paying members only or as attending conferences only occasionally, compares with the 41 percent of the teachers in the NEA sample judged to be inactive members. Eight percent of teachers in the sample belong to a teachers union which is comparable to the national average of around 10 percent. But the median salary for teachers in the sample, \$7,000, is \$600 above the 1965 Ohio figure for secondary teachers and \$500 above the national median for secondary teachers; one reason may be the lag between the collection and publication of salary figures, however.

In conclusion, although the sample was not selected by procedures which guarantee complete representativeness, in several respects respondents' characteristics are relatively close to the national and Ohio central tendencies. The sample does

underrepresent the proportion of teachers in the nation educated in public institutions, and slightly overrepresents male teachers in the nation as well as their salary level; and while it overrepresents the proportion of Ohio teachers with an M.A. degree, it is comparable to national samples in this respect. Otherwise, it is reasonably representative of teachers' ages, years of experience, education, marital status, and activity in professional organizations.

## PROCEDURES IN THE FIELD

### Questionnaire Administration

A graduate research assistant visited each school for an average of five days.<sup>9</sup> On the first day of his visit, questionnaires were distributed and procedures for completing them were explained during a faculty meeting. The questionnaire consisted of six parts and required two to three hours to complete. Because of their length, respondents were permitted to complete them at their convenience during the week. They were requested not to discuss their responses among themselves, although there was no way of controlling this element. They were also assured that their responses would be completely confidential, that their questionnaires would not be seen by anyone in the school, and that their school would not be identified in any of the published data. Most of the questionnaires were returned directly to the field representative before he left at the end of the week; a few of them were mailed back.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Graduate students working on advanced degrees in Sociology and in Education did most of the interviewing. Grateful acknowledgement is due to Mr. Frederick Brechler, Mr. Layton Thomas, Mrs. Sandra Swisher and Mr. David Morris.

<sup>10</sup>Modifications of this procedure, experimented with during the first year's study, were less effective. See Corwin (1963, pp. 164-165).

In general, three-fourths of the respondents completed their questionnaires,<sup>11</sup> although due to problems already mentioned, some schools fell considerably below the average rate of return. In one school, after the study was already underway, the principal gave some teachers permission to withdraw from the study. Six schools fell below the average rate for both questionnaires and interviews; in two schools, one-third or less returned questionnaires. See Table 3-3.

### Interviewing

During the week, a stratified random sample (of as many as 36 faculty members) was interviewed during tape recorded sessions lasting from 20 minutes to more than an hour. An average of 37 percent of the sample was interviewed, or nearly half of those who returned questionnaires. In small schools most of the faculty members returned their questionnaires and almost all of them were interviewed. In large schools, interviewees were randomly selected from each academic department in the school as well as from special education, driver education, extracurricular activities, counselors, supervisors, athletic coaches, drama and music teachers. It occasionally was deemed advisable to include teachers, not randomly selected, who were otherwise known to be good informants or who were involved in major incidents.

Interviewees were given the option of being interviewed without tape recorder, but few of them exercised it. They were given a precoded list of all faculty members in the school and instructed to refer to other teachers by the code numbers listed beside each name. The interviews were open-ended and loosely structured. Interviewers were instructed to direct the interview in whatever direction seemed most relevant and productive.

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<sup>11</sup>However, some questionnaires were only partially completed.

TABLE 3-3

RESPONDENT SAMPLE

School Number	Number of Faculty Members	Questionnaires Returned		Interviewed	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1	33	31	94	15	45
2	53	46	87	26	49
3	20	11	55	15	75
4	47	26	55	7	15
5	63	62	98	40	63
6	119	90	76	28	24
7	89	27	30	12	13
8	31	28	90	24	77
9	26	25	96	26	100
10	120	109	91	31	26
11	18	18	100	18	100
12	52	42	81	30	58
13	40	34	85	28	70
14	87	80	92	30	34
15	74	67	91	29	39
16	87	68	78	27	31
17	46	40	87	30	65
18	145	94	65	32	22
19	26	24	92	26	100
20	87	80	92	31	36
21	168	136	81	36	21
22	142	50	35	31	22
23	81	43	53	28	35
24	106	99	93	30	28
25	16	14	88	16	100
26	59	42	71	30	51
27	92	88	96	31	34
28	49	45	92	30	61
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1976</b>	<b>1519</b>	<b>77%</b>	<b>737</b>	<b>37%</b>

### Problems in the Field

Most interviewees were cooperative and, in fact, some were apologetic about not having conflicts to report. However, problems did arise in the field. Less than one percent refused to be interviewed, plus an additional small percentage of persons who were not wholly cooperative during their interviews. While these problems were not large in number, they were perhaps symptomatic of underlying issues, the implications of which are worthy of further consideration. At least three types of issues appear to have been in the minds of at least a few of the participants: personal distaste for the subject of conflict, fear of reprisal from the administration, and ethical considerations.

Personal Distaste for Conflict. For some interviewees, the subject of conflict was too repugnant to talk about in detail. Part of this reluctance to discuss their problems was out of loyalty to their school and other organizational interests as well as concern about their own image. Some of them banded together to defend themselves as groups. In a few schools, entire departments seemed to have agreed not to cooperate, apparently in order to hide departmental problems (which were usually learned about through other sources). At one school the problem was more immediate. Some of the teachers resented the fact that their lounge was being used for the purpose of interviewing. One respondent complained that the entire study was too "negative," that it seemed designed to make teachers think that small problems were of gigantic proportions, and that it could have a negative reflection on the school. Such respondents were unwilling to grant to conflict legitimate status as a subject of study, largely because they believed that the intent of the study was to evaluate them, and not just to analyze social organization. These problems were not peculiar to public schools, of course. One writer observes that:

It seems clear that all persons recognize some norm, however amorphous or splintered, for all involved take some pains to conceal what would be

denounced. In some cases, part of the official code is a dead letter except as it is used politically to control others. However this may be, the researcher who is obliged to get at all relevant behavior may obviously offend some persons in the organization.... The researcher, and not a remote part-time ethicist who cannot say where his personal code comes from, must size up the moral issues peculiar to his problem and bear responsibility for reconciling the diverse moral commitments he assumes in and out of his office. Naturally, he may involve himself and others in trouble....(Dalton,p. 59-60, 1964).

The implications of this issue are of considerable import to the design of research.

The question being raised is whether some empirical questions are inappropriate for study, or whether their appropriateness depends upon the favorableness of the conclusions reached. This could mean, for example, that in studies of abortion among middle-class families, an effort should be made to offset negative implications of abortion by stressing the positive features of middle-class people. These concerns are realistic to the extent that what may be regarded as theoretical problems can be used out of context for propagandistic purposes. Thus, persons participating in such a study must live with the prospect that the findings may be used against them. It is understandable that some respondents might have evaluated the study in terms of how the findings could influence the prestige and social image of their school.

But, to insist that questions must be phrased so as to neutralize the possible evaluations that could be drawn from the data is equally propagandistic; indeed, it builds the propaganda function into the research design. The dilemma is that laymen live in a propagandistic situation which researchers are obliged to ignore. As outsiders they can afford to do so, but it is not so easy for the participants of such a study.

Fear of Reprisal. One of the major reasons for the reluctance of some of the interviewees to confide in the interviewer was their sense of intimidation and fear of reprisal from the administration. The same organizational context responsible for the qualms of some of the respondents about their school's image and which caused them to treat the research staff as outsiders in some cases, was largely responsible

for their sense of intimidation. The respondents faced a dilemma. They felt pressured to participate, and yet they were aware that the very same pressure could be brought to bear if some of their statements became known to the administration. They had to choose between playing the role of interviewee and the role of employee, between candor and caution. The normal element of risk for the participants of such a study was especially acute in schools where participants suspected that the administration was behind the study. This suspicion was particularly apparent in one school where, because of a space shortage, the interviewer was assigned to the principal's office to do confidential interviewing. Two members of that faculty warned the field representative that if their responses fell into the wrong hands they would lose their jobs; however, they were candid despite their fears.

Some teachers were extremely blunt about their suspicions. An art teacher gave the field representative a badge labeled "chief investigator" and told him to wear it. A teacher at another school, suspicious that the study was backed by the administration said that the whole study "smacked of Fascism, where you are asked to inform on your fellow teachers."

These incidents, however, were atypical, and most of the problems were no more serious than an occasional interruption of an interview as teachers entered the room to use the telephone or search for a record. These momentary interruptions, however, seemed to have the effect of reminding the interviewees of outside pressures, making it necessary to regain their confidence. The suspicions of a few respondents toward the study were responsible for some of the difficulties which the field workers had in managing interpersonal relationships during their week-long visits. Originally, each interviewer had been instructed to use whatever opportunities were available during the week to observe the school informally--to eat lunch with the faculty and to otherwise become acquainted and establish rapport. However, it soon became apparent that the interviewer jeopardized his neutral position by associating himself with

cliques of faculty and members of the administration and risked being charged with "playing favorites", thus risking the loss of the confidence of other teachers. At one of the schools in particular, a couple of teachers remarked that the field representative seemed to be "chummy" with certain members of the administration. So in those schools where there was observable tension between groups, the interviewers were obliged to try to remain sociological strangers. However it was not always easy since members of the faculty sometimes sought them out; at one school, the assistant principal insisted upon eating lunch each day with the interviewers, a fact which some teachers later commented upon in the interviews.

The presence of a tape recorder did not appear to inhibit most interviewees, although some of them may have felt constrained to use it since they knew that other teachers were using it. There was one interviewee who refused to discuss a problem freely during the interview, but discussed it after the recorder had been turned off; that situation involved an illegal report made by the administration to the State Department of Education falsifying her qualifications to teach a subject. So, on the whole, the tape recorder did not seem to be an important factor.

Ethical Problems. In the majority of schools, at least one or two people expressed the belief that it would be unethical for them, even in confidence, to discuss problems involving their colleagues. One of their concerns was that the study would create problems for them and their colleagues. They were aware that it is difficult for outsiders to intrude into an ongoing system without altering situations. One respondent, in fact, wanted to know if the objective of the study was to "stir up trouble"; he said many teachers were resurrecting problems that had already died down.

At times the interviewer, by the slant of his questions, did inadvertently hint to interviewees of problems of which they previously had been unaware. In fact, one teacher, after being interviewed, decided that she was naive, saying,

I didn't know that all these things were happening, and that all these disputes were in progress. Evidently these are, or otherwise you wouldn't be asking all these questions.... Maybe I will keep my eyes and my ears open; maybe there is more going on than I know about.

In one case, a teacher had been unaware that several faculty members knew of her problem with the administration and accused the interviewer of "spreading gossip." However, this type of reaction was uncommon and suspicions of "leaks" were usually unfounded. In any event, if the study did increase the school's consciousness of some of its problems, it is also possible that it helped respondents to put their problems in a sociological perspective, i.e., to redirect the blame and hostility from the persons involved to the situations responsible for their problems.

Some participants seemed disturbed about the apparent invasion of their own privacy and that of others. Some critics of the American scene, such as Whyte and Packard, have complained about growing invasions of privacy; and the social sciences appear to play a guilty role in this development. Since few social-scientists have bothered to defend themselves, perhaps a few words of defense are in order. The fact that people traditionally have relied upon their right to secrecy as a protection to themselves and others from public opinion, must be balanced against the fact that the privacy of some persons sometimes is justifiably violated in order to protect an individual's rights or in order to solve more general social problems. A lawyer's investigation of a divorce suit, a physician's inquest into a case of venereal disease, or a psychiatrist's efforts to unlock the mystery of alcoholism may all lead the investigators to the secrets of innocent and not-so-innocent third parties. For similar reasons, social researchers sometimes investigate personal situations so that they may arrive at long-range solutions to social problems. However, ways of equitably reconciling those invasions with the rights of individual privacy have been developed. A code of ethics represents one institutionalized solution to the problem. The

fact that professional researchers are bound to treat information in confidence and are obliged not to use information against their respondents, safeguards much of the intent of the right-to-privacy norm.

Also, in a diversified society the fact that public opinion itself is not easily crystallized removes some of the traditional stigma surrounding many personal problems, which makes some types of knowledge less threatening than in a previous era. The society, as a whole, is learning to cope more directly with its problems. Open recognition of problems not only can be therapeutic for the persons involved, but can pave the way for better mutual understanding.

Finally, the distinction between purely private and public matters itself has come under closer scrutiny in recent years, not only with respect to discrimination in the sales of goods and services, for example, but more generally with respect to questions involving individual rights versus public responsibility. Society is so geared to information gathering and retrieval and is so interdependent, that certain types of information (such as mental illness case histories) can no longer be regarded simply as the private property of individuals or families. Indeed, it is possible that a clarification of this issue would show that the individual's right to privacy is not the actual issue confronted in this study. For, most of the conflicts investigated cannot be considered purely private matters. They involve the decision-making process, philosophies of education, the proper status of teachers--indeed, the very future of public education. These are issues of vital concern to every citizen, not just to the teachers involved. As a study of public or at least semi-public events and organizational problems it is not surprising that even the most closely guarded secrets were known by several members of every organization. "Gossip" in some sense had already made the events partly public, and public opinion, no doubt, had been formed long before the study. The study, then, may have served to focus or mobilize public opinion but it did not create it.

Indeed, the primary issue does not seem to be the individual's rights, but the organization's right to privacy. An inquiry into the competition between two teachers for a student or the pressure brought to bear to lower teaching loads is not comparable to an investigation of mental illness in a respondent's family. The respondent's dilemma was in whether or not to reveal to outsiders the inside knowledge about the organization. Just as the problems were organizational so the solutions, too, were often organizational. In some cases, as already mentioned, groups of teachers boycotted the study. In most cases, the administration exerted some kind of pressure as to participating or not. These reactions do not concern individual's rights, but are tied up with the interests of the organization and the status and defenses of the groups within it.

Some of the difficulties accounted for along these lines stem from the public's lack of trust in social science. Some of the respondents were suspicious of the research staff as a matter of principle. Individuals, after all, were being requested to relay information, often at second hand, to strangers about events which usually involved others as well as themselves. Understandably, they wanted assurances that the accuracy of their opinions would be checked and that the information they supplied would not be used against their colleagues. They were given these assurances, but some of them still felt that they had insufficient guarantees about the social responsibility of the social scientists. Many of these same persons undoubtedly would have given information freely to the FBI or any other organization whose confidence and intentions the public had learned to trust.

Their fears about social-scientists are not without foundation either--given the limited sense of responsibility of some groups of specialists in complex societies,

and also the increasing involvement of social scientists in applied research.<sup>12</sup> For the scientist's problem solving posture, which is a reflection of popular demand, has given the public the impression that social scientists are typically employed by someone either to alter a situation or to justify someone. Social-scientists have often been employed by school administrators, who do not necessarily have the interests of their teachers foremost in mind. Since they have demonstrated that their information can be useful, wary participants justifiably want to know how the information will be used and whose interests the social scientist represents.

In seeking to be useful to society, therefore, social-scientists have risked becoming identified as employees with vested interests. Because participants do not readily distinguish basic from applied research, they are suspicious of the true intentions of all social-science projects, which makes it difficult for a researcher to establish his credentials as an independent investigator, interested only in theoretical knowledge with no particular "axe to grind."

#### CONCLUSIONS

The sample consists of 28 public high schools, located in Ohio and three other midwestern states. More than one-third of the faculty members of these schools were interviewed, and over three-fourths of them returned lengthy questionnaires. The schools were selected to include a broad range of sizes and locations. The sample intentionally underrepresents small high schools in the region and overrepresents large ones.

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<sup>12</sup>Some social scientists deny that there is a distinction between pure and applied research. However, such a distinction can be made. It rests on such criteria as the specificity of objectives of the research, who determines those objectives, the source of the hypotheses, the degree of change intended by the research, the lapse of time permitted before the effectiveness of research is evaluated, the criteria used to evaluate the research, and the degree of control exercised by the funding agency over research policy and operation.

The sample of over 1,500 respondents is reasonably representative of teachers' ages, years of experience and education, marital status, and activity in professional organizations, although it slightly overrepresents the salary level for males.

The element of risk, which some respondents feel they are taking by participating in a project such as this, undoubtedly has some basis in fact and does in fact, influence their responses. Perhaps it is surprising, then, that this element of risk was not more influential than it was. In any event, any methodology has advantages as well as its price. This one, which combines interview and questionnaire methods, permits a relatively large number of cases concerning sensitive issues to be examined with relatively low expenditures of time and effort in comparison to participant observation methods. Sociology can be advanced more if sociologists are willing to identify the advantages and admit the problems associated with alternative procedures than if they engaged in polemics designed to substantiate the validity of one methodology in exclusion to the rest.

Methodologies must be viewed within the context of actual situations, rather than as absolutes, and knowledge based on them must be considered to be conditional. In view of the normal difficulties of sampling complex organizations, which are further compounded when sensitive problems are being investigated, the available sampling procedures and precautions against respondent bias, which originally were developed for the purpose of sampling populations of individuals rather than of organizations, are unrealistic and of little use as guidelines. All three of the issues which arose during the course of this research--reluctance to discuss conflict, fear of reprisal and ethical considerations--have in common the fact that organizational pressures can distort the responses of individuals. Most existing methodologies do not help to solve the distinctive problems that result from sampling organizations and investigating problems within organizational contexts. Experiences with this project, therefore, emphasize the need for a set of ethical standards and a methodology applicable

to populations of organizations, and the need for techniques to estimate, discount or overcome the type of bias inherent in field work conducted under these conditions.

Despite some of the problems discussed here, however, in perspective it should be emphasized that on the whole, most interviewees were cooperative and most appeared to endorse the aims of the study. In fact, the candidness of most teachers who had problems to report is remarkable in view of the issues that troubled a few of them. Some teachers appeared to appreciate the opportunity to discuss their problems with a neutral observer and a sympathetic listener; others, seemingly felt that their problems probably had already been reported by others, seemed to appreciate the opportunity to present "their side" of the story; a few seemed willing to discuss a problem with the hope that our staff would have the power to help them do something about it. But most respondents in the study appeared to cooperate because they sincerely wanted to be of assistance.

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## CHAPTER 4

### CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT

I have had my solutions for a long time, but I do not yet know how I am to arrive at them. (Gauss, 1964, p. 58).

Concerning, as it does, a comprehensive overview of ways in which structural arrangements are related to conflict, this research opens onto a vista of concerns so wide that a thorough examination of each of them would require an unlikely methodology that is immediately broad in scope and thorough and efficient. Some efficiency is compelled by financial and time limitations, but sometimes it has been necessary to compromise thoroughness in the interest of scope. Confronted with the unfeasibility of having field observers systematically participate in all 28 organizations plus working within the limits of a lengthy self-administered questionnaire and brief interviews, it was necessary to rely considerably on respondents' observations.

Despite the handicaps, however, crude indices and tentative measures that have some reliability were developed. Some of them are relatively complex and cover variables ranging from personal backgrounds, attitudes of individuals and groups to organizational conduct and to structural characteristics and value climates.<sup>1</sup>

At least since World War II with the American Soldier series, social scientists have been conscious of the seriousness of problems connected with measuring organizational characteristics. Some indices have been developed which are apparently reliable for specific purposes. The work of Lazarsfeld and his associates has also helped, but many of the other prolific writers on complex organization, such as Caplow,

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<sup>1</sup>Most of the necessary instruments and procedures were developed in a feasibility study supported by the U.S. Office of Education Contract No. 1934 in anticipation of this project. Details pertaining to the procedures summarized in this chapter are contained in the report of that project. (Corwin, 1963 and 1965).

Etzioni, and Parsons, appear to have been indifferent to the problems related to the measurements of critical variables. In any event, the day is some distance off when the field can refer to characteristics, such as standardization, with the same confidence that psychologists speak of the authoritarian personality; for the present, measures must be improvised for specific settings and problems.

Barton's (1961) comprehensive review of empirical measures for studying college characteristics provides one of the most useful references to date. In a search of over 100 studies, nearly 150 separate measures of input, output, environmental characteristics, organizational structures and members' attitudes plus activities were identified. Of particular relevance to the problems of this study are the measures of social structure and informal social relations reviewed in that volume. In different studies, bureaucratization has been measured in terms of the ratio of administrators to teachers, the number of administrative officers, and the proportion of faculty at the junior level. Faculty rights, in another study, were estimated from a check-list of specific rules concerning the faculty's formal authority; prevalence of meetings between faculty and administration, and reports of participation in administrative decisions have also been used. Trustee pressures, administrator-instigated incidents curtailing academic freedom and overall "power ratings," as reported by the faculty, have all been used to measure influence structures. Informal relations among a faculty have been inferred from the frequency of social contacts within departments, between departments and the outside community, and from a survey of overall ratings of the state of relationships among faculty members. Finally, descriptions of observers have been utilized to estimate the degree of integration and departmental organization of general education teachers.

While this heritage is in some respects lean, it can be cultivated. We shall profit from it in considering the more immediate problems of measuring the organizational characteristics of public schools.

## A TYPOLOGY OF MEASUREMENT

Sociological variables can be classified on the basis of their relationship to personality and social structure (Barton, 1961; Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1961). Beginning with the most personal variables and proceeding to the inherently structural characteristics, six levels of analysis are commonly employed in sociological research: (1) personal orientations of members--e.g., the job satisfaction of a teacher; (2) the personal behavior of members--e.g., the number of professional conferences an individual has attended during the last year; (3) demographic characteristics of members--e.g., a person's age and level of education; (4) official and informal relationships between two positions--e.g., the number of times a principal visits a teacher's classroom; (5) distributions of member characteristics throughout the organization (which can include any of the above characteristics)--e.g., the proportion of a teaching faculty with an M.A. degree; and (6) structural properties not derivable from member characteristics--e.g., the number of levels of authority. Generally speaking, the first three categories pertain to individual characteristics and the last three apply to organizational ones. But when the first three are treated as distributions, they can then be converted into organizational variables. For example, **by averaging** the job satisfaction of individual employees for the entire organization, or for departments within it, job satisfaction then becomes a property of the organization and not possessed by any person in particular.

The strictly organizational variables deserve more attention by sociologists than they customarily have received. With some justification, it can be maintained that a group is no less real than the individuals within it, and that individual personality in itself is a hypothetical construct inferred from the consistency of individual responses. Group properties can be inferred from individual reactions to the group, just as the temperature of the sun can be inferred from the reaction of other objects

and human beings to it. As Scott points out, "Just because an individual is used as a source of data is no reason that the data must describe his own characteristics rather than characteristics of some external system to which he is...responding" (Scott, 1965, p. 130).

The measures and indices developed for this study will be described in terms of each of the above categories.

### PERSONAL ORIENTATIONS

The term "orientation" refers to a person's conception of his relationship to a selected part of his total environment; for example, lower- and middle-class children are known to have a typically different orientation towards school. Orientations are a part of a value system. As such they are normative, representing a person's beliefs about what ought to occur, although they are less diffuse than attitudes which (in addition to beliefs) include feelings and emotions.

#### Role Orientations

The term role orientation (or conception) represents a further refinement; it is limited to orientations pertaining specifically to relationships between members of an organization. A role is a short-hand way of talking about the norms that regulate relationships between positions, as for example the norms defining the mutual rights and obligations between teachers and principals. A position, in turn, is a composite of interdependent roles; i.e., the position of "teacher" is comprised of the teachers' relationships with students, parents, and school board members as well as with administrators. It is a position in the sense that this pattern of rights and obligations determines the social placement of teachers, students, parents, etc. in relation to one another. Each teacher develops conceptions of the roles he is required to perform, and these are to some degree shared with other people.

While it is usually assumed that roles are relatively stable, there is a normal amount of variation in the way similar roles are conceived and performed in different organizations and also from situation to situation within an organization, depending upon the values of different members. These differences cause tension, which eventually can modify the role system itself. For that reason, despite its many ambiguities, the concept of role orientation can be of substantial utility in the study of conflict in complex organizations.

### Role Segments

In addition to their component roles, positions can be divided into "segments". A role-segment is a selection of norms shared in common with several roles, whereas a role includes all norms relevant to a relationship between two positions--i.e., all norms defining the student-teacher role. The same norms, for example, defining teachers as "disciplinarians" with respect to students (i.e., the rigid adherence to rules regulating subordinates) can also apply to principals, making them disciplinarians with respect to teachers. Similarly, the "consideration" role-segment (i.e., the expectation that one will show consideration to others)<sup>2</sup> is a part of many roles that happen to share these particular norms. Both the professional and employee norms (such as norms governing the appropriate amount of initiative) are commonly incorporated within many different roles--with parents, students, and administrators--and should be considered role-segments rather than specific roles.

A role-segment constitutes a kind of recognizable position too, albeit an unofficial and latent one in the sense that it is not deliberately created and quite often is not recognized officially. It is common to speak of a vocational group's

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<sup>2</sup>To help keep in mind this distinction between roles and role-segments, it seems advisable to reserve the term orientations to refer to role-segments and to use the term conception in reference to roles. For general reviews of the variety of meanings associated with this concept, and some associated problems, see the review of the literature by Corwin, Taves and Haas (1963) and Haas (1963).

"professional role," and references to the "employee role" are easily comprehended regardless of the setting or the particular positions involved.

The concept, role-segment, permits comparison between similar norms incorporated in different systems as well as comparison of similarities throughout different parts of the same system. Parallels between the professional segment of the nurse-physician role in hospitals, for example, and the corresponding aspects of the teacher-principal role in a different system can be bridged through this concept.

### Professional and Employee Orientations

Professional and bureaucratic-employee role-segments refer to contrasting principles of organization, although overlap also occurs between them. The major distinctions between professionals and professional employees are rooted in differences that are expected of them concerning the appropriate degree of standardization, centralization, and specialization of their work. Each of these bureaucratic characteristics can be visualized as a series of discreet variables ranging from high to low. The bureaucratic-employee status will be enforced primarily under the following conditions:

1. A high degree of standardization of work which (a) stresses uniformity of clients' problems, (b) is highly specific and has uniform rules and work procedures and (c) treats personnel as interchangeable.
2. A highly centralized decision-making process in which employees (a) have little responsibility for decision-making and (b) primarily have responsibility to the organization and the administration.
3. Emphasis on a task-oriented type of specialization in which skill (a) is primarily derived from practice or experience, (b) primarily involves the accomplishment of a set of tasks, and (c) primarily stresses efficiency and technique.

On the other hand, the professional status is best supported by the opposite conditions:

1. A low degree of standardization which (a) stresses the uniqueness of clients' problems, (b) provides diffuse roles with many alternatives, and (c) assigns personnel according to special competences.
2. A low degree of centralization in which employees (a) have responsibility for policy-level decisions and (b) are primarily loyal to clients and colleagues.
3. Emphasis on a functional-type of specialization in which skill is (a) primarily derived from mastery of theoretical knowledge and (b) primarily stresses competence in aiding clients.

This scheme pertains to characteristics of organizations. It is not an attempt to classify individuals who can maintain orientations that conflict with their existing positions and can use segregating mechanisms enabling them to uphold both orientations simultaneously. However, the opportunity that an organization affords its personnel to act professionally, and the amount of pressure that it exerts on them to act as employees, depends on the configuration of these variables.

Standardization. Under bureaucratic principles, each position is assigned responsibility using designated procedures for completing specific tasks. In contrast persons having professional status are assigned broad spheres of authority in accordance with their specialized knowledge, and are accorded final authority and responsibility for their decisions. The latter system permits initiative and imagination in solving clients' problems. While the assembly-line worker and the surgeon, for example, are both specialized, the degree of initiative expected of each differs markedly. Furthermore, in comparison to the emphasis made on research and decision-making authority for the professional, emphasis on files and records in bureaucracies only reinforces routine continuity and stability.

Both the professional and the employee are bound by rules. However, in comparison to the employee's status, rules guiding the professional are less specific and

more abstract and diffuse. Moreover, except for codes of ethics, the rules governing the professional usually are stated as alternatives while those governing an employee more often are unconditionally binding (e.g., rules stating that teachers must be in the building by 8:30 a.m. and may not leave the premises without permission are examples of the latter).

By design, standardization separates the products of work from the particular persons responsible for them, making personnel dispensable, interchangeable, and easily replaced. Not only are employees "assigned" to their job, but their qualifications for the job are determined by the administration. On the other hand, a premise of professional organization is that a member's qualifications are to be set by, and his competence evaluated by, his peers.

Since professionals operate under a rule system too, it cannot be assumed that all rules are detrimental to professional status. Rules can support the professional and provide him with assurances necessary for carrying out his decisions. This is one way of interpreting Moeller's (1966) findings concerning bureaucracy and the teachers' sense of power. Eight judges rated 20 school systems, varying in size from 37 to 700 full-time teachers, on the clarity of their division of labor, presence of a hierarchy of authority with carefully prescribed responsibilities, a system or rules of policy, impersonality, and emphasis on technical qualifications and efficiency--from a technical standpoint. Approximately 20 elementary plus 20 secondary teachers in each system were sent questionnaires eliciting their sense of power to influence and change policy decisions made by the administration. Although it was originally hypothesized that bureaucracy induces a sense of powerlessness, the reverse was found; teachers in more bureaucratized systems expressed a greater sense of power in the several tests than those in less bureaucratized systems. In the latter, where particularism and lack of policy are typical, individuals probably have less opportunity to exert influence than when they know the rules and their loopholes, and can anticipate what action the

administration will take.

Decision-Making Authority. Given the constraints of rules and standard procedures, in comparison to the professional system, the bureaucratic system limits the employee's autonomy over his work. Because bureaucratic situations are presumed to be categorical and recurring, a uniform set of rules is assumed to be applicable. In the bureaucratic system, administrative authorities in higher echelons are responsible for policing the conduct of employees. The situations which professionals confront, on the other hand, are assumed to be unique; the professional's special capacity being his ability to resolve special problems. The authority of professionals, of course, resides in the colleague group. Individuals do not necessarily have the right to make their own judgments independently. But in any case, regulations, administrative interference, close supervision, and emphasis on discipline and compliance constitute challenges to professional competence and authority.

The sources of professional and bureaucratic authority also differ. In the first case, the obedience of subordinates depends upon discipline and organizational sanctions (e.g., salary measures); in the second, it depends upon their respect for senior colleagues and professional sanctions (e.g., reputation). So while bureaucratic officials may typically be competent in some area of expertise, as bureaucrats their authority stems from the office they occupy. This distinction is clearer in the case of incompetent officials, who, nevertheless, can command deference from subordinates.

In bureaucracies, specialists of distinction are evaluated by administrators who may or may not be fully aware of new procedures and skills in that particular field (Gouldner, 1959). The possible discrepancy between their criteria of evaluation and those used by their subordinates is likely to be increased by the fact that professionally oriented teachers typically subscribe to ideas advocated by experts

outside of their own organization. While some teachers subscribe to the belief that there is a general teaching method which can be applied regardless of field, others believe that competence to teach depends upon methods and knowledge specific to the subject matter being taught, and in any event, that competence to teach cannot be evaluated apart from their ability to determine the appropriateness of the material being taught.

The fact that professionals are also evaluated by laymen who apply other than professional criteria can be especially threatening. As mentioned, lay control is the natural enemy of the professions and the major reason for the existence of professional organizations, which puts the professional teacher--hired by the board to carry out the "will of the community"--in an ambivalent position, indeed.

In practice, teachers have not achieved the level of autonomy that some of the other professions have achieved. They have virtually no control over important facets of their work such as the subjects taught, the materials used, the criteria for admitting students into classes, the forms of reporting pupil progress, and the qualifications for teacher training. Teachers are not represented at all on licensing boards in the majority of states, some of which expressly forbid professional educators from membership.

Basis of Specialization. Finally, the immediate relevance of organizational goals differs for professional and bureaucratic employees. The bureaucratic employee is rewarded for his efficiency. It is instructive in this connection, that in the absence of clear-cut and specific objectives, teachers and students often are rewarded for the rate at which material is "covered". Having no particular responsibility for the total product, the employee's principal concern is in completing specific tasks. Professional standards of evaluation, by comparison, are geared more directly to the primary objectives of client welfare. The surgeon is rewarded primarily for his part

in curing patients, for example; the length of time his operations may take is largely irrelevant apart from this primary consideration. Within the limits of his competence, a professional is responsible for any facet of a client's life which has a bearing upon the outcome of his administrations. Because the client's welfare is not always equivalent to that of the organization, the simultaneous demands of professional and bureaucratic principles are sometimes responsible for conflicts of loyalty between professional standards and those of the employing organization.

The importance of knowledge in professional organizations takes precedence over either technique or experience. While professionals probably do not become less competent with experience, to the extent that experience or specific methods have been emphasized in a training program, the vocation moves closer to the crafts where competence is based on experience and mastery of specific technique. Only by monopolizing a specific body of knowledge, such as the psychology of learning, can the field of teacher-education gain full professional authority.

The above is a caricature based on ideal types, which are unlikely to exist in pure form. But, to the extent that both sets of principles are appropriate to a situation, tension and compromise also are likely to be present.

#### Professional and Bureaucratic Orientation Scales

Colombotos used a four-item index of professionalism to examine the sources of professionalism in teaching, consisting of: technical competence (one item), the autonomy of teachers (two items), and a service ideal (one item). Teachers were asked how important each of the following was when they began to teach and how important it is now:

1. Chances to work with a teaching staff that is highly competent
2. Doing work my colleagues respect
3. Autonomy in my work; having enough freedom and responsibility to do my job the way it should be done

4. Chance to help people; to do something worthwhile for society

An index of the professional working climate was computed from the professional index by averaging the scores of the faculty of the school. The seven junior high schools in the sample were ranked accordingly. A low rank order (tau) correlation (-.05) between professional climate and past professionalism of teachers together with a tau of .43 between professional climate and net increase in professionalism seemed to support the interpretation that the professional working climate of a school has an influence in shaping the orientations of its teachers.

Webb developed more elaborate multiple-item, Likert-type professional and employee scales to measure the orientations of 200 elementary school teachers in Central Ohio. The employee scale is geared to four bureaucratic principles: technical specialization (divisions of labor), vertical differentiation (hierarchy), office-based integration, and uniformity due to rules. Four parallel scales were developed to measure allegiance to four professional principles: functional specialization, horizontal differentiation, competence-based integration, and uniformity based on general principles. The inter-item correlations of the 8 sub-scales ranged from  $r = .55$  to  $.79$  and the inter-item reliability of the two total scales was  $r = .88$  and  $.84$ . A low inverse relationship between the two total scales ( $r = -.16$ ) indicated some conflict between professional and bureaucratic modes of organization. The following are examples of items included in the scales:

TOTAL BUREAUCRATIC SCALE

- (a) School policy should be determined locally and to follow the standards of the local community.
- (b) While the P.T.A. should be active in its support of the school, it should not have any voice in determination of school policies and practices.

- (c) Teachers should follow school policies in all cases.

#### TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SCALE

- (a) The principal should let teachers know that he respects their right to make decisions in their own area of competence.
- (b) A principal should encourage teachers to try any new teaching methods for which they can show a sound reason.

Webb's bureaucratic scale was related positively to a person's loyalty to the local school system and related inversely to the belief that standards and requirements for teacher certification should be raised; the professional pattern was related inversely to loyalty to the local school system and positively related to the belief that standards and requirements for teacher certification should be raised.

Webb's scales are similar to those developed in the present study. Two Likert-type scales were constructed to measure the bureaucratic and professional orientations of a teaching faculty. The professional status-orientation scale consists of 16 items and the employee status-orientation scale consists of 29 items selected from several hundred statements that were judged relevant to each concept by a panel of sociologists and tested for internal consistency and reliability. The employee scale is composed of six segments: (1) loyalty to the administration; (2) loyalty to the organization; (3) belief that teaching competence is based on experience plus endorsement of treating personnel interchangeably; (4) endorsement of standardization; (5) emphasis on rules and procedures; and (6) loyalty to the public. The four role segments which comprise the professional scale are: (1) orientation to students; (2) orientation to the profession and professional colleagues; (3) belief that competence is based on knowledge; and (4) belief that teachers should have decision-making authority. An example of each type of item appears below in the order previously

mentioned; the complete scales are reproduced in Appendices 1a and 1b.

Bureaucratic-Employee Status Orientation:

- (a) Personnel who openly criticize the administration should be encouraged to go elsewhere.
- (b) What is best for the school is best for education.
- (c) Pay should be in relation to experience.
- (d) The work of a course should be so well planned that every child taking the same course throughout the state will eventually cover the same material.
- (e) Rules stating when teachers should arrive and depart from the building should be strictly enforced.
- (f) Teachers should take into account the opinions of their community to guide what they say in class and in their choice of teaching materials.

Professional Status Orientation:

- (a) It should be permissible for a teacher to violate a rule if he or she is sure that the best interests of the students will be served by doing so.
- (b) Teachers should try to live up to the standards of their profession even if the administration or the community does not seem to respect them.
- (c) Teachers should be evaluated primarily on the basis of their knowledge of the subject matter that is taught and their ability to communicate it.
- (d) Small matters should not have to be referred to someone "higher up" for a final answer.

For each item, five alternatives were used, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree," and weighted from five to one. Total scores were computed for each respondent. The magnitude of scores on the professional scale corresponded directly with the intensity of professional orientation; the employee scale was scored

in the reverse direction so these scores were inversely related to the intensity of the employee orientation. The final sets of items in each scale were tested for internal consistency, using critical ratio and scale-value-difference techniques.<sup>3</sup> With the method of internal consistency, an item is acceptable for inclusion in the final scale when it discriminates between respondents whose total scores on the combined set of items place them at each extreme of the distribution. Only items accounting for most of the differences between the two extreme groups have been retained. In the study that is cited, Webb found that the critical ratio-scale value difference method roughly selects the same items as first order intercorrelations among the items (Webb, 1964, p. 65).

Reliability. The split-half reliability of the employee scale is  $r = .74$ , or  $r_n = .84$  when the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula is applied to compensate for arbitrary reduction of the scale's length in using the internal consistency method. The internal reliability of the shorter professional scale is  $r = .48$ , or  $r_n = .65$  when corrected. The lower reliability of the professional scale seems to indicate that it is less reliable; however it is also possible that the opinions of teachers about professionalism are actually less consistent and do not form a perfect scale. Neither the scales developed by Webb to measure the professionalism of elementary teachers nor the professional scale developed by Sorenson (1965) for application to accountants achieved much better reliability. In any event, the reliability figures pertain to the measurement of individual subjects, not to large groups of subjects,

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<sup>3</sup>The scale value difference ratio is the ratio between the maximum difference theoretically possible (computed between the groups at the extreme quartiles on each item) and the actual difference between these extreme groups on the total set of items. Only the items with a scale value difference ratio of .32 and above have been retained; most of them have discriminative power above .50.

which would appear to demand less interindividual reliability.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps a more serious qualification is that different respondents could be using incomparable standards. A respondent who says that he "agrees" could actually be more in "agreement" than another who answers "strongly agree". Such responses may reflect more accurately measures of respondents' perceived relationships to another respondents. This epistemological reservation notwithstanding, Rosen and Rosen have found that Likert-type scale scores can be treated by both parametric and nonparametric techniques with comparable results from using either analysis (Rosen and Rosen, 1955).

In an analysis of more than 1500 respondents, the total scores of the two scales were significantly inversely correlated ( $r = -.57$ ) (Table 4-1). Insofar as individuals are concerned, then, the scales are measuring opposite poles of the same continuum. Linear correlations among the sub-scales ranged from .50 to .70, and correlations between the sub-scale scores and total scores of the employee scale ranged from  $r = .91$  to  $r = .55$ .<sup>5</sup> The administrative orientation sub-scale was the one most highly correlated with the total employee scale ( $r = .85$ ), accounting for almost two-thirds of the variance. Loyalty to the organization, rules and procedures, public orientation, and the interchangeability index were correlated with the total score to a relatively high degree (between  $r = .69$  and  $.85$ ). The two-item index on experience showed less

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<sup>4</sup>In effect, individual scores have been scaled. Selvin and Hagstrom suggest, as an alternative, scaling group data by averaging the responses to each question separately for each group and combining questions only after the individual data have been so transformed. The procedure has merit; but its disadvantage is that the scales cannot then be used for the dual purpose of simultaneously measuring individual orientations and organizational climates; nor is it clear that the conclusions reached from both procedures would differ (Selvin, Hagstrom, 1963).

<sup>5</sup>The numerical differences between the schools on some of the indices used to rank order them were sometimes small. It is important to recognize that these numbers represent ordinal not cardinal measurement, with a precise zero point. The assumption of equal intervals, implicit in using the mean, can be made only comparatively for the data at hand; they are not necessarily estimates of the magnitude of difference in the population. It is possible that, by an outside criterion, the schools in the study are clustered within a limited range of the maximum existing range of organizational characteristics.

correlation with the total score ( $r = .55$ ), but this short index also constitutes only a small portion of the total scale score. The correlations between the sub-scales of the professional scale and the total score range from  $r = .76$  to  $r = .91$ ; each sub-scale contributing approximately 25 to 50 percent of their respective variances. Most of the sub-scales show intercorrelation of  $r = .39$  or higher. This pattern of correlation is appropriate for a scale of this kind because it is designed to provide a measure of different dimensions of complex concepts. As long as the sub-scales are logically and empirically related to the general concept, it is not necessary that they contribute equally to the total scale score.

A parallel scale analysis was made of the group averages of the 28 school faculties. The schools were ranked on the basis of their mean faculty scores on each of the two scales and on each of the several sub-scales. In this case, the Spearman rank-order correlation between professional and employee orientations was not significant ( $r_s = -.07$ ), indicating that, at the level of organizational climates, the scales are measuring distinct variables and are not opposite ends of the same continuum (Table 4-1). Their ranks on the employee sub-scales all correlated significantly with the way they ranked on the total scale scores. Average faculty loyalty to the administration and the interchangeability orientation were most highly correlated with their total scale score ( $r_s = .74$ ), while experience-orientation had the lowest rank order-correlation ( $r_s = .39$ ).

On the professional scale, the rank of schools on average orientation to colleagues and decision-making authority had a relatively high correlation with the total scores ( $r_s = .68$  and  $.62$ , respectively). However, one of the sub-scales (client orientation) was not significantly correlated with the total scale scores of the faculty ( $r_s = .16$ ), despite the fact that this sub-scale was correlated with the total scale scores of individual teachers ( $r = .54$ ). Therefore, whether or not tension in professionally oriented schools is of benefit to students is highly problematic. In view of this discrepancy, client orientation will be considered separately from other components of the professional scale for some of the analyses.

TABLE 4-1

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN A SCHOOL'S AVERAGE PROFESSIONAL  
AND EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION SUB-SCALES AND TOTAL SCALE SCORES  
(N = 28)

SUB-SCALES	TOTAL SCALES			
	Professional Orientation		Employee Orientation	
	$r_s$	r	$r_s^t$	r
<u>Professional Orientation</u>				
Client Orientation	.16	(.76) <sup>1</sup>		
Orientation to Colleagues	.68**	(.91)		
Monopoly of Knowledge	.48**	(.85)		
Decision-making Authority	.62**	(.83)		
<u>Employee Orientation</u>				
Total Scale	-.07	(-.57)		
Loyalty of Administration			.74**	(.85) <sup>1</sup>
Loyalty of Orientation			.57**	(.69)
Experience Orientation			.39*	(.55)
Interchangeability Orientation			.74**	(.78)
Rules Orientation			.59**	(.85)
Public Orientation			.57**	(.82)
<u>Role Organization</u>				
High Professional- High Employee	.58		.58	
Low Employee	.27		-.41	
Low Professional- High Employee	-.39		.66	
Low Employee	-.40		.49	

\* Spearman Rank Order Correlation between school means significant at  $p \leq .05$ ; N = 28

\*\* Spearman Rank Order Correlation between school means significant at  $p \leq .01$ ; N = 28

1. Numbers in parentheses refer to linear correlations between sub-scales and total scale scores of individuals (N = 1500).

Validity. The problem of validating measures of orientations is at best complex. The appropriateness of the possible outside criteria depends upon the type of relationship that is assumed to exist between personal orientations and specific observable behaviors. For example, must groups known to behave professionally necessarily express professional orientations, and vice versa? If a discrepancy between behavior and orientation is possible, then what is the basis for validating a normative scale against groups known to behave differently? The problem, however, is not troublesome as long as a known professional group does express the expected orientations; so in that sense, external validating groups can provide a sufficient test, though it is not a necessary one.

The known groups selected to validate the scales developed for this study did express the expected differences. Each scale discriminates between select groups of respondents in the sample who most closely approximate high and low professional and employee behavioral norms.<sup>6</sup> The teachers with a reputation for professionalism and the least employee-like groups scored near the expected extremes on each scale: they were among the most professional and least bureaucratic groups in the study (see Table 4-2).

Role Organization. The schools were classified and ranked on the basis of the proportion of faculty having different combinations of professional and employee

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<sup>6</sup>(1) The 29 most professional teachers in the sample were selected because they placed high on all these criteria: five or more years of education (excluding those trained at normal schools); subscription to two or more professional journals; reading professional journals more than five hours a week; publication of two or more articles in professional journals; officer in a professional organization or active contribution to professional committees or meetings. The 30 least professional teachers in the sample reported generally opposite characteristics.

The 44 teachers chosen to represent the most bureaucratic teachers met these criteria: judged by the principal as an excellent employee; one or more standard deviations below the sample mean on a check list of criticisms against the school and its administrators; would not leave the school for an increase up to \$3,000 per year; fewer than five days sick leave during the year. The 19 teachers in the least bureaucratic employee group reported generally opposite characteristics.

TABLE 4-2

## SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW EMPLOYEE AND PROFESSIONAL VALIDATION GROUPS FOR EMPLOYEE AND PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION SCALES

EMPLOYEE VALIDATION GROUPS	N	Mean Employee <sup>a</sup> Scale Score	Test of Significance
High Criterion Group	44	77.3	$t_{18} = 2.48^*$ (High vs. low)
Low Criterion Group	19	88.0	
"Known" High Professional Group	19	96.2	
PROFESSIONAL VALIDATION GROUPS		Mean Professional <sup>a</sup> Scale Score	
High Criterion Group	29	53.1	CR= 10.7* (High vs.Low)
Low Criterion Group	30	48.4	
"Known" High Professional Group	19	60.1	
<p>a For the employee scale, higher scores indicate lower orientation. For the professional scale, higher scores indicate higher orientations.</p> <p>* Significant at <math>p \leq .01</math> (one tail test)</p>			

orientations. The distribution of each orientation scale was divided at the median, and individuals were classified as to whether their scores were simultaneously high, low, or mixed on the two scales. The rank-order correlations of each style of role organization with the mean orientations on the two scales considered separately are shown in Table 4-1. Employee orientations are most closely associated with the proportion of a faculty having simultaneously high-employee and low-professional orientations ( $r_s = .66$ ), but rank on professional orientation is most closely associated with the proportion of

faculty having simultaneously high-professional and high-employee orientations ( $r_s = .57$ ). For some purposes the schools were also classified into one of the four types of role organizations on the basis of the modal type of role organization.

### Indices of Work Satisfaction and Commitment

Whereas Linear scales presuppose an underlying variable measured in equal units, and ordinal scales assume a definite hierarchy of qualities (or ranks) without regard to the distance between them, an index can be formed from the sum of separate indicators of a concept without making assumptions about the form of the underlying relationship among them except that they are additive (Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1961). It should be cautioned that an index is not equivalent to an operational definition; an index does not define a concept in the way that years of schooling, for example, can be considered to be a definition of education. Rather, an index is a substitute for something that cannot be measured directly, in the sense that a test score, for example, is an index of education rather than education itself.

For this study, two indices of work satisfaction were developed, based on five items from a more inclusive scale constructed by Gross and his colleagues (1958):

1. How does teaching compare with other types of work?

\_\_\_\_\_ the most satisfying career one could follow; \_\_\_\_\_ one of the most satisfying careers; \_\_\_\_\_ as satisfying as most careers; \_\_\_\_\_ less satisfying than most careers.

2. If you "had to do it over again" would you enter the field of teaching?

\_\_\_\_\_ definitely yes; \_\_\_\_\_ probably yes; \_\_\_\_\_ probably no; \_\_\_\_\_ definitely no.

3. On the whole, are you satisfied that the school administration accepts you as a professional expert to the degree to which you feel you are entitled by reason of your position, training, and experience?

\_\_\_\_\_ very well satisfied; \_\_\_\_\_ fairly well satisfied;  
\_\_\_\_\_ fairly dissatisfied; \_\_\_\_\_ very dissatisfied.

4. How satisfied are you with your present job when you consider the expectations you had when you took the job?

\_\_\_\_\_ very well satisfied; \_\_\_\_\_ fairly well satisfied;  
\_\_\_\_\_ fairly dissatisfied; \_\_\_\_\_ very dissatisfied;

5. Please check the statement which best expresses your feeling concerning how satisfied you are with your job when you compare it to other teaching jobs.

\_\_\_\_\_ very well satisfied; \_\_\_\_\_ fairly well satisfied;  
\_\_\_\_\_ fairly dissatisfied; \_\_\_\_\_ very dissatisfied.

Among the 284 teachers in the first year sample, there was a reasonable degree of correlation between the first two items and among the last three items (Table 4-3). However, correlations between the two sets of items did not appear to be of sufficient magnitude to justify grouping all five items. These two sets of items also happen to be logically different. The first two pertain to satisfaction with a career in the vocation of teaching, while the other three items pertain to satisfaction with the present job. So, it was decided to use two measures of job satisfaction: (a) satisfaction with the vocation of teaching (items 1 and 2) and (b) satisfaction with the present job (items 3, 4, and 5). The average career satisfaction of the faculties of the separate schools showed a similar lack of rank order correlation with their mean job satisfaction ( $r_s = .09$ ).

Commitment to the career, while not entirely a reflection of satisfaction, is another relevant dimension of the problem. Eighty per cent of the men and 86 per cent of the women, in a nationwide sample of beginning secondary teachers surveyed by Mason and others, said that they either definitely or probably would enter teaching again if they had it to do over, with about two-thirds of them believing that they definitely or probably could achieve their long-run life goals in classroom teaching (Mason and Bain, 1958). Two-thirds of their sample of beginning teachers also planned to teach in the same school district the following year, and 18 per cent planned to teach in another district.

TABLE 4-3					
MATRIX OF LINEAR CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FIVE JOB SATISFACTION AND CAREER SATISFACTION ITEMS (N = 276)					
Item No.	Satisfaction with the Vocation		Satisfaction with the Job		
	1	2	3	4	5
1	-	<u>.56</u>	.23	.30	.22
2	-	-	.28	.37	.32
3	-	-	-	<u>.63</u>	<u>.39</u>
4	-	-	-	-	<u>.58</u>

Like these beginning teachers, two-thirds of the first year sample from the present study anticipated that they would be teaching in the same system in two years, most of them on the same job. The proportion varied by school, however, from 18 per cent of the 20 teachers in the smallest school to 77 per cent of the teachers in a 63-teacher school. Nine per cent of that sample planned to be working in a different system in two years, about half of them on better jobs. Five per cent planned to return to the university temporarily, while another five per cent planned to leave education altogether.

#### PERSONAL BEHAVIOR

Several parallel behavioral measures were developed to supplement and compare conclusions based on orientation measures. Under some conditions perhaps, behavior is consistent with personal orientations. However, when external penalties for deviation are high, or when alternatives are otherwise restricted, the association is likely to be less complete and quite complicated. A variety of circumstances can intervene between belief and action, including powerlessness to

act because of financial dependence or subordinate status. Certain circumstances make the relationship between attitudes and behavior so dubious that some social scientists, in fact, become visibly disturbed when their colleagues use orientation measures as both dependent and independent variables without attempting to relate them to overt behavior; and a few skeptics reject all orientation measures as improper subjects of sociology, which they believe to be primarily concerned with overt behavior. Although it seems rash to categorically exclude orientation measures from the sociological vision, it would be equally foolhardy to treat the two types of variables, behavior and orientation, interchangeably, or to completely ignore behavior in favor of orientations.

The only feasible way to measure simultaneously the behavior of 1500 persons in over two dozen organizations, however, is to use respondent reports. Although those who champion participant observation tend to view with a jaundiced eye reports of behavior which they themselves did not observe, it seems equally plausible that estimates accumulated from respondents' detailed descriptions of specific events are more reliable than reports based on the personal observations of a single investigator. Moreover, it was found repeatedly in this study that different ways of measuring conflict often yield similar conclusions.

#### Professional and Employee Behavior Indices

Since the professionalism of teachers and their compliance to bureaucratic standards are so crucial to the major theme of the study, behavioral indices were developed to supplement the orientation scales. Two composite behavioral indexes were devised using specific practices that seemed relevant to professional and employee roles.

The index of professional behavior is comprised of nine criteria that are related to levels of knowledge and related activities. The distributions of eight of them were trichotomized, and one was dichotomized. Respondents were assigned weights from 3 to 1, depending upon their position in the total distribution (see Table 4-4). Each

respondent was scored on each of the nine criteria and rated according to the total number of times he scored in the "high" category. Schools were ranked on the accumulated proportion of a faculty scoring high on each of the nine criteria.

An index of employee behavior, composed of five criteria, uses the same scoring procedure. See Table 4-5.

#### Orientation Scales and Behavior Indices

A significant positive rank order correlation was found between the average employee-orientation of a school and the average number of times its faculty scored high on the employee-behavior index ( $t = .42$ ) (Table 4-6). A faculty's orientation, in other words, tends to be reflected in parallel behavior patterns, although imperfectly. The association is high enough to support the contention that a common dimension of organization is being measured with both instruments. But at the same time, orientation cannot be equated with behavior since a significant proportion of a faculty's employee orientation is not reflected in its conduct as tapped by this index.

By contrast to the employee measures, the mean professional-orientation of a school is not associated with its professional behavior index ( $t = -.07$ ), although the index is significantly related to the monopoly of knowledge sub-scale ( $t = .22$ ).

The lack of association between a school's professional orientation and behavior can be partially attributed to the inability of the professional-behavior index to discriminate in the middle ranges of the scale, for the differences between the extreme schools on these measures are in the expected direction. Comparing the average professional orientations of the top seven schools in the professional behavior distribution with those in the bottom quartile, there was a low mean difference in the expected direction (1.05), which is statistically significant at  $p < .05$ , using a one-tail critical ratio test (Table 4-7). The two extremes on behavior were also

TABLE 4-4

## PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR INDEX ITEMS

BEHAVIORAL CRITERIA	LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY		
	High (3)	Middle (2)	Low (1)
	Monopoly of Knowledge		
1. Number of years of college completed	5-8 years	4 years	0-3 years
2. Highest college degree	M.A., Ph.D., or Ph.E.	B.A., B.S., or B.Ed.	None
3. Type of college	Liberal Arts	College of Education	Normal School or Teacher's College
4. Time devoted to professional reading	11 or more hours per week	5-10 hours per week	Less than 5 hours per week
	ORIENTATION TO COLLEAGUES		
5. Activity in professional organizations	Held office, active on committees, or contri- buted to programs	Attend con- ferences regularly or occasionally	No member- ship or dues member only
6. Number of conferences or workshops attended during the past two years	4 or more	2-3	0-1
7. Number of professional journals subscribed to	5 or more	1-4	None
8. Number of articles published	3 or more	1-2	None
	Commitment		
9. Employed full time	Yes	-138-	No

TABLE 4-5

## EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR INDEX ITEMS

BEHAVIORAL CRITERIA	LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY		
	High (3)	Middle (2)	Low (1)
Loyalty to the School			
1. Salary required to move him from his present position (See Q 8, Part II, Appendix 4)	Would not move for \$1000-\$3000 annual increase	Would not move for less than \$1000 annual increase	Would move for \$500 or less
Loyalty to the Administration			
2. Number of days absent from work (during the year)*	0-2	3-7	8-9
3. Number of agreements with 5 unfavorable statements about principal (See Q 17, Part II, Appendix 4).	None	No more than 2	3-5; plus no agreements with favorable statements
4. Number of agreements with 9 favorable statements about principal (See Q 17, Part II Appendix 4).	3-9; plus no agreements with negative statements	Up to 2	None
5. Loyalty to the administration (rated by the principal)**	Excellent	Good or average	Below average or poor

\* Since schools were visited over a six-month period, there may be some systematic error in this measure.

\*\* Six principals did not rate all of their teachers because of lack of opportunity to observe. Employees not rated in those six schools assigned a modal score, (2).

TABLE 4-6

RANK ORDER CORRELATION BETWEEN A FACULTY'S AVERAGE PROFESSIONAL AND  
EMPLOYEE ORIENTATIONS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING BEHAVIORIAL INDICES  
(N = 28)

RANK OF SCHOOL ON MEAN FACULTY ORIENTATIONS	RANK OF SCHOOL BASED ON PROPORTION OF FACULTY HIGH ON	
	Professional Behavior tau	Employee Behavior tau
Professional Orientation	<u>-.07</u>	-
Colleague Orientation	-.13	-
Monopoly Of Knowledge	.22*	-
Decision-Making Orientation	.12	-
Client Orientation	.09	-
Employee Orientation	-	<u>.42**</u>
Loyalty to the Administration	-	.39**
Loyalty to the Organization	-	.28*
Experience Orientation	-	.21*
Interchangeability Orientation	-	.18
Rules Orientation	-	.27*

\* Tau statistically significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Tau statistically significant at  $p \leq .01$

TABLE 4-7

## DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AVERAGE ORIENTATIONS OF FACULTIES WITH THE HIGHEST AND THE LOWEST PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR

EXTREMES ON AVERAGE PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR	AVERAGE ORIENTATIONS							
	Professional Orientation				Employee Orientation			
	Mean	Ave. Rank	Critical Ratio	U Test	Mean	Ave. Rank	Critical Ratio	U Test
<u>Professional Behavior Index</u>								
Upper Quartile (N=7)	58.6	8.0	1.75*	21	-	-	-	-
Lower Quartile (N=7)	57.5	7.0			-	-	-	-
<u>Employee Behavior Index</u>								
Upper Quartile (N=7)	-	-	-	-	76.5	8.1	3.72***	20
Lower Quartile (N=7)	-	-	-	-	80.2	6.8		
<u>Role Organization (mode)</u>								
(1) High Professional-High Employee	3.44	17.6			1.32	14.4		
(2) High Professional-Low Employee	3.41	16.3	-	.12*	1.43	16.8	-	9**
(3) Low Professional-High Employee	3.10	8.3			1.19	8.4		
(4) Low Professional-Low Employee	3.32	16.6			1.33	16.5		

\* Significant at  $p \leq .05$ , one tail test\*\* Significant at  $p \leq .01$ , one tail test\*\*\* Significant at  $p \leq .001$ , one tail test

compared on their average ranks on professional orientation; differences were in the same direction, although they were not statistically significant (using the Mann-Whitney-U test) (Table 4-7).

The relationship became more prominent when the schools' modal types of role organization were considered. Schools were classified on the basis of their most frequent type of role organization and then compared on their average rank on professional behavior. Schools having a predominantly "high professional-low employee" orientation ranked significantly higher on professional behavior (with a rank of 16.3) than those classified as "low professional-high employee" (which had an average rank of 8.3) (Table 4-7).

The professional conduct of a faculty, then, tends to reflect its professional orientation quite imperfectly, and only the more extreme orientations have a visible consequence of behavior. Orientation and behavior tend to be related, but they can hardly be equated.

#### Initiative-Compliance Scale

A scale was developed to estimate the tendencies of teachers to use "initiative" or to show "compliance" with respect to their administrators. It consists of 11 hypothetical incidents in which a teacher finds himself opposed to the administration; the incidents are based on actual conflicts that have been reported in public education. Here is a sample item from the scale which is reported in full in the Appendix numbered 1h: "The assistant principal told a teacher that he was too "outspoken" in criticizing certain policies of the school, and that this was causing unrest among the faculty members."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Similar items describe an attempt of a principal to determine course contents and methods of teaching, the participation of a teacher in local school board elections against school board rules, efforts of a principal to change a grade given by one of his teachers, efforts of the administration to prohibit the use of a standard textbook because it is "socialistically" inclined, teachers' disapproval of the administration's proposed change of the course of study, a teacher who takes a public stand on the issue of water fluoridation in a community that is divided on the issue, a teacher who refuses to move into the school district where he is teaching, and discrimination against women in a school.

Respondents were asked to imagine themselves in each situation and to indicate (1) what they would do and (2) the sanctions likely to be imposed in their school for failure to comply with the administration's wishes.<sup>8</sup>

A typology of initiative and compliance was formed by comparing each respondent's total scale scores on the two parts; see Table 4-8. The anticipated actions of teachers were labeled, "initiative-taking," "discreet support-seeking," and "compliance-compromising." Each of these is again divided into either "severe" or "moderate" constraint on the basis of responses to the second part of the question concerning the sanctions likely to be imposed for failure to comply. The six types of role behavior identified in this way are listed in Table 8.<sup>9</sup> Since respondents were not asked for their beliefs, but to anticipate their behavior in specific situations, the typology pertains to probable behavior and is not considered to describe general personality traits or personal orientations.

Only 17 per cent of the sample would take extreme measures under conditions of severe restraint (i.e., "rebellious"), and only one in three is either "rebellious" or "contrary." On the other hand, more than one in three teachers would "comply," and almost one in five would comply without the threat of external sanctions (the "submissive" pattern). One-third of the teachers would be more "discreet" and oppose the administration by seeking support of colleagues. The pattern of response provides evidence of the militancy of a substantial proportion of teachers. Since it is

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<sup>8</sup>The format for this questionnaire is based on one designed by Miller and Schull. (Miller and Schull, 1962). Six alternatives, weighted from 1 to 6, are possible for each part; in the first, they range from "compliance" to "quitting the job," and in the second part, from "no disapproval or mild disapproval" of the principal to "dismissal." The split-half reliability of each part is  $r = .74$  and  $r = .78$ , respectively, which are both above  $r_n = .85$  when corrected with the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula. The total respondent scores for each part of the 11 items are internally consistent, using critical ratio and scale value difference methods.

<sup>9</sup>Korber suggested that, as a realistic approach, qualifications should be consecutively added to each situation for independent consideration in such a way that different responses to the same basic situation would provide a continuum (Korber, 1959, pp 48-49). The above scale takes into account the critical condition of the restraint under which an act occurs. -143-

TABLE 4-8

A TYPOLOGY OF INITIATIVE AND COMPLIANCE  
OF PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS

TYPE OF BEHAVIOR PATTERN N = 1432		ANTICIPATED ACTION <sup>a</sup>	PREDICTED CONSTRAINT <sup>b</sup>
I.	Rebellious (17%) <sup>c</sup>	Initiative-taking	Severe
II.	Contrary (17%)	Initiative-taking	None-Moderate
III.	Defiant (17%)	Discreet Support-seeking	Severe
IV.	Cautious (18%)	Discreet Support-seeking	None-Moderate
V.	Realistic (16%)	Compliant-compromising	Severe
VI.	Submissive (16%)	Compliant-compromising	None-Moderate

<sup>a</sup>The labels for anticipated action are based on responses to the question, "What would you do in the situation described above?"

Initiative--ask for an investigation by a professional organization; or, refuse to comply with request; or, quit the job.

Discreet support-seeking--seek support of colleagues.

Compliant-compromising--comply with superior's request; or, try to compromise.

<sup>b</sup>The labels for predicted constraint are based on responses to the question, "What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request?"

Severe constraint--loss of deserved promotion or salary increase; or, transferred to less desirable position; or, dismissed from the school system.

None-moderate constraint--no disapproval or mild disapproval from the principal; or, loss of reputation.

<sup>c</sup>Figures in parentheses indicate the proportion of 1432 public high school teachers, for whom information was available, whose responses placed them in each cell.

typically a small minority that spearheads militant movements, the fact that nearly one in five teachers is rebellious is of some significance.

### Localism and Cosmopolitanism

A favorite sociological distinction between locals and cosmopolitans is relevant to the study's theme. The potential significance of these concepts was outlined in a small batch of articles a few years ago by Merton, Gouldner, Hughes, and Rossi, Reisman, and others. The local is parochial, being closely identified with his home community and its institutions' problems and interests. The cosmopolitan, by contrast, is a product of a variety of locations and situations and not as closely identified with his present community as with broader regional, national, and world-wide interests.

Unfortunately, these concepts are still gross in definition and crude in application. They have been defined so extensively, i.e., including such a variety of behavior that there is little left for hypotheses. So much meaning has been packed into the definitions that a researcher has a difficult time in distinguishing between the way the concept is being defined and with what it is supposed to be empirically associated.

These concepts are easily confused and sometimes implicitly interchanged with the professional-employee dichotomy. Gouldner, for example, finds that a college faculty's "commitment to skills," a professional characteristic so closely associated with elements of cosmopolitanism (Gouldner, 1957-58), that compared with locals, cosmopolitans desired lighter teaching loads in order to do research and to write, would more readily leave the college, knew fewer faculty members, were less opposed to AAUP intervention in college affairs, received more intellectual stimulation from sources outside the college, and considered salaries to be low. It is useful, however, to distinguish between cosmopolitanism and professionalism. The local-cosmopolitan concepts are more inclusive, including elements other than professional and employee notions. A cosmopolitan, for example, might rely on national clubs, opinion leaders or national

TABLE 4-9

LOCAL AND COSMOPOLITAN  
BEHAVIORAL INDICES

Item	Local	Cosmopolitan
1. Number of years in system*	9 or more years	1 - 8 years
2. Number of other systems worked in*	0 - 1	2 or more
3. Location of college compared to place of work	Same county or same state	From another state
4. Have lived in the present county prior to employment	Yes	No
5. Have held office in a local* community organization (in the present community only)	Yes	No

\*These items may incorporate an age bias. Younger persons are less likely to qualify as locals on the first criteria and perhaps more likely to qualify on the second one.

news magazines; none of which is strictly connected with professionalism. At the same time, a person can be oriented to local organizations other than the employing one, even some in conflict with his parent organization.

The confusion is compounded by the failure of many writers to distinguish between the normative and the behavioral dimensions of the concepts. The concepts themselves originally evolved from reference group-theory which is premised on the tendency of people to rely on the judgments of certain groups for their own standards of conduct. The terms cosmopolitanism and localism, then, distinguish between personal orientations that stem from different frames of reference. However, these orientations could easily be translated into standards of conduct, such as geographical mobility and reading habits.

Indices. Five behavioral indices were used to distinguish local from cosmopolitan teachers (see Table 4-9). Each teacher was assigned a total score representing the number of times he qualified on each of them.

The behavioral index was supplemented with a simple index of corresponding orientations. Respondents were asked to assume that there had been a disagreement within the school district about building a new school to accommodate the gifted children in the system, and to rank the importance of certain reference groups to whom they might look for guidance in making their decision. Persons who were considered to be locally oriented, rank one of the following as first: teachers or administrators in the same school, the local school board, or local parental groups. If their first choice was one of the next best, they were considered to have cosmopolitan orientations: state or national teachers' organizations, colleagues met through conferences, workshops or conventions, university professors, the U.S. Office of Education, or State Departments of Education. The two most frequently chosen reference groups were both local; administrators in the system were chosen by 19 per

cent and teachers in the local school were chosen by 15 per cent. The most frequently chosen in cosmopolitan orientation was professional colleagues met at conferences (chosen by 9 per cent); even more teachers chose the local school board (11.8 per cent).

### RELATIONAL MEASURES

In one sense all sociological variables imply relationships. However, in the case of personal orientations, the relationships are viewed from the perspectives of the persons involved. At the other extreme, the significance of structural variables depends upon the pattern formed by relationships between pairs of members. Relational properties cannot be completely derived either from the personal characteristics of the parties involved or from the official structure. Since individuals enter into a relationship and their personal predispositions can influence it the relationship itself is not equivalent to the sum of the personalities involved. It is a separate property of organization, although not necessarily an officially sanctioned one.<sup>10</sup> Four types of relational properties have received attention in this study: informal leadership, sociometric status, prestige and esteem, and supervisory practices.

#### Informal Leadership

Several questionnaire items were used to identify the "informal leaders" of each school.

Influence. First, each respondent was asked to recall three teachers in his school whose ideas and opinions seem to have received the most support from other teachers over the past year. Second, each was asked to name teachers with whom he has consulted most frequently, since the beginning of the school year, for advice

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<sup>10</sup>A more complex case develops when personal characteristics, such as race, become the basis of relationships which are in turn enforced through official sanctions, such as the threat of dismissal. In such cases, a relational property becomes part of the formal structure.

about a problem in connection with classroom teaching. Finally, office holders in professions, unions, or community organizations provided an independent criterion of leadership.

In the first year sample, a linear correlation was found between the number of times a person was mentioned as having been consulted by other teachers and the number of times he was mentioned as having received the most support from other teachers ( $r = .40$ ). While the relationship between these measures was not high, one can be fairly confident that the persons mentioned most frequently in either measure do exercise leadership.

Of the 91 officers in professions, unions and community organizations identified during the first year, 57 per cent were mentioned at least once as having been consulted, and 53 per cent were mentioned at least once as having received the most support. Of 50 officers in professional organizations, 64 per cent were mentioned at least once as having the most support; 20 per cent of them were not identified by either index. Excluding officers not "validated" as informal leaders by either measure, 71 per cent of the remaining 73 leaders were identified by the consultation index and 65 per cent were mentioned as having the most support.

It can be concluded that each of these indices does a good job of identifying those persons who exert some leadership. The overlap between the first two indices and the external criterion of holding office suggests that they are each measuring some common basis of informal leadership and that they are in this sense "valid."

Sociometric Structure. Weiss and Jacobson developed a complex matrix analysis for identifying the structure of work groups in organizations (Weiss and Jacobson, 1955). On the basis of respondents' identifications of their co-workers, members were separated into work groups, with some of them tentatively identified as liaison

persons between groups or isolates. The structure of two major units of an organization (the administrative and the operating divisions) differed with respect in the size of the work groups, the extent of contact among work groups, the methods of coordinating groups, and the structure of the executive group. It was possible to relate the structural differences to the varied goals of the divisions.

It would be a formidable task, however, to apply the matrix analysis method simultaneously to 28 organizations, so in the first year study, three simple procedures were used to identify the clique structure of schools. As one estimate of friendship patterns, teachers were requested to name their three best friends at school. The number of nominations received by an individual was compared to a measure of his "popularity," based on the frequency that others reported seeing him socially outside of work (rated on a five-point scale ranging from "very often" to "not at all"). When respondents were classified in four categories on both of the measures, there was only a crude relationship shown between the two measures; but there was consensus on the extreme groups.

Finally, respondents reported on the frequency they normally lunched with every other member of the school (ranging from "very frequently" to "not at all"). Responses were weighted from 1 to 5 and then averaged for each respondent. School averages were obtained by multiplying each weight by the number of respondents receiving it, and dividing it by the number of respondents.

Esteem. A teacher's esteem was tabulated from the number of times he was nominated by other respondents as one of three teachers in the school whose ideas about public education are most respected. The correlation in the first year study between this measure and the number of nominations for the most support from other teachers was  $r = .50$ . The results of this simple index were compared to a more systematic procedure that requested respondents to rate one another on a five-point scale on the

degree of respect they command. Although the number of nominations received did not appear to be effective for rank-ordering respondents below the upper extreme, this simple measure seemed to be a reasonably accurate means of identifying the sma proportion of teachers in a school who are most highly respected.

#### Supervisory Practices

Halpin (1956) developed two scales to assess the supervisory patterns of 50 Ohio school superintendents. One scale measures "initiating structure," or how wel the leader delineates patterns of organization, how clearly he defines the channels of communication, and the clarity of his methods and procedures. The "consideration scale measures the degree of friendship, mutual trust, and the respect between a leader and the members of his staff. Although school boards, staff members and the superintendents themselves believed that effective leaders emphasize both considera tion and initiating structure, superintendents did not live up to this ideal. Only 19 were described by their staffs as being high on both measures, and eight were de- scribed as low on both characteristics.

In a later study Halpin and Croft (1962) designed a 64-item questionnaire to characterize the "climates" of 71 elementary schools located in six regions of the country. On the basis of a factor analysis, the questionnaire was divided into eig sub-scales, four pertaining to characteristics of the group and four pertaining to characteristics of the leader. Only the group characteristics are relevant here; they include the following (an example of an item in the scale is also given below)

- (a) Disengagement--i.e., "A minority always opposes the majority"
- (b) Hindrance--i.e., "Routine duties interfere with the job of teaching"
- (c) Esprit--i.e., "The morale of teachers is high"
- (d) Intimacy--i.e., "Teachers' closest friends are other faculty members at the school"

Six organizational climates were identified along a continuum defined as open at one end and as closed at the other. The closed climate was characterized by a high degree of functional rigidity. The open climate depicts a situation in which members enjoy extremely high spirit, where teachers work well together without bickering and griping (i.e., low disengagement), where there is low hindrance to the accomplishment of their tasks, and where there are friendly relations toward one another (high intimacy); The principal sets an example by working hard himself (high thrust), gives high consideration to the teachers, is not aloof, and does not have to emphasize production. Although the open climate was considered to be the most desirable, only 17 of the 77 schools represented this type.

For the present study, a crude index of supervisory relationships was developed from teachers' reactions to a series of five negative and nine positive statements drawn from Halpin's Leadership Behavior Questionnaire which describes the behavior of a principal--e.g., "He acts without consulting his staff"; "He is one of the most competent educators in the school system"; "He is usually able to secure what the faculty wants from higher administration"; "He refuses to explain his actions to anyone". Schools were ranked on the average number of positive and negative statements agreed to by their faculties. The number of positive statements was associated with a faculty's employee orientation ( $t = .34$ ), but it was even more closely associated with its level of employee behavior ( $t = .66$ ); it was not highly associated with their professional orientations ( $t = .17n.s.$ ) (Table 4-10), although there was a clearer tendency for professionally acting faculties to show respect ( $t = .25$ ). On the other hand, there seemed to be little relationship between either the professionalism or the employeeism of a faculty and a principal's average evaluation of his individual teachers on utilization of work procedures, loyalty to the organization, and loyalty to the administration (using a five-point scale rating from excellent to poor).

TABLE 4-10

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN A SCHOOL'S LEVEL OF PROFESSIONALISM AND  
EMPLOYEEISM AND RECIPROCAL EVALUATIONS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND FACULTY  
(N = 28)

RANK OF SCHOOLS ON PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE ORIENTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR	RANK ON AVERAGE FACULTY EVALUATIONS OF PRINCIPAL (N=28)	PRINCIPAL'S <sup>1</sup> AVERAGE EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL FACULTY MEMBERS		
	Average Number of Positive Statements tau	Utilization of Work Procedures tau	Loyalty to Organization tau	Loyalty to Administration tau
Professional				
Orientation	.17	.15	.06	.04
Behavior <sup>1</sup>	.25*	-.16	-.11	.06
Employee				
Orientation	.34*	-.08	-.02	-.04
Behavior	.66**	-.11	-.05	.07

<sup>1</sup>Average number of times schools score on respective indices.

\* Rank order correlation among schools significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank order correlation among schools significant at  $p \leq .01$

As a more comprehensive measure of the amount of close supervision of teachers and the surveillance of a school by central-office administrators, a Guttman quasi-scale was constructed from 14 items answered by principals and teachers. The questions pertained to: the number of classroom observations normally made by administrators, as well as the nature of follow up and consultation afterwards; whether or not permission must be obtained to discuss controversial issues; the amount of supervision by the central office, including the frequency of the superintendent's visits to the school plus the number of reports required by the central office; and the

fairness and accuracy reported by teachers of their administrator's evaluations of them (see Appendix 1F). The quasi-scale's coefficient of reproducibility is .85 (which is below the desired .90) and its minimal marginal reproducibility is .71.<sup>11</sup>

### DISTRIBUTIONAL MEASURES

All of the personal orientation and behavioral measures so far described can be converted into organizational properties by computing their distributions for each organization. Schools can be classified according to their average professionalism or the range of their employee behavior scores, for example. In addition, several measures were developed exclusively as distribution properties.

#### Indices of Conflict Rates

A variety of methods have been used to study organizational conflict. One study relied on the judgments of an organization's members concerning the overall "tension" in the organization (Zald, 1962); Lazarsfeld and Theilens (1958) used the number of incidents involving academic freedom reported by professors; Haas (1963) recorded incidents as they arose in hospital work groups. Flanagan (1954) has used the critical incident technique to infer the state of relations in school systems. An attempt to measure "authority conflict" specifically in the public schools was reported by Anderson (1964), who surveyed teachers of English, science and industrial arts in a stratified sample of 10 junior high schools. A 15-item scale was developed having a split-half reliability of  $r = .67$ . Average correlations among the items ranged from .01 to .61. The index was based on the degree of teacher satisfaction with such diverse considerations as administrative backing and recognition of teachers, class assignments, transfer requests, faculty room and dining room provisions, and the teachers' attitudes toward collective bargaining and union membership.

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<sup>11</sup>The program used was written by the Health Services Computing Facility, UCLA. Twelve variables eventually were dichotomized (scored 1 and 7, respectively) and two were trichotomized. The schools were ranked according to the Cornell technique on the bases of scale patterns. Their scores ranged from 66 to 74.

Questionnaire Measures. For the present study, several indices of organizational tension and conflict were developed from both questionnaire data and interviews. Each respondent was given a checklist containing the names of every faculty member and administrator in the school. They were asked to indicate with a check mark the colleagues with whom they had had a disagreement during the year and to indicate whether it was moderate or severe. The schools were ranked on the proportion of the faculty involved in disagreements; moderate and severe disagreements were also considered separately.

Also included in the questionnaires was a measure of global tension based on responses to a question asking respondents to estimate, "How much tension?" exists between each of 12 types of role partners in the school (e.g., teacher-administrative role, teacher-teacher role, etc.). The alternatives--severe, moderate, slight and none--were weighted from 4 to 1. Means were computed for each school on total tension, and tension between teachers and administrators, other teachers, and students, and ranked on that basis.

Interview Measures. Specific conflict incidents were described in tape-recorded interviews with teachers and administrators. They were asked to describe any "difficulties, problems, friction incidents or disputes," involving themselves or other members of the faculty that had occurred during the academic year or in the recent past. An "incident" is defined as a description of a discrete episode in which a verbal attack or criticism was made against a teacher, group of teachers, or the school as a whole. A single episode was counted as one incident, regardless of the number of teachers involved in it or the number of times it was mentioned by different teachers. Each incident was classified in several ways by three of the graduate students responsible for the interviewing.<sup>12</sup> Its form was categorized as one of the following:

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<sup>12</sup>The study is indebted to Mr. Frederick Brechler, Mr. Layton Thomas, and Mrs. Sandra Sletto Swisher.

1. Complaint

- (a) General complaint (e.g., "I don't like the way things are run here.")
- (b) Complaints against a specific group or individual.
- (c) Complaints about policy.

2. Overt Incidents

- (a) Open dispute between two people.
- (b) Dispute among three or more people, usually involving an administrator.
- (c) One heated discussion.
- (d) Two or more heated discussions.
- (e) A major incident--one involving others in addition to the initial parties (usually a substantial segment of the organization and members of the community) in a heated dispute.

3. Impersonal Competition--not involving face-to-face confrontation but involving known tension between two or more parties due to their opposing positions or ideas.

The general content of each incident was classified into one of the six general categories; these in turn were divided into a total of 26 subcategories as listed below:

Authority Problems--Control over curriculum and classroom work, control over general school policy, competition for official authority and for social prestige, chain-of-command problems, incongruity among status, overlapping authority problems, insubordination, supervision problems, and misuse of authority.

Activity Problems--Distribution of teaching assignments and other duties, the scheduling of shared facilities and of students, problems involving enforcement of rules, lack of policy, problems involving change, and problems involving the distribution of rewards.

Personal Interaction and Communication Problems--Problems involving the official system of communication, social isolation and socializing problems among members of a school, methods of communication, and school-community problems.

Valence-Sentiment Problems--Problems involving alienation, lack of cooperation, and personality clashes.

School Finances and Facilities--Problems involving lack of money, school bond failures, shortages of faculty, etc.

Value Conflicts--Problems of moral and religious impropriety, economic and racial bias, appropriateness of disciplinary measures, etc.

School Philosophy--Differences of opinion about philosophy of education, general objectives, general merit of different programs, etc.

The categories were refined even further, so that 306 specific conflict-types were identified.

Each incident was also classified according to the parties involved: e.g., teachers vs. administrators, teacher union vs. state professional associations, etc. And finally, consideration was given to several other factors, including reactions of the parties, disposition and resolution of the issues, and who won or lost.

The general indices of organizational conflict that have been adopted are based on the number of each type of incident reported per interview. For convenience, the number of each type of incident reported per interview will be referred to as an incident ratio. For most analyses, the following incident ratios were used: the gross number of incidents reported after complaints were deducted from the total; the dispute ratio; the major incident ratio; the ratio of incidents involving authority issues; and the teacher-administrator incident ratio.

Corroboration. During the first year study very few incidents (10 per cent) were corroborated, in the sense that two or more respondents described the same particulars:

however, in the interest of collecting a large variety of incidents, respondents were not asked specifically to do so. Since the proportion of incidents corroborated in a school is partially a simple function of the proportion of staff interviewed, many noncorroborated incidents could be attributed to small samples rather than to distorted reports. Also, many of the incidents not directly corroborated were mentioned by "reliable" respondents, i.e., those mentioning a corroborated incident. Nearly half of the incidents in the first year study were either corroborated or reported by reliable respondents. The frequency with which validated, reliable, and nonvalidated, nonreliable types of issues were mentioned was not significantly different as tested by "chi square". Moreover, there was convergence in each school on the frequency with which certain types of incidents were mentioned: if a high proportion of overt disputes at a school, for example, involved disproportionate pay for certain teachers or administrators, then a high proportion of respondents were also likely to have reported a general complaint about this kind of problem even if they could not describe the specific disputes involved.

Consistency Among Measures. The measures were compared with one another for consistency. Generally speaking, each of the questionnaire-measures of disagreement and organizational tension was correlated with several of the measures derived from the interviews. However, none of the rank order correlations among the 28 schools was higher than  $t = .38$ , although many of them were statistically significant. The correlations between disagreement rates and organizational tension and the number of conflicts, complaints, and competitive relations reported per interview ranged between  $t = .23$  and  $t = .31$ .<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>The correlations for individuals tended to be higher, ranging from  $r = .52$  to  $.78$ .

All of the measures of severe, moderate and the total disagreement from the questionnaire correlated with the dispute ratios calculated from interview data ( $t = .34$ ,  $t = .37$ , and  $t = .38$ , respectively). The total disagreement rate also correlated with impersonal competition ( $t = .33$ ) and was significantly correlated with both the ratio of conflicts reported among teachers ( $t = .32$ ) and between the teachers and administrators ( $t = .26$ ); it also was associated with both authority conflict ( $t = .30$ ) and with conflict involving the distribution of special rewards ( $t = .26$ ). The authority ratio, in fact, was associated with all the measures of disagreement and organizational tension. By comparison, neither scheduling and distribution problems nor those involving structural reinforcement were correlated with any of the disagreement rates or organizational tension; the distribution of rewards was correlated only with total rates of disagreement and total organizational tension.

The rate of severe disagreement was significantly correlated with the number of teacher-administrator conflicts reported per interview, but not with conflict among teachers. Similarly, this measure was correlated with the authority conflict ratio ( $t = .30$ ), but not with other types of conflicts. The fact that the rate of severe disagreement correlated no more highly with the ratio of disputes ( $t = .34$ ) than with the heated discussions or major incidents seems to indicate that the respondents (who classified the disagreements themselves), were not using as stringent criteria to classify severe conflicts as used by the research team.

The major incident ratio was not significantly associated with severe disagreements among teachers, and, in fact, it was negatively associated with their total disagreement rate. This negative direction in the relationship is perhaps easier to understand in view of the fact that major incidents were positively correlated with tension with the principal ( $t = .31$ ). Major incidents, in other words, are more indicative of problems between teachers and administrators than of problems arising among teachers themselves.

Tension with the principal was also higher in schools where proportionately more personal complaints were mentioned by the interviewees ( $t = .22$ ), where there were proportionately more heated discussions ( $t = .24$ ), and where there was less impersonal competition ( $t = -.26$ ). Tension between principals and teachers was associated with authority problems ( $t = .28$ ) rather than with either scheduling or distribution problems. It can also be noted that total organizational tension was more closely associated with authority problems ( $t = .31$ ) than with either the distribution of rewards ( $t = .21$ ) or with scheduling and distribution problems ( $t = .02$ ).

Although it would perhaps be desirable if the correlations between the questionnaire and interview measures were higher in order to demonstrate the reliability and validity of the procedures, in view of the two diverse procedures used to gather the data, it is notable that they are correlated. For, while both procedures are perhaps associated with common problems, they are necessarily tapping somewhat different dimensions of them. The interviews, which included only a sample of the faculty, were intended to be selective in a broad range of the more salient conflicts, complaints and impersonal relations in schools--those which teachers had heard about as well as their own. The questionnaire, on the other hand, solicited the minor disagreements as well as the more significant ones from the vast majority of teachers on every faculty. Therefore, in comparison to the interviews, which provide an index of only the more salient conflicts known throughout the organization, this measure is much more sensitive to the full range including the trivial and private disputes among individuals. To the extent that disagreement rates primarily concern open discussions among teachers, the interviews can be expected to have ascertained only a limited sample of the total range.

In summary then, measures based on questionnaires and on interviews appear to be tapping different dimensions of conflict. The relatively modest positive correlation coefficients are adequate enough to demonstrate that the measures are related to some

common dimension, but they warn against treating the measures interchangeably.

Coder Reliability. The reliability between the two persons who coded the interviews was also checked. As a rule, they first worked independently and then rechecked each other's work, discussing their points of disagreement until they reached a joint conclusion. Often the coder who had interviewed in the school could add points of clarification. As mentioned, each incident was first coded into one of six general categories and then into one of several subcategories within it; and finally it was coded, according to its specific content, into one of 306 categories. This was a difficult task. Frequently, the information available was incomplete; statements were vague or their implications unknown; and at times it seemed more desirable to force an incident into the available categories than to continually elaborate them. Furthermore, some conflicts had so many ramifications that it was difficult to determine which of their several possible dimensions was primary.

Nevertheless, there was agreement between the interviewers on their classification of content. Since the general and subcategories are automatically defined once the specific content has been determined (but not the reverse), their ability to agree on the specific classifications is the most stringent test of intercoder reliability. Using a stratified random sample of 172 incidents from the 28 schools, the two coders, working independently, agreed on 87 per cent of the incidents when they were re-examined. Ten per cent of these agreements, curiously, differed from the original coding, however, leaving a total consensus of 77 per cent between the two coders on the first and second coding of 306 specific categories. The agreement on reclassification of the form of conflict was lower, only 68 per cent.

Considering the fact that for most purposes the specific categories were combined and enlarged, and assuming that most of the disagreement occurred within the broad categories rather than between them, the coding reliability seems reasonably satisfactory.

An Index of Heterogeneity

A variety of "latent" roles and value systems are present in most organizations, brought in with different social backgrounds, experiences and training of their members. A simple profile of heterogeneity for each school was constructed by dichotomizing 13 background characteristics and computing the ratio of faculty members in each category. A school's total score is the sum of these ratios. Subtotals were computed in the same way for local and cosmopolitan characteristics included in the index. The total index consists of the sum of the ratios of faculty members on the following characteristics:

TABLE 4-11  
THE HETEROGENEITY INDEX

CRITERIA OF HETEROGENEITY	TOTAL RATIO (28 SCHOOLS) COMBINED
1. Sex Ratio: (Male/Female)	1.51
2. Age Ratio: (Under 30/Over 45)	1.05
3. Marital Status Ratio: (Single/Married)	.27
4. Urban Background: (Graduated in a city of under 10,000/Graduated in a city over 10,000)	.82
5. Mobility Ratio: (No. of jobs/Years of Experience)	.10
6. Staff Expansion and Turnover Ratio: (Number hired in past two years/Faculty size in past two years)	.34
7. Education Ratio: (M.A. or better/B.A. or less)	.69
8. Ratio of Activity in Teacher Organizations: (Union/OEA)	.08
9. Ratio of Number of years in the System: (Over 9 years/Under 9 years)	.74
10. Ratio of Previous Residence in County Where Now Teaching: (Yes/No)	1.02
11. Ratio of Office Holders in Community Organizations: (Yes/No)	.43
12. Ratio of Number of Systems Taught in: (1 or less/2 or more)	2.17
13. Ratio of Those Attended College in the Same State Where Teaching: (Yes/No)	3.18
Total Index (Sum of the above ratios)	12.40
Sub Total Local Cosmopolitan	7.54

The heterogeneity indices for the various schools ranged from 10.7 to 22.7. For most of the schools, the main contributing factors were the location of the college attended, number of systems taught in, sex and age ratios, and place of residence.

#### PROPERTIES OF THE FORMAL STRUCTURE

The outstanding feature of formal structure is that it is relatively uninfluenced by particular members of the organization, and hence cannot be directly derived from either personal characteristics or combinations of them. Although integral properties of organization have a fundamental bearing on all relationships, they can be distinguished from relational properties by the fact that they are subject to relatively severe official sanctions (including a legal process and dismissal procedures), and they are relatively more stable, often capable of enduring complete replacements of personnel. In practice, whether a characteristic like standardization is a formal system property or whether it is a reflection of a few authoritarian administrators who have been in power for a long time may not be immediately apparent. One test is the uniformity of practices between organizations with similar structures. Another is how personnel turnover effects an organization's continuity; the difference between formal and informal properties, in fact, can be viewed as a variable and conveniently measured as a ratio of stability versus change that occurs with turnover.

Hemphill's work (1956) is one of the most diligent efforts to measure organizational variables. Although his monograph was published a decade ago, the fact that it remains one of the most advanced statements to date is a disconcerting indication of the languid pace at which methodology in this field has progressed. A questionnaire consisting of 150 Likert-type statements was used to measure 13 group dimensions: autonomy from other groups, control over members, flexibility (or informality of procedures), hedonic tone (or satisfaction and agreeableness of members in the group),

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homogeneity of members' backgrounds, intimacy (or personal relations), participation in the group, permeability (or the accessibility of the group to new members), polarization of goals, potency (or the salience of the group to its members), stability of the group over time, stratification and viscosity (or consensus and the absence of conflict). Intercorrelations among the various dimensions were relatively small, although control and autonomy scores were more highly correlated in a negative direction ( $r = -.55$ ). The questionnaire items were generalized enough so that the instrument could be applied to a variety of voluntary associations, a college, office workers, and to high school teachers.<sup>14</sup> A profile of group dimensions, based on the average responses of all group members, describes the group as it appears to them. These profiles provide a basis for classifying groups and organizations in terms of the relative stress placed on each characteristic.

Hall (1963) devised similar measures of several organizational variables. Using 82 global Likert-type statements which were answered by organization members, six scales were then devised and applied to 10 organizations. Scale reliabilities ranged from .80 to .90. Examples of some of the items for each type of scale included:

1. Hierarchy of authority scale--"A person can make his own decisions without checking with anyone else."
2. Division of labor scale--"Everyone has a specific job to do."
3. Rules for incumbent scale--"The employees are constantly being checked on rule violations."
4. Procedural specifications--"Going through the proper channels is consistently stressed."

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<sup>14</sup>The school was described by teachers as relatively autonomous, stable, and exercising moderately high control over the conduct of its teachers, but had little emphasis on stratification, had less intimacy than the standard population, had a heterogeneous membership that was difficult to join, was important to the group, and did require considerable participation.

5. Impersonality scale--"The organization does not encourage employee parties."
6. Technical competency--"Promotions are based entirely on how well a person does his job."

A few of Hall's items were modified for use in the professional and employee scales developed for this study.

The difficulty with this approach is that universality is achieved by using such highly abstract statements. Requesting a respondent to estimate aggregative characteristics (such as how much authority the faculty has) is more removed from his usual perceptions and experiences than, for example, asking him whether or not he uses his own textbook. This places the burden of generalization on the respondent. The fact that the investigator has virtually no knowledge of the specific incidents on which respondents have based their conclusions raises doubts about the standards of comparison, the interpretation, and the meaning of the concepts. Nevertheless, in view of the universality of such a procedure, it can be used profitably if interpreted with discretion. Moreover, MacKay (1964) found that although staff members of schools desired more bureaucratization, their observations of particular schools were not related to their desire for bureaucratic characteristics. Also, no evidence was found of any relationship between a person's hierarchical position in the school and his perception of bureaucratization. The fact that teachers and administrators agree on what they see may indicate that bureaucracy impinges on administrators and teachers in similar ways.

A College Characteristics Index was constructed by Stern (1963) from 300 true-false statements concerning college environments that was answered by respondents. The statements, somewhat more specific and immediately observable than those used by Hemphill or Hall, were organized into ten-item scales. The scale describing the amount of order in a college, for example, contains items such as "Faculty members

and administration have definite and clearly posted hours," or "Professors usually take attendance in class." Respondents were asked to consider whether or not each statement was generally characteristic of the college, or if it was something which might occur. Particular scales measure abasement, achievement, change-sameness, exhibitionism, narcissism, scientism, sex, sucor, autonomy, and understanding. The problem with this particular index is that since most of the scales were designed to correspond to personal needs, they are not necessarily directly relevant to a theory of organizational structure. Implicitly, organization is modeled after personality structure; and as a result the index probably does not tap the most significant structural characteristics. Attention will now be turned to the structural measures developed for the present study.

#### Indices of Centralization

Centralization of authority, like several of the other concepts employed in the study, is complex and difficult to assess with the simple indices that can be employed within the scope of this study. Previous studies, however, have provided some clues. Tannenbaum devised a profile, based on the descriptions of an organization's members, describing the level at which certain types of decisions normally are made. A "control graph" was constructed that described the pattern of control. The number of levels of authority, the amount of control exercised by each level, and the total amount of control exercised throughout the system portrayed a complex picture of organizations (Tannenbaum, 1961).

An instrument was developed for the present study to assess the level of authority at which major policy decisions are made. Respondents were asked to indicate (a) who should have the final authority to approve each of 32 types of decisions, and (b) who actually does approve each decision, with these possible alternatives: the individual teachers involved, the teaching faculty, the principal in consultation with teachers or with an appointed committee, the principal, the superintendent, school board

members, or the State Department of Education ( see Appendix 1d).

In the pretest, the responses of the most professionally oriented teachers in the sample were compared with the least professional extreme (i.e., the groups used to validate the scales). Those decisions on which there was a significant difference between the validating groups have been labeled "professional policy decisions"; they are primarily decisions which directly affect classroom work, such as assignment of material, supplementary reading matter, etc. The remaining decisions were labeled "professionally nonrelevant policy decisions" because they pertain more to broader spheres of the school or the system, such as hiring and promoting teachers and adding or dropping a program of courses.

Once the items were classified, the descriptive parts were scrutinized for their power to discriminate among the schools. Statements were omitted if there was little disagreement. In the remaining items, it was assumed that the proportion of teachers who indicated that a specific decision was made at a particular level reflected the actual frequency at which they are made there.

The levels of authority were weighted from 1 (for the individual teachers involved) to 7 (the State Department of Education), and the weights multiplied by the number of respondents identifying each level. The mean position of each school was computed for each part of the instrument. The two parts of the decision-making scale, the professional and the nonprofessional items, are significantly correlated ( $t = .45$ ).

As a third measure, teachers were asked about their authority to make the day-to-day routine decisions that arise in the course of teaching. This measure was based on three global items in the descriptive part of the professional scale pertaining to decision-making:

1. At my school, teachers are allowed to make their own decisions about problems that come up in the classroom.

2. At my school, small matters need not be referred higher up for final answer.
3. At my school, the ultimate authority over the major educational decisions is exercised by professional teachers.

Responses were weighted from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree), and averaged for each school. The correlations of this measure with centralization of nonprofessional and professional policies were inconsequential; the measure obviously concerns a different dimension of the decision-making structure.<sup>15</sup>

The autonomy of a faculty was also calculated using the average frequency with which faculty members reported consulting the administration about decisions concerning their classroom work. Faculties have less autonomy in schools with higher rates of consultation per teacher. Finally, teachers and principals were asked to estimate the number of levels of authority in the school and in the system as an index of the formal hierarchy.

### Standardization

Standardization is also a complex concept, which is one reason, perhaps, that few reliable measures of this concept are available. Anderson's (1964) "Index of impersonality in teacher-student relations" has reference to the standardized treatment of students by teachers. His scale is based on questions of how work is assigned, use of personal conferences, and criteria of evaluation. His "departmental rules scale," on the other hand, is more similar to the one developed for this study; it inquires about the authority of teachers to choose lesson plans and curriculum guides, their role in

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<sup>15</sup>Such measures, it should be noted, are based on the questionable assumptions that the proportion of members who agree with a statement reflects the existing "amount" of the variable in question, and that the majority's estimate is the most accurate estimate. The procedure, at times, also makes heavy demands on respondents when they are asked to estimate aggregative characteristics of the entire faculty (such as whether or not faculty opinion usually reflects that of the administration (Leonard, 1959).

preparing them, the procedures used to select textbooks, and the rules regulating discussion of controversial topics, grading students and assigning homework. The reliability of this scale, however, was only .22, with intercorrelation among the items ranging from .1 to .59.

For the present study, a Guttman quasi-scale was developed consisting of 15 questions answered by the principal and teachers of each school. The questions included in the scale pertain to the amount of discretion permitted in lesson plans, the role of teachers in their preparation, teachers' authority to choose textbooks, and their options over the use of texts (see Appendix 1G). The scale achieved a coefficient of reproducibility of .84 and a marginal reproducibility of .74. The scale scores of each school (rather than the scale ranks) were used to rank the schools.<sup>16</sup> This measure, therefore, will be referred to as an index. Its utility is also qualified by the fact that it cannot be applied to the seven schools in the first year study because some required information was not available.

This measure was supplemented with the rules sub-scale taken from the descriptive part of the employee status scale. The rules sub-scale consists of these statements:

1. Nearly all teachers at my school are completely familiar with the written descriptions of the rules, procedures, manuals and other standard operating procedures necessary for running the classroom.
2. The school has a manual of rules and regulations which are actually followed.

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<sup>16</sup>This was a pragmatic decision based on the fact that scale scores were more consistently associated with the dependent variables than the scale ranks. The program used was written by the Health Services Computing Facility, U.C.L.A. Fourteen items eventually were dichotomized (having scores 1 and 7) and one trichotomized. The scores ranged from 43 to 66.

3. Rules stating when the teachers should arrive and depart from the building are strictly enforced.
4. To prevent confusion and friction among the staff, there is a rule covering almost every problem that might come up at school.
5. There are definite rules specifying topics that are not appropriate for discussion in a classroom.
6. When a controversy arises about the interpretation of school rules, teachers at my school typically do not "stick their necks out" by taking a definite position.

The standardization index shows only a slight and statistically insignificant correlation with the rules sub-scale ( $t = .14$ ). These appear to be largely independent dimensions of standardization.

#### Specialization

The use which an organization makes of its more specialized personnel depends upon both the amount of specialized training required of them and the match between their special training and the jobs to which they are actually assigned. Whether or not teachers are used as specialists was inferred from the proportion of teachers reporting that they are teaching courses in which they have not majored in college, and in which they have neither majored nor minored. These two items will be used as indices of a faculty's level of specialization. The two measures tend to define schools in a similar, though hardly identical way ( $t = .40$ ); although they are measuring related characteristics, neither measure can substitute for the other.

#### Complexity

Specialization in the use of personnel should not be confused by an organization's division of labor. The latter term refers to the number of separate work units in an organization without regard to their position in the chain of command. It is possible

for an organization with an intricate division of work to make little use of any specialized training its personnel may have. In fact, refinements in the division of labor often reduce the level of skill and authority needed by an employee.

Organizational complexity is perhaps the most difficult concept assessed in this study. A Guttman quasi-scale was developed that used 17 variables concerning the number of distinct organizational parts in a school system. The scale items (all but one of which were answered by principals) include: the estimated number of levels of authority in the school and in the system; the estimated number of weeks it would normally take to effect a curriculum change; the number of staff in the school and in the system; the per cent of part-time teachers, clerical personnel and administrators in the system; the number of classes in the school with ability grouping; and the number of separate programs and classes in the school (see Appendix 1E). The coefficient reproducibility is .85 and the minimal marginal reproducibility is .65.<sup>17</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS

Someone has said that one does not need a razor to cut warm butter. If premature rigor is a scientific sin, this study is guiltless. Despite the methodological gymnastics reported in this chapter, the implements fashioned for this study are admittedly crude. But perhaps most of the measures have been pondered sufficiently enough to comfort the reader and to demonstrate that these measures are grossly related to the notions which they are supposed to represent. In most cases, they have been subjected to analyses more rigorous than required for the uses that will be made of them. As a further caution, in most instances the measures will be treated only as bases of

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<sup>17</sup>The program used was written by the Health Services Computing Faculty, U.C.L.A. Fifteen items were dichotomized (having scores 1 and 7) and two trichotomized. The scores ranged from 23 to 101. The schools were ranked according to the Cornell technique.

ordinal measures to rank order schools rather than to calibrate the magnitudes of differences between them. All that can be hoped is that they can support the weight of a short step in the intended direction.

The following popular children's nursery rhyme is an exaggerated portrayal of the nagging concern of this chapter--the problem of how to discriminate between abstract classes of phenomena.

Then I went for some Ziffs. They're exactly like Zuffs,  
But the Ziffs live on cliffs and the Zuffs live on bluffs.  
And, seeing how bluffs are exactly like cliffs,  
It's mighty hard telling the Zuffs from the Ziffs,  
But I know that the egg that I got from the bluffs,  
If it wasn't a Ziff's from the cliffs, was a Zuff's (Dr. Seuss, 1953).

Many elements of organization, on first impression, seem exactly alike. One can only hope that the instruments developed for this research represent an improvement in our ability to discriminate.

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CHAPTER 5

THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK

But the larger the group and the more complex the task it seeks to accomplish, the greater are the pressures to become explicitly organized (Blau and Scott, 1964, p. 7).

**System:** An aggregate of related interests or activities.... Whatever the system, its related character is identified by harmony in operation and the integration of its structure (Fairchild, 1944, p. 315).

A way of looking at society is a way also of not looking at it. The conception of school "systems" and the stress on the "socialization" functions of schools already implies selective perception about their fundamental nature. Dahrendorf writes that, "One of the more unfortunate connotations of the word 'system' is its closure.... There is no getting away from the fact that a system is essentially something that is...self-sufficient, internally consistent and closed to the outside." He concludes by saying, "...it is only a step from thinking about societies in terms of equilibrated systems to asserting that every disturber of the equilibrium, every deviant, is a 'spy'.... The system theory of society comes dangerously close to the conspiracy theory of history..." (Dahrendorf, 1958, p. 121). Before the concept of system can be criticized meaningfully, however, it must be understood much more thoroughly. Upon closer analysis, the system model, of which Dahrendorf so aptly warns, is not one but a variety of models which need to be explicitly identified and assessed against the way organizations actually function.

In general, the functional "theory," or more precisely, model, of organization rests upon the assumption that every organization must provide for certain necessary functions which include the replacement of members, the procurement of goods and services, distribution of functions and rewards, control of members, planning, and the boundary maintenance. A certain amount of control is required in order to fulfill

these functions, and control in turn is then easier to achieve under certain structural arrangements than with others. Centralized decision-making, uniform applications of rules, standard work procedures and close supervision are the basic ingredients of any control system, but there is little known about the way they are arranged in public high schools. This chapter, therefore, will trace out some of the typical structural patterns and consider their implications for alternative models of bureaucracy.

### THREE MODELS OF BUREAUCRACY

The concepts and assumptions that form the models of bureaucracy provide the general guidelines for thinking about the concept. These guidelines, however, support several versions of bureaucracy. In its crudest form, bureaucracy is portrayed as a dichotomous attribute: i.e., an organization is considered either to be bureaucratic or it is not.

Anomie and disorganization, seem to imply that organization and disorganization are distinctly separate processes which must be understood in terms of different concepts. In a more refined version, bureaucracy appears as a complex set of distinct characteristics. In the most advanced interpretation permitted within this general framework, each characteristic of the model forms a separate dimension which is considered to be a variable. At this point, the implications of this general system can veer in several directions.

#### The Reinforcement Model

One derivative is a model that assumes consistency of bureaucratic procedures which could presumably give mutual reinforcement to one another. If it can be assumed that there is a drive for maximum control in organizations, then it is reasonable that when one bureaucratic characteristic is emphasized, all dimensions will then be brought into play in support of one another. For example, decisions made at high levels will

be interpreted uniformly to interchangeable personnel through rules and other standard procedures enforced by close supervision. Triandis (1966) exemplifies this viewpoint when he proposes that, "The taller the organizational structure, the closer the supervision." Nor is the sheer aesthetic appeal from the symmetry of an internally consistent system the only reason for believing that bureaucratic dimensions might be mutually reinforcing. That bureaucratic elements sometimes do seem to propagate one another, is suggested in Gouldner's observation that impersonal rules are used to disguise the element of personal power relations between superiors and subordinates--and hence to partially accommodate the tensions that arise from the close supervision of specialists (Gouldner, 1954).<sup>1</sup>

#### The Independence Model

However, there is some question about whether consistent relationships actually do exist among these dimensions of bureaucracy. Hall (1963), and earlier, Hemphill (1956), reported only low intercorrelations among the bureaucratic characteristics of several organizations. Rather than being mutually reinforcing, the dimensions appeared to be quite independent of one another; in fact, they were so decidedly independent that Hall questioned whether one of the variables was appropriate to the model because it correlated negatively with the other variables. Although he does not provide a systematic rationale to explain the patterns he found, he does suggest that particular configurations of variables may be associated with different types of organizations and their activities--the implication being that some patterns are more rational or effective than others for the performance of particular activities.

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<sup>1</sup>However, it seems equally plausible in this case that the overall tensions would be reduced as effectively if some bureaucraties were relaxed to the same degree that others are stressed.

### The Compensatory Model

This suggestion becomes more meaningful when considered within an alternative framework to the independence model advocated by Hall. One possibility is that the various dimensions of bureaucracy exist in states of tension with each other. Using data on organizations in preindustrial societies, for example, Udy reports that although there are high intercorrelations among some of the variables, the two major dimensions--one of which he identified as "bureaucracy" and the other as "rationality"--are negatively associated, which to him seemed to indicate conflict between the dimensions (Udy, 1959).

The compensatory model also has been attractive to some functionalists, especially to those who have been concerned about the structurally patterned sources of strain in social systems. As Hage points out:

The major theme running through this (his) axiomatic theory is the idea of functional strains, as discussed in the writings of Parsons, Bales, and their associates, or the concept of organizational dilemma, as it is called by Blau and Scott. This means that an increase in one variable results in a decrease in another variable, or that the maximization of one social means results in the minimization of another. Although this dependence of one variable on another is an old idea, the problem is to specify which variables are in opposition, and perhaps more important, why they are (Hage, 1965, p. 296).

This tension-ridden aspect of bureaucracy may be part of a more comprehensive model which will be referred to as the "balance-of-forces," or the compensatory model. In this version, each dimension of bureaucracy is viewed as a means of resolving particular problems that arise because of inadequate control and lack of coordination. Such problems are likely to be aggravated by increases in organizational size, complexity, heterogeneity of membership, turnover and similar disrupting characteristics. From the standpoint of this model, a particular problem might be resolved in a variety of ways; or a single practice may be relevant for resolving several types of problems. The degree of flexibility to choose alternative forms of control is partly dependent upon the nature of the problem itself. The dimensions, rather than

being mutually reinforcing or independent of one another, or in any inherent conflict with one another, are viewed as partially interchangeable and compensatory. In short, organizations seem to substitute one bureaucratic practice for another and then compensate for an emphasis on one bureaucratic practice with a corresponding relaxation of others.

There are at least three reasons why organizations might use substitute measures in order to conserve the total amount of energy that must be expended on control. First is the fact that each bureaucratic practice requires an expenditure of time, energy, and other scarce resources which restrict the organization's ability to make maximum use of the control procedures potentially available. Once resources have been allocated in a particular way (e.g., emphasizing close supervision), the resources available for other alternatives will be limited. The scarcity of resources limits an organization's power to cope simultaneously with equal effectiveness to all of its problems, and forces it to selectively emphasize a few practices applicable to selected problems while neglecting others. Secondly, in some cases those subordinates whom bureaucratic practices are designed to control, are sufficiently loyal and homogeneous or otherwise compliant so that only a minimum of structural control is required; perhaps, too, some administrators will prefer not to assume the increased work loads necessary to implement additional procedures.

Thirdly, it is possible that under some conditions the necessary degree of control can be maintained with only a few effective bureaucratic procedures which themselves do not need reinforcement from other controls. If problems can be solved in a variety of ways and if an organization is free to choose from among available procedures, then there will be a complicated relationship between the type of problem confronted and the form of control used. Rushing expresses this relationship as a social psychological estimate of rewards in relation to costs: "Variation in conditions of

social structure, acting upon the reward-cost balance of individuals in organizations, causes levels of attempted organizational control and types of control strategies to vary" (Rushing, 1966, p. 426).

If bureaucratic procedures must be implemented within the limits of such constraints, then it seems likely that some organizations would tend to concentrate on only certain selected problems and thus would emphasize only one or two relevant forms of control while relaxing other dimensions as compensation. The drive in organizations, in other words, is not always to maximize all the forms of rational control, but in some cases at least, to mobilize only as much control as is necessary to regulate the most disturbing elements. In such cases, the dimensions are likely to be inversely associated.

From this standpoint the reinforcement model can be viewed as a limited case of the compensatory model. That is, bureaucratic practices will be emphasized simultaneously when the means of control used are weak and inherently depend upon supplementary reinforcement or when unusually disruptive problems are confronted.

### Implications

These models need not be viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives. Organizations probably can be found which conform to each model, and within a single organization different models may be applicable to different dimensions. The problem is to identify the conditions under which each model is appropriate.

A model's validity depends upon whether or not it helps to interpret the way organizations function. Therefore, models themselves are not appropriate subjects for research. Rather, they can be regarded simply as convenient constructs, of some use in guiding certain stages of investigation, but which are likely to be supplanted by still more advanced concepts. These models, then, will be used only as tentative guidelines for interpreting the patterns of organization typical to the

public schools in this sample. It should be remembered that these data were drawn from only a handful of organizations (which represent only one type of social organization) and that broader social trends, supply and demand ratios, and interorganizational relationships were not taken into account.

Although schools can be loosely characterized as bureaucratic in both method and intent, the bureaucratization of education has not been either an entirely coherent or a uniform development. It consists of more or less discreet practices related in complex ways. These patterns are complicated further by normal vacillations in the emphasis given to group autonomy and reintegration. A delicate tension exists between the latitude necessary for permitting employees to solve their own problems, and the compelling pressures on them to cooperate and comply to the degree necessary for administrators to maintain control. These internal processes are, in turn, affected by an organization's relationship to its external environment via its recruiting practices. These principles and tensions constitute the four principal dimensions of organization: (1) the division of labor, which segments each echelon laterally and fixes the distribution of work and of resources among specialists; (2) the recruiting pattern, which accounts for the heterogeneity of personnel backgrounds and is symptomatic of disruption caused by turnover; (3) standardized procedures of control, by which uniformity is maintained; and (4) the authority system, which establishes relationships vertically among subordinates and between echelons.

#### SPECIALIZATION AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR

The division of work is a function of a basic characteristic of any organization--its role system. Whereas, the role system is a property of an organization, the term "specialization," in contrast, refers to the level and type of training acquired by employees; the way in which specialists are used is a critical feature of social organization.

### Specialization of Personnel

The relatively high level of a formal education achieved by the typical teacher is one of the unique features of schools. While it is true that in some technical, industrial, or commercial organizations, large proportions of personnel are technically trained or college-educated (with the possible exceptions of law and accounting firms), very few can claim the average of five years of education per employee which the members of this sample have achieved; the least-educated faculty has four and one-half years of education; one school averages are nearly five and one-half years. Over one-third of the sample has an M.A. degree. Not even hospitals surpass these figures; even taking into consideration diploma nurses without college degrees, aids, orderlies, and students. The fact that each teacher attends an average of two professional conferences or workshops a year indicates that they continue their formal education while in service.

About half of their training (90 hours in the median school) is confined to colleges of education, and in one school, the typical teacher has taken only 45 hours of course work outside of Colleges of Education. While it may be debatable that specialized training in Education increases teaching competence, the claims made by educators that teachers have acquired a special type of training for their work do have some merit.

College degrees and specialized training could conceivably encourage teachers to expect a great deal of decision-making authority and responsibility. But some teacher-training institutions may counteract it by emphasizing their obligations as employees and their corresponding dependence for direction upon administrative superiors and laymen. In any event, there is no discernible relationship from the data between a faculty's level of professionalization (as measured by the professional orientation scale described in the preceding chapter) and its average level or type of education.

In addition to taking specialized education courses, most high school teachers have concentrated on a major area of academic work. High schools, however, do not fully utilize this specialized training. About one-third of the teachers in the median school reported teaching courses--at least frequently to occasionally--in areas in which they have not majored. This practice appears to indicate a lack of specialization and thus a low degree of bureaucratization in this respect. Over one-half of the faculty in one school reported this as a frequent practice, although in another the figure is only 13 percent. About 12 percent of these people have at least occasionally taught courses in which they neither majored nor minored in college; in another school the practice involves over one-fourth of the faculty.

This complete disregard for specialized training of any kind is more characteristic of schools with lower salaries ( $t = -.23$ ) and with fewer MA degrees on the faculty ( $t = -.21$ ).<sup>2</sup> Both of these might be considered negative reflections on academic quality. The trend in connection with the practice of assigning teachers to courses in which they have not majored is similar ( $t = -.21$  for both levels of salary and education).

Large organizations are more specialized, i.e., the practice of assigning teachers to courses outside of their majors becomes less frequent as both size of school and size of system increase ( $t = -.29$ ;  $t = -.39$ , respectively); the corresponding correlations for those who have neither majored nor minored in the courses they are teaching are also statistically significant ( $t = -.24$  and  $t = -.27$ , respectively) (see Table 5-1).

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<sup>2</sup> Throughout this chapter the symbol  $t$  refers to the Kendall tau rank order correlation coefficient between two ordinal variables. The corresponding values computed with the Spearman formula are usually higher; e.g., a tau of .30 equals .43 when computed with the Spearman formula for a sample of 28. For an  $N$  of 28 the tau must reach .21 to be statistically significant at the .05 level of probability. The corresponding tau for 21 cases is  $t = .25$ . Where correlations that are not statistically significant are reported in the discussion, they will be identified with an "n.s."

TABLE 5-1

## SPECIALIZATION AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOLS

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	MEASURES OF SPECIALIZATION			
	PROPORTION OF FACULTY WHO HAVE TAUGHT COURSES IN WHICH THEY DID NOT:			
	MAJOR (N = 28)		MAJOR OR MINOR (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Size - Number of Faculty in:</u>				
School	-.29*		-.24*	
School System	-.39**		-.27*	
<u>Centralization</u>				
Number of Levels of Authority (21 Schools)	-.40**	-.07r	-.38**	-.21r
Policy Decision-Making Index:				
Professional Policies	-.02		.08	
Nonprofessional Policies	.08	.05a	.29*	.26a .29p
Routine Decision-Making Authority	.27*		.04	
Rate of Consultation With Administration (Autonomy)	-.13	-.11a	-.28*	-.25a -.25p
<u>Standardization</u>				
Total Index (21 Schools)	-.22	-.05z	-.31*	-.24p
Rules	.01		.05	.14r
Interchangeability	-.02		.00	.04r
<u>Close Supervision</u>	.15		-.02	
<u>Complexity</u>	-.38**		-.31*	-.19p
<u>Heterogeneity</u>	.17		.17	
<u>Staff Additions</u>	.15			

\* Rank Order Correlation  
Significant at  $p < .05$   
\*\* Rank Order Correlation S  
Significant at  $p < .01$

KEY: a - Rules Sub Total  
p - Percent Teaching Courses Not Majored In  
r - Complexity Scale  
z - Levels of Authority Mean (21 Schools)

Disregard for specialization also declines with the complexity of schools as measured by the complexity scale ( $t = -.38$  and  $t = -.31$ , respectively)(Table 1). The reasons are probably due to both the greater technical competence required to operate more elaborately organized systems and to the tendency for jobs in such schools to be duplicated, which permits a specialist to concentrate his time on a specific type of work in a way not possible in smaller schools. Looking at it from another way, since the minimum number of functions that any school is by law required to perform remains constant and must be "covered", even the smallest of schools must maintain a rudimentary division of labor regardless of the number of specialists on the staff. Whether or not specialized training can be utilized is consequently fixed by the number of functions an organization is required to perform, in addition to the availability of specialists. But although specialists are utilized more effectively in larger schools, the fact that the correlations are far from perfect does indicate that some complex schools have difficulty retaining or holding specialists too; some small schools, on the other hand, appear to have found ways of overcoming their handicaps.

According to the compensatory model, other bureaucratic characteristics would compensate for low specialization, whereas the reinforcement model would lead one to expect that less specialized schools would not be highly bureaucratic in other respects, either. The data indicate that the more specialized schools also are more standardized, in support of the reinforcement model; but the fact that they are less centralized contradicts it. The rank order correlation of standardization with the proportion of teachers assigned to courses in which they have not majored is  $t = -.22n.s.$ , and with the proportion who have neither majored nor minored, it is  $t = -.31$  (Table 5-1). This latter relationship persists--although it is lowered when the number of levels of authority is controlled--but the former relationship seems to be more closely associated with centralization, since it drops to near zero when the number of levels

of authority is controlled (computed with the partial tau).<sup>3</sup> Standardization then, seems to be indirectly associated with increased competence, as some writers have suggested (Anderson, 1966). Although the evidence is not entirely uniform; MacKay (1964) found no relation of technical competence with emphasis on rules in Canadian schools and a negative correlation with emphasis on procedure (using Hall's (1963) scales). However, it should be noted that standardization is persistently more associated with the height of an organization's hierarchy ( $t_p = .26$  with complexity controlled), which suggests that standardization is more likely to be used as a way of coping with the problems that arise due to increasing social distance between subordinates and higher administrators than as a curb on specialized employees.<sup>4</sup>

But if less specialized schools are less standardized, they are more centralized in at least one respect. The level at which nonprofessional policy decision is made tends to be higher in schools which more frequently assign teachers to courses in which they have neither majored nor minored ( $t = .29$ ); on the other hand, schools which use this practice have fewer levels of authority ( $t_p = -.21$ , controlling for organizational complexity). In other words, less specialized schools are less hierarchical, but within that context they are relatively centralized; or, specialized schools are more decentralized. The fact that authority over certain types of decisions is retained at higher levels in less specialized schools may be one way of compensating for the lower competence that presumably is present when specialists are not fully utilized.

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<sup>3</sup>In all of the rank order correlations reported in this chapter, partial correlations were computed wherever both variables are related to the third (reported as  $t_p$ ). The partial correlation will be referred to in the discussion only where it makes a substantial change in the interpretation.

<sup>4</sup>The standardization index seems to be slightly associated with employee orientation ( $t = .29$ ,  $t_p = .16$  controlling for school size); the employees of standardized schools are perhaps more willing to accept control.

This pattern is consistent with several studies which have found that specialized organizations tend to be decentralized. For example, in a study of correctional institutions, Zald found that where specialists were more in usage, decision-making was less centralized (Zald, 1962); Hage (1965) observed that hospitals with more highly specialized staffs of physicians tended to be decentralized; and MacKay (1964), using Hall's (1963) scales, reports a negative correlation between technical competency and hierarchy in Canadian elementary and junior high schools. Their technical competence, in other words, seems to give specialists a disproportionate amount of influence. By comparison, the present data seem to indicate the counterpart of that proposition, i.e., that less-specialized subordinates are in a less favorable position to gain control of their work. If specialization undermines centralized decision-making authority, then lack of specialization may permit more centralization if there are other reasons for it.

However, there must be other reasons for it, unless one simply assumes that there is a natural tendency for authority to become centralized unless it is obstructed. It can be assumed, in other words, that centralization develops only under special conditions. As already suggested, perhaps it develops in less specialized organizations in order to guard against the technical inadequacies of subordinates who have been assigned to jobs for which they are ill prepared.

In contrast to most discussions in the literature, this general finding is seriously qualified, however, by the fact that less specialized teachers (i.e., those assigned to teach courses outside their majors) tend to have relatively more routine decision-making authority over their classrooms ( $t = .27$ ) despite their lack of training. Also, such schools are less "centralized" in the sense that they have fewer levels of authority. Finally, teachers in schools where they are frequently assigned to courses in which they have neither majored nor minored, also consult less with the administration ( $t = -.28$ ). This latter fact, of course, could indicate not only that

less specialized teachers have greater freedom because they do not have to check closely with the administration, but that they have less opportunity to influence major policy decisions because they are consulted less.

In short, there is a tendency for nonprofessional policy decisions to be more centralized in less specialized schools, but that fact must be balanced against the fact that such schools are less hierarchical to begin with, and their teachers have more routine decision-making and autonomy from the administration than the teachers in more specialized schools.

### The Division of Labor

The way work is divided in an organization probably depends, to a certain extent, on its objectives. Eisenstadt maintains that the extent of specialization required of employees in culturally oriented organizations is far greater than in economic organizations, but that relatively little complementary division of labor is required between their members; members of such organizations perform parallel rather than complementary tasks (Eisenstadt, 1958, p. 118). The following data are probably limited by the fact that they were gathered from only one type of organization.

Nonteaching duties. The work of teachers includes nonteaching, administrative and extracurricular duties as well as normal teaching obligations. According to one national study, at least one-fourth of their time each day is spent in activities unrelated to classroom work, with administrative chores alone consuming 15 percent of the normal day (NEA, 1963). Accordingly, most teachers in this sample were active on at least one or two committees, and in two schools, even more. In addition, they spent an average of 10 hours each week supervising extracurricular activities, the average ranging from as much as 24 hours to only 4 hours a week in different schools.

The proportion of a faculty responsible for extracurricular activities also varies, but in the median school, about 40 percent claim such duties. In smaller

schools (below 60 teachers), higher proportions tend to be responsible for extracurricular activities compared to larger ones: of the eight schools in which over 60 percent of the faculty are involved in extracurricular activities, six are small; on the other hand, six of the eight in which less than 30 percent of the faculty have such duties, are large.

Barker and his associates maintain that small schools permit more student participation than larger ones, but even if it is true, they fail to consider the other side of the coin: the added burden that extracurricular activities impose on teachers in small schools and the possible distractions from their academic duties (Barker and others, 1962).

Course Structure. In the academic realm, too, schools are segmented along several lines. The complexity of their course structures varies considerably. One school in the sample offers only 28 separate courses, while several offer 100 or more. Some of these schools also have adult education programs. In some schools, this system is compounded by ability grouping within courses and content areas, and in nearly half of them, at least part of the curriculum is duplicated again with double sessions for all or a portion of the courses; a slightly disproportionate occurrence of double sessions in larger schools is not statistically significant.

In most schools, the curriculum is divided into separate curriculum tracks. Only six of them do not have separate curricular programs, while 10 of the 28 have more than three tracks, and three of those have at least five programs.

Departmentalization. In about half of the schools, separate subject-matter fields are organized into departments in the charge of official heads; two schools have as many as 10 separate official department heads. One study found that the number of subdivisions within organizations is related to size (Haas, Hall and Johnson, 1965), and in this study, too, larger schools have significantly more official heads, although

the relationship is not entirely uniform (chi-square  $p < .05$ ). Of the eight schools with six or more department heads, only one is small (below 60 teachers), whereas 10 of the 15 schools without department heads are small (Table 5-2). However, at least one-third (five) of the large schools do function without official heads.

TABLE 5-2

NUMBER OF DEPARTMENT HEADS IN THE SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL SIZE.

Number of Department Heads

School Size	6 or more	1 - 5	None	Total
Large	7	2	5	14
Small	1	3	10	14
Total	8	5	15	28

$$\chi^2 = 6.36 (2 \text{ d.f.}). \text{ Significant at } p < .05$$

Overlaying this structure of courses and departments in some schools, is an organization of standing committees, the number of which exceeds 10 in six schools, although 21 schools have none. Nine of the 28 schools are using experimental programs and testing newer developments not yet fully incorporated into the traditional system. All nine are using team teaching in at least one classroom (only four of whom use it in five or more classes), and six also are participating in advanced placement programs. There seems to be a slight tendency towards professionally oriented schools having more experimental programs (although the chi-square value is not statistically significant); in six of the nine schools with such programs, the faculties have above-average professional orientations. The average employee orientation of a faculty shows no trend at all in relationship to experimentation.

Total Complexity. These separate elements, considered together, provide an estimate of total organizational complexity. As measured by the complexity scale, organizational complexity increases with the number of teachers in a school ( $t = .68$ ), and in a system ( $t = .54$ ) (Table 5-3); this supports the findings of another study (Haas, Hall and Johnson, 1965).

As already noted, complexity is associated with specialization, which contrasts with a negative relationship found by MacKay (1964) between schools' division of labor and their technical competence. To the extent that separate groups of specialists develop distinct goals, special interests and resources, organizations that are large, complex, and specialized are likely to be difficult to control. If bureaucratic practices ever need reinforcement from one another and the reinforcement version of the model is at all applicable, it should be with respect to complex organizations. Moreover, there does seem to be some consistency among bureaucratic variables in relation to complexity. The number of levels of authority, of course, increases with complexity ( $t_p = .54$  controlling for school size), since the number of levels of authority is part of the complexity measure. Also, as schools become more complex, more emphasis is placed on rules ( $t = .26$ ) which is identical to MacKay's findings in Canadian schools; and proportionately more faculty members are supervised by a central office administrator ( $t = .49$ ) (Not in the Table). Furthermore, complexity is associated with standardization ( $t = .36$ ).

Since it might be expected that complex organizations are difficult to control from the top, it is worth noting that the level at which nonprofessional decisions are made tends to decline with organizational complexity, although the measure is not statistically significant ( $t = .18$  ns).

In short, it appears that complex organizations are large, hierarchical, standardized and specialized. Whatever loss of control that may occur because nonprofessional decisions are less centralized tends to be compensated by disproportionate

TABLE 5-3

SCHOOL COMPLEXITY AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOLS

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	COMPLEXITY SCALE (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials
<u>Size</u> - Number of Faculty in:		
School	.68**	
School System	.54**	
<u>Centralization</u>		
Number of Levels of Authority (21 Schools)	.76**	.54j
Policy Decision-Making Index:		
Professional Policies	.10	
Nonprofessional Policies	-.18	
Routine Decision-Making	-.03	-.02j
Rate of Consultation With Administration (Autonomy)	.05	
<u>Standardization</u>		
Total Index (21 Schools)	.36**	
Rules	.26*	.26j
Interchangeability	.11	.13j
<u>Specialization</u> - Proportion of teachers with a course in which they have not:		
Majored	-.38**	
Majored or Minored	-.31*	
<u>Close Supervision</u>	.03	
<u>Heterogeneity</u>	-.15	

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$

KEY: j - School Size

emphasis on rules and standardized procedures and, of course, by more levels of authority. There is also an indication in such systems of more remote control from the central office, but in view of the potential lack of control that could otherwise arise in such schools, it is perhaps remarkable that their members are not supervised more closely; the social distance that is characteristic of such organizations probably makes close supervision unfeasible. The reinforcement model, in short, seems to apply in a limited extent to complex organizations, but even here bureaucratization is far from uniform.

### THE PATTERN OF RECRUITMENT

#### Heterogeneity

When an organization's members are recruited from heterogeneous backgrounds, they are likely to bring with them differences of values, perspectives and commitments, all of which can complicate a situation already complex, making it even more difficult to control. However, heterogeneity does not seem to be one of the problems of either large or complex systems. On the contrary, this characteristic diminishes with system size ( $t = -.32$ ) (Table 5-4) and perhaps with complexity as well ( $t = -.15ns$ ). This fact may be a testament to the recruiting powers of larger organizations that might be in a better position to select new employees according to uniform standards; although the fact that the larger systems are located in big cities (where there is a reservoir of local residents from relatively homogeneous middle-class suburbs) might also be relevant.

Some forms of bureaucratic controls tend to be characteristic of the more heterogeneous schools. For example, heterogeneous schools are more closely supervised ( $t = .22$ ), and there may be a slight tendency for nonprofessional policy to be made at higher levels, although it is not statistically significant ( $t = .12ns$ ); but both

measures fall below statistical significance when system size is controlled ( $t_p = .17ns$  in the former case).

Perhaps, in part, because heterogeneous schools do not have the problems of size and complexity to contend with, they actually have less of certain kinds of bureaucratic control: standardization shows a tendency to decline with heterogeneity ( $t = -.21ns$ ); routine decision-making authority is decentralized in such schools ( $t = .40$ ); also, their faculties may consult less with the administration ( $t = -.22$ ;  $t_p = .18ns$ , controlling for the proportion of teachers assigned to teach courses in which they neither majored nor minored). Perhaps close supervision is more effective than rules with heterogeneous employees, especially since smaller schools are involved. The emphasis on close supervision (and perhaps on interchangeability of personnel) in such systems, together with the possibly higher centralization of some decisions, probably helps to compensate for losses of control from either the greater routine decision-making authority of the teachers or from heterogeneity itself.

Staff Additions. Faculty turnover and expansion also represent potentially disruptive factors which are likely to require compensating controls. Some schools hire faculty at the rate of 30 or 40 per year, although one had hired only eight faculty members during a five-year period. The problems of large, hierarchical, complex schools seem quite likely to be aggravated by staff turnover and expansion. The number of faculty members hired during the preceding five years increases sharply with organizational complexity ( $t = .46$ ), number of levels of authority ( $t = .67$ ), school size ( $t = .61$ ) and, to a lesser extent with system size ( $t = .36$ ) (Table 5-4). As faculty additions increase, so does their authority over routine decisions ( $t = .42$ ). Given the potential disruption of turnover and expansion in systems that already are large and complex, it is understandable that increases in staff additions are compensated by tighter controls, i.e., emphasis on rules ( $t = .21$ ) and standardization ( $t = .36$ ).

TABLE 5-4

HETEROGENEITY OF PERSONNEL BACKGROUNDS AND STAFF ADDITIONS  
AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOLS

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS			
	HETEROGENEITY		NUMBER OF FACULTY HIRED DURING PAST FIVE YEARS	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Size</u> - Number of Faculty in:				
School	-.12		.61**	
School System	-.32**		.36**	
<u>Centralization</u>				
Number of Levels of Authority (21 Schools)	-.19		.67**	.18j
Policy Decision-Making Index:				
Professional Policies	-.00		.13	
Nonprofessional Policies	.12		.04	
Routine Decision-Making	.40**	.37k	.27*	
Rate of Consultation With Administration (Autonomy)	-.22*	.18ns	.15	
<u>Standardization</u>				
Total Index (21 Schools)	-.21		.36*	
Rules	-.02	.02k	.21*	
Interchangeability	.19	.17k	.08	
<u>Specialization</u> - Proportion of Teachers with courses in which they have not:				
Majored	.17		.15	
Majored or Minored	.17		-.02	
<u>Close Supervision</u>	.22*	.17k	.15	
<u>Complexity</u> - Scale (Ranks)	-.15		.46	

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$   
 \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size  
 k - System Size

## STANDARDIZATION

Rules and standard procedures provide impersonal administrative controls over specialists and help to coordinate complex systems. In all schools, the discretion of teachers over their classrooms is restricted by rules, and in some, their classroom conduct is virtually determined by them. The faculty of one school "agrees" that the six items on the descriptive rules sub-scale accurately portrays their school, while another faculty is "undecided." On the whole, the sample reports less emphasis on interchangeability (as measured by four items).

In over half of the 21 schools for which the information was available, the faculty agreed that there is a "high degree of control." Only 15 percent of the teachers in the sample work in situations where persons in the system teaching the same subject must follow the same lesson plans, but three-fourths of them work in schools having manuals of rules and regulations which are followed; one-half of them report strict enforcement of specific rules specifying the times for teachers' arrival and departure from school; and although two out of three teachers are not required to file lesson plans or curriculum guides with the administration, half of those who do follow them frequently or very frequently have not had any part in preparing the plans.

Although one out of every two teachers works in a situation where tests are required, most schools do not observe the practice. In 15 of the 21 schools reporting this information, at least three-fourths of the faculty reported that tests are optional, and when they are required, teachers are almost always free to design their own; only one percent of the sample was required to use system-wide or state-wide tests, but an additional two percent used school-wide exams designed by the faculty members.

The sample does not necessarily object to standardization. Over 90 percent of the respondents believe that a school should have a manual of rules and regulations

that is followed closely and with which everyone is completely familiar; two-thirds of them even recommend strict enforcement of rules specifying when teachers should arrive and depart from the building (see Appendix 1A). However, they do seem to object to highly specific rules which curtail their authority over the classroom. Only one-fifth of them, for example, agree that there should be definite rules specifying which topics are inappropriate for discussion in the classroom; only one-third want rules so specific that they would cover almost any problem that might arise; and only one-fourth believe that teachers of the same subject throughout the system should follow the same lesson plans. Yet, it should be recognized that even in these latter cases, substantial minorities do not object to being closely regulated.

These attitudes toward rules are not necessarily inconsistent. Standards provide guidelines for cooperation and protect teachers from instability, erratic fluctuation in procedure, and injustices in the system of distributing rewards and punishments; and while rigid enforcement of rules can limit a teacher's discretion in some respects, lax enforcement can undermine the system and leave him vulnerable to the caprice of administrators and colleagues. At the same time, teachers resist those rules which undermine a teacher's authority over his classroom and that do not necessarily confer the above advantages.

#### Emphasis on Rules

Rushing proposes that, "The greater the costs of surveillance, the greater the use of formal rules" (Rushing, 1966, p. 431). Presumably, the physical distance created by increased organizational size and by centralization increases the surveillance costs. The fact that rules tend to be emphasized more in hierarchical systems ( $t = .21$ ) and in systems where professional decisions are more centralized ( $t_p = .21$ , controlling for centralization of nonprofessional decisions) tends to support Rushing's proposition (Table 5-5); MacKay's findings regarding schools also support these

TABLE 5-5

## STANDARDIZATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	STANDARDIZATION (N = 21)		RULES (N = 28)		INTERCHANGEABILITY (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Size</u> - Number of Faculty in:						
School	.42**		.11		.01	
School System	.33*		.12		-.10	
<u>Centralization</u>						
Number of Levels of Authority (21 Schools)	.42**	.23r	.21	.02r	-.07	-.11r
Policy Decision-Making Index:						
Professional Policies	.21		.14	.21n	.25*	.30n
Nonprofessional Policies	-.11		-.10		-.04	
Routine Decision-Making Authority	-.21		.14	.14j	.28*	.27k
Rate of Consultation With Administration	.18		-.19		-.26*	
<u>Standardization</u>						
Total Index (21 Schools)	---	---	.14	.05r	-.04	-.05r
Rules	.14	.05r	---	---	.31*	.32j
Interchangeability	-.04	-.05r	.31*	.32j	---	---
<u>Specialization</u> - Proportion of Teachers with a course in which they have not:						
Majored	-.22	-.05z	.01		-.02	
Majored or Minored	-.31*	-.24p	.05	.14r	.00	.04r
<u>Close Supervision</u>	.26*	.27r	.26*		.22*	.17w
<u>Complexity</u>	.36*		.26*	.26j	.11	.13j
<u>Heterogeneity</u>	-.21		-.02	.02k	.19	.17k
<u>Staff Additions</u>	.39*		.21*		.09	

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$ \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$ 

**KEY:** j - School Size  
k - System Size  
n - Nonprofessional Does on Decisions  
p - Percent Courses Not Majored  
r - Complexity Scale  
w - Professional Should on Decisions  
z - Levels of Authority (21 Schools)

findings. Rules provide one way with which remote administrators in more centralized systems attempt to maintain control, i.e., by translating their decisions into concrete guidelines. There does not seem to be much relationship between emphasis on rules and an organization's size, however ( $t = .11ns$ ); the investigators of another study of 75 diverse types of organizations arrived at a similar conclusion (Haas, Hall and Johnson, 1965). (Larger schools, nevertheless, do more clearly rely on other types of standardization; the correlation of the standardization scale with school size is  $t = .42$  and with system size it is  $t = .33$ ).

Although the emphasis on rules appears to increase with the number of levels of authority ( $t = .21$ ), the correlation disappears when organizational complexity has been partialled out. That fact, together with the fact that the correlation between rules and complexity ( $t = .26$ ) persists after relevant variables have been controlled, suggests that rules are not responses to hierarchy per se so much as they are ways of coping with organizational complexity.

Emphasis on rules is also associated with staff additions ( $t = .21$ ) and with the propensity of administrators to treat personnel interchangeably ( $t = .31$ ); rules, in fact, may facilitate this practice. The fact that an emphasis on rules is associated with close supervision ( $t = .26$ ) indicates that supervision may be required to interpret, supplement and enforce rules in complex organizations. And too, rules may also clarify situations enough to reduce the occasion for consultation between teachers and administrators, since there is (possibly) less of it where rules are emphasized ( $t = -.19ns$ ).

In summing up, then, rules are emphasized in complex, hierarchical, centralized systems which are characterized by staff additions and in which personnel are treated interchangeably. Such systems are also more closely supervised. While this pattern approaches the reinforcement model, these organizations are not necessarily more specialized nor standardized as measured by the standardization index.

### Interchangeability

Interchangeability is more characteristic of schools where professional decisions are centralized ( $t = .30$ , controlling for centralization of nonprofessional decisions). Perhaps as a safeguard, where personnel are treated interchangeably, they also are more closely supervised ( $t = .22$ ) and, as already mentioned, they are more closely governed by rules ( $t = .31$ ). However, at the same time, teachers in such organizations do have more routine decision-making authority ( $t = .28$ ) and more autonomy from the administration ( $t = -.26$ ).

Close administrative control probably enables administrators to treat teachers interchangeably, but perhaps precisely because of these broad limits on their actions, they are permitted to develop some control over routine day-to-day decisions. Being treated as an "interchangeable cog" in an organization therefore, does not necessarily imply a complete state of powerlessness--perhaps partly because this practice is not especially typical of the more complex organizations where alienation is likely to be a problem.

### Standardization

It can be expected that coordination problems are more typical of larger organizations which, consequently, are more highly rationalized. Rushing proposes that, "As an organization grows, rules and regulations will increasingly replace direct surveillance as methods of organizational control" (Rushing, 1966, p. 441). As measured by the gross index, the standardization of the 21 schools for which this information was available does increase with school size ( $t = .42$ ) and size of system ( $t = .33$ ) (Table 5-5); these findings correspond to those of Haas, Hall and Johnson (1965). Also, standardization increases with several other disruptive characteristics. As discussed in the preceding section, standardized schools are more specialized; they have more staff additions ( $t = .39$ ); there is less agreement in supervisors'

instructions to teachers ( $t = -.32$ ); and they are more complex ( $t = .35$ ). The fact that the correlation between standardization and the number of levels of authority remains significant after organizational complexity has been partialled out ( $t_p = .23$ ), indicates that standardization is a function of increases in the hierarchy--perhaps more so than of organizational size and complexity per se.

Consistent with the reinforcement model, standardization also appears to be associated with several other forms of control. Both professional policy decisions and routine decision making become more centralized as standardization increases ( $t = .21$  and  $-.21$ , respectively). The fact that standardized schools are reinforced by more centralization is also supplemented by the fact that they are more closely supervised ( $t = .21$ ), the correlation holding under relevant controls, and standardized schools are also more characterized by remote supervision from central office administrators ( $t = .26$ ).

Fewer teachers in centralized, standardized schools report that their committee recommendations are followed by the administration ( $t = -.30$ ). Standardization of complete hierarchical organizations, then, appears to curtail the influence of teachers effectively, while increasing administrative control over certain kinds of decisions.

Standardization, then, appears to be a pivotal bureaucratic variable, one associated with most of the other forms of bureaucratic control. The reinforcement model, which portrays bureaucratic variables in association with one another, seems particularly applicable to standardization. This could indicate that standardization, by itself, is a relatively ineffective measure requiring other reinforcements; but it is equally plausible that standardization is used in critical situations as an ultimate measure to reinforce less effective types of control against the challenges posed by large, hierarchical, centralized, specialized, and complex systems with high rates of staff additions.

## THE OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL STATUS SYSTEMS

Besides being divided laterally into departments, programs, and other administrative subdivisions, responsibilities in complex systems are also divided vertically into administrative echelons, each with responsibilities for coordinating the work of subordinate levels. The official hierarchy provides the system's foundation, but overlaying it is an informal system of influence among subordinates, a many faceted decision-making structure plus networks of administrative-subordinate relations, central to which are patterns of supervision and evaluation. The resulting status system is as complex as the lateral division of labor.

### Official Status

Teachers--college-educated, hired and assigned to a complex system of courses and extra duties (only in part on the basis of their special training)--share a somewhat uniform position in the official hierarchy. All but a negligible number of them work in systems with single salary schedules, in which they are differentiated only on the basis of experience and formal education. More of the sample (three-fourths of them) report that their administrators emphasize experience rather than emphasizing educational backgrounds (one-half), but by comparison, most of them (80 percent) believe that they should be evaluated primarily for their knowledge and their ability to teach it. See Appendices 1A and 1B. When teachers are rewarded for experience, they are less subject to the arbitrary judgments of their administrators, which may have the effect of reducing rivalry among them.

Despite a wide spread in their years of experience, teachers in this sample operate within an extremely narrow salary range; it varies from an average of \$4000 to \$8000 dollars per year in different schools. This limited salary range, in conjunction with the emphasis on experience, creates an inflexibly narrow channel of mobility,

which seems especially likely to make some of the more competent younger teachers impatient.

Beyond the small salary increments for experience, most teachers have little opportunity to ascend far on the official status ladder, which itself is truncated. The fact that there are few intermediate positions between classroom teachers and higher officials creates a hiatus between teachers and administrators which, besides depressing their relative status, necessitates leaving the classroom to attain substantial promotions. The gulf is so great that few teachers plan to go into administration. With little variability from school to school, only five percent of the sample anticipate becoming administrators within the next two years. Only slightly more (13 percent) even hope for a better job in the same school; although over half of the faculty of one school do anticipate improved opportunities, and it is not uncommon to find one-fifth of a faculty anticipating improved positions. A few teachers (only six percent in the median school) expect to improve their situations by transferring to another school, but the fact that more of them (14 percent) would leave their present jobs for the same or a lower salary elsewhere, if the opportunity occurred, indicates a perceived shortage of opportunities in the present location.

A department head represents one of the few opportunities for promotion short of full-time administration. Over one-half of the schools in the sample, however, do not have department heads, and in eight there are only as many as 6 to 11 of these positions available. Part-time counselors represent another staff position in the administration which still permits one to teach. However, there are only 17 part-time counselors in the entire sample.

The power of administrators over their subordinates is partly derived from their control over promotions and other official rewards, which enables them to differentiate the more loyal and competent subordinates from the others. However, single salary schedules and the lack of middle-level positions reduce this power. Teachers, in turn,

find themselves in a common situation in which rivalry for official recognition is reduced. It is ironic that a condition which is responsible for the apathy of subordinates--the lack of opportunity for promotion--when combined with other forms of organization and tenure provisions can also be a source of unification and group strength against the administration.

### Informal Status

Their uniform official status, however, is only one component of the position of teachers in public high schools. In other less formal respects, teachers are highly differentiated from one another. Although not part of the official administrative system, informal status systems are very much in evidence otherwise. Some of the frustrations created by the official status system are probably compensated to a certain extent, but aggravated in other ways, by these auxiliary informal status systems.

Union membership. Membership in labor unions separates teachers. The usual argument is that because unions are associated with the labor movement, they are less professional than professional associations; but opponents contend that classroom teacher organizations are dominated by the administration, thus reducing their professional autonomy. Columbotos (1962) found that members of the N.E.A. are no more professional than A.F.T. members, although the professionalism of male A.F.T. members tended to increase with their level of participation in the organization. However, there is some support in the present study for the frequent assertion made by teachers that schools with higher proportions of union members are less professionally oriented. Unfortunately only four of the 28 schools have officially recognized teachers' unions, but union members are represented on most faculties. When trichotomized on the basis of the proportion of faculty belonging to a union, the schools in the sample with the highest proportions of union members, on the average, rank slightly lower on profes-

sional orientation than schools with average or fewer union members (as tested by the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance of ranks) (Table 5-6). But this is offset by the fact that the most unionized faculties display significantly more professional behavior (as well as employee behavior).

The above differences are modest, however, and the small negative rank order correlation between the proportion of union members on a faculty and its professional orientation is not statistically significant ( $t = -.12$ ). Furthermore, an equally low correlation between the professional behavior index and the proportion of union members on a faculty is in the opposite direction.

There does appear to be a grain of truth in the idea that professional associations are dominated by employee oriented teachers, in the sense that the proportion of a faculty having simultaneously low-professional and high-employee orientations is associated with the proportion who are active in a professional teacher's organization ( $t = .21$ ); the proportion of a faculty having the opposite types of role organization shows a low but not statistically significant inverse relationship ( $t = -.09$ ).

In general, then, the idea that schools with active professional teacher associations are dominated by "company men" (Lieberman, 1956) has qualified support. Schools with more active professional associations are not necessarily more employee oriented, but they are more likely to simultaneously neglect the professional in favor of the employee roles. But this does not imply that schools with more union members are more professionally oriented; to the contrary, unionized schools are slightly less professionally oriented even though their professional behavior is relatively high.

Prestige. Other invidious distinctions also develop between teachers on the basis of the prestige and importance attached to their jobs. In all of the schools, English, for example, is considered to be the most important course area (on the basis of the proportion of teachers nominating it as the last course that should be eliminated from

the curriculum). The autonomy of teachers does not always coincide with their prestige, however. This system of prestige will be considered more thoroughly in Chapter 8.

Informal Leadership. Schools vary considerably in their patterns of informal leadership, too, and particularly in the proportion of faculty who are acknowledged leaders. Teachers were asked to identify their most respected colleagues. In the median school, about 15 percent of the faculty received five or more votes. In one of the largest, however, only three percent of the faculty could command as many as

TABLE 5-6

RANK ORDER COMPARISONS OF THE PROFESSIONALISM AND EMPLOYEEISM OF 28 FACULTIES, CLASSIFIED BY PROPORTION WHO ARE MEMBERS OF A UNION

PROFESSIONALISM AND EMPLOYEEISM	PROPORTION OF FACULTY BELONGING TO A UNION			
	High N = 9	Average N = 10	Low N = 9	H
	Rank Average	Rank Average	Rank Average	
<b>EMPLOYEE</b>				
Orientations (mean)	13.1	14.8	16.9	-2.00*
Behavior Index	16.8	13.5	12.9	-9.30**
<b>PROFESSIONAL</b>				
Orientations (mean)	12.3	15.5	14.4	-9.83**
Behavior Index	15.9	15.5	12.3	-4.75*

\* Significant at  $p < .10$ , Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of Variance of Ranks

\*\* Significant at  $p < .01$ , Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of Variance of Ranks

five nominations from their colleagues; at the other extreme, one-fourth of one faculty was nominated at least five times. There is similar variability among schools in regard to the teachers nominated as having the most "support" from their colleagues. In one school, no one received as many as five votes, while in another, over one-fourth of the faculty received this tribute.

Larger schools appear to have a distinctly hierarchical influence structure. As the size of a school increases, the proportion of teachers receiving five or more nominations for both respect and support declines ( $t = -.27$  and  $t = -.44$ , respectively). Larger organizations, in other words, have relatively nucleated power structures, a pattern which probably reflects differences of interest that tend to develop in more complex systems. It is also significant that the frequency with which teachers talk to the principal also declines sharply with school size ( $t = -.66$ ). Therefore, even though more leadership positions are available to the rank-and-file teacher in larger schools, his influence with the administration is weakened by a diffuse system of informal leadership, and he is less likely to have opportunity to talk with, and thus influence the principal directly.

Interpersonal Relations. Finally, interpersonal relations and the sociability of faculties varies from school to school. A stringent index of sociability is the proportion of teachers with at least one of their best friends on the faculty. The typical teacher in the sample does count at least one of his colleagues as a best friend, but only a negligible 11 percent have as many as three of their best friends on the faculty, and even in the most gregarious school, one out of three does not consider another member of the faculty to be among his best friends. Again, this pattern varies considerably between schools. In one, fully three-fourths of the faculty do not have a best friend among their colleagues, while in another, nearly one-half have most of their best friends on the faculty.

In most of the twenty-eight schools, the majority of teachers reported having lunch very frequently with at least one other faculty member, but in one not particularly large school, only one-fifth reported this pattern, and in several the proportion was no higher than 30 or 40 percent. No school reflected a high degree of sociability among the faculty after school hours, and most teachers did not see even one of their colleagues "very frequently" socially; a majority do see one another at least "frequently" on social occasions, however.

The proportion of faculty lunching together shows a slight and not significant tendency to decline with system size ( $t = -.17ns$ ), but whatever loss there may be in on-the-job sociability in larger schools is more than compensated for by increases in off-the-job social occasions ( $t = .37$ ). The reason is probably that lunching cliques remain constant in size regardless of an organization's size, if only because larger schools present more formidable scheduling and ecological problems in getting together during school hours, and because groups tend to form on the basis of narrowly specialized interests. But larger faculties can sustain a larger number of off-the-job cliques and parties.

It is interesting that the proportion of faculty without friends on the faculty is not associated with organizational size. Perhaps then, the greater opportunity of developing close relationships in small schools and communities is offset by the larger number of potentially compatible friends available in large systems.

#### Centralization of Power and Authority

Although the informal distinctions (based on their relative popularity, influence and prestige) are important ingredients of teachers' status systems, they are not as vital as the teachers' actual power to participate in the decisions that regulate their work. This power, in turn, is a function of the level at which decisions

are made plus the social distance between them and the seat of decision-making authority.

Number of Levels of Authority. As one of several estimates of the way power is distributed in school systems, the principals (in 21 of the schools) were asked to estimate the number of different levels of authority through which a teacher's request for a curriculum change might have to travel. In most cases, two levels were considered to be sufficient, but in seven schools, it was estimated that three or four levels would be involved. Also, in half of the schools, principals estimated that it would take almost a month to get a decision on such a request, but in seven schools the required "red tape" would take more than ten weeks, and as much as a year in three of them. Teachers' estimates were a little more optimistic; depending on the school, they believed that it would take anywhere from 2 to 14 weeks before they would learn as to whether or not a suggested curriculum change had been approved.

The number of levels between the faculty and an administrator who can give final authority seems to be inversely related to the system size. Seven of the eight schools in which it might be necessary to go through as many as four or five levels are small; while seven of the nine, where only one level is indicated, are large (chi-square significant at  $p < .05$ ) (Table 5-7); the same pattern occurs where system size is concerned (Table 5-7a). Small organizations then, appear to be capable of making decisions at the top; but as organizational size increases, delegation of some of the decisions downward seems to occur, perhaps because curriculum changes become more frequent in large organizations and other problems take precedence.

A slightly different way of looking at the authority system is simply in terms of the total number of levels of authority in the official hierarchy. According to the estimates of teachers, the schools in the sample have either one, two, or three levels; the number of levels in the total system ranges from three to seven.

TABLE 5-7

NUMBER OF LEVELS OF AUTHORITY REQUIRED  
TO ACHIEVE CURRICULUM CHANGE AND SIZE OF SCHOOLS

Size of School	Number of Levels of Authority			Total
	5 - 4	3 - 2	1	
Large	1	6	7	14
Small	7	5	2	14
Total	8	11	9	28

$\chi^2 = 6.36$  (2 d.f.) Significant at  $p < .05$

TABLE 5-7a

NUMBER OF LEVELS OF AUTHORITY REQUIRED  
TO ACHIEVE CURRICULUM CHANGE AND SIZE OF SCHOOL SYSTEM

Size of System	Number of Levels of Authority			Total
	5 - 4	3 - 2	1	
Large	1	5	8	14
Small	7	6	1	14
Total	8	11	9	28

$\chi^2 = 10.02$  (2 d.f.) Significant at  $p < .01$

The mean number of authority levels estimated by teachers (in 21 of the schools for which the information was available) increases with school size ( $t = .71$ ) and size of system ( $t = .69$ ) (Table 5-8). Other investigators found a similar relationship between the organizational size and length of the hierarchy of 75 organizations (Haas, Hall and Johnson, 1965). As already reported, the number of levels of authority is

positively associated with specialization, i.e., it is negatively associated with the proportion of teachers teaching outside of their majors or minors ( $t = -.38$ ). Schools with hierarchical systems also have more staff additions ( $t = .67$ ). Probably because complex divisions of labor create more coordination problems, the number of levels of authority also increases with organizational complexity ( $t = .76$ , which is reduced to  $t = .54$  when school size is controlled) (Table 5-8). MacKay (1964) found a similar relationship in the schools he studied.

Then, as a system increases in size, specialization, and complexity, it evolves progressively to more levels of authority. New echelons probably develop because administrative work is progressively delegated as a way of maintaining a manageable span of control at each level, which then requires more echelons at the intermediate levels. Assuming that the number of subordinates who are supervised by a single supervisor remains somewhat constant, larger organizations require longer chains of command, and the intermediate line-and-staff administrators are coordinated at progressively higher levels. It should be noted, however, that these particular developments are partly based on the ideology that subordinates must be "administered" by a single head and that certain administrative services and uniform controls must be maintained.

Although the official hierarchy does provide a bare structure by which minimal coordination can be maintained among a broad scope of activities, losses in control over particular activities are bound to occur as the distance between the administration and teaching faculty increases. Hence, as the number of levels of authority increases, a larger proportion of the faculty believes that the superintendent is too removed from daily events to be familiar with their daily problems ( $t = .42$ ). One out of every three teachers in the median school expressed this belief, and in one school over half believed it; although at the other extreme only 77 percent of one faculty was willing to make that statement.

TABLE 5-8

LEVELS OF AUTHORITY IN SCHOOLS AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	NUMBER OF OFFICIAL LEVELS OF AUTHORITY (N = 21)	
	Taus	Partials
<u>Size</u> - Number of Faculty in:		
School	.71**	
School System	.69**	
<u>Centralization</u>		
Policy Decision-Making Index:		
Professional Policies	.05	
Nonprofessional Policies	-.12	
Routine Decision-Making	-.03	-.01r
Rate of Consultation with Administration (Autonomy)	.24	.26r
Number of Supervisors per Teacher	.62**	
Superintendent is too far removed	.42**	
Percent Supervised by a Central Office Administrator	.47**	
<u>Standardization</u>		
Total Index Scores (21 Schools)	.42**	.23r
Rules	.21	
Interchangeability	-.07	-.11r
<u>Specialization</u> - Proportion of Teachers with Courses in Which They Have Not:		
Majored	-.40**	-.07r
Majored or Minored	-.38**	-.20r
<u>Close Supervision</u> - Scale (Ranks)	-.01	
<u>Complexity</u> - Scale (Ranks)	.76**	.54j
<u>Heterogeneity</u>	-.19	
<u>Staff Additions</u>	.67**	.18j

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size  
r - Complexity Scale

Largely because the higher administration in hierarchical systems are perhaps removed from daily problems, certain decisions are not more centralized, and in fact, there may be a very slight tendency for nonprofessional policy decisions to be delegated downward ( $t = -.12$ ). Nonprofessional decisions are made at lower levels in nine of the 13 systems which have six or more levels of authority, whereas they are made at higher levels in six of the seven systems that have three or fewer levels of authority (chi-square significant at  $p < .06$ ) (Table 5-9). Teachers in systems with longer chains of command, in other words, do not necessarily lose decision-making authority; and they may gain in comparison to those in less hierarchical systems.

TABLE 5-9

TOTAL NUMBER OF LEVELS OF AUTHORITY IN THE SYSTEM AND LEVEL AT WHICH  
NONPROFESSIONAL DECISIONS ARE MADE

Level of Nonprofessional Decision Making	Number of Levels of Authority			Total
	6 or more	4 - 5	3 or less	
High	4	4	6	14
Low	9	4	1	14
Total	13	8	7	28

$\chi^2 = 5.48$ , (2 d.f.), Significant at  $p \leq .06$

Perhaps to partially compensate for whatever loss of control that may occur as social distance increases between administrators and subordinates in hierarchical systems, standardization ( $t = .42$ ;  $t_p = .23$  with complexity controlled), emphasis on rules ( $t = .21$ ) and the rate of consultation between teachers and administrators ( $t = .24$ ) all increase with the number of levels of authority; MacKay (1964) found an even higher relationship between hierarchy and rules in Canadian junior high and elementary schools.

Standardization is a much more important form of control than close supervision ( $t = -.01$ ) is in hierarchical systems, probably because personal surveillance is less feasible due to the social distance, as Rushing (1966) has suggested. But there are indications of increases in the amount of supervision by remote superiors in hierarchical systems. As the number of levels of authority increases, the proportion of teachers who report being supervised by a central office administrator increases ( $t = .47$ ) and the number of supervisors per teacher increases ( $t = .62$ ). There is a similar rank correlation between the proportion of faculty supervised by an administrator from the central office and both size of school and system ( $t = .42$  and  $t = .37$ , respectively, not reported). The disagreement between supervisors' instructions also appears to increase with both measures of organizational size ( $t = .60$  and  $t = .50$ , respectively).

In summation, in response to the problems of size, complexity, and specialization, organizations evolve progressively more levels of authority in order to control their increasing scope of activity. But at least some key decisions cannot very well be elevated to correspondingly higher levels of authority; then too, the hierarchy itself can also produce social distance. Both of these factors can jeopardize control and thus, supplementary controls are emphasized. In this case, the slight tendency for nonprofessional decisions to be decentralized in such systems is more than offset by increased consultation, remote supervision and standardization. There seems to be clear support for the reinforcement model with respect to hierarchical authority.

Centralization of Policy Decisions. The number of levels of authority and similar structural characteristics establish only the gross distribution of power. The true backbone of an organization, however, lies where key decisions actually are made. Therefore, it is important to have some impression about the role which teachers play in the decision-making process itself.

Gross and his associates report that the majority of school superintendents and school boards want their teachers to participate in major policy decisions; and 40 percent of the teachers in that study also feel that their part in policy formation should be increased (Gross and others, 1958). But in practice, for example, in only 10 percent of their sample do staff actually consult with the superintendent about filling a vacant teaching position. Nor is there evidence from other studies that school teachers are actually eager to assume the responsibility for added decision-making authority. Seeman found that on four of ten items designed to elicit the type of leadership that teachers preferred, a majority favored a directive "authoritative" leadership style which afforded them little opportunity to participate (Seeman, 1953).

Policy decisions of the schools in our sample are made at administrative levels, and although teachers frequently are consulted, there is little evidence that they are influential. The precariousness of their situation is reflected in the fact that although nearly every teacher serves on at least one committee; between one-fourth and one-half of them say that the majority of their recommendations are never followed; in two schools over 10 percent of the faculty believe that they are never followed, although typically substantial proportions believe that they are followed at least some of the time.

In all schools, only insignificant proportions of teachers perceived themselves as having any authority over faculty meetings and the vast majority reported that the principal or his assistant usually arranges the agenda for such meetings; in two schools, the superintendent or school board takes this responsibility.

Respondents reported that, on the average, the professional type of policy decisions are made by the principal in consultation with teachers or a committee of teachers, although teachers have more authority in some schools than in others. Nonprofessional types of decisions, on the other hand, are made further up the hierarchy. On the average, the sample located the source of these decisions between the principal

and the superintendent, the mean response in some schools falling definitely at the superintendent's office and at the principal's in others.

Centralization is not highly correlated with increasing organization size and complexity, as some writers have postulated (Table 5-10). Probably the reason is that it is not feasible to retain control at higher levels of authority in larger organizations. But the idea that an increase in centralization of authority results in more formalization is supported. As professional decisions become more centralized, standardization increases ( $t = .21$ ), rules are enforced more strictly ( $t_p = .21$ , controlling for centralization of nonprofessional decisions), and interchangeability becomes more typical ( $t = .25$ ) (Table 5-10). Centralization of nonprofessional decisions is also accompanied by increased emphasis on rules ( $t = .25$ ); but employees are less closely supervised ( $t_p = -.23$ , controlling for emphasis on rules).

In other words, centralization of policy decisions tends to be reinforced by some form of standardization, but close supervision is either not emphasized, or in the case of nonprofessional policy decisions, it is actually relaxed. Nor are such organizations associated with other bureaucratic forms, such as size, number of levels of authority, and specialization (which declines). The reinforcement model does not appear to be applicable to centralized policy decisions; to the extent that supervision is relaxed in centralized decisions as emphasis on rules increases, the compensatory model seems to be more appropriate.

Routine Decision-Making. Of course, within the broad limits set by policy decisions, there is still room for teachers to make routine day-to-day decisions about matters that arise in their classrooms. The fact that teachers work alone in classrooms within relatively autonomous school units virtually guarantees them some authority. The descriptive decision-making sub-scale provides a gross indication of the amount of authority which teachers do have over their day-to-day work; and it reveals

TABLE 5-10

## CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION MAKING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	PROFESSIONAL POLICY MAKING INDEX (N = 28)		NONPROFESSIONAL POLICY MAKING INDEX (N = 28)		ROUTINE DECISION MAKING (N = 28)		RATE OF CONSULTATION ABOUT PROBLEMS (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Size - Number of Faculty in:</u>								
School	.12		-.08		-.02		.04	
School System	-.01		-.12		-.12		.07	
<u>Centralization</u>								
Number of Levels of Authority (21 Schools)	.05		-.12		-.03		.24	
<u>Standardization</u>								
Total Index (21 Schools)	.21		-.11		-.21		.18	
Rules	.14	.21n	.25		.14		-.19	
Interchangeability	.25	.30n	-.04		.28*		-.26*	
<u>Specialization - Proportion of Teachers with a course in which they have not:</u>								
Majored	-.02		.08		.27*		-.13	-.12n
Majored or Minored	.08		.29*		.04		-.28*	-.27b
<u>Close Supervision</u>	.01		-.16		.34*		-.13	
<u>Complexity</u>	.10		-.18		-.03		.05	
<u>Heterogeneity Index</u>	-.00		.12		.40**		-.22*	
<u>Staff Additions</u>	.13		.04		.27		.15	

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$ \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$ 

KEY: n - Centralization of Nonprofessional Decisions

b - Emphasis on Rules

some alienation (see Appendix 1B). Whereas 70 percent of the sample believe that the ultimate authority over the major educational decisions should be exercised by professional teachers, only 43 percent see themselves now in such positions. Even more teachers (90 percent) believe that they should have the authority to make decisions about problems that arise in the classroom and that small matters should not have to be referred to someone higher up for a final answer; again, fewer (only two-thirds) report actually being permitted to make routine decisions.

There is more opportunity for teachers to make routine decisions in the more heterogeneous organizations ( $t = .40$ ), which have higher rates of staff turnover and additions ( $t = .27$ ) and have less specialized staffs ( $t = .27$  with the proportion assigned to courses outside their major); as already noted, this finding does not correspond with the general assumption in the literature, i.e., that specialists have more decision-making authority. To the fact that schools whose faculties have more authority over routine decisions are more heterogeneous, unstable and perhaps less standardized ( $t = -.21$  n.s.) must be added the fact that they are not more centralized in other ways. This is the portrait of potentially unruly organizations. However, the lack of control is compensated to some extent by the fact that they are more closely supervised ( $t = .34$ ) and their members are treated interchangeably ( $t = .28$ ).

It has already been noted that standardization and emphasis on rules help to compensate for decentralization of policy decisions. Similarly, close supervision and interchangeability seem to compensate for disproportionate amounts of routine decision-making authority of teachers.

Autonomy. The autonomy of teachers, or the lack of it, also reflects upon their decision-making power. As the term "autonomy" is used here, it refers to infrequent consultation between subordinates and the administration. The index used is the rate at which teachers consult the administration about their decisions and their problems.

No attempt has been made to ascertain the extent to which autonomy might reduce the opportunity of subordinates to influence administrative decisions through consultation.

During a year's time, the average teacher in the typical school consults with his principal about a decision or a problem approximately eight times. In one school, the average is as low as three consultations per teacher, while in another, the average teacher consults nearly 20 times. Over half the sample reported consulting with their principals at least once a week, but one in five saw him no more than once a month; in some schools over one-third of the faculty made this report. Four percent claimed they did not see the principal about a problem during a normal six-month period; in one school, one-fifth of the faculty made that claim.

Autonomy does not appear to be related to organizational size (Table 5-10). However, the frequency with which the faculty talks with the principal (as opposed to consulting with him) was found to decline with both school size ( $t = -.66$ ) and system size ( $t = -.62$ ). The rate of consultation does tend to increase with the number of levels of authority in the system ( $t = .24$  n.s.), and it declines with a faculty's heterogeneity ( $t = -.22$ ). The former finding could mean that teachers in hierarchical systems consult more in attempting to influence decisions made in remote offices; that they seek more direction from the administration, or that the administration requires consultation as a way of maintaining touch with disloyal employees in hierarchical systems. The second interpretation is not supported in the sense that faculties with autonomy are more loyal to the administration; i.e., as the proportion of a faculty with employee orientations in the upper 15 percent of the sample increases, the faculty consults less with the administration ( $t = -.24$ ). Schools in which teachers have more authority might be more closely controlled by standardized practices ( $t = .18$  n.s.), but for some reason (perhaps because they have loyal employees) less emphasis is placed on rules ( $t = -.19$  n.s.), and on interchangeability ( $t = -.26$ ).

This, then, is the image that begins to form of the position of teachers in the decision-making structure: they make few major nonprofessional policy decisions, and they participate only in a tangential way in the professional ones; although the majority do have enough discretion to make routine decisions that come up in the classroom, they would like to have more of this authority and they, too, are subject to the constraints of standardization, rules, or close supervision; the freedom which they otherwise seem to gain in larger systems is compensated for by increased rates of consultation with the administration.

### Teacher-Administrator Relations

Despite the problems that could be read into the authority system as it has been described thus far, generally speaking, the relations between teachers and their administrators are quite good. Teachers respect their administrators and appear to "get along" with them relatively well. In 11 of the 28 schools, the average teacher reported no conflicts with his principal during the last six months and in 17, the average faculty member did not agree with any of the five negative statements on a checklist of 14 statements evaluating the principal. The sample is correspondingly positive toward their principals. In all of the schools, the vast majority agreed with at least one of the positive statements, although not more than one-half agreed with four of them.

The overall trends are qualified, however, by variations from school to school. In four schools, one-fifth of the faculty reported having conflicts with the principal and in another, one-fifth agreed with four of the five negative statements and nearly one-half agreed with two of the five statements. The amount of close supervision increases with the proportion of faculty who are negative on all five statements ( $t = .21$ ), while standardization declines as the proportion of faculty who are favorable increases ( $t = -.26$ ). This pattern could mean that bureaucratic procedures are used

by administrators to control employees who are critical of them, or it could mean that employees blame administrators for the problems that arise in bureaucratic organizations and give them credit when they do not.

A faculty's willingness to rate its principal as both one of the best educators in the system and as an excellent leader increases sharply with the proportion exhibiting employee behavior ( $t = .47$  and  $t = .53$ , respectively). Employee oriented faculties show similar dispositions, but the correlations are not statistically significant and are not different than professionally oriented faculties in this respect.

Supervision: Teacher-Administrator Ratio. The ratio of school administrators to subordinates is an indication of the capacity of a system to supervise employees. One satirist claimed that the number of administrators in the British Navy increased at the same time that the number of ships in commission declined (Parkinson, 1957). Terrien and Mills (1955) found a similar tendency in public school systems. Also, between 1929 and 1952, the expenditures for administering public schools remained relatively constant (fluctuating between 3.5 and 4.5 of the total expenditures), while auxiliary staff increased from 4.4 percent to 7.8 percent.

The ratio of administrators to teachers, for schools in the present study, ranges from zero to twenty percent. In eight schools, more than ten percent of the personnel are administrators; the ratios for school systems are similar, although the range is greater (from zero to 26 percent).

A study of hospitals revealed that the number of administrators necessary to a hospital grew at a slower rate than the total staff size, but in a similar study of public school districts in California, it was found that the proportion of school administrators increased at a faster rate than total organizational size (Anderson and Warkow, 1961). In contrast to hospitals, then, it would appear that increases in the size of school districts exaggerate bureaucratic characteristics, at least insofar as

the ratio of the administrators to the staff is an index of this. Anderson and Warkow suggest that the difference can be explained by the fact that school districts consist of physically dispersed units, while hospitals do not. Physical dispersion of units requires more unit administrators to coordinate the work.

Larger systems, in the present sample, have smaller proportions of administrators than smaller ones (chi-square significant at  $p < .05$ ) (Table 5-11). All six systems in which administrators comprise between 11 and 26 percent of the personnel are small (i.e., below 240 teachers), while 14 of 20 systems having an administrator-teacher ratio of ten percent or less are large. On the other hand, the reverse relationship begins to emerge with respect to the size of school, although the chi-square is not statistically significant (Table 5-11a). Six of eight schools with between 10 to 20 percent administrators are large; while seven of ten schools with an administrator-teacher ratio of seven percent or below, are small.

This reversal of pattern between schools and school systems, if it does exist, possibly occurs because the minimum number of central office administrators necessary to run a system remains somewhat constant regardless of the number of schools to be administered; whereas administrative and staff functions in a school probably increase disproportionately to the number of students in the school (which in turn is reflected in the number of teachers).

Remote Supervision. A consideration of the working relationship between teachers and administrators should take supervisory practices into account, since any anxieties which subordinates may have about their status are likely to be aggravated if they feel confined by supervision. Most teachers work in schools with relatively complex supervisory patterns. The average teacher receives instructions from two or three people; in some schools, each person must satisfy three or more supervisors.

TABLE 5-11

PERCENT OF ADMINISTRATORS IN THE SYSTEM AND SYSTEM SIZE

Percent of Administrators in the System

System Size	26 - 11	10 - 5	4 or less	Total
Large (240 teachers or more)	0	9	5	14
Small (less than 240 teachers)	6	5	3	14
Total	6	14	8	28

$\chi^2 = 7.64$  (2 d.f.), Significant at  $p < .05$

TABLE 5-11a

PERCENT OF ADMINISTRATORS IN THE SCHOOL AND SCHOOL SIZE

Percent of Administrators in the School

School Size	20 - 10	9 - 8	7 or less	Total
Large (60 teachers or more)	6	5	3	14
Small (59 teachers or fewer)	2	5	7	14
Total	8	10	10	28

$\chi^2 = 3.60$  (2 d.f.); Not Significant

Most respondents reported, however, that their instructions seldom, or only occasionally, disagreed.

Teachers are not only supervised by administrators in their own schools, but by remote supervisors in the central office. The number of the latter increases sharply with the number of levels of authority ( $t = .64$ ) and with school size ( $t = .41$ ). Most teachers (58 percent of the faculty in the median school) are subject to an adminis-

trator in the central office who is authorized to supervise their course areas; the number of teachers involved increases with the number of levels of authority in the system ( $t = .47$ ). The vast majority of teachers had been contacted at least once during the preceding six months by a central office administrator to give them advice or to request something of them; in all but one of the 21 schools for which information is available, the majority have been visited at least once by such an administrator during their tenure, and in five schools, one-third of the faculty has received two or more visits.

Close Supervision. The status of teachers is probably affected more immediately by the amount of direct surveillance over them than by the number of remote supervisors in the central office. It is probably easier to check up on subordinates in smaller, less centralized schools than in larger complex ones. Triandis hypothesizes that the larger the size of the group, the lower the frequency of the leader's monitoring of the behavior of individual group members (Triandis, 1966). As he predicts, close supervision does decline with system size ( $t = -.22$ ) (Table 5-12), and also with the proportion of faculty who believe that the superintendent is too removed ( $t = -.37$ , not reported). Supervision also declines with the centralization of professional decisions ( $t_p = -.23$ , controlling for emphasis on rules); this is contrary to Triandis' prediction that it would decline with decentralization (Table 5-12).

Anderson implicitly uses the compensatory model when he hypothesizes that bureaucratic rules and similar controls vary inversely with the amount of supervision given to subordinates (Anderson, 1966). However, using the measures developed for our study, the reverse seems to be true. Close supervision is not a substitute for rules, but tends to be accompanied by more emphasis on both rules ( $t = .26$ ) and standardization ( $t = .26$ ); also, personnel in closely supervised systems tend to be treated interchangeably ( $t = .22$ ). Supervision, then, like certain other practices, appears to be reinforced by other bureaucratic controls.

TABLE 5-12

## CLOSE SUPERVISION AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	CLOSE SUPERVISION SCALE (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials
<u>Size</u> - Number of Faculty in:		
School	-.07	
School System	-.22*	
<u>Centralization</u>		
Number of Levels of Authority (21 Schools)	-.01	
Policy Decision-Making Index:		
Professional Policies	.01	
Nonprofessional Policies	-.16	-.23a
Routine Decision-Making	.34**	.17o
Rate of Consultation with Administration (Autonomy)	-.13	
<u>Standardization</u>		
Total Scores (21 Schools)	.26*	.27r
Rules	.26*	.27r
Interchangeability	.22*	.17r
<u>Specialization</u> - Proportion of Teachers with a course in which they have not:		
Majored	.15	
Majored or Minored	-.02	
<u>Complexity</u> - Scale	.03	
<u>Heterogeneity</u>	.22*	.17k
<u>Staff Additions</u>	.15	.16k

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$ \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$ 

KEY: a - Rules Sub Total  
k - System Size  
o - Decision-Making Sub-scale  
r - Complexity Scale

The fact that there is more supervision in heterogeneous schools ( $t = .22$ ), and where routine decision-making authority is decentralized ( $t = .34$ ), suggests that close supervision may be adopted as a way to control potentially unruly faculties.

It is noteworthy that close supervision does not appear to be associated with organizational complexity, especially in view of Rushing's prediction that direct surveillance will be supplanted by rules and regulations as an organization undergoes increasing structural differentiation (Rushing, 1966).

Evaluation. Frequent evaluation represents another means of checking closely on subordinates. In four schools, a near majority are evaluated three or more times a year, but the majority of teachers are evaluated by their principals no more than once. Only eight percent of the sample believe that their administrator's evaluations of them are unfair and inaccurate. The average rating, given by most principals to their faculties, ranges between "good" and "excellent" ( $\bar{X} = 4.2$ , on a five-point scale). One-third of the faculties fall below the "good" rating, but none of the principals rates his faculty overall as low as "average."<sup>5</sup> On loyalty to the administration the mean is higher ( $\bar{X} = 4.2$ ); in one school, the average rating falls between "average" and "good," but in two others it is near "excellent." The loyalty of faculties to the organization is rated similarly by principals.

Professional and Employee Norms. From the descriptions of their actual on-the-job behavior, one gets the impression that teachers are as compliant and loyal, and lacking in discretionary authority, as some writers have portrayed them (Lieberman, 1956; Friedenberq, 1962). Teachers, for example, express strong loyalty to their

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<sup>5</sup>The proportion of teachers receiving at least one excellent rating from their own colleagues shows more dispersion, ranging from only 40 percent in one small school to 100 percent in another, but this figure is below 80 percent, in only five schools.

administrators and their communities. Their parochialism is reflected in the fact that only a fraction of them (four percent) have been employed in any school system other than the one in which they are currently employed; this may help to explain why, when they were asked to whom they looked for advice regarding a proposed school for bright children, one in five teachers referred to their own administrators--the single, most frequent response. The sample, as a whole, fluctuates between "undecided" and "agreement," with seven statements maintaining that they owe loyalty to the administration, although they are definitely "undecided" about the loyalty owed to their organization (see Appendix 1A).

The above figures, of course, represent the average responses to several statements. They become more meaningful when analyzed separately. Approximately two-thirds or more of the sample agreed that teachers in their schools do make it a practice of adjusting their teaching to the administration's views of good educational practice, and are obedient, respectful and loyal to the principal; that they do look primarily to the judgment of the administration for guidance in case of disputes in the community (controversies over a textbook or a speaker); that they are completely familiar with written descriptions of the rules, procedures, manuals and other standard operating procedures connected with running a classroom; and that they would not publicly advocate a position on the place of religion in the school if it differed greatly from the majority opinion of the community. Even higher proportions of teachers believed that they should conform to these practices. See Appendices 1A and 1B.

Approximately one-half of the sample, too, agreed that their school administration is better qualified than the teachers to judge what is best for education; that rules stating when teachers should arrive and depart from the building are strictly enforced; and that teachers in their school do usually take into account the opinions of their community in guiding what they say in class and in their choice of teaching materials,

and in general, conform to the accepted standards of the community. Even higher proportions of the sample believed that most of the above practices are desirable.

One-half of the sample agreed that teachers who openly criticize the administration should be encouraged to go elsewhere; and that local control over schools by school boards represents the most fundamental form of democracy in public education; with over three-quarters agreeing that the criterion of a good school should be how well it serves the needs of the local community.

On the other hand, less than one-half of them believed that the ultimate authority over the major educational decisions should be exercised by professional teachers, or that teachers should try to put their standards and ideas of good teaching into practice even if the rules or procedures of the school prohibit it. Only one-third or less agreed that a teacher should consistently practice his or her ideas of the best educational practices even though the administration preferred other views; that it is permissible for a teacher to violate a rule if he or she is sure that the best interests of the students will be served by doing so; or that a teacher should refuse to do anything that may jeopardize the interests of his students regardless of his instructions or what the rules state. In regard to the last proposition, only one out of five teachers reported that colleagues do actually refuse to do what they are told unless they are satisfied that it is best for the student.

The above characterization adds up to a telling degree of compliance and lack of initiative on the part of teachers. However, there is another side to the story. In some respects, teachers do have a certain amount of freedom and express a considerable degree of regard for discretion and self-initiative. For example, less than one-quarter of the sample reported that teachers of the same subject in their system must follow the same lesson plans; that course work was so planned that every child taking the same kind of course throughout the state would eventually cover the same material; that there were rules covering almost every problem that might arise in the school;

that definite rules do exist specifying the topics that are not appropriate for discussion in the classroom; or that teachers do avoid controversial issues (such as abolishing the House un-American Activities Committee) which could jeopardize the school's public relations. Only slightly more (one-third) reported that teachers do try to keep out of "hot water" by following the wishes of the top administration, do teach their course in such a way that a substitute can take over at a moment's notice without serious interruption, or do avoid "sticking their necks out" when a controversy arises about the interpretation of school rules.

At the same time, over two-thirds of the sample agreed that teachers in their school are able to make their own decisions about problems in the classroom; that small matters in their school do not have to be referred to someone higher up for the final answer; and that the ultimate authority over the major educational decisions is exercised by professional teachers. Approximately one out of every two teachers reported that in their school, teachers do try to live up to what they think are the standards of their profession, even if the administration or the community does not seem to respect them. In all of these cases, even higher proportions of teachers believe that teachers should live up to these practices.

In summing up then, the eagerness of teachers to comply with their superiors is impressive; but they are not completely dominated by their organizations either, and there are issues on which the majority of them would take a firm stand even if it meant opposing the administration.

Professionalism and Bureaucratization. Evidence will be reported in the following chapter about the fact that as a school becomes bureaucratized, the professionalism of its faculty tends to decline and its employee-climate tends to flourish. There is, in particular, a tendency for more professionally oriented faculties to assume more routine decision-making authority ( $t = .34$ ); however, so do employee oriented

faculties (Table 5-13). The relationships of professional orientation and behavior with most other bureaucratic characteristics are only negligible. There are slight (not statistically significant) tendencies for a faculty's professional orientation to diminish as both professional and nonprofessional decisions become more centralized ( $t = -.12$  n.s.,  $t = -.14$  n.s., respectively), while it tends to increase in more hierarchical ( $t = .17$  n.s.), more closely supervised ( $t = .12$  n.s.), more specialized ( $t = .16$  n.s.) systems which are adding faculty ( $t = .17$  n.s.). While the magnitudes of these individual correlations are low and unreliable, the total pattern suggests that more professionally-oriented faculties may be found disproportionately among heterogeneous and changing faculties with a relatively high degree of routine decision-making authority. Other than possibly a little more supervision than normal, there is little attempt to compensate for the loss of control implicit in this pattern.

Columbotos (1962) found a weak relationship between professionalism and proceduralism for men; the medium professionals were slightly less procedural than either the high or low professionals. Among women, a stronger monotonic relationship appeared, but it was not quite statistically significant. A higher proportion of men than women reported that they break rules frequently or occasionally. Rushing proposes, on the other hand, that "An increase in the organizational skill structure will be accompanied by a decrease in the use of formal rules and surveillance to control conduct" (Rushing, 1966, p. 439). Neither a significant positive nor a negative relationship was found in this sample between professionalism and rules.

The faculties conforming most to standards of professional behavior may also have slightly more professional routine decision-making authority, although the correlation is not statistically significant ( $t = .16$ ). Professionally active faculties do consult less with the administration ( $t = -.24$ ), and they have higher rates of turnover and expansion ( $t = .26$ ). But, generally speaking, this characteristic does not seem to be closely associated with bureaucratic characteristics.

Table 5-13

## PROFESSIONALISM AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION (N = 28)	PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR (N = 28)	EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION (N = 28)	EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR (N = 28)
<u>Size</u> - Number of Faculty in:				
School	.04	.14	-.19	-.29*
School System	.02	.01	-.21*	-.27*
<u>Centralization</u>				
Number of Levels of Authority (21 Schools)	.17	.12	-.38**	-.28*
Policy Decision-Making Index:				
Professional Policies	-.12	-.04	.19	-.02
Nonprofessional Policies	-.14	-.10	.16	-.02
Routine Decision-Making Authority	.34**	.16	.36**	.24*
Rate of Consultation with Administration (Autonomy)	.06	-.24*	-.25*	-.18
<u>Standardization</u>				
Total Index (21 Schools)	.04	-.01	-.29*	-.35*
Rules	.03	.12	.26*	.29*
Interchangeability	-.02	-.06	.27*	.08
<u>Specialization</u> - Proportion of Teachers with Courses in which they have not:				
Majored	.09	.16	.24*	.35**
Majored or Minored	-.16	.00	.14	.17
<u>Close Supervision</u>	.14	.10	.29*	.23*
<u>Complexity</u>	-.01	.15	-.23*	-.18
<u>Heterogeneity</u>	.17	.07	.14	.12
<u>Staff Additions</u>	.17	.26*	.07	-.04

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$ \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

The employee orientation of a faculty, by comparison, is more closely associated with organizational variables. It tends to be associated with close supervision ( $t = .29$ ), emphasis on rules ( $t = .26$ ), interchangeability of personnel ( $t = .27$ ), and perhaps with centralization of professional policy decisions ( $t = .19$  n.s.) (Table 5-13). On the other hand, a faculty's average employee orientation appears to be lower in more hierarchical, complex, standardized, larger, less specialized systems;  $t = -.38$ ,  $t = 0.23$ ,  $t = -.29$ ,  $t = -.21$ , and  $t = -.24$ , respectively. However, since the number of levels of authority, standardization and the proportion specialized are correlated with organizational size, they are reduced (to + or  $-.16$ ) when size is partialled. When complexity is controlled, the correlation with system size is reduced also ( $t = -.12$ ), while the correlation with rules is increased (to  $t = -.35$ ). The correlation with supervision is not appreciably altered by partialling out controls.

Close supervision tends to increase when employee orientation increases ( $t = .29$ ), but the rate of consultation with the administration declines ( $t = -.25$ ). Employee orientation functions like professional orientation in that a faculty's commitment to either one is associated with more routine decision-making authority ( $t = .36$ ). There probably are different reasons for the similarity of the latter. Decentralization, in more professional faculties, could be in recognition for their technical competence and professional concern, while the authority of employee faculties may be in recognition of their loyalty to the administration, especially since close supervision and emphasis on rules in these organizations provide the administration with some safeguards.

Although in some cases, the correlations involving a faculty's employee behavior are lower, they form a similar pattern in nearly every respect, with the exception that the correlation with interchangeability is negligible.

In summarizing, the average employee orientation of a faculty is more systematically associated with bureaucratic characteristics than its professional orientation,

which seems to be less bound to specific organizational characteristics. The connection between employee orientation and bureaucracy is not entirely uniform, but the most loyal faculties seem to be more typical of schools that are less bureaucratic in some sense--i.e., they are smaller, less complex, less specialized and less standardized. But curiously, these schools are more bureaucratic in the sense that they are more closely controlled by an emphasis on rules, interchangeability, and close supervision. Employee-oriented schools, in other words, are more closely controlled despite the fact that they logically would seem to require less control; the employees of such schools probably request more direction on the one hand, and on the other hand, offer less resistance to it. Therefore, although both professional and employee orientations are associated with more routine decision-making authority, the authority of employee oriented faculties is curbed with other control measures. This suggests that employee oriented faculties (in the balance) have more authority, which could give them more leverage against the administration.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Each of the three models of bureaucracy considered is of some use in interpreting the patterns of data, depending upon which variables are being considered. By the same token, none of them is consistently supported. It appears that each dimension of bureaucracy needs to be considered separately; each operates on somewhat different principles. Whether or not there are overriding principles that explain the total pattern remains to be seen.

The fact that standardization and emphasis on rules both tend to be associated with most of the other bureaucratic characteristics supports the reinforcement model, insofar as its application can be limited to the dimension of standardization. However, since most of the other dimensions are not as consistently associated with allied bureaucratic practices, the compensatory model is more applicable to most of the

dimensions and, in many cases, the independence model must be used to account for the relatively low relationships that do occur.

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## CHAPTER 6

### TOWARD A THEORY<sup>1</sup> OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT: PROFESSIONALIZATION, BUREAUCRATIZATION AND STRUCTURAL CRYSTALLIZATION

It appears that not only in social life, but wherever there is life, there is conflict. May we perhaps go so far as to say that conflict is a condition necessary for life to be possible at all? (Dahrendorf, 1959, p. 208)

Before a comprehensive theory of complex organization can evolve beyond its initial stages, concepts must be developed that enable the different dimensions of organization to be treated together in some meaningful way. Such concepts, in particular, will permit organizational conflict to be more wisely interpreted within the framework of social organization. This chapter attempts a small step towards developing the necessary concepts and testing some rudimentary propositions that could form the basis of a primitive theory of organizational conflict.

The way conflict is explained depends on whether conflict is considered to be a normal part of life, such as Dahrendorf insists, or whether it is assumed to be exceptional. The model of organization that is used will influence the questions that one will ask. If it is assumed that there is normally a strain toward consistency and the use of bureaucratic procedures, then the logical question is: What accounts for disorganization? If, however, it is assumed that disorganization is a normal state, then the problem is to explain the emergence of organization.

The compensatory model provides a useful point of departure for examining the conditions which produce organization. According to it, bureaucracy develops in

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<sup>1</sup>As it is used in this context, empirical theory is a logically coherent body of confirmed generalizations that have in common certain assumptions and concepts that can be specified with a degree of precision. It is our contention, however, that there is no formula for achieving it; that theory develops as a result of modest attempts to imaginatively think through problems in conjunction with rather close and systematic observations.

response to social differentiation and the associated coordination problems. This position is implicit in a statement already repeated, "...the larger the group and the more complex the task it seeks to accomplish, the greater are the pressures to become explicitly organized," (Blau and Scott, 1962, p. 7). Size, complexity, heterogeneity, staff turnover and expansion, plus low compliance among employees, are all potentially disruptive conditions which bureaucratic procedures are designed to control. The less effective procedures will be used in conjunction with each other as reinforcements; in fact, it is plausible that certain procedures will aggravate a problem if used alone. The extreme alternatives are either to concentrate all available resources on making one or two controls work, or to diversify procedure by using several forms of control in a minimal way. If no particular dimension is emphasized then the various dimensions will be modestly associated. In other words, the reinforcement model, in comparison to the compensatory model, prevails in abnormally tension-ridden situations where the controls being used are ineffective by themselves.

### CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES

In order to bring into focus several critical, but often neglected, features of bureaucratic organizations, three concepts have been developed in addition to those already described: total bureaucratization, structural crystallization and the bureaucratic pattern. These concepts, together with the concept of professionalism, will form the nucleus of the theoretical framework.

#### Total Bureaucratization

The components of a bureaucracy include characteristics such as standardization, centralization, interchangeability, etc. Although these elements can function somewhat independently, in reality they exist together in close association. Certain configurations of elements can conceivably have emergent effects that indepen-

dently influence rates of conflict.

The term total bureaucratization will be used to refer to several of the bureaucratic variables in combination. As a crude measure, the ranks of a school on each of the following variables were totaled<sup>2</sup>: (1) close supervision, (2) emphasis on rules and (3) centralization of (a) professional policy decisions, (b) nonprofessional policy decisions and (c) routine decisions. A school's total bureaucratization score consists of the sum of its ranks on the five variables stated.

### Structural Crystallization

An organization's total bureaucratization score refers to a hierarchical or vertical dimension. There is also a nonvertical dimension which is parallel to what Lenski refers to in another context as status crystallization, or in other words, the consistency of rankings on several status dimensions. Some evidence has been accumulated to show that the consistency of a person's separate statuses is at least as important in explaining his preference for change and his political liberalism, as his rank on any one status (Lenski, 1954; Goffman, 1957; Jackson, 1962). But the equally important sociological problem of consistency among an organization's structural positions has been relatively neglected; Landecker's (1960) and Hodge's (1962) studies are exceptions.

The structural crystallization of each school was computed as the sum of the combined differences between its ranks on the five variables used in the total bureaucratic index. Lower total scores signify smaller differences between a school's separate rankings, and thus greater crystallization of the separate structures. .

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<sup>2</sup>The standardization index was not used for this analysis since data was not available for seven of the 28 schools.

The concept of structural crystallization provides a way of classifying organizations according to their structural configurations and independently of their levels of bureaucratization. It is also relevant to the reinforcement and compensatory bureaucratic models. In crystallized organizations, bureaucratic practices are used with consistently uniform emphasis; therefore, they reinforce each other; in uncrystallized organizations one or two practices are disproportionately stressed, similar to the pattern portrayed in the compensatory model.

### The Bureaucratic Pattern

Probably certain patterns of specific relationships among the variables are as important as the magnitude of differences among the dimensions themselves. It seems plausible that the relative emphasis and de-emphasis of certain combinations of bureaucratic practices may directly contribute to conflict rates, and influence the organization's ability to control conflict where it already exists. Therefore, the variables, which are the most or the least emphasized in each school (i.e., the "high-low" patterns), will be analyzed separately.

### Professionalism

Finally, the average professional and employee orientations and the behavior of each faculty will be considered, using the measures described in Chapter 4. It will be assumed that professionalism, together with such variables as organizational complexity, staff expansion and turnover, are prominent threats to organizational control.

## ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The theory to be explored consists of these concepts, certain assumptions and derivative hypotheses and their corollaries. The system is reasonably coherent and has a limited amount of empirical support (Brodbeck, 1959). However, seldom is it

possible to directly confirm social science theories from survey data. Such theories usually assume causality (i.e., a time sequence) which is difficult to assess without an experimental design. The sample used to explore the theory suffers from the additional handicap in that it is too small for statistically reliable conclusions; the analysis should be regarded as a multiple case study.

### Major Hypotheses

The first assumption, for which there is already a certain amount of empirical support, is that professionalism is a militant process. In a pilot study of seven high schools, Corwin (1965) found that the professionalism of a faculty is directly associated with organizational tension and conflict. Another study reports that teachers want more decision-making authority than they have at present (Sharma, 1955). From a study of 20 former teachers, Washburn (1957) concluded that there is a pervasive conflict in schools between the professional status of teachers and the fact of their subordination. While teachers had thought of themselves as professionals who, by rights, should have discretion over their work, they also felt hampered and limited by administrators who specified both the goals and procedures of instruction they were to use. The growth of systematic knowledge in teaching, plus some signs of concern among teachers for students' welfare, support their claims for the right to control certain aspects of teaching. Behind professionalization is a "drive for status"--i.e., the effort of a vocation to gain more control over its work. Professional associations originally were formed to free vocations from lay control, and the efforts of teachers to professionalize are no exception. Professionalization, therefore, represents a challenge to the traditional control exercised by laymen and their administrative representatives, and for that reason, professionalizing a publicly supported vocation is likely to require some militancy. Consequently, it is hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 1: Organizational tension and conflict are positively associated with professionalism.

In contrast to professionalism, bureaucracy is a form of administrative control over subordinates, partly designed to regulate and suppress conflict in the interests of predictability. In the absence of interfering factors, conflict can be expected to diminish with bureaucratization. Therefore, it is expected that:

Hypothesis 2: Organizational tension and conflict are negatively associated with total bureaucratization.

This hypothesis is subject to qualification, however, depending upon the degree of crystallization within the organizational structure. In accordance with the compensatory model of bureaucracy, it is assumed that bureaucratic practices are not normally emphasized uniformly unless mutual reinforcement is provoked by abnormal threats of control. Accordingly, the extent of structural crystallization which does exist is likely to have evolved in response to conflict. Consequently, crystallization will be found in tension-ridden situations, and conversely, the lack of crystallization (where one or two practices are emphasized to compensate for relaxation in others) is likely to be more characteristic of relatively peaceful environments.<sup>3</sup> It is also possible that emphasizing bureaucratic controls uniformly is itself a source of aggravation, to the extent that subordinates are predisposed toward resisting control. For these reasons, it is expected that:

Hypothesis 3: Organizational tension and conflict are positively associated with structural crystallization and negatively associated with lack of crystallization.

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<sup>3</sup>The reinforcement model would lead to a different conclusion. If it were assumed that there is a natural drive in organizations to maximize control and if consistency among bureaucratic dimensions were considered to be a normal state, then structural crystallization would represent a maximum degree of control and conflict in such organizations would be minimal.

### Corollaries

Several corollaries can be derived from the major hypotheses. So, if organizational conflict is positively associated with professionalism and negatively associated with bureaucratization, then it can be expected that:

Hypothesis 1A: Professionalism is inversely associated with bureaucratization.<sup>4</sup>

If conflict is inversely associated with bureaucratization and positively associated with structural crystallization, then it can be expected that:

Hypothesis 1B: Bureaucratization and structural crystallization are inversely associated.

From the assumption that bureaucratization and professionalization are working at cross-purposes still another corollary can be derived. If professionals are attempting to increase their autonomy, and if administrators use bureaucratic practices to control professional subordinates, then situations in which these principles are simultaneously emphasized will be especially tension-ridden. The clash between these two principles will not only provoke subordinates to defy the administration, but also to dispute among one another since the principles will be upheld in different ways by various segments of subordinates (Bucher and Strauss, 1961). Therefore, it is expected that:

Hypothesis 2A: The bureaucratization of MORE professional organizations is POSITIVELY associated with organizational tension and conflict, while

Hypothesis 2B: The bureaucratization of LESS professional organizations is NEGATIVELY associated with organizational tension and conflict.

Another set of corollaries can also be derived from the major propositions. If

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<sup>4</sup>The validity of this derivation is qualified by the fact that the sign rule applies only where the correlations among the premises are "high" (Costner and Leik, 1964).

conflict increases with structural crystallization and declines with the level of bureaucratization, then it is difficult to predict the level of conflict in organizations which are simultaneously highly bureaucratized and crystallized. However, where crystallization is low and bureaucratization is high, it can be expected that:

Hypothesis 3A: In LESS crystallized organizations rates of organizational tension and conflict DECLINE with bureaucratization.

Finally, tension-producing patterns may be inherent to the structure of an organization itself. As a result, it is expected that specific patterns of relationships among the structural variables are associated differently with conflict rates. Perhaps certain types of inconsistency can be identified which contribute to conflict independently of either their degree of inconsistency or the existing threat to control.

#### FINDINGS

1. The professionalism of a school is positively associated with its rates of organizational tension and conflict (Table 6-1).<sup>5</sup>

This finding, in general, confirms the first hypothesis. The data will be examined separately for professional orientation and behavior, and for employee orientation and behavior.

#### Professional Orientation

Rank Order Correlations. The number of conflicts, reported per interview, among a faculty increases with its average professional orientation. As professional orientation increases, all but two of the 12 indices of conflict (tension between the teachers and principal and major incidents) increase; of the remainder,

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<sup>5</sup>The number at the left margins refers to the hypothesis relevant to the findings.

only the correlation with "heated discussions" is not statistically significant, and even this measure reaches statistical significance when other relevant factors have been controlled (Table 6-1). It is noteworthy that incidents among teachers increase with professionalism ( $t = .24$ ) as well as incidents between teachers and administrators ( $t = .22$ ) and incidents involving authority ( $t = .27$ ); perhaps the most professionally oriented segment of teachers alienates itself from the majority whose accommodation to the existing system is threatened by militancy.

The fact that major incidents, in contrast to other forms of conflict, decline with professionalism ( $t = -.21$ ) may provide clues to some important features of professional militancy. Besides the fact that major incidents disrupt the entire organization and divert energy from its immediate educational objectives, it is possible that professionally oriented faculties avoid them because they are able to secure enough of their demands with more limited forms of militancy. The same norms, which encourage professionals to engage in disputes, may also prescribe the appropriate means. The fact that professional faculties are also highly concerned about their colleagues' opinions means that peers can easily restrain one another.

When the proportion of faculty that see each other "very frequently" socially, and the number of staff additions, are each taken into account, the correlation with the heated discussion ratio increases, and only the ratio of incidents between teachers and administration is substantially reduced using these controls ( $t = .15ns$  and  $.16ns$ ). This latter finding does indicate that social and organizational conditions contribute to the militancy of professional faculties.

Older faculties are less professionally oriented, and perhaps due to this fact, they are also less militant. The rank order correlation between a faculty's mean age and its professional orientation is  $t = -.36$ ; the correlation of age with severe disagreement is  $t = -.40$ . When faculty age is partialled out, consequently, the association with conflict drops slightly--e.g., with rates of severe disagreement it drops

TABLE 6-1

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN A FACULTY'S  
 ENDORSEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE ROLES  
 AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT  
 (N = 28 SCHOOLS)

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	PROFESSIONAL ROLES				EMPLOYEE ROLES			
	Professional Orientation		Professional Behavior		Employee Orientation		Employee Behavior	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.40**	.35d	.27*	.11x .28d	.04	.09x .05d	-.02	-.01x .06d
Average Tension Between Teachers and Principal	-.01		.29*		-.09		-.43**	
Average Tension Between Teachers and Students	.49**		.07		.06		.04	
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>								
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.26*	.22x .23d	-.16	-.06x -.17d	-.03	.09x -.10d	.07	.08x -.12d
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.34**	.30x .28d	-.07	.14x .07d	-.16	-.17x -.05d	-.19	-.16x -.09d
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>								
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>g</sup>	.26*	.20x .16d	-.16	.08x -.18d	-.11	.01x -.06d	-.08	-.08x -.04d
Disputes	.28*	.23x .23d	.28*	.20x .26d	-.15	-.23x -.23d	-.02	-.02x .04d
Heated Discussion	.11	.24x .28d	-.18	.14x .01d	-.19	.12x	-.09	-.09x
Major Incidents	-.21*	-.20x -.28d	-.26*	-.24x .26d	-.21*	-.21x -.16d	-.29*	-.30x -.26d
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>								
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.22*	.16x .15d	-.08	.05x -.04d	-.08	-.24x -.08d	-.31*	-.34x -.25d
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.24*	.22x .16d	-.08	-.07x -.05d	.07	.05x .09d	.01	-.01x .11d
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.27*	.23x .17d	.29*	.28x .15d	.02	-.07x -.03d	-.35**	-.37x -.27d

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: d - Socialize Very Frequently With Others on Faculty

x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

<sup>g</sup>Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

TABLE 6-2

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN A FACULTY'S ENDORSEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL ROLES AND SELECTED INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT, CONTROLLING FOR LEVELS OF BUREAUCRATIZATION AND PROFESSIONALISM

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	MEAN LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION				MEAN LEVEL OF BUREAUCRATIZATION			
	High (N=14)		Low (N=14)		High (N=14)		Low (N=14)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<b><u>Rates of Disagreement:</u></b>								
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.46*	-.45bb	.43**	.43bb	.55**	.55bb	.03	.04bb
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.02	.04bb	.39*	.39bb	.45*	.44bb	.17	.17bb
<b><u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u></b>								
Total Number of All Types of Incidents <sup>Ⓢ</sup> (Gross Incident Ratio)	-.07	-.03bb	.16	.19bb	.18	.15bb	.23	.23bb
Disputes	-.22	-.22bb	.25	.33bb	.29	.31bb	.19	.19bb
Heated Discussion	.13	.16bb	-.08	-.05bb	.07	.05bb	.14	.14bb
Major Incidents	.04	.09bb	.14	.14bb	-.37*	-.36bb	-.05	-.06bb
<b><u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u></b>								
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.07	.10bb	.45	.49bb	.18	.16bb	.34*	.34bb
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	-.07	-.07bb	.19	.22bb	.20	.19bb	.19	.18bb
<b><u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u></b>	.02	.03bb	.60**	.61bb	.33*	.32bb	.23	.23bb

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant At  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant At  $p \leq .01$

KEY: bb - Bureaucratization Total

<sup>Ⓢ</sup>Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

from  $t = .33$  to  $t = .22$ , and the correlation with total tension drops from  $t = .39$  to  $t = .33$ . So, age does account for some of the militancy of professionally oriented faculties; but it does not explain much of it, and the relationship persists at all age levels.<sup>6</sup>

The associations between professionalism and militancy are much more characteristic of the less professional schools than of the more professional schools (Table 6-2). The 28 schools were divided at the midpoint on their mean professional orientation. None of the correlations held in more professional organizations, where in fact, the total disagreement rate and dispute ratio both showed a significantly negative association with professional orientation. In less professional organizations, the correlation of professional orientation with both disagreement measures and the authority incident ratio remain significant in the positive direction. It appears, then, that once a faculty reaches a certain level of professionalism, further increases in professional orientation will no longer add to conflict. Perhaps the primary professional expectations have already been implemented in the more professional schools. However, the ratio of major incidents does increase with professional orientation in the more professional schools (although the association is not statistically significant), which could indicate that when highly professional faculties do become involved in conflict, it is likely to become a violent one.

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<sup>6</sup>Computing the linear correlations for the school means on some variables does not substantially alter the conclusions reached by using the rank order correlation technique. For example, the linear correlations between school means on four principle variables with two of the incident ratios are as follows:

	Professional Orientation Behavior (N = 28)		Employee Orientation Behavior (N = 28)	
Number of Authority Incidents per Interview	.26	.16	-.28	-.38
Total Number of Incidents Reported per Interview	.18	.34	-.06	-.12

The level of bureaucratization also makes some difference. The schools were divided at the midpoint on total bureaucratization scores and the correlations re-computed for both groups. Positive correlations between professionalism and total severe disagreement rates, and a negative association with major incidents hold only in the more bureaucratic schools; while the association with incidents between teachers and administrators seems slightly more typical of less bureaucratic organizations. It is possible that professional militancy is provoked by certain bureaucratic practices, but for that same reason, professionals in these organizations are in a less favorable position to express their annoyances directly to the administration.

#### Professional Behavior

The professional behavior index gives only partial support to the conclusions derived from the professional orientation scale (Table 6-1). The more professional a faculty's conduct, the more authority incidents reported in the organization per interview ( $t = .29$ ), total tension ( $t = .27$ ), disputes ( $t = .28$ ) and fewer major incidents reported ( $t = -.29$ ).

The behavior index does not reinforce the conclusion, however, that more professional faculties actually become involved in a greater amount of conflicts with the administration, but there is evidence of additional tension between teachers and the principal ( $t = .29$ ). It should be remembered that this index is a less discriminating measure than the orientation scale, and that it measures a different dimension of professionalism. With these reservations, it can then be conceded that professional militancy is not solely a function of the particular items that make up the scales, or of the value system per se, since there is some evidence of it reflected in professional activity.

TABLE 6-3

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN A FACULTY'S  
ENDORSEMENT OF EMPLOYEE ROLES AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL  
TENSION AND CONFLICT, CONTROLLING FOR LEVELS OF PROFESSIONALISM

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	MEAN LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION			
	High (N = 14)		Low (N = 14)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>				
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.16	.17bb	-.16	-.18bb
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.10	-.10bb	-.26	-.25bb
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>				
Total Number of All Types of Incidents <sup>&amp;</sup> (Gross Incident Ratio)	-.47**	-.47v -.49bb	.19	.22v .12bb
Disputes	-.12	-.12bb	.28	.13bb
Heated Discussion	-.49**	-.50bb	.12	.02bb
Major Incidents	-.30	-.31bb	-.14	-.14bb
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>				
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	-.43*	-.44bb	.12	.05bb
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	-.27	-.27bb	.03	.05bb
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	-.65	-.65bb	-.08	-.07bb

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant At  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant At  $p \leq .01$

KEY: v - Professional Orientation  
bb - Bureaucratization Total

<sup>&</sup>Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

### Employee Orientation

The general association between a faculty's employee orientation and its rate of conflict is less clear-cut; but the correlations are all in the negative direction (Table 6-1). Only the association with major incidents is statistically significant ( $t = -.21$ ).

When the correlations are computed separately for the more and for the less professional schools, the relationship between employee orientation and conflict is clarified (Table 6-3). Only in the more professional organizations, are negative associations of professional orientation with the gross incident ratio, heated discussion, incidents between teachers and administrators and among teachers, and incidents over authority issues, statistically significant. The affects of employee orientation, in other words, shows greater evidence in the more professionally oriented schools where the employee orientation has the most opposition. The lower correlations in the less professional schools also tend to be negative; however, the association with the dispute ratio is positive. The presence of employee orientation among a professional faculty is associated with reductions in minor friction, but when the same orientation is found among a less professional faculty, only severe disagreements clearly diminish and increase.

### Employee Behavior

The average employee behavior scores of a faculty reinforces the thesis that "good" employees become involved in fewer conflicts (Table 6-1). The employee behavior index is inversely associated with the major incident ratio ( $t = -.29$ ), teacher-administrator conflict ( $t = -.31$ ), and the ratio of conflicts involving authority ( $t = -.35$ ). The correlations are not altered appreciably by controlling for the number of staff additions, the frequency of contact with the principal, or the routine decision-making authority of the faculty.

TABLE 6-4

COMPARISONS BETWEEN SCHOOLS WITH EXTREME PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE ROLE ORIENTATIONS  
ON INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT (N = 14)

SCHOOLS IN EXTREME QUARTILES OF PRO- FESSIONALISM AND EMPLOYEEISM	NUMBER OF DISAGREEMENTS AMONG TEACHERS			DEGREE OF TENSION BETWEEN		
	Total Number	Moderate Disagreements	Severe Disagreements	Student vs. Teacher	Teachers vs. Principal	Total Tension
	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$
<u>Professional Orientation</u> High Quartile (N = 7)	9.6 2.5	9.6 .63	9.6 .31	10.7 1.06	9.1 .89	10.6 6.2
Low Quartile (N = 7)	5.4 1.1 U = 10**	5.1 .22 U = 10**	5.1 .08 U = 10**	4.1 .84 U = 2***	7.0 .84 U = 13*	4.3 6.3 U = 3***
<u>Professional Behavior</u> High Quartile (N = 7)	9.7 2.96	8.8 .73	7.4 .12	8.7 1.04	8.1 .92	9.6 8.8
Low Quartile (N = 7)	5.1 1.25 U = 9**	6.1 .32 U = 15	7.4 .29 U = 25	6.1 .89 U = 16	6.8 .82 U = 20	5.2 6.2 U = 10**
<u>Employee Orientation</u> High Quartile (N = 7)	8.3 2.14	6.6 .30	6.6 .25	8.7 1.02	3.4 .70	12.4 7.27
Low Quartile (N = 7)	5.7 2.18 U = 19	8.4 .44 U = 18	8.3 .14 U = 19	6.3 .90 U = 16	10.6 1.13 U = 3***	13.1 7.50 U = 23
<u>Employee Behavior</u> High Quartile (N = 7)	8.2 2.5	7.4 .35	5.9 .20	7.1 1.00	4.7 .59	7.3 7.8
Low Quartile (N = 7)	6.9 1.6 U = 20	7.6 .30 U = 24	9.0 .14 U = 14	7.8 .95 U = 22	10.3 1.09 U = 5***	2.7 7.2 U = 23

U = The Mann-Whitney test of differences between ranks.

\* Statistically Significant at  $p \leq .08$

\*\* Statistically Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\*\* Statistically Significant at  $p \leq .01$

TABLE 6-4 Page 2

SCHOOLS IN EXTREME QUARTILES OF PROFESSIONALISM AND EMPLOYEEISM	Gross Incident Ratio	Dispute Ratio	Heated Discussion Ratio	Major Incident Ratio	Teacher vs. Administration Conflict Ratio	Teacher vs. Teacher Conflict Ratio	Ratio of Incidents Involving Authority
	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$
<u>Professional Orientation</u> High Quartile (N = 7) Low Quartile (N = 7)	9.9 22.18	9.6 .64	10.1 6.25	6.4 .64	9.1 16.80	7.9 12.09	9.9 15.67
	5.1 14.82 U = 8**	5.3 .39 U = 10**	4.9 2.60 U = 6***	8.4 2.55 U = 18	5.7 11.87 U = 13*	5.7 8.94 U = 22	6.3 11.22 U = 8**
<u>Professional Behavior</u> High Quartile (N = 7) Low Quartile (N = 7)	9.1 20.50	9.3 .74	9.0 3.74	5.3 1.43	8.1 16.28	8.4 1.14	7.7 15.37
	5.6 14.56 U = 13*	5.8 .43 U = 12*	6.0 2.85 U = 14	9.6 3.78 U = 10**	6.9 13.59 U = 20	6.6 9.35 U = 18	7.1 15.32 U = 23
<u>Employee Orientation</u> High Quartile (N = 7) Low Quartile (N = 7)	8.0 19.74	5.4 4.54	9.6 4.45	9.0 6.03	7.6 14.38	8.0 12.14	8.6 17.98
	7.0 17.69 U = 21	9.6 6.42 U = 10**	5.4 2.31 U = 10**	6.0 2.20 U = 14	7.3 15.31 U = 24	8.1 10.47 U = 20	6.3 13.26 U = 17
<u>Employee Behavior</u> High Quartile (N = 7) Low Quartile (N = 7)	7.6 20.02	7.7 5.16	6.7 3.22	5.7 1.67	5.1 13.68	8.4 11.52	5.4 12.60
	7.4 20.13 U = 24	7.1 5.69 U = 23	8.3 3.86 U = 19	9.3 6.03 U = 12*	9.9 18.99 U = 8**	6.6 11.47 U = 18	9.4 20.05 U = 11**

U = The Mann-Whitney test of differences between ranks.

\* Statistically Significant at  $p \leq .08$

\*\* Statistically Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\*\* Statistically Significant at  $p \leq .01$

### Comparisons Between the Extremes

Using a different approach, schools in the extreme upper and lower quartiles of professionalism and employeeism were also compared, and accordingly the relationship became even more accentuated. Table 6-4 reports on an analysis of variance of the way schools rank on professional orientation and the tension and conflict rates using the Mann-Whitney Test. High professional schools rank twice as high as the less professional ones on most of the measures. The total number of disagreements, the number of severe and moderate disagreements, and the number of disputes reported per interview, are all approximately twice as high in the top professional schools as in the lowest group. Except for the major incident ratio, all of the differences are in the expected direction. The ratio of major incidents is four times higher in the extreme low professional group. With the exception of the major incident and teacher-teacher ratios, the differences are statistically significant at least at the  $p < .08$  level, and nine of the 13 comparisons are significant at  $p < .05$  level or above.

The conflict ratios of schools in the extreme quartiles on the professional behavior index were also compared. Most of the differences conform to the same pattern (Table 6-3), but since this is a less reliable measure, several of the comparisons are not statistically significant. The top schools, on professional behavior, are statistically higher than the lowest quartile in the following measures (at the  $p < .08$  level or higher): total disagreements, total tension, gross incident ratio and dispute ratio. The top quartile has a significantly lower major incident ratio, but this also corresponds to the comparison of schools at the extreme of the professional orientation. The fact that the conclusions reached, from comparisons of professional behavior, are similar to those with respect to the professional orientation measure, indicate that militancy is not merely a reflection of group attitudes.

Similar comparisons of extreme quartiles of employee orientation and behavior are less conclusive; but there is evidence that schools which give the most support to the

TABLE 6-5

COMPARISONS BETWEEN FOUR MODAL TYPES OF PROFESSIONAL-EMPLOYEE ROLE, ORGANIZATION OF 28 FACULTIES ON INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT (N = 31)<sup>1</sup>

SCHOOLS CLASSIFIED BY MODAL ROLE ORGANIZATION <sup>2</sup>	NUMBER OF DISAGREEMENTS AMONG TEACHERS				ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION BETWEEN			
	Total Number	Severe Disagreements	Moderate Disagreements	Teacher Versus Student	Teacher Versus Principal	Total Tension		
	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$	Average Rank $\bar{X}$
High Professional High Employee N = 9	12.5 2.01	14.8 .27	13.4 .41	16.9 1.09	14.1 .79	18.5	8.04	
High Professional Low Employee N = 5	19.8 2.93	21.8 .58	21.2 .65	19.2 1.07	13.2 .84	19.8	8.37	
Low Professional High Employee N = 9	13.6 2.07	11.8 .08	11.7 .33	13.0 1.00	15.6 .78	13.0	7.14	
Low Professional Low Employee N = 8	12.3 2.13	14.5 .24	12.8 .37	10.8 .95	18.9 1.00	12.3	7.36	
	H = 21.17**	H = 8.74*	H = 19.21**	H = 13.73**	H = 15.42**	H = .71		

<sup>1</sup>N = 31. Schools were classified on the basis of style of role organization of the Modal proportion of faculty. Three schools where two styles were exhibited by an equally high proportion of faculty, were included under two headings, which inflates the N by 3.

<sup>2</sup>Based on the Modal Proportion of faculty members in a school who simultaneously hold each combination of status orientations.

& All  $\bar{X}$  Ratios refer to the number of incidents reported per interview.

\* Statistically Significant at  $P \leq .05$

\*\* Statistically Significant at  $P \leq .01$



employee orientation have significantly fewer disputes and less tension between teachers and the principal. Contrary to the general pattern, however, the most employee oriented faculty becomes involved in twice as many heated discussions (Table 6-3). Also, parallel comparisons of extreme quartiles on employee behavior confirm the general conclusion that loyal employees are less militant, at least in some respects. The group with the lowest employee behavior has significantly fewer major incidents, teacher-administrator conflicts, incidents involving authority, and less tension between teachers and principal.

#### Role Organization

Faculties were also classified on the basis of four predominate (modal) styles of role organization (see Table 6-5). The differences on ten of the 13 conflict indices are statistically significant, as attested to by the Mann-Whitney analysis of variance between ranks (Table 6-4). Schools that have the highest proportions of faculty with simultaneously high professional- and low employee-orientations rank higher than the other three types on several of the significant measures--i.e., except total tension, the major incident ratio, and tension between teachers and principals. In both of the latter cases, their rates are lowest. However, schools where the reverse pattern predominates (i.e., low professional-high employee conceptions) do not have uniformly lower conflict rates. But they do rank low on moderate and severe disagreements, heated discussions, teacher-teacher conflicts, authority incidents and perhaps on the gross incident ratio. Schools in which faculties characteristically do not subscribe strongly to either have erratic conflict patterns. Tension between teachers and students is, ironically, the lowest in these schools; and between teachers and the principal, it is the highest; the dispute ratio is the lowest and the major incident ratio the highest.

TABLE 6-6

LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION OF 28  
SCHOOLS AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	SCHOOLS CLASSIFIED BY (MEAN) LEVEL OF:							
	Professional Orientation				Employee Orientation			
	High	Average	Low	H	High	Average	Low	H
<b>TOTAL TENSION</b>								
Average Rank	19.3	16.2	8.5	5.82	14.2	14.6	14.6	4.98
Mean	8.4	8.1	6.7		7.4	7.9	8.0	
<b>TOTAL</b>								
Average Rank	16.2	20.0	6.6	7.57	15.8	16.2	12.8	1.68
Mean	2.9	2.9	1.2		2.3	2.4	2.3	
<b>SEVERE</b>								
Average Rank	16.1	18.0	8.4	.05	10.2	14.2	17.5	7.26
Mean	.30	.52	.07		.21	.17	.53	
<b>GROSS INCIDENT RATIO</b>								
Rank	13.3	14.0	8.8	17.20*	11.3	15.9	16.0	8.82
Ratio	.85	.85	.15		.18	2.02	2.09	
<b>DISPUTE RATIO</b>								
Rank	16.3	18.3	8.1	18.13**	13.9	17.2	11.8	8.14
Ratio	.65	.81	.38		.6	7.35	.54	
<b>HEATED DISCUSSION RATIO</b>								
Rank	18.2	13.1	12.2	9.73*	10.2	17.6	15.2	10.85*
Ratio	.52	.29	.28		.25	.44	.39	
<b>MAJOR INCIDENT RATIO</b>								
Rank	10.9	15.4	16.9	9.09	14.1	10.8	18.8	10.98*
Ratio	.21	.31	.25		.20	.16	.52	
<b>TEACHER VS. ADMINISTRATOR CONFLICT RATIO</b>								
Rank	16.0	18.0	9.0	13.10*	12.7	16.1	12.6	.82
Ratio	1.65	1.83	1.19		1.47	1.72	1.50	
<b>TEACHER VS. TEACHER CONFLICT RATIO</b>								
Rank	15.56	18.7	8.78	14.52**	14.4	13.1	16.0	7.46
Ratio	1.16	1.35	.87		1.11	1.07	1.213	
<b>RATIO OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING AUTHORITY</b>								
Rank	14.4	20.1	8.1	16.65**	10.4	15.4	14.5	3.82
Ratio	1.45	1.9	1.16		1.353	1.47	1.41	

\* H statistically significant at  $p < .05$  tested by the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of Variance of Ranks, N = 28

\*\* H statistically significant at  $p < .01$  tested by the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of Variance of Ranks, N = 28

It has been shown, then, that there is a linear relationship between professional orientation and various measures of organizational tension and conflict; that extremely professional faculties have higher rates of conflict than the less professional extreme; and that faculties which combine a high professional orientation with a low employee orientation have more conflict, generally, than faculties which organize their roles in other ways.

#### Level of Orientation and Conflict

Finally, in Table 6-6, the schools have been classified into three categories, on the basis of their mean professional orientations first, and then on the basis of their employee orientations. The table indicates why the linear rank order correlation coefficients are not higher than they are. Six of the ten comparisons of average ranks are statistically significant as tested by the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance method. There is a crude linear trend only between levels of professional orientation and the average ranks on heated discussion and major incidents. In all other cases, the relationship is slightly curvilinear, and the primary differences are due to the relatively low conflict rates of the low-ranking professional schools. Many of the differences between schools with different levels of employee orientations are also curvilinear.

Only two of the comparisons of the conflict rates of schools with different levels of employee orientation are statistically significant, although several others approach significance. These measures also show signs of curvilinearity.

#### Teacher-Student Relations

Table 6-1 seems to indicate that the primary tension (as distinguished from overt incidents) in professional schools is not between teachers and principals

( $t = -.01$ ).<sup>7</sup> Actually, professionalism is more highly correlated with the reported level of tension between them (teachers and principals) and their students ( $t = .40$ ).

The fact that professionally oriented faculties feel more tension with their students can conceivably arise because they place more emphasis on knowledge and expect more of their students in general. The intention of students to do a "quality job" is probably weaker than the pressures on them to simply achieve better grades. An analysis of the four sub-scales comprising the professional scale (reported in the following chapter) supports this interpretation: tension between teachers and students increases significantly with teachers' emphasis on knowledge ( $t = .43$ ); it increases as well with emphasis on decision-making ( $t = .37$ ) and with colleague orientation ( $t = .25$ ).

1-A. The association between bureaucratization and professionalism is in the expected direction ( $t = -.18ns$ ); however, it does not quite reach statistical significance, and controlling for the mean age of the faculty does not alter the relationship. Therefore, there is only meager support for hypothesis 1-A. There seems to be only a slight tendency for bureaucratic organizations either to selectively recruit less professional teachers or to give them a smaller amount of support. But if professionalism is inversely associated with bureaucratization, then this might indicate that professionalism is opposed to bureaucratic principles.

At the same time, the positive association between employee orientation and bureaucratization is statistically significant ( $t = .24$ ), which indicates that bureaucratic organizations selectively give support to the employee role conception.

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<sup>7</sup>There is some tension between them and the principal's administrative assistants ( $t = .21$ ) (not shown in tables), and perhaps between them and the superintendent ( $t = .18ns$ , not shown), although this latter figure does not quite reach acceptable levels of statistical significance.

1-B. Total bureaucratization is not linearly associated with structural crystallization ( $t = -.04$ ). Hypothesis 1-B, therefore, is not supported by the rank order correlation. This lack of confirmation will require subsequent modifications in the theory.

2. Total bureaucratization is not linearly associated with conflict (Table 6-7). However, there is a negative association with some types of conflict in LESS BUREAUCRATIC organizations (Table 6-8). The lack of a clear negative association between bureaucratization and conflict is surprising, especially in view of the fact that more of the bureaucratic organizations tend to be less professionally and more employee oriented, which is a pattern that otherwise is associated with low rates of conflict.

But contrary to the prediction, bureaucratization appears to be relatively ineffective with major conflicts. Although the correlation with major incidents approaches statistical significance (and it is statistically significant when structural crystallization is controlled), the association is positive, which is opposite to the predicted direction; also, the relationship again falls below significance when controlling for average professional orientation ( $t_p = .13$ ).

The correlation with heated discussion is also positive and approaches significance when professional orientation is controlled ( $t_p = .19$ ). The possibility that major incidents and heated discussions occur more frequently in bureaucratic organizations suggests that bureaucratization is not an entirely effective means of curbing major forms of conflict, and, in fact, may provoke them.

When an organization's level of bureaucratization is taken into account, however, it appears that further increases in bureaucratization of those schools already relatively bureaucratized do not significantly suppress authority incidents ( $t = -.52$ ). The gross number of conflicts also tends to diminish, but the correlation is not statistically significant for a sample of 14 ( $t = .27$ ). However, major incidents seem to become more prevalent as the bureaucratization of relatively bureaucratic

TABLE 6-7

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AN ORGANIZATION'S  
STRUCTURAL CRYSTALLIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIZATION  
AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	STRUCTURAL CRYSTALLIZATION (N = 28)		TOTAL BUREAUCRATIZATION (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.22*	.22bb .21v	.02	.09v
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>				
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.14	.14bb .12v	.02	.07v
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.16	.16bb .14v	-.03	.03v
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>				
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio)&	.04	.04bb .02v	.03	.08v
Disputes	.26*	.26bb .25v	.07	.12v
Heated Discussion	-.15	-.16v	.12	.19v
Major Incidents	-.44**	-.46bb -.44v	.16	.13v
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>				
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	-.06	-.06bb -.08v	.09	.13v
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	-.03	-.03bb -.05v	.02	.06v
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	-.05	-.05bb -.07v	-.04	.01v

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$

KEY: v - Professional Orientation  
bb - Bureaucratization Total

& Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

TABLE 6-8

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AN ORGANIZATION'S TOTAL BUREAUCRATIZATION AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT BY LEVELS OF BUREAUCRATIZATION AND PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION OF THE FACULTY

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	MEAN PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION		MEAN TOTAL BUREAUCRATIZATION	
	High (N = 14)	Low (N = 14)	High (N = 14)	Low (N = 14)
	Taus	Taus	Taus	Taus
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>				
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.29	-.01	-.05	-.06
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.13	-.08	-.09	.03
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>				
Total Number of All Types of Incidents <sup>&amp;</sup> (Gross Incident Ratio)	.15	.08	-.27	.19
Disputes	.00	.35*	-.14	-.01
Heated Discussion	.18	.21	-.16	.10
Major Incidents	.32	-.03	.36*	.10
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>				
Teachers(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.21	.17	-.16	-.01
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	-.04	.17	-.05	.14
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.09	-.03	-.52**	.06

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$

<sup>&</sup> Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

organizations becomes greater. It is possible that the lack of opportunity for expressing minor disputes causes a buildup of problems which then take the form of major incidents when they do materialize. Routine conflict, in other words, which provides an escape valve to release pressure, fails to function when minor incidents are suppressed (Coser, 1956).

It appears, too, that bureaucratization may have different implications in more professional and in less professional organizations. Although the correlation does not reach statistical significance, it is interesting to note that in the more professional schools the total disagreement rate and incidents between teachers and administration show signs of increasing, rather than declining, with bureaucratization. Perhaps bureaucratization is not as effective in more professional organizations; and possibly, professionally oriented faculties marshal more resistance to attempts to extend administrative controls.

The hypothesis, then, must be modified to take into account the severity of conflict plus the level of professionalism and bureaucratization that an organization has achieved. Interpreting these trends loosely, it appears that bureaucratization does not necessarily suppress conflict, and that it may, in fact, aggravate major incidents. But slight increases of bureaucratization in less bureaucratic organizations do appear to be effective in coping with milder incidents and general organizational tensions--although again it is ineffective with, and may provoke, major incidents. It is possible that bureaucratic practices contribute to tension even while helping to curb the outbreak of more routine friction.

Some of the apparent irregularities in the relationships between total bureaucratization and the rates of conflict become more coherent after professionalism has been controlled.

2-A. Among schools with MORE professionally oriented faculties, all measures of conflict, except severe disagreements, are HIGHER in MORE bureaucratized than in LESS bureaucratized organizations (Table 6-9) whereas;

2-B. Among schools with LESS professionally oriented faculties, all of the measures of conflict, except the dispute ratio, are LOWER in MORE bureaucratized than in LESS bureaucratized organizations (Table 6-9).

This summary statement overstates the case since the cell sizes are very small; but the trends do tend to support hypothesis 2-A and 2-B. Analyzing the levels of bureaucratization separately for the most professional and the least professional schools, helps to clarify the independent affects of bureaucratization. It should be noted first, that with the exception of major incidents, more professionally oriented faculties have significantly higher rates of conflict than ones which are less professionally oriented (Table 6-9, totals). However, the rate of major incidents in less professional schools is twice that of more professional schools.

In considering first only the most professional schools, three of which are also highly bureaucratized in comparison to the five with the lowest level of bureaucratization, they have more of all types of conflict except severe disagreements. Except for severe disagreement and major incidents, the trends appear to be more dichotomous or curvilinear, rather than linear, with schools of average bureaucratization hovering near one extreme or the other. On the other hand, bureaucratization does seem to be effective in curbing severe disagreements in professionally oriented schools. The severe disagreement rate declines in proportion to the level of bureaucratization exactly the way the ratio of major incidents increases with bureaucratization. The fact that conflict in more bureaucratic professional schools takes on a more typical form of dispute and/or major incidents may have something to do with it. Open disputes provide an opportunity for disagreements to be resolved

TABLE 6-9

COMPARISONS AMONG LEVELS OF TOTAL BUREAUCRATIZATION OF 28 SCHOOLS ON  
INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT, BY LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	HIGH PROFESSIONALISM				LOW PROFESSIONALISM				HIGH VS. LOW PROFESSIONALISM (TOTALS ONLY)
	Level of Bureaucratization (N=14)				Level of Bureaucratization (N=14)				
	High (N=3)	Average (N=6)	Low (N=5)	Total (N=14)	High (N=5)	Average (N=5)	Low (N=4)	Total (N=14)	
Average Total Tension Between All Roles	8.57	8.70	7.61	8.28	6.15	7.28	7.17	6.84	46.67**
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	4.32	2.48	2.56	2.90	1.62	1.64	2.24	1.80	28.87**
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.26	.49	.56	.43	.05	.09	.13	.09	2.14**
Number of Major Incidents Reported Per Interview	.22	.24	.11	.19	.30	.16	.73	.38	1.90*
Number of Disputes Reported Per Interview	.91	.67	.73	.74	.61	.47	.45	.51	.33
Total Number of Incidents Called Type I Reported Per Interview	2.25	2.30	2.05	2.20	1.76	1.58	1.88	1.73	2.81**

\* Statistically Significant, one tail test,  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Statistically Significant, one tail test,  $p \leq .01$

before they become more severe, and failing that, in these highly bureaucratic situations, they may possibly materialize into full-scale major incidents. In the 14 less professional schools, for example--to the extent that there is a pattern--it is in the reverse direction. The four low professional schools which are less bureaucratic exhibit greater conflict than the more bureaucratized ones (Table 6-9).

Too few cases are involved to reach any conclusion and it appears that under less militant conditions, bureaucratization does succeed in reducing some, but not all, types of conflict. In comparison to the more bureaucratic ones, among the less bureaucratic, there are more of the following: higher rates of total disagreement, total tension, severe disagreement, major incidents, and gross incident ratios.<sup>8</sup> (However, in the case of both disputes and total tension, the lowest rates are in the schools of average bureaucratization.)

In other words, the bureaucratization of less professional organizations appears to reduce most forms of conflict; whereas when more professional schools become bureaucratized, conflict appears to increase. This is in accordance with the general thesis that bureaucratization and professionalization are incompatible forms of organization. But the trends, with respect to the more severe forms of conflict in professional schools, are exceptions to the general pattern. Since rates of severe conflict are several times higher in more professional organizations than in less professional ones, it appears that even in relatively militant professional organizations, bureaucratic practices are effective in quelling some types of conflict.

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<sup>8</sup>Because of the small number of schools in each cell, meaningful statistical tests could not be computed. However, for each conflict measure the schools were dichotomized on the basis of the sample mean. When the frequency distributions of the high and low professional schools in the high bureaucratic category were compared, a pattern formed for most of the 2x2 tables. All three of the high professional schools, for example, had high total tension and all five of the low professional schools had low total tension. In the case of total disagreement, there was one deviation from a perfect pattern, and in the case of disputes, there were two deviations. The other measures have three deviations each. However, a similar pattern could not be discerned for the less bureaucratic schools.

But otherwise, the efforts to bureaucratize professionally oriented faculties appear to aggravate tension.

The theory requires some modification, but several of the hypotheses have some support. In turning to the concept of structural crystallization, other complications developed.

3. There are statistically significant positive associations between an organization's rank on structural crystallization and the way it ranks on total tension ( $t = .22$ ) and the ratio of disputes ( $t = .26$ ); there is a negative association with the ratio of major incidents ( $t = -.44$ ) (Table 6-7). The associations with severe and total disagreement rates also are positive, but they are not statistically significant. The hypothesis tends to have some support, except for the fact that structural crystallization seems to be associated with fewer major incidents (even after total bureaucratization and professional orientation have been partialled out). The simultaneous use of bureaucratic practices as reinforcements for one another, then, seems to be effective in curbing major incidents, even though it is not effective with lesser forms of conflict.

In further support of the hypothesis, when schools are classified (trichotomized) in terms of the extent of structural crystallization (with the exception of major incidents), the 9 most structurally consistent schools have uniformly higher conflict rates than those with lower structural consistency (Table 6-10). Statistical tests between the nine highly crystallized schools and the nine low crystallized schools are significant for the total tension, dispute ratio and major incident ratio comparisons. Schools with average structural crystallization conform to a similar linear pattern with respect to total tension, total rate of disagreement, and major incidents, but again the association with the major incident ratio is in the inverse direction in contrast to the rest of the conflict measures.

TABLE 6-10

COMPARISONS AMONG LEVELS OF STRUCTURAL CRYSTALLIZATION OF  
28 SCHOOLS ON INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	LEVEL OF STRUCTURAL CRYSTALLIZATION					Total $\bar{X}$
	High (N=9) $\bar{X}$	Average (N=10) $\bar{X}$	Low (N=9) $\bar{X}$	t Test High vs. Low		
Average Total Tension Between All Roles	8.09	7.63	6.69	2.86*		7.74
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	2.95	2.09	2.05	1.41		2.35
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.40	.12	.32	.31		.31
Number of Major Incidents Reported Per Interview	.11	.22	.54	2.87*		.23
Number of Disputes Reported Per Interview	.77	.61	.51	2.60*		.68
Total Number of Incidents Called Type I Reported Per Interview	1.94	2.07	1.85	.32		2.02

\* Statistically Significant, one tail test,  $p \leq .01$

The pattern of evidence, then, provides some support for hypothesis 3, although many of the individual tests are not statistically reliable. The fact that the correlations are reduced slightly but uniformly when potentially disrupting characteristics of staff expansion, professionalism, and complexity are controlled indicates that crystallization in itself is not entirely responsible for the conflict; nor is it necessarily a direct response to conflict itself. While the correlation between crystallization and professional orientation is not high ( $r = .08$ ),<sup>9</sup> the correlations with staff expansion ( $r = .21$ ) and with organizational complexity ( $r = .12$ ) are at least as high as the relationship of this variable with some of the measures of conflict. This may indicate that structural crystallization is a response to other potentially disruptive characteristics, most of which in turn, are associated with conflict. If other factors intervene between structural crystallization and conflict, then this fact would help to explain the lack of association between bureaucratization and crystallization noted in the tests of corollary 1-B.

When the level of bureaucratization and of structural crystallization are considered jointly, it is possible to distinguish organizations that are consistently highly bureaucratic from those that are consistently less bureaucratic. It was felt that structural crystallization, when in conjunction with bureaucratization, would produce an interaction effect that alters the association of either variable with conflict.

3-A. In organizations with LESS crystallized structures, the most bureaucratic ones have LOWER conflict rates than the least bureaucratized ones (Table 6-11).

Again the cells are small, and except for major incidents, uncrystallized highly

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<sup>9</sup>The fact that the most structurally consistent schools also have the most professionally oriented faculties ( $\bar{X} = 59.2$ ) is further reason for believing that structural consistency is more of an organizational response to professionalism than it is a direct response to conflict itself.

bureaucratized organizations have the lowest rates of conflict in the entire sample. On one hand, crystallization probably evolves only in conflictful environments, and on the other hand, bureaucratization helps to suppress the friction that does arise. Whereas most forms of conflict increase as the already tension-ridden highly crystallized organizations become bureaucratized, conflict diminishes with the bureaucratization of less crystallized organizations. Since several forms of conflict are higher in more crystallized organizations, these patterns seem to suggest that attempts to bureaucratize already conflictful organizations merely aggravate the conflict; it is in less conflictful organizational environments that bureaucratization is most effective.

In organizations with MORE crystallized structures, the MOST bureaucratic ones have HIGHER total tension and dispute ratios than the LEAST bureaucratic ones (Table 6-11). The total disagreement rate is double in more bureaucratic crystallized organizations, and the severe disagreement rate is several times higher than in crystallized organizations which are less bureaucratic. The sample, however, is again too small for other than suggestive purposes, and some of the differences are slight and non-uniform. Nevertheless, they seem to contribute to the beginning of a general pattern.

Severe disagreements and major incidents seem to have a reverse pattern; severe disagreements are several times higher in less bureaucratic crystallized organizations. Bureaucratization may suppress or prevent more severe and intense forms of disagreement, although it does not seem to be effective with the even more intensive major incidents.

If conflict increases as crystallized organizations become more bureaucratic, the opposite trend also appears--i.e., that conflict increases as bureaucratic organizations become more crystallized (Table 6-12). Among the most bureaucratic organizations--except for severe disagreements and case major incidents--those which are

TABLE 6-11

COMPARISONS AMONG LEVELS OF BUREAUCRATIZATION OF 28 SCHOOLS ON RATES OF DISAGREEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION, BY LEVEL OF STRUCTURAL CRYSTALLIZATION

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	HIGH CRYSTALLIZATION				AVERAGE CRYSTALLIZATION				LOW CRYSTALLIZATION			
	Bureaucratization				Bureaucratization				Bureaucratization			
	High (N=2)	Average (N=3)	Low (N=4)		High (N=4)	Average (N=6)	Low (N=0)		High (N=2)	Average (N=2)	Low (N=5)	
Average Total Tension Between All Roles	8.48	8.53	8.00		7.42	8.11	-		5.97	7.81	7.43	
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	4.45	1.98	2.59		1.85	2.47	-		1.31	2.03	2.44	
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.09	.27	.94		.17	.13	-		.09	1.54	.23	
Number of Major Incidents Reported Per Interview	.10	.11	.17		.26	.20	-		.34	.42	.44	
Number of Disputes Reported Per Interview	1.03	.63	.79		.66	.58	-		.55	.63	.61	
Total Number of Incidents Called Type I Reported Per Interview	1.97	2.17	1.91		2.24	1.97	-		1.36	1.81	2.21	

TABLE 6-12

COMPARISONS AMONG LEVELS OF BUREAUCRATIZATION OF 28 SCHOOLS AND  
INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT, BY LEVEL OF CRYSTALLIZATION

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	HIGH BUREAUCRATIZATION Level of Crystallization			AVERAGE BUREAUCRATIZATION Level of Crystallization			LOW BUREAUCRATIZATION Level of Crystallization		
	High (N=2)	Average (N=4)	Low (N=2)	High (N=3)	Average (N=6)	Low (N=2)	High (N=4)	Average (N=0)	Low (N=5)
	Average Total Tension Between All Roles	8.48	7.42	5.97	8.53	8.11	7.81	8.00	-
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	4.45	1.85	1.31	1.98	2.47	2.03	2.59	-	2.44
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.09	.17	.23	.27	.13	1.54	.94	-	.12
Number of Major Incidents Reported Per Interview	.10	.26	.42	.11	.20	.34	.17	-	.44
Number of Disputes Reported Per Interview	1.03	.66	.55	.63	.58	.63	.79	-	.61
Total Number of Incidents Called Type I Reported Per Interview	1.97	2.24	1.36	2.17	1.97	1.81	1.91	-	2.21

highly crystallized have higher conflict rates than those which are less crystallized. The trend for severe disagreements and major incidents is reversed, however. They are least prevalent in organizations which are simultaneously highly bureaucratic and crystallized. Crystallization in bureaucratic organizations, in other words, seems to be ineffective with milder forms of incidents while apparently successful in suppressing the more intense forms of conflict.

The pattern in the least bureaucratic organizations is less clear-cut. In comparison to the lower amount of friction associated with the bureaucratization of less crystallized organizations, the crystallization of the least bureaucratic organizations is accompanied by higher rates in some forms of conflict. Major incidents, and the gross incident ratio, constitute the major exceptions. The crystallization of less bureaucratic organizations again is accompanied by a reduction of major incidents. In organizations of average levels of bureaucratization there is no clear trend.

In summing up, most forms of milder friction are relatively high in organizations which are simultaneously bureaucratized and crystallized. As a way of increasing control, bureaucratization can be expected to reduce conflict. But it does not appear to be as effective in the more conflictful situations. As crystallization seems to evolve in more conflictful environments, that characteristic probably indicates the existence of tension. Both the bureaucratization of the most crystallized organizations and the crystallization of the most bureaucratic ones are associated with relatively high rates of conflict. However, the bureaucratization of less crystallized organizations and the decrystallization of less bureaucratic organizations are accompanied by reductions in friction.

The more extreme forms of conflict, severe disagreements and major incidents, on the other hand, form the opposite pattern. Bureaucratization is accompanied by reductions in major incidents, regardless of the organization's level of crystal-

lization; and crystallization is accompanied by a reduction of major incidents regardless of the level of bureaucratization: severe disagreement rates tend to conform to the same pattern under conditions of high crystallization and high bureaucratization. It appears, then, that bureaucratization does suppress conflict, but only in less crystallized organizations, while crystallization tends to evolve in an environment that is already tension-ridden.

As these conclusions are based on a few case studies, they must be regarded as highly speculative and suggestive. But the overall pattern of data suggests that it is worth exploring more extensively into the relationship of bureaucratization and crystallization to conflict. The same form of organization which is effective with more extreme conflict may be less effective with milder forms of friction, and the reverse.

#### Patterns of Bureaucracy

The fact that structurally crystallized schools are more conflictful than crystallized ones, in part, may be due to a tendency for crystallization (hence reinforcement) to develop in situations which already are more conflictful. But it is also quite possible that some conflict may be produced independently by certain patterns of consistency and inconsistency. In view of the sample size, the findings again must be considered only illustrative, but the detailed analysis in Table 6-13 illustrates how conflict fluctuates with different patterns of emphasis on the various procedures.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>In seven of the nine schools having highly crystallized structures, either rules or close supervision were the most emphasized procedures of the five included in the measure. These same two dimensions, on the other hand, were emphasized in only three of nine schools with low crystallization; the other six uncrystallized schools were, however, characterized by an emphasis on centralized decision-making.

TABLE 6-13

**TYPES OF HIGH-LOW STRUCTURAL PATTERNS AND  
INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT**

SELECTED MEASURES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	TYPES OF HIGH LOW STRUCTURAL PATTERNS		
	Type I* (N=10)	Type II** (N=7)	All Other (N=11)
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	7.94	6.92	7.94
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>			
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	2.73	1.46	2.41
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.56	.10	.13
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>			
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio)&	2.27	1.66	1.86
Disputes	.80	.46	.58
Major Incidents	.19	.38	.32
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>			
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	1.65	1.60	1.47
<u>Mean Professional Orientation</u>	58.59	57.29	57.68

\* Type I: Emphasis on either rules or close supervision, and decentralization of professional or nonprofessional policy decisions on routine decision.

\*\* Type II: Centralization of professional and nonprofessional policy decisions on routine decisions, and deemphasis of either rules or close supervision.

The schools were classified as follows (according to which practices were simultaneously most emphasized and deemphasized):

Type I      EMPHASIS ON  
              (a) Rules  
              (b) Close supervision

              DECENTRALIZATION OF  
              (a) Professional  
              (b) Nonprofessional policy decisions  
              (c) Routine decisions<sup>11</sup>

Type II      CENTRALIZATION OF  
              (a) Professional  
              (b) Nonprofessional policy decisions  
              (c) Routine decisions

              DEEMPHASIS OF  
              (a) Rules  
              (b) Close supervision

Type III    All other high-low emphasis combinations.

It was found that the Type I pattern has higher rates of conflict and tension than the Type II pattern in every case, except for major incidents--in which the difference is reversed; also, the difference in teacher-administrator conflict ratios appears to be negligible (Table 6-13).<sup>11</sup> More specifically, four of the five schools having the lowest rates of total disagreement have a Type II pattern. The mean total disagreement rates of schools with the Type I pattern are uniformly higher than those of the Type II pattern.<sup>12</sup> The pattern with the uniformly highest conflict rates across most of the various measures is: close supervision or

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<sup>11</sup> A separate analysis, not reported, revealed that a Type I pattern is found predominately in structurally crystallized schools, while no Type II patterns were found in the most crystallized schools. This suggests that the distribution of bureaucratic patterns among schools with different degrees of crystallization may contribute independently to the conflict rates already observed.

<sup>12</sup> Since the faculties in the schools with the highest conflict rates tend to have higher professional orientations (see Table 6-13), that fact probably contributes to the conflict, and it seems plausible that these structural patterns develop in response to conflict arising from professionalism. However, the fact that the schools having the highest professional orientations have below average rates of total disagreement suggests that, in some cases, potentially conflictful schools are curbed more effectively by certain bureaucratic patterns, namely--where there is close decentralization of routine decisions.

emphasis on rules in conjunction with decentralization of nonprofessional policy decisions. However, the highest tension and disagreement rates in the sample occur in schools in the "other" category--emphasis on rules and deemphasis of supervision.

Schools with "other" combinations of united high-low patterns combined tend to have conflict rates intermediate to the Type I and Type II patterns. However, the fact that the level of organizational tension in Type I organizations is identical to that of schools with the other patterns indicates that what is critical, in this case, is that Type II organizations produce less tension than all of the others combined.

But in view of the fact that the conflict rates associated with these structural patterns are paralleled by correspondingly high and low professional orientations, one should not conclude prematurely that the pattern itself is responsible for the conflict. This possibility must be weighed against the possibility that certain types of structural arrangements simply attract or reinforce professionalism, which in turn is responsible for the conflict.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Data from limited exploratory studies that are based on small samples seldom permit interpretations to be confirmed, and, in this case, the problem is particularly acute because in its present state, the theory neither clearly specifies the cause of conflict nor accounts for its intensity. Yet, an attempt will be made to modify the theory, in view of the findings, with respect to both of these considerations. The role of structural crystallization in the conflict process must be interpreted in view of other intervening conditions. With the present data, it is not possible to determine to what extent structural crystallization, and for that matter, bureaucratization itself, are simply responses to existing conflictful situations and to what extent they contribute to that conflict. Probably each inter-

pretation is partially correct under different conditions and also depending upon which features of bureaucracy are being considered. But since the relative validity of these interpretations will eventually alter the implications of the theory, a cautious speculation will be attempted at this point.

It seems plausible that structural crystallization is not a direct response to conflict itself, as much as it is a response to other related conditions which themselves are associated with conflict. Structural crystallization, thus, may evolve in response to certain potentially conflictful conditions--conditions such as professionalism, organizational complexity, and staff turnover and expansion; and it is for this reason that a crude association appears between crystallization and conflict rather than between crystallization and bureaucratization itself. Rather than necessarily increasing with conflict, structural crystallization seems to reinforce whatever association exists between bureaucratization and conflict. Hence, if highly bureaucratic organizations are associated with high tension but with low rates of severe conflict, then these same trends tend to be intensified in consistently bureaucratic (i.e., crystallized) organizations.

However, in highly bureaucratic organizations, the fact that low crystallization is associated with low conflict rates (regardless of the association in crystallized bureaucratic ones), may indicate that uncrystallized organizations operate on a slightly different principle. Whereas crystallized organizations that have become highly bureaucratized may or may not be associated with existing conflict, uncrystallized bureaucratic ones seem to evolve more securely where there is relatively little conflict. The regulatory functions of bureaucratization, together with the tendency for organizations in less conflictful situations to remain uncrystallized, help to account for the relatively low rates of routine friction in uncrystallized, highly bureaucratic organizations. These appear to be the organizations in which the compensatory bureaucratic model (in which a few bureau-

cratic practices compensate for the neglect of others) is most applicable and most effective. It appears to be less effective, however, in organizations of average or low bureaucratization.

It now appears that if bureaucratization suppresses conflict, it is only the more intense conflicts which are suppressed effectively, and assuming that suppression is involved at all. The data does not demonstrate that bureaucratic practices "suppress" the outbreak of severe conflicts lying below the surface, however, and it is plausible that bureaucratization simply clarifies the structure so that there is less reason for conflict to develop at all. Also, although bureaucratic practices seem to be most effective in precisely the more tension-ridden professionally oriented schools (in which conflict is generally more characteristic), it was seen that professional faculties typically do not engage in major incidents, even though milder friction is more characteristic of such organizations. Bureaucratic organizations appear to be more effective in coping with more intense forms of conflict than with milder forms (which indeed they seem to aggravate), particularly in the presence of professionalism. Nevertheless, the evidence does not dispute the effectiveness of bureaucratization, particularly when it is accompanied by crystallization, in curbing more severe outbreaks.

It has been shown, also, that there is a linear relationship between professional orientation and various measures of organizational tension and conflict; that extremely professional faculties have higher rates of conflict than the less professional extreme; and that faculties which combine a high professional orientation with a low employee orientation have more conflict (in most respects) than faculties which organize their roles in other ways.

The fact that professionally oriented faculties sense more tension with their students conceivably arises because they place more emphasis on knowledge and expect more of their students in general.

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## CHAPTER 7

### SCHOOLS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS: An Elaboration of the Theory

I am concerned with a problem, namely, with the puzzling fact that social structures as distinct from most other structures are capable of producing within themselves the elements of their supersession and change. Social structures not only are subject to change but create permanently and systematically some of the determinant forces of their change within themselves (Dahrendorf, 1958).

Litwak (1961) has insisted that there is a compelling need to have models of organization which permit conflict. The theory introduced in the preceding chapter is an initial step but, since it is limited to only the gross measures of bureaucratization and professionalism, it represents merely an approximation of a more complete explanation. This chapter, therefore, tests additional hypotheses that seek to link conflict to professional roles as well as to other principles of organization. As a point of departure, it may be helpful to enumerate the critical variables which seem to recur in the literature on organizational conflict:

1. Specialization of personnel and functional division of resources are sources of conflict (Thompson, 1961). Some conflict occurs because certain parts of an organization develop a degree of autonomy from the others; having distinct functions, they develop their own objectives and norms and compete with one another (Katz, 1964). The simultaneous pressures toward departmental autonomy, on the one hand, and official interdependence of departments, on the other, represent contradictions (Gouldner, 1959). The amount of this pressure varies with the proximity of departments and the relationships between certain key members of each department (Kahn, 1964), and with the consequent need for joint decision-making (March and Simon, 1958). White, for example, found that the drive for departmental autonomy was greatest in those

areas where the interrelation of tasks was highest; hostility was also highest at these points (White, 1961). The crucial problem seems to be that departments and organizations have little control over outsiders, and yet are subject to their criticisms (Kahn, 1964).

2. Hierarchical conflicts result from interest-group struggles over the allocation of rewards--status, prestige and monetary returns (Katz, 1964; Thompson, 1960). The people in supervisory positions are especially subject to tensions (Kahn, 1964) because of anomalies inherent in such positions: the "dual" basis of authority, i.e., technical competence as opposed to sheer incumbency of office; pressures from superiors for efficiency in contrast to the professional's veneration of technical procedure; and the fact that executives in complex organizations typically are less qualified than their own subordinates to judge the specialists below them (Gouldner, 1959).
3. Latent roles of the labor force based on differences in the social backgrounds of an organization's members contribute to conflict (Thompson, 1960; Becker and Geer, 1960). Conflicts arise between generations, between new and old organizational elites, between males and females and between "locals" and "cosmopolitans" (Gouldner, 1959). These groups also differ in their loyalty to the organization, to lay audiences, and to their professions.

Gamson's (1966) efforts to explain rancorous conflict in community politics in terms of structural characteristics illustrates the general form which a sociological theory of conflict might take. He seeks to explain community conflict in terms of the amount of convergence between three types of variables:

- (a) Conduciveness refers to those variables which permit or encourage conflict (such as the opportunity of a group to participate in the political struc-

ture and group solidarity).

- (b) Strain refers to the extent of discontent generated by structural characteristics, and is often created by shifts in the control structure.
- (c) Integration refers to structural characteristics that prevent or inhibit conflict, such as overlapping organizational membership, interpersonal ties and social backgrounds.

This chapter will attempt to incorporate some of these variables, along with others, into a theory of a wider scope than was considered in the preceding chapter.

The hypotheses are necessarily just a contrived scaffolding. Hopefully, they will provide the basis for a more secure foundation as they are successively refined and discarded. At this point, the tests made of them are warped because it has not been possible to take fully into account system-wide, regional or national tensions known to be independently responsible for much internal tension. The ability to generalize from the data is further restricted by the small sample size, crude measures, and the limits on the number of controls that could be taken into account. Unfortunately, these deficiencies are characteristic of the social sciences. However, within these constraints and using several controls, the hypotheses were tested with as much detail as the data would tolerate. Each rank order correlation was computed to take into account several variables that were already found to be associated with either the dependent or independent variables. In addition, for many of the variables, correlations were computed separately for schools above and below the median on professional orientation, and for schools above and below the median on total bureaucratization scores. It has not been feasible to report all of the detailed tests, so they will be referred to only where they alter the general conclusions.

The significance of the following types of organizational characteristics will be explored:

- (a) Structural divisions and linkages between them

- (b) Participation of subordinates in the authority system
- (c) Standards of work procedures
- (d) Professional-and bureaucratic-employee principles of organizations
- (e) Interpersonal structures--especially informal patterns of interaction and collective activities of employees
- (f) Latent roles of the membership
- (g) Environmental support

The first three characteristics are part of the official division of labor and internal operating procedures; the first is divisive, while the third is integrative. The fourth characteristic refers to competing principles of organization insofar as they are reflected in the role conceptions of the membership; and the fifth refers to the informal interpersonal system which mediates potential conflict. The last two are associated with an organization's relationship to the outside society.

Several assumptions influenced the selection of this particular set of variables, namely, that strain increased with:

- (a) The complexity of a structure
- (b) Heterogeneity and instability of the membership
- (c) Scarcity of resources
- (d) Participation of the membership in the official and informal systems of interaction
- (e) Inconsistencies between regulating standards and procedures
- (f) The number of decisions to be made

#### STRUCTURAL SUBDIVISIONS AND LINKAGES

An organization's basic character is formed by the complexity of its operation. Complexity is a function of the number of separate but functionally interdependent subunits. Their interdependence is made possible through a system of structural

linkages, which is a graphic term that directs attention to the delicate combinations of the subunits that form an organization's fabric. It loosely refers to the points of connection between units, and although linkages will not be specifically identified as such in the following data, the significance of the indicators that are used can be better understood if the relevance of linkages is comprehended. To be completely accurate, an enumeration of the linkages would require separate measures of the relative autonomy of parts and the number of distinct connections among them. However, for the present purpose it will be assumed that the number of linkages roughly increases with the number of subdivisions in an organization.<sup>1</sup>

Insofar as the linkage entails cooperation between partially autonomous subunits of an organization, it can be expected that the problems of defining boundaries and responsibilities typically arise at linkage points. An organization's stability therefore, is likely to be adversely affected by the number of linkages: the more interrelations that must be maintained, the greater is the likelihood that it will break down at some point (Argyris, 1954).

Also, the natural inadequacies of a system that is only incompletely linked together are partly responsible for the inconsistent practices and role conceptions among the members of the separate units. Complex linkage systems tend to contribute to a general sense of uncertainty, which White (1961), Crozier (1964), and March and Simon (1958) plus others insist is a major source of conflict, although it seems more accurate to describe the problem in terms of the structural conditions which create uncertainty rather than emphasizing the mental state of an organization's members.

In short, complexity is a significant organizational characteristic because it

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<sup>1</sup>Although this analysis will be concerned primarily with the number of linkages, alternative patterns of linkage may have an even more important effect on system stability (Dubin, 1959). The more complete analysis would give more consideration to such patterns.

requires a delicate system of linkages that is the source of strain and accommodation. Taking into consideration the implications of these general propositions, it shall be proposed that:

Hypothesis 1: Separate objectives, misunderstandings, and, hence, conflict increase with the number of separate units in an organization.

The four crude indicators used, although they do not directly appraise the linkage system, do estimate the overall complexity and thus are theoretically useful for the reasons indicated above: Organizational size, number of authority levels, number of subparts, and degree of specialization.

### Organizational Size

In a study of friction incidents within work groups of two hospitals, Haas found a direct rank order correlation ( $r_s = .71$ ) between the number of incidents observed and the size of the work groups (Haas, 1963). Also, the clarity of certain subdivisions of labor was found by Ford and Stephenson to be inversely related to the size of the hospitals they studied and directly related to the degree of tension among co-workers (Ford and Stephenson, 1954).

It was found in Chapter 5 that the size of schools in the present sample is empirically associated with the amount of subdivision (i.e., organizational complexity and the number of levels of authority), and with other characteristics such as specialization, which, in themselves, seem likely to produce tension. Therefore, a pronounced relationship between size and conflict can be expected. The number of teachers in a school is significantly associated with most of the selected measures of organizational tension and conflict derived from the interviews and questionnaires (Table 7-1).<sup>2</sup> The positive associations between the number of teachers in a

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<sup>2</sup>The pattern is similar for the number of teachers in the system.

school and the following indices are statistically significant: total tension ( $t = .22$ ), the rate of severe disagreement ( $t = .35$ ), the total incident ratio ( $t = .38$ ), the ratio of disputes ( $t = .27$ ), and the heated discussion ratio ( $t = .37$ ).<sup>3</sup> Authority structures, in particular, appear to be less stable in larger schools in the sense that both the number of conflicts reported per interview involving authority ( $t = .26$ ) and the number of conflicts between teachers and administrators increase with the size of school ( $t = .41$ ); conflicts among teachers do not ( $t = .07$ ). In an analysis (not reported in the table), it was found that the ratio of major incidents and heated discussions specifically between teachers and administrators all are associated with school size ( $t = .29, .34, .48$ , respectively). Size, however, does not appear to be statistically associated with the number of major incidents reported per interview.

Controlling for the emphasis that schools place on rules does not appreciably alter the conclusions. However, the fact that both correlations with total tension and the rate of severe disagreement are reduced considerably when the number of staff additions made during the past five years is controlled, indicates that conflict is

<sup>3</sup>For convenience, the measures of conflict incidents derived from the interviews will be referred to as "ratios". A ratio refers to the number of each type of conflict reported per interview conducted in the school. Unless otherwise indicated, complaints are excluded from the total incident ratio, which refers to the total number of incidents reported in a school per interview conducted.

The tau was used as a measure of rank correlation. The levels of significance for taus of the different sample sizes used in the study are as follows:

N	Level of Significance	
	.05	.01
28	$t = .21$	$t = .32$
21	$t = .25$	$t = .37$
14	$t = .33$	$t = .47$
11	$t = .39$	$t = .55$
10	$t = .41$	$t = .58$

TABLE 7-1

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE AND  
NUMBER OF LEVELS OF AUTHORITY AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	SIZE OF ORGANIZATION (Number of Teachers in School) (N=28)		NUMBER OF LEVELS OF AUTHORITY (Mean of Teachers Estimates) (N=21)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.22*	.03x	.30*	.15j
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>				
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.16	-.03x	.18	
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.35**	.16x	.37**	.19j
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>				
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) &	.38**	.04x	.48**	.15j
Disputes	.27*	.02x	.32*	.14j
Heated Discussion	.37**	.35x	.39*	.12j
Major Incidents	.04	.15x	.18	.16j
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>				
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.41**	.18x	.40**	.05j
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	-.07	-.16x	.08	-.08j
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.26*	.07x	.26*	.01j

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant At  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant At  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size

x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

& Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

not entirely produced by size per se, but is very much influenced by factors which are in themselves associated with size.

In general, the conclusions do not change when the correlations are computed separately for schools with high and low professional orientations and for schools with high and low total bureaucratization, although a few modifications do show up. In the 14 less professional schools and in the 14 more bureaucratic schools, conflicts among teachers actually seem to decline with size ( $t = -.30$ ,  $t = -.35$ ). Size also seems to make more difference within less bureaucratized schools in respect to incidents pertaining to authority issues and total rates of disagreement ( $t = .36$  and  $.38$ , respectively, compared to  $t = .07$  and  $-.02$  in more bureaucratized schools). Severe disagreements, on the other hand, are more likely to increase with size in highly bureaucratic organizations than in less bureaucratic ones ( $t = .57$  compared to  $t = .12$ ). This means that the relationship between organizational size and conflict is conditioned by the level of bureaucratization. Disagreements increase as less bureaucratized organizations grow, but after a certain level of bureaucratization, further increases do not seem to be associated with conflict (with the exception of severe disagreements).

#### Number of Levels of Authority

The number of echelons in a series of linkage is a critical ingredient of an organization's complexity. Not only is adequate communication between echelons difficult normally to achieve in hierarchical organizations, but the fact that each echelon presses on its incumbents distinct role conceptions, problems, objectives and vested interests, further aggravates linkage problems. Conflict, therefore, seems likely to occur in centralized and differentiated organizations because members do not identify closely with persons in different echelons and do not share their perceptions and attitudes (Smith and Ari, 1964; Thompson, 1961). The possi-

bility, too, that certain echelons are instituted as a means of mediating existing conflicts between subordinate levels could intensify the relationship between this characteristic and conflict (Boulding, 1964).

Like organizational size, the number of the levels of authority is also positively associated with most of the measures of organizational tension and conflict under consideration. For example, ten of 13 systems, having six or seven levels of authority, report high rates of severe disagreement in comparison to only one of seven with three or fewer levels of authority (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .05$ ) (Table 7-2).

As the number of levels of authority increases, the following types of incidents become more frequent (Table 7-1): total tension ( $t = .30$ ), severe disagreement rate ( $t = .37$ ), total incident ratio ( $t = .48$ ), the dispute ratio ( $t = .32$ ), and the heated discussion ratio ( $t = .39$ ). The authority structure is less stable in hierarchical organizations as well. Incidents involving authority issues increase ( $t = .26$ ), and conflicts between teachers and administrators become more prevalent as the authority levels increase ( $t = .40$ ); but centralization is not associated with the solidarity among teachers, i.e., conflicts among themselves do not increase ( $t = .08$ ). It is worth noting, that while not statistically significant, the ratio of major incidents is also in the positive direction ( $t = .18$ ).

Although the length of hierarchy is associated with conflict rates, however, these relationships are also inflated by their association with other variables which are related to conflict. Hence, many of the correlations are reduced below statistical significance when either school size or complexity is controlled. This means that this relationship (like the one involving organizational size) represents a convergence of factors with compounded effects. However, the correlation with both the total incident ratio and the heated discussions that specifically involve teachers with administrators (not reported) remain significant after controlling for size

TABLE 7-2

TOTAL NUMBER OF LEVELS OF AUTHORITY IN THE SYSTEM AND  
RATES OF SEVERE DISAGREEMENT AMONG FACULTY

NUMBER OF LEVELS OF AUTHORITY

		6-7	4-5	3 or fewer	
RATES OF SEVERE DISAGREEMENT	High	10	3	1	14
	Low	3	5	6	14
		13	8	7	28

$\chi^2 = 7.82$  (2 d.f.),  
significant at  $p \leq .05$

( $t_p = .35$  and  $.26$ ).

Introducing the level of bureaucratization and professional orientation further modifies the conclusions. With the exception of the severe disagreement rate, the associations between levels of authority and conflict hold only in less bureaucratized organizations. For example, under a condition of low bureaucracy, the correlation between the number of levels of authority and incidents involving authority issues is  $t = .60$  and with teacher-administrator incidents it is  $t = .78$  while in highly bureaucratic schools the corresponding correlations are low and not statistically significant. The same pattern exists with respect to disputes ( $t = .69$  compared to  $.07$  in bureaucratic schools) and total disagreements ( $t = .33$  compared to  $.04$ ). It appears that starting an organization on the path toward bureaucratization creates more tension than further increments of bureaucracy in an organization already bureaucratized.

The correlations of levels of authority with authority incidents and teacher-administrator incidents are higher in more professional schools than in less professional schools ( $t = .60$  and  $.53$ , respectively, compared to  $.07$  and  $.20$ ). Hierarchical control, in other words, is associated with conflict primarily in professional climates. There are exceptions--e.g., hierarchy is more characteristically associated with severe disagreements in less professional schools ( $t = .56$  compared to  $.17$  in more professional schools)--but there appears to be slightly more strain associated with bureaucratization in the more professional climates.

#### Organizational Complexity

The overall complexity of an organization is a product of both its hierarchy and its "horizontal" division of labor. In fact, conflict arising among parallel subgroups with different functions, says Landsberger, is largely responsible for organizational conflict (Landsberger, 1961). Interdependent units develop distinctive role concep-

tions and objectives, and compete for resources and rewards (Wilson, 1966).

Departmentalization. Indices of specific components of the division of labor, as well as of the total organizational complexity, will be considered. Departmentalization is one factor contributing to total complexity. Using as an index of departmentalization the number of departments in each school that have officially recognized department heads, it appears that the number of departments is associated with the number of moderate and severe disagreements among the faculty (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .01$ ) (Tables 7-3a and 7-3b). Seven of the eight schools with more than six departments report high rates of moderate disagreement (more than four per person) in comparison to only three of 15 schools without department heads; a similar pattern exists for severe disagreements.

Experimental Programs. It is to be expected that attempts to experiment with programs are disruptive because such attempts to incorporate a new program with the rest of the system create linkage problems; and such appears to be the case (Table 7-4). Whereas, only two of nine experimenting schools report low rates of severe disagreement (less than .11 per individual), 12 of 19 schools not experimenting do have low rates (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .05$ ). There was also a slight tendency for schools using team teaching to report higher average rates of disagreement than schools not using this practise (70 percent compared to 40 percent), but the chi-square was not statistically significant for a sample of this size.

Number of Curricular Programs. The existence of separate academic and vocational programs is likely to contribute to the development of distinct goals and to compound the number of linkage problems. As Table 7-5 shows, five of the six schools without separate programs report low rates of total disagreement, while 13 of the 22 schools with one or more programs have above average rates of disagreement (between two and seven disagreements per teacher) (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .05$ ).

TABLE 7-3A

NUMBER OF DEPARTMENT HEADS IN THE SCHOOL AND  
RATES OF MODERATE DISAGREEMENT

NUMBER OF DEPARTMENT HEADS

RATES OF  
MODERATE DISAGREEMENT

	6 or more	1-5	none	
High	8	3	3	14
Low	0	2	12	14
	8	5	15	28

$\chi^2 = 13.60, (2 \text{ d.f.}),$   
Significant at  $p < .01$

TABLE 7-3B

NUMBER OF DEPARTMENT HEADS IN THE SCHOOL AND SEVERE DISAGREEMENT

NUMBER OF DEPARTMENT HEADS

		6 or more	1-5	none	
RATES OF SEVERE DISAGREEMENT	High	7	4	3	14
	Low	1	1	12	14
		8	5	15	28

$\chi^2 = 11.70, (2 \text{ d.f.})$   
 Significant at  $p \leq .01$

TABLE 7-4

PRESENCE OF EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS AND  
RATES OF SEVERE DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE FACULTY

EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS

RATES OF SEVERE  
DISAGREEMENT

	Yes	No	
High	7	7	14
Low	2	12	14
	9	19	28

$\chi^2 = 4.10, (1 \text{ d.f.})$   
Significant at  $p \leq .05$

TABLE 7-5

PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF SEPARATE VOCATIONAL PROGRAMS  
AND TOTAL RATES OF DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE FACULTY

VOCATIONAL PROGRAMS

		Yes	No	
TOTAL RATES OF DISAGREEMENT	High	13	1	14
	Low	9	5	14
		22	6	28

$\chi^2 = 4.51, (1 \text{ d.f.})$   
Significant at  $p. \leq .05$

Functional Overlap. The complexity of the supervisory system is also likely to contribute to conflict. Henry proposes that the amount of tension which develops between departments is directly proportional to their power and to the degree of functional overlap between them (Henry, 1954). The resulting stress on the individual is reflected by the number and consistency of commands received from supervisors. The consistency of instructions which teachers reported receiving from different supervisors is associated with the incident rate between teachers and administrators ( $t = .32$ ) and the rate of incidents involving authority issues ( $t = .27$ ).<sup>4</sup> However, there was no relationship between organizational complexity and inconsistency of instructions.

Total Organizational Complexity. If these specific indices of organizational complexity are related to disagreement rates, then it is likely that the overall index of complexity (the complexity scale) will show a similar relationship. Several of the indices of organizational conflict do increase significantly with organizational complexity scale scores (Table 7-6). Rates of severe disagreement ( $t = .32$ ), the total incident ratio ( $t = .33$ ), the ratio of disputes ( $t = .27$ ), the heated discussion ratio ( $t = .33$ ), and the ratio of conflicts between teachers and administrators ( $t = .23$ ) are all positively associated with organizational complexity.

Since it seems plausible that problems associated with a complex situation can be offset partially by experience (March and Simon, 1958), the mean ages of the faculties were controlled on the assumption that older faculties have had a longer period in which to work out their problems. The fact that the relationships hold for all age levels, suggests that experience, in itself, does not compensate for the problems

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<sup>4</sup>Teachers in each school were asked to estimate how frequently they received inconsistent instructions from different supervisors (on a five point scale ranging from very frequently to never). This measure is the mean of the responses for each school.

associated with complexity; this need not mean, however, that experience itself has no relationship with conflict.

Like the number of levels of authority, organizational complexity is associated with the size of schools; so when size is controlled, the correlations are also lowered. Complexity per se is probably only one of several factors accounting for the prevalence of conflict in complex organizations.

The observed relationships tend to hold for both the more and less professional schools with the exception of teacher-administrator conflict, which is higher in more professional schools than in the less professional ones ( $t = .81$  compared to  $t = .16$ ). Complexity in conjunction with a professional climate seems especially conducive to conflict between echelons.

### Specialization

Specialization has the effect of delineating groups and accentuating official boundary lines and, hence, aggravates linkage problems. When specialties are supported by the authority of distinctive competence, they become particularly identifiable as targets for hostility (Gans, 1966). Specialists are more likely than nonspecialists to develop vested interests and monopolistic claims over certain spheres of work, which they are ready to defend from encroachment. Indiscriminate assignments of personnel tend to blur official distinctions and weaken such identification. It was therefore expected that specialization would be positively associated with the incidence of conflict.

Although most of the correlations between conflict and specialization are in the expected direction, only a few of them are statistically significant (Table 7-6). The proportion of faculty assigned to courses in which they have neither majored nor minored is inversely associated with both the total rate of disagreement ( $t = -.23$ ) and with the ratio of disputes ( $t = -.24$ ); stated the other way, this means that certain types of conflicts are characteristic of specialized faculties. Also, the

number of major incidents reported per interview declines with the proportion of teachers assigned to courses outside of their majors ( $t = -.22$ ). These conclusions seem to be sustained after school size has been controlled.

Specialization appears to be unrelated to either the volume of conflict among teachers or between teachers and administrators, and it does not appear to be associated with incidents specifically involving authority issues. Specialization, in short, shows some relationship with incidence of conflict per se, but it seems to have little bearing on the general type of issues or parties involved.

The relationship of disputes to the proportion of faculty assigned outside their majors and minors persists in both more and in less bureaucratized schools; but controlling for level of bureaucratization illuminates certain relationships which otherwise are barely discernible. The associations with total disagreement rate, rate of severe disagreement, and teacher-teacher conflict are significant only in more bureaucratic organizations. Also, controlling for a faculty's level of professional orientation alters the association with disputes; low specialization is associated with disputes only in the more professional schools ( $t = -.44$  compared to  $.03$ ). It appears, in other words, that the relationship of specialization to certain types of conflict is accentuated in the more bureaucratic and in the more professionalized schools.

On the other hand, the fact that the proportion of faculty assigned outside of their majors is associated with their major incident ratio, holds only in less professional and less bureaucratic schools ( $t = -.38, -.30$ , respectively), but not in their counterparts. It seems that while conflict between specialists is accelerated in professional climates, despite bureaucratic controls, it is kept within bounds by both bureaucratic controls and professional norms; conflict among specialists seems to move out of bounds in settings where neither type of control dominates.

TABLE 7-6

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY  
AND LACK OF SPECIALIZATION AND INDICES  
OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY		LACK OF SPECIALIZATION			
			Proportion of Faculty Who Have Taught Courses in Which They Did			
	(N = 28)		not Major (N = 28)		not Major/Minor (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.19	.15j	.08		-.07	-.05j
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>						
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.16	.14j	.02		-.23*	-.20j
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.32**	.28j	-.18		-.12	-.07
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>						
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) &	.33**	.10j	-.03	.09j	-.04	.06j
Disputes	.27*	.12j	.01	.10j	-.24*	-.19j
Heated Discussion	.33*	.12j	-.06	-.04j	-.12	-.30j
Major Incidents	.10	.10j	-.22*	-.21j	.05	.06j
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>						
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.23*	-.08j	-.05	.08j	-.08	.02j
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.02	.04j	-.04	-.06j	-.10	-.12j
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.13	-.05j	.07	.15j	-.03	.04j

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size

& Complaints are not indicated in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

## PARTICIPATION IN THE AUTHORITY SYSTEM

Coleman has argued that conflict is encouraged when channels of legitimate political expression are closed (Coleman, 1957). Gamson, however, challenges the assumption that discontent accumulates in reservoirs, maintaining that open channels encourage expressions of existing tension, and if strain does exist, merely participating in the organization will not remove it (Gamson, 1966). This latter proposition seems reasonable. Participation in the decision-making process provides employees who are already malcontent with more opportunity to express irritations that otherwise might have remained latent. The decision-making apparatus provides an official channel for communication of existing grievances. The more frequently that subordinates participate in decision-making, the greater the amount of times that occasions can arise for disagreement. Conflict, in other words, will accompany the responsibility for decisions, wherever it resides, and insofar as day-to-day decisions are decentralized, the faculty will then have more reason to disagree among themselves.

Decisions frequently represent compromises of contradictory pressures, and these pressures do not necessarily disappear after decisions have been made; rather, they must be implemented under the same pressures. The people who made the decisions bear the brunt of criticism from offended groups. Mainly for this reason when employees cannot influence decisions, they will have less to fight about among themselves; although in this case, colleague solidarity can develop more easily and antagonism may be directed toward the administration.

Hypothesis 2: Organizational tension and conflict are positively associated with the participation of subordinates in the authority system.

This proposition can also take into account the differences between routine decisions and professional and nonprofessional policy decisions.

### Routine Decision-making

The authority of subordinates for routine decisions gives them some leverage against administrators, and larger spheres of discretion leave more room for disagreement among subordinates themselves. Routine decision-making authority is, accordingly, positively associated with the ratio of disputes ( $t = .39$ ). However, it is inversely associated with the major incident ratio ( $t = -.38$ ) (Table 7-7).<sup>5</sup> Both correlations stand after school size and average faculty professional orientation have been controlled. The correlations with most of the other indices of conflict are in the same direction, although they are not statistically significant.

This pattern suggests that the contentions of Gamson and Coleman both may be correct in certain respects. On the one hand, the authority to make routine decisions permits more opportunity for the expression of existing disputes and provides more occasions for disputes to arise. But on the other hand, the very opportunity of teachers to participate in the decision-making process could restrain minor aggravations from accumulating into major incidents.

Upon the introduction of other controls, it appears that both of these correlations are slightly more characteristic of less professional ( $t = .36$ ) and less bureaucratic organizations than of their counterparts. More bureaucratic organizations are likely to have other means of controlling subordinates, which could counteract the power play surrounding decentralization. Whereas the professional peer group controls might not be so effective in curbing individualistic sources of conflict in less professional schools, in highly professional schools, the incidents involving authority show a slight tendency to diminish with decision-making authority ( $t = -.29ns$ ).

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<sup>5</sup>These two measures of conflict are otherwise negatively associated ( $t = -.14$ ).

### Centralization of Nonprofessional and Professional Policy Decisions

If participation in routine decisions is positively associated with organizational conflict, then it seems reasonable to expect that centralization of key policy decisions will be inversely associated with conflict rates. There is some evidence, which may be relevant, that teachers do not disagree greatly with their role in policy development. An average of one-fourth of the sample registered some discrepancy between the actual and preferred level at which selected policy decisions are made, the discrepancy being somewhat larger for certain types of decisions--e.g., formulating instructional policy, granting permission for outside groups to speak, hiring new teachers, adding or dropping courses, determining required courses, selection of required textbooks, determining whether a required textbook should be used, teaching assignments, and determining qualifications of teachers to teach. The sorest point occurred on the few occasions when school boards make decisions which teachers consider to be outside of their sphere of authority; decisions centralized at the level of the principal and the failure of the principal to consult teachers, rank second and third, respectively, as contributors to discontent with the decision-making process. Yet, in general, the magnitude of discrepancy is not large, a matter of a few percentage points on a five point scale.

Although some of the correlations are in the expected direction, the only one that is statistically significant is the negative relationship between centralization of nonprofessional policy decision-making and the rate of severe disagreement ( $t = -.25$ ) (Table 7-7). There appears to be less opportunity and reason for severe disagreements in more centralized schools. Correlations involving the total rate of disagreement and disputes are in the same direction, but they are not statistically significant.

However, when the level of bureaucratization is taken into account, other rela-

TABLE 7-7

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATION IN THE AUTHORITY SYSTEM AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	ROUTINE DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY (N = 28)		PROFESSIONAL DECISION-MAKING POLICY INDEX (N = 28)		NONPROFESSIONAL DECISION-MAKING POLICY INDEX (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.14	.01v	.11		.01	
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>						
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.17	.09v	.13		-.18	-.19d
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.17	.08v	.00		-.25*	-.27d
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>						
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>⊗</sup>	.17	.01x .09v .19j	-.06	-.11j	-.04	-.02j
Disputes	.39**	.30x .31v .41j	.08	.05j	-.13	-.11j
Heated Discussion	.03	.04j	-.05	.00j	.08	.12j
Major Incidents	-.38**	-.37x -.38j -.34v	-.03	-.03j	.13	.13j
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>						
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.07	-.01v -.07x .08j	.14	.10j	.04	.08j
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.12	.10x .04v .12j	-.11	-.11j	-.04	.05j
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.05	-.04x -.04v .05j	.04	.01j	.04	.06i

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$   
 \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: d - Socialize Very Frequently With Others on Faculty  
 j - School Size  
 v - Professional Orientation  
 x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

⊗ Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

tionships do become evident. In the more bureaucratic organizations, both the total rate of disagreement and the total incident ratio diminish with this measure of centralization ( $t = -.34, -.34$ ). The tendency for severe disagreement to be absent from centralized schools is especially characteristic of the more professional schools ( $t = -.32$ ) and of the more bureaucratic schools ( $t = -.50$ ) than their opposites.

So, whereas the positive influence of participation in routine decision-making on conflict is evident in less bureaucratic organizations, in the more bureaucratic organizations the negative relation of centralized policy decisions on conflict is more pronounced. In each case the independent variables are associated with other factors that permit or prevent full participation in this decision-making process.

#### REGULATING PROCEDURES

The curious irony about social organization is that it contains within itself the seeds of its own growth and destruction. The very characteristics of an organization which are divisive enough to produce tension and conflict, prompt the implementation of still other organizational procedures intended to control and regulate it. The long-run change, growth, and decline of an organization, then, depend in part upon whether the divisive elements can outrun the effectiveness of the control mechanisms.

The fact that this balance fluctuates with momentary alterations of power makes it extremely difficult to anticipate how effective the control procedures will be. If they are effective, outbreaks of conflict will be suppressed. Since standardization and supervision generally are intended to narrow the discretion of subordinates, to clarify situations, and to protect spheres of authority, they probably help to prevent some conflict, especially conflict arising from misunderstanding. Kahn, for example, found that role conflict was highest where there was low emphasis on rules

and less close supervision (Kahn, 1964).

There are also several compelling reasons why regulating procedures should be positively associated with conflict: they provide support, they are likely to be resented by some employees, and they are likely to be implemented in settings where tension already exists. Considering the support function first, it is apparent that the very rules which limit the discretion of some groups protect others and give them a sense of independence (Gouldner, 1959). Because of their protective function, rules are used as implements of conflict. Each group in conflict, says Crozier, supports the rules and puts as much pressure as possible on the other side to make them obey the rules, while at the same time fighting to preserve its own area of freedom; he says, "Every member of the organization, therefore, is protected both from his superiors and from his subordinates. He is, on the one hand, totally deprived of initiative and completely controlled by rules imposed on him from the outside. On the other hand, he is completely free from personal interference by any other individual--as independent, in a sense, as if he were a non-salaried worker." (Crozier, 1964, p. 189).

A study of teachers' sense of power suggests that, although school systems may select teachers differing in their sense of power, certain bureaucratic characteristics of the school systems themselves also provide them with a sense of power. Teachers in more bureaucratic systems expressed a significantly higher sense of power than did teachers in less fully bureaucratized systems where particularism and lack of policy are more typical (Moeller and Charters, 1966). An orderly, understandable, and predictable organization, helps individuals to anticipate and influence possible consequences of their actions.

Because of the supportive functions of regulations, it is possible that the more standardized schools provide the sense of power and the rational environment in which conflict can be waged more successfully. To this extent, regulatory procedures may be

demanded by the parties in dispute.

The second reason why control procedures are probably related to conflict is that if a group subscribes to a professional ideology in which self-determination of work is central, then to the extent that regulations do restrict their freedom, they will tend to resist. Rules are sometimes used by the administration as ways of obtaining compliance when compliance cannot otherwise be assured. Subordinates sometimes react by withdrawing their loyalty (Gouldner, 1954).

Third, regulatory procedures normally are introduced in troubled situations where the control of interdependent and semi-autonomous units is already difficult --i.e., where there is impending conflict. Rushing, for example, maintains that emphasis on rules will be greater during periods of conflict than during periods of harmony in order to protect threatened groups (Rushing, 1966). However, bureaucratic controls may be more effective in controlling the major problems than the milder ones, which probably occur in greater frequency.

The tendency for conflict to outrun control in public high schools is probably encouraged by broader trends within the society, too. In comparison to factories, for example, schools may possibly have fewer completely routine tasks, and their members probably have a greater drive for professional authority. Administrators are apt to be less successful in maintaining control over the nonroutine work of groups sensitive to their professional status than over a completely routinized situation (Litwak, 1961). Tension will arise to the extent that the tradition of controlling public high schools from above still prevails (as some evidence in the preceding chapter suggests it does) in a setting that is otherwise becoming more professionalized.

Finally, the direction of societal change generally favors decentralization over control. The trend in public schools is currently toward decentralization, specialization, departmentalization, and professionalization (rather than closer

control), and the current emphasis is on improving the quality of education, not on the efficaciousness which an efficiency-conscious society was demanding three or four decades ago ( Callahan, 1962).

Hypothesis 3: Organizational tension and conflict are positively associated with emphasis on procedures for regulating organizational conflict.

Three major types of regulating procedures will be examined--standardization, emphasis on rules, and close supervision and remote supervision.

### I Standardization

The frequency of disputes is positively associated with the standardization of schools (Table 7-8). As standardization increases, there are significant increases in total tension ( $t = .28$ ), rates of severe disagreement ( $t = .26$ ), the total incident ratio ( $t = .31$ ), and the dispute ratio ( $t = .31$ ). The authority structure of standardized organizations is vulnerable also. The ratio of authority issues increases with the degree of standardization ( $t = .32$ ) and incidents between teachers and administrators grow accordingly ( $t = .53$ ), especially in comparison to conflicts among teachers themselves which do not show a regular increase ( $t = .03$ ). (Although the correlation with major incidents is not statistically significant, it is worth noting that that measure also increases with standardization.) Most of these correlations, however, drop below statistical significance when school size is controlled, indicating that factors other than standardization are contributing to these relationships.

Far from suppressing conflict, then, standardization is positively associated with it, especially with conflicts between teachers and administrators over authority issues. Standardization is probably both partially responsible for conflict, and a response to existing conflict. No matter how standardized an organization becomes, when its tasks are not equally routinized, when some of its members are specialists,

TABLE 7-8

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN STANDARDIZATION, EMPHASIS ON RULES AND CLOSE SUPERVISION AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	STANDARDIZATION INDEX (N = 21)		EMPHASIS ON RULES (N = 28)		CLOSE SUPERVISION (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.28*	.21x	.10	.03x	-.04	
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>						
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.20	.16x	.24*	.18x	.13	
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.26*	.16x	.06	-.03x	.12	
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>						
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>6</sup>	.31*	.11j	.22*	.12x .19j	.13	.17j
Disputes	.31*	.06x .20j	.21*	.14x .19j	.28*	.31j
Heated Discussion	.17	.06x .17j	.27*	.21x .25j	.02	.05j
Major Incidents	.21	.18j	.13	.16x .12j	-.14	-.14j
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>						
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.53**	.41j	.11	.01x .07j	.03	.07j
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.03	.05j	.12	.11x .13j	.15	.15j
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.32*	.20j	-.10	-.17x -.13j	-.11	-.10j

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size

x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

6 Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

and when subordinates are self-consciously professionalizing, it is unlikely that all areas of the organization can be closely controlled. There is likely to be some resistance to at least some of the controls, and it is possible that the uncontrolled areas will be even more subject to conflict.

The lack of correlation between standardization and conflict incidents among teachers, for the total sample, obscures the fact that in the 14 more professional schools standardization is positively associated with conflict ( $t = .41$ ,  $n = 11$ ), while in the less professional schools the relationship is negative ( $t = -.41$ ,  $n = 11$ ). Standardization appears to arrest conflict among subordinates in less professional climates and provoke it in more professional climates. In the high professional schools as compared to low professional schools, standardization also appears to be more closely associated with incidents between teachers and administrators, and with the total incident ratio. Again it appears that bureaucratization has a closer association with conflict in professional schools. But on the other hand, the same exception must be noted here as was mentioned in respect to the number of levels of authority. Only in the less professional schools does the severe disagreement rate increase with standardization ( $t = .65$ , compared to  $.04$ ).

Most of the relationships are characteristic only of less bureaucratic schools --e.g., for conflicts in less bureaucratic organizations involving authority issues  $t = -.49$  as compared to  $t = .09$  in more bureaucratic schools. But again the severe disagreement rate contradicts the general pattern; that relationship is more representative of highly bureaucratic schools ( $t = .43$  compared to  $.05$  in less bureaucratic schools).

With the exception of the severe disagreement rate, it is in the more professionally oriented and less bureaucratic schools that standardization is associated with conflict. Standardization is a greater threat to the professionally oriented faculties than to the less professional ones. At the same time, increasing stan-

standardization in less bureaucratized organizations probably reflects the lack of administrative control, and also the ability of employees in less bureaucratic organizations to resist initial steps toward bureaucratization.

## II Emphasis on Rules

This is also positively related to several measures of organizational tension and conflict (Table 7-8): i.e., the rates of severe disagreement, the total incident ratio, and ratio of disputes and heated discussions increase with emphasis on rules ( $t = .24, .22, .21, .27$ , respectively). These variables are affected by the number of staff additions and, except for heated discussion, tend to drop when that factor is controlled. Neither conflict over authority issues nor teacher-administrator conflict, however, is necessarily prevalent in schools where rules are emphasized.

Teachers also report a higher degree of tension between teachers and students in schools where rules are emphasized ( $t = .38$ , not reported). One of the reasons might be that rules are emphasized in schools where tensions between teachers and students already exist. But more important is the likelihood that rules reduce the flexibility of teachers in dealing with students. There is an inherent conflict in schools between the tendency of students to request specific treatment on the basis of their personal relations with teachers, and the pressures on teachers to judge their students impersonally on the basis of their accomplishments without regard to the informal status (Gordon, 1957).

As with the association to standardization, the tendency of the total disagreement rate to increase when emphasizing rules is typical of only the more professional ( $t = .32$ ) and the less bureaucratic organizations ( $t = .33$ ); while in the more bureaucratic organizations, rules are actually accompanied by reductions in conflicts involving authority issues ( $t = -.36$ ). There is a tendency for rules to have a higher

correlation with conflict in the more professional than in the less professional organizations. For example, in the more professional organizations, the total disagreement rate increases with emphasis on rules ( $t = .32$  in comparison to  $t = .11$  in less professional organizations). It may be significant that the correlation between rules and major incidents approaches statistical significance in the more professional schools ( $t = .30ns$ ). In less professional organizations, conflict among teachers increases with the emphasis on rules ( $t = .44$ ), and it seems to decline in more professional organizations ( $t = -.16ns$ ).

In short, rules appear to have a greater effect in curbing some types of conflicts in the more bureaucratic organizations than in the lesser ones. It is likely that in the latter organizations there are fewer of other kinds of control measures to reinforce rules, and there may be more opposition to rules in less bureaucratic climates as well. Emphasizing rules in professional climates, on the other hand, seems to increase some types of conflict, especially major incidents, but it does not increase conflict among teachers themselves. To the contrary, conflict among teachers is more typical when rules are not emphasized. Particularly in professional schools, rules stabilize relationships among subordinates, while at the same time they can be sources of other types of irritations between teachers and other people.

### III Close Supervision

It was expected that a close supervision of subordinates, a precarious relationship at best, was likely to irritate professional employees anticipating a degree of latitude. They would seem to particularly resent being checked upon when their relationships with their superiors were not good. Although there are low positive relationships between close supervision and some of the conflict measures, only the number of disputes reported per interview is statistically significant ( $t = .28$ ); it remains significant after school size has been controlled (Table 7-8).

Perhaps close supervision provides an opportunity for more open discussions of problems, and with that in mind, the low negative association between close supervision and the ratio of major incidents ( $t = -.14ns$ ) is revealing. However, the reduction of the correlation between major incidents and close supervision occurs only in less professional schools ( $t = -.42$ ), not the more professional ones. Perhaps a similar reduction also occurs in less bureaucratic schools, ( $t = -.30ns$ ), but the correlation definitely does not hold for more bureaucratic schools, where, in fact, there is the slight (not significant) tendency for major incidents to increase with close supervision. The association between disputes and close supervision holds only in less professional and more bureaucratic schools ( $t = .38, .34$ , respectively).

One reason that close supervision is not more systematically associated with conflict may be related to the increased opportunity which close contact with supervisors provides for subordinates in order to openly discuss the problems. Gamson (1966) suggests that rules are more likely to be used in conflictful situations because close supervision seems to aggravate intra-personal problems in difficult situations. However, these data indicate that this proportion is only partially accurate. The same supervisory practice in less professional and less bureaucratic organizations is effective in curbing major incidents, and can aggravate conflict (or at least not contain it) in more professional and more bureaucratic organizations.

In summarizing, contrary to what was expected and unlike the standardization index, neither emphasis on rules nor close supervision seems to be significantly associated with teacher-administrator conflicts or with conflicts involving authority issues. The index of standardization consists primarily of regulations governing the conduct of teachers, while the rules scale is so designed that there is no way of distinguishing the parties to whom they apply. It is possible that in the

case of rules, the legitimating, clarifying, and supportive functions offset the discontent of subordinates who might otherwise have resisted administrators who were charged with enforcing certain rules. In the case of close supervision, this practice might be used primarily where relationships between teachers and administrators are relatively harmonious.

### PROFESSIONALISM

To win control of a vocation from laymen and administrators is one of the major impulses behind professionalization. In the preceding chapter, it was shown that a faculty's commitment to professional role conceptions is generally associated with its militancy. It remains, then, to analyze this relationship in more detail--especially in combination with employee roles and in the more and the less bureaucratic and professional types of organizations.

Hypothesis 4: Organizational tension and conflict are associated with both the components of a faculty's professional and employee orientations and with their role organization.

This hypothesis will be examined by analyzing the component sub-scales of the faculties' professional and employee orientation scale scores, and the modal way in which each faculty organizes its professional and employee roles.

#### Components of Professional Orientation

Table 7-9 shows that the components of the professional orientation scale do not contribute equally to organizational conflict. The decision-making sub-scale is significantly associated with seven of the ten measures (the association with major incidents is negative); it is not significantly associated with conflicts among teachers nor with conflicts involving authority issues, although the relationships are in the positive direction. The sub-scale measuring emphasis on knowledge is also signifi-

TABLE 7-9

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION SUB-SCALES AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	PROFESSIONAL SUBSCALES							
	Client Orientation (N = 28)		Colleague Orientation (N = 28)		Monopoly of Knowledge (N = 28)		Decision-Making Orientation (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.08	.06e	.09	.05e	.43**	.41e	.28*	.25e
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>								
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.13	-.16e	.09	.04e	.13	.10e	.22*	.19e
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.02	-.05e	.26*	.22e	.34**	.31e	.32**	.26e
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>								
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>&amp;</sup>	-.02	.08x	.18	.17x	.36**	.15x	.27*	.01x
Disputes	-.08	-.02x	.19	.18x	.28*	.13x	.43**	.33x
Heated Discussion	-.10	-.05x	.04	.02x	.24	.08x	.09	.08x
Major Incidents	-.21*	-.22x	-.17	-.16x	-.14	-.09x	-.25*	-.22x
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>								
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.04	.13x	.06	.05x	.22*	.02x	.25*	.07x
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.01	.02x	.30*	.30x	.08	.04x	.09	.07x
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.17	.23x	.17	.16x	.22*	.08x	.13	.00x

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: e - Decision-Making Is Scale

x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

& Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

cantly associated with most of the measures; the exceptions are: conflict among teachers, total rate of disagreement and major incidents, but even these coefficients are in a direction consistent with the other measures. Colleague orientation is significantly associated with the rate of severe disagreements and conflict among teachers (which, oddly enough, is the only sub-scale associated with that type of conflict); the other measures are in the expected direction, and when school size is controlled, the total incident ratio and dispute ratio become significant as well.

The fact that the client orientation measure shows an appreciable positive increase with only one of the conflict measures (authority), raises serious questions about the reasons for professional militancy. Bidwell has suggested that, "One might expect the more professionally oriented teachers to be less "professional" in their classroom actions, that is, to diverge from the classic pattern because of their bonds with the colleague group." (Bidwell, 1965). These data suggest that colleague-oriented teachers are not only less client-oriented, but that the quest of teachers for decision-making authority and a favorable reputation among colleagues, may be more important impulses behind professional militancy than a strong commitment to client welfare. This need not mean that professional militancy is detrimental to client welfare, since it is possible that increased decision-making authority for teachers will be as beneficial (or detrimental), in the long run, as a more personalized, direct commitment to students. But strong commitment to client welfare does not lead to militancy to the extent that commitment to authority and reputation among colleagues does.

In summarizing, all of the professional sub-scales contribute to incidents over authority, but incidents between teachers and administrators are only associated with emphasis on knowledge and decision-making authority. These two sub-scales explain almost all of the association between professionalism and conflict. The association with incidents arising among teachers, however, is primarily and reasonably explained

by colleague orientation. All of the sub-scales contribute to the inverse relationship with major incidents, including the client orientation sub-scale (with the possible exception of the authority incident ratio); the latter sub-scale does not significantly increase with other kinds of conflict, and in fact the relationship may be inverse.

### Components of Employee Orientation

Three sub-scales seem to account for almost all of the inverse correlation between conflict and employee orientation--loyalty to the administration, loyalty to the organization, and public orientation (Table 7-10). Neither emphasis on experience nor on rules seem to be particularly important sources of employee reticence, and approval of treating employees interchangeably is associated only with the absence of incidents involving authority issues.

### Role Organization

If conflict increases with a faculty's professional orientation and diminishes with its employee orientation, then faculties which simultaneously support professional norms and reject those defining them as employees, should be exceptionally prone to conflict in comparison to faculties which have the reverse pattern of role organization. This interpretation is supported (Table 7-11). Every measure of conflict but one (the major incident ratio) increases with the proportion of a faculty having simultaneously high professional and low employee role conceptions. Correlations with both the gross incident ratio and with the number of authority issues reported per interview are relatively high ( $t = .44, .49$ , respectively) and these correlations remain after controlling for both a faculty's sociability (i.e., the proportion seeing each other socially very frequently) and its frequency of contact with the principal; however, two of the correlations (teacher-administrator incidents and dispute ratio) are reduced appreciably when the number of staff additions is

TABLE 7-10

**RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION SUB-SCALE  
AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT**

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	LOYALTY TO ADMINISTRATION (N = 28)		LOYALTY TO ORGANIZATION (N = 28)		EXPERIENCE SCALE (N = 28)		RULES (N = 28)		INTERCHANGE- ABILITY (N = 28)		PUBLIC ORIENTATION (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.17	.14j	.32**	.27j	-.07	-.09j	-.19	-.20j	.06		.27*	.23j
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>												
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.17	.14j	.14	.10j	-.03	-.04j	.06	.06j	.01		.02	-.01j
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.21*	.17j	.21*	.11j	.00	-.02j	.03	.02j	-.01		.20	.13j
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>												
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) $\frac{1}{2}$	.12	.15x	.39**	.26x	.09	.07x	-.14	-.14x	.08	.04x	.22*	.10x
Disputes	-.10	-.11x	.25*	.13x	-.02	-.05x	-.16	-.16x	-.19	-.25x	-.06	-.18x
Heated Discussion	.13	.14x	.39	.30x	.12	.10x	-.23*	-.23x	.16	.14x	.29	.22x
Major Incidents	.22*	.13x	.11	.16x	.05	.05x	-.08	-.09x	.08	.08x	.13	.16x
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>												
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.11	.12x	.24*	.11x	.09	.07x	-.11	-.11x	.06	.03x	.17	.07x
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.09	.09x	.16	.14x	.13	.13x	-.08	-.08x	-.03	-.03x	.03	.01x
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.36**	.37x	.36**	.29x	.06	.04x	.06	.07x	.28*	.26x	.23*	.17x

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$ \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$ 

KEY: j - School Size

x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

ε Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

TABLE 7-11

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MODAL ROLE ORIENTATION OF FACULTY AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	HIGH PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION HIGH EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION (N = 28)		HIGH PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION LOW EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION (N = 28)		LOW PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION HIGH EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION (N = 28)		LOW PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION LOW EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.21*	.23j	.22*	.18j	-.14	-.11j	.15	-.13j
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>								
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.03	.04j	.30*	.27j	.04	.07j	-.15	-.13j
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.05	.08j	.43**	.38j	-.14	-.10j	-.16	-.13j
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>								
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>6</sup>	.15	.07x	.44**	.23x	-.22*	-.16x	-.21*	-.05x
Disputes	.30*	.25x	.27*	.10x	.12	.17x	-.37**	-.29x
Heated Discussion	.06	.01x	.23*	.06x	-.27*	-.26x	-.05	-.08x
Major Incidents	-.23*	-.22x	-.18	-.14x	-.19	-.20x	.32**	.30x
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>								
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.06		.34**	.16x	-.17	-.15x	-.14	-.00x
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.07	.05x	.24*	.22x	-.07	-.07x	-.06	-.04x
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.02	-.05x	.49**	.41x	-.22*	-.20x	-.04	-.06x

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size

x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

<sup>6</sup> Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

controlled.

Conversely, the proportion of a faculty simultaneously upholding high employee and low professional orientations is negatively associated with all of the correlations, although only the total incident ratio and the ratio of authority issues, ( $t = -.22$  in both cases) and the ratio of conflicts involving heated discussions ( $t = -.27$ ) are statistically significant. These correlations diminish, however, when a faculty's sociability is controlled.

The pattern of relationships, then, is as expected. But the affect of role organization is magnified by lower sociability in schools characterized by low professional-high employee role conceptions, and to a lesser extent, by the tendency of staff additions to be higher in schools typified by high professional-low employee orientations.

Total tension and conflicts involving disputes also tend to occur where professional and employee role conceptions are simultaneously high ( $t = .30$ ), and to diminish where they are simultaneously low ( $t = -.37$ ). It appears, however, that one of the few conditions found in this study to be conducive to major incidents (in addition to standardization, specialization, and sociability) is the lack of commitment of large proportions of the members to either professional or the employee role conceptions ( $t = .32$ ). Again, it must be concluded that, whereas conflict is characteristic of professionally oriented staffs, major incidents are not. Rather, they occur where neither professional nor employee norms dominate. Professional norms apparently regulate the magnitude of conflict in which it is appropriate to engage as well as the appropriateness to become involved in conflict.

#### Role Consensus Between Principal and Faculty

It seems likely that the amount of conflict in an organization will be affected by differences between the chief administrator's role conceptions and those of his

faculty. Schools in the sample were ranked on the basis of their principals' professional and employee role conceptions, and on the magnitude of difference between each principal's role conception and the average (mean) role conception of his faculty. It was expected that the amount of conflict reported in a school would tend to increase with the amount of dissention. A few of the correlations were statistically significant. The difference between a principal's and a faculty's professional orientation was positively associated with the major incident ratio ( $t = .21$ ) and with the severe disagreement rate ( $t = .21$ ). Also, the difference between a principal's and faculty's employee orientation is positively associated with severe disagreement rate ( $t = .25$ ) (Not reported in tables). These relationships held after controlling for the professional and employee orientation of the principal.

#### FACILITATING CHANNELS

It has been suggested that, regardless of the existing structural tensions and other tension-producing conditions, overt incidents are unlikely to materialize unless the members of an organization have the means, as well as the desire, to participate in the official system. Informal channels of communication can function in the same way, i.e., to provide the occasions for expressing latent problems. Although peer group interaction can serve to build solidarity and suppress conflict, if underlying tensions do exist, peer interaction is more conducive to their expression than social distance, which serves to segregate contenders (Gamson, 1966).

The general working hypothesis is that:

Hypothesis 5: Organizational tension and conflict are positively associated with the rate of informal interaction among a faculty and between a faculty and its administration, and with their participation in employee associations.

Three types of facilitating channels of interaction will be considered:

- (a) Informal interaction patterns among peers:
  - (1) The proportion of faculty who lunch together; and
  - (2) The proportion of the faculty who see each other socially
- (b) Interaction between subordinates and administrators:
  - (1) Autonomy, or the rate at which the faculty consults the principal about a problem; and
  - (2) The frequency with which the faculty talks with the principal
- (c) Employee associations:
  - (1) The proportion of the faculty belonging to a teachers union; and
  - (2) The proportion of the faculty not active in professional associations<sup>6</sup>

#### Peer Group Relations

It can be expected that the more frequently that faculty members associate with one another on social occasions, the greater the likelihood that, if complaints exist, they will materialize as overt incidents. (See Table 7-12.)

Lunching Patterns. However, the proportion of a faculty who lunch together very frequently is significantly associated only with the number of disputes reported per interview ( $t = .21$ ); controlling for the size of school, the heated discussion ratio is also significant (but then the dispute ratio diminishes). The positive relationship with the dispute ratio holds up only in the low professional schools ( $t = .47$  compared to  $-.12$  in the high professional schools). The major incident ratio is lower in more sociable schools, the relationship being stronger in

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<sup>6</sup>Since most teachers are members of professional associations, it seemed more important to concentrate on a small minority of teachers in most schools which are not members.

less professional and in less bureaucratic schools ( $t = -.35, -.25$ ) than in the counterpart types of organizations. (See Table 7-11). (See Table 7-12). In other words, the same situation which provides an opportunity for open discussion--in the absence of other tension producing factors, such as those commonly associated with the more professional and more bureaucratic organizations--may thereby help to counteract the development of major incidents.

In view of the contamination that social interaction might have on the relationship between professional orientation and conflict, the latter set of relationships were analyzed separately for schools where lunching is frequent and where it is less frequent. The correlation between professional orientation and conflict incidents holds only for the schools where lunching is less frequent; this is true of every measure of conflict except major incidents. In other words, lunching is associated with conflict in the less professional schools, and the opposite, professionalism, is associated with conflict where lunching is less frequent. It appears that conflicts occur either where professionalism is high and sociability low, or the reverse.

The age of a faculty and its shared experience also affects the meaning of lunching behavior. The schools were divided into high and low groups (at the median) on the basis of both the average age of their faculties and the proportion of their faculties who have been in the school more than four years. In both cases, the positive correlations between lunching frequency and each measure of conflict (except major incidents) hold only for older faculties; in younger faculties, the relationships all are negative. It is in older faculties, in other words, that frequent lunching leads to conflict.<sup>7</sup> In younger faculties most conflict (except for major incidents) tends to decline with interaction.

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<sup>7</sup>Lunching frequently is also directly associated with years in the system ( $t = .45$ ).

In summation, it appears that interaction is a facilitating mechanism for conflict primarily in less professional schools and in older faculties (which are otherwise less militant); in more militant, younger and professionally oriented faculties --it has the reverse effect--interaction among the members of these faculties is associated with restraint. But again, major incidents must be a special case, for in less professional schools they decline with this form of interaction ( $t = -.35$ ). (Not reported in tables).

Social Occasions. The facilitating effects of interaction can be seen even more clearly when the proportion of faculty who "very frequently" see one another socially is used as an index of the informal interaction system (Table 7-12). That measure is positively associated with total tensions ( $t = .26$ ), the rate of severe disagreements ( $t = .29$ ), the total incident ratio ( $t = .43$ ), the dispute ratio ( $t = .21$ ), the heated discussion ratio ( $t = .47$ ), conflict between teachers and administrators ( $t = .30$ ) and among teachers ( $t = .32$ ), and the number of conflicts involving authority issues ( $t = .42$ ). The association with major incidents, also positive ( $t = .16$ ), reaches statistical significance when professional orientation of the faculty is controlled ( $t_p = .25$ ). However, this association is found primarily in less bureaucratic organizations ( $t = .36$  compared to  $-.12$  in more bureaucratic organizations). (Controlling for professional orientation reduces some of the other associations, notably the dispute ratio ( $t_p = .14$ ).)

Since both social interaction and conflict are associated with organizational size, this variable was taken into account. It was expected that personnel in smaller, undifferentiated schools are more likely to face similar problems than in larger schools, where social life is apt to be formed around cliques than to reflect school-wide cohesiveness. Controlling for size does reduce the correlation between sociability and the dispute ratio ( $t_p = .14$ ), and the number of conflicts between teachers and administrators reported per interview ( $t_p = .17$ ). However, the direction of the

TABLE 7-12

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RATES OF INTERACTION  
AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	FREQUENCY FACULTY TALKS WITH PRINCIPAL (N = 28)		PROPORTION OF FACULTY			
			Lunching Very Frequently (N = 28)		Seeing Each Other Socially Very Frequently (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	-.07	-.05j	.09	-.04v	.26*	.16v
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>						
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.14	-.09j	-.03	-.11v	.15	.08v
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.16	-.10j	.15	.06v	.29*	.21v
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>						
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>ε</sup>	-.28*	-.05j	.11	.04v .16j	.43**	.37v .33j
Disputes	-.12	.09j	.21*	.06j	.21*	.38j
Heated Discussion	-.23*	.08j	.02	.38j	.47**	.14v
Major Incidents	-.03	-.01j	-.13	-.07v -.12j	.16	.25v .16j
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>						
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	-.28**	.02j	.12	.06v .17j	.30*	.25v .17j
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.13	.11j	.00	-.07v -.00j	.32**	.22v .31j
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	-.18	-.02j	.10	.03v .13j	.42**	.37j

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$

KEY: v - Professional Orientation  
j - School Size

ε Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

correlation remains, and in four of the measures with conflict it remains statistically significant. In addition, the correlation between sociability and the number of heated discussions reported per interview is basically unaffected by the size factor ( $t_p = .38$ ). Sociability, therefore, seems to be connected with conflict independently of organization size.

#### Interaction With the Administration

All but one of the measures of conflict diminish but only the total incident ratio, heated discussion ratio, and the teacher-administrator conflict ratio are statistically significant ( $t = -.28$  in each case) (Table 7-12).

These associations are complicated by organizational size and fall below significance when size is controlled. Interaction between teachers and principals probably has different meanings in large and in small organizations. In larger, more conflictful organizations, communication between the faculty and the principal could be indicative of an informal appeal system serving to curb minor disagreements in their early stages; but even though there is greater opportunity for expressing disagreement in smaller schools, there is less tension in these schools and hence, perhaps less underlying disagreement to be expressed.

#### Membership in Employee Associations

In addition to informal interaction patterns, formal employee associations can provide the communication links necessary for expressing disagreements. Both professional associations and teachers' unions often have access to the administration, and can provide a mechanism for employees to make their differences of opinion known.

The amount of support given by employees to associations representing them should reflect their solidarity and perhaps the extent of their opposition to the administration. In situations where more than one association is present, or where

a substantial proportion of the membership refuses to join the dominant organization, internal conflict among employees is likely to be present also.

In the case of professional teachers' associations--the NEA affiliates--the fact that they not only admit administrators into their membership, but often rely on administrators for leadership, is likely to reduce their militancy. The unions, on the other hand, do exclude administrators and, supposedly, see a clearer view of conflict of interest between administrators and classroom teachers. However, only four schools in the present study have officially recognized unions, which probably reduces the opportunity of union members to express grievances. Most of the nonunion schools, however, do include as much as a small percentage of teachers who are members of unions.

Union Membership. The ranking of schools on the proportion of faculty belonging to a union is not associated with most of the conflict measures, except for the ratio of heated discussions reported per interview ( $t = .21$ ) (Table 7-13); this figure is reduced when school size is controlled, however. The proportion of union members in a school is not associated with conflicts over authority and, surprisingly, the ratio of conflicts reported between teachers and administrators diminishes (rather than increases as expected) in schools with more union members ( $t = -.21$ ); this correlation increases when school size is controlled.

Schools in which faculties are predisposed toward unions are perhaps more prone toward heated discussions, but there are relatively fewer, rather than more, open conflicts with the administration. Perhaps one reason is that most of the union members in this study are in a conservative segment of the A.F.T. and are located in nonunionized schools. And, too, administrators of such schools, under the threat of impending unionism, may be more sensitive to the opinions of the faculty and make necessary concessions to prevent widespread discontent.

TABLE 7-13

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	PERCENT IN UNION (N = 28)		PERCENT IN NONACTIVE MEMBERS OF PROFESSION (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.01		-.00	
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>				
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.04		-.19	
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.09		.25*	
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>				
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>ⓔ</sup>	.10	.04j	.10	-.02j
Disputes	-.06	-.11j	.02	-.07j
Heated Discussion	.21*	.15j	.11	.00j
Major Incidents	.01	.01j	.21*	.21j
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>				
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	-.21*	-.31j	.27*	.17j
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.06	.07j	-.07	-.05j
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	-.10	-.15j	.21*	.14j

\* Rank Order Correlations Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlations Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size

ⓔ Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

Non-Membership in Professional Associations. Since administrators are permitted to join classroom teachers' professional organizations and sometimes do dominate them, it would seem that the refusal of a small minority of teachers in each school to join these organizations would reflect a belligerent posture toward the administration. Furthermore, both administrators and colleagues probably have more difficulty controlling teachers who are not members of classroom teachers' organizations.

The severe disagreement rate and the ratio of major incidents both are higher in organizations where a larger proportion of teachers refuse to join professional associations ( $t = .25$ , and  $.21$ , respectively) (Table 7-13). More important, the ratio of conflicts between teachers and administrators is higher in these schools ( $t = .27$ ) and they have a disproportionately higher ratio of conflicts involving authority issues ( $t = .21$ ).

Contrary to the original expectations then, formal employee associations do not have the same facilitating effect on conflict as informal relationships do. Militancy, in fact, is greater where employees boycott these organizations. At least two of the conditions which logically should be present before employee associations facilitate conflict are not simultaneously present in most schools in this sample: (1) exclusion of administrators from membership and (2) an officially recognized right of the organization to represent all of the employees.

#### VULNERABILITY AND STABILITY

The homogeneity of an organization's objectives and role consensus among its members are both influenced by the way it is linked to its external environment by its recruiting practices. As Becker and Geer phrase it, "people take culture with them" (Becker and Geer, 1960). The "latent roles" of the labor force arising from differences in training, age, religion, sex and ethnic backgrounds constitute one of three major sources of organizational conflict and adaptability identified by

Thompson (1960). Conflict can be expected to diminish when personnel are drawn from the same background source--a preferred teacher's college, a specific regional background, a specific sex, religion, ethnic and social-economic background.

An organization's vulnerability to outside influences also depends to a great extent on these background differences. Hughes points to a contradiction between industry's complaint about the lack of ambition in its employees and also its complaint that certain persons (i.e., those of minority status) have too much of it (Hughes, 1949). Collins reports that ethnic background has a decided influence on promotion patterns (Collins, 1946). Whyte's study of the restaurant industry showed that due to the fact that countermen resented receiving orders from waitresses, an impersonal way of allocating work was evolved (Whyte, 1948).

The meaning of these background differences, however, alternates with the broader, institutional conflicts and changes in the society, and with the degree of consistency among major institutional values. For example, as the volume of immigration declines, ethnic background is likely to become less of a problem in most of the nation's schools. Similarly, local-cosmopolitan and rural-urban conflict probably will diminish as the American society settles on a dominant, mass national character. Becker and Geer (1960) point out that if latent culture can restrict an organization's procedures, the organizational structure can, in turn, restrict the latent culture. Latent culture, they propose, operates in areas that are less critical for the organization and which are not covered by the formal and informal structural roles; for that reason, there probably is less association between heterogeneity and conflict in more standardized than in less standardized organizations.

Three overlapping dimensions of the problem can be identified. The first concerns an organization's permeability to cultural values and practices as they are reflected in the diversity and heterogeneity of its members background and in their local and cosmopolitan origins; the diversity of a faculty's backgrounds is indica-

ative of the portion of the surrounding environment which has permeated an organization. A second dimension of this problem concerns the extent of disruption that occurs with the addition of new members, regardless of the diversity of values represented. A third condition is the stability of an organization as it is effected by the longevity of the membership.

The stage of recruitment is the point at which the latent culture penetrates an organization. Argyris (1954) emphasizes the importance of the dominant personality type recruited by some organizations; he found that the hiring procedures of a bank led to the selection of compliant employees possessing strong desires for security, who subsequently made poor supervisors when promoted. However, of equal importance is the variety of social types recruited to an organization. Heterogeneous backgrounds not only represent differences of values and conflicting role conceptions about work, but the background differences themselves can provoke conflict--young and old, men and women, university and college trained teachers compete for status on the basis of their latent identities independently of their official positions.

Hypothesis 6: Organizational tension and conflict are positively associated with the diversity of latent values represented in an organization and with the disruption that is expected to occur with staff additions.

Heterogeneity is positively associated with conflict among teachers ( $t = .36$ ); and when organizational size is controlled, the positive association with the gross incident ratio reaches significance ( $t_p = .25$ ), as does the dispute ratio ( $t_p = .21$ ). The association with the major incident ratio is negative ( $t = -.21$ ) (Table 7-14).

It is not immediately clear why there are fewer major incidents in heterogeneous schools, but a possible answer is that heterogeneity tends to be associated with close supervision and also with the proportion of faculty seeing each other socially, both of which tend to be inversely related to the appearance of major incidents.

### Staff Additions

The diversity or homogeneity of the latent culture notwithstanding, the sheer fact of adding new staff members in itself is likely to be a tension-producing process, not only because of interruptions and the readjustment problems associated with incorporating new members, but because the turnover and recruitment of new members could reflect the existence of other problems. Turnover among the leadership, in particular, seems to be associated with dissatisfaction (Levenson, 1961; Carlson, 1963).

All but two of the conflict measures (conflict among teachers and the occurrence of major incidents) are associated with the number of staff added to a school during the preceding five years (Table 7-14). As staff additions increase, so does the total incident ratio ( $t = .58$ ), the open dispute ratio ( $t = .41$ ), the heated discussion ratio ( $t = .39$ ), total tension ( $t = .34$ ), total disagreement rate ( $t = .30$ ), and severe disagreement rate ( $t = .37$ ). The ratio of conflict involving authority issues also increases with this measure ( $t = .47$ ); this particular relationship, however, is more typical of less bureaucratic schools than of more bureaucratic ones ( $t = .47$  compared to  $.04$  in more bureaucratic schools). These measures, moreover, remain significant after organizational size has been controlled.

The fact that conflict between teachers and administrators increases with the number of staff additions, while peer group conflict does not, could indicate that it is more difficult to integrate new members into the administrative system than into the peer group system. Both the total incident ratio and heated discussions specifically between teachers and administrators, in particular, are relatively high correlations ( $t = .58$  and  $.42$ , not reported), which remain significant after controlling for school size. Both are more characteristic of less bureaucratic schools, however ( $t = .71$  compared to  $.13$  for more bureaucratic schools).

The negative association of this measure with the occurrence of major incidents

TABLE 7-14

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HETEROGENEITY AND STAFF  
ADDITIONS AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	HETEROGENEITY (N = 28)		NUMBER OF FACULTY HIRED DURING PAST FIVE YEARS (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.03	.09k	.34**	.27j
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>				
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.08	-.02k	.30*	.26j
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.10	.20k	.37**	.20j
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>				
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) &	.18	.25j	.58**	.47j
Disputes	.16	.21j	.41**	.33j
Heated Discussion	.08	.14j	.39	.23j
Major Incidents	-.21	-.19j	-.13	-.21j
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>				
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.03	.08j	.47**	.30j
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.36**	.33j	.09	.16j
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.14	.18j	.31*	.21j

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$

KEY: k - System Size  
j - School Size

& Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

again reverses the usual positive relationship. When organizational size is controlled, the correlation is statistically significant ( $t_p = -.21$ ). To the extent that staff additions reflect turnover, the more discontented faculty members probably are siphoned off before conflicts develop into major incidents. This correlation is probably strengthened also by the association of this variable with other variables which are also negatively related to the major incident ratio (i.e., routine decision making and close supervision).

#### Local and Cosmopolitan Principals

The disruption that occurs as leaders assume and shed their positions could easily lead to conflict, given certain origins of leaders. Carlson (1963) reports that the patterns of leadership differ between local, or place-bound superintendents of schools in comparison to the cosmopolitan, or career-bound superintendents. Outsiders frequently are sought for their creativity and change, and consequently are more likely to be hired when the school board is not satisfied with the present system. Because of numerous job opportunities, career-bound superintendents are in a strong bargaining position in respect to the board. They are given broad personal mandates and permitted a wide latitude in their methods.

The schools in our study with principals from inside the system have higher conflict rates on six of eight measures analyzed than those with principals from outside (Table 7-15). In schools with inside principals, the major incident ratio and dispute ratio are at least double that of schools with principals from the outside, and the total incident ratio is one-third higher.

These figures fluctuate, however, with the number of years the principal has been in office. Although there is not a simple linear trend, there appears to be fewer overt incidents in schools where principals have come from the outside fairly recently; the major incident ratio, total incident ratio, teacher-administrator

TABLE 7-15

SCHOOLS WITH PRINCIPALS FROM INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM  
AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	PRINCIPAL HIRED FROM:				TOTAL (Mean)
	Inside the System (N = 18)		Outside the System (N = 10)		
	Less than 3 years (Mean)	Total (Mean)	Less than 3 years (Mean)	Total (Mean)	
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	7.13	7.72	8.29	7.79	7.74
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>					
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	2.26	2.18	2.99	2.36	2.23
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.69	.35	.40	.20	.31
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>					
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>6</sup>	1.79	2.05	1.17	1.49	1.85
Disputes	.62	.71	.32	.31	.57
Major Incidents	.32	.55	.09	.12	.40
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving:</u>					
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	1.41	1.57	.80	1.31	1.48
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	1.39	1.48	.70	1.13	1.35

<sup>6</sup> Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

ratio, and ratio of authority conflicts are all low compared to schools whose principals have come from the outside within the last three years.<sup>8</sup>

### Longevity

March and Simon hypothesize that the greater the past experience that all parties have had with a situation, the less probability that intra-individual conflict will arise (March and Simon, 1958); and it does seem likely that older and more stable faculties and administrations in comparison to younger ones, which have not worked together over a long period of time, are likely to have already solved many problems that new faculties confront--to have expelled nonconforming members, and to have established a shared tradition. All of these factors contribute to an organization's homogeneity, and, consequently, to its stability.

Hypothesis 7: Conflict and organizational tension are inversely associated with the average age and length of tenure of the faculty.

As the mean age of a faculty increases, the incidence of conflict declines on seven of the nine measures examined. Only the major incident ratio shows a slight (but not statistically significant) tendency to increase with average age (Table 7-16). Most of these relationships remain when controlling for complexity and the number of staff additions, although the fact that the latter control lowers

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<sup>8</sup>Since statistical tests were not computed for these comparisons, they must be interpreted cautiously. But it should be observed also that organizations with recently appointed outsiders do have high total tension and total disagreement rates as Carlson's study suggests they should. (Carlson, 1963). It is possible that the appointment of an outsider is tension provoking, but at the same time, this very act indicates that some of the existing reasons for conflict appear to be in the process of solution.

TABLE 7-16

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEAN AGE OF FACULTY AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	MEAN AGE (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	-.26*	-.21x
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>		
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.06	.00x
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	-.40**	-.36x
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>		
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) & ✓	-.24*	-.16x
Disputes	-.23*	-.16x
Heated Discussion	-.26	
Major Incidents	.12	.10x
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>		
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	-.19	-.11x
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	-.21*	-.21x
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	-.25*	-.21x

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$

KEY: x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

& Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

the relationship with the total incident and dispute ratios, as well, indicates that the relationship with longevity is influenced by other factors.

### GOALS

Each respondent was asked to rank the importance of six basic goals of education. The schools were ranked on the basis of the proportion of members that considered each goal to be of primary importance. The rank order correlations of these measures with the conflict measures, although not entirely consistent, indicate certain patterns (Table 7-17). None of the goals is associated with either the major incident or the total disagreement rates. However, three of the positive correlations of emphasis on critical thinking as a goal of education are statistically significant. Emphasis on character training has a significant positive correlation with five conflict measures; emphasis on socialization is also significant, with a positive correlation on three of these measures. On the other hand, emphasis on vocational training has a definite negative association with three of four conflict measures, and emphasis on knowledge of subject matter as a primary goal has an expressly negative association with four measures.

Hence, the total incident ratio increases with emphasis on critical thinking and character training and diminishes with emphasis on vocational training and knowledge of subject matter. The ratio of incidents involving authority increases with emphasis on critical thinking and diminishes with emphasis on vocational training. Total tension, heated discussion and disputes all become more frequent as schools emphasize either character training or socialization (i.e., the ability to get along with others). Teacher-teacher conflict diminishes with emphasis on subject matter and increases with emphasis on character training, while teacher-administrator conflicts diminish with emphasis on vocational training.

In short, there is some indication that certain organizational goals are asso-

TABLE 7-17

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GOALS  
AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	EMPHASIS ON (N = 28)					
	Critical Thinking	Vocational Training	Knowledge of Subject Matter	Character Training	Sociali- zation	Citizenship
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.05	-.12	-.33**	.27*	.26*	.15
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>						
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.12	.08	-.14	.05	.09	.09
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.33**	.07	-.09	-.02	-.19	-.23*
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>						
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>6</sup>	.21*	-.22*	-.27*	.24	.17	.02
Disputes	.15	-.03	-.23*	.35*	.27*	.03
Heated Discussion	-.10	-.14	-.15	.28*	.24*	-.17
Major Incidents	.00	-.10	.02	-.08	-.08	.07
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>						
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.17	-.24*	-.14	.07	.03	.14
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.16	-.19	-.21*	.21*	-.05	.06
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.26*	-.26*	-.18	.11	-.00	.06

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

<sup>6</sup> Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

ciated with the presence or absence of conflict and tension.

### Economic Support

The only definite relationship that economic variables have with conflict is the positive association between a system's total receipts and a school's major incident ratio ( $t = .31$ ) (Table 7-18). This relationship holds up after controlling for school size, complexity, professional orientation, and staff additions.<sup>9</sup> There does seem to be a slight tendency for conflict to increase with the level of economic support per pupil in the system, but only two of the relationships are statistically significant, and even these are not significant when school size and complexity are controlled.

On the other hand, when school size is controlled, the total receipts of a system seem to be negatively associated with total tension ( $t_p = -.21$ ), total disagreements ( $t_p = -.21$ ), and the dispute ratio ( $t_p = -.21$ ).

March and Simon suggest that the need for joint decision-making--and thus tension --increases as the amount of resources available to the entire organization diminishes (March and Simon, 1958); mutual dependence on limited resources increases competition and produces jealousy among competing departments and agencies. Mack (1965), on the other hand, argues that conflict increases in times of increasing opportunities. It is possible that, in general, both explanations are partially correct but major conflicts, in particular, are more prevalent where there are more economic resources to fight about. It is possible that certain kinds of conflict have greater prevalence in wealthier school systems for other reasons--for example, wealthier communities recruit more professionally oriented teachers. Therefore, this factor was controlled. The correlations that are statistically significant when size is controlled are not signif-

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<sup>9</sup>No significant relationships nor pattern of relationships was found between the average salary level of a faculty and the measures of conflict being considered here.

TABLE 7-18

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC SUPPORT  
AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	ECONOMIC SUPPORT (N = 28)		TOTAL RECEIPTS (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.13	.03j .14v	-.08	-.21j .00v
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>				
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.17	.11j .17v	-.12	-.21j -.06v
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.22*	.08j .23v	.02	-.16j .10v
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>				
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>&amp;</sup>	.19	.02j .19v	.16	-.00j .23v
Disputes	.27*	.17j .28v	-.06	-.21j -.00v
Major Incidents	.02	-.00j .02v	.31*	.33j .28v
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>				
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.08	-.12j .09v	.08	-.12j .14v
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	-.02	.01j -.02v	-.12	-.10j -.07v
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.13	.03j .14v	-.04	-.17j .02v

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size  
v - Professional Orientation

& Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

icant when professional orientation has been controlled.

### MORALE

The primary aim of this analysis has been to explore the organizational characteristics conducive to conflict. However, it is worthwhile considering some of the possible consequences of conflict on employee morale and on the quality of an organization's product.

Conflict is like committee work. While particular conflicts may be dissatisfying to the parties involved during their duration, an environment full of conflict, contrary to common impression, can be satisfying to the extent that it provides groups with the means to advance their interests and to defend their principles. It is indicative of a faculty's commitment to its work, its concern about improving conditions, and it represents an atmosphere where change and flexibility are possible. The average job satisfaction of a faculty can be considered to be at least one indication of its morale.

Hypothesis 8: Organizational tension and conflict are positively associated with job satisfaction and satisfaction with the teaching career.

#### Job Satisfaction and Work Satisfaction

The average job satisfaction of a faculty is positively associated with conflict (Table 7-19). It increases with the total tension ( $t = .39$ ), total rate of disagreement ( $t = .29$ ), rate of severe disagreement ( $t = .25$ ), and the total incident ratio ( $t = .26$ ). Also organizations in which conflicts between teachers and those between teachers and administrators are more typical have higher job satisfaction ( $t = .29$  and  $.32$ , respectively). It is probably significant that job satisfaction does not appear to increase with the ratio of major incidents. Perhaps it is more important that it increases proportionately with the ratio of authority issues ( $t = .44$ ). These correlations remain firm after organizational size has been controlled.

The relationship between career satisfaction and major incidents is negative and statistically significant ( $t = -.34$ ). But other than that, and with the exception of total tension, conflict has more relevance to job satisfaction.

Although the associations of job satisfaction with conflict possibly are due to other factors and could exist despite the existence of conflict, most conflict (except for major incidents) does not seem to undermine morale as it is often supposed. Major incidents represent another problem. It is possible that the faculty loses in most major incidents, and in any event major incidents are perhaps too consuming of energy and too destructive of personal reputation and represent too much opposition to create a satisfying environment.

#### Quality of Product

As a final consideration, the relationship between the proportion of students in a school who drop out before graduation and the proportion of students attending college were both considered in relation to conflict, in order to determine whether conflict has any immediate observable connection with learning outcomes. With one exception, correlations of the proportion of dropout rates in the school with the conflict indices hover near zero (not reported): impersonal competition is inversely associated with dropout rates ( $t = -.22$ ) (not reported in tables). The more effective schools seem to be more competitive. Competition probably helps to maintain pressure for academic achievement, but the competition itself may possibly be due to other sources of academic pressure.

The trend of the relationships between the proportion of high school graduates attending college with conflict measures is in the positive direction, although only the severe disagreement rate ( $t = .30$ ) and the total incident ratio ( $t = .25$ ) are significant. Again, perhaps the most that can be said is that conflict has no visibly detrimental effects on learning outcomes, and that it may have some beneficial effects, at least in the sense that more effective schools have to tolerate militant faculties.

TABLE 7-19

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WORK SATISFACTION  
AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	WITH JOB (N = 28)		WITH CAREER (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.39**	.34v	.21*	
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>				
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.29*	.25v	.15	
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.25*	.20v	-.10	
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>				
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>W</sup>	.26*	.27j	-.01	.05j
Disputes	.03	.03j	.14	.19j
Heated Discussion	.15	.15j	-.12	-.08j
Major Incidents	.05	.05j	-.34**	-.34j
<u>Number of Incidents For Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>				
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.32**	.34j	.03	.09j
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.29*	.30j	-.07	-.08j
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.44**	.45j	-.16	-.13j

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p \leq .01$

KEY: j - School Size  
v - Professional Orientation

& Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

TABLE 7-20

RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENT OF GRADUATES ATTENDING COLLEGE  
AND INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION AND CONFLICT	PERCENT OF GRADUATES ATTENDING COLLEGE (N = 28)	
	Taus	Partials
<u>Average Total Tension Between All Roles (Reported by Faculty Members)</u>	.11	.02x
<u>Rates of Disagreement:</u>		
Total Number of Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.06	.03v -.02x
Number of Severe Disagreements Per Faculty Member	.30*	.27v .22x
<u>Number of Incidents Reported Per Interview:</u>		
Total Number of All Types of Incidents (Gross Incident Ratio) <sup>&amp;</sup>	.25	.22v .11x
Disputes	.10	.06v -.02x
Heated Discussion	.17	.15v .06x
Major Incidents	.08	.11v .12x
<u>Number of Incidents Per Interview Involving the Following Role Partners:</u>		
Teacher(s) Versus Administrator(s)	.16	.13v .03x
Teacher(s) Versus Teacher(s)	.05	.02v .02x
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems (Reported Per Interview)</u>	.17	.14v .09x

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .05$

\*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $p < .01$

KEY: v - Professional Orientation

x - Number Added to Staff in Past Five Years

& Complaints are not included in the Total Number of Incidents Reported

## CONCLUSION

Because the sample size is relatively small, caution must be exercised with regard to the generalization of the data. However, there is at least the advantage that most of these variables are found in most types of organizations, and to the extent that the findings can be generalized, they can also be extended beyond educational organizations.

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## CHAPTER 8

### DEPARTMENTAL AUTONOMY AND PRESTIGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT

The value systems of the faculty particularly cluster around the individual disciplines and hence at one level of analysis there are as many value systems as there are departments (Clark, 1966, p. 285).

The work of modern secondary schools is organized mainly around the teaching of several academic disciplines and vocational programs and supplementary extracurricular functions. Teachers in different disciplines, programs, and official positions not only bring with them varied trainings and personal values but, upon taking over the job, they develop special interests, compete for limited resources, and cope with unique problems. Therefore, it can be expected that teachers in different parts of the program will differ in status orientations and propensity for conflict.

Teachers in the sample have been classified into nine academic departments and a vocational education category on the basis of the course area in which they normally teach. A miscellaneous category is also included, which is comprised of driver education, study-hall and corridor monitors and other less-academic teaching functions. Finally, counselors and administrators have been included for this analysis as separate categories for comparative purposes. For convenience, these 13 groups will be referred to as departments, although they do not necessarily have this official recognition.

#### STATUS ORIENTATIONS

Generally speaking, persons in the more academic departments are more professionally oriented and less employee oriented than those who perform these academic functions. Although the individual comparisons are not of necessity statistically different, it is instructive to look at the ranks of the departments on status orientation (Table 8-1).

TABLE 8-1

THE RANKS OF THE MEAN STATUS ORIENTATIONS OF  
13 TYPES OF DEPARTMENTS

DEPARTMENT	RANKS			
	PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION	CLIENT ORIENTATION	EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION	HIGH-PROFESSIONAL LOW-EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION
Social Science	1	5	13	1
English	2	1	10	4
Science	3	6	9	2
Math	4	8	11	5
Art, Music, Drama	5	4	8	6
Home Economics	6	3	4	12
Administration	7	13	3	9
Language and Humanities	8	2	7	7
Counselors	9	9	12	3
Business	10	7	5	8
Athletics	11	10	6	10
Vocational	12	11	2	11
Miscellaneous	13	12	1	13

Teachers of social science have the highest professional orientations in the sample ( $\bar{x} = 59.10$ ) and the lowest employee orientations ( $\bar{x} = 82.90$ ) (Table 8-2).<sup>1</sup> Nearly one-third of the social scientists are simultaneously more professionally and less employee-oriented. The English, science, math, and art-music-drama departments exhibit a similar pattern, while teachers of home economics, vocations, and the miscellaneous category rank low on this particular style of role organization. On the other hand, staff members classified as having miscellaneous duties, or as being in vocational education, administration, or athletics have the reverse pattern, i.e., simultaneously low professional and high employee conceptions. One-third or more of the persons in administration, vocational education (who are more employee oriented than even the administrators) and athletics simultaneously hold low professional and high employee orientations.

With few exceptions, client orientation tends to be uniformly high in all departments. A department's professional orientation is associated with its orientation to clients, but the two types of conception are not necessarily identical ( $t=.41$ ). Despite only average professional orientations in the language-humanities and home economics departments, both departments have strong client orientations, exceeded only by English ( $\bar{x} = 9.76$ ). The client orientation of social scientists, who have the highest professional orientations, is relatively close to that of the other academic teachers. The client orientation of administrators, however, is lower than most of the other departments ( $\bar{x} = 8.31$ ). Since this category includes all persons holding administrative positions, it should be noted that principals' employee orientations differ from those of other administrators ( $\bar{x} = 77.1$ ), but their professional orientation is similar ( $\bar{x} = 57.5$ ).

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<sup>1</sup>Colombotos found that academic teachers, according to their present professionalism, are more professional than nonacademic ones. Since there was no difference in the level of professionalism of academic and nonacademic male teachers at the time they entered teaching, and only a slight difference for females, it was concluded that orientations were shaped by academic teaching goals and not the academic subjects.

TABLE 8-2

## MEAN STATUS ORIENTATIONS OF 13 DEPARTMENTS

DEPARTMENT	N	STATUS ORIENTATIONS			ROLE ORGANIZATION			
		Professional Orientation <sup>2</sup>	Client Orientation <sup>2</sup>	Employee Orientation <sup>1</sup>	Percentages			
					HPHE	HPLÉ	LPHE	LPLÉ
Social Science	209	59.10	9.57	82.90	25.58	31.16	12.56	27.44
English	241	58.76	9.76	78.16	29.48	25.90	18.73	21.51
Science	166	58.46	9.51	78.10	24.28	28.90	20.81	21.97
Math	126	58.35	9.45	79.24	20.30	24.81	21.80	27.82
Art, Music, Dramatics	89	58.06	9.58	77.51	21.65	24.74	24.74	20.62
Home Economics	50	57.96	9.60	73.94	34.48	10.34	20.69	20.69
Administration <sup>3</sup>	54	57.94	8.31	73.61	23.64	14.55	36.36	23.64
Language and Humanities	102	57.84	9.65	77.33	29.52	22.86	24.76	20.00
Counselors	64	57.83	9.44	82.11	23.88	28.36	11.94	31.34
Business	122	57.38	9.50	75.93	27.34	21.09	23.44	22.66
Athletics	65	57.17	9.22	77.31	19.72	14.08	32.39	25.35
Vocational	134	57.15	9.05	72.68	27.34	11.51	33.09	24.46
Miscellaneous Nonacademic	18	55.89	8.72	71.39	33.33	5.56	27.78	33.33

<sup>1</sup>Higher scores indicate lower orientations.

<sup>2</sup>Higher scores indicate higher orientations.

<sup>3</sup>This includes all persons holding administrative positions. The principals' employee orientations differ,  $x = 77.1$ ; their professional orientations, however, are similar to the other administrators',  $x = 57.5$ .

It is perhaps ironic that the administration, many of whom still think of themselves as "instructional leaders," and to whom teachers often look for guidance in educational leadership, rank the lowest of the 13 groups in client orientation. Since they are the furthest removed from students, their unwillingness to define problems from the students' point of view is understandable; but the implications are provocative, especially since they are in command of the organization.

### STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

To form some impression of the pattern of organization characteristic of each type of department, a crude assessment was made of its relative prestige, autonomy, centralization, and standardization.

Prestige. The relative prestige of each department was estimated as the difference between (a) the proportion of teachers advocating that a department's courses should be the last to be eliminated if the curriculum were curtailed and (b) the proportion of teachers advocating that they (the courses) should be the first to be eliminated. This represents a measure of the functional importance of each department, not an evaluation of its particular members.

In every school it is agreed that English is, by far, the most important course (Table 8-3, Column 4). In comparison to the 59 percent who recommended that English should be the last (instead of the first) course to be eliminated, math ranks a poor second (7.5 percent), with science third (1.2 percent). The lowest ranking courses are in art-music-drama (-21.0 percent) and in the miscellaneous category (-16.5 percent). Courses in both language-humanities and home economics rank lower than athletics,

A department's prestige shows signs of declining with its employee orientation ( $t = -.31$ , although the correlation is not statistically significant) (Table 8-4). It increases significantly with its professional orientation ( $t = .41$ ), but not with its client orientation ( $t = .03$ ). This pattern suggests that the higher status departments

TABLE 8-3

MEAN SCORES AND RANKS OF THE  
AUTONOMY, PRESTIGE, AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS  
OF 13 TYPES OF DEPARTMENTS

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT	EMPHASIS ON RULES <sup>1</sup> (1)		ROUTINE DECISION-MAKING (2)		AUTONOMY (RATE AT WHICH ADMINISTRATION IS CONSULTED) <sup>2</sup> (3)		PRESTIGE		RATIO OF TIMES CONSULTED ADMINISTRATION TO TIMES CONSULTED TEACHER <sup>3</sup> (6)			
	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank	% DIFFERENCE MENTIONED AS FIRST AND AS LAST COURSE TO ELIMINATE (4)	PRESTIGE-AUTONOMY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RANKS (5)				
Social Science	14.56	2	14.56	12	9.15	10	-3.40	6	4	0.70	5	3
English	14.20	3	14.20	11	7.77	8	59.00	1	7	0.56	3	4
Science	13.75	9	13.75	5	6.62	6	1.20	3	3	0.35	6	9
Math	13.96	6	13.96	8	7.92	9	7.5	2	7	0.40	3	7
Art, Music, Dramatics	14.19	4	14.19	10	9.34	11	-21.0	13	-2	0.78	7	1
Home Economics	13.63	10	13.63	4	7.19	7	-5.40	10	-3	0.48	9	6
Administration	14.04	5	14.04	9	35.63	12	0.00	24	8	0.54	1	5
Language and Humanities	13.51	11	13.51	3	5.90	3	-7.50	11	-8	0.26	12	12
Counselors	14.98	1	14.98	13	47.25	13	-0.10	5	8	0.73	1	2
Business	13.94	7	13.94	7	5.93	4	-3.90	7	-3	0.40	9	7
Athletics	13.87	8	13.87	6	6.07	5	-4.70	8	-3	0.29	9	11

TABLE 8-3 page 2

MEAN SCORES AND RANKS OF THE  
AUTONOMY, PRESTIGE, AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS  
OF 13 TYPES OF DEPARTMENTS

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT	EMPHASIS OF RULES <sup>1</sup> (1)		ROUTINE DECISION-MAKING (2)		AUTONOMY (RATE AT WHICH ADMINISTRATION IS CONSULTED) <sup>2</sup> (3)		PRESTIGE			RATIO OF TIMES CONSULTED ADMINISTRATION TO TIMES CONSULTED TEACHERS <sup>3</sup> (6)		
	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank	$\bar{X}$	Rank	Score	Rank	Ratio	Rank
Vocational	12.96	12	12.96	2	5.62	2	-4.90	9	-7	11	0.33	10
Miscellaneous Nonacademic	12.00	13	12.00	1	3.00	1	-16.5	12	-11	13	0.12	13

<sup>1</sup>Lower scores indicate more emphasis on rules.

<sup>2</sup>Higher scores indicate lower autonomy.

<sup>3</sup>The higher the number, the more frequently the administration is consulted relative to colleagues.

TABLE 8-4

**RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS AMONG THE AUTONOMY,  
PRESTIGE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND STATUS ORIENTATIONS  
OF 13 TYPES OF DEPARTMENTS**

STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS	STATUS ORIENTATIONS (N = 13)						STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS (N = 13)							
	Professional Orientation		Client Orientation		Employee Orientation		Rules		Routine Decision Making		Prestige (N = 13)		Autonomy (N = 13)	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
Prestige	.41*		.03		-.31		.41*	.29a	.36*	-.22zz				
Rate of Consultation with Administration (Autonomy)	.44*		.10	.22tt	-.49**		-.69**		.64**			-.31	-.34a	
Prestige-Autonomy	.37*		.18		-.52		-.58**	.49ab .20zz	.53**	.44ab .16zz		.45*	.34zz*	.64** .71**
Ratio Consultation with Administration with Teachers	.41*		.23		-.36*		-.72**	.70ab .44zz	.51**	.47ab .10zz		-.23	.08v	.72**
Rules	.49*	-.38ab	-.10		.59**									
Decision Making	.28	-.29zz	.10	-.22zz	-.33									

\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $P \leq .05$ \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at  $P \leq .01$ **KEY:** a. Rules

b. Interchangeability

tt. Total Disagreement

z. Autonomy

ab. Prestige

give more support to the professional orientation, but a department's status is not necessarily connected with its client orientation. Rather, by implication, more prestigious departments are more oriented to knowledge, authority, and/or colleagues.

### Autonomy

Using the average number of times that teachers in each department have consulted the administration about a problem as an index (Table 8-3, Column 3), teachers in the miscellaneous and vocational categories, and those in language and humanities, appear to be the most autonomous. Administrators and counselors consult one another very frequently, and teachers of arts-music-drama and social scientists also consult the administration frequently, relatively speaking.

The rate of a department's consultation with the administration increases significantly with its professional orientation ( $t = .44$ ) and diminishes with its employee orientation ( $t = -.49$ ) (Table 8-4). The slight tendency for client orientation to increase with the rate of consultation is not statistically significant ( $t_p = .22$ ), in controlling for the total disagreement rate. Most professionally oriented departments and less employee-oriented departments, in other words, have less autonomy. There are several possible reasons for this. Professionally oriented faculties may initiate more consultation with the administration, in comparison to employee-oriented one.

as a way of checking and as a way of compensating for their otherwise higher routine decision-making authority (See Table 8-4). The nature of the work of professionally oriented faculties, which teachers consider to be functionally more important, may also necessitate more consultation.

Each respondent was also asked to indicate how many times he had consulted other teachers relative to consulting the administration about similar problems. Table 8-3, Column 6, reports each department's rate of consultation with administrators as a ratio to consultation with teachers. In none of the departments do teachers consult with the administration as frequently as they do with their colleagues. But counselors, teachers

in the fields of art-music-drama, and social scientists consult administrators more frequently, in a sense, than their colleagues, in comparison to other departments; while those in the miscellaneous category, language-humanities and vocational education, rely much more on their colleagues.

### Prestige-Autonomy

Discrepancies existing between a department's prestige and autonomy are symptomatic of fundamental status inconsistency problems. Although prestige tends to be higher in departments which consult less with the administration, the fact that the correlation is low and not statistically significant ( $t = .31$ ) indicates a large measure of disparity between the two dimensions of social rank.

Although teachers in the miscellaneous category rank first on autonomy (i.e., lowest on rate of consultation), only one department has lower prestige. Similar discrepancies exist in the language-humanities and vocational areas. On the other hand, the prestige rank of the English and math departments, in particular, exceeds their rank on autonomy. The difference between a department's rank on prestige and its rank on autonomy is shown in Table 8-3, Column 5; the positive scores indicate the number of ranks by which prestige exceeds autonomy, and the lower ones indicate the number of ranks by which autonomy exceeds prestige. This prestige-autonomy measure is influenced more by autonomy ( $t_p = .64$ , controlling for prestige) than by prestige ( $t_p = .34$ , controlling for autonomy) (See Table 8-4).

The more professionally oriented departments tend to have a higher disparity between prestige and autonomy ( $t = .37$ )--i.e., the higher a department's professional orientation, the higher its prestige in comparison to its autonomy. But such departments have only slightly higher and statistically nonsignificant client orientations ( $t = .18$ ). As the employee orientation of a department increases, on the other hand, its autonomy tends to exceed its prestige by an increasingly larger measure ( $t = -.32$ ).

### Status Consistency

The departments in which prestige exceeds autonomy have been treated separately from those in which autonomy exceeds prestige in Table 8-5. Each group is further differentiated in terms of the number of ranks separating the two dimensions. Departments in which autonomy exceeds prestige tend to have higher employee orientations (i.e., lower scores) and lower professional orientations than those having the reverse pattern. The lowest employee orientation is found in departments in which prestige exceeds autonomy by fewer than seven ranks. Departments in which prestige exceeds autonomy by fewer than seven ranks have a higher professional orientation than both the groups in which autonomy exceeds prestige. The professional behavior of the former types of departments is higher also than the latter types. A cursory examination of the professional orientation sub-scales (not reported in Table 8-5) indicated that most of the difference in professional orientation is apparently due to a greater emphasis on knowledge in the higher prestige departments which consult more with the administrators.

Rules are emphasized less in departments in which prestige exceeds autonomy in comparison to departments with higher autonomy, but this typology does not seem to differ with respect to decision-making authority. Omitting counselors and administrators from the comparisons reduces the magnitude of differences, but does not change any of the trends.

### Rules

Rules are emphasized most in vocational departments and in those being referred to as "miscellaneous" (i.e., they have lower scores), both of which represent marginal groups; and they are less emphasized for counselors, social scientists, and English and art-music-drama teachers. Emphasis on rules accompanies both prestige ( $t = .41$ ) and autonomy ( $t = -.69$ )--i.e., departments which consult disproportionately less with the administration (Table 8-4); the extent to which their authority exceeds

TABLE 8-5

CONSISTENCY OF DEPARTMENTAL PRESTIGE AND AUTONOMY AND  
STATUS ORIENTATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

STATUS ORIENTATIONS	PRESTIGE EXCEEDS AUTONOMY BY				AUTONOMY EXCEEDS PRESTIGE BY				F RATIO <sup>a</sup>
	7 or more ranks		6 or fewer ranks		7 or more ranks		6 or fewer ranks		
	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	
Employee Orientation	78.46	489	80.77	375	74.43	257	76.33	329	10.36
Professional Orientation	58.43	485	58.81	375	57.33	254	57.61	326	2.14
Professional Behavior Index	3.49	505	3.45	386	3.20	262	3.11	350	5.70
Organizational Structure									
Rules	14.23	478	14.20	374	13.11	246	13.95	321	7.90
Routine Decision Making	10.82	475	10.86	365	10.52	245	10.87	323	1.22

<sup>a</sup>The F test was computed on the basis of the number of persons in each type of department. However, since the number of departments involved is so small, the question of statistical significance of differences cannot be meaningfully answered.

their prestige, accordingly, increases with standardization ( $t = .58$ ), and their rates of consultation with the administration (relative to teachers), declines ( $t = -.72$ ). The members of the more standardized departments where rules are emphasized also have lower professional orientations ( $t = -.49$ ) and higher employee orientations ( $t = .59$ ), but their client orientations do not vary. Standardization, therefore, generally appears to compensate for the lack of consultation among the prestigious professionally oriented segments of the faculty.

#### Routine Decision-Making Authority

Generally speaking, departments which are less standardized have more decision-making authority, while those which are more standardized have the least authority. Next to counselors, social scientists have the most decision-making authority, followed by teachers of English and art-music-drama. Teachers in the nonacademic, miscellaneous and vocational departments report the most centralization. The degree of decentralization is positively associated with a department's prestige ( $t = .36$ ), but perhaps as a form of compensatory control, the rate of consultation with the administration in these departments may increase ( $t = .64$ ). Decentralized departments are less employee oriented ( $t = -.33$ ); the slight tendency for them to be professionally oriented, is not statistically significant ( $t = .28$ ).

#### DEPARTMENTAL CONFLICT

Administrators and counselors have the highest rates of conflict of the 13 groups no matter which measure of conflict is considered. Teachers of social science also rank relatively high on total tension, tension between teachers and the principal, heated discussions, and incidents over authority. Athletics and art-music-drama teachers also have relatively high rates of disputes, of incidents involving scheduling, and of conflict involving authority issues. The high rates of scheduling conflict

involving those two departments is noteworthy, for they probably reflect the anomalies of coordinating extracurricular activities with the academic program. Teachers in the vocational and miscellaneous areas have low rates of conflicts and that home economics teachers have low total tension and fewer authority conflict, while members of the language-humanities departments have low dispute ratios and fewer conflicts over authority.

### Status Orientations and Behavior

On several of the measures of conflict, a department's conflict rate declines with its client orientation (Table 8-6), but neither the professional nor employee orientation of a department appears to have the connection with departmental conflict that the total faculty orientation of a school has with school-wide conflict (see Chapters 6 and 7). Besides the fact that the present sample is smaller, there is also a smaller range in professional orientation scores; the fact that counselors and administrators are included as separate departments may have affected the relationship.

An analysis of departments ranked according to the proportion of their members who simultaneously held high professional and low employee orientations (not reported) was more consistent with expectations on 11 measures of conflict, but only two of them were statistically significant for a sample of this size.

But if a department's professional orientation is not associated with its conflict rate, its professional behavior is. In contrast to the professional orientation, as the professional behavior index of a department increases, so do all of its conflict rates, many of which are statistically significant.

The reason for these contrasts is not immediately clear. Perhaps distinct departmental norms nullify the usual militancy associated with professional orientations. Whatever the reason, it now appears that a department's militancy is associated with its professional behavior, while the militancy of an entire faculty has

TABLE 8-6

## INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION (N = 13)

Organizational Characteristics, Orientations and Behavior	Total Tension		Total Disagreements		Severe Disagreements		Disputes		One or More Heated Discussions		Major Incidents		Authority Issues		Scheduling Facilities		Scheduling Students	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
Emphasis on Rules	.23	.19ab .00zz	.36	.32ab .16zz	.39	.32ab .18zz	.51*	.51v* .50mm**	.08	.19v .15mm	.41	.41v .44mm*	.62**	.63v** .56mm**	.10	.03v .02mm	.28	.37v .41mm
Routine Decision-Making Authority	.33	.30ab .17zz	.31	.26ab .11zz	.65**	.62ab** .57zz**	.56**	.55v** .54mm*	.38	.46v* .44mm*	.31	.29v .29mm	.51*	.50v* .46mm*	.10	.15v .19mm	.33	.37v .38mm
Departmental Prestige	.15		.17		.26		.23	.19v .18mm	-.21	-.31v -.24mm	.13	.09v .10mm	.28	.24v .21mm	-.18	-.13v -.12mm	-.05	-.02v -.03mm
Rate of Con- sultation With the Ad- ministration (Departmental Autonomy)	.33		.35		.39		.62**	.62v** .60mm**	.08	.18v .3mm	.41	.41mm .41v	.56*	.50mm* .56v**	.00	.12mm .08v	.38	.48mm* .47v*
The Extent to Which Prestige Exceeds Autonomy	.24	.01zz	.36		.34	.08zz	.55**	.54v* .53mm*	.00	.07v .03mm	.53*	.53v* .52mm*	.39	.37v .33mm	-.24	-.20v -.19mm	.39	.46v* .44mm*
The Ratio of Con- sultation of Ad- ministrators Com- pared to Teachers	.10	.21zz	.24		.30	.05zz	.54*	.53v* .51mm	.05	.14v .08mm	.38	.38v .37mm	.44*	.41v .37mm	-.18	-.13v -.12mm	.41	.49v* .47mm*

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TENSION (N = 13)

Organizational Characteristics, Orientations and Behavior	Total Tension		Total Disagreement		Severe Disagreement		Disorder		One or More Heated Disputes		Major Incidents		Authority Issues		Scheduling Facilities		Scheduling Students	
	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials	Taus	Partials
Professional Orientation	.03	.10ab .20z	.06	.14ab .25z	.18	.09ab .01z	.15	.07ab .16z	.18	.30ab .24z	.10	.09z	.15	.12z .04ab	.15	.17z .09ab	-.08	.29z .06ab
Client Orientation	-.41	-.47z*	-.27		-.25	-.33z	-.08	-.09ab -.18z	-.67**	-.69ab**	-.03	-.07z -.03ab	-.08	-.16z -.09ab	-.28	-.28z -.28ab	-.21	-.27z -.20ab
Employee Orientation			.04		-.29		-.21	-.14ab -.14z	.08	-.15ab -.13z	-.10	-.12z .07ab	-.31	-.05z -.24ab	.21	.23z .16ab	.08	-.33z -.06ab
Professional Behavior Index	.44*	.42ab*	.24	.24ab .08z	.55**	.53ab*	.36	.34ab .04z	.18	.15ab .16z	.10	.15z .08ab	.46*	.23z .44ab*	.10	.12z .13ab	.08	-.17z .09ab
Employee Behavior Index	.17	.22ab .23z	.22	.31ab .32z	-.12	-.05ab -.06z	-.12	-.05ab -.03z	-.06	-.01ab -.05z	-.27	-.23z -.24ab	.04	.15z .13ab	.04	.04z -.01ab	-.04	.02z -.06ab

**KEY:**

- v. controlling for professional orientation
- mm. controlling for employee orientation
- \* Rank Order Correlation Significant at P < .05
- z. controlling for autonomy
- ab. controlling for prestige
- \*\* Rank Order Correlation Significant at P < .01

a closer association with its average status orientation.

### Rules

The emphasis that a department places on rules is positively associated with most of the measures of conflict, and in a greater amount of these cases, the associations are statistically significant (Table 8-6). This suggests that a department's rate of conflict might provoke rules, or in some cases, rules may be the reason for conflict.

### Routine Decision-Making Authority

Also, as a department's decision-making authority increases, its conflict rate increases accordingly; most of the correlations are statistically significant (Table 8-6). Freedom to make decisions, in contrast to rules, probably creates ambiguous give-and-take situations that are conducive to conflict.

### Prestige and Autonomy

There is a slight tendency for a department's rate of conflict to increase with its level of prestige, but most of the correlations are not statistically significant. It is possible that besides having higher professional standards to maintain, a prestigious department is more visible and central to the operations of a school, and, for that reason, has greater sensitivity to organizational problems than the departments which are more removed from the mainstream of activities.

The positive correlations between rates of consultation with the administration and most of the conflict rates are more definite. In general, the more a department consults with the administration (i.e., the lower its autonomy) the higher its rate of conflict. The correlations are particularly high with the dispute ratio ( $t = .62$ ) and conflicts involving authority ( $t = .56$ ) (Table 8-6). This association of conflict with the rate of consultation probably is partly a function of the sheer rate of contact between teachers and administrators; the more frequently the administration is consulted, the more likely that disagreements will arise due to the advice that is given.

But in addition, consultation in itself can reflect the existence of conflict--i.e., teachers are apt to consult more frequently with the administration when they are in disagreement among themselves.

### Prestige-Autonomy

Inconsistencies between status dimensions signify discrepant amounts of deference, privilege, and differences in expectations, and hence are potential sources of tension and dissatisfaction. Most of the conflict rates are significantly and positively correlated with the difference between prestige and autonomy (Table 8-6). The relationships with both the dispute ratio and major incidents are relatively high ( $t = .55$  and  $.53$ ). However, this measure explains nothing more than the autonomy measure did when considered by itself.

Analyses were made comparing the departments with different patterns of prestige and autonomy--by first including counselors and administrators, and then, since conflict rates for this group are extremely high, omitting them. Table 8-7 reports both analyses. When counselors and administrators are included, 10 of the 12 measures of conflict were highest in departments in which prestige exceeds autonomy. The two types of scheduling problems, however, are highest in departments in which autonomy modestly exceeds prestige (i.e., by fewer than seven ranks). In most of these cases, the highest rates are found specifically in departments with more prestige than autonomy (by seven or more ranks), which is the category in which both counselors and administrators are included. It is possible that they are responsible for many of the differences noted.

When counselors and administrators are omitted from the analysis, differences between several of the comparisons (notably, the heated discussion and major incident ratios) are no longer statistically significant. However, although the differences for the total disagreement rate and authority incident ratio are lowered, their pattern remains basically unchanged. Teacher-principal and total tension measures do

TABLE 8-7

CONSISTENCY OF DEPARTMENTAL PRESTIGE AND AUTONOMY  
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT AND TENSION

INDICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT	PRESTIGE EXCEEDS AUTONOMY BY:				AUTONOMY EXCEEDS PRESTIGE BY:				F RATIOS <sup>a</sup>	
	7 or more ranks		6 or fewer ranks		7 or more ranks		6 or fewer ranks		Included	Not Included
	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N		
<u>Total Number of Disagreements</u>	(3.55)	429 (336)	1.87	328	1.62	218	1.97	304	4.62	.55
<u>Number of Severe Disagreements</u>	(.27 (.13)	428 (336)	.27	329	.11	216	.11	303	.73	.52
<u>Incidents of:</u>										
<u>Teacher(s) vs. Principal(s)</u>	.95 (.89)	483 (368)	.94	372	.79	253	.85	334	2.50	1.95
<u>Total Number of Incidents</u>	7.84 (7.45)	490 (372)	8.26	379	7.53	256	7.37	340	2.23	2.55
<u>Disputes</u>	.66 (.29)	506 (384)	.32	388	.24	262	.49	353	12.26	6.71
<u>Heated Discussions</u>	.34 (.15)	506 (384)	.17	388	.13	262	.18	353	8.01	.69
<u>Major Incident</u>	.08 (.08)	506 (384)	.12	388	.07	262	.11	353	2.90	1.82
<u>Number of Incidents Involving Authority Problems:</u>										
<u>Control over Curriculum and Classroom Work</u>	.24 (.10)	506 (384)	.13	388	.07	262	.11	353	7.82	1.10
<u>Control over School Policy Not Directly Affecting Classroom Scheduling of:</u>	.16 (.04)	506 (384)	.09	388	.06	262	.09	353	4.00	2.65
<u>Shared Facilities</u>	.04 (.02)	506 (384)	.09	388	.06	262	.16	353	8.38	11.37
<u>Students</u>	.25 (.13)	506 (388)	.13	388	.11	262	.27	353	7.09	8.27
<u>General Nature</u>	1.36 (.74)	506 (388)	.74	388	.55	262	.57	353	16.08	1.50

<sup>a</sup>The F test was computed on the basis of the number of persons in each type of department. However, since the number of departments involved is so small, the question of statistical significance of differences cannot be meaningfully answered.

remain significantly highest in departments whose prestige exceeds autonomy. But the fact that the open dispute ratio is now highest in departments whose autonomy exceeds prestige by fewer than seven ranks, together with the fact that they continue to have the highest rates of scheduling problems, identifies these departments as highly conflict prone in certain respects.

In summing up, it seems that counselors and administrators, who otherwise may be conflict prone, are among the departments whose prestige is far in excess of autonomy, and this contributes greatly to the higher conflict rates of this type of department. Even without counselors and administrators, however, these types of departments do have a disproportionate amount of tension and perhaps of disagreement; but omitting the counselor-administrator group illuminates the problems that are located in departments whose autonomy is in excess of prestige.

These patterns could be due partly to the levels of professional and employee orientations associated with them as well as to discrepancies between prestige and autonomy. The fact that less autonomous departments necessarily interact more with the administration provides both a greater opportunity for certain types of conflict to occur and for other types of conflict to be contained at the initial stages. But the high conflict rates of departments with higher autonomy cannot be explained in the same terms. For example, the fact that both athletic and music-drama departments are included in the category in which scheduling problems are typical reflects the ambiguous status of extracurricular activities in high schools. There is sufficient evidence to warrant further investigation of the possible independent role that the sheer fact of status inconsistency may have in producing conflict.

#### CONCLUSIONS

In general, the more standardized departments in which rules are emphasized characteristically have higher employee orientation and lower professional orientation,

whereas more decentralized departments are characterized by the reverse orientations, i.e., higher professional orientations and lower employee orientations. In more prestigious and professionally oriented departments there is more emphasis on rules and greater decentralization. As the prestige of a department increases, its professional orientation also increases and its employee orientation declines; reverse patterns tend to be true of more autonomous departments (in which the faculty consults the administration relatively infrequently)--i.e., in autonomous departments rules are more emphasized and decisions are relatively centralized, while employee orientations are higher.

Most conflict rates decline with emphasis on rules and autonomy and increase with decentralization and, to a lesser extent, prestige too. Tension among teachers increases directly to the extent with which their department's prestige exceeds its autonomy, but scheduling problems and disputes are more characteristic of departments with the reverse pattern. Although conflict rates do not appear to be systematically related to the professional orientation of a department, they do increase directly with its professional behavior index.

The dispute ratio of a department, then, can be expected to increase to the extent that the department is decentralized, the rate at which the faculty consults the administration, and the professional behavior of the department's members. It is higher in departments where autonomy moderately exceeds prestige and declines with a department's emphasis on rules. Similar patterns explain conflicts involving authority issues, and with the exception of the professional behavior index, major incidents are explained in the same way.

Most of these findings correspond to conclusions already reached in the analysis of 28 schools, although not entirely. In both types of analyses, emphasis on rules and decentralization of decision-making authority were found to increase with various measures of conflict. On the other hand, the positive relationship concerning the

rate of consultation was identifiable only in the analysis of departments. Most important, the relationship of professional orientation with conflict, which so persistently has been found to be associated with conflict, was not significant in the departmental analysis. This unexpected development raises questions about what happens to professional orientations when filtered through departmental norms. But the fact that the professional behavior index is associated with conflict in the expected direction does reinforce the general thesis that professionalization is a militant process; the lack of association with orientation in this case may be a fluke of the sample size and limited variability in the orientations of different departments.

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## CHAPTER 9

## DOWN TO CASES

Faculty authority in our time tends to become professional authority in a federated form....The combination of professional authority and loosely joined structure has the imposing function of protecting the autonomy of the work of experts amidst extensive divergence of interests and commitments....The federation is a structure that gives reign to the quasi-autonomous, simultaneous development of the interests of a variety of groups. Within an academic federation, a number of departments, divisions, colleges, professional schools, institutes, and the like can co-exist, each pushing its own interests and going its own way to a rather considerable extent (Clark, 1966, p. 290).

To this point, the analysis has been largely confined to the gross characteristics of the high schools in the sample without much regard for either the subtleties of individual organizations or the content of the more typical incidents. In this chapter, a few selected organizations will be examined more intensively. In the following chapter, attention will be turned to the identity of the militant leaders.

## OFFICIAL POSITION AND CONFLICT

It is believed that conflict in schools is largely a product of normal status striving and status maintenance. Members of different positions are likely to have divergent perspectives and interests. Therefore, the pattern and intensity of conflict will be influenced by the way positions relate to one another, the specificity and clarity of roles, interdependence of functions and role conceptions.

The concept status, as used here, includes two elements: self-direction and a favorable share of resources and rewards. Incidents involving each of these elements can, in turn, take the form of either overt dispute or impersonal competition. The parties involved may be either of the same official rank or different rank. These six categories were used to structure a set of hypotheses.

In general, it was expected that the issues likely to arise between ranks would assume more overt forms of group resistance against administrators whose authority

infringes on the self-direction of teachers. The issues were likely to involve teachers' control over the classroom and their authority within the school. This thesis is defined more specifically below.

Tables 9-1 and 9-2 summarize the rates of various types of conflicts reported for the sample as a whole. In 638 interviews 2,099 incidents were reported, i.e., a ratio of 3.3 incidents reported per interview. Thirty-seven percent of those, however, involved impersonal complaints or complaints against specific persons, neither of which entailed further overt action on the part of the participants. Half of the remaining 1322 incidents (or one-third of the total number) involved open discussions, one-third of which included three or more parties; of the incidents not involving complaints, 19 percent (or 12 percent of the original total) involved one or more heated discussion and 10 percent constituted major incidents. Can any trends be detected in these incidents?

In view of the growing sensitivity of teachers to their lack of self-direction, and as a concomitant of their intensifying drive toward professionalization, it was expected that:

Hypothesis 1: Authority issues are the single most frequent type of problem.

As expected, the largest single category of conflict (44 percent) involved authority problems (as described in Chapter 4)(Table 9-1, Total). About one-third of them involved complaints and two such conflicts were reported by each three persons interviewed. By comparison, scheduling and distribution problems were less prevalent, but they still accounted for one-fifth of the total. Conflicts involving values, structural enforcement and change, and distribution of other rewards, by comparison, each accounted for five to seven percent of the total.

Because of the conflict between subordinates and official superiors that is inherent in professionalization, it was expected that:

TABLE 9-1

PROPORTION\* OF ALL INCIDENTS REPORTED AS CLASSIFIED BY NATURE OF PROBLEM AND VARYING INTENSITY

NATURE OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN INCIDENTS	INTENSITY										TOTAL
	Impersonal Complaints	Personal Complaints	Disputes	Disputes Involving 3 or More Parties	One or More Heated Discussions	Major Incidents	Impersonal Competition	No Data			
Authority	3.00	11.05	8.65	4.02	6.02	3.33	7.23	1.02			44.32
Scheduling and Distribution	2.11	2.50	5.50	2.20	1.10	.85	2.56	.79			17.61
Distribution of Other Rewards	.42	1.04	.90	.61	.36	.42	.90	.04			4.69
Structural Enforcement and Change	1.25	1.37	1.37	1.30	.47	.28	.38	.28			6.70
Communication and Socialization	1.13	1.80	.52	.42	.19	.23	.19	.13			4.61
Valence - Sentiment	.09	1.60	.71	.00	.56	.04	.28	.32			3.60
School-Community	1.23	1.42	.04	.09	.00	.61	.09	.04			3.52
Resources	1.28	1.04	.57	.45	.23	.38	.09	.08			4.12
Values	.37	2.19	1.41	.76	1.23	.61	.19	.23			6.99
Philosophy	.28	.04	.33	.00	.14	.04	.04	.03			.90
No Data	.43	.70	.59	.26	.36	.24	.36	---			2.94
TOTAL	11.59	24.75	20.59	10.11	10.56	7.03	12.31	2.96			100.00

\* In all cases the percentages refer to the percent of the total number of conflicts.

Hypothesis 2: Incidents between teachers and administrators occur more frequently than incidents among teachers themselves.

It is significant that half of all of the conflicts occurred between teachers and members of the administration; 20 percent of these were confined to complaints (Table 9-2, Totals). Eighteen percent of the teacher-administrator conflicts (nine percent of the total) specifically included persons in guidance.

Conflict among teachers was, by comparison, less frequent. One-third of all of the incidents reported involved teachers in conflict among themselves; one-fourth of these were complaints. Over one-fourth of the incidents among teachers involved teachers in extracurricular activities.

Implied in the first two hypotheses is a third:

Hypothesis 3: Authority incidents between teachers and administrators constitute the single most frequent type of problem.

Half of the teacher-administrator conflicts, or over one out of four of all incidents reported (29 percent) involved authority problems which, as anticipated, is the largest single category of conflict in the sample (not reported in the tables); 16 percent of these conflicts involved heated discussions or major incidents. By comparison, only 15 percent of all incidents involved authority issues among teachers, a substantial number of which involved academic teachers against teachers in vocational education programs. (But nearly one-half of both the teacher-administrator and the teacher-teacher incidents involved authority issues.) In comparison to the 11 percent of the teacher-administrator conflicts specifically involving control over the classroom, curriculum, or school policy, however, only two percent of the teacher-teacher conflicts involved these types of authority issues. It is also interesting to note that whereas conflicts between teachers and guidance counselors were almost equally divided between authority and distribution problems, among teachers of extracurricular activities distribution problems occurred at twice the rate as authority problems did.

TABLE 9-2

## PERCENTAGE\* OF CONFLICTS AS CLASSIFIED BY PARTIES INVOLVED FOR VARYING INTENSITIES

ROLE-PARTNERS INVOLVED IN INCIDENTS	INTENSITY										SUB-TOTAL	TOTAL
	Impersonal Complaints	Personal Complaints	Disputes	Disputes Involving 3 or More Parties	One or More Heated Dispute	Major Incidents	Impersonal Competition	No Data				
Teacher-Administration	6.61	12.31	10.00	5.50	4.58	3.25	3.04	1.80				47.09
Teacher-Line Administrator	6.16	9.71	7.30	4.10	3.40	3.02	2.20	1.50				37.39
Teacher-Staff	.09	.42	.23	.00	.00	.19	.00	.00				.93
Teacher-Guidance	.36	2.18	2.47	1.40	1.18	.04	.84	.30				8.77
Teacher-Teacher	1.27	6.34	7.64	2.46	4.66	1.73	7.81	1.90				33.81
Academic Teacher vs. Vocational Teacher	.99	4.77	5.22	1.70	3.34	1.26	5.62	1.27				24.17
Teacher vs. Extra-curricular Teacher	.28	1.57	2.42	.76	1.32	.47	2.19	.63				9.64
Administrator-Administrator	.37	.66	.61	.38	.61	.33	.42	.15				3.53
Teacher-Student	.23	.95	.23	.42	.32	.28	.04	.14				2.61
Teacher and Administrator vs. Public	1.51	2.18	.76	.66	.80	1.09	.33	.16				7.49
Miscellaneous Conflicts	.14	.52	.14	.33	.00	.00	.04	.00				1.17
No Data	.71	1.49	.82	.29	.39	.24	.36	.00				4.30
TOTAL	10.84	24.45	20.20	10.04	11.36	6.92	12.04	4.15				100.00

\* In all cases the percentages refer to the percent of the total number of conflicts.

The form which various incidents take, also, is likely to vary with the type of issue and personnel involved. If authority issues are vital to the interests of teaching as a profession, then it can be expected that conflicts involving authority issues will provoke more resolute involvement on the part of participants, and so we have:

Hypothesis 4: A disproportionately larger number of authority incidents, in comparison to other types of conflict, will take the form of major incidents and heated discussions.

There is little support for this hypothesis. The proportion of authority incidents which were heated discussion or major incident (21 percent) was only slightly higher than the total sample proportion (19 percent); instead, disproportionately more value conflicts took these forms (26 percent). Although nearly half of the major incidents and heated discussions involved authority issues, the percentage was not unusual (given the fact that nearly half of all conflicts in the sample involved authority issues).

Incidents involving the scheduling and distribution of scarce resources are more likely than other types of incidents to involve competition between two parties for the favor of a third in control of the resources, rather than direct confrontation between the parties themselves. Therefore, it was expected that:

Hypothesis 5: A disproportionately larger number of scheduling and distribution problems (than other types of problems) will (a) take the form of impersonal competition; (b) disproportionately involve peers among themselves rather than with administrators; and (c) take the form of competition.

The first part of this hypothesis is unsubstantiated. A slightly larger share of authority problems, in fact, took the form of impersonal competition in comparison to distribution problems (27 percent compared to 22 percent). However, the second part

of the hypothesis is supported. Scheduling and distribution problems were more characteristic of peer group conflict than of teacher-administrator conflict; the difference is 21 percent compared to 12 percent when problems involving distribution of rewards have been omitted; it is 25 percent compared to 16 percent when distribution of rewards are included. The third part of the hypothesis is also supported. Impersonal competition occurred more frequently among teachers than between teachers and administrators; twenty-four percent of all incidents among teachers took this form in comparison to only seven percent of the incidents between teachers and administrators. Complaints also were more typical of incidents between teachers and administrators than of incidents among teachers (37 percent compared to 25 percent). Similarly, 19 percent of all incidents among teachers involved competition for official status or prestige; by comparison, only five percent of the teacher-administrator incidents were of this type.

Finally, it was reasoned that because open conflict between ranks challenges the entire authority structure, this type of conflict is less likely to be vehement than incidents among the peer group.

Hypothesis 6: Disproportionately fewer incidents between teachers and administrators will involve heated discussions or major incidents than incidents among teachers themselves.

This hypothesis does not have much support. The proportion of teachers who became involved in heated discussions (14 percent) is only four percent higher than for teacher-administrator incidents, and it is four percent below the sample average; nearly identical proportions of teacher-teacher and teacher-administrator conflicts involved major incidents. The fact that over ten percent of the latter type of conflict involved major incidents seems to indicate a certain degree of instability in the authority structure of public schools, but this may not be abnormally high for complex organizations.

## DISCORDANT AND TRANQUIL ORGANIZATIONS

The preceding chapters have examined in detail relationships between specific sets of variables, but no attempt has been made up to this point to present a composite picture of either the more discordant or the more tranquil organizations in the sample. As a way of assembling the available information, the three schools ranking among the 4 highest (on five of eight) separate measures of conflict were selected for a special and detailed comparison with three schools ranking among the lowest on three (of six) conflict measures. A profile of the characteristics differentiating the two organizations was constructed from all available relevant information.

Table 9-3 summarizes the results. Reported are the characteristics on which the discordant organizations exceed the tranquil ones; the characteristics on which the tranquil organizations exceed the discordant ones; and the characteristics on which they appear to be similar. However, this analysis was by inspection only; the differences cited are not necessarily significant statistics.

To summarize the table, in comparison to the tranquil organizations, the more discordant ones have younger faculties who have been in the system for a shorter period of time; they have more professional faculties (with the exceptions that they have lower client orientations and slightly smaller proportions inactive in professional organizations). They are more gregarious, but they talk less frequently with the principal and are more negative toward the principal. They have higher job satisfaction but lower career satisfaction.

The discordant organizations also are larger, more bureaucratic, more heterogeneous and have higher rates of staff turnover and expansion, but they permit teachers to assume more routine decision-making authority, are less complex, rely less on rules and are less closely supervised; they also have lower total income.

TABLE 9-3

A COMPARISON OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THREE DISCORDANT  
AND THREE TRANQUIL ORGANIZATIONS<sup>b</sup>

CHARACTERISTICS ON WHICH THE DISCORDANT EXCEED THE TRANQUIL ORGANIZATION <sup>b</sup>	CHARACTERISTICS ON WHICH THE TRANQUIL EXCEED THE DISCORDANT ORGANIZATION <sup>b</sup>	CHARACTERISTICS ON WHICH BOTH ORGANIZATIONS ARE SIMILAR <sup>b</sup>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. PERSONNEL BACKGROUNDS

- |                                                                              |                                      |                                                                 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) Proportion of mem-<br>bers not active in<br>a profession (12<br>percent) | (a) Average of Faculty<br>(11 years) | (a) Percentage of facul-<br>ty with M.A. degrees<br>(2 percent) |
|                                                                              |                                      | (b) Percentage Unionized<br>(2 percent)                         |
|                                                                              |                                      | (c) Percentage of facul-<br>ty married (2 per-<br>cent)         |
|                                                                              |                                      | (d) Average Years of<br>college ( $\bar{X}_d = 0.11$ )          |

II. PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATIONS

- |                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) Average Profession-<br>al Orientation of<br>the Faculty ( $\bar{X}_d =$<br>2.71)                                          | (a) Average Client<br>Orientation of the<br>faculty ( $\bar{X}_d = 0.23$ )                                                |
| (b) Proportion of facul-<br>ty with Professional<br>Orientation in the<br>Upper 19 percentile<br>(9 percent)                  | (b) Proportion of facul-<br>ty simultaneously low<br>on professional and<br>high on employee ori-<br>entation (7 percent) |
| (c) Proportion of facul-<br>ty Simultaneously<br>high on professional<br>and low on employee<br>orientation (13 per-<br>cent) | (c) Employee Behavior<br>Index ( $\bar{X}_d = .30$ )                                                                      |
| (d) Professional Behav-<br>ior Index ( $\bar{X}_d = .20$ )                                                                    |                                                                                                                           |

III. ON THE JOB ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

- |                                                                             |                                                                               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) Average job satis-<br>faction of the fac-<br>ulty ( $\bar{X}_d = .70$ ) | (a) Average career satis-<br>faction of the faculty<br>( $\bar{X}_d = 0.58$ ) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

TABLE 9-3 page 2

CHARACTERISTICS ON WHICH THE DISCORDANT EXCEED THE TRANQUIL ORGANIZATION ✓	CHARACTERISTICS ON WHICH THE TRANQUIL EXCEED THE DISCORDANT ORGANIZATION ✓	CHARACTERISTICS ON WHICH BOTH ORGANIZATIONS ARE SIMILAR ✓
(b) Proportion of faculty who lunch together very frequently (13 percent)	(b) Average number of years the faculty has been in the system ( $\bar{X}_d = 4$ years)	
(c) Proportion of faculty who socialize very frequently (25 percent)	(c) Frequency with which the faculty talks with the principal ( $\bar{X}_d = .73$ )	
(d) Proportion of faculty who are negative toward the principal on three or more counts (9 percent)	(d) Proportion of faculty who are positive toward the principal on eight or more counts (9 percent)	

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

(a) Number of faculty members in the school ( $\bar{X}_d = 98$ )	(a) Rules Orientation of the school ( $\bar{X}_d = 1.46$ )	(a) Proportion of teachers assigned to courses outside of their: Major (1 percent) Major or minor (3.3 percent)
(b) Routine Decision-Making Authority of teachers ( $\bar{X}_d = 1.94$ )	(b) Organizational-Complexity ( $\bar{X}_d = 2.53$ )	(b) Mean salary level (\$66.00)
(c) Total Bureaucratization ( $\bar{X}_d = 19.33$ )	(c) Close Supervision Scores ( $\bar{X}_d = 18.7$ )	
(d) Heterogeneity scores of the faculty ( $\bar{X}_d = 4.4$ )	(d) Total Receipts for the school ( $\bar{X}_d = \$6,000,000$ )	
(e) Number of staff additions since 1958 ( $\bar{X}_d = 135$ )		

V. PREFERRED GOALS

(a) Emphasis on character training (7 percent)	(a) Emphasis on subject matter (23 percent)	(a) Emphasis on citizenship (3 percent)
(b) Emphasis on critical thinking (15.3 percent)	(b) Emphasis on vocational training (6 percent)	(b) Emphasis on socialization (2 percent)

VI. PRODUCTS

(a) Proportion of students attending college (10 percent)	(b) Proportion of student drop outs (0.6 percent)
-----------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------

- a. The numbers in parenthesis indicate amount of difference in the two organizations.  
 b. Determined by inspection only.

They place more emphasis on character training and critical thinking and put comparatively less emphasis on subject matter and vocational training. They also have high proportions of students attending college.

**In Summary:**

- I. Nearly half of the conflicts were classified as authority problems, and an additional 20 percent involved scheduling and distribution problems.
- II. Half of the incidents occurred between teachers and members of the administration; half of these involved authority problems; one out of four incidents in the sample, therefore, involved teachers and administrators in authority problems, which was the largest single category of conflict.
- III. Only 15 percent of the conflicts in the sample involved authority conflict among teachers themselves; over one in four incidents among teachers involved teachers in extracurricular activities.
- IV. Scheduling and distribution problems were more characteristic of peer group conflicts than of teacher-administrator conflicts.
- V. Impersonal competition was proportionately more frequent among teachers than between teachers and administrators.

An inspection of the three most discordant and the three most tranquil organizations in the sample showed that, in comparison to the tranquil ones, the discordant organizations have fewer members who are active in a professional organization, have higher average professional orientations, exhibit more professional behavior and have more persons with simultaneously high professional and low employee orientations; the members of such organizations are more sociable and express more job satisfaction, but they are more negative toward their principals. These organizations are larger and more bureaucratic, with more decentralization of routine decision-making authority; they are more heterogeneous and have higher rates of staff turnover.

and expansion. The discordant organizations also place more emphasis on character training and critical thinking and more of their graduates go to college.

By comparison, the tranquil organizations have older faculties who have been in the system longer and who are more client oriented; they exhibit more employee-type behavior and have more people with simultaneously low professional and high employee orientations. The members of such organizations are more satisfied with their teaching careers (as opposed to their specific jobs), and are more positive toward their principal and speak with him more frequently. These organizations have a greater complexity but have closer supervision and more emphasis on rules, and they have a higher total income. They also place more emphasis on subject matter and vocational training.

#### CONTENT ANALYSES

Certain problems seemed to recur in the transcripts of the interviews which can be alluded to here in only summary fashion. Two-thirds of the incidents were recurrent, i.e., had occurred previously among the parties involved. Half of all of the incidents mentioned were handled by direct discussion between the parties. But in 17 percent of the cases, the parties involved simply ignored the situation after it had happened. In another six percent they "segmentalized" it, i.e., they insulated the problem from their other relationships. In 12 percent of the instances the parties attempted to discuss the problems indirectly; in 11 percent of the cases there were efforts to "pass the buck" to a higher authority in order to handle it. These figures, however, varied considerably among the schools. For example, the proportion of conflicts in which the individuals that were involved attempted to discuss the problem ranged from 18 to 69 percent in different schools, and in another school nearly half of the cases were ignored by the teachers; in still another, only five percent were ignored.

Teachers can provide insight into the functioning of schools. Therefore, while it is hazardous to generalize too profoundly from selected offhand comments, it would be equally remiss not to indulge in speculation. It is safe to say, for example, that while perhaps most teachers may be resigned, if not content with their place in the system, a substantial minority are convinced that they deserve more authority; and a handful of them are determined to increase their power, even at the risk of being insubordinate. Indeed, nearly half of the incidents reported involved authority issues of one kind or another; about 50 of nearly 2100 incidents identified specifically involved the insubordination of teachers and was implicit in many of the various other authority issues. Certain individuals and groups of teachers, especially athletics and some types of academic teachers, already have achieved a disproportionate amount of influence in most schools.

But the authority of teachers can be no higher than that of their administrators, who, in many systems, are treated by the public as little more than employees. Many administrators do not subscribe to, some do not even comprehend, the pretensions of teachers as specialists and authorities, and cannot envision them as anything but obedient employees. Therefore, it is not surprising that many teachers feel that their problems arise because they are inadequately protected from parents and school boards--and, particularly, students. But it seems equally plausible that in some cases, students also need protection from their teachers. The norm advocated by many teachers, that they must always be defended regardless of the circumstances, would create a real danger if it were observed with any consistency, which it is not.

The interviews uncovered a number of tensions between counselors and teachers, in particular; not the least important is the tendency of counselors to take the part of students in mediations with teachers. They even exercise surveillance over teachers in protection of their students. But one cannot escape the impression that at times, the counselors' primary concern seemed to be to get the troublemakers through

school and out of everyone's hair. Many of the counselors, too, seem to feel at least as obligated to teachers as to students.

One of the major surprises of the study is the extent of competitiveness among teachers for control over, and distribution of, students. Probably to the old hands at teaching, it would come as no surprise that despite teachers' talk about salaries and facilities, it is good students that are really in short supply. Teachers, therefore, insist upon authority over students, not only over their academic performance, but over their personal lives as well. Teachers go to some lengths to assure that their colleagues do not violate their territorial claims to certain students. Controlling discipline is one side of the coin, and obtaining a fair share of able students is the other.

He who controls discipline, in particular, controls the classroom. Teachers grow bitter toward their more mischievous charges who upset their classrooms, make their jobs more difficult and distract other students. Only some resent the prerogatives of students enough to openly wonder whether students should have any rights at all, but most of them clearly resent an administration that is lax on discipline. Of course, the act of disciplining students in itself is time consuming, unrewarding, and onerous. It is a responsibility which teachers would like to slough onto their wary administrations. But they are not willing to compromise their final authority to determine what the discipline policy is to be, since to many teachers, discipline lies at the heart of a successful classroom. Yet, it must be wondered, when teachers act as both prosecution and judge, are students perhaps as likely to receive vengeance instead of justice?

The most sacrosanct resource that teachers must share is the student. They are, of course, abundant, but from the viewpoint of teachers, there is an oversupply of unable delinquent types and a shortage of academically superior types. The quality of a teacher's students reflects upon his stature. Therefore, at the core of their fight for authority over students is a struggle to gain a fair share of the preferred ones,

and at least to avoid consignment to "dumping grounds". Extracurricular activities play a key role in problems involving the distribution of students. The fact that they often are taken from class reflects upon the status of the activities concerned, and activities' teachers compete among themselves to have good students join their programs; indeed, the competition for students among extracurricular activities is more severe than among academic teachers, especially in the least bureaucratic schools --music and athletics are the biggest contenders.

Although some "academic courses" serve as "dumping grounds", vocational courses are most frequently used for this function, which is resented by vocational teachers. Counselors, partly from conviction but encouraged by outside pressure, play a decisive role in these allocation problems, since they often use their influence to place good students into the academic courses, and away from the music, art, writing and vocational courses. The most fortunate teachers see "dumping grounds" simply as a matter of specialization; however, the problem is that no one wants to specialize with the undesirable students. They also justify "dumping grounds" in terms of their utility for the student, the difficulty of teaching them, the maintenance of their own status and empire building. Among the strategies available for competing for students are exerting pressure on the counselors, developing rules of competition and claims to territory (such as equalization policies), setting admission requirements, controlling assignment procedures (including informal recruiting) and attempting to change the scheduling system itself.

Not all of the authority issues and distribution problems concern insubordination of, and competition for, students, however. Teachers fight among themselves and with their administrators over curriculum content and the methods of teaching it. At stake, in many of these cases, is the convenience of some administrator, or the prestige of a department or teacher. The personal sense of obligation of some

teachers to guard students from immoral influences, their indifference in many cases, and especially, their concerted efforts to cautiously forestall possible public displeasure, all play a part in shaping a curriculum. In fact, their sensitivity to outside public opinion was responsible for a substantial share of the conflicts. Teachers and administrators alike are, therefore, sensitive to public relations. It is notable that even though the study focused on only conflicts within schools, the fact that 10 percent of them involved school-community relations is indicative of the importance of the community context for understanding organizational behavior. Teachers resent efforts of parents to influence grading, some of them preferring to avoid becoming familiar with parents, so that they will not have to take their problems into consideration and so can avoid their wrath. School board members were criticized for political interference and for lack of sympathy for teachers and in many communities, political conservatism was a source of irritation.

Grading brings out the worst in school community relationships, and it does not help teacher-administrator relationships either. Administrators are more willing than teachers to grant that some students aren't capable of learning. Teachers whose prestige weighs heavily on the performance of their students, are more likely to believe that their students aren't trying hard enough. But few teachers or administrators seem to blame failures on the quality of teaching, except for the fact that a few teachers are criticized for being too interested in subject matter; even fewer teachers attribute the difficulties involved to the system itself. But it is, nevertheless, clearly understood that part of the problem is that no one wants certain students who have been stereotyped at a particular level of ability.

The authority problems, then, like a large share of the student disciplinary problems, revert to the competition among teachers as they try to monopolize the preferred students and slough off the undesirable ones. The grading problem, however, also reflects much larger difficulties surrounding academic standards. Standards,

in turn, are part of a prestige system that determines the criteria for judging teaching competence. Competence is a controversial topic, partly because of disagreements about what it is, and partly because individuals are sometimes less responsible for their own incompetence than are certain features of their jobs--such as promotion and job assignment policies and an evaluation procedure under which administrators are under no compulsion to observe their teachers in the act of teaching before evaluating them. The irony underlying this system becomes evident when schoolmen attempt to convince parents that all teachers are equally competent, while at the same time they privately complain about one another's teaching incompetence and negligence.

Therefore, in addition to creating "dumptenders", job assignment procedures raise other problems, such as those connected with assigning teachers to courses for which they are unqualified, and with unequal work loads.

Incidents involving scheduling of physical facilities also occur in most schools. Extracurricular activities, especially band and football, usually compete for facilities, and in the least bureaucratic schools seem to find some difficulty in sharing classroom space.

It is problems such as these that make teachers appreciate certain rules. Although they don't like red tape, and they object to some rules--such as those creating what sometimes seem to be unbearable deadlines and regulating their personal work habits--they know also that they are vulnerable without them and so are willing to put up with anything that helps to clarify their jobs.

Underlying many of these incidents are status problems. Inconsistencies between age, experience, education, sex, and other social positions with official positions often lead to problems. Persons with inconsistent statuses are particularly open to charges of favoritism and to criticisms for obtaining an unfair (by some criteria) share of the rewards.

A number of conflicts, too, involved personal values, philosophies of education, idiosyncracies and personal irritations and weaknesses. And, finally, it should be

pointed out that many teachers had no problems to report. Some didn't think that conflict is professional; others simply avoided it or did not socialize with their colleagues; and in some cases, the size and ecology of their schools was responsible for minimizing contacts among teachers, and, thus, the opportunities for conflict.

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CHAPTER 10

THE BELLIGERENT PROFESSIONALS

These people who I think are the most dynamic teachers, the best teachers, are the ones who most frequently get involved in these conflicts. They are so keyed up all the time (A high school teacher).

I have often questioned whether it is worth it to have an excellent teacher when she causes such friction (A high school teacher).

During their discussions, teachers occasionally would speculate about the nature of the people who dared to become involved in conflict. Some of them were quite charitable; others were not. In an effort to follow some of the leads that they provided, in order to identify belligerent teachers, the militant leadership and their adversaries, the analysis now will turn from the organizational context--which has been the primary subject of concern up to now--and focus more narrowly on the identities of people.

Even though another unit of analysis is considered, it could be expected that the hypotheses developed concerning the relationship between professional climate and conflict would remain generally applicable to individuals. The term, general, is used advisedly however, since structural effects also must be considered, i.e., the fact that different settings can cause the same individuals to behave in various ways. It is possible, for example, that an usually militant person would eventually become passive after years in a peaceful organization; while a person not normally inclined to be belligerent could become so among militant associates. For these reasons one cannot merely assume that the findings on organizational climates will apply to individuals without the use of other reasons. Generally, however, it does seem reasonable that the findings on the organizational level would be paralleled at the individual level. An organization's professional climate is dependent upon the role conceptions

of its members, and the members' conceptions are, in turn, modified by the general climate of opinion; as a general tendency, then, individual orientations and organizational climates seem more likely to reinforce one another than not.

Linear correlations, comparisons of means and frequency distributions were all examined in connection with the hypotheses.

### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RANK-AND-FILE BELLIGERENTS

Before turning to the problem of identifying the militant leaders, an analysis will be made of the rank-and-file person who becomes involved in conflict.

#### Professional Orientation and Behavior

One of the primary forces contributing to militancy, it has been argued, is a professional role conception. But what does this mean? Does it mean that professional people are more likely than less professional ones to become involved in conflict? And if so, does it also follow that their frequency of involvement increases directly with their degree of professionalism? In order to answer these questions, comparisons were made of a person's rate of involvement in conflict and whether or not he had ever become involved in conflict.

Linear Correlations. The correlations of both professional orientations and professional behavior with eight measures of conflict rates were all in the positive direction, but when the sample was taken as a whole they were low (Table 11-1). The correlations with professional orientation are exceptionally low ( $r = .00$  to  $.07$ ) with the exception of the total disagreement rate ( $r = .23$ ). One reason that correlations with professional orientation were not higher can be attributed to a small variance in the conflict measures (which in most cases ranged from one to three conflicts per person) in comparison to the large variance in the orientation measures; the somewhat higher correlation with the total disagreement rate probably is in part

TABLE 11-1

LINEAR CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE ORIENTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUAL TEACHERS AND THEIR RATES OF CONFLICT (N = 1511)

TYPE OF CONFLICT	PROFESSIONAL						EMPLOYEE					
	Orientation			Behavior			Orientation			Behavior		
	Total r	Males	Females	Total r	Males	Females	Total r	Males	Females	Total r	Males	Females
Total Number of Incidents (Less Complaints)	.04	.20	.14	.21	.50	.59	-.04	-.18	-.23	-.24	-.74	-.23
Number of Open Disputes	.04	.20	.14	.17	.49	.56	-.04	-.20	-.36	-.19	-.56	-.29
Number of Authority Incidents	.05	.18	.19	.17	.41	.37	-.05	-.21	-.28	-.25	-.85	-.27
Number of Incidents with Other Teachers	.07	.20	.22	.17	.48	.34	-.05	-.20	-.28	-.08	-.49	-.31
Number of Incidents with the Administration	.05	.23	.15	.16	.44	.42	-.06	-.26	-.20	-.26	-.68	-.26
Number of Major Incidents	.00	.17	.51	.09	.29	.25	-.04	-.32	-.54	-.13	-.38	-.37
Total Number of Disagreements	.23	.55	.76	.06	.31	.21	-.23	-.59	-.68	-.04	-.28	-.27
Number of Severe Disagreements	.05	.17	.37	.08	.30	.14	-.06	-.39	-.39	-.06	-.37	-.28

due to the fact that there is more variance in this measure, and also it is based on self-reports and thus is more inclusive of all the respondents and of the total population of conflicts.<sup>1</sup>

The correlations are substantially higher for particular groups within the total sample. When the gender is controlled, all of the correlations involving professional orientation are higher, ranging from .14 to .76 (Table 11-1). The correlations between professional orientation and total disagreement rate, severe disagreement rate, and major incidents are all substantially higher for women than for men (respectively;  $r = .76$  compared to .55;  $r = .37$  compared to .17;  $r = .15$  compared to .17). The correlations were increased in a similar fashion by controlling for a person's age.

For the total sample, correlations of the conflict measures with the professional behavior index (ranging from  $r = .06$  to  $r = .21$ ) were generally higher than the total sample correlations with professional orientation. The behavioral index has a distribution range closer to that of the conflict measures. These correlations also increase when sex is controlled. For females, as an example, the correlations of the professional behavior index with the total conflict measure is  $r = .59$ ; for males it is  $r = .50$  (Table 11-1).

In general, then, judging from the total pattern of results, it can be concluded that between the orientation and behavioral measures, professionalism is correlated with most measures of conflict, except possibly the number of major incidents and severe disagreements. If the professional orientation of the total sample doesn't

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<sup>1</sup>Since ways were developed to measure organizational rates of conflict, they do not necessarily generate distributions applicable to individuals. For one thing, only a sample of persons was included in each school, which makes the measures less reliable for individual, than for the school as a whole. Since a large proportion of the respondents were not involved in conflict, and only smaller proportions were involved in more than one, in effect, the distribution consists largely of 0's and 1's.

explain much of the variance, it does explain more of the variance when males and females are considered separately.

Means Analysis. Since the above correlations were not notably high it seemed advisable to pursue the analysis further. It is possible that professional orientation is associated with conflict rates in other than the linear pattern assumed in correlation analysis. Table 11-2, for example, shows that the two hundred teachers in the sample with the highest professional orientations, on the average, tend to have at least a slightly higher conflict rate than the typical member of the sample. The differences are statistically significant (using a One-Tail Critical Ratio test) for the total number of incidents (less complaints), the number of teacher-administrator incidents, and the number of authority incidents.

Similarly, when teachers are classified into high, middle and low groups on the basis of their professional orientations, there is a crude and statistically significant tendency, on seven of the eight conflict measures tested, for persons with weaker orientations to become involved in fewer incidents than the teachers with either average or stronger orientations (Table 11-3); that is, the low category is more likely than the high category to be statistically different from the average group. Hence, the average teacher with a strong professional orientation, becomes involved in twice as many authority issues (mean = 1.11) as his counterpart with a weaker orientation (mean = .63). The ratio is similar for the rate of involvement in incidents with administrators and for open disputes.

However, these groups are reversed on their average frequency of involvement in major incidents--i.e., the teachers with weaker professional orientations become involved in more major incidents than their colleagues with stronger orientations; this pattern, then, parallels the findings on organizational climates.

TABLE 11-2

CONFLICT RATES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH EXTREMELY HIGH PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATIONS COMPARED TO THE TOTAL SAMPLE

TYPE OF CONFLICT	MEAN OF INDIVIDUALS IN UPPER EXTREME 15 PERCENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION DISTRIBUTION (N = 200)	MEAN OF TOTAL SAMPLE (N = 1513)	CRITICAL RATIO
Total Number of Incidents (Less Complaints)	1.40	1.15	1.65*
Number of Open Disputes	.44	.38	.80
Number of Incidents Among Teachers	.81	.72	.85
Number of Incidents Between Teacher(s) vs. Administrator(s)	1.11	.82	2.0**
Number of Authority Incidents	.98	.79	1.66*
Number of Major Incidents	.15	.11	1.30

\* Critical Ratio Significant at  $p \leq .05$ , One-Tail Test

\*\* Critical Ratio significant at  $p \leq .05$ , Two-Tail Test

Rates of Involvement. Finally, another question can be raised. Does professionalism explain the question of whether or not persons become involved in conflict more clearly than it explains their frequency of involvement? Perhaps the vital test of a professionally militant person is whether or not he becomes involved in a conflict, not how many times he becomes involved.

The proportion of people with strong, moderate and weak professional orientations, who have been involved in at least one conflict, were computed and the differences tested by chi-square. The direction of differences was as expected for four five of the eight measures tested, but percentage differences were two of the chi-squares were statistically significant. For example, whereas 95 percent of the most professional group reported at least one disagreement, 89 percent of

TABLE 11-3

COMPARISONS OF THE CONFLICT RATES OF INDIVIDUALS WITH STRONG, MODERATE AND WEAK PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATIONS (N = 1513)

TYPE OF CONFLICT	MEAN LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION			F RATIO	CRITICAL RATIO
	1 Strong (N = 510)	2 Moderate (N = 535)	3 Weak (N = 468)		
Total Number of Incidents (Less Complaints)	1.53	1.47	1.00	5.82*	(1, 2) .34 (1, 3) 3.17** (2, 3) 2.98**
Number of Open Disputes	0.57	0.49	0.30	8.31**	(1, 2) -1.09 (1, 3) 3.35** (2, 3) 3.98**
Number of Incidents Among Teachers	0.80	0.78	0.56	4.93**	(1, 2) .26 (1, 3) 2.88** (2, 3) 2.79**
Number of Incidents Between Teachers and Administrators	1.17	1.07	0.75	4.91**	(1, 2) .68 (1, 3) 3.05** (2, 3) 2.42**
Number of Authority Incidents	1.11	1.02	0.63	10.27**	(1, 2) .73 (1, 3) 4.05** (2, 3) 4.90**
Number of Major Incidents	0.10	0.12	0.17	4.12**	(1, 2) 0.82 (1, 3) 2.58** (2, 3) 1.93
Number of Severe Disagreements	0.15	0.11	0.06	2.73	(1, 2) .96 (1, 3) 2.16* (2, 3) 1.85
Total Number of Disagreements	8.10	8.04	6.56	13.64**	(1, 2) .16 (1, 3) 4.89** (2, 3) 4.51**

\* Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Significant at  $p \leq .01$

the lowest group did (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .05$ ); the comparable figures for the rate of involvement in authority issues are 41 percent and 35 percent (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .05$ ). On the other hand, the total rate of involvement in incidents of all types for these two groups was identical (46 percent and 26 percent for the respective measures).

In short, although the proportion of teachers who become involved in certain types of incidents tends to be a little higher for those with strong professional orientations, the differences are not as striking as their average (mean) rates of involvement. This seems to mean that what separates the most professional teachers from the least professional ones is not that they become involved in conflict, but that they become involved in conflict (on the average) more frequently. Persons with strong professional orientations appear to be "recidivistic."

#### Role Organization

There are some indications then, that a person's professionalism is, at least to some extent, positively associated with his involvement in conflict, and that loyal employees are less likely to become involved in conflicts than those who are not so loyal. Therefore, it seems reasonable that conflicts will be exceptionally high or low when these two role conceptions are combined in specific ways.

Persons with simultaneously high professional orientations and little loyalty to their employee roles do have slightly higher rates of involvement in conflict than those with the reverse loyalties (Table 11-4). However, the percentage differences are not impressive in most cases, and only three of the chi-squares are statistically significant. Yet the ratio of involvement in major incidents is two to one; 12 percent of the high professional-low employee group was identified as being involved in major incidents in comparison to six percent of the group with the reversed role organization. The differences on the other two statistically significant tests are not as

TABLE 11-4

PROPORTIONS OF PERSONS WITH FOUR STYLES OF ROLE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED IN SELECTED TYPES OF CONFLICT

PERCENT OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN SELECTED TYPES OF CONFLICT	STYLES OF ROLE ORGANIZATION						TOTAL (N = 1469)	CHI-SQUARE	D.F.
	High Professional			Low Professional					
	High Employee (N = 403)	Low Employee (N = 353)	High Employee (N = 346)	Low Employee (N = 367)					
Total Number of All Types of Incidents	48.1	47.3	44.8	47.1	46.9	.90	3		
Disputes	12.2	16.7	9.3	12.8	12.8	8.77*	3		
Open Discussion	26.6	27.4	23.8	23.8	25.4	1.93	3		
Heated Discussion	14.4	16.2	15.1	11.7	14.3	3.16	3		
Heated Discussion With Three or More	16.5	17.1	13.1	15.0	15.5	2.51	3		
Major Incident	8.0	11.9	5.8	11.2	9.2	10.17*	3		
Impersonal Competition	18.7	14.4	13.6	14.7	15.5	4.46	3		
Incidents Involving Authority Problems	39.2	43.3	32.4	35.1	37.6	10.38*	3		

\* Chi-Square Significant at  $p \leq .05$



high; for example, comparable differences of involvement in authority issues are 43 percent and 32 percent, respectively.

The rates of involvement and the differences between these two styles of role organization were accentuated when a select few persons, with extreme acceptance and rejection of these role conceptions, were examined independently. Twenty-one percent of the 42 persons who were simultaneously among the highest professional orientation and the lowest employee orientations in the sample (i.e., were in the upper and lower 15th percentile of these respective distributions) had been involved in heated discussions; this is double the rate of persons who were simultaneously in the highest 15th percentile on the employee orientation and the lowest 15th percentile on the professional orientation distribution (10 percent). Persons with these extreme types of role conceptions differed greatly on the following measures: total number of incidents, number of general complaints, number of heated discussions, number of incidents involving impersonal competition, and the number of disputes involving three or more parties. The comparable rates at which each of these select groups was involved in authority issues however, were not much different than the total sample (50 percent and 35 percent, respectively).

#### Employee Orientation and Behavior

For the sample as a whole, the negative relationships between an individual's conflict rates and his employee orientation are barely perceptible, except that the correlation with severe disagreement is higher ( $r = -.23$ ; Table 11-1). As in the case of professional orientation, the correlations increase with sex controlled; they range from ( $r = -.63$ ), in the case of females involved in disagreements, to ( $r = -.18$ ) for the total incident rate of males.

The total sample correlations between the employee behavior index and conflict rates are somewhat higher than those with orientation; they range from ( $r = -.04$  for

total disagreement rate to ( $r = -.26$ ) for teacher-administrator conflicts. Some of the correlations for men were exceptionally high in comparison to women. For example, the correlation between the male total incident rate and their employee orientation is ( $r = -.74$ ) compared to ( $r = -.23$ ) for women; the correlation of the men's employee orientation with authority conflicts ( $r = -.85$ ) and teacher-administrator conflicts ( $r = -.68$ ) also are higher than the women's ( $r = -.27$  and  $r = -.26$  respectively).

In other words, although the relationship is not striking for the sample as a whole, there is some tendency for the most employee-oriented teachers, and especially those whose conduct identifies them as loyal employees, to be less militant.

#### The Social Identities of Professional Belligerents

Professional orientations do not differ between the sexes or between the young (i.e., under 35 years of age) and older age groups (Table 11-5); the slightly higher professional orientation scores of the younger males are not significantly different from the other groups. However, men (all age brackets) and younger people (both sexes) do have statistically lower employee orientations than their opposites. The young men have exceptionally low employee orientations, while older women are extremely loyal employees. The employee orientations of both older males and younger females are intermediate. Males also show evidence of more professional behavior than women, but older males excel the young in this respect. In any case it appears that men characteristically are less employee oriented than women, and lean more toward certain types of professional behavior. Curiously, the "organization man" turns out to be an older woman.

Since there is already evidence that being professional and being employee oriented are associated with a person's rates of conflict, the fact that men have significantly higher rates of conflict than women, on all eight of the conflict indices

TABLE 11-5

## COMPARISONS OF THE MEAN PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE SCORES OF MEN AND WOMEN AND THEIR CONFLICT RATES, BY AGE GROUP

	MEN				WOMEN				TOTAL		
	young <sup>a</sup>		old		young <sup>a</sup>		old		Male	Female	Critical Ratio
	(N = 446)	(N = 475)	(N = 241)	(N = 349)	(N = 921)	(N = 590)	(N = 921)	(N = 590)			
Professional and Employee Orientation and Behavior											
Mean Professional Orientation Scale	55.92	55.82	54.94	55.22	55.87	55.10	0.11	-.21			0.95
Mean Professional Behavior Index	3.00	3.95	2.23	3.58	3.49	3.03	-9.88**	-12.25**			5.69**
Mean Employee Orientation Scale	78.49	74.46	75.67	69.88	76.41	72.24	3.05	3.02			3.64
Mean Employee Behavior Index	8.65	8.43	9.03	8.70	8.53	8.84	0.84*	1.11			-1.51
Number of Conflicts Per Person											
Total Number (Less Complaints)	1.19	2.07	.72	1.02	1.64	.90	-4.44**	-2.32*			6.15**
Number of Open Discussions	.43	.64	.31	.37	.54	.34	-2.76**	-.92			3.70**
Number of Authority Issues	.81	1.43	.55	.68	1.13	.62	-4.27**	-1.21			5.49**
Number of Teacher-Teacher Incidents	.69	1.00	.46	.56	.85	.52	-3.12**	-1.26			4.96**
Number of Severe Disagreements	.15	.11	.08	.07	.13	.07	0.80	.47			2.36*
Total Number of Disagreements	8.03	8.25	7.47	6.31	8.14	6.79	0.67	2.38*			4.82**
Number of Major Incidents	.12	.19	.05	.08	.16	.07	-2.61**	5.18**			4.85**
Number of Teacher-Administrator Incidents	.89	1.50	.65	.74	1.20	.70	-3.77**	-.69			4.75**

\* Critical Ratio Significant at  $p \leq .05$ \*\* Critical Ratio Significant at  $p \leq .01$ <sup>a</sup> Young: 35 years of age or younger

tested, seems reasonable. The average male has been involved in over eight disagreements and between one and two incidents, most of which have been with the administration and over issues of authority. By comparison, the average woman has been involved in less than seven disagreements and less than one incident. Because males are concentrated in high schools, it is doubtful that elementary teachers are as militant.<sup>2</sup>

It would be more difficult to anticipate the comparative conflict rates of young and old males, given the disparity between their relative employee orientations and professional behavior. It is therefore interesting, that--despite the lower employee orientations of younger men--the older ones, who have shown more signs of professional behavior, become involved in statistically more conflicts than the younger ones on six of the eight measures of conflict. There is a similar tendency for older women to become involved in more conflicts than younger ones, but only three of eight of these tests are statistically significant. It is possible that young men, by virtue of their youth and gender, have more militant attitudes, but that the older ones have the sense of professional stature and prestige to put them in a position to actually challenge authority and to openly dispute with colleagues. The fact that older males are more militant could also mean that not all of the more militant younger people leave teaching. At the same time, the more militant attitudes of the young men may be more symptomatic of a new generation of militants to replace the present generation of influentials.

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<sup>2</sup>In view of these findings, rank order correlations were computed between the proportion of males in a school and its conflict rates. The correlations were in the positive direction but were very low; they ranged from .04 for teacher-administrator conflicts to .17 for disputes. Most of the structural variance and mean professional orientation explained more of the conflict variables than the proportion men in the school.

## INITIATIVE-SEEKING AND COMPLIANT TEACHERS

The initiative-compliance typology described in Chapter 4 was assessed for its power to discriminate the highly professional and highly militant teachers. Because of the way it was designed and given the premises of the study, it was expected that the rebellious and contrary types of teachers, in comparison to other types in the typology, would be more professionally oriented and become involved in more conflicts, on the average.

In general, the rebellious and contrary teachers are both more professional and more militant (Table 11-6). Their professional orientations are statistically higher than both the "defiant-cautious" and "realistic-submissive" types. They also have the highest client orientation. Rebellious and contrary teachers become involved in more "total" number of conflicts, teacher-administrator conflicts, and authority conflicts, than either of the other two groups; they also become more involved in a greater amount of conflicts with other teachers than the "defiant-cautious" group.

## WORK SATISFACTION

In Chapter 7, evidence was reported that a school's climate of work satisfaction increases with its rates of conflict. An individual's satisfaction with his work also increases with his conflict rates. However, for schools, conflicts were more highly correlated with job satisfaction than with career satisfaction. In the case of individuals, the correlations with career satisfaction was, in most cases, higher (Table 11-7). A person's career satisfaction increased markedly with the total number of conflicts in which he had become involved ( $r = .52$ ), the number of authority conflicts ( $r = .49$ ), the number of conflicts with the administration ( $r = .52$ ), and open disputes ( $r = .40$ ); career satisfaction is also somewhat related to the number of major incidents in which a person has participated ( $r = .28$ ). The comparable correlations with

TABLE 11-6

LEVEL OF INITIATIVE AND COMPLIANCE OF TEACHERS AND THEIR PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATIONS AND CONFLICT RATES

PROFESSIONALISM AND TYPE OF CONFLICT	LEVEL OF INITIATIVE AND COMPLIANCE			CRITICAL RATIO
	(1) Mean of Rebellious and Contrary (N = 452)	(2) Mean of Defiant and Cautious (N = 474)	(3) Mean of Realistic and Submissive (N = 420)	
Professional Orientation	59.14	56.00	55.18	(1 vs. 2) 4.09*** (1 vs. 3) 5.09*** (2 vs. 3) 0.96
Client Orientation	9.70	9.04	8.46	(1 vs. 2) 3.73*** (1 vs. 3) 6.49*** (2 vs. 3) 2.90***
Total Number of Incidents (Less Complaints)	1.29	1.02	1.02	(1 vs. 2) 2.15** (1 vs. 3) 2.19** (2 vs. 3) 0.04
Number of Open Disputes	.40	.33	.38	(1 vs. 2) 1.26 (1 vs. 3) 0.38 (2 vs. 3) 0.92
Number of Teacher-Teacher Incidents	.80	.60	.71	(1 vs. 2) 2.27** (1 vs. 3) 0.99 (2 vs. 3) -1.24
Number of Teacher-Administrator Incidents	.96	.79	.58	(1 vs. 2) 1.66* (1 vs. 3) 3.82** (2 vs. 3) 2.51**
Number of Authority Incidents	.90	.71	.65	(1 vs. 2) 1.97** (1 vs. 3) 2.58** (2 vs. 3) 0.60
Number of Major Incidents	.13	.11	.05	(1 vs. 2) 0.84 (1 vs. 3) 3.78*** (2 vs. 3) 2.94***

\* Significant at  $p \leq .05$ , one-tail test

\*\* Significant at  $p \leq .05$ , two-tail test

\*\*\* Significant at  $p \leq .01$ , two-tail test

satisfaction for a specific job are lower (hovering around  $r = .15$  to  $r = .18$ ), but they also are in the positive direction.

Perhaps only those people who are already committed to teaching and satisfied with their careers and jobs, become concerned enough to participate in conflict. But at the same time, the very act of conflict itself may give one the sense that he has had a part in the long-range development of education. Perhaps it is that fact which makes conflict satisfying from the standpoint of one's career goals; insofar as his specific job is concerned, conflict can be threatening and disruptive. But the very fact that participating in conflict is rewarding for one's career goals, does make the particular job more desirable.

TABLE 11-7

LINEAR CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE JOB AND CAREER SATISFACTION  
OF INDUSTRIAL TEACHERS AND THEIR RATES OF CONFLICT (N = 1511)

TYPE OF CONFLICT	CAREER SATISFACTION r	JOB SATISFACTION r
Total Number of Incidents (Less Complaints)	.52	.18
Number of Open Disputes:	.40	.18
Number of Authority Incidents	.49	.15
Number of Incidents with Other Teachers	.19	.05
Number of Incidents with the Administration	.52	.16
Number of Major Incidents	.28	.06
Total Number of Disagreements	.04	.13
Number of Severe Disagreements	.04	.09

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITANT PROFESSIONAL LEADERS

Professional movements advance in a spearhead-like fashion, with a few leaders paving the way for a lagging rank-and-file. Therefore a handful of professional leaders in teaching may have significance for the future development of the professional movement far out of proportion to their numbers. The militant professional leaders are of particular interest because key leadership positions normally are tension-ridden, and because they are the ones who will lead the fight for status.

In the following analysis, therefore, a brief profile of militant professional leaders will be compared to the rank-and-file of teachers. It was expected that a group of teachers identified as "militant professionals" by other means would occupy positions of leadership in teaching and, therefore, would possess other leadership characteristics leading to involvement in wide-ranging types of conflict.

For the purposes of this analysis, 200 teachers with professional orientations in the upper 15 percent of the distributions of their respective schools were selected as the most professional teachers; they will be referred to as ultra-professionals. They, in turn, have been classified according to their involvement or lack of involvement in conflict as follows:

1. Militant ultra-professionals--persons in the upper 15th percentile of professional orientations:
  - a. Type I; moderates--those who have been involved in at least one dispute
  - b. Type II; belligerents--those who have been involved in at least one heated discussion or major incident
2. Nonmilitant ultra-professionals--persons in the upper 15th percentile of professional orientations who have not been involved in disputes, heated discussions or major incidents.

3. Rank-and-file teachers--persons in the lower 85th percentile of the distribution of professional orientations.

### Background Characteristics

If teaching is in the process of professionalization, then it is likely that the most professionally oriented teachers, i.e., the ultra-professionals, will have positions of informal leadership. Thus they will have social characteristics normally associated with leaders. But to the extent that professionalization is a militant process, the militant ultra-professionals will occupy the primary leadership positions; their leadership characteristics will be especially prominent.

Group Support. It was expected, therefore, that more militant ultra-professionals would have more support from their colleagues than either the typical teacher in the sample or the nonmilitant ultra-professionals.<sup>3</sup> Table 11-8 provides support for this proposition. Fifty-six percent of the moderate militant ultra-professionals (Type I) and 59 percent of the belligerent militants (Type II) were identified as having group support, whereas only 38 percent of the nonmilitant professionals, and of the total sample, were so identified (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .01$ ).

Group Respect. For similar reasons, it was expected that peers would show more respect for the militants than the nonmilitants. Fifty-two percent of the moderate militants and 68 percent of the belligerent militants were highly respected by their colleagues (Table 11-9).<sup>4</sup> This compares with only 30 percent of the nonmilitant professionals and 34 percent of the total sample (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .001$ ).

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<sup>3</sup>Support from colleagues was assessed by asking teachers to mention colleagues whose ideas and opinions had received the most support from other teachers within the past year or two. The criterion used here had been nominated at least once.

<sup>4</sup>These are individuals mentioned by at least two or more colleagues as a person whose ideas about education they respect the most.

TABLE 11-8

PROPORTION OF ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS AND RANK-AND-FILE TEACHERS IDENTIFIED AS BEING WITH AND WITHOUT THE SUPPORT FROM COLLEAGUES

SUPPORT OF COLLEAGUES	ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS			RANK-AND-FILE (N = 1266)	TOTAL (N = 1466)
	Moderate Militants <sup>2</sup> (Type I) (N = 52)	Belligerent Militants <sup>3</sup> (Type II) (N = 34)	Nonmilitants <sup>4</sup> (N = 114)		
Yes <sup>1</sup>	.56	.59	.38	.37	.38
No	.44	.41	.62	.63	.62

$\chi^2 = 13.87$ , 3 d. f. significant at  $p \leq .01$

<sup>1</sup>Identified by at least one colleague as persons whose ideas and opinions have gotten the most support from other teachers within the last year or two

<sup>2</sup>Ultra-militants (in the upper 15% of the professional orientation distribution) involved in disputes

<sup>3</sup>Ultra-militants involved in heated discussions or major incidents

<sup>4</sup>Ultra-militants not involved in disputes, heated discussions, or major incidents

TABLE 11-9

PROPORTIONS OF ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS AND RANK-AND-FILE TEACHERS IDENTIFIED AS HAVING AND NOT HAVING THE MOST RESPECT FROM COLLEAGUES<sup>1</sup>

RESPECT OF COLLEAGUES	ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS			RANK-AND-FILE (N = 1266)	TOTAL (N = 1466)
	Moderate Militants <sup>2</sup> (Type I) (N = 52)	Belligerent Militants <sup>3</sup> (Type II) (N = 34)	Nonmilitants <sup>4</sup> (N = 114)		
High	.52	.68	.30	.33	.34
Low	.48	.32	.70	.67	.66

$\chi^2 = 23.25$ , 3 d. f. significant at  $p \leq .001$

<sup>1</sup>Mentioned by at least two colleagues as a person whose ideas about public education they respect the most

<sup>2</sup>Ultra-militants (in the upper 15% of the professional orientation distribution) involved in disputes

<sup>3</sup>Ultra-militants involved in heated discussions or major incidents

<sup>4</sup>Ultra-militants not involved in disputes, heated discussions, or major incidents

It appears that ultra-professionals who risk involvement in major incidents and heated discussions are more likely to gain the respect of their colleagues than are the less belligerent militants. The participation of these professionally motivated teachers in conflict appears to have the approval of their colleagues.

Level of Education. It was expected that, as leaders of their groups, the militant professionals would lead their peers in educational achievement as well. Over half of the militant professionals (Types I and II combined) have an M.A. degree or better, in comparison to 40 percent of the total sample (Table 11-10, chi-square significant at  $p \leq .05$ ). Slightly more of the militant professionals have an M.A. degree than the nonmilitants, as expected, but the difference is relatively small (51 percent compared to 46 percent).

Sex Characteristics. Since positions of leadership in this society usually are occupied by males, and in view of the finding that men are generally more belligerent than women, it was expected that the militant ultra-professionals would be disproportionately male. This is generally true (Table 11-11, chi-square significant at  $p \leq .001$ ). Sixty-five percent of the moderate militants and 79 percent of the belligerent militants were males, in comparison with only 45 percent of the nonmilitant ultra-professionals. However, the fact that the disproportion of males among Type I militants is only slight, in comparison to the total sample (which is 61 percent male), indicates that women do carry their weight of leadership among those who adopt this particular form of militant professionalism. The primary difference is that the belligerent militants are predominately men (79 percent), while men are underrepresented among the nonmilitant ultra-professionals (45 percent). Therefore, the most belligerent professional militants are likely to be men, and the ultra-professionals who do not become militant are more likely to be women. However, some women do contribute to a type of militant leadership, even though most members of their gender are not so

TABLE 11-10

PROPORTIONS OF ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS AND RANK-AND-FILE TEACHERS  
WITH AND WITHOUT MASTERS DEGREES

EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT	ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS		RANK-AND-FILE (N = 1266)	TOTAL (N = 1466)
	Moderate and Belligerent Militants <sup>1, 2</sup> (Types I and II) (N = 86)	Nonmilitants <sup>3</sup> (N = 114)		
Masters Degree or better	.51	.46	.38	.40
Less than a Masters Degree	.49	.54	.62	.60

$\chi^2 = 7.51$ , 2 d. f. significant at  $p < .05$

<sup>1</sup>Ultra-militants (in the upper 15% of the professional orientation distribution) involved in disputes

<sup>2</sup>Ultra-militants involved in heated discussions or major incidents

<sup>3</sup>Ultra-militants not involved in disputes, heated discussions, or major incidents

TABLE 11-11

PROPORTIONS OF MEN AND WOMEN AMONG ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS AND RANK-AND-FILE TEACHERS

GENDER	ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS			RANK-AND-FILE (N = 1266)	TOTAL (N = 1466)
	Moderate Militants <sup>1</sup> (Type I) (N = 52)	Belligerent Militants <sup>2</sup> (Type II) (N = 34)	Nonmilitants <sup>3</sup> (N = 114)		
Men	.65	.79	.45	.62	.61
Women	.35	.21	.55	.38	.39

$\chi^2 = 18.11$ , 3 d. f. significant at  $p < .001$

<sup>1</sup>Ultra-militants (in the upper 15% of the professional orientation distribution) involved in disputes

<sup>2</sup>Ultra-militants involved in heated discussions or major incidents

<sup>3</sup>Ultra-militants not involved in disputes, heated discussions, or major incidents

disposed. The representation of women among militant leaders is especially striking in view of their general unaggressiveness shown in the sample. Perhaps the normal differences between the sexes are leveled in the process of professionalization.

Age. A number of factors are likely to affect the association between age and leadership capacity. The youngest teachers are more likely than older ones to be in touch with new developments because of their recent education, to have less at stake in the status quo, and to generally favor change; but until a certain level of maturity has been reached, they are unlikely to have gained the experience expected of leaders, nor to be well integrated into their informal group structures. Perhaps these factors help to account for the fact that the militant professionals (Types I and II combined) are disproportionately middle-aged (31 to 45 years of age)--44 percent compared to 36 percent of the total sample; and that the nonmilitant professionals are underrepresented in the middle-aged (25 percent) (Table 11-12, chi-square significant at  $p < .001$ ). In another analysis, however, no difference was found concerning the number of years that different types of professionals had been employed in their particular school.

Initiative and Compliance. As was expected, the militant professionals show evidence of rebelliousness as measured by the initiative-compliance scale described in Chapter Four. Sixty-two percent of the moderate militants are classified on that scale as rebellious or contrary, in comparison to 50% of the nonprofessional militants and 52% of the total sample. But the major difference exists between the belligerent militants and the rest; 92 percent of them are rebellious or contrary, and only eight percent are realistic or submissive (Table 11-13, chi-square significant at  $p < .05$ ). Since this scale asks respondents to anticipate what they would do under certain conditions, this evidence could indicate that belligerent militants do not think of their

TABLE 11-12

PROPORTIONS OF ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS AND RANK-AND-FILE TEACHERS  
OF DIFFERENT AGE LEVELS

AGE RANGE	ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS			RANK-AND-FILE (N = 1266)	TOTAL (N = 1466)
	Moderate Militants <sup>1</sup> (Type I) (N = 52)	Belligerent Militants <sup>2</sup> (Type II) (N = 34)	Nonmilitants <sup>3</sup> (N = 114)		
21-30	.23	.38	.27	.36	.33
31-45	.44	.25	.35	.36	.36
46-75	.33	.38	.38	.27	.31

$\chi^2 = 27.53$ , 6 d. f. significant at  $p < .001$

<sup>1</sup>Ultra-militants (in the upper 15% of the professional orientation distribution) involved in disputes

<sup>2</sup>Ultra-militants involved in heated discussions or major incidents

<sup>3</sup>Ultra-militants not involved in disputes, heated discussions, or major incidents

TABLE 11-13

PROPORTIONS OF ULTRA-PROFESSIONAL AND RANK-AND-FILE TEACHERS  
WHO ARE REBELLIOUS OR CONTRARY AND WHO ARE REALISTIC OR SUBMISSIVE

TYPE OF INITIATIVE AND COMPLIANCE	ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS			RANK-AND-FILE (N = 1266)	TOTAL (N = 1466)
	Moderate Militants <sup>1</sup> (Type I) (N = 52)	Belligerent Militants <sup>2</sup> (Type II) (N = 34)	Nonmilitants <sup>3</sup> (N = 114)		
Rebellious or Contrary	.62	.92	.59	.50	.52
Realistic or Submissive	.38	.03	.41	.50	.48

$\chi^2 = 9.64$ , 3 d. f., significant at  $p < .05$

<sup>1</sup>Ultra-militants (in the upper 15% of the professional orientation distribution) involved in disputes

<sup>2</sup>Ultra-militants involved in heated discussions or major incidents

<sup>3</sup>Ultra-militants not involved in disputes, heated discussions, or major incidents

involvement in conflict as accidental or exceptional, and are fully aware of their predisposition towards militancy.

In another analysis (not reported) it was also found that the militant professionals are overrepresented among persons with low employee orientations, but they do not vary greatly from nonmilitant professionals in this respect (chi-square significant at  $p < .001$ ).

Client Orientation. A disproportionate number of militant professionals (Types I and II combined) have high client orientations (74 percent in comparison to the 31 percent in the rest of the sample); they are even slightly higher than nonmilitant professionals (69 percent) (Table 11-14, chi-square significant at  $p \leq .001$ ). This pattern is consistent with the usual discussions of professionalism. The fact that at least the leaders of the professional movement are motivated directly out of personal concern for their students is the first indication in the study that this factor is a primary motivation behind professional militancy.

#### Selected Types of Conflict

It will be instructive to compare the two types of ultra-professional militant leaders on the types of conflict in which they have been involved. Table 11-15 reports the proportion of each class of ultra-professionals involved in certain types of conflicts. Only comparisons which are significantly different at  $p \leq .01$  level of significance or above are reported. The largest proportions of both types of militant professionals have been involved in teacher-administrator incidents. Eighty-three percent of moderate militants and 88 percent of belligerent militants have become involved in conflicts with the administration, which is more than double the rate of the rest of the sample. However, in comparison to belligerent militants, 82 percent of whom have been involved in conflict with other teachers (almost as often as

TABLE 11-14

PROPORTIONS OF ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS AND RANK-AND-FILE TEACHERS  
WITH DIFFERING LEVELS OF CLIENT ORIENTATION

LEVEL OF CLIENT ORIENTATION	ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS Moderate and Belligerent Militants <sup>1, 2</sup> (Types I and II) (N = 86)	Nonmilitants <sup>3</sup> (N = 114)	RANK-AND-FILE (N = 1266)	TOTAL (N = 1466)
High	.74	.69	.35	.31
Moderate	.20	.25	.41	.39
Low	.06	.06	.23	.30

$\chi^2 = 196.53$ , 4 d. f. significant at  $p < .001$

<sup>1</sup>Ultra-militants (in the upper 15% of the professional orientation distribution) involved in disputes

<sup>2</sup>Ultra-militants involved in heated discussions or major incidents

<sup>3</sup>Ultra-militants not involved in disputes, heated discussions, or major incidents, but perhaps involved in complaint (?)

with the administration), the moderate militants are less prone to disputes with other teachers, preferring the administration (50 percent compared to 83 percent).

The two types also differ in other respects. Notably, in comparison to the moderate militants, a much higher proportion of the belligerents have been involved in problems involving scheduling and distribution of personnel and resources (82 percent compared to 56 percent). Conversely, a slightly higher proportion of moderate militant professionals have become involved in authority problems (73 percent compared to 62 percent).

Finally, conflicts involving the public, and conflicts between academic teachers and vocational teachers are both far more typical of belligerent militants than of the moderates (35 percent compared to 10 percent in the first case; 76 percent compared to 46 percent in the second case).

TABLE 11-15

PROPORTIONS OF ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS AND RANK-AND-FILE  
TEACHERS INVOLVED IN SELECTED TYPES OF CONFLICT

SELECTED TYPES OF CONFLICT	ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS				RANK-AND-FILE TEACHERS Percent Involved (N = 1269)	TOTAL (N = 1469)	CHI-SQUARE LEVEL OF Significance
	Militant -- Involved In		Nonmilitant				
	Moderate Militant Percent Involved <sup>1</sup> (N = 52)	Belligerent Militant Percent Involved <sup>2</sup> (N = 34)	Percent Involved <sup>3</sup> (N = 114)				
Authority Issues	.73	.62	.17		.37	.38	.001
Scheduling and Distribution Problems	.56	.82	.16		.36	.36	.001
Teacher-Administrative or Incidents	.83	.88	.13		.38	.39	.001
Teacher-Teacher Total	.50	.83	.16		.36	.36	.001
Teacher-Guidance Personnel	.27	.21	.06		.13	.13	.01
Academic-Vocational Teachers	.46	.76	.13		.30	.30	.001
Teacher-Public	.10	.35	.00		.10	.09	.001

<sup>1</sup> Ultra-militants (in the upper 15% of professional orientation distribution) involved in disputes.

<sup>2</sup> Ultra-militants involved in heated discussions or major incidents.

<sup>3</sup> Ultra-militants not involved in conflicts, except impersonal competition.

On the other hand, the analyses on several of the comparisons (not reported) were not statistically significant. There appears to be no difference in the frequency with which the different types of ultra-professionals and the rank-and-file teachers become involved in conflict with students, with extracurricular activities teachers, and the extent to which they become involved in value conflicts--although belligerents are overrepresented in extracurricular activity and value issues.

In summation, it appears that in comparison to the moderate militant professionals, who participate in less severe disputes, the belligerent ultra-professionals are more likely to be concerned with scheduling and distribution problems, and they seem to be as ready to tangle with their peers (particularly those in vocational education) as with the administration. They are also more likely to become involved in conflicts with the public. By comparison, the moderate militants expend most of their energies on authority issues, especially those which seem to involve the administration.

The fact that belligerent professionals very frequently become involved in incidents with their own colleagues perhaps tells something about the general character of professional movements. On the one hand, it is likely that those teachers who are willing to take extreme positions and become involved in major incidents, do so at the risk of alienating some of their colleagues who are not willing to go that far, or who otherwise are neutral. This tendency of professional movements to become segmented and fraught with conflict among peers is perhaps typical of the professionalization process (Bucher and Strauss, 1961). However, it is equally possible that this type of professional leader is predisposed to conflict with his peers, conflicts which easily get out of hand because of the absence of an authority differential to control conflict within bounds. Thus, the fact that belligerent militants are comparatively less concerned with authority problems than with scheduling and distribution problems suggests that they are perhaps more involved in a struggle for personal resources than for decision-making authority, in comparison to their counterparts. Perhaps these two

types of leaders merely represent alternative strategies toward professionalization; or perhaps they represent the relative balance between individual rewards and group autonomy, which is one of the fundamental dilemmas of any profession.

### Militant Professionals Compared to the Officers of Unions and Professional Associations

The officers of the teachers' professional associations and unions are acknowledged leaders of the teaching profession's drive for status. How do they compare with the informal leaders?

Respondents were asked whether or not they had ever held any office in a teacher's professional association or union. Thirty people identified themselves as union officers, and over 300 identified themselves as having been an officer in a professional association. There is no way of knowing exactly what positions or organizations were included in these self-designations. Most of the officers probably were in local and state organizations, and undoubtedly many officers in both organizations were not in the main stream of militant activity, much of which is still focused at state and national levels.

When professional and union officers were compared by themselves, the AFT officers expressed statistically less loyalty to the administration (i.e., a higher score; the CR is significant at  $p < .05$ ), and they had a statistically lower employee behavior score; however, their total employee orientation, although lower, was not statistically different from the other officers (Table 11-16).<sup>5</sup> At the same time, officers also had a higher professional orientation than officers of professional associations (CR significant at  $p < .05$ ), and their professional behavior scores tended to

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<sup>5</sup>On a chi-square test comparing officers with high, average and low employee orientations, however, union officers had significantly lower employee orientations than officers of professional associations ( $p < .05$ ); only 13 percent of the union officers had high employee orientations in comparison to 32 percent of the other officers.

TABLE 11-16

COMPARISONS OF THE MEAN PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE ORIENTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR OF THE OFFICERS OF TEACHERS' PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND UNIONS

MEAN ORIENTATION AND BEHAVIOR SCORES AND INDICES OF CONFLICT	OFFICIAL POSITION		CRITICAL RATIO
	Officers of:		
	Teachers' Professions (N = 348)	Union (N = 307)	
Orientation and Behavior	$\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	
Employee Orientation	77.54	83.60	- .31
Loyalty to Administration	17.96	20.13	-2.36**
Employee Behavior	18.56	12.86	5.92***
Professional Orientation	58.26	61.00	-2.70***
Student Orientation	16.46	11.30	5.68***
Professional Behavior	19.23	19.91	1.73*
Indices of Conflict			
Total Incidents	8.66	6.87	1.96**
Major Incident	.47	.20	1.96**
Disputes	17.50	26.20	-1.86*
Impersonal Competition	.49	.13	2.89***
Teacher(s) vs. Administrator(s)	3.04	1.57	2.49**
Teacher(s) vs. Teacher(s)	1.09	.50	3.72***
Authority	18.30	26.73	-1.84*

\* Critical Ratio Significant at  $p \leq .05$  One-Tail Test  
 \*\* Critical Ratio Significant at  $p \leq .05$  Two-Tail Test  
 \*\*\* Critical Ratio Significant at  $p \leq .01$  One-Tail Test

be a little higher (CR significant at  $p \leq .05$ , one-tail test). They had statistically lower client orientations, however ( $p \leq .01$ ).

Although this higher overall professionalism and lower loyalty to the administration on the part of union officers might be expected to be accompanied by uniformly higher conflict rates, the pattern is more complex than that. Union officers become involved only in statistically more authority issues and more disputes (in both cases the CR's are statistically significant at  $p \leq .05$ , one-tail test) (Table 11-16), and also a statistically larger proportion of AFT officers are either rebellious or contrary on the initiative-compliance scale (65 percent compared to 49 percent). However, the rates of conflict with the administration, with other teachers, major incidents, impersonal competition and the total incident rates are all substantially lower for union officers than for officers of professional associations.

There are a number of possible reasons for this pattern. The geographical area from which this sample is drawn is dominated by the more conservative segment of the AFT (The National Caucus). It is possible that officers in these areas avert conflict by using informal procedures. Also, administrators at this particular period of time may be seeking to avert trouble with unions, in an effort to avoid the difficulties that have developed in other parts of the nation. The professional officers, on the other hand, are predominately male high school teachers, who are not typical of NEA members (70 percent of the professional officers in this sample are male as compared to 80 percent of the AFT officers). Finally, the fact that most of the union officers are not in schools with strong unions, or even with official union recognition, is an especially important consideration, since the grievance structure does not exist that would otherwise facilitate conflict with the administration.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>The writer is indebted to Mr. Pete Schnaufner, Director of Research for the American Federation of Teachers, for an informative conversation on this topic.

Table 11-17 provides a brief comparison of the militancy of the four types of informal leaders and officers under consideration. Although professional officers become involved in incidents with the administration nearly twice as frequently as their AFT counterparts (45 percent compared to 23 percent), the conflict rates of belligerent and moderate militant leaders are nearly twice as high again (82 percent and 88 percent) (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .01$ ). Professional officers have similarly higher rates of conflict with other teachers than AFT officers (50 percent compared to 37 percent); in this case, the professional officers are identical to the moderate militants (50 percent), although they still have lower rates than the belligerent militants (82 percent). The AFT officers have exceptionally low rates of involvement in scheduling and distribution problems (13 percent); officers of professional associations, who are more likely to become involved in these incidents (41 percent), are again similar to moderate militants (56 percent), and once more belligerent militants have exceptionally high rates of involvement in scheduling and distribution problems (82 percent).

However, there is a reverse pattern with respect to involvement in authority incidents. In this case, the AFT officers have the highest rates of involvement (90 percent). Although the involvement rate of professional officers is also high (87 percent), it is slightly lower than the AFT officers, and the CR, already reported, indicated that union officers do exceed professional officers in this respect. Oddly enough, the informal leaders also are reversed on this index. More of the moderate militants than of the belligerent militants become involved in authority incidents (73 percent compared to 62 percent).

Accordingly, proportionately more union officers have simultaneously high professional and low employee role organization than professional officers' (chi-square significant at  $p \leq .05$ ). Fifty percent of the union officers have a simultaneously high-professional--low employee role organization, and only three percent have the reverse

TABLE 11-17

**COMPARISONS OF THE PERCENT OF LEADERS AND OFFICERS  
OF TEACHERS' ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN CONFLICT**

TYPES OF CONFLICT	TYPE OF LEADER OR OFFICER				CHI-SQUARE	D. F.
	Informal Leaders		Officers of			
	Moderate Militant (N = 52)	Belligerent Militant (N = 34)	AFT (N = 30)	Professional Associations (N = 348)		
Incidents Involving Scheduling People and Distribution of Resources	55.77	82.35	13.33	41.38	35.60**	3
Teacher vs. Administration	82.69	88.23	23.33	45.11	53.78**	3
Teacher-Administration vs. Public	9.62	35.29	0.00	12.93	19.44**	3
Teacher-Teacher Total	50.00	82.35	36.67	49.71	16.08**	3
Authority	73.08	61.76	90.00	86.78	19.51**	3

\* Chi-square Significant at  $p \leq .05$

\*\* Chi-square Significant at  $p \leq .01$

pattern--i.e., a low professional-high employee style of organization. The comparable figures for professional officers are 27 percent and 20 percent.<sup>7</sup>

In other words, AFT officers seem to be more professional and express less loyalty toward the administration (both by word and action) than officers of professional associations. But, despite the fact that they express more defiance on the initiative-compliance scale, they are more militant than the professional officers in only two respects--i.e., their rates of involvement in authority issues and in disputes. In most respects, professional officers are militant. But in every respect except one, the informal leaders are more militant than the officials of either organization. Perhaps and distinctly because the informal leaders usually are more militant, it is

<sup>7</sup>Also, proportionately more AFT officers were mentioned as having respect from other teachers (68 percent compared to 55 percent), but the two groups did not differ on support from colleagues (55 percent of both groups were mentioned two or more times).

all the more significant that AFT officers exceed all groups on their rates of involvement in authority issues. Yet, one cannot escape the impression that the real leadership for militant professionalism in education is coming from the behind-the-scenes informal leaders more frequently than from officers of the established teacher organizations.

### THE ADVERSARIES

Professionalization tends to divide occupations into opposing camps. Each has different commitments to professional status and upholds different attitudes toward changing the occupation, toward the desired rate of progress, and also the appropriateness of divergent strategies. This fact raises questions about the nature of the adversaries of the militant professional leaders. Who resists them? Is it their colleagues? The least professional persons? The typical members? Or do the militant professionals dispute primarily among themselves?

For some insight into these questions, the professional and client orientations of the militant professionals were compared with the orientations of their adversaries in various types of conflicts (omitting complaints from consideration). Adversaries who were involved in a solitary conflict with militant professionals were distinguished from the adversaries more "chronically" involved, i.e., involved in more than one conflict with militant professional leaders.

#### Professional Orientation

The professional orientations of the moderate and of the belligerent militant leaders, respectively, are  $\bar{X} = 70.5$  and  $\bar{X} = 68.9$  (Table 11-18). The two types of adversaries of the moderate group have lower professional orientations, which range around  $\bar{X} = 58.0$ ; the critical ratios between each group of leaders and their adversaries ( $CR = 7.5$  and  $CR = 6.2$ ) are both significant at  $p \leq .01$ . They are typical of rank-and-file

TABLE 11-18

PROFESSIONAL AND CLIENT ORIENTATIONS OF THE ADVERSARIES OF MODERATE AND BELLIGERENT MILITANT ULTRA-PROFESSIONALS

ADVERSARIES OF LEADERS	TYPE OF ORIENTATIONS	
	Professional	Client
$\bar{X}$ Moderate Militant Leaders* (N = 52)	70.5	11.3
Adversaries of Moderate Leaders (N = 76):		9.1
$\bar{X}$ Solitary Incident (N = 65)	58.0	9.2
$\bar{X}$ Chronic Involvement (N = 11)	57.6	
$\bar{X}$ Belligerent Militant Leaders** (N = 34)	68.9	11.5
Adversaries of Belligerent Leaders (N = 133):		
$\bar{X}$ Solitary Incident (N = 85)	58.6	9.2
$\bar{X}$ Chronic Involvement (N = 48)	54.3	8.1
$\bar{X}$ Rank-and-File Members (N = 1438)	57.9	9.3

\* Persons in the upper 15 percent of the Professional Orientation distribution who have been involved in a conflict

\*\* Persons in the upper 15 percent of the Professional Orientation distribution who have been involved in a major incident

a. Statistical tests of significance are reported in the narrative.

members in the sample ( $\bar{X} = 57.9$ ). The adversaries of the moderate leaders do not differ in professional orientation from the belligerents' enemies; nor do the chronic adversaries differ from those involved in solitary incidents.

However, the professional orientations of those belligerent leaders' adversaries involved in one (solitary) major incident, though lower than the leaders' (critical ratio significant at  $p \leq .05$ ) are statistically higher than the rank-and-file adversary ( $\bar{X} = 57.9$ , critical ratio significant at  $p \leq .01$ ); while the chronic enemies of belligerents have significantly lower professional orientations than those of the solitary group ( $\bar{X} = 54.3$ ), the critical ratio is not significant. The opponents of belligerent leaders in solitary major incidents, in other words, have abnormally high professional orientations, but the same is not true of chronic adversaries.

#### Client Orientation

The client orientations of the moderate and of the belligerent professional leaders are respectively,  $\bar{X} = 11.3$  and  $11.5$  (Table 11-18). The solitary adversaries of both moderates and belligerents have lower client orientations ( $\bar{X} = 9.1$  and  $9.2$ , significant at  $p \leq .01$ ) which is more typical of the rank-and-file ( $\bar{X} = 9.3$ ). The belligerent leaders' chronic opponents, however, have client orientations below the rank-and-file ( $\bar{X} = 8.1$ , critical ratio significant at  $p \leq .01$ ); so do the moderate leaders' chronic enemies ( $\bar{X} = 9.2$ ); although the difference, in the latter, is statistically significant only on a one-tail test ( $CR = 1.69$ ).

The trend with respect to major incidents is similar to that reported for professional orientations. The solitary adversaries of belligerent leaders in major incidents not only have client orientations below the leaders' ( $\bar{X} = 9.2$ , critical ratio statistically significant at  $p \leq .01$ ), but they are significantly higher than the chronic adversaries' ( $\bar{X} = 8.1$ , critical ratio statistically significant at  $p \leq .01$ ), and theirs tend to be below the rank-and-file members' client orientations ( $\bar{X} = 9.3$ , critical ratio significant at  $p \leq .05$ , one-tail test).

### Implications

These data do not reveal "in-fighting" among militant professionals of equally high professional orientation. Instead they show that part of the militancy of professional leaders is turned against the rank-and-file colleagues who have less commitment to professionalism than they do. Hence, conflict between militant professional leaders and their reluctant colleagues may be as important a step toward gaining professional autonomy as conflict does directly with the administration. The fact that the militant professional leaders have high client orientations and are more oriented toward protecting client welfare than their adversaries, at least provides some evidence that professionalization may be to the benefit of clients. Even though client orientation normally does not increase with militancy, the leaders of the professional movement at least are able to combine militancy with a client orientation, and hence are, on the average, more client oriented than their adversaries. The militant professional leader, in particular, counterbalances the exceptionally low client orientations of those colleagues who are chronically opposed to him. There is reason to believe, then, that the existence of militant professional leaders in schools does provide militant spokesmen for the students' interests, even though the teachers who are most oriented to students, generally speaking, are not militant.

The low professional and client orientations of the chronic adversaries of belligerent militants involved in major incidents suggests the presence, in teaching, of a hard core of resistance to professionalization. Indeed, the militancy of the professional leaders must be, at least in part, provoked by these less professional contenders who, in the absence of militant professionals, could very well dominate public school teachers. At the same time, the relatively high professional and client orientations of adversaries contending against belligerent militants in solitary major incidents indicates that the power of militant professional leaders is held in check by their more professionally oriented peers.

## CONCLUSION

The hypotheses developed in connection with the 28 organizations, taken as a whole, were reapplied in an analysis of the 1500 individuals in the sample.

For the sample as a whole, with the exception of the total disagreement rate, the linear correlations between a person's professional orientation and his conflict rate were very low.

The correlations between professional orientation and total disagreement rate, severe disagreement rate and major incidents were all substantially higher for women than for men.

For the total sample, correlations of the conflict measures with the professional behavior index were generally higher than the total sample correlations with professional orientation.

The two hundred teachers with the highest professional orientations in the sample, on the average, tended to have at least slightly higher conflict rates than the typical member of the sample.

When teachers were classified into high, middle and low groups, on the basis of their professional orientations, there was a crude statistical tendency on seven of the eight conflict measures that showed that persons tested who had weaker orientations become involved in fewer incidents than the teachers with either average or stronger orientations. The teacher with a strong professional orientation becomes involved in twice as many authority issues as his counterpart with a weak orientation. However, the groups are reversed on their average frequency of involvement in major incidents-- i.e., the teachers with weaker professional orientations became involved in more major incidents than their colleagues with weaker orientations; this pattern, then, paralleled the findings on organizational climates.

Although the percentage of teachers who become involved in certain types of incidents tended to be a little high for those with strong professional orientation, the

differences were not as striking as their average (mean) rates of involvement. This seems to mean that the separation of the most professionally oriented teachers from the least professionally oriented is their involvement in conflict, but not their average frequency of involvement.

Although the relationship was not striking for the sample as a whole, there was some tendency for the most employee-oriented teachers, and especially those whose conduct identifies them as loyal employees, to be less militant.

Persons who were highly professional with little loyalty to their employee roles had disproportionately high rates of involvement in conflict, while those with the reverse loyalties were less likely to be involved. However, the percentage differences were not large.

Professional orientations did not differ between the sexes or between the young and old age groups; the slightly higher professional orientation scores of the younger males were not statistically different from the other groups.

Young men had exceptionally low employee orientations, while older women were extremely loyal employees. The employee orientations of both older males and younger females were intermediate. Males also showed evidence of more professional behavior than women, but older males excelled the young in this respect. In either case, it appears that men characteristically were less employee oriented than women, and leaned more toward certain types of professional behavior.

Men had significantly higher rates of conflict than women on all eight of the conflict indices tested.

Younger men had lower employee orientations, but the older ones, who have shown more signs of professional behavior, became involved in statistically more conflicts than the younger ones on six of the eight measures of conflict. It is plausible that young men, by virtue of their youth and gender, have less complaint attitudes, but the older ones have the sense of professional accomplishment and prestige to put

them in a position to actually challenge authority and openly dispute with colleagues. The fact that older males are militant indicates that all of the militants do not leave the field of teaching early in their careers, as one might have expected. Moreover, the attitudes of the young men may be symptomatic of a new generation of militants to replace the present generation of influentials.

In general, the rebellious and contrary teachers are both more professional and more militant (Table 11-6). Their professional orientations are statistically higher than both the "defiant-cautious" and "realistic-submissive" types.

An individual's satisfaction with his work increases significantly with his conflict rates. The correlations with career satisfaction are in most cases, higher than with their job satisfaction. Perhaps only those persons who were already committed to teaching, and satisfied with their careers and with their jobs, become concerned enough to participate in conflict. But at the same time, the very act of conflict may give one the sense that he has had a part in the long-range development of education.

The most professional persons who became involved in conflict had more support from their colleagues, were more respected and had more education than either the typical teacher in the sample or the nonmilitants of their persuasion.

The most belligerent professional militants were more likely to be men than women, and the ultra-professionals who didn't become militant were more likely to be women, but some women did contribute to the leadership of a milder form of militancy, though most members of their gender were not so disposed. Perhaps the normal differences between the sexes are leveled in the process of professionalization.

In comparison to the moderate militant professionals who participated in less severe disputes, the belligerent (i.e., involved in major incidents) ultra-professionals were more likely to be concerned with scheduling and distribution problems, and they seemed to be as ready to tangle with their peers, particularly those in vocational

education, as with the administration. They were also more likely to become involved in conflicts with the public. By comparison, the moderate militants expended most of the energies on authority issues, most of which involved the administration.

The fact that belligerent professionals very frequently become involved in incidents with their own colleagues might tell us about the general character of professional movements. It is likely that those teachers who are willing to take extreme positions and become involved in major incidents, do so at the risk of alienating at least some of their colleagues who are not willing to go that far, or who otherwise were neutral; this tendency of professional movements to become segmented and fraught with conflict among peers is perhaps typical of the professionalization process. The fact that belligerent militants are comparatively less concerned with authority problems than with scheduling and distribution problems, suggests that they are perhaps more involved in a struggle for personal resources than for decision-making authority, in comparison to their counterparts. Perhaps these two types of leaders simply represent alternative strategies toward professionalization; or perhaps they represent the relative balance between individual rewards and group autonomy, which is one of the fundamental dilemmas of any profession.

AFT officers seemed to be more professional, and express less loyalty (both by word and action) to the administrators than officers of professional associations. But, despite the fact that they expressed more defiance on the Initiative-Compliance scale, they were more militant than professional officers in only two respects--i.e., rates of authority and the disputes. In most other respects, professional officers were more militant. But in every respect but one, the informal leaders were more militant than the officers of either organization. Perhaps precisely because they are, it is all the more significant that AFT officers exceed all groups on rate of involvement in authority conflicts. Yet, one cannot escape the impression that the

leadership for militant professionalism in education is coming from behind-the-scenes informal leaders more frequently than from officers of established teachers' organizations.

There was little evidence of "in-fighting" among militant professionals of equally high professional orientation. Instead, the militancy of professional leaders seemed to be turned against those rank-and-file colleagues with less commitment to professionalism. Hence, conflict between militant professional leaders and their reluctant colleagues may be as important a step toward gaining professional autonomy as conflict concerned directly with the administration. The fact that the militant professional leaders had high client orientations and were more oriented toward protecting client welfare than their adversaries, at last provides some evidence that professionalization may be to the benefit of clients. Even though client orientation normally did not increase with militancy, the leaders of the professional movement, at least, were able to combine militancy with a client orientation, and thus on the average, were more client oriented than their adversaries. The militant professional leader, in particular, counterbalanced the exceptionally low client orientations of those colleagues who were chronically opposed to him.

The low professional and client orientations of the chronic adversaries of belligerent militants involved in major incidents suggests the presence, in teaching, of a hard core of resistance to professionalization. Indeed, the militancy of the professional leaders must be, at least in part, provoked by these less professional contenders who, in the absence of militant professionals, could very well dominate public school teachers. At the same time, the relatively high professional and client orientations of adversaries contending against belligerent militants in solitary major incidents indicates that the power of militant professional leaders is held in check by their more professionally oriented peers.

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## CHAPTER 11

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

...And no one reads the final report. (Davis, 1964, p. 233).

#### OVERVIEW

Two features of modern bureaucracies run contrary to the close surveillance of employees. The first is the sheer complexity of these organizations; complexity creates alternatives which require the initiative and the imagination of employees. The second is the professionalization of employees and their concurring demand for more opportunities to use independent judgement.

This study examined several critical components of public school organization and explored the relationship of each in regard to staff conflict (special consideration was given to the professional and employee role conceptions of teaching faculties). One guiding assumption behind the study was that an emerging profession such as teaching was seeking more authority, while the organizations in which the teachers worked were designed to standardize and otherwise control their work. In the attempt to increase its authority, the vocation became militant and used other forms of initiative which were in conflict with that which is normally expected of teachers as employees. Therefore, professional employees disagreed about the relative importance of their dual roles.

A second assumption was that tension in an organization arose from opposing principles integral to the organization itself. The conflict generated by these principles helped to regulate and compromise conflicts of interests and also kept the various parts of the organization within bounds.

One purpose of the study was to empirically identify typical patterns of bureaucracy in public high schools which might be relevant to several types of conflict that

arose in organizational settings. A second objective was to test several propositions as to the way certain types of organizational conflict correlated with organizational variables--i.e., several components of bureaucracy, and the formal and informal status of an organization's members. A third objective was to test several propositions about the way organizational conflict correlated with the professional and employee role conceptions, and also the behavior of entire faculties and of individual teachers. A fourth objective was to identify the nature and frequency of typical routine conflicts in the public schools. Finally, the relationship of organizational conflict to the job and career satisfaction of faculties and individual teachers was to be examined.

It was expected that the rates of conflict would be associated with (a) differences in the positions of personnel within an organization, (b) differences in their backgrounds and their role conceptions, and (c) the extent to which an organization was bureaucratized. Bureaucracy was considered to be a multidimensional concept consisting primarily of these three components: (1) specialization of employees, (2) centralization of the decision-making process and (3) standardization of work.

#### PROCEDURES

A sample was selected consisting of 28 public high schools located in Ohio and three other midwestern states. It was collected in two phases. More than one-third of the 1,976 faculty members of these schools were interviewed about their disputes with their colleagues, and over three-fourths of them returned lengthy questionnaires.

Since the purpose of the study was to examine varying types of organizations, and not to assess the prevalence of conflict in the region, the sample was not necessarily a complete representation of the high schools in the region. Small high schools are underrepresented and large high schools are overrepresented. Nevertheless, respondents' characteristics (in the sample) were, in most respects, relatively

close to national and Ohio central tendencies, with the exception of a somewhat higher proportion of males and a higher salary level. It was found that the procedures normally used for sampling populations of individuals were not completely adequate for the purposes of sampling organizations. There were signs of problems due to the non-representativeness of the sample: our lack of control over the research setting, respondent antipathy and reluctance to discuss conflict plus fear of reprisal from the administration, and ethical problems concerning breach of privacy and lack of public confidence in social science. However, most interviewees were cooperative and appeared to endorse the aims of the study.

From the questionnaire completed by the respondents in the sample, the instruments and measures described below were developed.

Professional Orientation. A teacher's conception of his professional role was measured by a 16 item Likert-type scale consisting of four sub-scales: orientation to students; orientation to the profession and professional colleagues; a belief that competence is based on knowledge; and a belief that teachers should have decision-making authority. The corrected split-half reliability of the scale was  $r_n = .65$ . A school's professional orientation was represented by the average professional scale scores of its faculty.

Professional Behavior. Nine criteria were used in an index to assess a person's professional behavior, such as the number of years of college completed, the time devoted to professional reading, his participation in professional activities, etc. Schools were ranked on the accumulative proportion of a faculty scoring high on these criteria.

Employee Orientation. A teacher's conception of his obligations as an employee was measured by a 29 item Likert-type scale, consisting of six sub-scales: loyalty

to the administration, loyalty to the organization, a belief that teaching competence is based on experience and the endorsement of treating personnel interchangeably; endorsement of standardization; emphasis on rules and procedures; and loyalty to the public. The corrected split-half reliability was  $r_n = .84$ . A school's employee orientation was represented by the average employee scale scores of its faculty.

Employee Behavior. Five criteria were used in the employee behavior index: the salary required to move the respondent from his present position, the number of days he had been absent from work, the number of unfavorable and favorable statements about the principal, that he agreed with, and his loyalty to the administration (as rated by the principal). Schools were ranked on the accumulative proportion of faculty scoring high on these criteria.

Questionnaire Measures of Conflict. Each respondent indicated on a checklist of the names of the members of his faculty and administration, the colleagues with whom he had "severe" and "moderate" disagreements. The respondents also estimated the degree of tension existing in their school among 12 types of roles. Schools were ranked on the average rate of conflict per person, and average tension.

Interview Measures of Conflict. Teachers and administrators also described their specific conflict incidents in tape-recorded interviews. On the basis of a content analysis, each incident was classified as follows: complaints (general complaints, complaints against specific groups or individuals, and complaints about general policy); overt incidents (open disputes between two people, disputes among three or more people, heated discussions, and major incidents usually involving a substantial segment of the organization and members of the community); and impersonal competition not involving face to face confrontation. The content of each incident was classified into one of six general categories: authority problems, activity problems,

personal interaction and communication problems, valence-sentiment problems, school finances and facility problems, value conflicts, and conflicts over school philosophy. Each of these categories was refined further, making a total of 26 subcategories and 306 specific conflict-types. Each incident was also classified according to the parties involved, the way the parties reacted, and the disposition and resolution of the issues. The indices of organizational conflict that were adopted were based on the number of each type of incident reported per interview (referred to as incident ratios). These procedures were checked for consistency among the measures, corroboration, and coder reliability.

Supervision. A Guttman quasi-scale was constructed from 14 items that were answered by principals and teachers. The questions pertained to the number of classroom observations normally made by administrators, the nature of follow-up and consultation afterwards, whether or not permission had to be obtained to discuss controversial issues, and similar considerations. The coefficient of reproducibility was .85 and the minimum-marginal reproducibility was .71. Schools were ranked on the basis of scale patterns, using the Cornell Technique.

Standardization Index. A Guttman quasi-scale was developed from 15 items that were answered by the principal and teachers of each school. The questions pertained to the amount of discretion permitted to teachers in their use of lesson plans, their role in preparing lesson plans, their authority to choose textbooks, and the options they had in using textbooks. The coefficient of reproducibility was .84 and its minimum-marginal reproducibility was .74. Schools were ranked on the basis of their scale scores.

Rules. The measure of a school's emphasis on rules consisted of six descriptive statements: the use of written descriptions, procedures and manuals in the school,

specific rules in regard to when teachers should arrive and depart, availability of rules for problems that might come up, rules available for topics not appropriate to classroom discussion, and the willingness of teachers at the school to "stick out their necks" in interpreting school rules. Each item formed a Likert-type scale. Schools were ranked on the basis of the average response of the faculty to the total set of items.

Complexity. A Guttman quasi-scale was developed that used 17 variables concerning the number of distinct organizational parts in a school system. All but one of the items was answered by the principals. The items included the estimated number of weeks it would normally take to effect a curriculum change, the number of staff in the school and in the system, the proportion of part-time teachers, clerical workers and administrators in the system; the number of classes in the school with ability grouping, and the number of separate courses and programs in the school. Its coefficient of reproducibility was .85 and the minimal-marginal reproducibility was .65. Schools were ranked on the basis of their scale patterns.

Centralization of Decisions. Respondents estimated the level in the system on which each of the 32 types of policy decisions affecting the teacher's classroom work usually was made. The decisions where there was a significant difference between the high and low professional groups used for validating the scales were considered to be professional policy decisions; they usually were directly related to classroom work. The levels of authority were weighted from one (for the individual teachers involved) to seven (for the State Department of Education), and the weights were multiplied by the number of respondents identifying each level. The mean position of each school was computed for each part of the instrument, and the schools ranked accordingly.

Routine Decision-making. Three global Likert-type items answered by teachers, were used to estimate their authority to make routine day-to-day decisions that arose

in the course of teaching: whether teachers were allowed to make their own decisions about problems that arose in the classroom; whether small matters needed to be referred to a higher level for final answer; and whether or not the ultimate authority over educational policy decisions was made by the professional teachers. Schools were ranked on the basis of the average faculty response to the set of items.

Specialization Index. The use made of a faculty's specialized training was inferred from the proportion of teachers in a school reporting as to whether they were teaching courses in which (1) they had not majored in college and (2) in which they had neither majored nor minored. The higher the proportions of a faculty reporting "yes," the lower the specialization of the school was ranked.

Total Bureaucratization Index. The measure of an organization's total bureaucratization consisted of the total of their ranks on these variables: (1) close supervision, (2) emphasis on rules, and (3) centralization of (a) professional policy decisions, (b) nonprofessional policy decisions and (c) routine decisions.

Structural Crystallization. This concept referred to a nonvertical dimension of organization, i.e., the consistency of an organization's rankings on several status dimensions. It was determined as the total combination of differences computed between each school's rank on the five variables used in the index of total bureaucratization. Lower total scores signified smaller differences between a school's separate rankings, and hence greater crystallization of the separate structures.

Heterogeneity of Staff Backgrounds. A profile of heterogeneity for each school was constructed by dichotomizing 13 background characteristics (such as age and sex), and computing the ratio of faculty members in each category. Schools were ranked on their total heterogeneity scores, which were computed on the sum of these ratios.

Initiative and Compliance. Respondents were asked to imagine themselves in a series of 11 hypothetical situations involving conflict between a teacher and the administration and to indicate (1) what they would do, and (2) the sanctions likely to be imposed in their school for failure to comply with the administration's wishes. The items were selected by the scale value difference method. They described situations such as an attempt of a principal to determine the course content and methods of teaching, a teacher who took a public stand on the issue of water fluoridation in a community that was divided on the issue, and discrimination against women in a school. A typology of "initiative" and "compliance" was formed by comparing each respondent's total score on the two parts. The corrected split-half reliability of each of the two parts was approximately  $r_n = .85$ .

Job Satisfaction Index. A teacher's satisfaction with his present job was estimated from an index of three items having relatively high intercorrelation. The items concerned were: whether the teacher felt that the school administration accepted him as a professional expert, his present satisfaction compared to his expectations of the job, and satisfaction compared to other teaching jobs. The alternatives, weighted from four to one, ranged from "very well satisfied" to "very dissatisfied." A school's level of job satisfaction was reflected in the average job satisfaction scores of its faculty.

Career Satisfaction Index. This index consisted of two items on which teachers were asked to compare teaching with other types of work, and to indicate whether they would enter the field of teaching if they had to do it over again. The alternatives to each item were weighted from one to four. A school's level of career satisfaction was reflected in the average career satisfaction scores of its faculty.

## FINDINGS

### Typical Patterns of Organization

1. More standardized organizations were characterized by larger faculties, more levels of authority, more organizational complexity, closer supervision, more effective use of specialists, and less authority for teachers to make routine decisions.
  - (a) Organizations in which rules were stressed were characterized by more levels of authority, more centralization of professional decisions, treatment of personnel interchangeably, closer supervision, and more effective use of specialists.
2. Organizations in which personnel were closely supervised were more standardized, placed more emphasis on rules, treated personnel interchangeably, had decentralization of nonprofessional decisions plus routine decisions, and the personnel had more heterogeneous backgrounds.
3. More specialized systems had smaller faculties, more levels of authority, centralized decision-making authority for teachers, more standardization, greater organizational complexity, decentralization of nonprofessional policy decisions, and more teacher autonomy.
4. More hierarchical organizations were characterized by larger faculties, more standardization and emphasis on rules, more effective use of specialists, more teacher autonomy, and greater organizational complexity.
5. Organizations with centralization of nonprofessional policy decisions had less specialization, less close supervision, and possibly, less organizational complexity.

6. Organizations in which professional decisions were centralized were more standardized, placed more emphasis on rules, and treated personnel as interchangeable.
7. Organizations in which subordinates had more routine decision-making authority were characterized by close supervision , less standardization, less specialization, and more heterogeneous backgrounds of personnel.
8. Complex organizations were characterized by larger faculties, more levels of authority, more standardization and emphasis on rules, and more specialization.
9. Large schools were characterized by more levels of authority, more standardization, more specialization, and more organizational complexity.
10. Large school systems were characterized by more levels of authority, more standardization, more specialization, more organizational complexity, less supervision, and less heterogeneity of personnel backgrounds.

#### Association Between Organizational Variables and Conflict

##### 1. Professionalism

(a) Except for major incidents, all measures of staff conflicts increased with the average professional orientation of a faculty.

However, the major incident ratio declined with this measure.

(b) Although the average age of a faculty accounted for some of the variance, the above relationship persisted at all age levels. The associations were more characteristic of the less professional schools than of the more professional schools. Also, the positive correlation between professional orientation and disagreement rates and the negative association with major incidents were both more

characteristic of the more bureaucratic schools; the association with incidents between teachers and administrators seemed slightly more typical of less bureaucratic organizations.

- (c) Schools in the extreme upper and lower quartiles of professionalism were also compared. On most of the measures, faculties in the top seven professional schools ranked significantly higher than those in the lower seven schools. The total number of disagreements and the number of severe and moderate disagreements plus the number of disputes reported per interview, were approximately twice as high in the top professional schools as in the lowest group. However, the ratio of major incidents was four times higher in the extreme low professional group.
- (d) Faculties were also classified on the basis of their predominant style of role organization. Schools with the highest proportions of the faculty holding simultaneously high professional and low employee orientations were higher than schools with the reverse styles of organization on 10 of 13 conflict measures.
- (e) The professional behavior index tended to reaffirm the conclusions derived from the professional orientation scale, but not as consistently.
- (f) Most of the associations between a faculty's employee orientation and its conflict rates were not significant, although all of the correlations were in the negative direction. Also, these negative associations were mostly accentuated in the more professional schools in comparison to the less professional ones.
- (g) The average employee behavior scores of a faculty tended to reinforce the conclusions derived from employee orientation.

(h) Only one conflict measure (the authority incident ratio) increased appreciably with client orientation, a fact which raises serious questions about the reasons for militancy.

## 2. Total Bureaucratization and Structural Crystallization

(a) In the more professional schools, both total disagreement rates and incidents between teachers and administration increased with bureaucratization.

(b) Among schools with more professionally oriented faculties, all measures of conflict (except severe disagreements) were higher in the more bureaucratized than in the less bureaucratized organizations; whereas, among schools with less professionally oriented faculties, most of the measures of conflict were lower in the more bureaucratized than in the less bureaucratized organizations.

(c) An organization's structural crystallization was positively associated with several measures of conflict. Also, when schools were classified by level of structural crystallization, the most structurally consistent schools had uniformly higher conflict rates than those with lower consistency (except for major incidents). Moreover, organizations with less crystallized structures had lower conflict rates if they were more bureaucratized; whereas organizations with more crystallized structures had higher total disagreement rather than tension rates if they were more bureaucratized.

(d) Organizations with high rates of total disagreement emphasized either rules or close supervision while decentralizing decisions.

## Components of Organizations and Conflict

1. Although the total bureaucratization of an organization was not directly associated with conflict, certain components of bureaucratic organizations

were positively associated with several types of conflict:

- (a) Size
  - (b) The number of levels of authority
  - (c) The number of departments
  - (d) Total organizational complexity
  - (e) Specialization
  - (f) Decentralization of routine decisions (except for major incidents)
  - (g) Standardization and emphasis on rules
  - (h) Social interaction among the faculty
  - (i) Heterogeneity of staff backgrounds
  - (j) The rate of staff additions
  - (k) The emphasis a faculty placed on critical thinking and character training
2. Conflict declined, on the other hand, with the age of a faculty, with its rate of interaction with the principal, and to a limited extent, with its average employee orientation and behavior.

#### Departmental Analysis

Teachers and administrators were classified into 13 groups on the basis of their functions. Most of these findings corresponded to conclusions reached in the analysis of 28 schools, although not entirely. In both types of analysis, emphasis on rules and decentralization of decision-making authority were found to increase with various measures of conflict. On the other hand, a positive relationship concerning the rate of consultation was identifiable only from the departmental analysis. Most important, the relationship of professional orientation which so persistently had been found to be associated with conflict, was not significant in the departmental analysis.

### Case Studies

An inspection of the three most discordant and the three most tranquil organizations in the sample showed that, in comparison to the tranquil ones, the discordant organizations had fewer members who were active in a professional organization, had higher average professional orientations and professional behavior scores, and had more persons with simultaneously high professional and low employee orientations; the members of such organizations were more sociable and expressed more satisfaction, but they were more heterogeneous and had higher rates of staff turnover and expansion. The discordant organizations also placed more emphasis on character training and critical thinking, and more of their graduates went to college.

### Number of Conflicts

1. Nearly half of the conflicts were classified as authority problems; and an additional 20 percent involved scheduling and distribution problems.
2. Half of the incidents occurred between teachers and members of the administration, half of these involved authority problems; one out of four incidents in the sample, therefore, involved teachers and administrators in authority problems and was the largest single category of conflict.
3. Only 15 percent of the conflicts in the sample involved authority conflicts among teachers themselves; over one in four incidents among teachers involved teachers in extracurricular activities.
4. Scheduling and distribution problems were more characteristic of the peer group conflicts than of teacher-administrator conflicts.
5. Impersonal competition was proportionately more frequent among teachers than between teachers and administrators.

## Content Analysis

1. A content analysis of the specific incidents seemed to indicate that while most teachers might be resigned to, if not content with, their place in the system, a substantial minority were convinced that they deserved more authority; and a handful of them were determined to increase their power, even if it required insubordination.
2. Many administrators did not subscribe to, nor even comprehend, the pretention of teachers as specialists and authorities and could not envision them as anything other than obedient employees. Many teachers felt that their problems arose because they were inadequately protected from parents, school boards, and their students.
3. Teachers insisted upon authority over students; not only over their academic performance, but their personal lives as well. Teachers went to some lengths to assure that their colleagues did not violate the territorial claims which they had possessively staked out over certain students. Controlling discipline was one side of the coin, and obtaining a fair share of able students was the other.
4. The scarcest resource that teachers must share appeared to be students. From the viewpoint of teachers, there was an oversupply of unable, delinquent types of students and a shortage of academically superior types. The quality of a teacher's students reflected upon his own status. Extracurricular activities played a key role in these types of problems.
5. Although some "academic courses" served as "dumping grounds," the fact that vocational courses were most frequently used for this function was resented by vocational teachers. The problem was that no one wanted to specialize with the undesirable students.

6. Teachers fought among themselves and with their administrators over curriculum content and the methods of teaching it. At stake, in many of these cases, was the convenience of some administrator or the prestige of a department or teacher.
7. Administrators were more willing than teachers to grant that some students were not capable of learning; teachers, whose prestige weighs heavily on the performance of their students, were more likely to believe that their students were not trying hard enough.

### Analysis of Individuals

The hypotheses developed in connection with the 28 organizations were reapplied in an analysis of the 1500 individuals in the sample.

- (1) For the sample as a whole, the linear correlations between a person's professional orientation and his conflict rates were very low (with the exception of the total disagreement rate).
- (2) The correlations between professional orientation and total disagreement rate, severe disagreement rate, and major incidents were all substantially higher for women than for men.
- (3) For the total sample, correlations of the conflict measures with the professional behavior index were generally higher than the total sample correlations with professional orientation.
- (4) The two hundred teachers in the sample with the highest professional orientations, on the average, tended to have at least slightly higher conflict rates than the typical member of the sample.
- (5) When teachers were classified into high, middle, and low groups on the basis of their professional orientations, there was a general tendency (on seven of eight of the conflict measures tested) for persons with

weaker orientations to become involved in statistically fewer incidents than the teachers with either average or stronger orientations. For example, the teacher with a strong professional orientation became involved in twice as many authority issues as his counterpart with a weak orientation. However, the groups were reversed on their average frequency of involvement in major incidents--i.e., the teachers with weaker professional orientations became involved in more major incidents than did their colleagues with weaker orientations. This pattern, then, paralleled the findings on organizational climates.

- (6) Although the percentage of teachers who became involved in certain types of incidents tended to be a little higher for those with strong professional orientation, the differences were not as striking when their average rates of involvement were compared.
- (7) Although the relationship was not striking for the sample as a whole, there was some tendency for the most employee-oriented teachers, and especially those whose conduct identified them as loyal employees, to be less militant.
- (8) Persons who were highly professional with little loyalty to their employee roles, had disproportionately higher rates of involvement in conflict than those with the reverse loyalties. However, the percentage differences were not large.
- (9) Professional orientations did not differ between the sexes or between the young and old age groups; the slightly higher professional orientation scores of the younger males were not statistically different from the other groups.
- (10) Young men, however, had exceptionally low employee orientations, while older women were extremely loyal employees. The employee

orientations of both older males and younger females were intermediate. Males also showed evidence of more professional behavior than women, but older males excelled the young in this respect. In either case, it appeared that men characteristically were less employee oriented than women and leaned more toward certain types of professional behavior.

- (11) Men had significantly higher rates of conflict than women on all eight of the conflict indices tested. Younger men had lower employee orientations but the older ones, who also had shown more signs of professional behavior, became involved in statistically more conflicts than the younger ones (shown on six of the eight measures of conflict). It is plausible that the young men, by virtue of their youth and gender, had less compliant attitudes, but that the older ones had a sense of professional accomplishment and prestige which placed them in a position to actually challenge authority and openly dispute with colleagues.
- (12) In general, the "rebellious" and "contrary" teachers were both more professional and more militant. Their professional orientations were statistically higher than both the "defiant-cautious" and "realistic-submissive" types.
- (13) An individual's satisfaction with his work increased significantly with his conflict rates. The correlation with his career satisfaction was, in most cases, higher than with his job satisfaction.
- (14) Among the most professional persons, those who became involved in conflict also, had more support from their colleagues, were more respected, and had more education than either the typical teacher in the sample or those of their persuasion who did not become involved in conflict.
- (15) The most belligerent professional militants were more likely to be men than women, and the ultra-professionals who did not become militant

were more likely to be women. But some women did contribute to militant leadership of a milder form, even though most members of their gender were not so disposed.

- (16) In comparison to the moderately militant ultra-professionals who participated in less severe disputes, the belligerents (i.e., those involved in major incidents) were more than likely to concern themselves with scheduling and distribution problems; and they were readier to tangle with their peers, especially those in vocational education. They were also more apt to become involved in conflicts with the public. By comparison, the moderate militants expended most of their energies on authority issues, much of which involved the administration. It seemed that those teachers who were willing to take an extreme position and become involved in major incidents were also willing to risk alienating their colleagues; this segmentation and conflict among peers seems typical of professional movements.
- (17) A.F.T. officers seemed to be more professional and express less loyalty (both by word and action) to the administrators than did the officers of professional associations. But, despite the fact that they expressed more defiance on the Initiative-Compliance scale, in only two respects were they more militant than professional officers-- i.e., their involvement in authority issues, and in disputes. In most other respects, professional officers were more militant.
- (18) In every other respect but one, the informal leaders were more militant than the officers of either organization. The impression given was that leadership for militant professionalism in education was originating more from the behind-the-scenes informal leaders rather than from the officers of established teachers' organizations.

- (19) There was little evidence of "in-fighting" among militant professionals of equally high professional orientation. Instead, the militancy of professional leaders seemed to be turned against their rank-and-file colleagues who were less committed to professionalism. Perhaps these conflicts between militant professional leaders and their reluctant colleagues were as important as conflicts that directly involved the administration for the purpose of gaining professional autonomy. The militant professional leaders' high client orientations counterbalanced the exceptionally low client orientations of the colleagues who chronically opposed them. The fact that the militant professional leaders were more oriented toward protecting students' welfare than their adversaries were, some evidence that professionalization directly benefited clients.
- (20) The low professional and low client orientations of the chronic adversaries of belligerent militants who were involved in major incidents suggests the presence, in teaching, of a hard core of resistance to professionalization. Indeed, the militancy of the professional leaders must be, in part, provoked by these less professional contenders. In the absence of militant professionals, their less professional adversaries could very well dominate public school teaching. At the same time, the relatively high professional and client orientations of the select adversaries who resisted belligerent militants in solitary major incidents, indicates that the power of militant professional leaders is held in check by some of their more professionally oriented peers.

#### IMPLICATIONS

- (1) There is little reason to believe that bureaucratization's association with conflict is an uncomplicated situation. However, when less pro-

professional organizations were bureaucratized, most forms of conflict appeared to diminish; whereas, when more professional ones were bureaucratized, conflict appeared to increase. This could indicate that bureaucratization is ineffective in more professional organizations, mainly because professionals can marshal more resistance to control.

(2) Bureaucratization and structural crystallization seemed to evolve as direct responses to conflict. It is plausible, then, that bureaucratization is, in part, a direct response to other conditions--such as professionalism, organizational complexity and staff turnover--which, in turn, are directly associated with conflict. In either case, it seems more fruitful to view highly organized systems as highly problematic, and that they would develop only under special circumstances, rather than being a normal state of human affairs. Conflict, then, not only represents the breakdown of organization, but it was and is a cause of organization. The lack of crystallization, in particular, was found where there was relatively little conflict; crystallized organizations, on the other hand, seemed to evolve in both conflictful and in less conflictful environments, depending upon whether the organization was highly bureaucratized or not.

(3) Standardization and emphasis on rules tended to be associated with almost all of the other bureaucratic characteristics. This finding supports the reinforcement model of bureaucracy--a model which assumes that bureaucratic procedures consistently reinforce one another. However, since most of the other components of bureaucracy were not consistently associated with one another, the compensatory model was more applicable in most cases; this is a model which assumes that bureaucratic practices are interchangeable and partially incon-

sistent. In many cases an independence model--which assumes that bureaucratic practices are simply independent of one another--must be used to account for the relatively low relationships that occurred.

In general, organizational controls were used sparingly. A high degree of organization evolves only under serious provocation.

(4) In almost every test (with the exception of major incidents), as a faculty's average professionalism increased, all of its conflict rates increased accordingly. However, the fact that professionalism was inversely associated with major incidents may indicate that the same professional norms which encourage involvement in disputes also prescribe the appropriateness of certain forms of conflict.

(5) The correlation between an individual's professionalism and his frequency of involvement in conflict was not as definite, although it was in the expected direction. This relationship depended upon a person's age and gender--men were more militant, but the correlation between professional orientation and conflict was higher for women. Also, the correlation might not have been completely linear. It is more accurate to say that teachers with low professional orientations, on the average, became involved less frequently than other teachers in most types of conflict (except major incidents).

(6) Teachers with stronger orientations toward their colleagues were more militant and less client-oriented. It is possible that the quest of teachers for more decision-making authority and more favorable reputations may be the more important impulses behind professional militancy rather than a strong commitment to students' welfare. However, this does not necessarily imply that militancy is detrimental to students.

- (7) The most salient conflicts in public schools arose over authority issues between teachers and administrators, and over the control and distribution of students.
- (8) Much of the militant leadership in public education seemed to come from informal leaders, in addition to the officers of either professional associations or unions.
- (9) Informal leaders of the professional movement were more concerned about the welfare of students than were their adversaries; these leaders, however, were resisted by a hard core of their colleagues.
- (10) The fact that conflict was associated with the average job satisfaction of both a faculty and an individual suggests that most forms of conflict (except major incidents) contribute to the morale of teachers, or are at least a product of high morale. One reason may have been that conflict provides a means by which a faculty can become engaged in the development of public education.

## REFERENCES

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**APPENDIX**

29 EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION SCALE ITEMS ( $r_n = .84$ )\*

SCALE ITEMS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SAMPLE RESPONDING TO EACH ALTERNATIVE (n = 1485)					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
Administrative Orientation ( $r_n = .81$ )						
1. Teachers <u>should</u> adjust their teaching to the administration's views of good educational practice.	10.8	57.1	15.1	13.0	3.0	1.0
A. At my school, typically, they <u>do</u> adjust their views.	5.8	55.6	20.8	12.3	2.4	3.0
2. The school administration <u>should</u> be better qualified than the teacher to judge what is best for education.	18.1	41.0	16.4	17.0	5.9	1.6
A. At my school the administration <u>is</u> generally better qualified.	7.2	41.1	27.5	16.8	5.2	2.23
3. Teachers <u>should</u> be obedient, respectful and loyal to the principal.	33.1	54.5	7.3	3.2	0.6	1.3
A. At my school the teachers <u>are</u> .	12.3	58.1	16.5	9.3	2.1	1.7
4. In case of a dispute in the community over whether a controversial textbook or controversial speaker should be permitted in the school, the teacher <u>should</u> look primarily to the judgement of the administration for guidance.	27.3	51.7	10.7	6.8	2.2	1.4

\*  $r_n$  refers to the corrected split half reliability of the scale and subscale items.

SCALE ITEMS	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
<u>Administrative Orientation (r<sub>n</sub> = .81) cont.</u>						
A. At my school, teachers <u>do</u> .	16.2	57.6	17.1	4.7	0.9	3.7
5. Personnel who openly criticize the administration <u>should</u> be encouraged to go elsewhere.	19.4	32.7	19.2	20.8	6.6	1.4
A. At my school they <u>are</u> .	6.6	26.7	37.6	19.8	3.7	5.6
6. Teachers <u>should</u> not be influenced by the opinions of those teachers whose thinking does not reflect the thinking of the administration.	5.9	21.0	21.7	35.4	13.5	2.6
A. At my school, typically, they <u>are not</u> .	3.3	28.9	37.7	22.0	3.9	4.3
7. The only way a teacher can keep out of "hot water" is to follow the wishes of the top administration.	7.1	28.3	18.9	34.1	8.7	2.8
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	6.7	29.6	25.0	28.8	6.4	3.9
<u>Loyalty to the Organization (r<sub>n</sub> = .80)</u>						
8. What is best for the school is best for education.	4.7	19.0	26.2	32.1	12.3	5.7
9. A good teacher <u>should</u> put the interests of his school above everything else.	9.1	33.2	20.4	25.0	9.8	2.5
A. At my school the good teachers <u>do</u> .	4.7	31.5	31.1	24.4	4.6	3.7

SCALE ITEMS	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
<u>Loyalty to the Organization (<math>r_n = .80</math>)</u> cont.						
10. In case of doubt about whether a particular practice is better than another, the primary test <u>should</u> be what seems best for the overall reputation of the school.	14.2	41.0	17.5	18.4	6.5	2.4
11. A good teacher <u>should</u> put the interests of his department above everything else.	4.4	17.8	18.4	43.9	12.7	2.7
A. At my school the good teachers <u>do</u> .	3.6	24.0	27.9	33.6	6.6	4.5
<u>Experience Orientation (<math>r_n = .21</math>)</u>						
12. Pay <u>should</u> be in relation to teacher experience.	18.0	45.2	15.4	16.0	3.6	2.0
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	21.0	54.9	9.1	8.4	3.2	3.4
13. Often, classroom experience simply gives a teacher the opportunity to practice his mistakes.	6.7	35.6	18.3	25.5	9.0	4.9
<u>Standardization Orientation (<math>r_n = .70</math>)</u>						
14. Teachers of the same subject throughout the system <u>should</u> follow the same kind of lesson plan.	3.9	19.6	13.7	38.9	22.1	1.9
A. This <u>is</u> the case in my system.	0.9	14.6	21.5	40.7	18.2	4.1
15. Teachers <u>should</u> teach their course in such a way that a substitute can take over at a moment's notice without serious interruption.	17.4	44.1	12.3	17.0	6.6	2.8

SCALE ITEMS	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
<u>Standardization Orientation (r<sub>n</sub> = .70)</u> <u>cont.</u>						
A. At my school teachers <u>do</u> .	3.5	29.9	31.3	24.9	5.7	4.7
16. The work of a course <u>should</u> be so planned that every child taking the same kind of course throughout the state eventually will cover the same material.	10.4	30.2	16.9	27.0	13.5	2.0
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	3.3	23.6	26.1	32.0	10.6	4.5
17. A good teacher <u>should</u> be able to efficiently teach the children what they need to know in the limited time available.	15.1	47.6	14.3	15.3	4.0	3.6
A. This <u>is</u> the definition of a good teacher at my school.	7.2	37.3	26.3	19.3	4.4	5.5
<u>Rules and Procedures Orientation (r<sub>n</sub> = .84)</u>						
18. Teachers <u>should</u> be completely familiar with the written descriptions of the rules, procedures, manuals and other standard operating procedures for running the classroom.	42.3	48.8	4.6	2.0	1.1	1.4
A. At my school, nearly all teachers <u>are</u> .	13.2	54.7	18.2	9.9	1.6	2.4
19. The school <u>should</u> have a manual of rules and regulations which are actually followed.	43.6	49.4	3.0	1.8	0.8	1.4
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	23.3	53.4	10.1	9.1	1.9	2.2

SCALE ITEMS	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
<u>Rules and Procedures Orientation (<math>r_n = .84</math>)</u> cont.						
20. Rules stating when the teachers should arrive and depart from the building <u>should</u> be strictly enforced.	18.8	44.4	13.1	17.0	5.0	1.8
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	9.5	40.5	20.4	23.3	4.1	2.2
21. To prevent confusion and friction among the staff, there <u>should</u> be a rule covering almost every problem that might come up at the school.	7.5	26.2	20.0	31.9	12.2	2.2
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	3.0	24.1	26.5	34.3	9.2	3.0
22. There <u>should</u> be definite rules specifying the topics that are not appropriate for discussion in a classroom.	4.7	16.1	21.4	37.8	17.7	2.3
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	1.7	11.4	27.7	41.5	13.7	3.9
23. When a controversy arises about the interpretation of school rules, a teacher <u>should</u> not "stick his neck out" by taking a definite position.	3.8	18.8	18.4	40.9	16.4	1.8
A. At my school, typically, they <u>do not</u> .	3.8	27.7	30.0	29.7	5.48	3.25
<u>Orientation to the Public (<math>r_n = .84</math>)</u>						
24. Teachers <u>should</u> take into account the opinions of their community in <u>what</u> they say in class and in <u>the</u> choice of teaching materials	9.4	48.4	22.9	13.7	3.8	1.9

SCALE ITEMS	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
<u>Orientation to the Public (<math>r_n = .84</math>)</u> <u>cont.</u>						
A. At my school, typically, they <u>do</u> .	5.0	48.8	29.8	11.0	2.2	3.3
25. Teachers <u>should not</u> publicly advocate a position on the place of religion in the school which differs greatly from the majority opinion of the community.	17.4	40.8	18.2	15.6	4.5	3.6
A. At my school, typically they <u>do not</u> .	13.3	50.3	24.2	4.6	1.4	6.2
26. A good teacher is one who conforms, in general, to accepted standards in the community.	11.0	46.2	16.2	17.8	6.5	2.3
A. At my school, this is the definition of a good teacher.	7.7	41.4	25.2	17.2	4.1	4.4
27. The criterion of a good school <u>should be one that serves the needs of the local community.</u>	27.0	51.2	10.2	7.9	2.2	1.6
28. Teachers <u>should not</u> attempt to discuss any controversial issues (such as abolishing the House Un-American Activities Committee) which may jeopardize the school's public relations.	3.7	13.1	19.3	41.8	19.9	2.2
A. At my school teachers, typically, <u>do not</u> .	3.5	18.8	34.2	30.9	7.9	4.7
29. Local control over schools by school boards represents the most fundamental form of democracy in public education.	11.6	39.7	22.0	16.2	6.5	4.0

16 PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION SCALE ITEMS ( $r_n = .65$ )

SCALE ITEMS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SAMPLE RESPONDING TO EACH ALTERNATIVE (n = 1482)					No Response
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
<u>Client Orientation</u> ( $r = .54, .22, .50$ )						
1. It <u>should</u> be permissible for the teacher to violate a rule if he/she is sure that the best interests of the students will be served in doing so.	13.0	47.0	22.6	12.6	2.1	2.8
A. At my school this is <u>is</u> permissible.	3.2	30.9	38.4	20.2	2.6	4.7
2. Unless she is satisfied that it is best for the student, a teacher <u>should not</u> do what she is told to do.	2.8	16.7	29.3	36.4	10.0	4.9
A. At my school, typically, teachers <u>do not</u> do what they are told unless they are convinced that it is best for the student.	2.1	16.4	34.4	32.0	8.1	7.0
3. A good teacher <u>should not</u> do anything that he believes may jeopardize the interests of his students regardless of who tells him to or what the rules state.	4.0	19.6	29.8	34.6	7.2	5.0
A. At my school, good teachers <u>do not</u> .	2.8	27.5	42.9	16.4	2.9	7.5

Appendix 1E

COMPLEXITY QUASI-SCALE  
QUESTIONS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GUTTMAN SCALE

I. QUESTIONS ASKED OF PRINCIPALS	<u>CODE</u>
1. Suppose that a teacher would like to see a major change in his curriculum area. He goes to see the person immediately above him in the hierarchy; he sends the teacher to see the person above him, etc. What is the <u>maximum</u> number of such "levels of authority" (i.e., people above the teacher), that he might have to go through before he reaches the superintendent's office?	Enter actual number
2. How many weeks do you estimate that it might take before the teacher would learn whether or not his idea about the curriculum change has been accepted?	Enter actual number
3. Total number of staff in school system.	Enter actual number
4. Total number of staff in your school (including teachers, administrators, and non-teaching professional staff, such as school nurse).	Enter actual number
5. Total number of full time teachers (include only personnel actually assigned to teaching duties).	Enter actual number
6. Total number of part time teachers (include only personnel actually assigned to teaching duties).	Enter actual number
7. Total number of administrators in school system.	Enter actual percent
8. Total number of full time "line" administrators (i.e., those who have the principal supervisory responsibilities).	Enter actual percent
9. Total number of full time professional "staff" personnel engaged in non-teaching professional duties (such as school nurse, attendance officer, vocational guidance director, and finance officer) and not included above as an administrator.	Enter actual percent
10. Total number of full time office, clerical personnel assigned to the school.	Enter actual percent
11. Total number of classes in which there is homogeneous ability grouping.	Enter actual number
12. Total number of separate vocational training programs (e.g., clerical, industrial, sales, etc.) -- i.e., for which <u>separate</u> departments are responsible.	Enter actual number

SCALE ITEMS	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
<u>Colleague Orientation (r<sub>n</sub> = .66)</u>						
4. Teachers <u>should</u> try to live up to what they think are the standards of their profession even if the administration or the community does not seem to respect them.	31.0	55.1	7.6	3.0	1.1	2.4
A. This is typically true of the teachers at my school.	7.1	44.7	27.7	13.6	2.3	4.6
5. One primary criterion of a good school <u>should</u> be the degree of respect that it commands from other teachers around the state.	14.4	51.8	18.0	10.2	1.9	3.6
6. A teacher <u>should</u> try to put his standards and ideals of good teaching into practice even if the rules or procedures of the school prohibit it.	7.5	35.2	29.0	20.2	2.5	5.6
A. At my school typically teachers <u>do</u> give priority to their professional ideals.	3.5	37.4	38.7	12.9	1.1	5.4
7. Teachers <u>should</u> subscribe to and diligently read the standard professional journals.	19.4	55.1	15.4	7.1	1.2	1.9
A. This is the case at my school.	3.4	29.0	41.6	18.9	2.5	4.5
8. Teachers <u>should</u> be an <u>active</u> member of at least one professional teaching association, and attend most conferences and meetings of the association.	23.8	57.4	10.5	5.7	1.2	1.6

SCALE ITEMS	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
<u>Colleague Orientation (<math>r_n = .66</math>) cont.</u>						
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	6.0	36.1	27.9	22.3	4.1	3.7
9. A teacher <u>should</u> consistently practice his/her ideas of the best educational practices even though the administration prefers other views.	6.4	37.3	32.2	17.8	1.8	4.5
A. At my school, typically, teachers <u>do</u> give priority to their own ideas.	2.4	33.7	41.4	15.6	1.2	5.7
<u>Monopoly of Knowledge (<math>r = .18</math>)</u>						
10. A teacher's skill <u>should</u> be based primarily on his acquaintance with his subject matter.	9.2	39.4	18.4	26.2	4.3	2.5
A. This <u>is</u> the basis for judging teachers' skill at my school.	3.3	28.5	35.2	25.8	2.9	4.3
11. Teachers <u>should</u> be evaluated primarily on the basis of their knowledge of the subject that is to be taught, and their ability to communicate it.	33.3	47.3	7.8	8.0	1.6	2.2
A. This <u>is</u> how teachers are evaluated at my school.	8.9	38.4	25.9	19.2	3.1	4.4

SCALE ITEMS	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Response
<u>Monopoly of Knowledge (r = .18) cont.</u>						
12. Schools <u>should</u> hire no one to teach unless he holds at least a 4-year bachelors degree.	40.6	37.7	8.8	8.3	2.5	2.3
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	23.6	36.5	13.3	17.2	5.4	3.9
13. In view of the teacher shortage, it <u>should</u> be permissible to hire teachers trained at non-accredited colleges.	4.2	14.4	16.7	33.1	28.5	3.1
A. My school <u>does</u> hire teachers from non-accredited colleges.	1.6	7.8	25.3	30.4	25.9	9.1
<u>Decision Making (r = .90, .36, .40)</u>						
14. A teacher <u>should</u> be able to make his own decisions about problems that come up in the classroom.	31.1	59.9	5.6	1.2	0.4	1.8
A. At my school teachers are <u>allowed</u> to make these decisions.	18.1	53.7	9.1	13.9	2.6	2.6
15. Small matters <u>should not</u> have to be referred to someone higher up for final answer.	44.4	50.3	2.3	1.0	0.2	1.8
A. At my school small matters need <u>not</u> be referred to someone higher up.	27.3	45.2	7.6	13.3	4.1	2.6
16. The ultimate authority over the major educational decisions <u>should</u> be exercised by professional teachers.	25.4	45.4	16.3	8.4	1.3	3.2
A. This <u>is</u> the case at my school.	8.5	34.6	30.7	17.2	3.8	5.3

Appendix 1C

A MATRIX OF LINEAR CORRELATIONS AMONG TOTAL AND SUBSCALE SCORES OF THE PROFESSIONAL AND EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION SCALES (N = 1546)

TYPE OF SCALE OR SUBSCALE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Employee Orientation Total Scale Score	-	.85		.55	.78	.85	.82	-.57				
2. Administrative Orientation		-	.61	.37	.57	.67	.64					
3. Loyalty to the Organization			-	.41	.54	.57	.57	.79				
4. Experience				-	.39	.42	.38					
5. Interchangeability					-	.67	.53					
6. Rules and Procedures						-	.61					
7. Public Orientation							-					
8. Professional Orientation Total Scale Score								-	.76	.91	.85	.83
9. Client Orientation									-	.64	.50	.53
10. Orientation to Colleagues--Profession										-	.65	.63
11. Monopoly of Knowledge											-	.70
12. Decision-Making Authority												-

Appendix 1D

ITEMS IN THE CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING INDEX  
LEVELS OF AUTHORITY AT WHICH SELECTED TYPES OF DECISIONS ARE MADE  
AND LEVELS AT WHICH RESPONDENT(S) BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE MADE

TYPE OF DECISION	PERCENT INDICATING FINAL AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR VETO (n = 1508)								
	1 Individual Teacher Involved		2 Teaching Faculty		3 Principal With Teachers		4 Principal		
	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should	
I. Items in the Centralization of Professional Decision-Making									
1. Selection of required textbooks.	17	20.4	16.5	18.2	28.9	28.5	1.7	1.4	
2. Selection of supplementary reading materials.	48.3	47.6	13.6	15.4	14.8	14.4	2.7	0.9	
3. Determining if faculty should have tenure.	0.1	0.1	0.5	1.1	0.9	3.2	10.8	14.8	
4. Giving permission to outside groups to speak to students.	2.4	2.9	0.7	1.7	6.1	10.3	49.1	40.1	
5. Formulating instructional policy.	2.0	1.6	4.4	6.6	15.7	20.6	14.3	10.3	
6. Establishing the essential minimum knowledge that students taking a particular course should derive in the course.	35.5	30.1	12.7	15.0	20.9	21.3	5.8	3.8	
7. Determining what concepts and values are to be taught in a particular course.	36.3	31.4	17.1	18.0	22.4	22.5	4.0	2.9	
8. The appropriate method for teaching particular courses.	57.2	49.9	11.0	11.9	13.1	14.3	2.7	1.5	
9. The appropriateness of lecture, discussion, term papers, types and frequency of tests for courses or for the school as a whole.	41.4	34.8	16.2	16.7	17.1	19.8	8.0	5.2	
10. The appropriate number of hours or homework to be expected of students in various programs.	54.1	43.8	10.9	12.3	14.1	17.6	5.0	3.7	
11. The appropriate grading curve; the percentage of students to be passed, failed, etc.	40.9	38.2	6.5	7.6	17.2	20.8	11.6	7.0	
12. The departmental budget.	2.8	3.4	4.2	6.4	16.5	21.7	16.2	13.4	
13. What courses are to be taught.	0.6	0.9	1.3	3.3	13.4	16.8	15.5	11.9	
14. Whether a teacher needs to "tone down" her statements in the classroom.	2.1	2.6	0.4	1.8	8.1	12.7	49.7	42.3	
SUBTOTAL OF DIFFERENCES	43.3		20.0		36.9		45.9		

TYPE OF DECISION	5 Superintendent		6 School Boards		7 State Department of Education		Total Difference Does-Should
	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should	
I. Items in the Centralization of Professional Decision-Making (cont)							
1. Selection of required textbooks.	10.2	4.2	13.5	5.2	0.9	1.0	19.9
2. Selection of supplementary reading materials.	5.0	2.1	3.6	1.6	0.2	0.2	9.6
3. Determining if faculty should have tenure.	29.2	26.8	33.5	21.9	8.0	8.2	21.1
4. Giving permission to outside groups to speak to students.	17.8	16.8	9.1	0.7	0.1	0.2	24.2
5. Formulating instructional policy.	32.3	28.0	14.3	9.0	1.2	1.8	21.7
6. Establishing the essential minimum knowledge that students taking a particular course should derive in the course.	3.9	2.7	1.7	0.7	3.1	4.3	13.5
7. Determining what concepts and values are to be taught in a particular course.	3.4	2.2	1.7	0.9	1.7	2.2	9.5
8. The appropriate method for teaching particular courses.	1.9	1.1	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.6	11.8
9. The appropriateness of lecture, discussion, term papers, types and frequency of tests for courses or for the school as a whole.	2.8	1.5	0.9	0.7	0.1	0.2	14.2
10. The appropriate number of hours or homework to be expected of students in various programs.	2.4	1.3	1.1	0.6	0.2	0.3	18.2
11. The appropriate grading curve; the percentage of students to be passed, failed, etc.	7.6	3.7	2.2	1.0	0.3	0.2	17.2
12. The departmental budget.	25.0	18.6	16.5	11.3	0.3	0.4	22.5
13. What courses are to be taught.	27.5	23.7	18.7	13.1	7.0	7.3	19.0
14. Whether a teacher needs to "tone down" her statements in the classroom.	13.9	10.3	7.4	5.0	0.1	0.1	19.9
<b>SUBTOTAL OF DIFFERENCES</b>	<b>39.9</b>		<b>52.8</b>		<b>3.5</b>		<b>242.3</b>

Appendix 1D

ITEMS IN THE CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING INDEX  
LEVELS OF AUTHORITY AT WHICH SELECTED TYPES OF DECISIONS ARE MADE  
AND LEVELS AT WHICH RESPONDENT(S) BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE MADE

TYPE OF TENSION	PERCENT INDICATING FINAL AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR VETO (n = 1508)							
	1 Individual Teacher Involved		2 Teaching Faculty		3 Principal With Teachers		4 Principal	
	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should
II. Non-Professional Decision-Making Index								
1. Determining the required courses.	1.1	1.2	1.9	3.8	12.9	16.5	8.7	6.6
2. Adding or dropping courses.	0.7	1.4	2.3	4.4	19.3	27.0	23.6	17.4
3. Adding or dropping a program of courses.	0.3	0.5	1.9	3.3	13.5	20.6	13.9	10.8
4. Hiring new teachers.	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	1.0	5.4	9.0
5. Determining whether faculty members should be promoted to a higher position of authority.	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.7	2.7	15.0	18.8
6. Deciding whether to renew a teacher's contract.	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.7	12.9	15.1
7. Promoting a teacher to department head or other supervisory position.	0.3	0.5	0.2	1.0	1.1	4.4	25.1	25.6
8. Deciding on the proper procedure of handling a student discipline problem.	10.0	10.7	0.7	1.4	19.3	20.6	54.4	41.2
9. A teacher's competence to teach.	0.5	0.5	0.3	1.9	3.3	7.1	43.2	39.2
10. Whether a controversial textbook should be used.	1.6	2.9	2.3	4.5	9.8	17.1	6.5	4.5
SUBTOTAL OF DIFFERENCES	3.3		11.7		38.3		40.7	

**TYPE OF TENSION**

	5 Superintendent		6 School Boards		7 State Department of Education		Total Difference Does-Should
	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should	
<b>II. Non-Professional Decision-Making Index (cont)</b>							
1. Determining the required courses.	16.5	13.9	14.3	9.4	30.8	28.1	17.9
2. Adding or dropping courses.	20.6	16.8	16.3	10.5	1.2	1.5	26.6
3. Adding or dropping a program of courses.	25.6	22.6	23.2	16.3	2.9	2.3	22.3
4. Hiring new teachers.	53.6	47.9	32.5	23.3	0.1	0.3	19.7
5. Determining whether faculty members should be promoted to a higher position of authority.	44.5	40.8	24.2	14.5	0.3	0.6	20.3
6. Deciding whether to renew a teacher's contract.	41.3	39.0	34.2	23.8	0.3	0.4	16.5
7. Promoting a teacher to department head or other supervisory position.	38.4	34.0	18.2	11.1	0.2	0.3	16.4
8. Deciding on the proper procedure of handling a student discipline problem.	4.3	2.9	2.7	1.6	0.0	0.0	15.4
9. A teacher's competence to teach.	23.3	19.1	8.2	3.5	5.6	4.8	19.1
10. Whether a controversial textbook should be used.	20.7	18.1	35.9	25.5	1.5	1.7	26.0
<b>SUBTOTAL OF DIFFERENCES</b>	<b>33.7</b>		<b>70.2</b>		<b>5.3</b>		<b>203.2</b>

Appendix 1D

ITEMS IN THE CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING INDEX  
LEVELS OF AUTHORITY AT WHICH SELECTED TYPES OF DECISIONS ARE MADE  
AND LEVELS AT WHICH RESPONDENT(S) BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE MADE

TYPE OF DECISION	PERCENT INDICATING FINAL AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR VETO (n = 1508)								
	1 Individual Teacher Involved		2 Teaching Faculty		3 Principal With Teachers		4 Principal		
	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should	
III. Items Not Included in Indices									
1. Dismissing present teachers.	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.1	1.3	7.4	9.7	
2. Ruling on teachers' grievances.	0.2	0.3	2.5	4.1	5.2	10.7	19.7	16.0	
3. Allowing outside groups to use school property.	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.9	11.9	12.1	
4. Who is to be assigned to teach each course.	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.9	6.0	12.0	59.8	48.3	
5. Who is qualified to teach each course.	0.3	1.1	0.3	1.1	3.5	8.0	36.2	29.8	
6. Whether or not a community needs a special school for the mentally gifted.	0.1	0.1	0.6	1.7	0.9	2.7	1.1	1.1	
7. The proportion of tax money to be allocated to slum schools within the city.	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	
8. Whether a controversial teacher should be re-hired.	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.9	0.9	3.5	5.8	7.3	
SUBTOTAL OF DIFFERENCES	1.6		5.6		22.1		25.7		
GRAND TOTAL	48.2		37.3		97.3		112.3		

TYPE OF DECISION	5 Superintendent		6 School Boards		7 State Department of Education		Total Difference Does-Should
	Does	Should	Does	Should	Does	Should	
III. Items Not Included in Indices (cont)							
1. Dismissing present teachers.	42.1	38.5	39.5	29.2	0.2	0.7	18.5
2. Ruling on teachers' grievances.	30.2	27.1	22.7	17.4	0.7	1.3	20.9
3. Allowing outside groups to use school property.	29.2	26.6	45.5	38.9	0.4	0.7	10.3
4. Who is to be assigned to teach each course.	18.6	14.8	2.8	2.3	0.5	0.3	23.0
5. Who is qualified to teach each course.	29.8	24.1	4.2	2.6	13.1	12.3	20.6
6. Whether or not a community needs a special school for the mentally gifted.	13.9	13.5	51.5	41.5	7.4	8.7	14.6
7. The proportion of tax money to be allocated to slum schools within the city.	6.7	7.6	48.8	44.8	10.1	10.2	5.2
8. Whether a controversial teacher should be re-hired.	30.9	28.6	45.8	35.3	0.9	0.9	17.9
SUBTOTAL OF DIFFERENCES	23.4		48.8		3.8		131.0
GRAND TOTAL	97.0		171.8		12.6		576.5

Appendix 1E

COMPLEXITY QUASI-SCALE  
QUESTIONS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GUTTMAN SCALE

I. QUESTIONS ASKED OF PRINCIPALS

CODE

- |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                      |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1.  | Suppose that a teacher would like to see a major change in his curriculum area. He goes to see the person immediately above him in the hierarchy; he sends the teacher to see the person above him, etc. What is the <u>maximum</u> number of such "levels of authority" (i.e., people above the teacher), that he might have to go through before he reaches the superintendent's office? | Enter actual number  |
| 2.  | How many weeks do you estimate that it might take before the teacher would learn whether or not his idea about the curriculum change has been accepted?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Enter actual number  |
| 3.  | Total number of staff in school system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Enter actual number  |
| 4.  | Total number of staff in your school (including teachers, administrators, and non-teaching professional staff, such as school nurse).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Enter actual number  |
| 5.  | Total number of full time teachers (include only personnel actually assigned to teaching duties).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Enter actual number  |
| 6.  | Total number of part time teachers (include only personnel actually assigned to teaching duties).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Enter actual number  |
| 7.  | Total number of administrators in school system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Enter actual percent |
| 8.  | Total number of full time "line" administrators (i.e., those who have the principal supervisory responsibilities).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Enter actual percent |
| 9.  | Total number of full time professional "staff" personnel engaged in non-teaching professional duties (such as school nurse, attendance officer, vocational guidance director, and finance officer) and not included above as an administrator.                                                                                                                                             | Enter actual percent |
| 10. | Total number of full time office, clerical personnel assigned to the school.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Enter actual percent |
| 11. | Total number of classes in which there is homogeneous ability grouping.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Enter actual number  |
| 12. | Total number of separate vocational training programs (e.g., clerical, industrial, sales, etc.) -- i.e., for which <u>separate</u> departments are responsible.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Enter actual number  |

QUESTIONS ASKED OF PRINCIPALS (CONT)

CODE

13. Total number of part time teachers advising extracurricular activities. Enter actual percent
14. Total number of separate courses offered each year. Enter actual number
15. Please estimate as accurately as possible the number of "separate levels of authority" (sometimes referred to as the "chain of command" or line of responsibility) in your school. Enter actual number
16. Please estimate as accurately as possible the number of "separate levels of authority" (sometimes referred to as the "chain of command" or line of responsibility) in your school system. Enter actual total

II. QUESTIONS ASKED OF TEACHERS

17. Suppose that a teacher would like to see a major change in his curriculum area. He goes to see the person immediately above him in the hierarchy; he sends the teacher to see the person above him, etc. What is the maximum number of such "levels of authority" (i.e., people above the teacher), that he might have to go through before he reaches the superintendent's office? Enter actual number

Coefficient of Reproducibility = .85  
Minimal Marginal Reproducibility = .65

This Quasi-scale was ranked according to the Cornell Technique using 28 high schools and 17 variables. Respondent scale ranks were used in analyses with this particular scale.

Appendix 1F

SUPERVISION QUASI-SCALE:  
QUESTIONS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GUTTMAN SCALE

I. QUESTIONS ASKED PRINCIPALS

1.	<p>What percentage of your teaching faculty do you observe each month?</p> <p>a. On the average, what is the length of time of a visitation?</p>	<p><u>Length</u> 40-60 minutes 20-40 minutes 10-20 minutes Less than 10 Does not observe</p>	<p><u>Code</u> 0 1 2 3 4</p>
2.	<p>Check the items that describe the type of follow-up experience that you provide after a visitation.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> an evaluation report is filed in the superintendent's office</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> a conference is conducted with the teacher shortly after the visitation</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> no conference is held unless major difficulties are observed</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> a conference is held only when a teacher requests it</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> no follow-up experience is provided</p>	<p><u>Response</u> Report filed Conference Conference only with difficulty Conference only at teacher's request No follow-up experience</p>	<p><u>Code</u> 1 2 3 4 5</p>
3.	<p>Now, check the items that describe how you <u>do</u> conduct supervision.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I <u>do</u> spend most of my time in the office operating the school</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Someone other than the principal in the school system <u>does</u> supervise teachers</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> I <u>am</u> careful not to neglect teacher supervision</p>	<p><u>Response</u> Most of the time in the office Someone else supervises Principal does not neglect supervision</p>	<p><u>Code</u> 1 2 3</p>
4.	<p>Now, check the items that describe how you ordinarily <u>do</u> conduct supervision.</p> <p>I <u>am</u> careful to observe that teachers do not violate the principles of learning in their classrooms.</p>	<p><u>Response</u> Not checked Checked yes</p>	<p><u>Code</u> 1 2</p>
5.	<p>I <u>do not</u> offer specific advise to a teacher on how to conduct the classroom unless requested by him to do so.</p>	<p><u>Response</u> Checked yes Not checked</p>	<p><u>Code</u> 1 2</p>
6.	<p>Are teachers required to get permission from you to discuss in class controversial topics such as politics, sex education, civil rights, etc?</p>	<p><u>Response</u> No Yes</p>	<p><u>Code</u> 1 2</p>

**SUPERVISION QUASI-SCALE (CONT)**

7.	How frequently does the superintendent visit your school?	<u>Response</u> Rarely Occassionally Often Very frequently	<u>Code</u> 1 2 3 4
8.	In general, would you say that your school is "closely supervised" (in comparison to most schools with which you are familiar)?	<u>Response</u> No Yes	<u>Code</u> 1 2
9.	How many separate reports are you required to file with the superintendent's office? (enter number) <u>    </u> daily <u>    </u> weekly <u>    </u> monthly <u>    </u> annually	<u>Response</u> None 1-2 Annually 3-5 Annually 6-10 Annually 1-2 Monthly 3-4 Monthly 1 or more weekly or 1 or more daily	<u>Code</u> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10.	What percentage of your teaching faculty do you observe each month?	<u>Percent</u> 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-79 80 and above	<u>Code</u> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**II. QUESTIONS ASKED TEACHERS**

11.	Do you think that, generally, the administration's evaluations of you have been essentially <u>accurate</u> and <u>fair</u> ?	<u>Percent of Respondents Who Said No</u> 0-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 13-18	<u>Code</u> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12.	How many times a year are you evaluated by the superintendent?	<u>Mean Response</u> 0-9	<u>Code</u> Enter Actual Number
13.	How many times a year are you evaluated by the principal?	<u>Mean Response</u> 0-9	<u>Code</u> Enter Actual Number

**SUPERVISION QUASI-SCALE (CONT)**

14. How many times a year are you evaluated  
by Department head?

Mean Response  
0-9

Code  
Enter  
Actual  
Number

Coefficient of Reproducibility = .85  
Minimal Marginal Reproducibility = .71

This Quasi-scale was ranked according to the Cornell Technique using 28 high schools and 14 variables. Respondent scale ranks were used in analyses with this particular scale.

Appendix 1G

STANDARDIZATION INDEX:  
QUESTIONS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GUTTMAN SCALE

I. QUESTIONS ASKED OF PRINCIPAL

1.	Check the item that describes your school's policy concerning teachers' lesson plans: (Check only once except where otherwise indicated). 1. Teachers have the choice whether or not to make lesson plans.	<u>Response</u> No Yes	<u>Code</u> 1 2
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If the response to Item No. 1 in No, the respondent was asked to check one of the following:

Check the item that describes your school's policy concerning teachers' lesson plans: (Check only once except where otherwise indicated).

2.	Lesson plans are expected but there is no provision for reviewing them.* (See 3a): Teachers are required to make lesson plans covering (a) each day's work (b) each week's work (c) each unit's work (d) the period covered by the lesson plan is optional	<u>Response</u>  (d) (c) (b) (a)	<u>Code</u> 1 (expected only) 2 (yes optional) 3 (yes unit) 4 (yes week) 5 (yes day)
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If the response to Item No. 1 is No and No. 2 does not apply, the respondent was asked to check one of the following:

Check the item that describes your school's policy concerning teachers' lesson plans: (check only once except where otherwise indicated).

3.	Lesson plans are required and filed with the principal's office.* (Sec 3a). Teachers are required to make lesson plans covering (a) each day's work (b) each week's work (c) each unit's work (d) the period covered by the lesson plan is optional	<u>Response</u>  (d) (c) (b) (a)	<u>Code</u> 1 (required only) 2 (yes optional) 3 (yes unit) 4 (yes week) 5 (yes day)
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**STANDARDIZATION INDEX (CONT)**

If the response to Item No. 1 is No and Number 2 and 3 does not apply, the respondent was asked to check one of the following:

Check the item that describes your school's policy concerning teachers' lesson plans: (Check only once except where otherwise indicated).

4.	Lesson plans are required and conferences are held with teachers concerning them:	<u>Response</u>	<u>Code</u>
	a. conferences are held very frequently		1 (required but no conference)
	b. conferences are held frequently	(c)	2 (occasionally)
	c. conferences are held occasionally	(b)	3 (frequently)
		(a)	4 (very frequently)

Answer either Number 5 or 6:

5	Check the item that describes your school's policy concerning textbooks. A teacher is responsible to see that the content in textbook is completed in the course of a year.	<u>Response</u>	<u>Code</u>
		No	1
		Yes	2

6	Check the item that describes your school's policy concerning textbooks. Textbooks can be used as references or as guidelines for teachers rather than as material to be covered.	<u>Response</u>	<u>Code</u>
		No	1
		Yes	2

7	Is there a handbook or written description of your job? How specific is it?	<u>Response</u>	<u>Code</u>
		No	1
		Yes, very general	2
		Yes, general	3
		Yes, specific	4
		Yes, very specific	5

8	Are you bothered by rules and regulations (or "red tape")?	<u>Response</u>	<u>Code</u>
		No	1
		Yes	2

**STANDARDIZATION INDEX (CONT)**

9.	What is the average class size in the English program?	<u>Number</u> 20-24	<u>Coded</u> 1 (very small)
		25	2 (small)
		26-28	3 (medium)
		29-30	4 (large)
		31-32	5 (very large)

**II. QUESTIONS ASKED TEACHERS**

10.	Is there a standard lesson plan or curriculum guide for your principal course on file with the administration, which prescribes the course material to be covered and/or the preferred classroom procedures?	<u>Mean Response</u> Teacher prepared- no	<u>Code</u> 1
		Teacher prepared- no to yes	2
		Teacher prepared not followed	3
		Teacher prepared seldom followed	4
		Teacher prepared seldom to occa- sionally followed	5

11.	If the answer to question 10 is yes, did <u>you</u> prepare the plan or guide?	<u>Percent who</u> <u>respond no</u>	<u>Code</u>
		0-15	1
		16-22	2
		23-29	3
		30-36	4
		37-43	5
		44-50	6
		51-72	7

12.	Did you prepare the plan or guide?	<u>Percent who</u> <u>respond yes</u>	<u>Code</u>
		9-14	1
		15-19	2
		20-24	3
		25-29	4
		30-34	5
		35-39	6
		40-49	7

**STANDARDIZATION SCALE (CONT)**

13.	If the answer to question 10 is yes, how frequently do you actually follow it closely?	Percent who respond frequently or very frequently	Code
		0-2	1
		3-5	2
		6-8	3
		9-11	4
		12-14	5
		15-17	6
		18-26	7

Answer either 14 or 15:

14.	How would you describe your authority over the tests which you administer examining the students over the content of their course work? Tests are given entirely at the teacher's option.	Percent who respond "yes"	Code
		1-15	1
		16-25	2
		26-35	3
		36-45	4
		46-55	5
		56-65	6
		66-100	7
		0	0

15.	How would you describe your authority over the tests which you administer examining the students over the content of their course work? Tests are required, but they are designed by the individual classroom teacher.	Percent who respond "yes"	Code
		1-15	1
		16-25	2
		26-35	3
		36-45	4
		46-55	5
		56-100	6
		0	0

Coefficient of Reproducibility = .84  
Minimal Marginal Reproducibility = .74

This Quasi-scale was ranked according to the Cornell Technique using 21 high schools and 15 variables. Respondent scores, rather than scale ranks, were used in analysis with this particular index.

Code Number \_\_\_\_\_

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## PART III.

## THE WAY YOU SEE IT

Below is a list of incidents which have occurred in different schools throughout the country. We are interested in getting your reactions to these situations. There is no right or wrong answer. Just imagine yourself in each situation. Indicate (1) what you would do in each of these situations and (2) what is likely to happen when such a situation arises at your school.

1. The assistant principal told a teacher that he was too "outspoken" in criticizing certain policies of the school and that this was causing unrest among faculty members. The teacher continued to be critical of certain administrative policies.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the administration
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the administration
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the assistant principal to make such a demand?  No  Yes

2. A mathematics teacher was told by the principal that he was not presenting his subject in the most effective way, and that he should revise his course content and the methods of teaching it. He refused to change his practices on the grounds that his professional society had recommended his procedures.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

(To Be Continued On Next Page)

## (Question 2 Continued)

B. What do you anticipate will happen if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the principal
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the principal
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the principal to make such a demand?      No      Yes

3. The principal requested a teacher not to invite a well-known author to speak to his class because of the speaker's alleged "socialistic leanings." The teacher felt the allegations were unfounded, and that his students would benefit by hearing what he had to say. He proceeded to invite the speaker.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the principal
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the principal
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the principal to make such a demand?      No      Yes

4. The school board rules explicitly stated that teachers should not participate in the local school board elections. One teacher made a public statement that one of the present board members was a professional politician, and otherwise actively engaged in the campaign. He was told to desist.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

(To Be Continued on Next Page)

## (Question 4 Continued)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the school board
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the school board
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the school board to make such a demand?  No  Yes

5. A principal occasionally changed the grade given by one of his teachers if a student's complaint to him seemed to justify a higher grade. One teacher protested and was told by the principal that he had the final authority over whatever happened in his school, and asked her to understand.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the principal
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the principal
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the principal to make such a demand?  No  Yes

6. The administration requested teachers not to use a standard textbook in American Government because it was "socialistically" inclined. A history teacher felt that the book was the best available and proceeded to submit an order for it.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the administration
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the administration
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the administration to make such a demand?  No  Yes

7. The administration changed a course of study which included philosophy and music appreciation to one which was based strictly on the sciences and mathematics. A committee of teachers went to see the principal and voiced disapproval; they were told that the administration was in a better position to make the decision due to the complexity of the issue. One teacher complained to the school board.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the administration
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the administration
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from school system

(To Be Continued on Next Page)

## (Question 7 Continued)

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the administration to make such a demand?           No           Yes

8. A chemistry teacher took an active stand in favor of water fluoridation in a community that was divided on the issue. The superintendent requested him to avoid becoming further involved in the issue. He refused.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the superintendent
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the superintendent
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the superintendent to make such a demand?           No           Yes

10. The administration issued a directive that teachers should help to improve parent-teacher relations. A parent-teacher committee was established to select textbooks. One math teacher refused to participate, stating that the parents of such a committee are not qualified to select textbooks.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

(To Be Continued on Next Page)

## (Question 10 Continued)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the administration
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the administration
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the administration to make such a demand?       No       Yes

11. One school system did not permit students to read several American literature classics by Faulkner, Hemingway, Steinbeck, and others. One teacher actively sought to have the policy repealed by soliciting the support of certain influential citizens in the community. The principal asked her to desist her campaign against the policy because she was stirring up trouble for the school. She refused saying that her action had the support of the National English Teacher's Association.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the principal
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the principal
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the principal to make such a demand?       No       Yes

12. In one school, male teachers received preference in promotions. A group of women teachers at the school complained to the school board. They were told that the situation would be changed, but it was not. One female teacher who was passed over for a promotion wrote a letter to the NEA and State Department of Education. The principal ordered her to stop stirring up trouble.

A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

(To Be Continued on Next Page)

(Question 12 Continued)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with request
- 6. Quit the job

B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the principal
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the principal
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

C. Do you think it was right and reasonable for the principal to make such a demand?      No      Yes